The parliamentary election of Jean-Claude Juncker as the Commission president re-launched the debate on the parliamentary transformation of the EU. The article critically discusses the argument that EU can or should become a parliamentary federation. Based on the analytical distinction between federation by aggregation and by disaggregation, and assuming the EU as a species of the former type, the article shows the difficulty of adopting a parliamentary government at the horizontal level because of the demographic asymmetry and cultural differentiation between the EU Member States. The constraints on adopting a parliamentary government are reflected in the Lisbon Treaty. But, also with a change of the Treaty, parliamentary government in the EU would be obstructed by inter-institutional and structural dilemmas.
Fabbrini, Sergio. (2015). The European Union and the Puzzle of Parliamentary Government. REVUE D'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE = JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, (ISSN: 0703-6337), 37:5, 571-586. Doi: 10.1080/07036337.2015.1019877.
The European Union and the Puzzle of Parliamentary Government
FABBRINI, SERGIO
2015
Abstract
The parliamentary election of Jean-Claude Juncker as the Commission president re-launched the debate on the parliamentary transformation of the EU. The article critically discusses the argument that EU can or should become a parliamentary federation. Based on the analytical distinction between federation by aggregation and by disaggregation, and assuming the EU as a species of the former type, the article shows the difficulty of adopting a parliamentary government at the horizontal level because of the demographic asymmetry and cultural differentiation between the EU Member States. The constraints on adopting a parliamentary government are reflected in the Lisbon Treaty. But, also with a change of the Treaty, parliamentary government in the EU would be obstructed by inter-institutional and structural dilemmas.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Fabbrini.JEI.PuzzleofParliamentaryGovernment.2015.pdf
Solo gestori archivio
Tipologia:
Versione dell'editore
Licenza:
DRM (Digital rights management) non definiti
Dimensione
164.87 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
164.87 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.



