Prospect theory goes public: experimental evidence on cognitive biases in public policy and management decisions

This article tests a broad range of cognitive biases branching out from prospect theory in the context of public policy and management. Results illuminate systematic deviations from rationality. In experiments 1 through 5, the framing of outcomes influenced decisions across policy and management domains. In experiment 6, public employees were prone to an anchoring bias when setting standards for responsiveness. Experiment 7 shows that public workers tend to put more effort into activities that affect higher percentages of beneficiaries, even if the absolute number of affected clients is constant. Experiments 8 and 9 suggest that public employees are more likely to stick to a suboptimal status quo as the number of superior alternatives increases. Experiment 10 provides evidence of an asymmetric dominance effect: decisions changed when a decoy was present. This article contributes to behavioral public administration by replicating and extending previous trials.