

Global Public Reason: An Internal Account and Multiple Justificatory Strategies **Summary**

Global public reason

The main theme of this thesis is to conceptualize a conception of global public reason. Global public reason is, here, understood as the idea that does not belong to a particular political system, namely to liberal democratic systems. It is conceived, rather, in terms of the conception of politics itself, as belonging to political practice. It is perceived as the reason and reasoning of individuals, societies and nonstate actors, who discourse a variety of political and moral issues. Global public reason can also be characterized as a conception that specifies a space for deliberation, in which public political reasoning can be possible. It is then argued that public reason has the capacity to be considered in different contexts and that its normative force can be seen in the relation between various societies and publics. Global public reasons are said to be diverse reasons offered by societies, individuals and organisations to justify international institutional orders and decision-making procedures. These are democratic procedures and quite significant, in the sense that no society can claim to have the legitimate exercise of coercive power without engaging in procedures that are seen, by the light of global public reason, to be fair and legitimate.

One can wonder why we should talk about global public reason in a world where the political debate is circumscribed by power relations. I will then be arguing that it is exactly for this reason, namely various unequal relations in which both individuals and societies stand to one another and the injustices that follow from this inequality, that this notion of global public reason is needed. This notion aspires to achieve two goals in the relations between different societies. First, it tries to build a sphere of deliberation and reasoning in which most contentious issues and disagreements can be debated through a reasonable way of dialogue. Thus, the *dialogical* nature of the relations between different societies and peoples

is emphasised and given weight (Bernstein 2007). In this common sphere, peoples, individuals and organizations offer their reasons for the policies and institutions that govern them, and critically reflect on the principles and the ways these institutions operate. While this notion adheres to tolerating differences and to a mutual relation between societies based on respect (Rawls, *LP*, 122), it takes the practice of critical reflection of the reasons, offered by participants and the scrutiny of policies and institutions as significant to the integrity of public reason and reasoning. One plausible way to achieve a kind of agreement, among liberal and nonliberal societies, on certain political principles and democratic values is to appeal to the strategy of internal reasoning, in which a diversity of reasons that are reinforced by peoples' value commitments can be offered in support of the political principles. This strategy or methodology allows participants of these societies to search for reasons, whenever there is a disagreement on the principles, policies and institutions. Although it depends on the conflicts and disagreements within values to find internal reasons, this strategy does not aim to leave these conflicts unresolved. The conflict within the values of one society will help another, to offer reasons that could be appealing to them, to endorse principles and values that are supposed to give legitimacy to the exercise of political power, and bring more stability to the society. I will be explaining more about this strategy of internal reasons and the role of internal conflict in it.¹

Second, the notion of global public reason tries to contribute to the creation of a public that is global in its scope and site or domain, and which engages with the rules and policies of international institutions, and tries to set the proper standards of argument about the legitimacy of global governance and politics. It tries to bridge the gap between local questions of social justice and the impact that this would have at the global level. Because the decisions and rules that are made in global governance affect a wide variety of peoples,

¹ For a full and detailed discussion of this strategy and its functioning, see chapter 3 below.

ranging from their basic rights and liberties to their life prospects, people through global public reason can participate in and challenge these decision makings. However, the main problem is that those who live in poverty in one part of the world are deprived of the basic capabilities to participate in an international debate and, therefore, global public reason should address this lack of capability for reasoning (Sen 1992; 2009). The site or domain of global public reason is then characterised by the participation of all those peoples and organizations that demand justification of the norms, values and principles, which regulate a variety of relations between different societies. They demand that their capabilities for reasoning, deliberation and public scrutiny are not hindered by the rules and decisions made by governments and their representatives. The capability to reason, following Sen's capability-based approach, is a valuable functioning which reflects the opportunity of a person or community or public to freely pursue what they think is valuable. A person's or public's advantages and disadvantages are assessed in terms of their having such capabilities and, consequently, their ability to achieve a variety of combinations of functionings (Sen 2009: 231-8). When considering the unequal capabilities to reason that exist between different societies –as some enjoy a more powerful position, economically and militarily– it will then become apparent that the task of global public reason is to address these inequalities. It should also try to expand the domain of global politics to the inclusion of different possible agents of discourse, such as the discourse of individuals and nonstate actors, who demand to be part of the exercise of public reason and reasoning.

