This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate bothpublic and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.

A Minority Game with Bounded Recall / J., Renault; Scarsini, Marco; T., Tomala. - In: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. - ISSN 0364-765X. - 32:(2007), pp. 873-889. [10.1287/moor.1070.0284]

A Minority Game with Bounded Recall

SCARSINI, MARCO;
2007

Abstract

This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate bothpublic and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.
A Minority Game with Bounded Recall / J., Renault; Scarsini, Marco; T., Tomala. - In: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. - ISSN 0364-765X. - 32:(2007), pp. 873-889. [10.1287/moor.1070.0284]
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
1 - MOR2007.pdf

Solo gestori archivio

Tipologia: Documento in Post-print
Licenza: DRM non definito
Dimensione 291.15 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
291.15 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/3158
Citazioni
  • Scopus 6
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 6
social impact