Our paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of different risk-sharing mechanisms in providing stability to a monetary union. We select two stylized tools with extreme and opposite features. The first is an expansionary but conventional monetary policy that is used to help EMU’s most fragile member states manage their public debts; the second is a centralized fiscal policy that allows for the transfer of a portion of these public debts from EMU’s most fragile member states to those considered EMU’s “core”. By a stylized periphery-core model of a monetary union, we compare the strengths and weaknesses of these two tools in order to reach some welfare implications in terms of union stability.
EMU Stability: Direct and Indirect Risk Sharing / Messori, Marcello; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni; Canofari, Paolo. - In: OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW. - ISSN 0923-7992. - 28(2017), pp. 847-862. [10.1007/s11079-017-9462-z]
Titolo: | EMU Stability: Direct and Indirect Risk Sharing | |
Autori: | Canofari, Paolo (Corresponding) | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2017 | |
Rivista: | ||
Citazione: | EMU Stability: Direct and Indirect Risk Sharing / Messori, Marcello; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni; Canofari, Paolo. - In: OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW. - ISSN 0923-7992. - 28(2017), pp. 847-862. [10.1007/s11079-017-9462-z] | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11385/177764 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01.1 - Articolo su rivista (Article) |
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