It is then important to consider that the scope, site and constituency of public reason have global characters. The *scope* of global public reason is characterized by the broad list of questions that are matters of public deliberation and reasoning. There are a substantial number of justice-related issues at the inter-trans-national level that are of global concern, such as global poverty, environmental concerns, health and pandemics, immigration and

border control and human rights, as well as global governance. These are all political issues and decisions that could be matters of discussion between societies, whether liberal or nonliberal. One could argue that their relations, at different levels, might be influenced by these decisions. For instance, the causes and impacts of poverty and its related issues in one country are matters of not only a local concern, but of a global concern (Pogge 2002). Thus, any notion of international or global public reason requires a consideration of these extensive issues, which necessarily specify the scope of this notion.

The *site* or domain of global public reason is constituted by the discourse of citizens – coming from different nations– expressing their protests and discontents with the ways international governing bodies handle various issues that directly or indirectly affect them, as well as with the abuses of transnational power that affect people in developing countries (Miller 2010). In other words, the site or domain of global public reason can be identified as global politics. The *constituency* of global public reason is, then, the distinct publics, peoples, societies and governments that engage in public reasoning on political principles and values and other moral issues that concern them all, since they share the space and world and are tied together in different ways.

There is also another, equally, important reason for advancing and developing a conception of global public reason. Political philosophy today has not developed or, at least, has done little to advance a theory of global public reason.² Rawls offers a theory of public reason in *Political Liberalism*, that is suited to a specific context, namely to liberal constitutional democracies. In *The Law of Peoples*, he sketches over a notion of public reason suited to the international society of peoples, based on the principles of the law of peoples. “The Law of Peoples proceeds from the international political world as we see it, and

² There are obviously some philosophical efforts and articulations by Joshua Cohen, in some of his works cited here; and Amartya Sen (2009); and some others who are cited in the bibliography.

concerns what the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people should be.” (*LP*, 83)³ I will be arguing, however, that Rawls does not offer a theoretical framework for global public reason, which belongs to a conception of international political justice and one that addresses a variety of political issues and decisions that are of global concern.⁴

The global public reason, that is advanced here, differs substantially from Rawls’s notion of public reason for the society of peoples, which is based on the notion of toleration. Toleration can be seen as a necessary condition, but not sufficient for global public reason. It is clear from *The Law of Peoples*, that Rawls’s public reason for the society of peoples provides no basis on which its scope, site and constituency can be extended to cover the issues of justice. In the relation between liberal and decent nonliberal peoples, his notion is intended only to see how decent societies can subscribe to the law of peoples, and to formulate minimal requirements that liberal peoples are meant to set for nonliberal peoples who could agree to them. His notion of an international public reason is shallow and limited to toleration.

To consider the political relations between different societies, in the inter-transnational context, various kinds of conflict arise with regard to political principles, ideals and moral values as well as policy issues. Toleration can work towards this disagreement and conflict by accommodating them on the basis of mutual respect, as Rawls argues, but avoid making any relativist claims about the diversity of beliefs and practices. However, toleration would provide a shallow basis for global public reason, if it is not accompanied by the strategy of internal reasons and reasoning. Based on this, I will argue for an *inclusive* view of global public reason that requires us to rethink the rigid dichotomy between public and non-

³ See also Freeman (2006: 244).

