In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure / Briata, Federica; Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito. - In: ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE. OECONOMICA, CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 1802-4696. - 6:3(2012), pp. 199-208.
Titolo: | Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2012 | |
Rivista: | ||
Citazione: | Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure / Briata, Federica; Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito. - In: ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE. OECONOMICA, CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 1802-4696. - 6:3(2012), pp. 199-208. | |
Abstract: | In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents. | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11385/50656 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01.1 - Articolo su rivista (Article) |
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