The scope of the paper is to review the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometime, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, if coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Strategic Interaction and Conventions / Espinosa, M. P.; Kovarik, J.; Ponti, Giovanni. - In: REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGIA. - ISSN 0034-9712. - 70(x1):(2012), pp. 15-26. [10.3989/ris.2011.07.14]

Strategic Interaction and Conventions

PONTI, GIOVANNI
2012

Abstract

The scope of the paper is to review the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometime, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, if coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.
Behavioral Game Theory; conventions; social norms
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/27845
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