⁴ Some have explored avenues within Rawls’s work to suggest a conception of global or, more modestly, international public reason. See Brown (2010); Smith (2011).

public reasons in the global context. The example of environmental concerns will be offered to illustrate this point. (See chapter 5, section 2)

All these issues will be discussed and investigated in chapter 5, where full-fledged arguments will be developed for global public reason, based on the preceding findings and discussions and the theoretical framework that will be established in the preliminary chapters.

Public reason reconsidered

In order to arrive at establishing global public reason as a theoretical conception and as a notion of practical reason, I will have to examine the idea of public reason as formulated and advanced by Rawls. More specifically, I start, this thesis, from the point where Rawls argues that the idea of public reason is, characteristically, the idea of liberal democratic societies. I start by critiquing this point and state that the ideal of public reason can function in nonliberal societies. Bearing this in mind, public reason in nonliberal societies will be different from Rawls's notion of public reason in liberal democracies, that is to say, different from the idea of democracy's public reason. Even if it is admitted that every society has its own public reason, including decent nonliberal societies, according to Rawls's account and argument, public reason cannot be practised in these societies, simply because, the argument continues, the justification of political power, and therefore of laws and institutions, in such societies would be in terms of "comprehensive doctrines," and not in terms of a "freestanding" political conception of justice. I argue that public reason will be operationalized in nonliberal societies, once it is understood in terms of a strategy of multiple justifications and therefore public deliberation would proceed according to certain constraints.

In chapter 1, I will examine the main arguments provided by Rawls for the idea of public reason. The chapter tries to identify the main shortcomings that the account of democracy's public reason will have as a result of reconsidering this idea in light of a new

interpretation of public reason. The assumption that Rawls relies on in defining democracy's public reason is that although constitutional democracies are marked by the existence of reasonable comprehensive moral, philosophical and religious doctrines, individuals in democratic societies, nevertheless, all affirm the same political conception. The content of public reason is then constituted by a liberal political conception of justice. The political character of this conception of justice requires it to be independent from any comprehensive doctrine that may exist in democratic societies. But what holds these democratic pluralistic societies together despite existing incompatible, though reasonable comprehensive religious doctrines, according to Rawls, is the idea of an overlapping consensus. However, I will argue that one problematic issue with regard to public reason and justification is to envisage this justification in terms of shared reasons on which *everyone* would agree.

The idea of the overlapping consensus is then tied to the idea of public reason in that the former is meant to prepare the grounds for citizens to accept the political conception of justice based on their moral views, and public reason sets the constraints in accordance with this conception, which should provide the public basis of justification. A consensus on a political conception of justice requires participants in the forums of public reason to give reasons and justifications that can be publicly accessible to all, and to essentially rest on political values. Rawls's emphasis on this point is that a public standard of justification is proper when it can be appealed to in the justification process of the basic institutions of a society.

What this notion of public reason assumes is that there are shared and external reasons according to which all would be expected to endorse the political conception of justice. It requires that citizens and public officials to justify, to one another, the enforcement of laws and policies by appeal to reasons that are fundamentally centred on these political conceptions of justice. In other words, each has to give reasons for supporting a law that can

be shared by others and deemed to be conclusive from the point of view of each. This basically addresses the problem of how a political conception or law can be justified by everyone, regardless of what comprehensive doctrines they hold.

It is argued that public reason requires a reinterpretation, so it is suitable for different and variable socio-political contexts, and for that reason it is more adequate to be associated with a conception of politics and political practice. I argue that public reason in nonliberal societies has different contents and characteristics. This will be the subject matter of chapter 2.

Chapter 2, then, will explore the possibilities for finding a conception of legitimacy that could be understood in relation to nonliberal regimes. The test of legitimacy of such regimes depends on meeting two conditions. First, they should meet the basic legitimation demand, that is, states become part of the solution to the “first” political Hobbesian question. To be precise, states meet this legitimacy demand when they provide security, protection, trust, and the conditions of cooperation. Second, they should provide a space for public deliberation and argument in which citizens can participate. If these nonliberal polities can be characterized as legitimate based on the above political grounds, then the exercise of coercive political power requires justification and the question that arises is that whether it is justified in terms of dominant comprehensive views, and if so, whether there is a wide disagreement about what these comprehensive views require.

