Three aspects of the life of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) after delegation are examined: their independence from elected ofcials, their relationship with regulatees; their decision-making processes. The article suggests that IRAs enjoy considerable insulation from elected politicians in terms of party politicization and tenure. The evidence for relations between IRAs and business regulatees is more mixed: the two have been relatively separate in terms of the professional origins and destinations of senior IRA staff and, in some countries, there has been considerable legal con ict between them. However, in an important and visible eld such as merger control, IRAs have undertaken little activity. The greatest changes introduced by IRAs have been in decision-making processes, which they have opened up, in contrast to closed processes before delegation.

Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe / Thatcher, Mark. - In: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY. - ISSN 1466-4429. - 9:6(2002), pp. 954-972. [10.1080/1350176022000046445]

Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe

Mark Thatcher
2002

Abstract

Three aspects of the life of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) after delegation are examined: their independence from elected ofcials, their relationship with regulatees; their decision-making processes. The article suggests that IRAs enjoy considerable insulation from elected politicians in terms of party politicization and tenure. The evidence for relations between IRAs and business regulatees is more mixed: the two have been relatively separate in terms of the professional origins and destinations of senior IRA staff and, in some countries, there has been considerable legal con ict between them. However, in an important and visible eld such as merger control, IRAs have undertaken little activity. The greatest changes introduced by IRAs have been in decision-making processes, which they have opened up, in contrast to closed processes before delegation.
2002
Independent regulatory agencies; capture; delegation; political control; legitimacy; regulation.
Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe / Thatcher, Mark. - In: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY. - ISSN 1466-4429. - 9:6(2002), pp. 954-972. [10.1080/1350176022000046445]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/182983
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