We consider nonatomic routing games with one source and one destination connected by multiple parallel edges. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we prove that under suitable conditions on the costs the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case, and that these counterexamples already occur in simple networks with only 2 parallel links.

Price of Anarchy for Highly Congested Routing Games in Parallel Networks / Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo; Cominetti, Roberto; Scarsini, Marco. - In: THEORY OF COMPUTING SYSTEMS. - ISSN 1432-4350. - 63:1(2019), pp. 90-113. [10.1007/s00224-017-9834-1]

Price of Anarchy for Highly Congested Routing Games in Parallel Networks

Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo;Cominetti, Roberto;Scarsini, Marco
2019

Abstract

We consider nonatomic routing games with one source and one destination connected by multiple parallel edges. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we prove that under suitable conditions on the costs the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case, and that these counterexamples already occur in simple networks with only 2 parallel links.
Nonatomic routing games, Price of Anarchy, Regularly varying functions, Wardrop equilibrium, Parallel networks, High congestion
Price of Anarchy for Highly Congested Routing Games in Parallel Networks / Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo; Cominetti, Roberto; Scarsini, Marco. - In: THEORY OF COMPUTING SYSTEMS. - ISSN 1432-4350. - 63:1(2019), pp. 90-113. [10.1007/s00224-017-9834-1]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/177265
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