Competition authorities (EU Commission and ICA) have recently dealt with an unusual setting: the abuse consisting in sub-optimal investment in essential facilities in order to by-pass regulatory constraints. The special features of such cases are canvassed in the paper.
Titolo: | "Foreclosure" della rete per effetto di sub-investimento strategico |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2014 |
Abstract: | Competition authorities (EU Commission and ICA) have recently dealt with an unusual setting: the abuse consisting in sub-optimal investment in essential facilities in order to by-pass regulatory constraints. The special features of such cases are canvassed in the paper. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11385/142994 |
ISBN: | 978-85-15-25119-0 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 02.1 - Capitolo o saggio su monografia (Monograph’s Chapter/Essay) |
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.