

Ph.D. Program in Political Theory XXVIII Cycle

**Military education in the changing  
operational environment**

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**Might liberal thought provide the decisive edge?**

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## **Index**

CHAPTER 1 .....	4
The security environment: challenges and impact on military forces ..	4
1.1 Evolution of the International Context .....	4
1.2. Different doctrines, similar outcomes: UN, US, NATO, and EU.	9
1.3 Education as the means to respond to new challenges .....	21
1.4 Conclusion .....	24
CHAPTER 2 .....	27
Military Education: concepts and challenges .....	27
2.1 Overview of the Military Education System .....	27
2.2 The Reform of Military Education: an ongoing debate .....	35
2.3 Philosophy of education's impact on military education .....	44
2.4 Conclusion .....	51
CHAPTER 3 .....	54
Military ethics within the framework of political philosophy .....	54
3.1 Origins and evolution of liberal thought: a brief review .....	54
3.2 Liberal values and moral philosophy in education .....	56
3.3 Ethics in military education .....	67
3.4 Conclusion .....	80
CHAPTER 4 .....	83
Leadership and Ethics .....	83
4.1 The relevance of leadership .....	85
4.2 Is good leadership different from ethical leadership?.....	89
4.3 About military leadership .....	94
4.4 Conclusion .....	103
CHAPTER 5 .....	107
Cross cultural competence and liberal values.....	107
5.1 Intercultural competence: a definition .....	108
5.2 Cross Cultural Competence in Military research.....	112
5.3 The operational bearing of Cross Cultural Competency .....	120

5.4 Educating to cross cultural competence. A case study: the NATO Defense College .....	127
5.5 Conclusion .....	134
ANNEX 5.1 .....	139
CONCLUSION.....	141
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	145
OTHER SOURCES .....	159

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **The security environment: challenges and impact on military forces**

*"Impara a Vedere. Realizza che ogni cosa è connessa con il Tutto."*

Leonardo Da Vinci.

#### **1.1 Evolution of the International Context**

During the Cold War, the international scenario was characterized by a clear delimitation of powers; stability was guaranteed on a strategic level by the rules of mutual deterrence and, on a political level, by a delicate balance based on institutions such as the UN and the international conventions on disarmament and non-proliferation. For fifty years, such a balance of power ensured a certain stability and predictability of the system. The collapse of the Soviet Empire marked a profound change in the international framework: threats were no longer unambiguous and predictable – related to a possible large-scale attack launched by the Warsaw Pact forces against the West – but rather became undetermined, as volatile as the deeply changing scenario. The concept of security also evolved, from mere defence against clear and definite threats to an attempt to cope with unpredictable, diverse and multidimensional menaces. Hence security planning and the organization of the Armed Forces can no longer be restricted to territorial defence, as it happened during the Cold War. The increased uncertainty of threats has a significant influence on the relationship between the state and its military organization. The scourge of international terrorism, the proliferation and distribution of weapons of mass destruction, the erosion of the regime of nuclear non-proliferation, the surfacing of failed and failing states, the protection of sea lanes of communication and energy supply

routes, cyber security, and environmental challenges are all global issues that affect everyone.

In today's interconnected world, security challenges have become more and more transnational, no longer confined within state borders. New actors have emerged on the international scene, altering power relations with their increased importance. Among the effects of globalization are an increased influence of non-state actors, growing frictions within state societies, and the emergence of a transnational network based on common interests rather than territorial sovereignty. In fact, besides unpredictability, the other distinctive feature of the new international scenario is a transfer of authority and political legitimacy from states to new political or non-political actors.

The end of the Cold War caused a reassessment of the concept of security beyond the conventional, state-centric and militarized terms of the bi-polar era. Today security has to be understood in broader terms in order to encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. At the centre of this new idea of security lies the shaping of the concept of "human security"<sup>1</sup>, whose definition and policy implications are still debated among scholars and policymakers<sup>2</sup>. Its key innovation has been to promote a universalistic approach to security and referring to a human community with global common concerns, shifting the focus from the

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<sup>1</sup>UNDP, Human Development Report 1994. New Dimensions of Human Security, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994>

<sup>2</sup> Advocates of human security are divided between two different perceptions of the concept: a narrow approach is supported by middle powers such as Canada and Japan and embedded in the Human Security Report regularly produced by the Human Security Report Project (HSRP) in Vancouver (<http://www.hsrgroup.org>); the main reference for the promoters of the broader perspective is the UNDP's Human Development Report. See Nikolaos Tzifakis, "Problematizing human security: a general/contextual conceptual approach", in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2011), p.353-368.

security of the State to that of the individual. It adopts a multidimensional and holistic interpretation of security, by advocating the need to ensure for individuals not only “freedom from fear”, but also “freedom from want”, supporting the conviction that issues such as underdevelopment, human rights violations and insecurity of citizens in conflict zones are strongly interrelated. From a policy perspective, human security puts non-military root causes of instability on the agenda together with military implications, and offers a common framework for cooperative problem-solving among diverse actors (governments, NGOs, international organizations, transnational agencies and coalitions) and across separate but related policy areas (development, human rights, conflict resolution, etc.).

The emergence of the human security concept has been accompanied by a gradual shifting from the classical concepts of sovereignty and non-interference to a more prismatic right to intervene. The appearance of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine dates back to its first formulation in the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)<sup>3</sup>, and was defined at the 2005 UN World Summit, where member states made the commitment to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa, ICISS, December 2001, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> See UN General Assembly, *Resolution on the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1)*, 24 October 2005, <http://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1>. In paragraphs 138-139, heads of state or government agreed to the following principles: (1) each individual state has the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, which also entails a responsibility for the prevention of these crimes; (2) the international community should encourage or assist states to exercise this responsibility; (3) the international community has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations threatened by these crimes. When a state manifestly fails in its protection responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the international community must take stronger

The multifaceted erosion of state sovereignty is highly related to the porosity of modern borders, weakened by both technological developments and the political decision to encourage free circulation of people and goods. New transnational entities, such as networks of terrorism and organized crime – whose action is being studied not only from a criminological point of view, but also from a geopolitical one – have forcefully emerged, exercising their power and pursuing their own interests. The international community has experienced a series of conflicts at a regional and sub-regional level. With the end of the Cold War, many people in the West had hoped for a period of peace and prosperity; on the contrary, the issue of war has become topical again in the last twenty years<sup>5</sup>. Besides the traditional notion of war between states, regulated by the Geneva Conventions, two new concepts of war have emerged: humanitarian intervention and the so-called irregular warfare.

The concept of humanitarian intervention was created in response to the continuing Rwandan genocide and has been largely used in reference to the crisis in Kosovo. This kind of war is grounded on the need to protect fundamental human rights violated in another state, thus interfering in a way that normally would not be allowed by international law, implying not just a defensive attitude but also an aggressive one. In this respect, the United Nations have established the initiative *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P), with a view to preventing or stopping the so-called mass atrocities: crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing.

Such a scenario was exacerbated by the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the so-called “War on Terror”, which led to the

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measures, including the collective use of force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.

<sup>5</sup>JEAN Carlo, “L’uso della forza. Se vuoi la pace comprendi la guerra” (The Use of Force. If You Want Peace, You Must Understand War), Laterza, 1996.

conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The “War on Terror”, launched by the Bush Administration, entails concepts such as preventive war, irregular and asymmetric warfare, which are extremely problematic and difficult to define for the traditional interpretation patterns of international law. “Irregular warfare” implies fighting against a not clearly identified enemy, in an undetermined place and for an indefinite time.

Such a blurred concept of war requires a profound change in military responses. As stated in 2005 by Admiral Di Paola, then Chief of the Italian Defence Staff: “The multilayered and unpredictable nature of future threats, above all those of terrorism and failing states, demands development of a capability to prevent and, when necessary, to intervene quickly and efficiently even at a great distance from the homeland. In other words, unlike in the past, the military contribution to national security can no longer depend exclusively on the capability to guard and provide static defence of the metropolitan areas (‘homeland defence’); it must develop the capability to dynamically face threats whenever and wherever they occur.”<sup>6</sup>

More recently the White Paper<sup>7</sup> issued in 2015 by the Italian Minister of Defence underlines that “the current period is characterized by two simultaneous geopolitical trends: a progressive globalization of phenomena and problems, which tends to turn the world into a highly interconnected and interdependent “global village” - especially for that part of the world with a high level of interdependence - and a parallel process of fragmentation, which causes structural weakening and destabilisation, particularly in weaker

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<sup>6</sup>Strategic Concept of the Chief of the Italian Defence Staff: [http://www.difesa.it/Pubblicistica/infodifesa/Documents/95838\\_libroconcettostategico.pdf](http://www.difesa.it/Pubblicistica/infodifesa/Documents/95838_libroconcettostategico.pdf) (page 10).

<sup>7</sup>Libro Bianco (White Paper) [http://www.difesa.it/Primo\\_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro\\_Bianco.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro_Bianco.aspx)

or newly constituted states.” Therefore “Addressing the problem of national security and defence from a modern perspective requires a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary approach. It is necessary to consider how the various capabilities that make the country safer can be developed and if the concept of “defence” can evolve, become broader, including all the different perspectives and skills involved in it”.

### **1.2. Different doctrines, similar outcomes: UN, US, NATO, and EU.**

Never so often as in the recent past and probably in the near future in different regions of the world, economic disparities have led to political, social, and cultural turmoil and conflicts, including terrorism, as the streak of attacks from France, to Kuwait, from Nigeria to Tunisia as shown.

The National Intelligence Council, an organization supporting the US Director of National Intelligence, with its Global Trends Reports<sup>8</sup> have influenced strategic conversations within and beyond the US Government. In creating the report - an unclassified assessment of long-term trends shaping the future geopolitical landscape - the N.I.C. engages expertise from outside government on factors of such as globalization, demography and the environment, producing a forward-looking document to aid policymakers in their long term planning on key issues of worldwide importance. The picture drawn by the report is quite effective, in depicting a world where future global economic and population growth will put pressure on energy, food, and water resources; states with significant youth-bulges will remain ripe for continued instability, unless employment

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<sup>8</sup> The reports are available at <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends>

conditions change dramatically, while the current economic crisis is creating considerable risk of instability in countries with large account deficits, not only in the developing world. Demographic trends indicate that significant portions of the populations in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia will be less than 30 years old in 2025. These “youth bulges” combined with high unemployment, resource scarcities, and disruptive political successions increases the prospect for instability in this scenario, as the combination of broad unemployment and insufficient government capacities, offers fertile soil for fostering volatility and violence. This might not sound surprising now to a public used to the migration chronicles from the Mediterranean, but a very apt picture of this scenario was already contained in the Global Trends 2025 released in 2008.

Hence the problem of coping with these “global troubles” including the spread of violent extremism, transnational terrorism and crime, food and water scarcities, failing states, and intrastate conflicts has been driving the security agenda.

Since the autumn of 1956, when the UN established the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) to mediate between Egypt and Israel after the Suez crisis, Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have constantly increased, especially during the last twenty years. Moreover, the range of activities and interventions that can be considered as PSOs has widened and diversified: from conflict prevention to humanitarian aid, from peace-making to peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building operations. Such operations are no longer a prerogative of the UN; more and more often, they are carried out by other international organizations (NATO, EU, OECD, etc.) or ad hoc coalitions of states.

Italy's contribution, initially sporadic, has become increasingly substantial after the end of the Cold War.<sup>9</sup> The Italian Constitution clearly rejects war – despite allowing its use for defensive purposes – and encourages any initiatives or limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world-order ensuring peace. In accordance with the Constitution, the recent involvements of the Italian Armed Forces were carried out as cooperative interventions within multilateral coalitions, thus giving them legitimacy and making their action more politically convincing.

The asymmetric nature of modern conflicts has reduced the effectiveness of traditional coercive strategies, based on the threat of use of force. The Vietnam War was the epitome of the failure of coercive strategies employed by a great power or coalitions against states that were much smaller and militarily weaker: where the latter has shown considerable endurance of hardships and privations that would be unbearable to Western societies, while managing to inflict equally high political costs, demonstrating how difficult it can be for a great power to force a change in the policies and behaviours of a small, poor country. Non-state actors such as guerrilla groups have become aware that the threat of the use of force is often based on conditioning of public opinion and mass media. While Western countries seek a delicate balance with humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and peace-making operations and a limited use of force, opposing actors that are militarily weaker, but ideologically solid and purposeful are left with wide room for manoeuvre to pursue their political objectives.

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<sup>9</sup> CORALLUZZO Valter, “Le Missioni Italiane all'estero: Problemi e Prospettive” (Italian Missions Abroad – Issues and Prospects), ISPI (Italian Institute for International Political Studies), September 2012.

In these asymmetric scenarios, the traditional notion of military power based on deterrence and coercion has been challenged. Most military interventions are bound to be ascribed as humanitarian intervention in a broad sense, or “irregular warfare”<sup>10</sup>. The challenges posed by violent extremism, transnational terrorism and criminal networks, intrastate conflict, stabilization and reconstruction operations, failing states, and irregular forms of warfare dominate the security agenda in the current operational environment and will continue to dominate to do so in the future.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command published in 2010 the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) that besides providing a perspective on future trends, shocks and contexts, investigated their military implications and relevance for future commanders and other leaders and professionals in the field of international security, and concluded that threats range from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to cooperative engagement in the global commons.

The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept<sup>11</sup> states that collective defence is the Alliance’s greatest responsibility and “deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element” of NATO’s overall strategy and it provides a comprehensive list of capabilities the Alliance aims to maintain and develop to counter existing and emerging threats. These threats include beside the traditional ones, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the emerging ones like terrorism, cyber-

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<sup>10</sup> The US Joint Publication 1-02 defines irregular warfare as: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_82705.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm)

attacks and key environmental and resource constraints. Accordingly the same document reaffirms NATO's holistic approach to crisis management, envisaging NATO involvement at all stages of a crisis: "NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction." While encouraging a greater number of actors to participate and coordinate their efforts and considering a broader range of tools to be more effective across the crisis management spectrum, this comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to crises, puts greater emphasis on training and developing local forces and renewed efforts to enhance civil-military planning and interaction. The final part of the 2010 Strategic Concept focuses on promoting international security through cooperation. At the root of this cooperation is the principle of seeking security "at the lowest possible level of forces".

The depicted security environment requires capabilities to conduct counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, special operations, stability and reconstruction operations, urban conflict, critical infrastructure protection, and homeland security: all of which differ sensibly from traditional warfare.

Unsurprisingly similar issues have been debated in Europe (where most nations are both members of the EU and NATO countries at the same time), as the classical mission assigned to the armed forces in the countries of the European Union, meaning the physical defence of the national borders and territory, cannot be regarded as the daily task of the different services anymore. Internal and external security of the Member States need to be assured beyond national borders, following multiple forms and in cooperation with a new range of partners.

On keeping with this trend the cited Italian White Paper<sup>12</sup> reaffirms that for the future “In addition to its primary task - i.e. to ensure adequate defence of the State and in a NATO context, collective defence, the armed forces will have to be ready to contribute to the European Union to carry out a series of activities and operations that include:

- Rapid operations aimed to protect vital national interests, either independently or as part of a broader coalition;
- Peace operations and stabilization in response to international crises;
- Specialist support activities and a training, both nationally and abroad;
- The safeguarding of free institutions in case of necessity or urgency;
- Humanitarian assistance and support in case of disasters, both nationally and abroad;
- Evacuation of overseas compatriots in case of emergency

For the EU as much as for any other crisis management actor, effective crisis management requires a sound understanding of the environment in which it operates, both in terms of ‘the problem to be tackled’ and in terms of ‘the types of policy responses’ that are required. The changing nature of security threats requires a parallel adaptation of policy responses: as a consequence the range of activities that fall within the remit of EU crisis management has become increasingly complex and multifaceted; secondly, the range of actors that contribute to crisis management has enlarged and diversified.

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<sup>12</sup>Libro Bianco (White Paper)[http://www.difesa.it/Primo\\_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro\\_Bianco.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro_Bianco.aspx)

As a result of new strategic threats, Europe's forces are undergoing a significant transformation: Europe's mass, mainly conscript armies are being replaced by smaller, more capable, professionalised militaries concentrated into new operational headquarters and rapid reaction brigades, able to plan, command and execute global military interventions. At the same time, both at headquarter and operational level, European forces are co-operating with each other across national borders at a level which would have been inconceivable in the twentieth century<sup>13</sup>. As a result European military forces are converging on common forms of military expertise, forming a transnational military network<sup>14</sup>.

The operations, so-called “other than war” operations, have acquired a considerable importance for the Europeans in the maintaining and enforcing of international peace; this means however that the military forces have to adapt in order to add new functions and capabilities to the core of their assignments. EU Member states have committed to a Common Foreign Security Policy for the European Union, aiming to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.<sup>15</sup> CSDP operations constitute one dimension of the comprehensive approach, of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of the EU's external action, and even of multilateral peace efforts.

EU's crisis management concept is a security-centred activity that besides its security dimension, requires a response going beyond purely security-focused measures. Within the EU CSDP Security is

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<sup>13</sup>[http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm)

<sup>14</sup> PAILE Sylvain “European Education and Training for Young Officers. The European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, Inspired by Erasmus”, European Security & Defence College ISBN.978-92-95201-01-9 DOI.10.2855/12912

<sup>15</sup>[http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm)

understood in its widest sense: it combines a traditional definition of state security (crisis management often involves reinforcing the state apparatus) with a more human security approach that establishes the link between the security of the state and that of individuals. This widened security agenda links to the nexus between security and development according to which no long-term peace can be sustained without a parallel process of economic development. The hybrid civil-military nature of crisis management in the EU has become one of its central features.<sup>16</sup>

In fact, the crisis management spectrum encompasses activities that relate to security, civilian protection, the rule of law, security sector reform, institution-building, electoral support, economic recovery and development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, good governance, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants.

This is coherent with the recent evolution in UNSC resolutions, fine-tuned to adjust to new situations, to allow a variety of uses of force, an emphasis on the protection of civilians, different and sometimes innovative formats of peace operations aimed to greater effectiveness in urgent situations, an emphasis on partnerships with a wider variety of government and nongovernment partners with crossing of organizational boundaries, and creating flexible forms to facilitate these partnerships.<sup>17</sup>

UNSCRs maintain - despite recent controversies after the collapse of Libya followed to the international intervention<sup>18</sup> - a high

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<sup>16</sup> TARDY Thierry 'CSDP in Action –What Contribution to International Security?' Chaillot Papers, EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2015, p.9-10

<sup>17</sup> ELRON Efrat, *21<sup>st</sup> Century Peacekeeping and Future Warfare*, Strategic Insights, v. 10, Special issue(October 2011)105-116

<sup>18</sup>On the legitimacy of intervention, see J. WELSH, "Authorizing humanitarian intervention," in R. Price and M. Zacher

degree of international legitimacy and the representation of the collective will of the international community gives them considerable leverage over the conflicting parties. In several current areas of intervention, basic infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed while large sections of the population may have been displaced. Over the next quarter century military forces will be continually engaged in some dynamic combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve conflict and they are also being deployed in settings considered less and less ripe for conflict resolution, where the state's capacity to provide security to its population and maintain public order is often weak and political violence may still be ongoing in various parts of the country. Society may have divided along ethnic, religious, or regional lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed during the conflict, further complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation.

When participating in this kind of interventions, each state needs to coordinate its action with partners and allies, integrating their Armed Forces and pursuing strategic balance from a military, political and economic point of view. In this respect, military force requires to be used in strict accordance with international law and only in geopolitical contexts where such actions can prevent more dangerous and uncontrollable bursts of violence. This has reintroduced the debate

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(eds.), *The United Nations and Global Security* (London: Palgrave, 2004); M. DOYLE, "The Ethics of Multilateral Intervention," *Theoria* 53, no. 109 (2006), 28–48; and J. PATTISON, *Humanitarian Intervention and The Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* (Oxford University Press, 2010)

On Libya, in particular see M. WALZER, "The Case Against Our Attack on Libya," *The New Republic*, March 20, 2011. On the opposite position, see A. BELLAMY, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," *Ethics and International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2011), 263–9; and more cautiously, R. PAPE, "When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention," *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012), p. 61–9

on the meaning of war, its causes, the ways to prevent it and – when it is unavoidable – to face it with as little damage as possible. Furthermore, new forms of armed control have appeared, aimed at ensuring the security of a region and preventively disarming potential enemies, with a view to preventing the armed conflict rather than fighting it.

Such interventions raise a number of new, different and unique operational challenges: because the objective of military action is not to simply defeat or destroy an enemy militarily but primarily to foster stabilization and protect populations, promoting local engagement and ownership. So where the objectives of regular war-fighting are often expressed in terms of units destroyed, terrain controlled and territory seized, the objectives of “irregular” war are best expressed in terms of the strength of government institutions and the willingness of the people to cooperate in realizing a set of goals and objectives.

In regular wars, armies win by annihilating or neutralize other armies who are typically easily distinguished from the civilian population. The ontology of this way of war is fairly straightforward: the actors are either friends or foes; actions in war entail either resistance or surrender; and the end-state of war is either victory or defeat. In “irregular” war, the loyalties, attitudes, and quality of life of the people do not simply impact the outcome of a conflict: they determine it.<sup>19</sup> Thus, civilians are not simply part of the battlefield; they *are* the battlefield.

In such a context military interventions, are bound to have different objectives than traditional war-fighting, having to take into account human protection purposes. In this way, irregular wars broaden the means and ends of war: such conflicts are not zero-sum.

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<sup>19</sup>LUBAN D, *Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study*, Princeton University Press (1988) p.133

As argued above, the successful conduct of the mission is critically dependent on consent and local ownership, as no sustained stability can be imposed from the outside, be it in capacity-building, monitoring or peacekeeping. The challenge is to foster local support not only at the highest level of the state authorities, but also within the ministries/administrations that will be the involved in the operation. When mandates imply, as is often the case, changes in the distribution of power or in governance structures and responsibilities within the host state, consent is all the more difficult as the interlocutors feel threatened in their own positions by the foreign intervention. Local ownership therefore has two equally important dimensions: it is about empowering local stakeholders as much as it is about the host country consent to change<sup>20</sup>. This in turn raises difficulties to sustain the legitimacy of the multinational presence, that erodes over time: local perceptions of the EU as a neo-colonial actor, exploited by extremists' propaganda such as Islamic State or Al Qaeda, together with criticism of the 'liberal peace' agenda that most CSDP operations are seen to epitomise, tend to undermine local participation.

The military fundamentals, where to defeat an enemy is part of the tactical operation and overall strategy, are challenged by the emerging need for military able to shoot, move, and communicate in the traditional sense. The military are required to be able to defeat an enemy, simultaneously shaking the hand of a local villager, and conducting stability operations activities enabling economic growth in a civil and secure environment.

Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali or the Central African Republic have shown how these various actors interact. Incrementally, this has led to the development of more or less

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<sup>20</sup> TARDY T., *Ibid.*, p.47

institutionalised and reciprocal partnerships. Both the United Nations and the new peacekeeping actors and other regional organizations have sought reciprocal cooperation and the development of mutually-beneficial relations. This, in turn, has brought to a certain degree of 'hybridisation' of operations, whereby operations are no longer the product of one single institution but rather the result of the interaction of several conflict management policies and/or cultures. Such relations require cooperation, coordination, and division of labour among different actors, but have also displayed competition and hierarchical tensions between institutions whose political clout and operational capacity can vary a lot from one to the other. As a consequence, cooperation constitutes an imperative and should be inherent to all parties involved: the multi-actor and multi-level nature of contemporary crisis management means that any security actor needs to think about its own role as part of a bigger picture, where no actor can pretend to make a lasting difference if its action is not part of a broader policy bringing together the full panoply of military, economic and political instruments.<sup>21</sup>

The security environment requires the military's capabilities and readiness to prepare to perform several missions – regardless of the environment and within the interagency approach. These missions include a wide variety of activities such as: defend the homeland, counter terrorism, irregular warfare, deter and defeat aggression, counter weapons of mass destruction, operate effectively in cyberspace and space, contrast anti-access/area denial challenges, conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations, conduct humanitarian/disaster relief operations, provide support to civil

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<sup>21</sup>TARDY T., *Ibid.*, p.11

authorities, provide a stabilizing presence, and additional operations as required.

### **1.3 Education as the means to respond to new challenges**

The treatise of Baron Von Clausewitz represents a cornerstone in military literature, and yet despite Von Clausewitz statement that War “is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass... but always the collision of two living forces.”<sup>22</sup>, an enduring feature of conflict lies in the recurring fact that military leaders often fail to recognize their enemy as a learning, adaptive force. Even where adversaries share a similar historical and cultural background, the mere fact of belligerence guarantees profound differences in attitudes, expectations, and behaviours. Hence, where conflict arises between different cultures, the likelihood that adversaries will act in mutually incomprehensible ways is even more likely. There are bound to be surprises and processes of learning, adapting, and copying, as this interaction is inherent in war, as well as any military intervention. Thus, Sun Tzu’s maxim that “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles” is not easy to accomplish. The conduct of war demands a deep understanding of the enemy – his culture, history, geography, religious and ideological motivations, and particularly the manifest differences in his perceptions of the external world. Thus the nature of the human condition will guarantee that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of events. Hence military leaders need to be able to understand and adapt to the warfare environment, but how to obtain a truly “adaptive mind-set”? As I will explain in the following chapter

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<sup>22</sup> VON CLAUSEWITZ Carl, *On War*, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 77

the answer to this question is through education, intended as the ability to respond to the unknown<sup>23</sup>.

