We investigate the possibility for an agent of manipulating her/his declarations on the evaluations of the items in order to increase her/his total utility, when the division is stated as a bargaining problem. Our analysis shows that the Nash solution has a slight advantage with respect to the egalitarian solution in terms of manipulation prevention.
On the Manipulability of the Division of Two Items Among Two Agents Using a Bargaining Approach / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito. - (2019), pp. 223-230.
On the Manipulability of the Division of Two Items Among Two Agents Using a Bargaining Approach
Marco Dall'Aglio
;
2019
Abstract
We investigate the possibility for an agent of manipulating her/his declarations on the evaluations of the items in order to increase her/his total utility, when the division is stated as a bargaining problem. Our analysis shows that the Nash solution has a slight advantage with respect to the egalitarian solution in terms of manipulation prevention.
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