Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critical, i.e. essential for a coalition to win. We introduce new indices that measure the power of a player in being decisive through the collaboration of other players. We study the behavior of these criticality indices to compare the power of different players within a single voting situation, and that of the same player with varying weight across different voting situations. In both cases we establish monotonicity results in line with those of Turnovec [1998]. Finally, we examine which properties characterizing the indices of Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf are shared by these new indices.
Indices of Criticality in Simple Games / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito; Moretti, Stefano. - (2019), pp. 583-603. [10.1142/9789811202018_0028]
Titolo: | Indices of Criticality in Simple Games | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2019 | |
Citazione: | Indices of Criticality in Simple Games / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito; Moretti, Stefano. - (2019), pp. 583-603. [10.1142/9789811202018_0028] | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11385/191088 | |
ISBN: | 978-981-120-201-8 978-981-120-200-1 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 02.1 - Capitolo o saggio su monografia (Monograph’s Chapter/Essay) |
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