In a circular neighborhood of eight, each member contributes repeatedly to two local public goods, one with the left and one with the right neighbor. All eight two-person games provide only local feedback information and are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Heterogeneity is induced intra-personally by asymmetric productivity in left and right games and inter-personally by two randomly selected group members who are less privileged (LP) by being either less productive or excluded from end-of-period feedback information about their payoffs and neighbors’ contributions. Although both LP-types let the neighborhood as a whole evolve less cooperatively, their spillover dynamics differ. While less productive LPs initiate “spoiling the basket” via their low contributions, LPs with no-end-of-round information are exploited by their neighbors. Furthermore, LP-positioning, closest versus most distant, affects how the neighborhood evolves.

Does Heterogeneity Spoil the Basket? The Role of Productivity and Feedback Information on Public Good Provision / Angelovski, Andrej; Di Cagno, Daniela; Guth, Werner; Marazzi, Francesca; Panaccione, Luca. - In: JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2214-8043. - 77:December(2018), pp. 40-49. [10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.006]

Does Heterogeneity Spoil the Basket? The Role of Productivity and Feedback Information on Public Good Provision

Angelovski, Andrej
;
Di Cagno, Daniela;Marazzi, Francesca;Panaccione, Luca
2018

Abstract

In a circular neighborhood of eight, each member contributes repeatedly to two local public goods, one with the left and one with the right neighbor. All eight two-person games provide only local feedback information and are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Heterogeneity is induced intra-personally by asymmetric productivity in left and right games and inter-personally by two randomly selected group members who are less privileged (LP) by being either less productive or excluded from end-of-period feedback information about their payoffs and neighbors’ contributions. Although both LP-types let the neighborhood as a whole evolve less cooperatively, their spillover dynamics differ. While less productive LPs initiate “spoiling the basket” via their low contributions, LPs with no-end-of-round information are exploited by their neighbors. Furthermore, LP-positioning, closest versus most distant, affects how the neighborhood evolves.
Public goods, Behavioral spillovers, Voluntary contribution mechanism, Heterogeneity, Experiment
Does Heterogeneity Spoil the Basket? The Role of Productivity and Feedback Information on Public Good Provision / Angelovski, Andrej; Di Cagno, Daniela; Guth, Werner; Marazzi, Francesca; Panaccione, Luca. - In: JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2214-8043. - 77:December(2018), pp. 40-49. [10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.006]
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
paper_v69_JBEE.pdf

Open Access

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati
Dimensione 1.28 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.28 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11385/182265
Citazioni
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 1
social impact