What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a “sender” provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel “viscosity” dynamic programming principle, we characterize the sender’s equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.

Slow persuasion / Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig. - In: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1933-6837. - 18:1(2023), pp. 129-162. [10.3982/TE5175]

Slow persuasion

Escudé, Matteo;
2023

Abstract

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a “sender” provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel “viscosity” dynamic programming principle, we characterize the sender’s equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.
2023
Slow persuasion / Escudé, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig. - In: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1933-6837. - 18:1(2023), pp. 129-162. [10.3982/TE5175]
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Theoretical Economics - 2023 - Escud - Slow persuasion.pdf

Open Access

Tipologia: Versione dell'editore
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 292.1 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
292.1 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/226038
Citazioni
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact