La Banca d'Italia e il problema della sua autonomia (dalla traslazione della sovranità monetaria alla perdita della supervisione bancaria?)

Some of the most recent decisions disclosed by the Italian government do not devote sufficient attention to the technical and legal developments of the financial markets; these choices affect significantly the traditional institutional configuration of the Bank of Italy. This paper aims at underlining how the economic integration characterizing the European territory since the Treaty of Maastricht – despite determining a substantial transfer of monetary and banking sovereignty from national institutions in favor of the ECB – does not alter the role of the Italian central bank in its substance. On the contrary, such a process reaffirms the innovative modes of cohesion that should ground the economic integration within the European Union. In particular, the current regulation does not undermine the function of the Bank of Italy as principal national authority in the financial market, even reducing the scope its traditional duties (monetary control and banking supervision): on one hand, the Bank of Italy operates supports and cooperates with the ECB in the supervision on “significant” entities; on the other one, its traditional control over the “less significant” banks is preserved, except in exceptional cases