Some feared that judicialization in the World Trade Organization (WTO) would decrease WTO members' propensity to support multilateral trade liberalization. Yet, in 2001 WTO members launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, fervently supported by the European Union (EU) despite the influence of domestic protectionist forces. This contribution offers an explanation of why judicialization elicited increased convergence of policy preferences between a liberalizing agent (Commission) and multiple principals (economic interests). I identify three judicialization-led rationales for this: the empowerment of exporters relative to protectionist forces; the enhanced attractiveness of the WTO as an institutional location for international regulatory standards; and the strengthening of incentives to engage positively in negotiations to offset the likely costs of adverse panel rulings. I show the plausibility of this argument through an empirical analysis of EU politics in three negotiation areas in the Doha Round: services; agriculture; and the ‘Singapore issues’.

WTO judicialization and preference convergence in EU trade policy: making the agent's life easier / Poletti, Arlo. - In: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY. - ISSN 1350-1763. - 18:3(2011), pp. 361-382. [10.1080/13501763.2011.551071]

WTO judicialization and preference convergence in EU trade policy: making the agent's life easier

POLETTI, ARLO
2011

Abstract

Some feared that judicialization in the World Trade Organization (WTO) would decrease WTO members' propensity to support multilateral trade liberalization. Yet, in 2001 WTO members launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, fervently supported by the European Union (EU) despite the influence of domestic protectionist forces. This contribution offers an explanation of why judicialization elicited increased convergence of policy preferences between a liberalizing agent (Commission) and multiple principals (economic interests). I identify three judicialization-led rationales for this: the empowerment of exporters relative to protectionist forces; the enhanced attractiveness of the WTO as an institutional location for international regulatory standards; and the strengthening of incentives to engage positively in negotiations to offset the likely costs of adverse panel rulings. I show the plausibility of this argument through an empirical analysis of EU politics in three negotiation areas in the Doha Round: services; agriculture; and the ‘Singapore issues’.
WTO judicialization and preference convergence in EU trade policy: making the agent's life easier / Poletti, Arlo. - In: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY. - ISSN 1350-1763. - 18:3(2011), pp. 361-382. [10.1080/13501763.2011.551071]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/66257
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