Agency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.
Corporate governance issues in family and non-family owned firms: an empirical analysis of CEO compensation, executive turnover, and earnings management / Macciocchi, Daniele. - (2014 Jun 10).
Corporate governance issues in family and non-family owned firms: an empirical analysis of CEO compensation, executive turnover, and earnings management
MACCIOCCHI, DANIELE
2014
Abstract
Agency conflicts, family ownership, and CEO pay for performance sensitivity. Executive turnover and familial relations: family controlled firms and family CEOs in Italy. Family ownership, earnings management, and CEO turnover.
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