This paper builds on agency and institutional theory to extend the analysis of the effects of ownership and control on R&D investments by considering the influence of different types of ownership and of institutional corporate governance systems. Our empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset of 1000 firms publicly-traded in six European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK). Controlling for industry- and firm-level effects, our findings show that higher shareholding by families is negatively associated with R&D investment. Moreover, widely-held firms invest less in R&D in the United Kingdom than in Continental European countries, thus suggesting the existence of a greater pressure towards the reduction of R&D in market-based governance systems. The results are robust against possible sample selection biases due to firms’ discretional R&D disclosure.
The Effects of Owner identity and External Governance Systems on R&D Investments: A Study of Western European Firms / F., Munari; Oriani, Raffaele; M., Sobrero. - In: RESEARCH POLICY. - ISSN 0048-7333. - 39:8(2010), pp. 1093-1104.
Titolo: | The Effects of Owner identity and External Governance Systems on R&D Investments: A Study of Western European Firms | |
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Data di pubblicazione: | 2010 | |
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Citazione: | The Effects of Owner identity and External Governance Systems on R&D Investments: A Study of Western European Firms / F., Munari; Oriani, Raffaele; M., Sobrero. - In: RESEARCH POLICY. - ISSN 0048-7333. - 39:8(2010), pp. 1093-1104. | |
Abstract: | This paper builds on agency and institutional theory to extend the analysis of the effects of ownership and control on R&D investments by considering the influence of different types of ownership and of institutional corporate governance systems. Our empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset of 1000 firms publicly-traded in six European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK). Controlling for industry- and firm-level effects, our findings show that higher shareholding by families is negatively associated with R&D investment. Moreover, widely-held firms invest less in R&D in the United Kingdom than in Continental European countries, thus suggesting the existence of a greater pressure towards the reduction of R&D in market-based governance systems. The results are robust against possible sample selection biases due to firms’ discretional R&D disclosure. | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11385/3275 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01.1 - Articolo su rivista (Article) |
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