Preventing Financial Statement Frauds through Better Corporate Governance

Acting within the agency theory theoretical framework, the paper focuses on the role of the corporate governance as a system to monitor and predict the fraud occurrence and magnitude. Specifically, the study examines the impact of the quality of the corporate governance of the firms, for which a fraud was detected, on the fraud occurrence and magnitude. We posit that fraudulent behaviours, by those who can take advantage of information asymmetry and gain personal benefits from them, can occur when strong agency problems emerge and a weak governance exists. Thus, the financial statement fraud can be seen as the result of high agency problems and high conflicts of interests not solved by the company. Starting from a sample of 101 listed companies, for which a fraud was detected, using a principal component analysis, we develop a corporate governance index, which measures the quality of the governance system of the firms. To test the hypothesis, we run a multinomial logistic regression on a cross-sectional analysis, controlling the results with a matched sample of firms that did not experienced any fraud. Empirical evidences seem to confirm the existence of a negative relationship between the quality of the corporate governance system of a firm and both the financial statement fraud occurrence and magnitude, indicating the governance system of the firm as a fraud deterrent for any amount of financial statement fraud. These findings are even stronger for firms characterized by the presence of a blockholder. This study contributes to the governance literature by focusing on the corporate governance quality and its impact on financial statement frauds. Moreover, the analysis suggests that a good level of governance can help companies to mitigate the agency problems and to detect fraudulent behaviours, thus our empirical evidence can guide regulators in developing regulations to avoid the fraud occurrence.