In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure / Briata, Federica; Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito. - In: ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE. OECONOMICA, CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 1802-4696. - 6:3(2012), pp. 199-208.

Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure

DALL'AGLIO, MARCO;
2012

Abstract

In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
Fairness; Knaster’s procedure; complete risk aversion; dynamic coalition formation
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
DynamicCollusion.pdf

Open Access

Descrizione: Articolo Post-Print
Tipologia: Documento in Post-print
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 113.94 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
113.94 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/50656
Citazioni
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact