The paper is focused on the problem of «compulsory voting» inside the contemporary democracies. The research demand is: is there a relation between compulsory vote and the possibility to increase the electoral turnout for citizens more and more detached from politics in many countries (to strengthen the sentiment of civic duty)? Furthermore: which are the reasons of supporters of compulsory voting and the arguments against it for keeping a voluntary system in political elections (for instance the electoral choice pattern called «donkey vote»)? Based on data and empirical findings, the Author favours a model of liberal democracy that cannot tolerate impositions and constraints whatsoever for voting choices and does not consider non-vote as an element of delegitimization of the democratic system.
Compulsory voting: does a massive electoral turnout encourage a social duty or the «dunkey vote»? / De Mucci, Raffaele. - In: STUDI DI SOCIOLOGIA. - ISSN 0039-291X. - 4(2019), pp. 323-346. [10.26350/000309_000074]
Compulsory voting: does a massive electoral turnout encourage a social duty or the «dunkey vote»?
RAFFAELE DE MUCCI
2019
Abstract
The paper is focused on the problem of «compulsory voting» inside the contemporary democracies. The research demand is: is there a relation between compulsory vote and the possibility to increase the electoral turnout for citizens more and more detached from politics in many countries (to strengthen the sentiment of civic duty)? Furthermore: which are the reasons of supporters of compulsory voting and the arguments against it for keeping a voluntary system in political elections (for instance the electoral choice pattern called «donkey vote»)? Based on data and empirical findings, the Author favours a model of liberal democracy that cannot tolerate impositions and constraints whatsoever for voting choices and does not consider non-vote as an element of delegitimization of the democratic system.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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