The chapter discusses the Spitzenkandidaten process in the light of the theory of parliamentary federation. In fact, the Spitzenkandidaten is a political innovation, introduced in 2014, aiming to gradually transform the EU (and its functioning) in the direction of a supranational parliamentary federation. The chapter will be organized as follows. First, it will consider the proposals on the democratization of the EU executive power, of which the Spitzenkandidaten is a variant, emerged in the Conference on the Future of Europe (Cofeu) as the latest example of the debate on the issue. Second, it will consider the institutional features of the EU executive power, showing the latter’s dual nature, as European Council and European Commission. Third, it will develop a theory of parliamentary government in federal systems, identifying the systemic conditions of its historical sustainability. Fourth, it will compare the EU decision-making structure with those systemic conditions to test whether the two are compatible. The conclusion, finally, will bring home the argument that parliamentary government in the EU constitutes a puzzle difficult to compose, also with a change of the Treaty.
The Rise and Fall of the Spitzenkandidaten? The Inner Logic of Parliamentary Federation / Fabbrini, Sergio. - (2024), pp. 63-82. [10.1007/978-3-031-48173-4_4]
The Rise and Fall of the Spitzenkandidaten? The Inner Logic of Parliamentary Federation
Fabbrini, Sergio
2024
Abstract
The chapter discusses the Spitzenkandidaten process in the light of the theory of parliamentary federation. In fact, the Spitzenkandidaten is a political innovation, introduced in 2014, aiming to gradually transform the EU (and its functioning) in the direction of a supranational parliamentary federation. The chapter will be organized as follows. First, it will consider the proposals on the democratization of the EU executive power, of which the Spitzenkandidaten is a variant, emerged in the Conference on the Future of Europe (Cofeu) as the latest example of the debate on the issue. Second, it will consider the institutional features of the EU executive power, showing the latter’s dual nature, as European Council and European Commission. Third, it will develop a theory of parliamentary government in federal systems, identifying the systemic conditions of its historical sustainability. Fourth, it will compare the EU decision-making structure with those systemic conditions to test whether the two are compatible. The conclusion, finally, will bring home the argument that parliamentary government in the EU constitutes a puzzle difficult to compose, also with a change of the Treaty.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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