The current and future operational environment encouraged a more holistic manner to military preparedness. While refining their collective and individual skills the forces are confronted with other aspects, including war-fighting culture, understanding civilian agencies, governance, economic development, rule of law, civil security, and the need to gain the respect and trust of the local population.

The effects of conducting inadequate training, as resulted evident in the notorious Koran burning's episode, impacts the military's capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, conversely to educate the military to develop the capacity for action and thinking ensures they remain prepared to assume the added responsibility of doing the right thing, at the right time. Military forces are called to adapt to the future volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment, while witnessing in all Western nations (including the US) significant downsizing. The force structure will have to be smaller, flexible, agile and reversible with no loss to capabilities: daunting task for a smaller force with a wider scope of missions in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. A smaller force requires a professionalized force across the ranks with a "mission command" mentality. Where "mission command"<sup>24</sup> is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders

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<sup>23</sup> HAYCOCK Ronald G. 'Getting Here from There': Trauma and Transformation in Canadian Military Education", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol. 32, Nr 1, 2004. <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za>

<sup>24</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Mission Command, Field Manual 6-0 Draft* (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of the Army, August 8, 2011), 1-2.

in the conduct of unified operations. Thus mission command mentality enables initiative and the agility of leaders to take action appropriate to the situation. The trust, confidence, and abilities in junior leaders remains a requirement for success in a decentralized operating environment in which the lack of understanding and situation awareness causes potentially strategic complications.

So how does the military's framework of education and culture adapt to facilitate the basics required for success addressing the operational environment? An article in the "Cavalry and Armour Journal", highlighted the paradigm shift required for small unit leader development. It is noteworthy to underline the areas of emphasis required for proficient small unit leaders and future operational environments: these include and equate to understanding development, living/teaching the military values, building teams, understanding and operating in different cultures, working and incorporating external enablers (either technological or civilian agencies), advanced situational awareness of an ever-changing environment, comprehensive fitness (mental, spiritual, and physical), and social and family well-being.<sup>25</sup>

Reviewing the training methodology of the past, there exists a common theme of focusing on the fundamentals - the repetition of actions ensured the military did the right thing when directed. This mentality responded to the environment of a linear fight against a defined enemy force. In a nonlinear, VUCA milieu, the new method must enable the unit command to become a more relevant thinking participant. It has been argued that past military training lacked the focus on the cognitive skills development - enabling the skills to collect, analyse, adapt, and make critical decisions at the right time

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<sup>25</sup> BROWN MG Robert B., "9 as 1: Small-Unit Leader Development-a Paradigm Shift," The Cavalry and Armor Journal, November December 2011, 26

and place. Initially, this sort of muscle memory training methodology (repetition) enabled the development of the skills required for success in a linear environment, with a known enemy, and a centralized decision-making process. The military's deficiencies in training became apparent as the environment shifted to a more dynamic and demanding way of looking at the problem and required a holistic understanding of the ways and means outside of the trained expertise. The military education framework is thus required to develop officers who seek after the "why" of a situation, task or directive, the understanding of which makes better use of the purpose<sup>26</sup>.

Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin<sup>27</sup> summarized the linkages between military preparedness and the evolution of challenges stating that “in addition to the well-trained officer we needed during the Cold War, our jurisdiction during the era of globalization requires a well-educated officer as well”.

#### **1.4 Conclusion**

This first chapter aimed to set the scene in which military operations and missions currently take place. Such an environment is defined in military terms: volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA). As a consequence, besides traditional war-fighting, more and more crisis management activities are required: these encompass the whole range of missions from peace-keeping to peace making, from peace-enforcing to stabilization and state building etc., whose aim is partly about transforming societies so as to help the recipient states to move away from fragility and conflict. As such it is a highly political endeavour in a very complex environment: the effectiveness of crisis management largely depends upon the propensity of local

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<sup>26</sup> VANDERGRIF Donald E., “Today's Training and Education (Development) Revolution: The Future is Now! ” The Land Warfare Papers 76, 16 April 2010.

<sup>27</sup> MCCAUSLAND Jeffrey D. and MARTIN Gregg F., “Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st-Century Army”, in Parameters, Autumn 2001,

actors, both official and from civil society, to accept or even participate in the various external endeavours. Hence local ownership is crucial to the success of any Peace and Stability Operation: the key issue is related to the capacity of the local actors to accept and digest the societal changes that such an operation may imply. Local actors can either become enablers to the peace efforts for a stable society or represent 'spoilers' of a peace process or operation – and even become direct threats to the external peacekeeping presence. When this is the case, crisis management operations are, by and large, ill-equipped to respond<sup>28</sup>. UN and AU operations have been deployed in situations of open conflict. But either a 'no peace to keep' situation has paralyzed the activity of the institution (as was the case for the UN in South Sudan or Northern Mali) or, in the case of the AU in Somalia, it has simply transformed the operation into a peace enforcement endeavour.

This raises the issue of how adapted and adaptable peace operations are to the evolution of threats and conflicts and whether they should shift towards more robustness – for example, to confront armed groups, terrorism or organized crime.

The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)<sup>29</sup>, cited earlier, clearly underlines that the ability to adapt to the reality of war has been the key component in military effectiveness in the past and will continue to be so in the future. Beyond critical thinking, the outcomes of education, described in the cited white paper are: "

- the ability to understand the security environment and the contribution of all elements of national power;
- the ability to deal with surprise and uncertainty;
- the ability to recognize change and lead transitions;

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<sup>28</sup> TARDY T., *Ibid.*, p.15

<sup>29</sup> "The Joint Operating Environment 2010", available at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe\\_2010.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joe/joe_2010.pdf)

- the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment and understanding."

Therefore the answer to the new threats and challenges posed by the security environment are to be sought in the effectiveness of military education, that will constitute the object of my research in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 2

### **Military Education: concepts and challenges**

*Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe”*

*H.G. Wells, The Outline of History, p.1169*

#### **2.1 Overview of the Military Education System**

Before investigating the complex reality of education of military forces, it is important to define and clarify a few key concepts. First in my analysis I will refer mainly, although not solely, to education of military officers, as a specific branch of the “higher education” system as it is known in the civilian area in general. Military officers compose the highest category in the military hierarchy and this implies that an officer must possess the set of knowledge, skills and competences, that make her/him a suitable leader. On keeping with the challenges posed by a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment to military forces highlighted in the previous chapter, my research is focused on education as different from training; although education and training are strictly linked and both necessary, I share Prof Ronald G. Haycock’s view, in considering training a predictable response to a predictable situation, whereas education is a “reasoned” response to an unpredictable situation – which is critical thinking in the face of the unknown<sup>30</sup>.

Education is something that touches every single member of the military profession, and is as relevant for the civilians who cooperate with the military. Military education is a factor whose impact reaches outside the mere learning objectives as defined in the different curricula. Every top military official has nowadays attended during the course of his career military institutions, whose mission statement reflect the need to develop officers who are critical thinkers and

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<sup>30</sup> HAYCOCK Ronald G. Ibid. 2004 <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za>

problem solvers, who will be prepared for higher command and to serve effectively in national and multinational staff positions, within a framework of shared common values.

The aims of military education institutions are generally similar and most Western nations share a similar system of military education in officers' ranks, along the lines of a common pattern, generally constructed of four phases. Phase one is the course in the military academy or within a civilian university that leads to a commission as a lieutenant. Phase two is the intermediate officer education for lieutenants and captains, during which officers take courses in a specific field of military specialty as well as company-level leadership courses. Phase three and four constitute the higher-levels of education for officer. Phase three is commonly a one- to two-year general staff course in which the student is educated in the operational arts and also receives some education in strategy and political / economic issues, since an effective operational planner must be able to understand the environment and translate strategic intent into practical operational plans. Phase four is a course of varying duration (four to twelve months) for lieutenant colonels and colonels to educate them at the strategic level of conflict. This phase involves learning the difficult and highly complex mechanisms that combine the intent of the civilian leadership with the other civilian and military means to achieve national policy goals. In the fifth chapter I will briefly present one case of the fourth phase, or a strategic level course.

The Prussians invented the concept of higher officer education in the nineteenth century with the development of the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, a rigorous three-year course of education in the operational and strategic military arts that prepared officers to join a small elite general staff corps. That highly educated general staff corps, working with a common doctrine and understanding, developed the war plans

and operational training and concepts that made the Prussian Army a superior force on the battlefield. One lesson to learn from modern military history is therefore the central importance of higher officer education to the fighting power of the armed forces: military education can mean the difference between victory and defeat, success and failure.

In order for the national armed forces to obtain the adequate human capabilities for their missions, a European-wide observation<sup>31</sup> reveals that the basic officers' education is generally structured on two "pillars", which are the academic education and vocational training, supporting the leadership "pediment", a goal in its own. In fact being a military officer is not simply a "job" but a "vocation", because it has implications for soldiers' everyday life and it may require the ultimate sacrifice from them. Besides a leadership's role entails some distinctive features in interpersonal relationships, such as influence, vision, obligation, responsibility. I will explore more deeply the relevance of leadership in the military later on in this work, as leadership<sup>32</sup> is key to becoming a military commander in all aspects of the work as an officer: e.g. acting as a leader in coaching subordinates, or noting changes in the operational environment and reporting on them. Moreover ethics and leadership are inextricably intertwined: it may be easily argued that leadership is linked to behaviour, therefore

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<sup>31</sup> PAILE Sylvain (Ed.) "Europe for the Future Officers, Officers for the Future Europe -Compendium of the European Military Officers Basic Education". Department of Science and Military Education of the Ministry of National Defence in cooperation with the European Security and Defence College, September 2011

<sup>32</sup>There is an extensive literature on leadership. See for example: "The nature of leadership" editors David V. DAY, John ANTONAKIS, 2nd ed. SAGE Publications 2012. Previous publications more specific to the military domain include: Vesa NISSINEN, "Military Leadership Training, Development of Leadership Behaviour in the Finnish Defence Forces", Publication Series 1 Research Reports No 18/2001 (National Defence College, Helsinki 2001); James MAC GREGOR BURN, "Leadership", Harper Collins, New York 1978; Bernard M. BASS, "Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations", Free Press, New York, 1985

to ethics, and also that both are necessary for the particularity of the work and the cohesion that is required from armed forces.

Therefore the content of military education is not easy to determine, as isn't any debate on education, and getting it right requires a sound vision and direction from the national defence ministry and top defence staffs and the educational institutions. Anyone familiar to change management theory and practice would understand the pivotal role played by the top management in drafting and implementing a clear vision of the future. As I argued earlier, dealing with the implications of the current and future operational environment, it is certainly reasonable to assume that armed forces ought to be prepared to undertake a variety of military intervention operations. These may vary from relatively benign environments to situations where heavy combat or conflicts with irregular forces is likely. Armed forces need therefore to educate officers to face major conventional war scenarios as well as a diversified range of missions that include counter terrorism, irregular warfare, deter and defeat aggression, anti-access/area denial challenges, stability and counterinsurgency operations, humanitarian/disaster relief operations, supporting civil authorities, providing a stabilizing presence, and additional operations as required. These interventions raise a number of new, different and unique operational challenges; because the objective of military action, in the last decades, is not to defeat or destroy an enemy militarily but primarily to foster stabilization and protect populations, through combined diplomatic and military efforts, promoting local engagement and ownership, it differs from traditional war-fighting. To effectively prepare the military to handle the complex moral demands of combating irregular adversaries, military leaders must educate soldiers to see themselves not only as warriors who destroy enemies, but also as protectors who serve the public and

are, in a sense, members of the communities in which they operate. This means that the curricula of military education courses will have to be balanced, to include a variety of forms of warfare. Getting the right balance in the curriculum is a difficult task and requires coordination and dialogue between the top command levels and the leaders of the military education establishment.

In the words of the Italian Defence Minister<sup>33</sup> “the Defence will aim to create an integrated and modern military component, able to acquire, develop and sustain over time the skills best suited for:

- understanding the causes of modern conflict and the needs arising from the evolution of the international situation;
- preventing the emergence and consolidation of situations of risk or threats to the country;
- intervene quickly, precisely and effectively to handle crisis situations and to eliminate any threats to the security and interests of the country.”

Therefore the “forces should be organised, prepared, educated and trained to operate in multinational environments and as part of a larger deployment.” in order to achieve “integration and interoperability with the Allied Forces”.

Across the Atlantic, General Martin E. Dempsey the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in the white paper on Joint Education<sup>34</sup> stated clearly that the objectives of education and institutions review is aimed to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and critical thinking skills necessary to keep the pace with the changing strategic environment. Education represent a force multiplier in the effort to develop and advance the shared values, the

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<sup>33</sup> Libro Bianco (White Paper)

[http://www.difesa.it/Primo\\_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro\\_Bianco.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro_Bianco.aspx)

<sup>34</sup> DEMPSEY Martin E., Joint Education White Paper, July 16, 2012, available at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white\\_papers/cjcs\\_wp\\_education.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers/cjcs_wp_education.pdf)

standards and attributes that define the Profession of Arms. Later in this work I will examine these shared values with regards to military ethics, but here is a direct quotation on the profession of Arms from the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff :

*The Profession of Arms demands (...) each of us display moral courage and always do what is right, regardless of the cost. We are all volunteers in our willingness to serve and to place others' needs above our own. As shared values, our calling cards are Duty, Honour, Courage, Integrity, and Selfless Service. Commitment to the rule of law is integral to our values which provide the moral and ethical fabric of our profession.*<sup>35</sup>

As seen in the previous chapter the threats are now globalized and instability in one region of the world might bring insecurity everywhere in the world. Security, therefore, is also globalized and requires global actions. The profession of a military officer is necessarily one of the most “internationally-oriented” and thus it requires a certain degree of open-mindedness. This requirement is even stronger with regard to modern or “new” missions. International operations involving a deployment of armed forces are now multilateral in most cases, implying a philosophy of acting in concert. Interoperability, in its traditional meaning, is the ability of different components of national armed forces to work together with a common objective. At the multinational level, the North-Atlantic Alliance defines the interoperability as “The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks”<sup>36</sup>. Despite the source of this definition resides within the NATO Standardization Agency, the meaning of interoperability, in my view, stretches further than its technical

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<sup>35</sup>DEMPSEY Martin E., “America’s Military – A Profession of Arms” White Paper, July 16, 2012, available at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white\\_papers/cjcs\\_wp\\_profession.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers/cjcs_wp_profession.pdf)

<sup>36</sup>NATO Standardization Agency, Allied Administrative Publications AAP-6, 2009

connotation, or “standardization”, that is harmonization of national procedures or equipment. Being interoperable means to be able to work together in an any kind of context, overcoming differences of languages, nationalities, cultures, to unite towards a common objective and a shared set of values. It implies that officers might be prepared to suspend their belonging to a group – the Navy officers or the Italian officers, e.g. - for a group broader than nationality, language, culture, etc. Within this context the integration of different cultures, thus sharing the majority of values, appears to be the most challenging target.

Again the Italian White Paper<sup>37</sup> highlights how “The human element will remain central to the action of the military component, and it is essential to maintain this high level of professionalism over time. The ability to interact in multicultural and complex environments, the ability to understand situations as well as a spirit of invention and adaptability to different environments, will be the main human characteristics in which to invest.” Notably, it emphasizes “The armed forces are constantly evolving and relying more and more on the ability to react rapidly and adapt quickly to changing scenarios and needs.” Hence “aspects like the motivation to learn, the ability to view things long-term and the ability to solve problems, are essential qualities to be pursued by the Defence education system.”

Military education, in particular professional military education, has a strong bearing not only on military effectiveness but also on personnel cohesion. There has been a heated debate among scholars about the primary basis of cohesion. Some scholars have continued to emphasize that social cohesion derives on the intimate bonds of

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<sup>37</sup> Libro Bianco (White Paper)  
[http://www.difesa.it/Primo\\_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro\\_Bianco.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro_Bianco.aspx)

friendship among soldiers<sup>38</sup>. Yet, increasingly, scholars have stressed impersonal task-cohesion in which solidarity depends on the requirements of immediate goals, not friendship. The key to cohesion lies on trust and reliability, that is whether each is capable to do his/her job. Collective combat performance—cohesion—relies on professional competence<sup>39</sup>. Accordingly, individuals are judged not so much on their personal characteristics but their professional ability and they are accepted into the section, platoon, or ship on this basis.

An interesting example of the phenomenon of professionalized cohesion has been made by Eyal Ben-Ari et al.<sup>40</sup>: in the work on the Israel Defence Force (IDF) in Second Intifada they observed that Israeli combat units were reassembled and merged due to the exigencies of specific missions and troop availability; “the units were split time and time again—battalions into companies and companies into platoons and sometimes squads”<sup>41</sup>. IDF soldiers relied on swift

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<sup>38</sup> WONG, Leonard et al., *Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003); SIEBOLD Guy, “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion,” *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no. 2 (January 2007): 286-295; SIEBOLD Guy and KELLY D., *Development of the Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Manpower and Personnel Laboratory, 1988

<sup>39</sup>STRACHAN Hew, “Training, Morale and Modern War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 2 (April 2006): 211–27; Uli Ben-SHALOM, Zeev LEHRER, and Eyal BEN-ARI, “Cohesion During Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” *Armed Forces and Society* 32, no. 1 (October 2005): 63-79; Anthony KING, *The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Anthony KING, “The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Military,” *Armed Forces and Society* 32, no. 4 (July 2006): 493-512; Anthony KING, *The Combat Soldier* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> WONG Leonard et al., *Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003); Guy Siebold, “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion,” *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no. 2 (January 2007): 286-295; Guy Siebold and D. Kelly, *Development of the Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Manpower and Personnel Laboratory, 1988

<sup>40</sup> BEN-ARI ,Eyal et al., “Rethinking Contemporary Warfare: A Sociological View of the Al-Aqsa Intifada” New York: SUNY Press, 2010

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 74

trust to generate cohesion, they were able to cooperate with each other by reference to common tactics and procedures and adduced whether their new partners were competent and trustworthy in executing these tactics by means of accelerated processes of mutual testing.<sup>42</sup> Significantly, and against the classical theory of military cohesion, swift trust seemed to be as effective as deep social cohesion: “troops do not necessarily know each other, but the variety of capabilities, equipment, and perspectives they bring to missions allows much flexibility and the use of the lethal potential of the military to its fullest potential.”<sup>43</sup> This deepened professional solidarity which Ben-Ari et al have observed in the IDF can be easily paralleled with the emergence of “Forward Operating Base (FOB) cohesion” often experienced by western troops in Afghanistan and Iraq: that is, an impersonal cohesion among individual soldiers who patrol together but who may have had very little prior social contact. Western soldiers are very aware of the changing basis of solidarity on the frontline and, in interviews, were explicit about the transformation:

*There is no longer the need for section level cohesion. You go out with a platoon consisting of various elements; there is Patrol Based cohesion. There is FOB cohesion. From a psychological perspective, friendship is developed by professionalism not because someone is in your section*<sup>44</sup>

## **2.2 The Reform of Military Education: an ongoing debate**

One of the great dangers in military education is the problem of popular fads or interests that take hold in the imagination of the

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid, 81

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 87

<sup>44</sup>KING Anthony C. “The Female Soldier” Parameters 43(2) Summer 2013. OPTAG team, interview by author, Camp Bastion Helmand, Afghanistan, June 27, 2010

political and military leadership and are translated into demands that the military education institutions reorient themselves to follow the latest trend (or the most recent form of conflict). To maintain a sound education system, curricula need to be developed by education professionals, in dialogue with their defence staffs, with the aim to fostering critical thinking and the ability to adapt to ever-changing scenarios.

Dr. Peter Foot<sup>45</sup> responding to the cliché that generals – and by extension, staff and war colleges – prepare to fight the previous war rather than the next one, laid out today’s appropriate professional military educational targets when facing uncertainty and ambiguity, in the context of usable skills. Foot refers to Air Marshal Sir Brian Burridge (the British field force commander during the Iraqi war), who, taking his illustration from music, argued that modern militaries have to adapt to the requirements of jazz, not continue their preference for classical orchestral playing. Burridge aptly described the “cataclysmic” change in posture required to Defence Forces from the “Cold War” era to the “Post Modernism”, as follows:

*“Having been in the profession of arms through this transition, I likened it to performing as the second violin in a large symphony orchestra. The musical score defined the individual musician’s activity; set notation, probably written a long time ago, defines what to play and when; the conductor is somewhat distant; there is little room for creativity and the tempo is defined to within close limits. Even the style of playing is codified. More importantly, it is possible to practice over and over again, until the orchestra operates in perfect harmony.*

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<sup>45</sup>FOOT, Peter “Military Education and the Transformation of the Canadian Forces”, Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2006

*Now the musical equivalent is jazz. There is no sheet music. Improvisation is required around a central theme; the tempo is variable and complex, and mostly in the gift of whoever is the lead player at the time. The band is diverse in character yet has to be close-knit in approach. Each session produces a different treatment of the same tune. Jazz musicians live by their wits and the quality of their ear. Military commanders now also live by their wits and by their intuition”<sup>46</sup>*

*“Military adaptability to changing international conditions, Burridge argued, is the pre-requisite for applying national or international strategy – within the trinity of diplomacy, economic power and military power - using information effectively, taking an effects-based approach, making careful judgments over legality, assessing risk, and being ready to act in a timely fashion. As with military campaigning, so it is with jazz. Basic skills are vital and are inculcated at an early stage. It is the later exposure to varieties, alternatives and examples that gives the new performer his or her special contribution to the whole”.*

In the aftermath of the report addressing the challenges of Professional Military Education produced by the United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services<sup>47</sup> numerous scholars and researcher in military education debated around its ability to prepare the military to operate in the current operations environment. One of the most interesting passages was its focus on education toward intellectual agility:

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<sup>46</sup> BURRIDGE Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian, 4 June 2004, The Annual Lecture St. George’s House : ‘The Principles and Practice of Military Intervention in the Post-Modern World’, pp. 8-13.<http://www.stgeorghouse.org/lectures/>

<sup>47</sup>“Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Twenty Years After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel,” H.A.S.C. publication No. 111-67, May 20, 2009

*the current Professional Military Education (PME) system should be improved to meet the country's needs of today and tomorrow. (...) PME, therefore, must remain dynamic. It must respond to present needs and consistently anticipate those of the future. It must continuously evolve in order to imbue service members with the intellectual agility to assume expanded roles and to perform new missions in an ever dynamic and increasingly complicated security environment.*<sup>48</sup>

I will not review the status of current reform initiatives but simply draw from the debates and the research papers produced to highlight the traits relevant for this research. The Professional Military Education (PME) system in the US encompasses a complex of institutions, varying from the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, PA, to the Naval War College in Newport, RI, just to mention a few.

Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor and former Chair of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, in her article "The Reform of Military Education. Twenty-five years later"<sup>49</sup> argued that neither the Joint Staff responsible for PME, nor the individual military services, have seriously tackled what education for intellectual agility, as opposed to training, entails. When training and education are viewed interchangeably, intellectual agility is sacrificed to training-friendly metrics, whose checklists include common educational standards, a taxonomy of desired learning achievements, learning objectives, learning areas, requirements for faculty and student, till defining the percentages from the different services. Johnson-Freese recalls the position of the two founders of

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<sup>48</sup> "Another Crossroads," p. vii.

<sup>49</sup> JOHNSON-FREESE Joan, "The Reform of Military Education: Twenty Five Years Later," *Orbis* 56 (Winter 2012)

the Naval War College, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, who, according to a history of the College, maintained that:

*The college curriculum required large blocks of time for the students to read and to think actively about the abstract problems presented. It was not a course in which data was poured into the ears of students by a series of lectures. The lectures were only a stimulus to the main thrust of the college.*<sup>50</sup>

Therefore Johnson-Freese points out that education, then as now, requires critical thinking and reflection, which takes time. While training has right and wrong answers which allow immediate progress measurement, education is incremental and involves grappling with ambiguity, especially now that Armed forces face with an ambiguous and ever changing operational environment.

Despite the training-friendly approach, adopted in most of the PME colleges, the former commandant of the Army War College, Robert Scales, lamented the apparent deterioration of the value placed on PME in 2010:

*“Throughout the services officers are avoiding attendance in schools, and school lengths are being shortened. The Army’s full-term staff college is now attended by fewer and fewer officers. The best and brightest are avoiding the war colleges in favour of service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The average age of war college students has increased from 41 to 45, making this institution a preparation for retirement rather than a launching platform for strategic leadership”.*<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> HATTENDORF John, et al., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, RI Naval War College Press, 1984), pp. 27-28

<sup>51</sup> SCALES, R. “Too Busy to Learn.” Proceedings, February 2010, <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-02/too-busy-learn>

Scales suggests that modern military leaders suffer from the same cultural bias toward action rather than reflection that permeated the British Army in World War I, with the consequence that the deaths of more than a million almost failed to erase it, and he warns against the risks we might encounter if following a similar intellectual discourse. His solution is to change the military's reward system to elevate soldier scholars rather than denigrate them. He advocates a return to the day when uniformed officers rather than civilian instructors and contractors are assigned to the schoolhouse to teach, not because their careers are dead-ended, but as career enhancing assignments on the way to even higher levels of responsibility.

