In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
Briata, Federica; Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito. (2012). Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure. ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE. OECONOMICA, CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW, (ISSN: 1802-4696), 6:3, 199-208.
Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure
DALL'AGLIO, MARCO;
2012
Abstract
In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
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