After the Eurozone crisis, European Union (EU) Member States have the obligation to establish independent ﬁscal institutions (IFIs)—also known as ﬁscal councils—composed of recognised experts responsible for the monitoring of the compliance with ﬁscal rules in accordance with European norms. Eurozone Coun- tries are the ﬁrst addressees of this obligation and are bound by stricter legal constraints than States outside the Euro area. The form these IFIs take varies from one Member State to the other and so do their powers. In any event, in requiring their creation, the European norms have potentially led to a reorganisation and a change in the institutional balance at national level. At the same time, they may have participated to the improvement of democracy in ensuring more inde- pendent expertise, transparent and public information, and knowledge that Parlia- ments can use to control and scrutinise their Government ’ s actions, although the ﬁscal councils themselves remain weak. In this context, this contribution aims to answer the following research question: Do IFIs, according to the new European and national rules of implementation, constitute a threat to democracy or, rather could they, in fact, enhance democracy?
|Titolo:||Fiscal Councils: Threat or Opportunity for Democracy in the Post-Crisis Economic and Monetary Union?|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2017|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||02.1 - Capitolo o saggio su monografia (Monograph’s Chapter/Essay)|
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|Fasone and Fromage_Fiscal councils.pdf||Versione dell'editore||DRM non definito||Administrator|