Dr John Reed, former Army officer and now a tenured faculty member at the University of San Diego, underlines in his article "What's Wrong and What's Right With the War Colleges" the importance for military officers to have a place where they can delve deeply into the nuances of their profession, and most importantly plumb the tensions, intricacies, and limitations of military operations in a democracy, where uninformed and undereducated officers who control vast amounts of military power can fall, or be led, to serious mischief:

*"the adult learning model, seminar method, use of case studies contextually appropriate to a unique group of experienced practitioners, and the many opportunities to engage in no holds barred professional discussions with a parade of flag officers and civilian officials are bright spots that should not be underestimated for their positive impact on future senior military leaders If done properly*

that very process can serve as an important protection of the republic.”<sup>52</sup>

The US National Defence University (NDU) is implementing major reforms in the graduate-level programs it provides senior military officers and other national security professionals. The basic rationale for the change at NDU is that in a period of declining defence budgets and increasingly complex security challenges, there’s the need for the best strategic leadership possible. Christopher J. Lamb and Brittany Porro<sup>53</sup> reviewed the different criticisms (table 1) to explain the changes taking place and why additional steps to reinforce and extend the changes are necessary.

**Table 1. Senior War College Problem Areas According to Critics**

Sources Evaluating Adequacy of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)	Institutional Problems: Who Teaches What, How, and to What End?				Systemic Problems: Support for and Management of JPME	
	Faculty	Curriculum	Methods	Rigor	Support	Leadership
Cronin (2010)	X	X	X	X	X	X
Government Accountability Office on DOD JPME study (2013)		X				
House Armed Services Committee study (2010)	X	X	X			X
Johnson-Freese (2012, 2014)	X	X	X	X	X	X
Reed (2011, 2014)	X			X		X
Ricks citing Daniel Hughes (2011)	X			X	X	
Scales (2010)	X		X		X	X
Wiarda (2011)	X	X		X	X	X

Sources: Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010); Patrick M. Cronin, "PME: A Strategic Education," *Marine Corps Gazette* 94, no. 6 (2010); *Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development: Report to Congressional Committees*, 2013; Joan Johnson-Freese, "The Reform of Military Education: Twenty Five Years Later," *Orbis* 56 (Winter 2012); Kevin P. Kelley and Joan Johnson-Freese, "Getting to the Goal in Professional Military Education," *Orbis* 58, no. 1 (2014), 119–131; George E. Reed, "What's Wrong and What's Right with the War Colleges," *DefensePolicy.org*, July 1, 2011; George E. Reed, "The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College," *Joint Force Quarterly* 72 (1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2014); George E. Reed, "Examining the War Colleges: An Administrative Perspective," conference paper presented at the Reforming Professional Military Education: A Clash of Professional Ethics session at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, April 5, 2013; Thomas Ricks, "Need Budget Cuts? We Probably Can Start by Shutting the Air War College," April 11, 2011; Ricks cited Daniel Hughes chapter in Douglas Higbee, *Military Culture and Education* (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2010); Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy to Learn," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 136, no. 2 (2010); Howard Wiarda, *Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: A Clash of Cultures* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011).]

Lamb and Porro quote General Martin Dempsey, who argued that developing capable future leaders is the best hedge against an austere and uncertain future. Good leaders, he noted, can “see us through when our organizational structure is not perfect, when technology comes up short, when training misses the mark, and when

<sup>52</sup> REED George E., “What’s Wrong and What’s Right with the War Colleges,” *DefensePolicy.org*, July 1, 2011

<sup>53</sup> LAMB & PORRO, “Next Steps for Transforming Education” JFQ 76,( 1st Quarter 2015)

guidance is late to need.” In the future, leaders who can think through complex problems, out-think adversaries, reconcile context, uncertainty, and surprise, and seek and embrace adaptability will be “our decisive edge.”<sup>54</sup>

In accord Dr. Steven Metz, Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College argues that the purpose of the war colleges is actually a mix of professionalism (that is, sharing a body of knowledge related to the military mission) and higher education, which includes developing critical thinking skills<sup>55</sup>: senior leaders want strategists who understand not only current doctrine but also how to cope with emerging national security problems.

This is precisely the point that many military and not military leaders have been making: education need to impart the critical thinking skills that will allow future leaders to adapt and perform well in a dynamic, complex security environment.

An even harsher debate on the necessary reform of Military Education took place in Canada following the publication, by the Canadian Minister of National Defence<sup>56</sup>, of an excoriating report that roundly condemned the poor state of leadership, ethics discipline, professional knowledge and education in the Canadian Armed Forces particularly among officers. It was recognized that the current warfare, whether conventional, peacekeeping or asymmetric, has placed new and more challenges to what the military needs to know and how they

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<sup>54</sup> DEMPSEY, “From the Chairman: Building Tomorrow’s Leaders,” Joint Force Quarterly 67 (4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2012)

<sup>55</sup> METZ Steven, “Strategic Horizons: U.S. Professional Military Education on the Chopping Block,” World Politics Review, April 17, 2013, available at [www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12879/strategic-horizons-u-s-professional-military-education-on-the-chopping-block](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12879/strategic-horizons-u-s-professional-military-education-on-the-chopping-block)

<sup>56</sup> DND, “Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces” by The Honorable M. Douglas Young, PC, MP, Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs, 25 March 1997.

must act. As Prof. Ronald G. Haycock underlined “*Contemporary soldiers are confronted by a bewildering range of civil, cultural and political factors foreign to their traditional martial skills. They must be knowledgeable and analytical with it all to do their jobs; and to use Sir Michael Howard’s phrase, they must have a “liberal conscience.”*”<sup>57</sup>

As mentioned earlier the number of European crisis management operations in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and multinational military operations launched by European Union Member States have increased<sup>58</sup>. That caused a fast-growing need for a stronger interoperability of military forces, not only with regard to the pure technical and procedural aspects but also to the ability for the European military officers to work closely and effectively together. Recent studies<sup>59</sup> have, in fact, underlined that the classical mission assigned to the armed forces in the countries of the European Union, i.e. the physical defence of the national borders and territory, while not obsolete, yet cannot be regarded as the daily task of the different services anymore. Internal and external security of the Member States must now be assured beyond national borders, following multiple forms and in cooperation with a new range of partners. Military therefore need to adapt in order to add new functions and capabilities to the core of their assignments: acting alone, for the armed forces of a State, has become unlikely and new partners have emerged, in the sense that, especially in the European context, participation of civilian actors to the missions and operations for peace is frequently part of the mission, as it is gaining

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<sup>57</sup> HAYCOCK Ronald G. ‘Ibid., 2004 <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za>

<sup>58</sup> TARDY T., Ibid., 2015

<sup>59</sup> PAILE Sylvain (Ed.) Ibid., September 2011

the political and democratic support both inside and outside the Union – specifically in the countries where the operation is set.

Education of a European military officer, therefore, values flexibility and open-mindedness in order to create adequate capabilities for the future security of the Union. These values are assimilated as early as possible in the educational and training process of future military elites since, in many European States, young officers will be confronted with the international dimension of their job as soon as they are posted as leaders of units. One way to foster this ability is to integrate the education across Europe. This recognition set the basis for the launch of an European initiative on the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus in 2008<sup>60</sup>. In the field of military education, a closer cooperation not only among the European Armed Forces, but also among civilian agencies is a precondition for the military to be able to face challenges and threats which cannot be overcome acting alone.

### **2.3 Philosophy of education's impact on military education**

The on-going struggle in military education is not new in the area of education: such an important social domain has attracted the attention of philosophers for thousands of years, especially as there are complex issues aplenty that have great philosophical interest. Restated more explicitly in terms familiar to philosophers of education, the issues the debate above skimmed over were: education as transmission of knowledge versus education as the fostering of inquiry and reasoning skills that are conducive to the development of autonomy. For some critics, that this kind of debate takes place at all in the field of military education, is surprising in itself: the traditional

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<sup>60</sup>2903rd External Relations Council meeting, Brussels 10 and 11 November 2008; <http://www.emilyo.eu>

military education rested more on the concept of obedience than on that of autonomy. This change of perspective is visibly linked with the change in the operational environment, on which I elaborated earlier on in this research. For the aim of this research it suffices to reflect on the social significance and depth of the field of education, recognizing that the issues it raises are multifaceted and complex: authoritative handbooks in the field<sup>61</sup> cite philosophers such as Adorno, Aristotle, Carr, Derrida, Descartes, Dewey, Foucault, Habermas, Hager, Hegel, Horkheimer, Kant, Locke, Lyotard, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Plato, Rawls, Richard Rorty, Rousseau, and Wittgenstein. The list conveys something of the diversity of the domain and its open nature even enticed other theorists and researchers from disciplines other than philosophy, such as the behaviourist B.F. Skinner.

It is worth noting how the issues highlighted above mirror some of the questions philosophers of education have been debating down the ages: the distinction between educating versus training versus indoctrination; the apparent contrast between education for personal development or education for citizenship; the supposed dichotomy between theory and practice. I maintain that in views of John Dewey and William James the function of theory is to guide intelligent practice and problem-solving, therefore my understanding is to hold that the “theory v. practice” dichotomy is a false one. Nonetheless I see the reasons underlying some of the critiques moved to Military Education when trying to steer the curriculum from immediate

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<sup>61</sup>BLAKE, N., SMEYERS, P., SMITH, R. and STANDISH, P. (2003) *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK  
CURREN, R., (ed.), 2003, *A Companion to the Philosophy of Education*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK  
CURREN, R., (ed.), 2007, *Philosophy of Education: An Anthology*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK

progress measurement, in favour of an incremental approach to education, granting the time for reflection needed to grapple with ambiguity. For the purpose of this research I drew mainly from the work of David Carr<sup>62</sup> in his effort to present a coherent perspective on education and the issues related to it, starting with the basic idea that education is profoundly implicated in the essentially normative task of promoting *personal* growth. The concept of person that Carr maintains is distinct from human being and is that of a bearer of rational and practical capacities, values and traits of character. To this extent, he calls upon the doctrine of the great French founding father of modern philosophy, René Descartes - the so called Cartesian dualism – supporting the idea that minds or souls are immaterial entities that are metaphysically or ontologically distinct from the physical bodies with which they are associated. The significant truth in this idea is that human persons are indeed not identical with the biologically constituted bodies of human beings, and that features of human personality, character and value do seem resistant to explanation and understanding in the natural scientific terms of physics, chemistry or biology. Indeed a form of Cartesianism seems to survive even in Kant's *Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason* where he promotes the idea of the moral agent as a non-empirical subject of an other-worldly moral law. For Kant there can be no genuine personhood without the freedom of rational autonomy or self-determination – but, in turn, no such self-determination apart from the rational disinterest and impartiality that characterises the moral law: for Kant the *real* person is not the empirical self of familiar everyday association, but rather the metaphysical self of transcendent practical rationality.

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<sup>62</sup>CARR David, *Making Sense of Education*, Routledge Falmer London and NY (2003)

From this brief exploration of the conceptual relationship between education and personhood – from, indeed, the suggestion that education primarily concerns the promotion of personhood – Carr argues that ideas of person and education are essentially normative notions: from this viewpoint, personhood is best understood as a function of the initiation via education and other processes of socialisation into the values, habits, practices, customs and institutions constitutive of peculiarly human culture. What may be considered peculiar about human culture, therefore is that it is the free outcome of the actions and decisions of rational agents who are able to design and steer their lives in the light of reasons not completely explicable in the quantitative terms of natural science. From the time of Plato onwards philosophers noted the problematic gap between causal and normative explanation and understanding, such as the appreciation of non-instrumental person – constitutive dimensions of knowledge, understanding and skill as those features that enable us to understand ourselves, the world around us and our relations with others.

Following the publication of the works of Rawls, a body of work in philosophy has systematically examined the foundations of liberalism, and philosophy of education has been drawn into the debate<sup>63</sup>. An animated dispute around the aims of education in a pluralistic society swept through the academia, with deep fundamental disagreements<sup>64</sup>: Callan and White<sup>65</sup> have given an analysis of why this topic have become such a focus of attention. “What has been

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<sup>63</sup> PHILLIPS, D.C. and SIEGEL, Harvey, "Philosophy of Education", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/education-philosophy>

<sup>64</sup>CALLAN, E., 1997, *Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford

<sup>65</sup> CALLAN, E., and WHITE, J., 2003, “Liberalism and Communitarianism”, in *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education*, N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith and P. Standish (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp.95-109

happening in philosophy of education in recent years”, they argue, mirrors “a wider self-examination in liberal societies themselves”. Both external factors affecting World’s events, from the fall of communism to the spread of ethnic conflicts to internal challenges like the famous US Supreme Court’s ruling (*Wisconsin v. Yoder*<sup>66</sup>) - ‘have all heightened consciousness of the contingency of liberal politics”. In assessing this decision the philosophic community suggests that a balance has to be attained between (i) the interest of civic society in having an informed, well-educated, participatory citizenry; (ii) the interest of a group in preserving their own culture; and (iii) the interests of the children, who have a right to develop into autonomous individuals who can make reflective decisions for themselves about the nature of the life they wish to lead.

The concept of autonomy developed by Oxford-trained liberal theorist Moira Levinson offers a well-articulated argument supporting her vision of the ideal liberal education in *The Demands of Liberal Education*. Levinson maintains the aim of liberal education, to be<sup>67</sup>:

*“to teach (..) the skills, habits, knowledge, and dispositions (..) to be thoughtful, mature, self-assured individuals who map their path in the world with care and confidence, take responsibility for their actions, fulfil their duties as citizens, question themselves and others when appropriate, listen to and learn from others, and ultimately lead their lives with dignity, integrity, and self-respect—i.e. to be autonomous in the fullest sense of the word”*

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<sup>66</sup> *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) No. 70-110, where the Court recognized the right to members of the Amish community to withdraw their children from public schools before they had reached the age of sixteen, for, it had been argued, any deeper education would endanger the existence of the group and its culture. <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/case.html>

<sup>67</sup> LEVINSON, M. (1999) *The Demands of Liberal Education*. New York: Oxford University Press, p.164

Surprisingly this concept is not too distant to the aim of military education as described earlier, i.e. developing critical thinking combined with the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment and understanding, the ability to deal with surprise and uncertainty and the ability to recognize change and lead transitions. Therefore it might be argued that philosophy of education has a play on military education and even that military education might be considered from a normative perspective a liberal education in the sense that it requires above all the intellectual and moral resources and capacities for critical interpretation of information or knowledge, in order for the military to be able to take principled and/or discriminating decisions

The benefits of a liberal education have again been put under the spotlight by the famous speech held at the UN General Assembly by the Peace Nobel Prize winner Malala Yousafzai, who argued “one child, one teacher, one pen and one book can change the world.”

Most of the recent critics to liberal education, beside the misuse of Malala’s figure for purely pro-drone strikes propaganda, rely on its being "deconstructive" in contributing to the profound spiritual crisis in the Western world of our time. One critic<sup>68</sup> describes this spiritual “ruthlessness” recalling the famous words of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche - "God is dead" - taking heed of the impact liberal education may have on those cultures which are deeply religious, where the very discourse on the "death of God" is deemed as spiritually "decadent" and secularly "offensive."

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<sup>68</sup> BAOFU Peter, Ph.D. ‘The Story of Malala, and its Misuse for the Western Culture War’ 29 Nov 2013  
Available at: [http://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/columnists/29-11-2013/126274-malala\\_stroy-0/](http://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/columnists/29-11-2013/126274-malala_stroy-0/)

Yet a recent article by Rabbi Dr. Shmuly Yanklowitz<sup>69</sup> - the President & Dean of the Valley Beit Midrash, Founder & President of Uri L'Tzedek, Founder and CEO of The Shamayim V'Aretz Institute – bears warnings to the dangers of not embracing liberal education even within religious institutions, “There is an ongoing fear that allowing students to think for themselves will lead them towards the "wrong" options. This is a mistake. Religious institutions have to see the dignity in students and honour their right to make choices and to think critically and openly. Disagreements should be part of the process, but they must be understood in context. Discouraging honest debate is the antithesis to an informed student body.” He argues that misinformed students will never grow up to be productive citizens, concluding that religious institutions will only flourish with a more open, inclusive, and intellectually nuanced approach.

A debate on education has recently sparkedled also within the Muslim world, due to the endeavor of Sheikh 'Abdullah bin Bayyah, as the head of the Forum for the Promotion of Peace in Muslim societies, a UAE-based think tank, who promoted a series of initiatives<sup>70</sup> within the Muslim world to counter the activity of "criminal groups" that "alarmingly distort [Islam's] fundamental

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<sup>69</sup> Rabbi Shmuly Yanklowitz, ‘Religious Pedagogues Should Embrace Liberal Education’ 19 Jan 2016

Available at: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-shmuly-yanklowitz/religious-pedagogues-should-embrace-liberal-education\\_b\\_8993136.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-shmuly-yanklowitz/religious-pedagogues-should-embrace-liberal-education_b_8993136.html)

<sup>70</sup> In 2010 Sheikh 'Abdullah bin Bayyah initiated the New Mardin Declaration, which sought to address certain fatwas by 14th century Hanbali Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyya that are invoked as authoritative by the *takfiri* Salafi-jihadi movement. In 2014, the Sheikh was a prominent signatory of the open letter to ISIS "caliph" Al-Baghdadi that used Islamic sources to refute the Islamic State's religious doctrine and to condemn the torture, murder and destruction committed by this organization. For more on this see:

MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1205, “Delegitimizing ISIS On Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi By Muslim Scholars”, November 24, 2015  
MEMRI Daily Brief No. 76, “Marrakesh: Steps Towards A Solution Or Confusion?”, February 6, 2016.

at <http://www.memri.org>

principles and goals." On January 25-27, 2016, Muslim scholars and intellectuals from over 120 countries, along with representatives of Islamic and international organizations, as well as leaders from diverse religious groups and nationalities, convened in Marrakesh to discuss the protection of religious minorities in Muslim-majority countries and on January 27, the participants issued a closing statement, the Marrakesh Declaration<sup>71</sup>. Drawing from the 7th century Charter of Medina, the declaration advocates the protection of minority rights as integral to Islamic heritage and history: the Charter of Medina, according to the declaration, contains "principles of constitutional contractual citizenship such as freedom of movement, property ownership, mutual solidarity and defense, as well as principles of justice and equality before the law", thus providing the basis for guaranteeing human and citizen rights in the constitutions of modern Muslim states, and also calls for "Muslim educational institutions and authorities to conduct a courageous review of educational curricula."

## **2.4 Conclusion**

C.P. Snow<sup>72</sup> in his REDE Lecture in 1959 on the "two cultures" underlined how education is key to closing the gap between the scientific and the humanities approach. He argued "it is a necessity in the most abstract intellectual sense, as well as in the most practical. When those two senses have grown apart, then no society is going to be able to think with wisdom".

If we agree the difference between scientific analysis and normative theory to be in the difference between what the world *is* and what it *ought to be*, we can recognize the innate normativity of education in so far as it is concerned in what the students *should*

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<sup>71</sup> <http://www.Marrakeshdeclaration.org>

<sup>72</sup> <https://www.rbkc.gov.uk/pdf/Rede-lecture-2-cultures.pdf>

develop into. It is probably safe to say that education has usually been regarded as to some extent implicated in moral development and/or the cultivation of positive human value.

The relation between education and social reform has been investigated at length, centring upon whether education is essentially conservative, or whether it can be an (or, the) agent of social change. In my research I will focus on its capability to become an agent of change in the military domain, in relation with the new military operations. Critical normative and ethical scrutiny in the context of professional educational and policy making may constitute the kind of educated reflection and deliberation, that are needed in today's operational environment to form the normative reasoning ultimately concerned with promoting force protection together with the well-being of populations involved in a wider moral sense, balancing risk and applying the principles of proportionality and discrimination.

In the Aristotelian tradition strict impartiality is not the most salient feature of moral thought, as there may be no less injustice in treating un-equals equally than there is in treating equals unequally. In this regard I might argue that military education has to remain an essentially 'Socratic' practice in the sense that its foundations lay not in having more knowledge than others, but in its keener appreciation of the complexity of the issues and of the limits of understanding it all.

Both in the Socratic view, as in current military doctrine, wisdom is a kind of critical capability.

These abilities though need to be coupled with the ethical behaviour required by the military profession. As mentioned earlier on, expanding the ethics education of senior military leaders is critical to meeting the demands of current hostilities and the challenge of preserving the trust of the public and allies. In the words of Gen. Dempsey "trust stands out as the defining element that enabled our

military to overcome adversity and endure the demands of extended combat”<sup>73</sup>. To maintain this elusive trust, military leaders must keenly understand the tension inherent in completing martial missions both adroitly and ethically. Recognizing the intricacy of these issues entails a reflection on the pervasive relevance of ethics education, on-keeping with the famous quote from President Theodore Roosevelt “To educate a man in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society”, on which I’m going to elaborate more in the next chapter dedicated to Military Ethics.

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<sup>73</sup> DEMPSEY Martin E., America's Military-A Profession of Arms – White paper , available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white\\_papers.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers.htm)

## CHAPTER 3

### **Military ethics within the framework of political philosophy**

*“If a ruler sets himself right, he will be followed without his command. If he does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed”*

*Confucius*

#### **3.1 Origins and evolution of liberal thought: a brief review**

Western liberal thought developed since the seventeenth century ideas regarding the origin of the state, the concept of the nation-in-arms and the possibility of restraining conflict through codified law and international convention. The debates around these ideas, which involved thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mills, Hegel and Marx, extending to the more contemporary Rawls and Gauthier, contributed to compile the notion that a single thread of thought can be traced back to classical Greece. This line of thought provides the foundations for designing a just society, on the basis of shared moral values. The salient trait of a liberal conscience consists in individual autonomy, or free will, restrained by others’ right to self-determination, according to the so called “liberal harm principle”,<sup>74</sup>: as such it can be argued that liberal conscience encompasses in itself toleration and respect.

The debate between and among philosophers about the identification and nature of shared values is a central issue in moral philosophy, and it is not a discourse that will lead to unequivocal

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<sup>74</sup> The liberal harm principle marks the limits of individual freedom in John Stuart Mill’s liberalism. See: J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, in M. Warnock (ed.), *Utilitarianism*, London, Collins, Fontana Library, 1970

answers. The foremost work of Kymlicka<sup>75</sup> endorses a new conception of the rights and status of minority cultures, consistent with liberal democratic principles, aiming to overcome “classical” liberal objections to recognizing such rights on the grounds of individual freedom, social justice, and national unity. The recognition of different perspectives in the matter should not preclude the pursuit for common aspects of social behaviour that can bridge the cultural differences that exist between different groups, if the society is to advance. According to philosopher, social and political theorist, Sir Isaiah Berlin, values are not transcendent but rather creations of mankind, and yet that the nature of mankind is such that certain values – the importance of individual liberty, for instance – will hold true across cultures. In fact, despite Berlin’s contribution to the philosophical discourse promoted the concept of “value pluralism”, he maintained that “We must not dramatize the incompatibility of values - there is a great deal of broad agreement among people in different societies”<sup>76</sup>. As his endorsement of a minimum area of negative liberty for any decent human life and his animus towards authoritarian regimes demonstrate he recognized the universality of basic liberal values. According to Berlin “the world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others”<sup>77</sup>. This is a world of moral conflicts and dilemmas, the resolution of which must undergo a process of reasoned decision making, without yielding to general relativism: the ability to understand the values of other

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<sup>75</sup> KYMLICKA Will, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995

<sup>76</sup> BERLIN Isaiah, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Murray, London 1990

<sup>77</sup> BERLIN Isaiah, *Liberty*, ed. H. Hardy, Oxford University Press ,2002 (pp 213-214)

cultures entails a shared framework of reference, i.e. common metrics. One principle of a liberal regime is that it seeks to justify itself "at the tribunal of each person's reason"<sup>78</sup>, liberal citizens need to be capable of reasoning for themselves - i.e. to make autonomous judgments - hence to act reasonably and to address their fellow citizens with reasons they can be expected to share.

The idea of a reasoned moral decision making is on-keeping with the Aristotelian tradition as developed in depth by Kant: the person with practical reason (*phronemos*) decides how the competing considerations should be balanced, through accumulation of experience in dealing with cognate situations. The human capacity to understand other cultures, through the universality of human experience, and empathise with their values presupposes a common "human horizon"<sup>79</sup>, or a shared field of liberal values. Rawls expands the reasoning even further and his account of public reason relies on citizens who have been educated to share a "sense of justice." In Rawls's words a stable society requires an "overlapping consensus" on the conception of justice. Insofar as liberalism provides special weight to concept such as toleration, personal autonomy and human rights, hence our ability to understand other cultures implies a set of universal liberal values.

### **3.2 Liberal values and moral philosophy in education**

Liberalism influenced deeply the philosophy of education particularly in the field of moral philosophy. Kant's approach to moral development emphasised that 'the human being is not born as it is but grows and develops over time into an autonomous person. Kant's

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<sup>78</sup> WALDRON, Jeremy, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," in *Philosophical Quarterly* 37 (1987): 127-50.

