Les « nudges » et le droit constitutionnel: une alliance prometteuse ou risquée?

This article examines the compatibility and limits of the nudge approach in constitutional law. It explores the necessary adjustments to apply the theory of nudges at the constitutional level and the specificities of the community of constitutional actors. The article then analyzes the hidden soft incentives within the constitution, shedding light on the interactions between constitutional actors and state attempts to influence citizens’ self-determination within the framework of constitutional liberties. Finally, it addresses the validity of using nudges in constitutional law by examining issues related to state powers, constitutional rights, and their implications for democracy and the protection of fundamental rights. The article concludes that constitutional nudging can be an effective tool when used transparently and proportionally while respecting the values of solidarity and relational individualism within a democratic constitutional system. It also warns against excessive use that could reduce individuals to subjects of experimentation in the legislative laboratory.