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NATO AND THE EU:
OPTIMIZING THE VALUE
OF PARTNERSHIP IN
A HYPERCOMPETITIVE WORLD

DARIA SKODNIK DANIELS, M.Sc.

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR SEBASTIANO MAFFETTONE, Ph.D.
THESIS UNDER THE DIRECTON OF PROFESSOR
AAKASH SINGH RATHORE, LL.M., Ph.D.

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Executive Summary

World history has been dominated not only by singular events but also by processes driving gradual paradigm shift in the distribution of power. The very notion of a globally dominant power is a relatively new tenure having its roots in imperial rivalries, which led to two destructive wars for world domination, and then to the Cold War confrontation. Since the 20th century referred to as the European, the power shifted to Atlantic, but the rise of global prominence of three Asian powers, Japan, China and India, made the 21st century an Asia – Pacific one. New competition among the great powers is defining the future of the international system. It is maxim that economic strength is the foundation of hegemonic power. A strong economy provides the resources for strong military power to maintain the dominant position in the world affairs. At the same time investing in the security gives the solid ground for the economic stability. In these complexities of the international relations NATO and the EU play an important role in preserving a balance of power taking on responsibility of preserving peace and stability in the region and globally. Predictions about the future balance of power are in the hands of the strategists that look beyond the events of the day and think about how the state's interests will be affected over the longer term by shifting power arrangements.

In the 21st century, the nation-state is confronted with an increasingly complex and interdependent environment, characterised by the forces of globalisation, regional and global networks of state and non-state actors, and regional and global security risks and threats. In other words, it could be argued that anarchy remains the defining feature of the international relations. It can also be claimed that in a hypercompetitive world which is driving force behind the state affairs is most likely that nobody can really be in control. Though, competition is not only happening between the states or among regional powers but includes competition of non-state actors, like Al Qaida, versus states, or multinational corporations and other institutions.

Although national state remains the main actor in the international relations, it is no longer the only force of influence. The new world order cannot be defined solely in terms of the interests of national sovereign states and arrangements between them.

Transnational processes in a steadily globalizing international environment have increasingly influence it. New emerging international actors, e.g., civil society, non-governmental organizations, Multinational Corporations, terrorist groups, criminal associations, all perpetuate uncertainty and unpredictability of the international environment. This complexity of the international environment has a profound impact on the security challenges that the international community is facing today. The 21st century is not only encountering challenges of a linear nature, e.g., globalization, economic crisis, regional competitiveness, and lack of resources, but also a cross-cutting global risks being illicit trade, organized crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, and many more that for the purpose of this thesis cannot be discussed. Nonetheless, security remains one of the main features of the state interest. While most of today's challenges have extraterritorial dimensions that require multinational solutions, cooperation between the states confronting these new security environments is the only effective approach. Although the states are likely to compete, for the reason stated above, states still form durable alliances as they mutually benefit from the cooperation.

The world today stays largely securitized¹. Security is an underlying element of the international relations. Security means a different think to a different actor. It is in an exclusive domain of the nation states also when joining alliances, as NATO for example. "Security in objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."² "Security or insecurity can be defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, those threaten to, or have the potential to bring down or significantly weaken state structures."³ The main dynamic of the international relations is driven by the perception of threats that can weaken the nation state.

In assessing the complexity of challenges and threats, the international organizations come to different conclusions what constitutes risks or threats to its peoples. This concept can be summed up in the Churchillian phrase `where you stand depends on

1 Securitization in international relations is a concept connected with the Copenhagen School of Security studies, and is largely seen as synthesis of constructivist and classical political realism in its approach to international security. Securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security.

2 Wolfers (1962)

3 Ayoob (1997:130)

where you sit`, i.e., your point of view depends on your position in the geopolitical landscape. The concept of security itself has evolved but has not been captured in the strategic thinking. The new strategic concepts are in re-active mode to emerging security threats. They do not integrate the necessary strategic elements to be able effectively and in timely manner confront the security challenges to the international community with means other than military. The interdisciplinary combination and complementarity of the capabilities of the international community is the key to adequate responses to future security challenges. From this aspect, it is highly imprudent to separate those capabilities to one or the other international organization. Threats to NATO or the EU's population are common which is why the alliances still matter even though the "coalitions of the willing" are often implied.

