During the recent financial crisis, emerging economies have kept accumulating both sovereign reserves and debt. To account for this empirical fact, we model the optimal portfolio choice of a sovereign that is subject to liquidity and productivity shocks. We determine the equilibrium level of debt and its cost by solving a contracting game between sovereign and international lenders. Although raising debt increases the sovereign exposure to liquidity and productivity crises, the simultaneous accumulation of reserves can mitigate the negative effects of such crises. This mechanism rationalizes the complementarity between debt and reserves.
Sovereign Debt and Reserve with Productivity and Liquidity Crises / Corneli, F; Tarantino, Emanuele. - In: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE. - ISSN 0261-5606. - 65:(2016), pp. 166-194. [10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.02.016]
Sovereign Debt and Reserve with Productivity and Liquidity Crises
TARANTINO, EMANUELE
2016
Abstract
During the recent financial crisis, emerging economies have kept accumulating both sovereign reserves and debt. To account for this empirical fact, we model the optimal portfolio choice of a sovereign that is subject to liquidity and productivity shocks. We determine the equilibrium level of debt and its cost by solving a contracting game between sovereign and international lenders. Although raising debt increases the sovereign exposure to liquidity and productivity crises, the simultaneous accumulation of reserves can mitigate the negative effects of such crises. This mechanism rationalizes the complementarity between debt and reserves.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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