I will then argue that since in the design of laws and institutions, in these societies, there will be reference to religious doctrines, then any enforcement of laws should depend on diverse or *multiple justificatory strategies*, rather than on one single source or strategy. This point is, particularly, important in pluralistic societies, where different religions other than the majority’s religious doctrine demand participation in the decision making process.

Thus, in non-liberal societies the justification of the exercise of coercive power is offered, in most cases, in terms of religious-based legal codes, for example, in terms of the Islamic law, *Sharia*. In this context, the claim is that consensus cannot be generated within members of society, merely on the basis of the Islamic legal codes without reference to other legal sources and other moral and political value systems. One sound argument for this claim is that enforcing Islamic law as the only source of legislation, and thus the ultimate moral and political system of values, will have to take seriously the diversity of cultural and religious views inherent in Muslim-majority societies, which are pluralistic in their societal formations. The plurality of cultural and religious groups within some of these societies will, in turn, produce disagreements between the state and society and among individuals, when it comes to supporting or rejecting a law. These disagreements will be, mainly, on what these specific legal codes require and whether the state and its public institutions, justifiably and legitimately, interpret such religious legal codes.

Any indoctrinated law, i.e., laws that are fused with religious doctrines and guided by a system of moral values, which are dependent on the tenets of the religion, requires multiple interpretations and appeal to sources, other than the doctrinal source, in order to generate consensus. In the strategy of multiple justifications, there will be reference to value commitments in order to prove the truth or falsity of an argument. What is distinctive about it is that this justificatory strategy does not assume that there is an independent or external reason to which everyone would agree. The reasons that are given, will be derived, if that is right, from within substantive value commitments themselves. Thus, a variety of reasons can enter the process of justification, insofar as coercion is not used to impose one reason over others.

The cogency of a justificatory strategy that provides justification, for example, for a liberal value and principle, in nonliberal societies, seems to depend on whether people in

these societies would accept the principle, not on the basis of its superior cognitive validity or truth content, but whether it can be endorsed by them from within their substantive value commitments. A justification given in support of a law cannot attract the endorsement of all, no matter how legitimate the procedures are in reaching a certain outcome, if the justification itself is not based on diverse reasons. It is for this reason that one can argue that a legitimate system cannot claim that it is capable of offering justifications to all affected parties, without acknowledging the existence of conflicts and disagreements and the need to employ different sources and diverse justificatory strategies.

I will provide a context –which is the Muslim majority societies– for the existing disagreements and conflicts regarding the interpretation of the religious law and doctrine. In this context there is a wide disagreement, among theologians, philosophers and moderns as to how to interpret the law and what the doctrine requires in terms of its implementation. If a polity is based on Islamic doctrine for its legislation and the process of law making, then the most problematic issue would be the existence of a diversity of interpretations of the scripture. This is problematic because citizens have to be satisfied that the justification of power and institutions is not given in terms of one single perspective. If the state wishes to unify these interpretations into a single interpretation then it risks sliding into a theocratic tyranny. It is then argued that public deliberation in nonliberal societies has to be constrained, and this constraint or limitation is represented in the claim that a religious doctrine, as a single justificatory strategy, cannot be used in justifying public laws and policies.

This constraint on what the law requires and how it should be interpreted, in societies dominated by a comprehensive doctrine, demands a conception of public reason that could provide justification to social and political institutions and generate consensus. In nonliberal societies, then, this conception functions differently from democracy's public reason. It does allow multiple arguments, including religious arguments, to offer reasons and justifications

for the law. The peculiarity of public reason in nonliberal societies is that it is not informed by a freestanding political conception, but by different political and moral conceptions. However, what it might be promising in the working ideas of this notion, in these societies, is that the disagreements about the requirements of the religious law and different interpretations of this law could lead to the emergence of a space of legal deliberation and reasoning not dominated by the implementation of the religious law. The appeal to multiple justificatory strategies has the advantage to *displace* the religious law from the public sphere and, then, to be seen as only one reason among others.

