In a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain, players establish both operations and marketing strategies and coordinate the chain through the implementation of a support program. A retailer, who sets both the pricing and the advertising strategies, acts as chain leader and decides whether to support a manufacturer’s operational strategy, such as quality improvements. The players share the overall chain revenues based on an exogenous, fixed sharing agreement. We compared coordinated and non-coordinated solutions in which coordination is carried out via a support program for quality improvements. While according to the literature a retailer–leader always has an economic preference for operation-based coordination, our findings reveal that: (a) low operational efficiency and effectiveness discourage the retailer’s interest in coordination and (b) good sharing parameter values overcome concerns regarding operational inefficiency but not those of operational ineffectiveness.
|Titolo:||Should a retailer support a quality improvements strategy?|
De Giovanni, Pietro (Corresponding)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2013|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||02.1 - Capitolo o saggio su monografia (Monograph’s Chapter/Essay)|
File in questo prodotto:
|Should a retailer contribute to a Quality strategy.pdf||Versione dell'editore||DRM non definito||Administrator|