We design a laboratory experiment aimed at eliciting participants’ preferences between two alternative algorithms stemming from two different theoretical models for resolution of conflicts in a sharing problem. We also investigate participants’ willingness to appeal to the court in case they are not satisfied by the division suggested by the computer. Results show that the two algorithms, “Nash” and “Egalitarian”, seems to be equally preferred by our participants. However, when we consider their gender, we find that women are more likely to prefer the “Nash” allocation while men prefer the “Egalitarian” one. Nevertheless, participants mostly accept the division proposed by the computer even when the preferred algorithm is not implemented: only 5% of the cases are brought to court. Lastly, we find that preferences between division rules are stable and persistent throughout repetitions of the game: participants show a clear individual preference for one of the two type of division.

Algorithms in conflict resolution: A lab experiment / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Di Cagno, Daniela Teresa; Marazzi, Francesca. - (2019), pp. 273-296.

Algorithms in conflict resolution: A lab experiment

Marco Dall’Aglio
;
Daniela Di Cagno;Francesca Marazzi
2019

Abstract

We design a laboratory experiment aimed at eliciting participants’ preferences between two alternative algorithms stemming from two different theoretical models for resolution of conflicts in a sharing problem. We also investigate participants’ willingness to appeal to the court in case they are not satisfied by the division suggested by the computer. Results show that the two algorithms, “Nash” and “Egalitarian”, seems to be equally preferred by our participants. However, when we consider their gender, we find that women are more likely to prefer the “Nash” allocation while men prefer the “Egalitarian” one. Nevertheless, participants mostly accept the division proposed by the computer even when the preferred algorithm is not implemented: only 5% of the cases are brought to court. Lastly, we find that preferences between division rules are stable and persistent throughout repetitions of the game: participants show a clear individual preference for one of the two type of division.
978-88-921-3131-6
Lab Experiment, Fair Division, Dispute and Conflict Resolution
Algorithms in conflict resolution: A lab experiment / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Di Cagno, Daniela Teresa; Marazzi, Francesca. - (2019), pp. 273-296.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/191807
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