Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.

Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules / Rodica, Branzei; Dall'Aglio, Marco; Stef H., Tijs. - 2008-97:(2008).

Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules

DALL'AGLIO, MARCO;
2008

Abstract

Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.
cooperative games, interval data, bankruptcy problems.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/56257
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