<sup>79</sup> BERLIN, Isaiah, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Murray, London 1990 (p.80) *Ib.* *The Proper Study of Mankind*, ed. H. Hardy & Hausheer, London Chatto & Windus, 1997

understanding of moral development was one of progression through three stages; disciplining, cultivating and civilising and finally moralising, what Rawls defined as the “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”<sup>80</sup>. Kant argued that ‘through disciplining, the child learns to accept norms which restrict his freedoms so that it is compatible with the freedom of others (...)the child learns to govern himself in accordance with these norms’<sup>81</sup>. In his views discipline foster the development of an understanding of what constitutes society’s moral code and norms.

In his work Kant highlighted how the process of learning and growing liberates the child from “the despotism of desires” and he thereby acquires the liberty of ‘human choice’.<sup>82</sup> Kant described the second stage of moral development as when youth becomes cultured through the acquisition of certain skills and knowledge leading to the development of understanding, judgement and reason. Kant maintained that at the stage of a young adult, the youth becomes both cultured and civilised and through this they develop an ability to judge and reflect on the worth of their actions and the development of self-discipline to act in such a way that fits in with the established social norms. Unlike the disciplining stage of moral development, obedience to following moral norms is not just the fear of being punished but is based on a sense of honour and shame and a desire for social acceptance. The final stage of moral development, moralising, is the process of the youth accepting to obey the moral norms not just because they do good themselves but because the acceptance of moral norms is good in itself. Kant upheld that ‘moralisation aims to bring

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<sup>80</sup> RAWLS, John, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980." *Journal of Philosophy* 77 (1980): 515-572

<sup>81</sup> FORMOSA, Paul, "Discipline and Autonomy: The Kantian link between Education and Morality," in *Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary*, eds. Klas Roth & Chris Surprenant. New York: Routledge, 2011: 163-76.

<sup>82</sup> FORMOSA, Paul, *ib.*.

the pupil to acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends...and this requires not only that he does good, but that he does it because it is good'. This is backed up from what Kant claims 'requires not only the capacity to correctly judge moral particulars and to correctly understand the normative basis of such judgements in the requirement of practical reason, but also the acquisition of a disposition or character to always act in accordance with such judgements'.

Similarly in Rawls we can trace a three stage account of moral development, based on the assumption that the child matures in a well ordered society realizing the principles of justice as fairness<sup>83</sup>. The first stage is the "morality of authority": at this stage the child simply finds himself subject to injunctions set by his parents. He cannot question the legitimacy of these injunctions since he lacks, at this age, the very concept of justification. The second stage is that of the "morality of association". This stage commences when the child begins to be aware that he occupies various social roles. At this stage morality is understood as consisting of standards of conduct for the particular roles and stations that one occupies. Eventually the adolescent comes to realize how the various roles and associations fit into a general system of cooperation which he recognises as just, as benefiting all members, and as maintained by the evident good will of others. The final stage is that of the "morality of principles"; on reaching the third stage of development one moves beyond the upper end of the morality of association where a person understands the principles of justice, but his motive for complying with these principles derives largely from his personal ties and fellow feeling for others, and his concern for the approbation of the wider society. At

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<sup>83</sup> RAWLS, John, A Theory of Justice. Rev. edition (1999) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

this level the inner motivation springs by becoming attached to the principles “of justice” themselves. A “moral person” is characterized by two "moral powers." The first is the capacity for the “sense of justice”, where one can understand, apply, and act from a conception of justice. The second is the capacity to formulate, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good.

The quest for justice has continued to engage the attention of philosophers across time and space. Rawls<sup>84</sup> endorses a notion of egalitarian liberalism, which postulates the idea that there should be a balance between two concepts frequently regarded as being in tension: individual freedom and social equality. The term ‘social justice’ implies ideas of mutual obligation and a certain legal and institutional monitoring of the distribution of opportunities between citizens, such that all are given a fair and equal chance to succeed in life: a “stable society” requires an “overlapping consensus” on the conception of justice. On the other hand classic liberal theorists such as Nozick<sup>85</sup> have rejected Rawlsian theories of social justice (i.e. those implying moderate constraints on individual freedom and some redistribution of resources from the most to the least advantaged). They emphasise individuals’ entitlement to keep whatever resources/ advantages they earn or inherit, passing this on to their children as they see fit with no right for state or society to intervene. Conversely advocates of equal opportunities are concerned with the principles of fairness, equity and justice. The debates revolves around how to treat people as moral person (human beings) and allocate certain limited resources. Justice in relation to equality seeks to ascertain how people should be treated in the distribution of all or certain social resources, welfare and roles.

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<sup>84</sup>RAWLS, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

<sup>85</sup>NOZICK, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)<sup>86</sup> in his first article asserts that 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood'.

This assertion stems from the tragic events of the 20th century, when authoritarian dictatorships exposed what carnage a technically efficient and tactically well trained military forces could inflict to the world when fired by nationalist or racist doctrine.

Studies on liberal education and moral development are intensely intertwined both with the theme of citizenship<sup>87</sup> (as noted in the previous chapter) and with the research on leadership, the latter also being the object of a continued and keen interest in the military field, on which I will elaborate further, later on in this work.

Within the Western perspective, notions of citizenship beyond the state have existed for two thousand years and have reflected the diverse political and socio-cultural contexts of the time periods in which they were formed<sup>88</sup>. In the period of the Roman Empire, the Stoic tradition of “world citizenship”, for example, encouraged citizens to work for the “common good” and emphasized the “universal law of nature”. With the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant introduced the term “cosmopolitan citizen”<sup>89</sup>, through his reflections on an interconnected world community. In the 20th century, notions of the global dimension of citizenship deepened during the First and Second World Wars, contributing to the development of key global

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<sup>86</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>

<sup>87</sup> CALLAN, E., 1997, *Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford

<sup>88</sup> HEATER, D., *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*. St. Martin's Press(1996)

<sup>89</sup> KANT, I., *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on politics, History and Morals*. Hackett Publishing (1983)

governance institutions such as the United Nations, which were created in an effort to establish universal values that transcended national and cultural boundaries. Throughout the 20th century, supra-national institutional bodies continued to broaden, including transnational corporations, civil society organizations, women's and anti-racist movements, The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bureau of Education. Within the educational field UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization) was specifically created in order to respond to the firm belief that political and economic agreements are not enough to build a lasting peace, and that in fact there are principles which are essential cornerstones on-which an education for a humanistic and international society must be built. Peace must be established on the basis of humanity's moral and intellectual solidarity.

International cooperation initiatives also led to the creation and signing of key conventions and treaties strengthening the legal framework for "global values", with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a foundation. As an example it suffice to recall the Vienna declaration issued at the World Conference on Human Rights where it was unanimously agreed that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and inter-related (June 1993, Vienna). In accordance to the following Action plan, UNESCO issued a set of guidelines on Values for the Humanistic & International Dimension as a means of fostering humanistic and international understanding<sup>90</sup>. These guidelines are based on the belief that there are principles which are essential cornerstones on-which an education for a humanistic and international society must be built. In the planning and implementation of educational experiences three key ideas (namely

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<sup>90</sup>CIDREE/UNESCO Publication, 1993 ISBN 1 85955 090 8

cooperation, interdependence and autonomy) provide a unifying base for development of the below-listed principles, which must be coupled with openness, in the sense of a willingness to discuss and to listen:

- a sense of self-esteem;
- a respect and tolerance for others;
- a sense of belonging (meaning that all must have a secure physical, emotional and political locus within society);
- a sense of social responsibility (meaning an understanding that the diverse society in which we live must recognise the imperative to act with tolerance and responsibility in relation to social, political, cultural and environmental factors);
- an appreciation of the importance of learning (meaning a recognition that knowledge, in whatever construction, is a means to new understandings, insights, creative opportunities, and an appreciation of the interconnectedness of our world).

It appears palpable the parallel that can be drawn between these principles and the constituent elements of 'Intercultural competence'<sup>91</sup> that has figured very prominently in the debate about 'global citizenship', especially as referred to the "desired" attitudes i.e.:

- Respect: seeking out other cultures' attributes; value cultural diversity; thinking comparatively and without prejudice about cultural differences
- Openness: suspending criticism of other cultures; investing in collecting 'evidence' of cultural difference; being disposed to be proven wrong;

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<sup>91</sup> DEARDORFF Darla K. in *Journal of Studies in International Education*, Fall 2006, 10, p.241-266 and in *The SAGE Handbook of Intercultural Competence*, 2009 (Thousand Oaks: Sage).

- Curiosity: seeking out intercultural interactions, viewing difference as a learning opportunity, being aware of one's own ignorance

- Discovery: tolerating ambiguity and viewing it as a positive experience; willingness to move beyond one's comfort zone .

Similarly in the context of the National Symposium organized by the International Education Association of Australia, global citizenship has recently been defined as: “an attitude or disposition towards others and the world; underpinned by moral and transformative cosmopolitanism and liberal values (openness, tolerance, respect and responsibility for self, others and the planet); more than a technical efficiency or competence; a mind-set for mature, critical, ethical and interconnected thinking; underpinned by ethical capacities that cannot be easily captured by surveys or quantitative measurement; positioned along a continuum of development; a non-prescriptive and variable concept”<sup>92</sup>.

Today, competing notions of global citizenship (such as cosmopolitan, multicultural, universal, and/or virtual citizenship, to name a few) coexist, revealing an range of varied perspectives and core themes under the broader notion of global citizenship. A recent publication<sup>93</sup> makes a compelling argument regarding the existing interconnection between global citizenship and the understanding of human rights as universal, with specific reference to those contained in United Nations' declarations and covenants. Challenging those who argue that human rights must “necessarily [differ] according to group

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<sup>92</sup>LILLEY, K. (2014). Educating global citizens: translating the 'idea' into university organisational practice. Discussion paper prepared for an International Education Association of Australia National Symposium: 'Fostering global citizenship and global competence', Melbourne. Retrieved from [www.ieaa.org.au](http://www.ieaa.org.au)

<sup>93</sup> Ali A. ABDI and Lynette SHULTZ (Eds.). *Educating for Human Rights and Global Citizenship*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York (2008) (pp. 3 – 4)

and context”, Ali A. Abdi and Lynette Shultz state that “universal human rights creates a vision of a world of diversity where all humans have an equitable claim to the rewards and privileges of their social, economic, political, and cultural context”. In their view human rights transcend national boundaries and are inherent to all individuals and groups including those who live in “global spaces where fragile or nonexistent states...cannot guarantee the rights of citizenship”.

Steering the discourse towards military education, the twentieth century events revealed how the military might become willing pawns at the hands of rulers - if isolated from politics and society and limited in horizon by increased training and the absence of a truly liberal education. If the quote by Clemenceau that “war was too important to be left to the generals” is correct, contemporary research highlights also that it is too important to be monopolized by any one interest group<sup>94</sup>. Contemporary researcher Recchia in his work concluded that an independent military leadership that actively participates in policy debates on the international use of force, by vigorously (and sometimes publicly) expressing its professional concerns, is key to restraining hawkish civilian officials and ensuring an effective strategic assessment.

The Military need to adapt in order to add new functions and capabilities to the core of their assignments: acting alone, for the armed forces of a State, has become unlikely and new partners have emerged. In fact participation of civilian actors to the missions and operations for peace is frequently part of the mission, as it is gaining the political and democratic support both inside and outside a single State or within the European Union, but most crucially in the countries

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<sup>94</sup>S. RECCHIA, “Objective Control Revisited: The U.S. Generals as a Check on Civilian Hawks”, paper presented at the 2013 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco

where the operation is set. It suffice here to cite one example: the combined migrants/Libyan crisis and the continued endeavour by Italian authorities and military forces to gain the support of the UN, of the UE and of the nascent national Libyan Government.

The concept of justice and particularly that of “social justice” is highly relevant from a political philosophy perspective but it is also crucial in a military education discourse in order for the military not only to be able to fully comprehend the security environment in which they operate, but also to actively participates in policy debates on the international use of force.

The traditional just war theory distinguishes between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. This distinction has been elegantly described by Michael Walzer:

*“War is always judged twice, first with the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. The second is adverbial: we say that a war is fought justly or unjustly... The two sorts of judgment are logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules”.*<sup>95</sup>

As thoroughly analysed in a recent publication<sup>96</sup> in the classical philosophical thought “the basis for intervention varied a great deal: they ranged from humanitarian rationales, which included the imperative to rescue fellow human beings abroad from egregious harm, such as cannibalism and human sacrifice (Vitoria); the punishment of vicious oppression by a tyrannical ruler (Grotius); or

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<sup>95</sup>Walzer, M. “*Just and Unjust Wars*”, Basic Books, New York, 1992, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed..

<sup>96</sup> “Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill”- Edited by Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh Cambridge University Press, November 2013

stopping large-scale massacres of religious or ethnic minorities (Mazzini) – to the need to “preventively” oppose and neutralize looming dangers – whether stemming from pirates hiding in foreign lands (Suarez); states threatening to disrupt the traditional balance of power (Vattel); or revolutionary governments that more fundamentally challenge the European political order (Burke)”. Contemporary discussions on just war have dealt also with the dilemma of the *jus in bello*, especially in the United States, where the debate has been largely centred on the way the war in Vietnam was conducted as pointed out on several occasions, by Walzer himself<sup>97</sup>.

Beard<sup>98</sup> in a recent articles suggests a different perspective, seeing the internal character of military personnel as being just as important as the moral character of the acts they perform. Reviewing the origins of the Just War Theory, enshrined in the *jus ad bellum* conditions listed by Aquinas, i.e. the of just cause, right intention and legitimate authority, Beard underlines Aquinas’ *in bello* concerns later expressed in his *Summa Theologica*, where Aquinas reflects on the virtues that bear most directly on those who fight in wars. Thus he highlights how the attention on the “military ethics” appears inherent to the birth of the Just War Theory.

Each of the above mentioned rationales for waging war maintain its usefulness in the contemporary debate concerning the legitimate basis for intervention, although in terms of military intervention and associated risks, the views of most of the thinkers steer towards a more cautious and sometimes sceptical direction, in adherence to Kant’s warning of the dangers of power and interest in corrupting the moral purpose. As we know Kant maintained that human beings all

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<sup>97</sup>Walzer, M. *Arguing about War*, Yale university Press 2004

<sup>98</sup> Matthew BEARD (2014) Virtuous Soldiers: A Role for the Liberal Arts?, *Journal of Military Ethics*, 13:3, 274-294

have the same dignity, and in virtue of this dignity they deserve to be treated as equals. Whenever individuals are treated unequally on the basis of characteristics that are arbitrary and irrelevant, their fundamental human dignity is violated. Justice, then, is a central part of ethics and should be given due consideration in evaluating any decision. In face of the obligation to treat all persons equally if this is not the case we must determine whether the difference in treatment is justified. As John Rawls has underlined the stability of a society—or any group—depends upon the extent to which the members of that society feel that they are being treated justly. When some of society's members come to feel that they are subject to unequal treatment, the foundations have been laid for social unrest, disturbances, and strife. The members of a community, Rawls holds, depend on each other, and they will retain their social unity only to the extent that their institutions are just.

The role of any education institution, therefore, is to attempt to educate its pupils so that they develop an understanding of “the world that [they] encounter in ordinary experience”<sup>99</sup>, its moral conflicts and dilemmas, the resolution of which must undergo a process of reasoned decision making. As argued earlier liberal citizens need to be capable of reasoning for themselves - i.e. to make autonomous judgments - hence to act reasonably and to address their fellow citizens with reasons they can be expected to share.

### **3.3 Ethics in military education**

The combination of the afore-mentioned concepts demands for a sound military education: “soldiers have to be as well educated as the

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<sup>99</sup> BERLIN Isaiah, Liberty, ed. H. Hardy, Oxford University Press , 2002 (pp 213-214)

civilians lest they become mere superbly trained automata”<sup>100</sup>. Warfare of the last six decades, whether conventional, cold war, peacekeeping or now asymmetric and irregular, has placed new and more challenges to what the military needs to know and how they must act.

Contemporary “western” military are confronted by a bewildering range of civil, cultural and political factors foreign to their traditional martial skills. They must be knowledgeable and analytical with it all to be able to fulfil their mission and do their jobs; overall, to use Sir Michael Howard’s phrase, they must have a “liberal conscience”<sup>101</sup>. When dealing with operations so called “other than war” it is crucial they acquire the human capacity to understand other cultures, through the universality of human experience, in order to seek that “overlapping consensus” on the conception of justice, required for a stable society. Hence military personnel need to act as “moral person” insofar as they need to be capable to make autonomous judgments, as well as to act reasonably, according to a “sense of justice”, and to address their fellow citizens with reasons they can be expected to share. As mentioned earlier a liberal conscience provides the ability to understand other cultures by a set of universal liberal values.

In this era of global connectivity many armed forces of the world are under increasing public scrutiny, and if their members behave in a fashion which the public deems morally reprehensible it may destroy public support for their mission. Immoral behaviour by even the lowest ranking soldier can have a strategic effect, as

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<sup>100</sup> Ronald G. HAYCOCK ‘Getting Here from There’: Trauma and Transformation in Canadian Military Education”, *ScientiaMilitaria*, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 32, Nr 1, 2004. <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za>

<sup>101</sup>HOWARD, M. “War and the liberal Conscience”, Columbia University Press Second edition 2008, ISBN-10: 0231700482

witnessed by the impact of the images of Private Lynndie England, at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The present time has been aptly defined as the era of the “strategic corporal.”<sup>102</sup>

“The cornerstone of service must remain dignity and respect among all members of the force. The mortar is leadership. We must set the example of extraordinary character and exceptional competence at every echelon. (...) The ethical decisions and proper behaviour of each member of the Joint Force mould our professional reputation. Each one of us - from the private to the general - represents the whole of our profession. Our actions speak louder and echo longer than our words”.<sup>103</sup>

When viewed in this manner, the conflict between role and ordinary morality is overcome, as that which is contrary to ordinary morality indirectly undermines the mission by destroying public support, and is therefore also contrary to role morality. Hilliard Aronovitch in an article in *Journal of Applied Philosophy* concluded: “Effective fighters are also ethical fighters, good soldiers in the one sense are also good soldiers in the other sense ..... Hence, good soldiers must in certain ways be good persons as well.”<sup>104</sup>

However this ultimate goal needs to be balanced against the dangers represented by the potential upwelling of a spirit of elitism: if we teach individuals that they must be “moral” and that their

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<sup>102</sup> As General Charles C. KRULAK noted in 1999, “In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests—the Strategic Corporal.” General Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” *Marines Magazine*, 28 (1999), [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic\\_corporal.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm)

<sup>103</sup> Martin E. DEMPSEY, From the Chairman “Mount Up and Move Out” JFQ 72, (1st Quarter 2014)

<sup>104</sup> Hilliard ARONOVITCH, “Good Soldiers: A Traditional Approach,” *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 18(2001), 17

institution demands and upholds the highest standards, there is always a danger that members of those institutions will come to regard themselves as morally superior to those outside the military. Perversely, anything they do then becomes moral in their eyes, because they are “good” and so whatever they do must be good<sup>105</sup>. At the German Zentrum für Innere Führung<sup>106</sup> (Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre), the aim of ethics education is to ensure that the ethics of soldiers coincide as closely as possible with the society they serve, ensuring that soldiers continue to view themselves as citizens, not as members of some special caste. The principles of Innere Führung serve to reduce to a tolerable level any tensions or conflicts arising between the individual rights and freedoms of service personnel as citizens on the one hand, and the demands of their military duties on the other. A key aspect is that the leadership behaviour of superior officers must be imbued with respect for human dignity. Unsurprisingly, given the shared history leading the II World War, the German approach to view the “soldier as citizen in uniform.”<sup>107</sup> is not dissimilar to what is affirmed in the recent Italian White Paper:

“As part of their activities, the armed forces constantly refer to the moral and ethical values of the nation they represent. Loyalty, a sense of duty, tradition, the awareness that a mission might pose a

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<sup>105</sup> Maurice KEEN, a notable modern scholar of ancient chivalry, in his study of European knights in the Middle Ages explains this phenomenon. It was, he claims, precisely the high-minded chivalric propaganda and indoctrination about serving the weak, the Church, and ladies, that convinced knights that fighting was a godly activity and that, therefore, the more they slaughtered the better they were. Maurice Keen, “Chivalry, Nobility, and the Man-at-Arms,” in *War, Literature, and Politics in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. C. T. Allmand (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press, 1976), p. 45

<sup>106</sup> Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 2005 of Armed Forces Personnel, p.206

<sup>107</sup> ROBINSON, Paul “Ethics Training and Development in the Military” Parameters, Spring 2007, US Army War College Quarterly

threat and the protection of the best interests of the nation, are part of a culture that should be emphasized, strengthened and passed on to future generations. These values must permeate all of the Defence staff activities in the belief that preparation, i.e., respect of human life and a sense of justice, remain the pillars of public service” [...] “A real sharing of the same framework of values between citizens and their armed forces requires constant communication and assiduous interaction between the parties, who make transparency, public interest and constructive criticism the basis of the trusting relationship which should always exist between institutions and citizens”<sup>108</sup>

Responsibility is at the very heart of citizenship. Thus military ethics and military education are of crucial importance to the creation of a military which is knowledgeable, reasonable, and which combines the sense of belonging with accountability and the capacity for ethical action. As argued earlier, acting fairly in the context of a just political order just does require a different kind of person than one whose role is to close with and destroy largely distinguishable enemy forces. This entails that professional military education systems will have to pay attention to cultivating all the traits necessary to effectively move between traditional and non-traditional warfare. Capacity building and stabilization operations can be realized through the promotion, respect, and protection of the rights and freedoms recognized under both domestic and international law. As articulated earlier, according to John Rawls, the stability of a society depends on the extent to which the members of that society feel that they are being treated justly: therefore while ensuring the rights of the majority, the rights of minorities must likewise be taken into account. Furthermore, simply pointing out that a particular tactic is effective in

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<sup>108</sup> Libro Bianco (White Paper)  
[http://www.difesa.it/Primo\\_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro\\_Bianco.aspx](http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/20150429Libro_Bianco.aspx)

the short term is not sufficient to morally justify it, besides being susceptible of developing into ineffective in the long term. Not recognizing those trade-offs entails negative consequences of their own: in fact while one cannot avoid making certain trade-offs, in choosing targets and tactics, it does not follow that one must either concede defeat or commit unethical acts. On the contrary it implies that one is obligated to seek alternatives to practices that make a fetish of tactical victories, according to the overarching duty of protecting fellow soldiers and avoiding civilian casualties. Successful ethical reasoning, just like successful practical reasoning, entails balancing competing demands, not selectively ignoring them. Concerning the principles on which ethics education should be aimed to, there is broad consensus that the objective should be to foster individuals who are able to cope with ethical challenges independently and act “autonomously”. These individuals need to be able to recognize that the values they believe in are more important than merely obeying orders or succumbing to peer pressure. Scholar and academic Susan Martinelli-Fernandez argues in favour of a Kantian approach to moral education in the military “The goal of moral education... is not merely to get the agent to follow rules. It is the cultivation of moral agency, an agency that involves one becoming an independent, right thinking and right acting person”<sup>109</sup>

Autonomous thinking, though, is not always valued in the same way in the military context. Officers such as the UK’s Flight Lieutenant Malcolm Kendall-Smith and the US’s Lieutenant Ehren Watada, refused to obey orders to serve in a war they considered

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<sup>109</sup> MARTINELLI-FERNANDEZ Susan, ‘Educating Honorable Warriors’, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol.5, Iss.1, 2006, p. 57 Another example in recent academic literature include WORTEL Eva and BOSCH Jolanda, ‘Strengthening Moral Competence: A ‘Train the Trainer’ Course on Military Ethics’, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol.10, Iss.1, 2011, pp.17-35

illegal and immoral (the Iraq conflict). They thought about the issues, reached an autonomous decision on what was right, refused to compromise their values, and took a step which they knew would result in personal hardship; the military's response in both cases was to punish them<sup>110</sup>.

The episode regarding British General Sir Mike Jackson during the Kosovo Operation tells an opposite story: Gen. Jackson refused to obey the order of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), US General Wesley Clark, to attack the newly-arrived Russian contingent at Pristina airfield in Kosovo, and ultimately his refusal led to the relief from command of Gen. Clark. In his memoirs, Clark reported Jackson as having said: "Sir, I am not going to start the Third World War for you...".<sup>111</sup>

The Italian Supreme Court's judges must have followed a similar reasoning when they recently condemned the Serbian Air Force officers responsible for the knocking down of two Italian helicopters deployed in Croatia as part of the European Monitoring Mission in 1992<sup>112</sup>. The sentence in fact not only found guilty the Serbian Government, but also the Mig21 Pilot, responsible for obeying an illicit order, as well as the entire line of command, that issued it.

