Using a firm-level international panel dataset, we study if unemployment insurance offered by the government and by firms are substitutes. We exploit cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family vs. non-family ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. Our evidence supports the substitutability hypothesis: employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries and periods with less generous public unemployment insurance, while no such substitutability emerges for non-family firms.

Ellul, Andrew; Pagano, Marco; Schivardi, Fabiano. (2018). Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence. THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, (ISSN: 0893-9454), 31:4, 1566-1603. Doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhx104.

Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence

SCHIVARDI, FABIANO
2018

Abstract

Using a firm-level international panel dataset, we study if unemployment insurance offered by the government and by firms are substitutes. We exploit cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family vs. non-family ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. Our evidence supports the substitutability hypothesis: employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries and periods with less generous public unemployment insurance, while no such substitutability emerges for non-family firms.
2018
Risk-sharing, insurance, social security, unemployment, wages, family firms
Ellul, Andrew; Pagano, Marco; Schivardi, Fabiano. (2018). Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence. THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, (ISSN: 0893-9454), 31:4, 1566-1603. Doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhx104.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11385/176381
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