Inter-institutional relations are characterised by competition as by cooperation between organisations that must demonstrate their relevance. This perception is often discussed also in the relations between NATO and the EU. The primary reasons why building partnerships remains difficult is the heterogeneity of international actors, their mandates, institutional forms, resources, political influence and level of development as crises management actors, as all comes afore in both of mentioned organizations. Although inter-institutional cooperation and burden –sharing have developed on the basis of the comparative advantages owned by each organization, the fact remains that nearly all institutions aspire or they are forced due to the lack of cooperation on the ground, to embrace entire spectrum of crises management activities. Need for a partnership is recognised by all the international institutions but the internal coordination and coherence impedes building the necessary links.⁴

In today's inter-related world, peace and security are indivisible. Meeting today's security challenges requires the international community to work together effectively. A wide spectrum of civil and military instruments is necessary to respond successfully to 21st century security complexities and challenges. Tackling those security challenges requires a holistic approach and permanent coordination, consultation and interaction among all the stakeholders, to encourage common action for sustainable peace and sustainable regionally as well as globally.

⁴ Tardy (2010)

Present thesis examines the increasing complexity of the global security environment and dynamic and the ability of NATO and the EU to come to terms with a rapidly changing strategic milieu. The future, in all likelihood, will be very different from the past, and the chapters in this volume develop a framework that may help gaining a better understanding of the security challenges of the 21st Century debate and the role of two major actors, namely NATO and the European Union.

Part I gives the major conceptual foundation for the study, starting with the statement of the hypothesis, posing the research questions and stating the challenge of research. Different concepts of the political theories will be discussed that in my view best explain the following: First, the contemporary international system and the role of a nation state. An enhanced theoretical understanding of the role of state is important to yield the base for further discussion of the alliances among states. Second, based previous findings for the purpose of this thesis it is important to define the driving forces for nation states to cooperate and the meaning of security in this context. Thirdly, and most importantly, to analyse the very complexity of political theories, including realism, constructivism, liberalism and democratic peace theory, in relation to NATO and the EU and their role in the worlds affairs.

Part II gives an overview of the evolving security challenges of the 21st Century. As the security is an extremely important factor for states and force driving international relations, the complexity of the security environment, with cross-cutting global risks, and contemporary security threats, will be discussed in some detail.

Part III looks at the evolution of NATO and the EU, examinations the *raison d'être* of both organizations and their mission in the regional and global security equilibrium. Once we understand the origins and evolution of the two alliances, we can correctly judge the likely outcome of their relationship in the future.

Part IV will examine NATO's and the EU's strategies reflecting their values and missions, as the main guidance in adopting to the changed 21st Century security environment, to gear up for meeting new security risks and threats in preserving peace and stability in an unstable world.

The final section, Part V, concludes with the findings responding to the main purpose of this thesis, as it reads in the title: “NATO and the EU: Optimizing the value of partnership in a Hypercompetitive World«. The present state of their relationship and prospects for the future symbiosis between them will be analysed.

1. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION FOR THE STUDY

“Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century or rather at each moment of history from the problems which events themselves pose”.

(Raymond Aron, *On Clausewitz*, 1973)

1.1 Introduction

In the 21st century security era the nation-state is confronted with an increasingly complex and interdependent environment, characterised by the forces of globalisation, regional and global networks of state and non-state actors, and regional and global security risks and threats. In other words, it could be argued that anarchy remains the defining feature of international relations. Most of today’s challenges have extraterritorial dimensions that require multinational solutions and therefore cooperation between the states confronting these new environments is the only effective approach.