This is consistent with the foremost work on military ethics drawn by the Italian Admiral Cristiano Bettini, where he powerfully affirms that the capstone of military education taught within Military Academies goes beyond the respect of given rules (as if military ethics could be included in the field of professional deontology) in the sense

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<sup>110</sup> ROBINSON Paul, "Magnanimity and Integrity as Military Virtues", *Journal of Military Ethics*, 6:4, (2007) p.259-269

<sup>111</sup> CLARK Wesley K., "Waging Modern Warfare: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat" (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 394

<sup>112</sup> OSSINO Andrea, "Elicottero italiano Abbattuto. Serbia Condannata.", *IL TEMPO* 15/09/2015

that it is aimed the development of “autonomous individuals”<sup>113</sup>: the acme being selfless service and duty, in so far as they are they are exercised with “discrezione” and “prudenza”. In this context “discrezione” means the ability to make decisions and take actions, on the basis of a sound reasoning aimed to the “common good”; whereas “prudenza” retains its Latin (*prudencia*) meaning of wisdom, cultural awareness and respect for others. The concept of Duty is therefore broader than its strict sense, and it encompasses the “moral imperative” combining the freedom of choice and the necessity of restraint, i.e. liberty and responsibility.<sup>114</sup>

A US researcher<sup>115</sup> aptly underlined how overcoming the fear to act, making ethical decisions, and having the internal fortitude to take action decisively count when the everyday activity of the military profession wields the power of life and death. Therefore it is paramount that individual student develops the capability to act ethically when events demand, wielding their ordained power in both a legal and ethical manner. Tension exists between the efficient accomplishment of missions and conformity with fundamental social values, and between personal morality and that of the military profession. Ethics mediates this constant tension; choices often must be made between imperfect solutions when there is no time for the luxury of deep reflection. Ethics education edifies soldiers (soldier, in this discussion, refers to all military personnel) who are not ethics specialists, inducing them to develop professionalism, self-control, and “moral intuition.”

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<sup>113</sup>BETTINI, Cristiano, “La formazione etica - Guida per ufficiale e funzionari”, Laurus Robuffo Ed. Roma 2013, p.27-29

<sup>114</sup> BETTINI, Cristiano, ib. p.42-48

<sup>115</sup> MAJOR Edward, “Ethics Education of Military Leaders”, MILITARY REVIEW March-April 2014 ,pp 55-60

The room that political/moral philosophy might have in military ethics education has been significantly debated.<sup>116</sup> Lectures on deontology, liberalism or other philosophical systems often are not seen as directly relevant to the practical needs of the military. Nonetheless there are pitfalls in entirely excluding philosophers from what is after all their intellectual terrain: I've argued earlier how crucial the devolvement of critical thinking, the liberty of "human choice"—resultant from some philosophy education – might be for all military officers. At a conference held at the University of Hull - a leading institution in Ethics and Social Justice, and the base of the Military Ethics Education Network (the MEEN) - along a similar reasoning Dr. Cook noted that cadets at the US Air Force Academy generally consider their required philosophy course "one of the very best in the core curriculum", underlining how it is the one place where "cadets engage in sustained normative reflections and learn some skills for doing so . . . and where they engage in sustained critical thinking about complex problems."<sup>117</sup>

Robinson notes that "the approach adopted in most armed forces is that of "virtue ethics"<sup>118</sup>, that essentially, seeks to ensure moral behaviour by instilling certain virtues, as, for instance, in the example given by Adm. Bettini of the characterization of autonomous individuals. This majority approach is consistent with the legacy of Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*, where for Aquinas, 'happiness... consists in an operation of virtue' (I-II q. 4 a. 7). In this context the activities that serve to instantiate the virtues in people can be morally

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<sup>116</sup> ROBINSON, Paul "Ethics Training and Development in the Military" Parameters Spring 2007,

<sup>117</sup> COOK, Martin L. "Ethics Education, Ethics Training, and Character Development: Who 'Owns' Ethics in the US Air Force Academy," presented at the University of Hull, 22 June 2006, as cited by P.ROBINSON, ib.

<sup>118</sup> ROBINSON, Paul "Ethics Training and Development in the Military" Parameters Spring 2007

laudable paths by which individuals can achieve flourishing: the military life, with the virtues that it requires and fosters, could be one such path to flourishing. The advantage, from a military standpoint, of this approach is that in combat there are intense pressures and little time for deep intellectual philosophizing. In such situations having an individual who will behave properly due to conditioned responses is highly desirable. Consequently, many military academies have adopted an approach based on Aristotelian “virtue ethics.” Asa Kasher<sup>119</sup>, author of the Code of Ethics of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) criticized an approach based solely on virtue ethics: he argues that since the focus of most Western armed forces, as well as the justification of most wars, in recent years, has been humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations, it makes little sense to teach soldiers only “military” ethics. The use of the term “warrior ethics”<sup>120</sup> has become rather obsolete and at times contested, most scholars favouring a distinction between the terms soldiers and warriors. In the words of the American author Ralph Peters: Warriors are “erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect them, and do not obey orders they do not like.”<sup>121</sup> Warrior ethics and virtues according to such interpretations are undesirable, especially in an age where soldiers are rarely involved in direct combat, but are more likely to conduct “operations other than

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<sup>119</sup> KASHER Asa “The Spirit of the IDF: The Ethical Code of the Israel Defence Forces”,

[http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society\\_&\\_Culture/IDF\\_ethics.html](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/IDF_ethics.html).

<sup>120</sup> For a critique of “warrior” ethics see: Thomas St. Denis, “The Dangerous Appeal of the Warrior,” Canadian Military Journal, 2 (Summer 2001), 31-38; Robert Fisk, a retired US army officer, “Ethos of the Destroyers: The American Military’s Cult of Cruelty,” Counterpunch, 16-17 September 2006, <http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk09162006.html>.

<sup>121</sup>PETERS, Ralph "Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?" (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1999),p. 32

war.” These operations require a very different approach to that of the traditional combat soldier. Professor Kasher also argues that military ethics should not be ethics applied to the broad category of military affairs, but rather a concept directly related to what constitutes correct behaviour for military personnel. “In the IDF, ethics training begins with the development of professional identity, not with conventional morality. Soldiers in modern democracies tend to be moral relativists. They regard talk of morality as an external imposition. But if you talk in terms of professional development and identity they are more accepting. Instead of starting with lists of virtues and attempting to indoctrinate the individual soldier, one needs to first expose the individual to what it means to be a soldier in a democratic state. This means that the starting point of ethics training should be the principles of liberal democracy, its values and norms.”<sup>122</sup>

Beard<sup>123</sup>, debating how Augustine and Aquinas would describe the virtuous soldier, underlines first and foremost that the “virtuous soldier” has to be a “virtuous person”: a person who habitually and wilfully chooses actions that promote the good in a particular situation, i.e. he/she will be the type of person who willingly chooses to do what is right without any external motivation to do so. In other words, according to what presented earlier in this chapter, a person who has achieved the “moralizing” stage of Kantian personal development and is able to recognize Rawls’ “sense of justice”, having reached the “morality of principles”. Thus, if the virtues are habits to act rightfully that direct a person towards happiness ( cfr. Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica*, I-II q. 4 a. 7), for virtuous military personnel, involvement in military life becomes an active contributor

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<sup>122</sup>As reported in Paul ROBINSON, “Ethics Training and Development in the Military” Parameters Spring 2007

<sup>123</sup> BEARD Matthew (2014) Virtuous Soldiers: A Role for the Liberal Arts?, *Journal of Military Ethics*, 13:3, 274-294

to their moral and psychological well-being, allowing them to reconcile their involvement in war with their living a morally praiseworthy and personally satisfying life.

By comparing the lists of the virtues produced in most Armed Forces, it appears manifest that although these may vary from country to country and service to service, they have considerable overlap. In Italy the Military Disciplinary Code<sup>124</sup> maintains at its core the loyalty towards the democratic institutions, with discipline and honour, sense of responsibility and “reasoned” (consapevole) solidarity towards others as central values (art 9); the principle of obedience (art. 5) is balanced by the duty to take initiative when necessary for the mission (art.13). Similarly examining the United States Army “Values”<sup>125</sup>, namely Duty, Honor, Courage, Integrity, and Selfless Service, the “Core Values”<sup>126</sup> of the British Army, i.e. Selfless Commitment, Courage, Discipline, Integrity, Loyalty, Respect for Others, or those of the Canadian Forces, Duty Loyalty Integrity Courage, the similarities between lists suggests that there is a common core of military virtues on which a set of universal values might be derived.

Examples of military worth and respect for the opposing parties as other human beings is not purely theoretical, and examples can be found in past history: to cite one for all, the Italian Navy Commander Salvatore Todaro, on board the Italian Navy submarine “Cappellini” during the battle in the Atlantic Ocean, after sinking the British vessels Eumaeus and Shakespeare, and the Belgian vessel Kabalo

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<sup>124</sup>Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 11/07/1986 N. 545. Approvazione del regolamento di disciplina militare, ai sensi dell'art. 5, primo comma, della legge 11 luglio 1978, n. 382

<sup>125</sup>. DEMPSEY, Martin E, America's Military-A Profession of Arms – White paper , available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white\\_papers.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers.htm)

<sup>126</sup> Ministry of Defence (Army), “Values and Standards of the British Army: Commanders’ Edition”, Army Code 63813, 2000, pp. 6-11, also available at <http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/regiments/24654.aspx>

rescued and brought to safety their respective crew, and was consequently awarded the bronze, silver and gold medals of honour for his endeavours.

A contrasting position is expressed by Carrick <sup>127</sup>, who fears that relying on universal, morality to govern warfare will generate a kind of ‘moral schizophrenia’ and advocates for a ‘ring-fencing soldiering within the notion of professional role morality’. He argues that since soldiering involves deeds that defy everyday morality, such as intentional killing, as such, it is preferable to educate soldiers so that they see the practice of soldiering as a separate moral realm from that of everyday life, in order to provide substantial psychological protection for soldiers who are asked to kill. To avoid a dangerous kind of slippage, one must insulate what a soldier does from the rest of his moral life by referencing his professional role; that is, embracing a kind of role morality.

I already expressed some concerns regarding the danger of separating military’s ethics from the citizens’ ethics ( as linked to the concern for a possible surge of elitism), however there are a series of study tacking the matter from a different viewpoint: Professor Nancy Sherman<sup>128</sup> maintained that in large part the moral schizophrenia is unavoidable for the modern soldier, mainly due to the huge gulf between ‘peacetime’ and ‘wartime’ morality. In fact Sherman, underlining that what a person does actually affects the type of person he or she is, highlights the reverse: if soldiers are encouraged to think of soldiering as entirely separate from other walks of life, there will be

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<sup>127</sup> CARRICK, Don. (2008) The Future of Ethics Education in the Military, in: Paul Robinson, Nigel de Lee & Don Carrick (Eds), *Ethics Education in the Military* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 187–198

<sup>128</sup> SHERMAN, Nancy. (2010) *The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds and Souls of our Soldiers* (New York: Norton).p.115

inevitable seepage where aspects of their soldiering are habituated, or haunt them in the form of guilt:

“Border passing” – that is, moving between civilian roles and the roles required in uniform and in war – is neither morally nor psychologically simple. The passage can subject both psychologically strong and morally good persons to feelings of shame and remorse, as well as to traumatic symptoms’.

In kind Gregory Reichberg<sup>129</sup> emphasizes why Aquinas chooses to situate his discussion of war within a discussion of the virtues: because he believes that ethical conduct in war requires the same character traits as does ethical conduct in other walks of life, and that the virtues of soldiering must be directed towards happiness in the same way as other virtues. Accordingly the model proposed by Berghaus and Cartagena<sup>130</sup> is aimed to develop soldiers ‘in a holistic manner’, focusing on ‘character traits in the professional and personal domains of their moral selves’, and it appears better suited to protecting against moral schizophrenia (viz. fragmentation) than does a role morality approach.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

In an era in which societies are increasingly insistent that soldiers must exercise restraint, minimize collateral damage, and so on, the sole acceptance of the ‘force protection’ logic is arguably no longer adequate. Greater efforts need to be made to encourage military personnel to consider themselves ‘citizens under arms temporarily enabled to the use of force’ i.e. members of a broader group which encompasses civil society. Therefore ethics education methodology

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<sup>129</sup> REICHBERG, Gregory. (2011) Aquinas’ Moral Typology of Peace and War, *Review of Metaphysics*, 64(3), pp. 467–487.

<sup>130</sup> BERGHAUS, Paul T. & CARTAGENA, Nathan L. (2013) Developing Good Soldiers: The Problem of Fragmentation within the Army, *Journal of Military Ethics*, 12(4), pp. 287–303.

should steer towards more a “values-based” approach, building on the more traditional and simplistic “virtue”/ “role morality” one (virtues representing desirable characteristics of individuals, such as courage; and values representing the ideals that the community cherishes, such as freedom and respect). Robison aptly provided further reinforcement for this idea: “If armed forces explicitly promote courage and loyalty to comrades, but not respect for human dignity and human life, one should not be surprised that, if in a difficult moment there is a conflict between the former and the latter, many will choose the former. That might have been appropriate in past eras when the primary task of soldiers was the waging of conventional war. In a time of supposed humanitarian operations, for which public opinion demands the highest standards in the treatment of civilians (and of captives), more emphasis on virtues such as respect for human dignity would seem to be required. By placing virtues such as ‘respect for human life’ and ‘respect for human dignity’ on an equal footing with courage and loyalty, and by educating soldiers to value more deeply the opinions of those outside their immediate circle, we may find a place for both internal and external honour within a more satisfactory military ethics. It is not that we want soldiers who do not care about what others think of them; it is that we want soldiers who are willing, when it is suitable, to risk the disapproval of their comrades to win the approval of those whom they serve.”<sup>131</sup>

However, to be effective, ethics education should be practically oriented and relevant to the soldier, sailor, or airman: in the next chapter I will address the operational relevance of liberal values and ethics, particularly in connection to the concept of leadership. The development of ethical habits of mind is essential to equip the

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<sup>131</sup> ROBINSON Paul (2007) Magnanimity and Integrity as Military Virtues, *Journal of Military Ethics*, 6:4, 259-269

individual leader with the ability to react professionally to rapidly changing environment and tactics and to foster trust within military organizations and alliances with partner forces. Moving moral sensitivity to the point where the individual leader possesses the courage to act upon it is peremptory. This calls for the enhancement of the leader's "self-sustaining capacity to be a moral actor [even] in the absence of social sanctions or reinforcements."<sup>132</sup>.

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<sup>132</sup> HANNAH Sean T. and SWEENEY Patrick J. "Frameworks of Moral Development and the West Point Experience: Building Leaders of Character for the Army and the Nation," from *Forging the Warrior's Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer*, Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 127, citing USMA Circular 1-101, Cadet Leader Development System, 2002

## CHAPTER 4

### Leadership and Ethics

*‘Leadership is a matter of intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, and discipline . . . Reliance on intelligence alone results in rebelliousness. Exercise of humaneness alone results in weakness. Fixation on trust results in folly. Dependence on the strength of courage results in violence. Excessive discipline and sternness in command result in cruelty. When one has all five virtues together, each appropriate to its function, then one can be a leader.’*

*Sun Tzu*

As highlighted in the first chapter in connection with the changing operational environment, General Martin Dempsey has identified the notion of “mission command” as a critical capability to the concept of Joint Force 2020<sup>133</sup>. He maintains that “the education of (..) officer corps—joint and service—must begin at the start of service to instil the cognitive capability to understand, to receive and express intent, to take decisive initiative within intent, and to trust.” By recalling the definition of mission command provided by the US military doctrine i.e. “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.”<sup>134</sup> It can be perceived how comfortably it sits with what we’ve been discussing in the previous chapter, i.e. that “ethical habit of mind essential to equip the individual leader with the ability to react professionally to rapidly changing environment and to foster trust”.

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<sup>133</sup> DEMPSEY Martin E, Mission Command White Paper, April 3, 2012, available at : [www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-04/042312114128\\_CJCS\\_Mission\\_Command\\_White\\_Paper\\_2012\\_a.pdf](http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-04/042312114128_CJCS_Mission_Command_White_Paper_2012_a.pdf)

<sup>134</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), II-2.

The liberality of thought as a key component of military success is not a new concept, although it may still sound unusual; in fact in 1934, Lieutenant General James Breckenridge, commander of the Marine School at Quantico, wrote, “It is my constant ambition to see the Marine officers filled with ambition, initiative, and originality; and they can get these attributes only by liberality of thought - broad thought - thought that differs from precedent and the compulsory imprint of others. I want them to originate, not to copy.”<sup>135</sup>

Likewise General Dempsey identifies the development of critical thinking as the key ingredient “to fully realize the potential of mission command” in order to “effectively instil the cognitive capability to understand, receive, and clearly express intent, to take decisive initiative within intent, accept prudent risk, and build trust within the force.”<sup>136</sup>

In the domain of military education some critics<sup>137</sup> have argued that innovative methods are needed to impart critical thinking skills. The traditional reliance on the Socratic method of open seminar discussion moderated by faculty it is perceived as falling short as a means of replicating complex problem-solving under stress, an essential requirement for strategic leaders. Some suggest that the customary Socratic approach should be augmented with more advanced simulations and crisis decision making exercises to better prepare students for future strategic leadership challenges. As known in the Aristotelian tradition strict impartiality is not the most salient feature of moral thought, as there may be no less injustice in treating

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<sup>135</sup> Letter from Lieutenant General Breckenridge to Colonel Smith, November 21, 1934, Julian C. Smith Papers, Marine Corps Archives, Private Papers Collection 188, Box 34.

<sup>136</sup> Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Education White Paper, July 16, 2012, available at [www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-07/071812110954\\_CJCS\\_Joint\\_Education\\_White\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-07/071812110954_CJCS_Joint_Education_White_Paper.pdf)

<sup>137</sup> Cfr. Chapter 2, Para 2.2 The Reform in Military Education: an on-going debate.

un-equals equally than there is in treating equals unequally. Therefore the kind of deliberation required for genuine interpersonal moral association necessarily involves some affective or empathic sensitivity to the needs of others in their particular circumstances. Thus the liberal values fostered by the Socratic model are key to develop military leaders both ethical and effective: in times of uncertainty it's crucial to develop the ability to understand and adapt to the environment in order to ensure readiness to face future unknown challenges. To this end education needs to march hand in hand with ethics. The 'moral component' of fighting power and military effectiveness is a subject increasingly under international scrutiny. Given that the primary goal of the armed forces is to achieve operational effectiveness, the "strategic corporal", or captain, physically and morally, can make all the difference to operational success or failure. A mission can fail if it is not a 'just war' as much as if the fighting is militarily ineffective. It can fail if soldiers conduct themselves wrongly or insensitively, with regard to the culture of the nation in which they are operating. I will elaborate further on this but in the light of the above it could be argued that an ethical behaviour, i.e. a behaviour inspired to the liberal values as expressed in the previous chapter, is also operationally effective. In the words of General Dempsey, who underlines the strong inter-linkage between liberal values and leadership: "The cornerstone of service must remain dignity and respect among all members of the force. The mortar is leadership."<sup>138</sup>

#### **4.1 The relevance of leadership**

As seen earlier military education is aimed to develop commanders with a thorough knowledge of their duties, in possess of

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<sup>138</sup> DEMPSEY Martin E., "From the Chairman: mount up and move out" JFQ 72, 1st Quarter 2014.

a sense of justice, and able, through an appropriate leadership, to be a model for their subordinates. There is an unchanging quality about military leadership and military expertise: the peculiar mind-set and skill-set of the military officer is universal, viz. its essence is not affected by changes in location. On this basis one might concur with political scientist Samuel P. Huntington when he characterized the ideal officer as patriotic, yet almost above patriotism in the sense of being a part of the brotherhood of arms.

Providing adequate education is crucial in ensuring that ethical principles are shared among the troops. In the words of one of the leading scholars in leadership and ethics “*The moral triumphs and failures of leaders carry a greater weight and volume than those of non-leaders. In leadership we see morality magnified, and that is why the study of ethics is fundamental to our understanding of leadership.*”<sup>139</sup> Leadership and ethics are in fact inextricably intertwined.

The individual leader needs to possess the courage to act as a moral actor. Moral leadership is a vital supplement to military education: it is crucial that leaders foster a culture which encourages ethical debate. Robinson<sup>140</sup> refers to the example provided by Jamie Cullens, director of the Centre for Defence Leadership Studies at the Australian Defence College, who pointed out that the Australian Defence Force has sought to create an organizational culture which is willing to discuss past errors as well as to promote traditions emphasizing military achievements and positive examples of military ethics and liberal values. Robinson in fact suggests that through

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<sup>139</sup>CIULLA J., “Ethics and Effectiveness: the nature of good leadership” in David V. Day, John Antonakis editors “The nature of leadership” 2nd ed. 2012 SAGE Publications, Inc Thousand Oaks, California, ISBN 978-1-4129-8020-3 p.508

<sup>140</sup> ROBINSON P., “Ethics Training and Development in the Military”. From Parameters, Spring 2007, pp. 22-36.

programs of this sort it could be feasible to tackle ethical issues before, not after, the next disaster, and he concludes reaffirming the need for a common set of values, to be used in coalition warfare, despite the lack of consensus on how to institutionalise this kind of ethics education in the military.

Leadership has always been recognized as the “pediment” of military education, as the author<sup>141</sup> of one of the most comprehensive handbook on leadership states:

*In industrial, educational, and military settings, and in social movements, leadership plays a critical, if not the most critical, role, and is therefore an important subject for study and research.*

Formally the duties of superiors (i.e. commanders) are included in a framework combining laws, rules and regulations on the status of armed forces personnel; these duties are further elaborated in military disciplinary codes and penal laws. In general the commanding officer is responsible for the education, security, discipline, health, wellbeing, morale, and general operational ability of his subordinates. The following specific duties are included in the majority of military systems: the duty to set a good example for one’s subordinates, the duty to care for one’s subordinates, and the responsibility for the discipline of subordinates. Here suffices to cite a couple of examples from different backgrounds: according to the definition adopted by the Russian Federation<sup>142</sup>, the scope of responsibilities of military commanders unfolds as follows:

*Commanders [...] in peacetime and wartime are solely responsible for constant combat and mobilization readiness; the successful fulfilment of combat tasks; education; military discipline;*

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<sup>141</sup> BASS, B. M. (2008). *The Bass handbook of leadership: Theory, research and managerial applications* (4th ed.). New York: Free Press

<sup>142</sup> *Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel*

*law and order; the moral and psychological condition of military personnel; the safety of military service; the condition and safety of military equipment and military stocks; pecuniary, technical, financial, and everyday maintenance; and medical service.*

In Italy the Duties of Superiors<sup>143</sup> are based on respect and dignity of every person and underline the importance of setting a good example, as detailed below:

*1. Superiors are responsible for ensuring that their subordinates respect laws, regulations, and military orders. They should serve as a good example of discipline and of how regulations should be respected.*

*2. Superiors are responsible for maintaining discipline among their subordinates, and they should aim to achieve the maximum degree of efficiency in their unit. They should, in particular:*

*a) Respect, in relations with their subordinates, the equal dignity of all soldiers and shall base their evaluations on objective and fair criteria;*

*b) Generally speaking, avoid publicly reprimanding a soldier who has misbehaved. The superior should speak with him privately;*

*c) Establish in-depth relationships with their subordinates, evaluating their personal qualities and trying to improve their skills;*

*d) Take care of the military education of their subordinates and adopt measures for improving proper relations among, civic education, and professional skills;*

*e) Ensure that personnel have good working and living conditions;*

*f) Ensure that security norms are respected in order to preserve their subordinates' physical integrity;*

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<sup>143</sup> Art. 21 of Decree of the President of the Republic No. 545/1986

*g) Grant any meetings that are requested (including to discuss personal or family issues), under the conditions established by law, and provide a prompt evaluation of the petitions presented in the manners prescribed by law;*

*h) Show exemplary behaviour in all circumstances and act firmly and impartially;*

*i) Ensure the best conditions possible for their subordinates to execute the orders they receive.*

Yet laws, rule and regulations sometimes fall short in providing an exhaustive framework to commanders, as John Gardner very aptly points out in his plea for ethical leaders “We should hope that our leaders will keep alive values that are not so easy to embed in laws - our caring for others, about honour and integrity, about tolerance and mutual respect, and about human fulfilment within a framework of values” <sup>144</sup>.

Thus the body of leadership theory and research continues to grow each year. Given the sheer volume of leadership scholarship that is available, my purpose is not to try to review it all, but to investigate the linkage between leadership and ethics and its operational relevance. Leadership theory is a key component of the necessary foundation of knowledge in the development of effective commanders: units perform well if leaders are able to motivate their troops and instil a sense of cohesion. The difference between winning and losing battles lies often on the extra effort inspired by effective leadership.

#### **4.2 Is good leadership different from ethical leadership?**

Leadership often transcends organization, as people who hold positions of leadership do not always exercise it, whereas others lead

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<sup>144</sup> GARDNER, J. W. (1990). On leadership. New York, NY: The Free Press. p. 77

without holding positions of leadership. Bennis and Nanus<sup>145</sup> tell us that managers do things right and leaders do the right thing. Ciulla defines a leader as “ Someone who (...) thinks about how to enlarge the domain of what is possible, which means that he or she has a broader sense of what is possible and therefore a broader sense of moral obligation”<sup>146</sup>. In the military jargon the term ‘vision’ captures this aspect of leadership. A “vision” not only comprises goals, but rather ways of seeing the future that implicitly or explicitly entail some notion of the good. Here lies the vital difference between a leader and a manager, where someone who behaves like a manager feels morally obligated to do only what it is possible within his/her role. In researching in the field of leadership, the cultural attitude toward the word its-self needs to be accounted for: in America, the word leader has a gratifying flair, whereas the Italian word *Duce* and the German word *Fuhrer* definitely have not. The word leader carries both emotional and normative baggage – its meaning is socially and historically constructed.

