We investigate the possibility for an agent of manipulating her/his declarations on the evaluations of the items in order to increase her/his total utility, when the division is stated as a bargaining problem. Our analysis shows that the Nash solution has a slight advantage with respect to the egalitarian solution in terms of manipulation prevention.

On the Manipulability of the Division of Two Items Among Two Agents Using a Bargaining Approach / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito. - (2019), pp. 223-230.

On the Manipulability of the Division of Two Items Among Two Agents Using a Bargaining Approach

Marco Dall'Aglio
;
2019

Abstract

We investigate the possibility for an agent of manipulating her/his declarations on the evaluations of the items in order to increase her/his total utility, when the division is stated as a bargaining problem. Our analysis shows that the Nash solution has a slight advantage with respect to the egalitarian solution in terms of manipulation prevention.
978-88-921-8923-2
Fair Division, Manipulation, Bargaining, Nash Solution, Egalitarian Solution
On the Manipulability of the Division of Two Items Among Two Agents Using a Bargaining Approach / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito. - (2019), pp. 223-230.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/200296
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