Competition authorities (EU Commission and ICA) have recently dealt with an unusual setting: the abuse consisting in sub-optimal investment in essential facilities in order to by-pass regulatory constraints. The special features of such cases are canvassed in the paper.
"Foreclosure" della rete per effetto di sub-investimento strategico / Pardolesi, Roberto; G., Faella. - (2014), pp. 131-146.
"Foreclosure" della rete per effetto di sub-investimento strategico
PARDOLESI, ROBERTO;
2014
Abstract
Competition authorities (EU Commission and ICA) have recently dealt with an unusual setting: the abuse consisting in sub-optimal investment in essential facilities in order to by-pass regulatory constraints. The special features of such cases are canvassed in the paper.
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