The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been extended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other players.
Orders of Criticality in Voting Games / Dall'Aglio, Marco; Fragnelli, Vito; Moretti, Stefano. - In: OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND DECISIONS. - ISSN 2081-8858. - 26:2(2016), pp. 53-67. [10.5277/ord160204]
Orders of Criticality in Voting Games
DALL'AGLIO, MARCO;
2016
Abstract
The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been extended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other players.
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