James MacGregor Burns has explored quite broadly the realm of leadership and in his latest book, “Transforming Leadership” he describes ‘leadership not only as a field of study, but a master discipline that illuminates some of the toughest problems of human needs and social change, and, in the process, exploits the findings of political science, history, sociology, philosophy, theology, literature and psychology.’<sup>147</sup> Burns does not embrace the great man theory: rather he believes that transforming leaders engage followers in a

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<sup>145</sup>BENNIS, W. and NANUS, B. 1985. *Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge*: 45. New York: HarperCollins

<sup>146</sup> CIULLA Joanne B. “The state of leadership ethics and the work that lies before us”, in *Business Ethics: A European Review*, Volume 14 Number 4 October 2005. Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK. p.325

<sup>147</sup> BURNS, J.M.” *Transforming Leadership*” (2003).New York: Atlantic Monthly Press

dialogue about values and through this process they come to a consensus on what is important. The transforming leaders do not elevate people's values to their own values, but rather leaders and followers elevate each other's values. These agreed-upon values then have to measure up to what Burns called in his first book the 'end values' of liberty, justice and equality<sup>148</sup>. The end values represent, according to Burns, the standards we need to apply to determine if a leader does the right thing, in the right way and for the right reason. Taking into account the combined views of Walzer and Aquinas with regards to the Just War Theory, by comparison we can translate Burns' definition in military terms as acting fairly /ethically, within the *jus in bello* constraints, in the context of a *jus ad bellum* legitimate war.

A key aspect of Burns' theory lies in the ethical dialectic between leaders and followers, on an equality basis. A concept further explored by Robert C. Solomon, who focuses on understanding the dynamics of trust. Trust is always about both leaders and followers, therefore he suggests to study the two-way transaction between leaders and followers. Solomon notes that the most important element of trust is not how to gain it, but how to give it<sup>149</sup>.

It is true that leadership morality and immorality is magnified. Yet this does not mean that leaders should have higher ethical standards than everyone else. In fact leaders happen to fail not when they do not live up to higher standards of morality, but because they do not live up to the same standards of morality expected by a global citizen. As Ciulla famously argued "What we hope for in leaders is a

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<sup>148</sup> BURNS, J.M."Leadership", (1978) New York: Harper and Row

<sup>149</sup> SOLOMON, R.C. 1998. 'Ethical leadership, emotions, and trust: beyond 'charisma'. In Ciulla, J.B., Ethics, The Heart of Leadership. Westport, CT: Praeger.

higher rate of success at being moral because the failures are so costly”.

The leader/follower relationship is one of mutual influence, regardless of disparities in the amount or type of power held by each side. By accepting the proposition that leadership is a relationship, one cannot study the ethics of leaders without including the ethics of followers. Justice, fairness, trust, duties and the greater collective good are more than a leader’s beliefs. They represent universal values and the pillars for all human relationships. As discussed earlier in this work, both history and current court rulings exposed the fact that the idea of ‘just following orders’ does not take subordinates off of the moral hook.

Ciulla and Burns have explored the matter of leadership ethics and confronted with similar issues although from different perspectives. Ciulla derives her end values from Aristotle, who said that the ultimate end, for which there is no other end, is *eudaimonia* or happiness. Aristotle describes *eudaimonia* as a combination of ‘living well or faring well with being happy.’<sup>150</sup> As Ciulla herself underlined<sup>151</sup> she “found happiness more satisfactory than liberty, equality, and justice as an answer to the question: What is the end of leadership?” Ciulla and Burns recently converged in as so far as “Burns now includes happiness in his list of end values and (Ciulla) now include justice, liberty, respect for person and equality.”, and Ciulla, despite her conviction that “*eudaimonia* works” as an answer, agrees with Burns that “we need the full range of moral philosophy and human values to understand what ‘living well or faring well’ mean.” Unlike Burns, Ciulla does not split moral philosophy into new

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<sup>150</sup> ARISTOTLE 1984. *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I. In Barnes, J. (Ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. II: 1730. Princeton: Princeton University Press

<sup>151</sup> CIULLA Joanne B “The state of leadership ethics and the work that lies before us” p.332

categories, but rather she maintains that we need to split leadership into parts for moral analysis.

The role of commanders in ensuring ethical effectiveness depends on the leadership style of the commander. Although, as I will elaborate later on, I share Ciulla's view, where she sees leader ethics and leader outcomes as indissolubly interweaved, arguing that leaders cannot be considered effective unless they are ethical<sup>152</sup>, in practice one can distinguish between a leadership style based on power and control and a leadership style that emphasizes the role of commanders in creating an environment of mutual trust and respect. According to the first approach, the main task of commanders is to make their subordinates respect their leadership by closely supervising their activities and imposing severe sanctions whenever the rules are infringed or when disciplinary offences occur. Following this approach, leadership is based on fear and the threat of punishment. The second approach underlines the role of the moral leadership of commanders as a more effective means of maintaining discipline while creating an environment based on mutual trust. Military leadership based on mutual trust and respect, contrary to that based on threats and fear, is the foundation for a well-functioning military. An important example of this approach can be found in the concept of the cited *InnereFührung* in Germany. Following this approach, the behaviour of both commanders and subordinates should be guided by respect for human rights.

In his work Burns<sup>153</sup> described the first as "transactional" and the second as "transformational": transactional leaders appeal to lower level needs of followers, exchanging benefits and rewards in return to

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<sup>152</sup> DAY, David V., & ANTONAKIS, John editors "The nature of leadership" 2nd ed. 2012 SAGE Publications, Inc Thousand Oaks, California, ISBN 978-1-4129-8020-3 p.19

<sup>153</sup> BURNS, J.M. "Leadership", (1978) ib.

obedience; transformational leaders involved higher level needs such as esteem, competence and self-fulfilment, referring to values as liberty equality and justice to elicit motivation. He mentions Franklin Roosevelt and Mahatma Ghandi as examples. Numerous authors<sup>154</sup>, outside the military domain, have argued that transformational leaders are guided by universal ethical values, feel a sense obligation to the group and treat others with respect and trust, empowering subordinates and focusing on shared goals and objectives; they engage in higher level moral reasoning, demonstrate greater integrity, are more successful in leading organizational turnarounds, encourage the development of positive ethical climates, institutionalise ethical practises, and foster social responsibility.

### **4.3 About military leadership**

Transmitting and maintaining values<sup>155</sup> and standards of proper behaviour among subordinates is a core responsibility of commanders. Given the relevance of leadership in the military domain it is not surprising that one of the foremost scholar in this field comes from researching in the military field: Bass endorsed a “new paradigm of

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<sup>154</sup>TURNER, N., BERLING, J. EPITROPAKI, O., BUTCHER, V., & MILNER, C. (202, April). Transformational leadership & moral reasoning, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87, 304-311; TOOR, S.R. & OFORI, G.(2009). Ethical leadership: examining the relationship with full range of leadership model, employee outcomes and organizational culture, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 90, 533-547; HOOD, J.N. (2003) The relationship of leadership style and CEO values to ethical practices in organizations, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 43 263-273; CARLOS, D.S. & PERREWE P.L. (1995) Institutionalization of organizational ethics through transformational leadership, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 14, 829-838; PUFFER, S.M. & MCCARTHY, D.J, (2008) Ethical turnaround and transformational leadership: A global imperative for corporate social responsibility, *Thunderbird International Business Review*, 50, 304-314.

<sup>155</sup> “Values and Standards of the British Army: Commanders’ Edition”, March 2000, available online at:

[http://www.army.mod.uk/servingsoldier/usefulinfo/valuesgeneral/values/ss\\_hrprs\\_values\\_comd\\_w.html](http://www.army.mod.uk/servingsoldier/usefulinfo/valuesgeneral/values/ss_hrprs_values_comd_w.html)

leadership”<sup>156</sup> able to achieve superior results by employing one or more of the following four components :

1. Charismatic leadership or idealized influence. Transformational leaders behave in ways that result in their being role models for their followers. The leaders are admired, respected, and trusted. Followers identify with the leaders and want to emulate them. Among the things the leader does to earn this credit is considering the needs of others over his or her own personal needs. The leader shares risks with followers and is consistent rather than arbitrary. He or she can be counted on to do the right thing, demonstrating high standards of ethical and moral conduct. He or she avoids using power for personal gain and only when needed.

2. Inspirational motivation. Transformational leaders behave in ways that motivate and inspire those around them by providing meaning and challenge to their followers' work. Team spirit is aroused. Enthusiasm and optimism are displayed. The leader gets followers involved in envisioning attractive future states. The leader creates clearly communicated expectations that followers want to meet and also demonstrates commitment to goals and the shared vision.

3. Intellectual stimulation. Transformational leaders stimulate their followers' efforts to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and approaching old situations in new ways. Creativity is encouraged. There is no public criticism of individual members' mistakes. New ideas and creative problem solutions are solicited from followers, who are included in the process of addressing problems and finding solutions. Followers are

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<sup>156</sup>Bass, B.M. (1996), A New paradigm of leadership: an inquiry into transformational leadership. Alexandria, VA. US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

encouraged to try new approaches, and their ideas are not criticized because they differ from the leaders' ideas.

4. Individualized consideration. Transformational leaders pay special attention to each individual's needs for achievement and growth by acting as coach or mentor. Followers and colleagues are developed to successively higher levels of potential. Individualized consideration is practiced as follows: new learning opportunities are created along with a supportive climate; individual differences in terms of needs and desires are recognized. The leader's behaviour demonstrates acceptance of individual differences (e.g., some employees receive more encouragement, some more autonomy, others firmer standards, and still others more task structure). A two-way exchange in communication is encouraged, and "management by walking around" work spaces is practiced. Interactions with followers are personalized (e.g., the leader remembers previous conversations, is aware of individual concerns, and sees the individual as a whole person rather than as just an employee). The individually considerate leader listens effectively. The leader delegates tasks as a means of developing followers. Delegated tasks are monitored to see if the followers need additional direction or support and to assess progress; ideally, followers do not feel they are being checked on.

Analysing aspects of leadership, implies implicitly or explicitly a discussion about ethics. One of the oldest themes concerning the ethics of leaders is the ability of a leader to have the personal resources to deal with power: Plato in his the 'Ring of Gyges.'<sup>157</sup>, tells the story of a shepherd boy who discovers a ring that makes him invisible. The anecdote literally and figuratively raises the transparency question: would you be moral if you had the power to be

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<sup>157</sup> Plato 1992. Republic: 34–36. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co. (Translated by G.M.A.Grube.)

invisible? In fact some of the finest literature on the personal morality of leaders comes from the ancients. One illustration of this can be found in Paul Woodruff's book on leadership and ethics, "Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue". Woodruff, a philosopher and distinguished classics scholar, underlines how reverence is a virtue that both the ancient Greeks and followers of Confucius sought in their leaders, defining reverence as follows:

Reverence begins in a deep understanding of human limitations; from this grows the capacity to be in awe of whatever we believe lies outside our control – God, truth, justice, nature, even death. The capacity for awe, as it grows, brings with it the capacity for respecting fellow human beings, flaws and all. This in turn fosters the ability to be ashamed when we show moral flaws exceeding the normal human allotment.<sup>158</sup>

As shown, reverence entails the traditional liberal value of respect, but it also has a specific relevance for leaders. Using numerous examples from ancient literature and contemporary life, Woodruff discusses one of the greatest ethical challenges of leadership: power often makes leaders forget their human limitations.

This understanding of the human limitations must not prevent the aspiration to "a broader sense of what is possible and therefore a broader sense of moral obligation". Leaders then must be able to evaluate the surrounding environment, shape far-reaching goals for the future, involving some notion of the common good, without losing contact with their humanity. This can be achieved through the dialectic process described by Burns, allowing leaders to engage followers in a dialogue about values and through this process together reach the consensus on what is important. Real leaders, aware of their human

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<sup>158</sup> WOODRUFF, P. 2001. *Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue*: 3. New York: Oxford University Press

limitations, do not try to elevate people's values to their own, but rather leaders and followers elevate each other's values, and then try to measure up to what Burns called in his first book the 'end values' of liberty, justice and equality. These, as a result, represent more than a leader's beliefs, they correspond to universal values setting the tune for all human relationships.

Sisson, after researching leadership outcomes outside the military domain, argues, using Aristotle's ethics as a framework, that ethical leadership is a means for getting things done both in business and society. Sisson, following the virtue ethics approach, concludes that, 'managing moral capital amounts to practicing the virtues of justice, temperance, fortitude and prudence, not the least in the exercise of one's work and in the course of one's life.'<sup>159</sup>

Here again the analysis focuses on the virtues of leaders per se. One other example of it lies in the long standing and contested debate with reference to altruism<sup>160</sup> as opposed to selfishness as a criterion for ethical leadership. Nagel 's work<sup>161</sup>, in fact, reminds us that altruism is a motive for acting, but it is not in and of itself a normative principle. The sad events in Paris, Ankara or Istanbul, or in Nigeria, Iraq or Pakistan, clearly demonstrate that a terrorist who becomes a suicide bomber might have purely altruistic motivations, but the means that he uses to complete his mission – killing innocent people – are not ethical, even if his cause is a just one.

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<sup>159</sup> SISSON, A.J.G. 2003. *The Moral Capital of Leaders: Why Virtue Matters*: 161. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd.

<sup>160</sup>For supporters of "altruism" see for example: Kanungo, R. and Mendonca, M. 1996. *Ethical Dimensions of Leadership*: 35. Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage.Ozinga, J.R. 1999. *Altruism*: xvi. Westport, CT: Praeger

<sup>161</sup>Nagel, T. 1970.*The Possibility of Altruism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Avolio and Locke<sup>162</sup> bring this discussion to its extreme, without reaching a conclusive argument. I maintain that leadership ethics is about the relationship of individuals with others, and in this sense, I consider both sides partially right and partially wrong.

The UK Navy doctrine<sup>163</sup> upholds the concept of leadership and ethics being intertwined, and literally states: “Leadership inevitably pervades all aspects of ethos and is absolutely fundamental to its maintenance. Good leadership inspires and underpins everything we do and is the glue that holds all our activity together. (...) the duty of all leaders, at every level, is to maintain the morale and cohesion of the team. Good teamwork is absolutely essential if we are to face and overcome the challenges inherent in war fighting. Strong teamwork is fundamental to our success and is the component that brings all our individual efforts together. It unites us in our understanding and commitment to work with each other, whatever our function in order to provide maximum unity of effort. Shared pride in success comes from good teamwork. We are so much stronger, and have a better chance of winning, when we work together.

The maintenance of good morale is one of the principles of war. It is based on recognition of the needs of the individuals who collectively form the team, and it manifests itself in the and [...]determination to achieve the aim. Good morale is based on: a shared sense of purpose; clear understanding of, and belief in, the aim; discipline and self-respect [...] and well merited mutual trust and respect between those in and under command.

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<sup>162</sup>AVOLIO, B.J. and LOCKE, E.E. 2002. ‘Contrasting different philosophies of leader motivation: Altruism versus egoistic’, *The Leadership Quarterly* 13:4:169–171

<sup>163</sup> "The Queens Regulations for the Royal Navy" - BRD2 - (April 2015 Edition), and "Naval Personnel Management" - BR3 - (February 2016 Edition)

Humility. We should not be self-important or arrogant and we should never show condescension towards others. Instead we should treat others with respect and, while confident in our own ability, we should value others and welcome and recognise their contributions. We should appreciate our own fallibility and learn from our mistakes”.

This idea of leadership effectiveness not constructed in a vacuum, but within interpersonal relations, and to be combined with humility as above described, is not solely rooted in the Western tradition. A parallel can be drawn between the idea of “reverence” defined by Woodruff, that links the Greek and Chinese traditions, and the ethics of “compassion” of Buddhist descent, in the description provided by the Dalai Lama himself<sup>164</sup>:

When we bring up our children to have knowledge without compassion, their attitude towards others is likely to be a mixture of envy of those in positions above them, aggressive competitiveness towards their peers, and scorn for these less fortunate. This leads to a propensity toward greed, presumption, excess, and very quickly to loss of happiness.

The most appropriate definition of ethical leadership to be applied in a military environment is the one highlighted by Brown Trevino and Harrison<sup>165</sup>: the demonstration of normatively appropriate behaviour through personal actions and interpersonal relations and the promotion of such conduct to followers through a two -way communication, reinforcements and decision making.

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<sup>164</sup> Dalai Lama XIV (1999)*Ancient wisdom, modern world: Ethics for a new millennium*. (T. Jimpa Trans.) New York: Riverhead Book. p. 181

<sup>165</sup> Michael E. BROWN, Linda K. TREVIÑO & David A. HARRISON, *Ethical leadership: A social learning perspective for construct development and testing*, in *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, Volume 97, Issue 2, July 2005, p.120

It fits well with the speech given by General Sir Nick Carter<sup>166</sup>, Chief of the General Staff, as he launched the new Army Leadership Code to all the Regimental Sergeant Majors and Commanding Officers at a special event at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst on 3 September '15: "What we are hoping the army leadership code will do is it will teach. (..) It shows soldiers what good and bad leadership is, so they can highlight the fact that someone isn't carrying out their leadership as they should do, and they can bring it up to their chain of command that the leadership is not in line with army leadership"

It is on-keeping with the pledge quoted earlier by Robinson, according to whom : "we want soldiers who are willing, when it is suitable, to risk the disapproval of their comrades to win the approval of those whom they serve"

Explaining his vision for a modern and inclusive Army General Carter said: "The operating context is very different to the one perhaps we grew up in 25 to 30 years ago. Therefore we feel it is important to lay out what it is we want people to do by way of leadership to help them have the tools that they need.

"What we don't want to see are the values and standards we espouse not being adhered to both in peace time and in war time. And, it's really important that we live by those values and standards, because they are the basis on which team work is built."

The importance of mutual trust and team work can be associated - from a philosophical point of view - with the idea that is group actions, which reveal features identifying 'proper' or real leadership as opposed to cases of 'purported' leadership, advanced by philosopher Eva Kort. Through the following example she highlights the

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<sup>166</sup> <http://www.army.mod.uk/news/27973.aspx>

normative and practical aspects of leadership: A concertmaster holds a formal leadership position. If he conducts the orchestra with instructions that the musicians know are bad, they will follow him because of his position. 'It is only when the concertmaster (...)participate in the plural action in (generally) the right sort of way – that the concertmaster is the leader in the proper sense' <sup>167</sup>

Recalling the music similitude evoked by Burrige in the 2004 St George's Annual Lecture (Cfr Chapter 2 on Education), in an environment where the tempo is variable and complex and improvisation is required around a central theme, the lead player is crucial as he needs to maintain a diverse group as in-tuned as possible. Military commanders hence are required more and more to be able to provide that "central theme" and be recognized as lead player, to be trusted and followed in their intuition.

Military commanders have in fact become increasingly aware that on the battlefield, they cannot rely on mere obedience, instead they need to aspire to Kort's definition of a leader, i.e. that "leaders are those whose ideas are voluntarily endorsed and acted on by others". This idea is not merely rooted in the western tradition, in fact it's in-tuned with the Confucian predicament that "If a ruler sets himself right, he will be followed without his command. If he does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed"<sup>168</sup>.

At a more practical level, an analogous viewpoint, ingrained in a more military – related scenario, has been expressed by a U.S. researcher<sup>169</sup>, who further underlined the link between ethics education and the development of specific skill-set, i.e. the ability of

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<sup>167</sup> KORT, D. Eva (2008) "What after all is leadership" in *Leadership' and Plural Action*, *Leadership Quarterly* 19.(411-425), p. 422

<sup>168</sup> CONFUCIUS, (Trans. 1963) in W. Chan, (Ed.& Trans) *A source book in Chinese philosophy*, Princeton: NJ. Princeton University Press. p. 38

<sup>169</sup> MAJOR ,Edward "Ethics Education of Military Leaders" *MILITARY REVIEW* March-April 2014

military leaders to build trust through mutual understanding: first, as the ability of deployed security forces to deal with the current environment of persistent conflict of ever-increasing lethality; second, as the ability of senior military leaders to communicate effectively with the policy makers of their home countries and within a joint and combined environment. Hence ethical habits of mind are essential both to equip the individual leader with the ability to react professionally to rapidly changing environment and tactics as well as in order to foster trust within military organizations and alliances with partner forces, and the civil society as a whole.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

Ciulla and Forsyth<sup>170</sup> have recently examined a variety of philosophic theories, distinguishing three moral facets to the ethics of leaders:

1. The ethics of what a leader does or the ends of a leader's actions (Mill).
2. The ethics of how a leader does things, or the process of leadership (Aristotle).
3. The moral reasons of why leaders do things, or their moral intentions (Kant).

Kant<sup>171</sup> describes the categorical imperative, as the moral choice that you would want to make into a universal law. The concept of "categorical imperative" is fundamental to justice and to building trust. Kant emphasizes the importance of moral consistency and respect for the dignity of all human beings, and he forbids using people as a means to an end.

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<sup>170</sup> CIULLA J.B. & FORSYTH D.R. Leadership Ethics THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP SAGE Publications, Inc Thousand Oaks, California cap.17 p.227-239

<sup>171</sup> KANT, I. (1993). *Foundations of the metaphysics of morals* (J.W. Ellington, trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.

Aristotle<sup>172</sup> explained how ‘Every excellence brings to good the thing to which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well. (...) Therefore, if this is true in every case, the excellence of man also will be the state which makes man good and which makes him do his work well’ (p. 1747). Thus excellence is inseparable from task and the concept of good. The function of humans, according to Aristotle, is to reason. Military officers, to be moral agents, must reason well, because reason tells you how to practice moral and professional virtues. In so far as the task of a commanding officer is to lead, an excellent leader will be both effective and ethical. In other words, the ethical leader will also be a competent leader, because he or she will reason well and thus know what is required in the job and act on it in the right way. Hence an ethical leader, basing his leadership on the liberal reasoning, valuing respect and thus able to build trust, is also an effective leader.

The combined views of Burns and Ciulla, analysed earlier in this chapter, demonstrate that defining the end of leadership encompasses values such as justice, liberty, respect for person and equality, as well as self fulfilment or *eudaimonia* - in the sense of flourishing as a human being- which according to Aristotle is an end in itself. In fact Ciulla argues that ‘The relationship between leaders and followers and the ends of that relationship must rest on eudaimonia’<sup>173</sup> It is the goal and the ultimate test of ethical and effective leadership. Burns, on the other end, describes transforming leadership as the relationship in which leaders and followers elevate each other’s values, such as

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<sup>172</sup> ARISTOTLE (1984). Nichomachean ethics. Book I. In J. Barnes (ed.), *The complete works of Aristotle* (Vol. 2, pp. 1729– 1867). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

<sup>173</sup> CIULLA, J. B. (1995). Leadership ethics: mapping the territory. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 5(1), 5–28. (p. 19 fn72)

liberty equality and justice, ultimately elevating their ideas about what will ultimately make them happy.

It can be argued here that utilitarianism, i.e. the moral principle of seeking the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, is also part of the job description for most leaders. This might raise the objections the moral cost/benefit analysis used to determine what will bring about the greatest happiness is too cold and calculating and does not consider individual relationships.

In similitude with the objections John Stuart Mill addresses at the beginning of 'What Utilitarianism Is'<sup>174</sup>, it can be answered that morality is about objective ideas and the minute you start molding your idea of ethics to the relationship you have with particular individuals, you lose your ethics. Like Kant and Plato, Mill's emphasis on moral consistency does not allow leaders to make exceptions to the greatest happiness principle for themselves, their family, or their friends. The irony of moral luck is that leaders who are reckless and do not base their actions on sound moral and practical considerations are often condemned when they fail and celebrated as heroes when they succeed. That is why Kant (1933) maintained that since we cannot always know how things will turn out, moral judgments should be based on the right moral principles and not on outcomes. Moral consistency is such a fundamental part of the concept of leadership that no one would describe their ideal leader as someone who makes exceptions to the rules, procedures or duties, for friends, family, ethnic and religious groups, or people they like. Conversely this sort of behaviour describes distort "purported" leaders. Furthermore, leaders are challenged to make sure that in seeking the greatest happiness, they do not cause a handful of people

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<sup>174</sup> MILL, J. S. (1987). What utilitarianism is. In A. Ryan (ed.), *Utilitarianism and other essays* (pp. 276–297). New York: Penguin Books.

great misery. It would be a shallow notion of happiness, the one based on cold expediency or the suffering of a few.

The meta-analysis outside the military domain confirms that ethical leadership has practical as well as moral benefits: in fact studies conducted in work environments indicate that business that promote employee well-being are more productive and profitable<sup>175</sup>

Military commanders hence are required to assume that “normatively appropriate behaviour through personal actions and interpersonal relations and promote a similar conduct to followers through a two-way communication, reinforcements and decision making”, to become “leaders (...) whose ideas are voluntarily endorsed and acted on by others, to be able to be recognized as lead player, to be trusted and followed in their intuition, that is to provide “central theme” needed to succeed in today’s operational environment.

In conclusion, an ethical leader –according to the definition by Ciulla and Fosyth, someone who does the right thing, the right way, and for the right reasons - is also an effective leader.

