This article examines Italy's governing coalition in 2024. The analysis first explores how the coalition functions, focusing on the relationships between party leaders and the parties that make up the majority supporting the Meloni government. It then turns to European issues, both electoral and institutional, as well as key foreign-policy orientations. Next, it considers the internal dynamics and balance of power within the centre-right alliance in the context of regional elections. Finally, it analyses how the Government's agenda - particularly regarding institutional reforms and major socio-economic policies - evolved as a result of political negotiations among centre-right forces during the Government's second year in office.

The governing coalition / Castellani, Lorenzo. - In: CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS. - ISSN 2324-8823. - 17:2(2025), pp. 164-178. [10.1080/23248823.2025.2473787]

The governing coalition

Castellani L.
2025

Abstract

This article examines Italy's governing coalition in 2024. The analysis first explores how the coalition functions, focusing on the relationships between party leaders and the parties that make up the majority supporting the Meloni government. It then turns to European issues, both electoral and institutional, as well as key foreign-policy orientations. Next, it considers the internal dynamics and balance of power within the centre-right alliance in the context of regional elections. Finally, it analyses how the Government's agenda - particularly regarding institutional reforms and major socio-economic policies - evolved as a result of political negotiations among centre-right forces during the Government's second year in office.
2025
Governing coalition, majority, Europeanization, public policy, reforms
The governing coalition / Castellani, Lorenzo. - In: CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS. - ISSN 2324-8823. - 17:2(2025), pp. 164-178. [10.1080/23248823.2025.2473787]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/250799
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