This conception of public reason makes use of, and depends for its functioning in different contexts on, the strategy of internal reasons, which will be discussed in chapter 3.

Public reason and the strategy of internal reasons and reasoning

In chapter 3, I will propose a justificatory strategy, namely the strategy of internal reasons and reasoning that depends on the presence of internal conflicts within and between value commitments. I argue that in this justificatory strategy, we should not exclude that subjects will appeal to their internal reasons to justify laws and policies, and individuals might not appeal to some external reasons that are not enhanced by subjects' value commitments.

Internal reasons are those that individuals have for lending support to certain political principles. External reasons, however, are those that individuals are supposed to have for accepting a law or a decision, without relying on their value commitments. The claim that will be made here is that there are no external reasons, but only internal reasons, according to which people would accept and embrace the political and liberal principles.

Most (classical) liberals presume that liberty should be the norm and on the basis of this presumption, freedom of speech, for instance, is considered to be justified not only in

liberal societies, but also across different contexts, and any reasonable doctrine and rational person should be willing to accept it. They view people's endorsement of liberal principles as a matter of reasonability and rationality, and not something that should be reinforced by appeal to their substantive value commitments. It is argued that an alternative strategy is to look for reasons that are coming from within these value commitments to support, say, freedom of speech. They contend that the argument for freedom of speech could be based on the claim that we should tolerate other views just in case they are right. There is a strong demand, suggested by this argument, placed on the acceptance and justification of freedom of speech. In other words, this strong demand on the justification of freedom of speech by reference to the rationality of persons rules out any other justificatory strategy, which appeals to persons' value commitments to support such a liberal principle.

The task of a global notion of public reason is to find internal reasons, in the local and global context, that could lend support and justify free speech. An alternative justificatory approach, therefore, would be that whether censorship of blasphemy can be justified based on substantive value commitments and to look for arguments, through public reasoning, that appeal to Islamic doctrine to prove that censorship of blasphemy is wrong. The advantage of the strategy of internal reasons and reasoning is that people in their public deliberation would not be burdened with a strong demand such as adopting principles that they may not happen to endorse by reference to their value commitments. However, any reference to such values should be based on the capacity to provide reasons that are publicly debated and subject to mutual criticism. This capacity is particularly important to show whether those who appeal to values that they have strong commitments to, can offer others reasons in the public sphere that are politically valid.

After establishing, in chapter 2, that there are wide disagreements and conflicts within and between values regarding how to interpret and implement the law –and the example of

Muslim societies are offered as bearers of this internal conflict, it will then be argued that one can find reasons from within these values to support political principles. For these purposes, the strategy of internal reasons depends on the fact that there is an internal conflict within a value that in itself reproduces disagreement and conflict of values. Internal conflict –which is a necessary condition for internal reasons to work– is that a certain conviction (whether Islamic, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist or any other moral conviction) has it within itself values and commitments that have the possibility to conflict with each other.

A Muslim, for instance, believes that freedom of religion, thought and expression are not in the advantage of Islamic faith and identity, since they could encourage apostasy within Muslims, particularly in Muslim-populated societies, and put the authority of the religious law and doctrine under question. To counter the Muslim's argument against freedom of religion, the liberal and secularist need to appeal to some of her other values that are *in tension or conflict* with her commitment to oppose the freedom of religion.

