The contribution, after having criticized the thesis of the existence of a democratic deficit in the European Union and having recalled the multiplicity of representative levels that it originates, dwells on the centrality of political responsibility in contemporary democracies. It then notes how, precisely as a result of the interweaving between the different representative levels, the political-electoral cycles end up being altered, giving rise to a series of arrhythmias, which make it much more complex to assert political responsibilities. Trust in democratic institutions also tends to be further undermined by some rhetorical oversimplifications (such as the interpretation of the Spitzenkandidaten as a “direct election” of the Head of Government) and internationalist practices (such as the appointment, at the top positions of the Union's institutions, of leaders who were defeated in national elections). In conclusion, it is believed that the detected arrhythmias can be mitigated by expressly recognizing, within a Euro-national parliamentary system, the multiplicity of effects that derive from each election and better coordinating the timing of the different electoral appointments.
Il contributo, dopo aver sottoposto a critica la tesi dell’esistenza di un deficit democratico nell’Unione europea e aver richiamato la molteplicità dei livelli rappresentativi che essa origina, si sofferma sulla centralità della responsabilità politica nelle democrazie contemporanee. Rileva poi come, proprio per effetto dell’intreccio tra i diversi livelli rappresentativi, i cicli politico-elettorali finiscano per essere alterati e per essere soggetti ad una serie di aritmie, che rendono assai più complesso far valere le responsabilità politica. La fiducia nelle istituzioni democratiche tende poi ad essere ulteriormente minata da alcune ipersemplificazioni retoriche (come ad esempio l’interpretazione degli Spitzenkandidaten come di un’elezione diretta del Capo del governo) e di prassi internazionalistica (come la nomina, ai vertici delle istituzioni dell’Unione, di leader usciti sconfitti nelle elezioni nazionali). In conclusione, si ritiene che le rilevate aritmie possano attenuarsi riconoscendo espressamente, nell’ambito di un sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale, la molteplicità degli effetti che discendono da ciascuna elezione e meglio coordinando le tempistiche dei diversi appuntamenti elettorali.
Elezioni e aritmie nella democrazia rappresentativa dell’Unione europea / Lupo, Nicola. - In: STUDI PARLAMENTARI E DI POLITICA COSTITUZIONALE. - ISSN 0303-9714. - 210(2022), pp. 11-31.
Elezioni e aritmie nella democrazia rappresentativa dell’Unione europea
Nicola Lupo
2022
Abstract
The contribution, after having criticized the thesis of the existence of a democratic deficit in the European Union and having recalled the multiplicity of representative levels that it originates, dwells on the centrality of political responsibility in contemporary democracies. It then notes how, precisely as a result of the interweaving between the different representative levels, the political-electoral cycles end up being altered, giving rise to a series of arrhythmias, which make it much more complex to assert political responsibilities. Trust in democratic institutions also tends to be further undermined by some rhetorical oversimplifications (such as the interpretation of the Spitzenkandidaten as a “direct election” of the Head of Government) and internationalist practices (such as the appointment, at the top positions of the Union's institutions, of leaders who were defeated in national elections). In conclusion, it is believed that the detected arrhythmias can be mitigated by expressly recognizing, within a Euro-national parliamentary system, the multiplicity of effects that derive from each election and better coordinating the timing of the different electoral appointments.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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