The “technical governments” in Italy: the executives led by Ciampi, Dini and Monti in the difficult equilibrium between technocracy and politics By focusing on the Italian case, the aim of the essay is to scrutinise the experience of the so called “technical governments”. In this respect, it first proposes a general definition of the category and then applies it to the executives led by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (1993-1994), Lamberto Dini (1995-1996) and Mario Monti (2011-2013). More in detail, firstly the essay describes the specific features – communalities and differences – of each of the three Italian executives. Secondly, following a Constitutional law approach, it evaluates, on the one hand, the compliance of those experiences with the Constitution currently into force, and, on the other hand, it investigates their effects on the parliamentary rules and procedures. Thirdly, the essay evaluates the impact of the European Union dynamics on national level, which are encouraging the formation of executives supported by a wide parliamentary majority and fostering the risk to elude political responsibility. Finally, the essay concludes arguing the need to look for a new point of equilibrium between technocracy and politics in the Italian institutions.