The idea of values being in a state of internal conflict helps clarify the point that some reasons that are considered internally persuasive and true from the point of view of specific value commitments could support particular liberal principles. It also addresses the problematic issue of external reasons as assumed to be those reasons that every rational and reasonable agent would accept. When, for example, Muslims are internally conflicted about the acceptance of some liberal values, one cannot appeal to a method of justification of these values based on the presupposition that reasonable Muslims should accept them. Instead, the alternative method would be that these values can be justified if there are available resources within Islam, to which Muslims have fundamental commitments, that could lend support to such values. These conflicts are akin to moral conflicts that any moral agent experiences in her life, and they represent the agent's oscillation between two sets of conflicting values that one of them should give way to the other.

Detecting internal reasons within a value is a strategy that allows moral agents to provide justifications based on value commitments and provide reasons that have the capability to survive public reasoning. This capability depends on the extent that these reasons can be persuasive to others based on equal terms of respect. Internal conflict then provides resources within a value commitment for internal reasons to emerge and to rely on these reasons in an argument for supporting, say, liberal and secular values. This is a strategy that avoids such universal formulations such as the assumption that, if a doctrine is reasonable enough, then there are reasons to believe that the doctrine would accept such values.

One possible challenge to the argument for internal reasons, and the absence of external reasons, in supporting the liberal principles will be relativism. The externalist theorist will argue that, when disagreements occur between value commitments and moral judgements, there will be no scope for appealing to reasons that stand outside of these internal reasons and, consequently, every value commitment will claim the truth of their values. I will be arguing that relativism will not follow from the above argument.

In the context of our discussion of internal reasons, relativism implies only if the internal conflict within and between values does not exist. Internal conflict within a value system, by definition, implies that some moral values and judgements can be wrong in the course of ethical reasoning. These values are in conflict with some other values in a disagreement the resolution of which requires, in most cases, that a commitment to a value is inconsistent with holding other values. For relativism to maintain its theoretical consistency, it has to deny conflicts within value systems, and a relativist has to endorse that two conflicting values or moral judgements over a moral or political issue are not actually in conflict, but each has a *relativistic* justification.

To reject relativism, one can argue, that there is no value commitment that is completely unconflicted and that it is hardly the case that any value commitment holds perfectly and wholly coherent value systems. So, for instance, Muslims –and, in fact, others who hold other beliefs- are conflicted and disagreeing over such values as the interpretation and implementation of Islamic law and over their differing adherences to values such as freedom and equality.

It is not only that relativism gives an incoherent description of our moral claims regarding certain moral and political issues. But, the danger that relativism poses for value commitments lies precisely in leaving human societies with their distinct and various “conceptual schemes,” in Davidson’s language, that we can make no effort –and it is a futile effort after all– to understand these variations. Human societies, according to relativism, therefore are left with nonnegotiable and uncomprehending politics of identity. In this specific sense of relativism, identities and commitments to fundamental values become so valorized that the diversity of values and opinions will be considered by the relativist as an argument for cultural diversity and the unreachability, and the poverty, of communication between value commitments. Relativism would claim that its thesis about reasons is correct, if there is no overarching reason that all can subscribe to. This implies, in this context, that Muslims have to consider their commitments to Islamic identity as fundamentally nonnegotiable and not subject to criticism and public reasoning. I will be arguing, in chapter 3, that relativism cannot provide a convincing argument against the argument, that will be advanced here, for internal reasons and reasoning.

In chapter 4, I will be arguing that the strategy of internal reasons and reasoning is a strategy that can be viewed also in terms of the idea of overlapping consensus. The important point is that consensus is not based on the assumption that all subjects and citizens would agree on a single external reason, which is deemed to have no connection with their diverse

value commitments. It is, rather, argued that consensus can be modelled on the way that individuals, in their public deliberation and reasoning, provide a diversity of internal reasons which can also serve as justifying reasons for laws and policies that are essential for the stability of society.

It will be argued here that when individuals, officials and peoples engage in public political deliberation and in giving reasons and justifications, these reasons should undergo a process of public validity, viz., subjects must be able to show that their reasons can be subject to a process of critique and revision, if they have to be convincing to others. What the strategy of internal reason, *as an account of public reason*, suggests is that citizens give reasons, considering that they are derived from and supported by their value commitments, which they sincerely hold and believe in.

