We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. These bounds are based on the convexity properties of the range of utility vectors associated to all possible divisions of the good. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.
Titolo: | Computing Values for Games of CooperativeFair Division |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2012 |
Abstract: | We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. These bounds are based on the convexity properties of the range of utility vectors associated to all possible divisions of the good. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11385/49655 |
ISBN: | 9788846730459 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 02.1 - Capitolo o saggio su monografia (Monograph’s Chapter/Essay) |
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