Between Manipulation and Adaptation: The Italian Intelligence and Right-Wing Subversion and Terrorism, 1966–1974

This article examines the performance of Italian intelligence services in confronting neofascist groups between 1966 and 1974. Traditional historiography has argued that the intelligence community formed a covert alliance with neofascists, shielding and even assisting their subversive and terrorist activities to counter the perceived communist threat. Drawing on previously unavailable archival sources, this study challenges that view. It finds that a “manipulation strategy” targeting right-wing organizations to combat communism was limited to 1967–1970 and did not extend to supporting terrorism or subversion. From 1971 to 1974, while military intelligence sought to adapt to the growing right-wing extremist challenge, its collection and analytical capabilities remained inadequate. As a consequence, the intelligence service consistently failed to generate effective warnings or penetrate the clandestine networks of the extreme right.