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<sup>175</sup> HARTER, J. K., SCHMIDT, F. L., & KEYES, C. L. M. (2003). Well-being in the workplace and its relationship to business outcomes: a review of the Gallup studies. In C. L. M. Keyes & J. Haidt (eds), *Flourishing: positive psychology and the life well-lived* (pp. 205–224). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

## CHAPTER 5

### Cross cultural competence and liberal values

“... in the 21st century, military strength will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures that they understand”

Obama, Aug 2009<sup>176</sup>

While in the previous chapters I have assessed the linkages between liberal thought, military ethics and military leadership and effectiveness, there is one more aspect that binds together military education and liberal values, such as liberty equality and respect: cross cultural competence. Today the military engages in a variety of different missions, each with different requirements, as discussed earlier: conventional combat, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, stability and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Missions can shift and change rapidly. All of these will occur (1) in collaboration with different cultural groups; (2) among different cultural groups; or (3) against different cultural groups. Armed Forces operate within and among populations that are culturally very different from themselves. In addition, the military is already itself culturally diverse and encounters a wide range of other culturally diverse groups, including allies (e.g., NATO troops, non-government organizations, and civilians), as well as enemies. Future military activities – whether for peacekeeping or war-fighting – will require Soldiers to be able to form relationships, build trust, communicate, and collaborate with people of greatly different backgrounds. The skill-set required to do this is what I refer to as “cross-cultural competence.” Cross cultural or Intercultural competence has sparked

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<sup>176</sup> President Barack OBAMA in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, August 2009

research in academia as well as within military circles, as I will highlight in the following pages.

### **5.1 Intercultural competence: a definition**

Over the past half century, a considerable amount of studies have been produced on the concept of intercultural competence in its varying terms. In 2006 Darla Deardorff<sup>177</sup> published the first research-based definition of intercultural competence, followed by a synthesis of work published in the *Sage Handbook of Intercultural Competence*<sup>178</sup> (2009) and a subsequent growing list of publications on this topic, not only in the US but also in many other countries around the world. In fact, Spitzberg and Changnon<sup>179</sup> discussed more than 20 different definitions and frameworks. Various conferences addressed this topic as well, like the 2014 Intercultural Learner Conference at Duke University as well as the international Association of International Educators (NAFSA) conference in San Diego in May 2014, to name a couple.

How can intercultural competence be defined? “Intercultural competence is the ability to develop knowledge, skills and attitudes that lead to communication and behaviour that is both *effective* and *appropriate* in intercultural interactions (and all interactions can be considered to be intercultural)”<sup>180</sup>. I have highlighted in the previous chapter how both communication and behaviour are crucial elements

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<sup>177</sup>DEARDORFF, D.L. (2006). Identification and assessment of inter cultural competence as a student outcome of internationalization. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 10(3), 241-266. Available at <http://jsi.sagepub.com/content/10/3/241.full.pdf+html>

<sup>178</sup>DEARDORFF, D. (Ed.). (2009). *The SAGE handbook of intercultural competence*. Thousand Oaks, CA.

<sup>179</sup>SPITZBERG, B.H., & CHANGNON, G. (2009). Conceptualizing multicultural competence. In D.K. Deardorff (Ed.), *Handbook of intercultural competence* (pp. 2-52). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

<sup>180</sup>Adapted from Deardoff 2006

in effective leadership, and thus effective leadership is linked with intercultural competence.

The process of compiling a common framework of reference in this field has not been effortless: there have been countless definitions published on intercultural competence. In her 2006 study Deardoff documented the first consensus among leading intercultural experts, primarily from the United States, on aspects of intercultural competence. The result was determined through a research methodology called the Delphi technique, an iterative process used to achieve consensus among a panel of experts. The aspects on which these experts reached consensus were categorized and placed into a model: this model focuses on internal and external outcomes of intercultural competence based on a specific set of knowledge, skills and attitudes inherent to intercultural competence. Within this framework Knowledge comprises:

- Cultural self- awareness, or articulating how one's own culture has shaped one's identity and world view;

- Culture specific knowledge, i.e. analyzing and explaining aspects of other cultures (history, values, politics, economics, communication styles, values, beliefs and practices);

- Sociolinguistic awareness, i.e. acquiring basic local language skills, articulating differences in verbal/ non-verbal communication and adjusting one's speech to accommodate nationals from other cultures

- Grasp of global issues and trends, i.e. explaining the meaning and implications of globalization and relating local issues to global forces

The Skills required are:

- Listening, observing, evaluating :using patience and perseverance to identify and minimize ethnocentrism, seek out cultural clues and meaning

- Analyzing, interpreting and relating: seeking out linkages, causality and relationships using comparative techniques of analysis

- Critical thinking: viewing and interpreting the world from other cultures' point of view and identifying one's own

The Attitudes essential to accomplish the above are:

- Respect: seeking out other cultures' attributes; value cultural diversity; thinking comparatively and without prejudice about cultural differences

- Openness: suspending criticism of other cultures; investing in collecting 'evidence' of cultural difference; being disposed to be proven wrong;

- Curiosity: seeking out intercultural interactions, viewing difference as a learning opportunity, being aware of one's own ignorance

- Discovery: tolerating ambiguity and viewing it as a positive experience; willingness to move beyond one's comfort zone

Recently Deardoff<sup>181</sup> highlighted four crucial aspects in the assessment and development of intercultural competence education: first and foremost the key is to recognize that intercultural competence development is an ongoing process, and thus it becomes important for individuals to be given opportunities to reflect on and assess the development of their own intercultural competence over time. Second, critical-thinking skills play a crucial role in an individual's ability to acquire and evaluate knowledge. Third, the cited attitudes constitute

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<sup>181</sup>DEARDOFF, D.K. "Assessing Intercultural Competence" in *Assessing Complex General Education Student Learning Outcomes* "New Directions For Institutional Research" no. 149, Spring 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) • DOI: 10.1002/ir.381

the basis to build on all other aspects of intercultural competence. Fourth, most intercultural experts have agreed on the paramount importance of developing the ability to see from others' perspectives. As a result cultural knowledge entails a more holistic, contextual understanding of a culture, including the historical, political, and social contexts. Thus any assessment of culture-specific knowledge needs to go beyond the conventional surface-level knowledge of foods, greetings, customs, and so on. Further, even an "holistic" knowledge alone is not sufficient for intercultural competence development. Another scholar, Bok<sup>182</sup> following a similar reasoning underlined how developing skills for thinking inter-culturally becomes more important than actual knowledge acquired.

The desired external outcome of intercultural competence development, as said, is to be able behave and communicate effectively; yet the internal desired outcome is to achieve an informed frame of reference/ filter shift according to the environment, and through this increased :

- Adaptability, adjustment to new cultural environment, to different communications styles and behaviours;
- Flexibility, selecting and using appropriate communication styles and behaviours; cognitive flexibility;
- Ethno-relative view
- Empathy

One of the practical methods advised by researchers to further students' intercultural competence is through an educational program that brings together international and domestic students in intentional ways. As I have discussed earlier in the education chapter, there is a

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<sup>182</sup>BOK, D. *Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why They Should Be Learning More*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

growing commitment within the Euro-Atlantic area to promote contacts and exchanges across the military community. Later on I will highlight how one example of senior military education might represent the basis on which a more intentional and coordinated intercultural competence education might be built. It connects with another stream of intercultural research: service learning, that “involve[s] students in relationships across human differences, e.g. gender, race, age, economic status, national origin, faith, sexual [and gender orientations], and/or educational attainment”<sup>183</sup> (Slimbach, 1996, p. 102). Intercultural exchanges happen when students question their own and others identities through a dialectic method and open students to be conjointly more appropriate and effective in their views about and engagement with other people.

As debated in the previous chapters, despite being questioned, the Socratic method of open seminar discussion moderated by faculty is still key to develop military leaders both ethical and effective: in times of uncertainty it’s crucial to develop the ability to understand and adapt to the environment in order to ensure readiness to face future unknown challenges.

## **5.2 Cross Cultural Competence in Military research**

Military units operate within and among populations that are culturally very different from themselves. In addition, each armed force is already itself culturally diverse and encounters a wide range of other culturally diverse groups, including allies (e.g., NATO troops, non-government organizations, and civilians), as well as enemies. Future military activities – whether for peacekeeping or war-fighting - - will require military forces to be able to form relationships, build

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<sup>183</sup>SLIMBACH, R. “Connecting Head, Heart, and Hands: Developing Intercultural Service Competence.” In R. Sigmon (ed.), *Journey to Service-Learning: Experiences from Independent Liberal Arts Colleges and Universities*. Washington, D.C.: Council of Independent Colleges, 1996., p. 102

trust, communicate, and collaborate with people of greatly different backgrounds. The skill-set required to do this is what in the military jargon is called “cross-cultural competence.”

Research has examined the variables associated with intercultural effectiveness among other populations who live and work outside their country of origin for extended periods of time: expatriate managers, study-abroad students, and Peace Corps volunteers<sup>184</sup>. This literature provided the basis for an in-depth analysis<sup>185</sup>, conducted under the aegis of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), which reviewed the research on an individual’s ability to adapt successfully to other cultures and applied it to the military context, in an attempt to identify and measure the characteristics that comprise cross-cultural competence. Recognizing the unquestionable differences between Service member deployment experiences and those of expats or students, the last decade has witnessed an incredible growth in military-related Cross Cultural Competence research (so called 3C), on the foundation laid by academics in the civilian field. Generally speaking, 3C refers to the ability to successfully operate across cultures. Over the course of the last decade, the need to select, train and develop a force capable of operating anywhere in the world has never been more apparent. Cross-cultural competence is thus defined as the “set of knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enable individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments”<sup>186</sup>.

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<sup>184</sup> See for example: Bhaskar-Shrinivas, Harrison, Shaffer, & Luk, 2005; Black, 1990; Dearthoff, 2006; Hechanova, Beehr, & Christiansen, 2003; Van Dyne, Ang, & Koh, 2008; Van Dyne et al., 2012

<sup>185</sup> ABBE, A., GULICK, L. M. V., & HERMAN, J. L. (2008). *Cross-Cultural Competence in army leaders: A conceptual and empirical foundation* (Study Report 2008-01). Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

<sup>186</sup> ABBE, A., GULICK, L. M. V., & HERMAN, J. L. (2008).ib.

There is emerging agreement within the military services that culture is an important factor in irregular warfare and stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations. From Iraq to Afghanistan to Haiti, to East Timor to the Horn of Africa the military members must effectively navigate cultures very different than their own across the full spectrum of military operations. Accordingly, research in cross-cultural competence (3C), or the “individual capability that contributes to intercultural effectiveness regardless of the particular intersection of cultures”, has gained renewed interest across the military environment, particularly within the US Department of Defence (Abbe, Gulik, & Herman, 2008, p. 2)

Socio-cultural factors affect every level of engagement in irregular warfare, from the interpersonal interactions while negotiating with local leaders, military advisers training their counterparts, to group and societal engagements during strategic communication and influence operations. The impact of these factors has been widely recognized at every level of defence leadership, and some of the more frequently cited wartime leadership challenges have an intercultural component. The top challenges for Army company commanders listed in a 2007 article included interacting or working with indigenous leaders, security forces, and members of the population<sup>187</sup>. Creating specialized groups to assess socio-cultural factors, such as Human Terrain Teams, or Local Engagement Teams, or Cultural Advisors, provides an important asset but does not diminish the need for cultural capability across the military leadership

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<sup>187</sup> Company Command, “Leadership Challenges in Iraq,” *Army*, 57 (September 2007), 77-82

Research<sup>188</sup> has highlighted how the problem of cultural training and education within the military field has primarily been framed in terms of increasing cultural knowledge—targeting cultural awareness or understanding, thus failing to grasp the complexity of cross cultural competence. Abbe and Halpin<sup>189</sup> recently have argued that cultural knowledge is a necessary but insufficient component upon which to build the broad cultural capability needed by general-purpose military forces to meet current and future challenges. Developing a multifaceted cross cultural capability takes time, as it involves combining attitudes, knowledge, and skills to achieve a strategic perspective on culture, and this developmental challenge cannot be met by a single training centre, schoolhouse, or program of instruction. Armed forces cannot “surge” cultural expertise, nor can they expect complex interpersonal skills and cultural cognition to develop when placed in competition with fundamental military skill sets<sup>190</sup>. Yet as Admiral Mike Mullen noted, the institutional changes demanded in an era of persistent conflict include determining “different ways to promote, different ways to educate, different ways to train, compared to what we’ve done in the past.”<sup>191</sup> The implication of current operational environment or irregular warfare is that the agility needed to perform effectively may be difficult to instill during

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<sup>188</sup>MCFARLAND Maxie “Military Cultural Education,” *Military Review*, 85 (March/April 2005), 62-69; Brian R. Selmeski, “Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development” (Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, Center for Security, Armed Forces, and Society, 2007).

<sup>189</sup>ABBE, A & HALPIN, S.M. *The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education and Leader Development, Parameters, Winter 2009-10*

<sup>190</sup>Evidence suggests that it takes about ten years of deliberate practice to develop domain expertise. K. A. Ericsson and A. C. Lehmann, “Expert and Exceptional Performance: Evidence of Maximal Adaptation to Task Constraints,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, 47 (February 1996), 273-305

<sup>191</sup>MULLEN Mike, “Defense Language Institute All Hands Call” (Monterey, Calif.: Defense Language Institute, 10 August 2009), <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1230>

training, or as I have argued earlier training prepares you for certainty, education for uncertainty (cfr Cap Education); training may simply provide opportunities for practice. Therefore Military Education, combined with the ethics, needs to provide the foundation enabling soldiers to cope with uncertainty on which more generalizable knowledge and skills can be built. General Peter Chiarelli, former Army Vice Chief of Staff, has argued for this “broadening” role of education in contributing to a leader’s versatility<sup>192</sup>.

Given the broad categories with which 3C is defined, it is important to clarify what is meant by knowledge, skills, abilities, attitudes and other characteristics. Hereby I adopt the definitions given by Gatewood and Field in their work on human resources: knowledge consists of “a body of information, usually of a factual or procedural nature that makes for successful performance of a task”<sup>193</sup>. Cross-cultural knowledge, as it relates to 3C, refers to knowledge about cultures in general (e.g., cross-cultural schemas, understanding the core components that comprise culture, including differences in political systems, economies, and history) rather than culture-specific facts or information. For example, understanding that a society’s gender roles may impact societal members’ behaviour is an example of culture-general knowledge, whereas knowing that Pashtun women play a subservient role to men is an example of culture-specific knowledge. While culture-specific knowledge helps Service members navigate particular cultures or regions, culture-general knowledge should prepare individuals with a basic enough understanding of cultures to ask the appropriate questions once they enter a new Area of Operations (AO); in other words, culture-general knowledge provides

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<sup>192</sup>Peter W. CHIARELLI, “Training Full Spectrum: Less is More,” *Small Wars Journal* (July 2009), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/print/less-is-more/>

<sup>193</sup>GATEWOOD, R.D. & FIELD, H.S. (1990). *Human resource selection* (2nd ed.). Orlando, FL: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, p.347

those in theatre with the tools for how to learn and to think, rather than what to think.

Skills concern “an individual's level of proficiency or competency in performing a specific task” . Skills can be physical (psychomotor), or they may be behavioural (affective) or cognitive in nature. Examples of cross-cultural skills include self-regulation and monitoring, negotiation, interpersonal skills, verbal and non-verbal communication, and stress-management, among others. In contrast with skills, abilities are more general, enduring “capabilities that an individual possesses at the time when he/she first begins to perform a task” .

Finally, other characteristics comprise individual attributes, prior experiences, attitudes, values and personal work styles that influence one's 3C performance. These might appear residual, on the contrary research has shown their critical impact on cross cultural competence performance. For example willingness and motivation to engage with members of other cultures (or “openness” in other words) is considered a necessary component for effective interaction, along with three personal traits deemed able to facilitate cultural learning<sup>194</sup>: “1. *Curiosity* (otherwise, why bother learning about other people?); 2. *Tolerance* for ambiguity and uncertainty (because not everything will make sense right away); 3 Willingness to *suspend judgment* in order to learn (because it is not about you, it is about them)”

Despite some of the differences across 3C models, most capture a set of commonly agreed-upon knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes (KSAAAs) needed for effective cross-cultural performance. In 2010, scholars at the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

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<sup>194</sup>CALIGIURI, P., NOE, R., NOLAN, R., RYAN, A. M., & DRASGOW, F. (2011). Training, developing, and assessing cross-cultural competence in military personnel (Technical Report No. 1284). Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

and Social Sciences (ARI) generated a series of studies<sup>195</sup> that helped create a developmental model to detail cultural competence development together with the related KSAs<sup>196</sup>. Through a variety of methods, including a literature review and critical incident interviews with Soldiers, the research at the ARI distilled the KSAs down to 17 (due to overlap and redundancy) and then placed them into one of five general components (also called “factors”) of cross-cultural competence. The factors, their descriptions and the KSAs they subsumed are detailed in Figure 1 below.

Factor	Description	Relevant KSAs
Cultural Maturity	The ability to remain confident, calm and dedicated in cross-cultural settings, and to further seek interactions to promote mission success	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emotional self-regulation</li> <li>• Self-efficacy</li> <li>• Dedication</li> <li>• Willingness to engage</li> <li>• Emotional empathy</li> </ul>
Cognitive Flexibility	The ability to withhold judgment in the face of limited information, remain open to alternative explanations and easily adjust perceptions based on new information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flexibility</li> <li>• Uncertainty avoidance</li> <li>• Openness</li> </ul>
Cultural Knowledge	The knowledge that cultural differences are deeper than customs, with an awareness of how they influence one's own behaviors and perceptions and those of others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Awareness</li> </ul>
Cultural Acuity	The ability to form accurate cross-cultural understandings and assessments of: situational dynamics, the perspectives of others, and the impact of cultural actions on the broader mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perspective-taking</li> <li>• Sense-making</li> <li>• Big picture mentality</li> </ul>
Inter-personal Skills	The ability to consistently present oneself in a manner that promotes positive short- and long-term relationships in order to achieve mission objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Self-monitoring</li> <li>• Rapport building</li> <li>• Relationship building</li> <li>• Manipulation/Persuasion</li> </ul>

<sup>195</sup>MCCLOSKEY, Michael J., Aniko GRANDJEAN, and Kyle J. BEHYMER “Assessing the Development of Cross--- Cultural Competence in Soldiers.” Technical Report 1277. United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. November 2010.

MCCLOSKEY, Michael J., Kyle J. BEHYMER, Elizabeth L. PAPAUTSKY, Karol G. ROSS, and Allison ABBE “A Developmental Model of Cross---Cultural Competence at the Tactical Level.” Technical Report 1278. United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. November 2010.

MCCLOSKEY, Michael J., Kyle J. BEHYMER, Elizabeth L. PAPAUTSKY, and Aniko GRANDJEAN. “Measuring Learning and Development in Cross---Cultural Competence.” Technical Report 1317. United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. September 2012

Researchers from the Cognitive Performance Group working with Defence Equal Opportunity Management Institute reached very similar conclusions: they developed a ~~Cultural~~ **Cultural Competence Inventory (3CI)**, designed specifically to assess the cultural competence of military personnel<sup>197</sup>. Specifically, the tool was designed to assist commanders in evaluating the readiness of their troops to interact effectively and appropriately with foreign nationals, multi-national forces, and other individuals, agencies, and organizations. In fact despite the majority of the 3C research to date has focused on the KSAs needed to be effective across geographic boundaries, the same skills and abilities provide intercultural competence usable across Services, other government agencies, and even during operations with coalition forces. Given the extent to which military members must effectively operate in a joint environment, it is critical being able to facilitate these interactions in a valuable way. The cultures across the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are all substantially different from one another and in different ways. In a similar way, the military's ability to be successful in an environment with an increased focus on humanitarian and reconstruction operations requires that military forces know how to work with and utilize the resources of other agencies that have vastly different organizational cultures and missions than their own.

Although the authors admit that the instrument needs additional empirical work to explore its predictive validity, it measures six dimensions of cross-cultural competence, deemed critical to cross-cultural competence among military personnel in the cross-cultural contexts of the current operating environment. These six dimensions

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<sup>197</sup>Karol G. ROSS, Daniel P. MCDONALD, Barbara A. FRITZSCHE, and Huy LE, "Development of the Cross- Cultural Competence Inventory (3CI)," in *Advances in Cross-Cultural Decision Making*, edited by Dylan Schmorrow and Denise Nicholson (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis Group, 2011): 87-96.

are 1) willingness to engage, 2) cognitive flexibility and openness, 3) emotional regulation, 4) tolerance for uncertainty, 5) self-efficacy, 6) ethno-cultural empathy.

The above results from the research conducted by both the 3CI and the ARI group illustrate how the KSAs associated with 3C are not unique to that capacity. They overlap significantly with the KSAs being identified as vital in research on other issues of interest to Defence domain, such as small unit leader decision-making, adaptability, resilience, observation/situational awareness, leadership<sup>198</sup>, and ethics as a cross cutting aspect.

A comprehensive approach to education then requires the liberal values framework discussed in previous chapters, able to fostering the development of such characteristic as flexibility, agility of mind, respect, that respond to the demands posed to the military in nowadays environment under multiple viewpoints in order for them to be ethical and hence effective (cfr Cap 4)

### **5.3 The operational bearing of Cross Cultural Competency**

Examples derived from field show how cross cultural competency is key in multiple tasks dealt with by the military in the current operational environment. When deployed, military personnel are confronted with a wide array of factors influencing their mission. The support of societies in their movement from conflict to peace is a very demanding and complex challenge. Besides, the presence of the International Community affects the existing power structures in the

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<sup>198</sup>US Army, Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006); Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6-11, *Leading Marines* (Washington: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1995); US Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, 2006).

area, entailing that the design of the international support has an direct impact on the future of the affected community. The issues at stake include questions about who will receive the International Community's resources, who is invited to take part in negotiations and thereby recognized as an important player, who will give and receive information and what security threats are identified and given priority? Making international support in areas of crises and conflict more effective and contributing to long-term stability and peace requires that all of the different groups, people from different ages, sexes, social status and ethnicities, in the affected area are heard and respected. If international actors are unaware of the social, unequal, dimensions on the ground, they are at risk of providing support, security and development, only to parts of the population furthering the discrimination of other groups. Recognizing that civil entities might have a head-start when compared to military entities, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance' Forces rely on the NATO so-called Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence (COE), which is the acknowledged body for conceptual, doctrinal and educational expertise on the the military function through which a commander links to civil actors active in a theatre of operations. Directives and guidelines are in fact issued<sup>199</sup> to promote awareness of the diversified social construction of gender roles and responsibilities, connected to several aspects, such as nationality, social status, ethnicity and age.

On 31 October 2000, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which addresses the significant and disproportionate impact that armed conflict has on women and girls, as well as recognises the

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<sup>199</sup>*NATO AJP-3.4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*; NATO, BI-SC Civil-Military Cooperation Functional Planning Guide (8 June 2012); NATO, BI-SC Integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspective into the NATO command structure (8 August 2012) (NATO Bi-SC Directive 40-1-Revision1- 2012) .

under-valued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building. This Resolution stresses the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents of peace and security. The focus of UNSCR 1325 is Protection, Prevention, Participation and gender mainstreaming in order to achieve gender equality.

An effective operational response uses Comprehensive Approach (CA) principles to address multi-faceted conflicts and crises, and contribute to sustainable and lasting peace. Recognizing that to achieve and to maintain peace and security requires a diversity of qualifications and resources and that therefore complementary skills of both male and female personnel are essential for the effectiveness of NATO operations in today's world, within the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, a specific body, the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP), promotes gender mainstreaming as an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, programmes and military operations. By advising NATO's political and military leadership, as well as member nations, on gender-related issues and the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions, the NCGP contributes to operational effectiveness in line with Alliance objectives and priorities. In fact NATO recognizes that women, girls and boys are potentially more vulnerable to threats, intimidation and assaults during armed conflict including sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and sexual exploitation and abuse. In addition, sexual violence can be used as a strategic weapon of war, wherein rape, forced prostitution, sexual enslavement, forced sterilisation, mutilation and other forms of sexual violence serve to terrorise, displace and even ethnically cleanse a population.

Through the systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations military personnel are able to identify and understand different security concerns of women and men, girls and boys in the area of operation or take account of power relations in the community. For example, military planning activities should assess the "relationship between men and women in the context of the society" to ensure women and men have equal access to assistance where the military is engaged in supporting humanitarian assistance. Other examples would include understanding how customary "conflict-resolution mechanisms affect women and men differently and how their social status may change as a result of war."<sup>200</sup>

For example, collecting water and firewood are highly gendered activities in many conflict affected areas. Women and girls often bear the primary responsibility for these outdoor activities. This is significant from a security perspective because while they conduct their outdoor activities, women and girls may be the first to observe actions that might affect the security environment. Their perspectives can enhance the mission's understanding of the security environment on a daily basis. In addition, collecting firewood, fetching water, and attending public markets to buy food, can expose women and girls to security risks such as rape, assault, and kidnapping. Therefore, consultation with women and women's organisations is essential in the planning of patrol routes and schedules when trying to improve security. Such consultation is crucial, as measures taken to protect women and girls without consultation often result in ineffective or counterproductive effects. While assessing the local situation military

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<sup>200</sup> See United Nations (2010), "Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence - An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice", New York, NY: United Nations, p. 5, for guidance on consequent action following a gender analysis

personnel need to be able to work closely with civilian counterparts present in the Area of Operation (AOO) - like the international community and local actors - in a comprehensive manner, benefiting from their experience and knowledge of the area. Hence there is both a strategic and an operational need for cross cultural competence.

