We compare two zero-sum versions of the so called Chinos Game, a traditional parlour game played in many countries. In one version, which we call Preemption Scenario, the first player who guesses right wins the prize. In the alternative version, called the Copycat Scenario, the last player who guesses right wins the prize. While in the Preemption Sce- nario there is a unique and fully revealing equilibrium, in the Copycat Scenario all equilib- ria have first movers pool (i.e. hide) their private information. Our experimental evidence shows, however, that in the latter case early movers do not pool but try to fool, i.e. to “lie” by systematically distorting behavior relative to equilibrium play. In fact, doing so they benefit, although the resulting gains diminish as the game proceeds. This highlights the point that, as players adjust their behavior off equilibrium, they also attempt to exploit the induced strategic uncertainty whenever the game allows for this possibility.

Pooling or fooling? An experiment on signaling / Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.; Ponti, Giovanni Benedetto; Vega-Redondo, Fernando; Yu, Haihan. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 176:(2020), pp. 582-596. [10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.012]

Pooling or fooling? An experiment on signaling

Giovanni Ponti
;
2020

Abstract

We compare two zero-sum versions of the so called Chinos Game, a traditional parlour game played in many countries. In one version, which we call Preemption Scenario, the first player who guesses right wins the prize. In the alternative version, called the Copycat Scenario, the last player who guesses right wins the prize. While in the Preemption Sce- nario there is a unique and fully revealing equilibrium, in the Copycat Scenario all equilib- ria have first movers pool (i.e. hide) their private information. Our experimental evidence shows, however, that in the latter case early movers do not pool but try to fool, i.e. to “lie” by systematically distorting behavior relative to equilibrium play. In fact, doing so they benefit, although the resulting gains diminish as the game proceeds. This highlights the point that, as players adjust their behavior off equilibrium, they also attempt to exploit the induced strategic uncertainty whenever the game allows for this possibility.
Signaling games Sequential decision-making Insider information disclosure
Pooling or fooling? An experiment on signaling / Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.; Ponti, Giovanni Benedetto; Vega-Redondo, Fernando; Yu, Haihan. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-2681. - 176:(2020), pp. 582-596. [10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.012]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/200155
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