Family firms are the most prevalent organizational form worldwide, con-tributing significantly to employment, innovation, and long-term value crea-tion. Despite their dominance, they remain theoretically and empirically dis-tinctive, raising questions about how ownership concentration, socio-emo-tional wealth (SEW), and agency conflicts influence financial reporting, dis-closure, and strategic decisions. A persistent challenge in this literature concerns the definition of “family firms,” which varies across ownership thresholds, managerial involvement, and succession, complicating cross-country comparisons and empirical inter-pretation. Moreover, listed family-controlled corporations differ from private family businesses, particularly in their disclosure incentives, governance costs, and investor protection, making institutional context central to analysis. Building on agency theory and the SEW perspective, this monograph re-views research on accounting and governance in family firms, covering per-formance, earnings quality, voluntary disclosure, investment, mergers and ac-quisitions (M&A), crisis resilience, and corporate reputation. It documents consistent regularities — such as lower earnings management, distinctive dis-closure patterns, and risk-averse investment — as well as areas where findings diverge depending on institutional setting and ownership structures. The book argues that family firms offer a unique laboratory for studying incentives, trust, and the interplay between governance and financial commu-nication. It concludes by highlighting avenues for future work, especially on sustainability reporting, ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) dis-closure, and the internationalization of family-controlled businesses.
Siciliano, Gianfranco. (2025). Family Firms: Research Foundations, Challenges, and Future Directions. Giappichelli. Isbn: 979-12-211-1679-3.
Family Firms: Research Foundations, Challenges, and Future Directions
Siciliano G
2025
Abstract
Family firms are the most prevalent organizational form worldwide, con-tributing significantly to employment, innovation, and long-term value crea-tion. Despite their dominance, they remain theoretically and empirically dis-tinctive, raising questions about how ownership concentration, socio-emo-tional wealth (SEW), and agency conflicts influence financial reporting, dis-closure, and strategic decisions. A persistent challenge in this literature concerns the definition of “family firms,” which varies across ownership thresholds, managerial involvement, and succession, complicating cross-country comparisons and empirical inter-pretation. Moreover, listed family-controlled corporations differ from private family businesses, particularly in their disclosure incentives, governance costs, and investor protection, making institutional context central to analysis. Building on agency theory and the SEW perspective, this monograph re-views research on accounting and governance in family firms, covering per-formance, earnings quality, voluntary disclosure, investment, mergers and ac-quisitions (M&A), crisis resilience, and corporate reputation. It documents consistent regularities — such as lower earnings management, distinctive dis-closure patterns, and risk-averse investment — as well as areas where findings diverge depending on institutional setting and ownership structures. The book argues that family firms offer a unique laboratory for studying incentives, trust, and the interplay between governance and financial commu-nication. It concludes by highlighting avenues for future work, especially on sustainability reporting, ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) dis-closure, and the internationalization of family-controlled businesses.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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