In this chapter, a weaker version of the idea of overlapping consensus will be offered that meets the objection that people cannot share the same reason and justification in their public reasoning. A weaker notion of overlapping consensus then is the idea that, in public discussion, people do not have the same reasons to justify a principle. They, instead, come to agree on it only when it is supported by their internal reasons. This would allow individuals to present their internal reasons as justifications for what is in question, and to see these reasons not as deriving from some values that are external to their values, but as reasons that are supported and reinforced by their substantive value commitments. Here, I will present an argument for how support, based on internal reasons –drawn from value commitments– for the freedom of speech in opposition to the censorship of blasphemy can be possible (see chapter 4, section 3).

Consensus in nonliberal societies, for example, is not based on a single justificatory strategy (see chapter 2). Officials cannot justify law and the coercive use of political power

by appeal to exclusively religious-based reasons or even some other principles that do not attract the consensus of the majority of citizens. Rather, they need to appeal to a strategy that makes use of different reasons, but these reasons have to be publicly subject to criticism, scrutiny and revision. Consensus cannot be based on the claim that citizens will agree on some proposed principles, without leaving some scope for reasonable disagreements that represent the plurality of moral convictions within societies.

This notion of consensus does not presuppose that everyone will agree, provided that they are reasonable, on a single overarching conception or reason. It supposes, on the contrary, that if internal reasons can be provided to support a proposed conception or principle, then an overlapping consensus can be achieved on the principle. The starting point here is, then, the strategy of internal reasons in which a diversity of reasons, and not an external reason, can be given as justifications for the principles in question. The extended or global notion of public reason –that is proposed throughout– takes the reasonability of persons and doctrines not as a condition of their entry into the practice of public reason. It, instead, engages all in the public political forum and tries to pin down reasonable and rational persons through a process of public reasoning.

The strong demand that the liberal account of the overlapping consensus suggests is that it requires shared reasons to affirm the freestanding political conception of justice. The only way to do this, as the argument for the liberal overlapping consensus has it, is to accept not only the principles of the freestanding conception, but also the justification, or the public justification of it. The alternative view which includes a weaker notion of overlapping consensus requires that the proposed liberal principles will be supported by different internal reasons and not by appeal to a single external reason. When consensus is legitimately generated by appeal to multiple justificatory strategies on the laws and policies, then the claim to bring everyone to accept a political conception, that is not justified by appeal to the

value commitments held by individuals and communities seems to be demanding and difficult to attain.

A different reading of the overlapping consensus suggests that it should not be taken as prescribing any underlying justification. This should be left to different internal reasons which people provide and find compelling for subscribing to the principles in question. The use and functioning of the internal reason strategy and also understanding the *dialectical* force of this strategy in finding reasons to support the liberal principles would allow us to understand the move to an overlapping consensus, without putting a strong demand on the ways justifications are offered, and without the assumption of the original position.

Chapter 5, then, will be the culmination of the discussion of public reason, and there I will elaborate, as it was stated at the beginning of this introduction, on the idea of global public reason and the application of the strategy of internal reasons and reasoning to the international arena, where the relation and the public deliberation of both liberal and nonliberal societies are considered. Thus, the conception of global public reason will be centred on toleration and the strategy of internal reasons and reasoning. What this conception considers to be of significance is the thesis that liberal and nonliberal societies, in their political relations, should practise toleration, based on the value of respect. What is equally significant is that, in the case of disagreement, conflicting parties should engage in the search for reasons which could lead to persuade unconvinced parties, through public reasoning, that the political rights and freedoms are important for every society to embrace. This is a notion that belongs to a conception of global justice and seeks to bring political and social justice to the sphere of reasoning, and also to provide reasons for embracing the political principles of justice.