What balance is struck between unity and uniformity of EU norms and national diversity in the implementation of EU legislation posing institutional obligations for Member States? The chapter aims to answer this question by drawing on the case of independent fiscal councils, whose setting up or reform has been made mandatory in the framework of the reform of the European economic governance post-crisis (in particular, see Directive EU 85/2011 and EU Regulation 473/2013). Indeed, these independent bodies, which monitor and assess the fiscal performance of the national budgetary authorities, are now in place in all Member States. A first comparative evaluation of their institutional positioning and design and their functions is presented to analyse the leeway left for national legal systems in the implementation of EU law and the control exercised by the Commission in this regard. Besides the comparison amongst selected national fiscal councils, the chapter also compares this case with that of the execution of EU norms that in the past already imposed institutional obligations amongst the Member States, such as for the creation of anti-trust and privacy authorities, to check similarities and differences, and to consider potential learning effects from the prior experience, if any. The chapter concludes by arguing that, in particular for what concerns fiscal councils, EU rules fixing institutional obligations have left a broad margin of “elaboration discretion” to EU countries in their implementation, hence showing considerable deference to national diversity.

EU norms posing institutional obligations on Member States / Fasone, Cristina. - (2024), pp. 80-99. [10.4337/9781035302956.00009]

EU norms posing institutional obligations on Member States

Fasone, Cristina
2024

Abstract

What balance is struck between unity and uniformity of EU norms and national diversity in the implementation of EU legislation posing institutional obligations for Member States? The chapter aims to answer this question by drawing on the case of independent fiscal councils, whose setting up or reform has been made mandatory in the framework of the reform of the European economic governance post-crisis (in particular, see Directive EU 85/2011 and EU Regulation 473/2013). Indeed, these independent bodies, which monitor and assess the fiscal performance of the national budgetary authorities, are now in place in all Member States. A first comparative evaluation of their institutional positioning and design and their functions is presented to analyse the leeway left for national legal systems in the implementation of EU law and the control exercised by the Commission in this regard. Besides the comparison amongst selected national fiscal councils, the chapter also compares this case with that of the execution of EU norms that in the past already imposed institutional obligations amongst the Member States, such as for the creation of anti-trust and privacy authorities, to check similarities and differences, and to consider potential learning effects from the prior experience, if any. The chapter concludes by arguing that, in particular for what concerns fiscal councils, EU rules fixing institutional obligations have left a broad margin of “elaboration discretion” to EU countries in their implementation, hence showing considerable deference to national diversity.
2024
EU norms posing institutional obligations on Member States / Fasone, Cristina. - (2024), pp. 80-99. [10.4337/9781035302956.00009]
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Fasone_Balancing Unity and Diversity.pdf

Solo gestori archivio

Tipologia: Versione dell'editore
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati
Dimensione 354.76 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
354.76 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/238058
Citazioni
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact