The standard setting organizations' decisions on licensing policy and standard's technological specification, and the ensuing implications for social welfare are analyzed. The author finds the conditions under which a licensing rule that grants monopoly power to the licensors whose technology is adopted in the standard can be employed by the members of the consortium (ex‐post licensing). Moreover, it is shown that the adoption of ex‐post licensing might lead to the inefficient exclusion of an efficient stand‐alone licensor. Finally, the author discusses the conditions under which a policy of ex‐ante licensing can be less efficient than ex‐post licensing.
Licensing Policy and Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations / Tarantino, E. - In: ECONOMIC INQUIRY. - ISSN 0095-2583. - 53:1(2014), pp. 604-623. [10.1111/ecin.12112]
Titolo: | Licensing Policy and Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2014 | |
Rivista: | ||
Citazione: | Licensing Policy and Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations / Tarantino, E. - In: ECONOMIC INQUIRY. - ISSN 0095-2583. - 53:1(2014), pp. 604-623. [10.1111/ecin.12112] | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11385/189694 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01.1 - Articolo su rivista (Article) |
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