High Frequency Trading e informazioni privilegiate: insider trading "strutturale" o lecita superiorità informativa?

This article aims to analyze the implications of algorithmic trading, specifically of High Frequency Trading (HFT), with respect to the regulation of insider trading in the United States and in the European Union, in order to verify whether the operational mechanisms of HFTs and the resulting informational benefits enjoyed by such traders may fall under the current ban on insider trading in both jurisdictions. After describing how HFTs practically gain informational advantages due to co-location and private feeds over other HFTs and the so-called slow traders, the article compares the insider trading disciplines in EU and in the US, tracing their respective evolution and the main differences between them. The conclusion is that HFTs may be considered as insider traders in EU, but not in the US. In this respect, the parity of information approach adopted in the European legislation is more likely (than the US approach) to lead to sanction the asymmetry between HFT and non-HFT traders as a form of insider trading. This, in turn, poses some questions on the real meaning and scope of disclosure obligations imposed to issuers for the benefit of financial markets integrity.