The report<sup>201</sup> following the round table held in 2011 at Chatham House on the importance of “Cultural Dialogue in International Security” supports my case. It shows an overall consensus on the insufficient level of cooperation between military and civilian actors, to reach the final objectives of peace-building. In order to address these shortcomings, it is considered of critical importance in armed conflict to foster a proper understanding of the socio-economic, political and cultural needs of local populations through improved collaboration with politicians, actors on the ground, military leaders, International Organisations (IOs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). It concludes therefore that “Developing mutual respect, open channels of communications and a willingness to adapt represent both challenges to cope with and requirements to meet”.

Yet another example is provided by the report presenting the findings of in-depth interviews of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) conducted by RAND<sup>202</sup>. The purpose of the report drawing from the experiences of the special operations advisory mission in Afghanistan, is to identify best practices for building partner capacity at the operational headquarters level. The report also identifies key

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<sup>201</sup>Rapporteur Caroline VARIN, PhD, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science Report “Cultural Dialogue in International Security: The Role of Values in Counter-Insurgency and Stabilisation: Mil-Mil, Civ-Mil and ‘Civ-Civ’ Dialogue from the Balkans to South Asia, September 2011, Chatham House London, [www.chathamhouse.org](http://www.chathamhouse.org)

<sup>202</sup>HELMUS, Todd C. “Advising the Command : Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan” 2015 RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA

recommendations that are intended to help address key challenges in operational-level partnering. In particular it concludes that “Advisors should assiduously seek to build rapport with host-nation counterparts and apply the nuanced art of advising counterparts in ways that cultivate problem-solving skills and ownership of solutions. Advisors should carefully cultivate relationships across the network of coalition mentors and help partners build such connections across the host nation’s security architecture. Enhancing partner sustainability is a critically important goal (....) To most effectively carry out the advisor mission, the United States and its allies, including NATO, should prepare advisors for the mission at hand with training that not only builds language and cultural skills but also gives prospective advisors the necessary tools for advising”. The key to success lies in working towards transition from the start and making sure the host nation is responsible: if there is no local ownership the efforts made during the mission will be in vain. Or in the words of a Senior official from NATO<sup>203</sup> ”a hit-and-run strategy does not work, and promises to deliver expensive failure. It is clear that military capacity-building must be a true strategic objective, rather than an afterthought”. Yet there is growing recognition that not every soldier, sailor, marine, or airman has the personality and social skills suited to the advisory mission<sup>204</sup>. The US Department of the Army’s manual for security force assistance notes that advisors must be “patient and personable enough to work effectively with” host-nation counterparts and that

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<sup>203</sup>WILTON PARK CONFERENCE, Presentation by Michel Soula Deputy Director Of Operations, NATO HQ “*Assisting Host Country Militaries: Assessing Lessons from NATO, EU and Member State Experience*” December 4, 2013.

<sup>204</sup>Nicholas Armstrong, “*Afghanistan 2014–2024: Advising for Sustainability*” *Small Wars Journal*, May 4, 2012.

they require personality traits that allow them to “adapt and thrive in a foreign culture.”<sup>205</sup>

Here again the enabling traits include tolerance for ambiguity, open-mindedness, empathy, and a tolerance for differences: hence to be able to develop cross cultural competence across military forces, education must be based on liberal values ethics, able to provide the tools to be effective leaders both from an ethical, cross cultural, strategic and operational point of view.

The Partnership for Peace Consortium<sup>206</sup> (PfPC) is an international security cooperation organization of over 800 defence academies and security studies institutes across 60 countries. Founded in 1999 during the NATO Summit, the PfPC aims at “strengthening defence and military education through enhanced national and institutional cooperation” and was chartered to promote defence education and defence institution building and foster regional stability.

A series of study/working groups provide the PfPC’s international security cooperation framework, addressing relevant international security topics focused on defence education and defence institution building:

- Advanced Distributed Learning
- Combating Terrorism
- Conflict Studies
- Defence Education Development
- Emerging Security Challenges
- Regional Stability in the South Caucasus
- Regional Stability in Southeast Europe
- Security Sector Reform

Over 60 PfPC events per year across the US, Europe and Central Asia provide the groups with a forum for debate and exchange of ideas on contemporary international security topics. Such forums are designed to

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<sup>205</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009, p. 7-3

<sup>206</sup> <http://www.pfp-consortium.org>

identify and facilitate options for nonviolent resolution to international differences, and to further defence education transformation and defence institution building goals in recipient countries. The groups benefit from a multinational, multidisciplinary network of experts across defence, academia, industry, and civil society.

One other example is provided by the PfP Consortium Workshop on Gender and Security Sector Reform hosted in 2010 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, an institution known for its advisory support and practical assistance programmes on security sector governance. In the course of the two days, policy-makers and practitioners with field experience shared best practices and concrete examples from the ground drawn from their own work. These included lessons learnt from the Royal Netherland Army's work in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan on the empowerment of local women, and the challenges some Armed Forces currently face in gender mainstreaming. Other discussions centred on defence reform and the measures some countries such as Serbia, Hungary and Spain have developed to strengthen the role of women in defence institution building. Participants found that the integration of a gender perspective in the daily work of peacekeepers, armed forces and defence ministries does not only contribute to make the work of those institutions more democratic and inclusive, but also adds to operational effectiveness.

#### **5.4 Educating to cross cultural competence. A case study: the NATO Defense College**

Current methods<sup>207</sup> used to train cross-cultural competence range from classroom instruction (e.g., lecture, case study, group

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<sup>207</sup>Holmes-Eber, P., & Kane, B. (2009). Incorporating culture into the MCPP. *Marine Corps Gazette*, 93(10), 46-51.

activities) to pre-deployment training (e.g., key leader engagements, role-playing exercises) to the use of cultural avatars and 3C computer simulations. One attempt to link education with cultural capabilities is provided by the Adaptive Leader Course for junior officers held in by US Army, which represents an opportunity for further development<sup>208</sup>. It has been recognized across military researchers the necessity to move beyond an approach to understanding culture that favors short-term culture-specific responses to immediate mission needs. Military researchers<sup>209</sup> have also argued that, in today's expeditionary environment, military forces need also to understand culture-general principles and to develop a framework of cultural analysis applicable to operations in any environment. One promising way to approach cross-cultural competence without providing direct cultural instruction is through contact with culturally dissimilar people. For example, at the US Command and General Staff College, international students enroll in Intermediate Level Education courses, thus US students have opportunities to interact with their international classmates throughout the academic year. This exchange opportunity is common to most military colleges/academies. In fact as argued earlier in this work (cfr Chapter 3 on Education) one of the methods advised by researchers to further students' intercultural competence is through an educational program that brings together international and domestic students in intentional ways. On keeping with Bok's assertion that "The best way to learn from one another is not through taking classes but in the dorm room discussions, mealtime conversations, and other group activities"

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<sup>208</sup>Donald E. Vandergriff, "Old Dogs Teaching New Tricks," *Army*, 57 (December 2007), 59-66.

<sup>209</sup>HOLMES-EBER, P., & SALMONI, B. A. (2008).Operational culture for marines. *Marine Corps Gazette*,92(5), 72-77

on campus (Bok 2006, p. 248) Evidence<sup>210</sup> highlights the benefits of exposure to outside voices: therefore it need not to be discarded the value of exposing leaders to perspectives and methods of analysis not widely represented in the military. Officers often cite their studies at civilian institutions as experiences that contribute markedly to their intellectual agility. As said earlier<sup>211</sup> intercultural exchanges happen when students question their own and others identities: a dialectic method and time for critical reflection prevent the learning to perpetuate stereotypes and open students to be conjointly more appropriate and effective in their views about and engagement with other people. Culture is best taught as a factor across full-spectrum operations, an enabler supporting other capabilities, rather than an “a la carte” supplement to conventional war-fighter knowledge and skills. As Donald Rumsfeld stated “Future strategic challenges may include multiple engagements around the world with a greater reliance on partner relationships, and expanded cultural breadth and agility will be required if we are to meet those challenges”<sup>212</sup>

I would like to present here the research I conducted at the NATO Defense College as an interesting on-going attempt to build cross cultural competence across military across the globe.

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<sup>210</sup>Charlan Jeanne NEMETH and Julianne L. KWAN, “Minority Influence, Divergent Thinking, and Detection of Correct Solutions,” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 17 (September 1987), 788-99; Charlan J. NEMETH, Bernard PERSONNAZ, Marie PERSONNAZ, and Jack A. GONCALO, “The Liberating Role of Conflict in Group Creativity: A Study in Two Countries,” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 34 (July/August 2004), 365-74.

<sup>211</sup>SLIMBACH, R. “Connecting Head, Heart, and Hands: Developing Intercultural Service Competence.” In R. Sigmon (ed.), *Journey to Service-Learning: Experiences from Independent Liberal Arts Colleges and Universities*. Washington, D.C.: Council of Independent Colleges, 1996., p. 102

<sup>212</sup>RUMSFELD Donald, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2006)

The mission of the NDC<sup>213</sup> is “to contribute to the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance by developing its role as a major centre of education, study and research on transatlantic security issues and fostering creative strategic thinking on key issues facing the Alliance”. The curriculum is not only open to NATO member nations’ course members but also to participants from the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries and from both NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) programmes, and the Senior Course may also include Course Members from Iraq and other Global Partners of NATO. The Senior Course learning objectives are to:

a. Broaden a Course Member’s (CM) understanding of (..) the international security environment and NATO’s approach to it, and to foster the awareness that there are rarely simple solutions to the often complex issues emerging in the current dynamic security environment and that the challenges and opportunities ( ...) will need to be approached with flexibility and an open mind

b. Improve a CM’s knowledge and understanding of:

- the Alliance's shared values and interests, politico-military concepts, policies, organization and working methods;
- the internal and external adaptations, and new missions of the Alliance including crisis management and conflict prevention;
- the potential risks to the security of the Alliance and its members;
- the Alliance members’ political, security, defence and socio-economic systems and interests; their capability and limitations in international relations, particularly in the spheres of defence and security; and their cultural diversity;

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<sup>213</sup>Military Committee 123/8, <https://www.ndc.nato.int>

- the key international organisations which have a role to play in Euro-Atlantic security, particularly the EU, and how they interact with the Alliance and each other;

- trends in world affairs in various fields which may influence the security of the Alliance and its members

c. Increase the effectiveness of Course Members through a process of:

- enhancing their ability to think strategically and analyse critically;

- deepening their knowledge and developing new skills, particularly in decision-making/ consensus building.

To that end, the Course provides an opportunity to work and build consensus with officers and officials from different Alliance and Partner countries, with a wide variety of backgrounds and experience with a view to furthering cohesion within the Alliance and between the Alliance and its Partners.

As highlighted earlier by the research in the field of inter-cultural competence, the development of a inter-cultural competence – or cross cultural capabilities - must be intentional, cohesive and coordinated. An education endeavour in this field requires adequate faculty preparation, coupled with time for reflection, and facilitation of meaningful intercultural interaction.

I personally attended the Senior Course in 2009 and I served at the NATO Defense College, while conducting my PhD research, as member of the faculty, and although conscious of ample room of improvement, I have witnessed how sharing of knowledge and views among Course Members and the process of achieving consensus, play a dominant role in reaching common understanding of the international environment and the defence and collective security issues at stake.

Throughout the Senior Course, Faculty Advisers (FAs) play an active role in the learning process by guiding the efforts of Course Members and contributing their own expertise and experience to discussions, acting as facilitators for the dialectic process, fostering an informed contribution to discussions and other forms of active participation by each Course Member in order to achieve a common understanding. Among the variety of methods used in plenary and seminar sessions are discussions, debates, panels, case studies, individual papers, role playing and exercises

The NATO Defense College carefully forms the Senior Course committees so that each is broadly multinational, with both civilians and members from each of the armed services. This ensures that a diverse set of backgrounds and experiences are present in each committee.

Field Studies constitute an essential and integral part of the course curriculum and provide an opportunity for professional growth, cultural enrichment and participation in many out of office activities with fellow Course Members thus representing an opportunity to deepen reciprocal understanding of each other.

Each year, two five and a half-month sessions of the Senior Course bring together military officers (mainly colonel and lieutenant colonel) and mid-level civilian officials for discussions of all issues surrounding transatlantic relations. Shorter courses bring general, flag officer and ambassadors together for the same purpose. During the Cold War, NATO Defense College classes included only citizens of NATO member states, this has changed increasingly since the 1990s as partner states from all over the world were increasingly invited to participate in various programs run by the college. When I attended the College as a Course Member, the senior course comprised of 92 officials from 80 different countries, coming from NATO nations

together with global partners from Japan to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Finland Switzerland and Austria just to name a few. When I was assigned as Faculty Adviser, I chaired discussion where representatives of Japan, China and South Korea were seated at the same table together with representatives of Israel, Algeria and Egypt. Given such diversity, there should be no expectation of consensus in the discussions that take place in group meetings, and yet consensus often is achieved. However the foremost benefit of such meetings is the opportunity for full and frank exchanges in a respectful manner. The aim of the Faculty Advisers, who chair this meetings, is in fact to make sure that everyone at the table has the chance of being heard and of presenting their different points of view. Participants frequently marvel at how this setting provides the occasion for exchanges amongst such divergent perspectives from so many different national backgrounds and cultures. In strictly military terms such exchanges constitute the intellectual foundation of “interoperability”: the ability of allied and partner militaries to operate together under fire. From a more strategic perspective this college has become an important facilitator not only for the defence cooperation goals of the alliance, but also for the mission of reaching out to non-members states to promote transparency and cooperation. In a broader vision this dialectic process might constitute the closer we can get to cross cultural competence education within the framework of liberal values. As each course member participate in an Elective Course during the length of the Senior Course, led by a Subject Matter Expert who chairs the discussions, I furthered my investigation by chairing an elective course on “The evolving challenge of military education and training”, where I exposed my attendees to the themes discussed so far (liberal values and cross cultural competence as an effective response to

security challenges). Despite the philosophic terminology does not always lend itself to easy adoption among military personnel, the overall assessment of the course was a positive one, and one course member even chose the subject as the theme of his final paper (see Annex 1). Terms like “emotional self-regulation” has been the cause of laughter during meetings, as the role playing exercise I assigned. However, when it is explicitly linked to something more familiar, such as, resilience, observation/situational awareness and adaptability the conversation can move forward more easily. The challenge is balancing accessibility and palatability with the need to maintain clear links to the operational environment.

### **5.5 Conclusion**

The conventional ways of thinking about security and defence appear to be inadequate for policy-makers as they approach an increasingly complex strategic agenda, one in which the use of military force alone can rarely – if ever – effectively secure a desired political end, and the potential for success in the strategic and diplomatic fields becomes somewhat of an enigma.

One effort to respond to the challenge consisted in the Chatham House two-year project on ‘Cultural Dialogue in International Security’, whose purpose was to create a neutral ground where policy-makers and opinion-leaders from different cultural backgrounds can come together and pragmatically discuss approaches to current strategic challenges.

The first year of the project focused on cross-cultural dialogue within the Euro-Atlantic area bringing together scholars and policy-makers in order to manage security risks effectively and cooperatively. In the second year, those from within the West engaged in a new external cultural dialogue with emerging powers and global

partners. The inaugural workshop of the project was held on 21 March 2011, addressing the foundational ideas that underpin the project (such as how the current strategic environment is defined, and how key concepts of culture, norms and values) and sought to fundamentally highlight the need for a cross cultural dialogue within the Euro-Atlantic area itself and beyond<sup>214</sup>.

A one-day roundtable event gathered thought leaders from the policy, academic and private sector met to discuss the concepts of norms and values within the context of an internal cultural dialogue.

The centrality of a common understanding of universal set of values represents a vital theme in the debate. For example, the liberal peace theory suggests that because liberal democracies do not tend towards conflict between each other, the spread of liberal democracy would bring peace to those states that adopt it. Additionally, much of the architecture of contemporary liberalism – human rights, democracy, structures of the global economy, etc.– rely on an unstated universalism. Human rights, for example, depend on a universalistic claim of how human beings should be treated, otherwise they would exist only as an aspiration. The underlining challenge, however, consist in recognizing and valuing the universal set of values while restraining from other universalizing tendencies: striking the right balance is an on-going endeavour. Democracy is a matter of norms and institutions, while liberalism is an organically developed matter of values.

As I argued earlier in this paper (cfr Chapter 1 & 3) universalism is not impossible in the face of modern security risks, and different sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human

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<sup>214</sup> *Cross-Cultural Dialogue in Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence*. Report of a Chatham House Workshop, 3 May 2011 [http://www.chathamhouse.org/0511\\_cdsummary](http://www.chathamhouse.org/0511_cdsummary)

Rights, or a stream of moral philosophy, support the idea that a common set of values could be considered universal and enforceable; whereas the concept of democracy had been reified as a result of the invasion of Iraq. Yet the issue appears to be different: a state becomes democratic as a normative way of proceeding, turning democracy into an absolute value in itself, misrepresents its instrumental purpose in society.

The idea of a multicultural society is not relegated to the Western tradition: one example of an attempt by a society to compose its future in multicultural terms, is provided by the *Shahnameh* or *Book of Kings*, an epic Persian poem dating back to the 10th century, which explores the views of many cultural and ethical stances on warfare, turning the defence of Persia against the Roman General Vespasian into a multicultural statement of what ethics should be and how to create international relations that are just. Yet another non western example is provided by the pre-revolution work of Iranian philosopher Ali Shariati, which was aimed at forming a new nationalism in Iran through a reformed and modernistic view of Islam, more tuned to the modern world, and able to accommodate modern Western philosophy.

Shariati presents modernity as a universal fact that is not limited to the countries that initiated it: “*Contemporary civilization is the most grandiose of all human civilizations...Apollo doesn't belong only to America, neither to the Whites or the Blacks, but to the whole of human civilization.*”<sup>215</sup> The necessity of independence and national renaissance does not imply isolation from the world. Europe and the West cannot be rejected as a whole as if they represented a monolithic doctrine. Shariati further underlines the importance of what I referred

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<sup>215</sup> Cited in N. Yavari-D'Hellencourt, *Modernisation autoritaire en Turquie et en Iran*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1989, p. 98

to in this work as cultural awareness or cultural empathy: for him, modernization is not a technical product, it cannot therefore be limited to an import operation: *“Civilization and culture are not import products. They cannot be moved like a television set or a radio or a refrigerator from one place to another and work again thanks to electricity. They require the ground to be prepared, the earth to be worked, patience, research, intelligence and vigilance on the part of the cultivator. They require the transformation of man, of thought, the knowledge of the environment.”* In a text with decidedly Marxist accents, Shariati writes: *“Wanting to escape the oppression of the powerful and the slave-masters, man turns to the great religions and listens to the prophets: But he suffers the combat and the martyrs only to become prey to the magi, the khalifs, the Brahmins, and even worse, the dark and mortal chaos of the Medieval church... Generations fought and died to bring about a renaissance, to mobilize humanity to conquer science and liberty in order to be freed from that it had to suffer in the name of religion.”*<sup>216</sup> Yet he warns against the process of dehumanization in contemporary capitalism: *“Won over by liberalism, humanity chose democracy instead of theocracy as the key to liberty. It was caught in a hard-line capitalism in which democracy turned out to be as disappointing as theocracy. Liberalism is revealed as a regime in which liberty exists only for the titans that fight to outdo each other in plunder.”* Shariati draws a direct link between capitalism’s tendency toward general exploitation, on the one hand, and the tendency toward the loss of cultural identity and spirituality on the other, for people without history and culture are more easily exploitable.

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
<sup>216</sup> SHARIATI, Ali, *Marxism and other Western fallacies*, Mirzan Press, Berkeley, 1980.

The comprehensiveness of international relations in the future calls for a true understanding of the others and their goals. The consequences of the current security risks and threats would not just affect the Euro-Atlantic region and so the military forces as well as civilians must be willing and able to work with other regions around the world. I maintain that building these partnerships require that we are be able to understand another culture on its own terms, overcoming the isolated legacies of different regions and moving towards a civic identity in which we recognize our common humanity and become acculturated to one another. Liberal thought and education thus provide the skills necessary to the military to be able to adapt to the changing operational environment and cope with the emerging challenges.

## ANNEX 5.1

**NATO UNCLASSIFIED**

The evolving challenge of military education and training,  
in keeping with the changing operational environment




**3.21.1 Please add amplifying comments, if desired**

Became a crucial element of my individual paper

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**3.22.1 Please add amplifying comments, if desired**

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## CONCLUSION

Scholar and academic Mervyn Frost in his 2013 Elson Lecture<sup>217</sup> made the case that the relationship between ethics and military affairs has changed in ways which are fundamental and are often not well understood. In conventional wars, he maintains ethics played at best a marginal role, in fact ethical concerns influenced the decision to go to war in the first place and then to some extent how the war was to be conducted. The relevant ethical considerations were contained in the well-known just war tradition with its two parts: the *ius ad bellum* and the *ius in bello*. Yet he endorses the idea of international ethics, i.e. the emerging of ethics in international relations - still understood in terms of the power relations between states - once viewed as oxymoronic, has recently surfaced as being of significance. Despite a widespread contemporary recognition of the salience of ethical questions in the international domain, where actors regularly confront questions of an ethical nature, such as justice, legitimacy, human rights, democracy, the human good, and so on, there is still a pervasive sense in the discipline and amongst practitioners, that ethical injunctions provide, at best, a slight constraint on policies and actions that are pursued mostly for reasons of self-interest and the accumulation of national power. He aptly challenged this view of ethics as being only marginally significant in world politics, and argued that ethical constraints are of fundamental importance at every point for both the theory and practice of international politics. Moreover he explored the role that ethical wrongdoing (foul play) plays in international relations: in particular he highlighted how, contrary to realist understandings of international

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<sup>217</sup> FROST, Mervyn, "Ethics, Foul Play and Asymmetric Warfare", 2013 Elson Ethics Lecture, St. George's Chapel – Windsor Castle, 11 September 2013

relations, the avoidance of ethical foul play must be understood as a fundamental goal for actors in world politics. Finally, he very deftly argued that understanding the role of foul play in international affairs is particularly important in the light of the so-called “war on terror” and the so called “new wars”<sup>218</sup>.

The feature that all these wars have in common is that they are asymmetric wars. Sometimes war is state on state, but, most recently, terrorist groups have engaged states in wars of a different kind, exerting a significant political power. Terrorist groups (Al Qaeda, Al Nusra, Taliban) committed a number of significant ethical fouls within contemporary global practices: for example, Al Qaeda flew the hijacked aeroplanes into the twin towers, it committed a series of bombings in London or Madrid, ISIS sent out suicide bombers into public places in France and other countries. In doing these things they committed significant human rights abuses, or in the language of Frost’s paper they committed ethical fouls. These deeds alone did not cause military damage to the sovereign states, nor did they succeed in spreading widespread terror. Instead, by these acts, AQ (and its allied groups) “bounced” the USA and its allies into a righteous response to the ethical abuse to which they had been subjected. That reaction then turned into an over-reaction in which they undercut some of the ethical constraints normally operative on participants in the practice of states. In other words, Frost maintains that these minnows provoked the United States and its allies into committing a series of ethical fouls which undermined their own ethical standing, prestige, legitimacy and thereby their influence and power in the international practices. For example, the initial bombing of the twin towers led to: the invasion of Afghanistan and then of Iraq (both of which could plausibly be

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<sup>218</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

construed as occupations which is an ethical wrongdoing in contemporary international affairs); the institution in the United States of a new class of interrogation perilously close to torture (which could plausibly be interpreted as flouting a widely held international ethical norm against torture which is embodied in the Geneva convention); the introduction of a new category of prisoner “the unlawful combatant” who is neither a prisoner of war nor a criminal (which can plausibly be construed as departing from a well established set of ethical and legal constraints governing the treatment of prisoners captured during war); the introduction of previously outlawed methods of assassination, often extending into the sovereign territory of neighbouring states, (which may be interpreted as flouting ethical norms to do with due process at the very least); and so on. Within the wider international community many of these actions were interpreted as gross affronts to core ethical values embedded in both the society of sovereign states and global civil society. These ethical criticisms have had widespread effects globally. One effect, was to inspire many young people from a wide range of different countries to consider supporting AQ and its allies. The subsequent conduct of AQ testifies to its having understood this technique: it must have appeared evident to AQ (and other groups), that they can accumulate power and influence by highlighting how the actions of their opponents fall foul of the ethical requirements of the global practices. In fact they have become adept at highlighting the human rights abuses, the democratic shortcomings, and the invasions of sovereignty perpetuated by the superpower and its allies, by the modern means of communication available to them, through social media such as, Facebook, e-mail, Twitter, YouTube, and so on. A consequence arising from the ethical criticisms of the western reaction was to deal a substantial blow to the ethical standing of the USA and its allies within the international

domain. This in turn affected the political power of terrorist groups on the international stage.

Frost reaffirms then the paramount importance of maintaining occupation of the ethical high ground within the key global practices: it is necessary that liberal democracies do not fall into the ethical traps that have been set for them. He concludes that it is the only way, through which they can ensure that the terrorist groups, committing ethical foul deeds, remain in the low land and thus remain relatively powerless.

In my research I come to a similar conclusion: liberal values in military education provide both the ethics foundation to maintain legitimacy on the international arena as well as the decisive edge to be effective in any operational environment.

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