This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versuscommon knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random match-ing. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learningphasecommontoalltreatments,wevarytheknowledgelevelsassociatedwithexternaladvice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized asfollows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and thepercentageofefficientequilibriumplayarehigherwithrespecttothecontroltreatment,revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficientto significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to theabsence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledgeof level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequentlythan common knowledge

You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment / Devetag, MARIA GIOVANNA; Hosni, Hykel; Sillari, Giacomo. - In: SYNTHESE. - ISSN 0039-7857. - 190:8(2013), pp. 1351-1381. [10.1007/s11229-012-0177-9]

You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment

DEVETAG, MARIA GIOVANNA;SILLARI, GIACOMO
2013

Abstract

This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versuscommon knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random match-ing. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learningphasecommontoalltreatments,wevarytheknowledgelevelsassociatedwithexternaladvice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized asfollows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and thepercentageofefficientequilibriumplayarehigherwithrespecttothecontroltreatment,revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficientto significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to theabsence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledgeof level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequentlythan common knowledge
You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment / Devetag, MARIA GIOVANNA; Hosni, Hykel; Sillari, Giacomo. - In: SYNTHESE. - ISSN 0039-7857. - 190:8(2013), pp. 1351-1381. [10.1007/s11229-012-0177-9]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/60003
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