During the Cold War the common perception of the threat of the Communist Soviet Union expanding its zone of influence, drew the western states together in close cooperation. NATO is a product of a political realism which was based on an objective perception of the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. A common criticism of NATO since the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 is that it was defined by Cold War boundaries, and has therefore a diminished relevance in the post-1990 world. NATO managed to define a new role for itself by transforming from a primarily collective defence oriented military body to a more politically orientated organization, focusing on collective security in the new, larger Euro-Atlantic area of interest. The idea that regionalism was weaker in post-Cold War Europe has been contradicted by the enlargement of NATO and the EU that has taken place over the last two decades. Some scholars saw the reason for this phenomenon as the emergence of new threats, such as the Global South, or a divide along the line of civilizations as claimed by Huntington.⁵ Although the nature of conflict has changed, neither of the two theories has become a geopolitical reality. As culture and ideology are important in

⁵ Waltz (1979)

international relations, the vital interests of each single state are still the main driving force behind its foreign policy.

According to Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the international system is an anarchic one. International institutions are weak and certainly weaker than institutions in domestic political systems. Values are not universally shared. There is no powerful and authoritative world government, but there is a system of international law with mechanisms for applying that law to particular cases, both through international courts and through regional and global bodies, such as the UN Security Council.⁶ The key dynamic is not collective problem solving by like-minded states, but rather the competition for power among nationalist nations, exactly as Hans Morgenthau predicted decades ago. Since community characterizes the international system, he identifies two: a community of democracies and a community of autocracies. China, together with Russia and some of the Islamic states in the Middle East, are, according to Kagan, members of the latter. The autocracies do not agree on everything, but their common interest is in protecting their autonomy against democratizing tendencies promoted by the league, the alliance or the axis of democracies.⁷

Let us first look at the contemporary international order: the situation today is based on a long evolutionary process centred on the sovereign state. The “Peace of Westphalia” of 1648, which shaped the development of the modern state system, was often taken as the hypothetical starting point for the emergence of the European state system. When decolonisation followed WWII, this state system became the foundation of a global order.⁸ Westphalia instituted the notion of a nation-state and territorial sovereignty⁹ and encouraged the institutionalization of both diplomacy and armies. Colonialism transferred this specifically European system to the Americas, Africa, and Asia as the "standard of civilization". States have been and are likely to


6 Harding (2008)

7 Ibid.

8 Waltz (1979:40-43)

9 Sovereignty, though its meanings have varied across history, also has a core meaning, supreme authority within a territory. It is a modern notion of political authority. Historical variants can be understood along three dimensions — the holder of sovereignty, the absoluteness of sovereignty, and the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty. The state is the political institution in which sovereignty is embodied. An assemblage of states forms a sovereign states system. (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/> Accessed September 13, 2010.

remain central actors in world politics, as well as competitive actors in the new geopolitical environment. Beside states, the multinational corporations (MNCs), a variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and non-state actors are becoming increasingly important players in international relations but, at the same time they are also a factor of significant uncertainty. The complexity of international relations with such a diversity of actors, often with overlapping aims, objectives, and membership, is adding to the unpredictability of international relations.



Source: Ambassador Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, March 1, 2012

None of the international organizations is a holistic entity as they are based on member states whose national interests are a driving or a braking force in the effectiveness of the international organization. To make cooperation among them possible, member states create a framework based on regulatory norms to ensure a common form of behaviour. They do not necessarily share a common vision but rather have common interests for which they join alliances.

As the most important part of the conceptual foundation for this study, I began by defining the hypothesis in the first sub-paragraph below. Throughout my research, the research questions listed below were at the basis of the research process to verify the

hypothesis. In an attempt to understand the nature of international relations, the world of contemporary international affairs has been linked to the political theories that best explain the present international order and in particular the subjects of this thesis, namely realism, constructivism, liberalism and the theory of democratic peace.

Let me begin with my thesis statement.

