In a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain, players establish both operations and marketing strategies and coordinate the chain through the implementation of a support program. A retailer, who sets both the pricing and the advertising strategies, acts as chain leader and decides whether to support a manufacturer’s operational strategy, such as quality improvements. The players share the overall chain revenues based on an exogenous, fixed sharing agreement. We compared coordinated and non-coordinated solutions in which coordination is carried out via a support program for quality improvements. While according to the literature a retailer–leader always has an economic preference for operation-based coordination, our findings reveal that: (a) low operational efficiency and effectiveness discourage the retailer’s interest in coordination and (b) good sharing parameter values overcome concerns regarding operational inefficiency but not those of operational ineffectiveness.

Should a retailer support a quality improvements strategy? / De Giovanni, P. - 13:(2013), pp. 125-148. [10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_7]

Should a retailer support a quality improvements strategy?

De Giovanni P
2013

Abstract

In a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain, players establish both operations and marketing strategies and coordinate the chain through the implementation of a support program. A retailer, who sets both the pricing and the advertising strategies, acts as chain leader and decides whether to support a manufacturer’s operational strategy, such as quality improvements. The players share the overall chain revenues based on an exogenous, fixed sharing agreement. We compared coordinated and non-coordinated solutions in which coordination is carried out via a support program for quality improvements. While according to the literature a retailer–leader always has an economic preference for operation-based coordination, our findings reveal that: (a) low operational efficiency and effectiveness discourage the retailer’s interest in coordination and (b) good sharing parameter values overcome concerns regarding operational inefficiency but not those of operational ineffectiveness.
978-3-319-02689-3
Supply Chain Management; Coordination; Differential game
Should a retailer support a quality improvements strategy? / De Giovanni, P. - 13:(2013), pp. 125-148. [10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_7]
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Should a retailer contribute to a Quality strategy.pdf

Solo gestori archivio

Tipologia: Versione dell'editore
Licenza: DRM non definito
Dimensione 138.24 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
138.24 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/190334
Citazioni
  • Scopus 6
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact