L’elisir di lunga vita? Sfiducia costruttiva e stabilit`a dei governi in prospettiva comparata

In multiparty parliamentary democracies, government stability is key for effective governance. A considerable body of literature investigated this issue emphasising structure- and crises-related explanations. Recently, a flourishing scholarship has been focussing on institutional determinants of government stability. Among the institutional provisions examined, the constructive vote of no confidence (CVNC) is prompting remarkable scholarly interest. This article sheds light on the relationship between constructive vote of no confidence and government stability. Drawing on Lento and Hazan (2021) framework, it is hypothesised that the CVNC decreases the risk of cabinet dissolution. The research hypotheses are tested through a survival analysis based on an original multilevel dataset. The analysis confirms the impact of the CVNC in boosting government survival, yet this effect is limited to discretionary dissolutions.