Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines correctness con- ditions for rule-following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correct- ness conditions sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea (cf. P.I. §§198, 199) that a rule is followed insofar as a convention is in place. In particular, I consider the game-theoretic definition of convention offered by David Lewis and I show that it illuminates essential aspects of the communitarian understanding of rule-following.

Rule-following as Coordination / Sillari, Giacomo. - In: SYNTHESE. - ISSN 0039-7857. - 190:5(2013), pp. 871-890. [10.1007/s11229-012-0190-z]

Rule-following as Coordination

SILLARI, GIACOMO
2013

Abstract

Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines correctness con- ditions for rule-following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correct- ness conditions sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea (cf. P.I. §§198, 199) that a rule is followed insofar as a convention is in place. In particular, I consider the game-theoretic definition of convention offered by David Lewis and I show that it illuminates essential aspects of the communitarian understanding of rule-following.
Rule-following as Coordination / Sillari, Giacomo. - In: SYNTHESE. - ISSN 0039-7857. - 190:5(2013), pp. 871-890. [10.1007/s11229-012-0190-z]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/78279
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