1.2 Hypothesis

Through my doctoral studies, the extensive research process, and taking into account discussions with a variety of security and defence experts, I formulated the following hypothesis:

“NATO is the only credible actor able to deal with the worst excesses of the realist world. The EU is the only effective corporate actor in Europe able to achieve synergy with NATO in a liberal world. A NATO-EU partnership offers significantly enhanced opportunities to both organizations to better allocate their military and civilian resources in order to manage the security challenges of the 21st century. Moreover, the very complexity of these challenges will drive NATO and the EU to work together increasingly closely.”

1.3 Research Questions

To verify the above hypothesis I asked the following questions:

1. NATO and the EU: What is their main rationale and mission?
2. Why haven't they worked closely to date?
3. In a world bereft of any positive driving force to make NATO and the EU work together more vigorously, will it require a major crisis to make them do so?
4. How best can NATO and the EU join forces to address the complexity of current and future security challenges?

1.4 Statement of the Challenge

The hope rests on the conviction that knowledge begins with certainties and induction can uncover them, but to arrive at something objectively real in political science is hard. Theories cannot be constructed only through induction. A theoretical notion may be a concept, such as force, or an assumption, but it does not explain or predict anything. Assumptions are not assertions of fact, either true or false. Strangely enough, they find their justification in the success of the theories that employ them. Of theories, we ask: “How great is their explanatory power?” Just as laws are “facts of observation”, theories are “speculative processes introduced to explain them” Experimental results are permanent; theories, however well supported, may not last. Laws do not say why particular associations hold, a theory, though related to the world about which explanations are wanted, always remains distinct from that world. “Reality” will be congruent with neither.¹⁰

In the research process, I had no problems accessing adequate literature on the topic of my research. On the contrary, working in an international environment and having professional contacts with different experts in the defence and security fields, I had plenty of sources to gain insight from. With the explicative approach based on primary and secondary sources, I elucidated the evolutionary processes of the international relations and interpreted the basis for cooperation among different actors in the security environment, focusing on NATO and the EU partnership. Based on the background analysis of NATO and the EU evolution, the complementary nature of the two organizations will be discussed in a separate chapter of this thesis.

Through reasoning on new security challenges that determine the security environment of the 21st Century and consequently demand the international organizations to progressively adopt and provide impetus for NATO and EU reforms. In support of this analysis, a wide spectrum of different schools of thought with different perspectives on the issues had to be analysed so as to find a personal perspective and approach to further explain the nature of things and the state of affairs.

¹⁰ Waltz (1979: 42-44)

The whole process culminates in the comparison of the concepts of the future of alliances, namely NATO and the EU. Expertise and vast research-work in the field of international security poses a challenge in itself in terms of keeping one's own perception while remaining realistic as to the future of the NATO-EU partnership. Some very obvious conclusions are not so obvious when you drive them through the political processes of both organizations respectively, and even more so, through the actions of their member states. For the purpose of this thesis, it would not be feasible to enter the "black-boxes" of the states' or international organizations' bureaucratic decision-making processes, or to discuss in depth state preferences, but only to observe the outputs reflected in international relations, especially in the field of international security. My critical approach to discussing the topic of "NATO and the EU: Optimizing the Value of Partnership in a Hypercompetitive World" still remains subjective notwithstanding all the objective data collected.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

Theories of international relations differ fundamentally in their conception of the nature of man, society, and politics. In international relations, there is an on-going competition between the realists and liberalists. Realism emphasizes the perpetual tendency for conflict between states; liberalism identifies several ways to prevent these tendencies from resulting in conflict. No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, in discussing the present thesis "NATO and the EU: Optimizing the Value of Partnership in a Hypercompetitive World", Realist and Constructivist thought will be examined in relation to NATO while Liberalism and the Kantian paradigm will be discussed in relation to the EU.

Using these theories I will try to explain the forces that shape international events, looking mostly at the contemporary, highly complex security environment. Furthermore, NATO will be discussed in terms of the political theories of realism and constructivism. What realists and constructivists have in common is a shared threat perception which NATO members have a problem defining: in this respect the Churchillian phrase `where you stand depends on where you sit` comes to mind. Although realism best explains NATO's background, the constructivist idea perceives

alliances like NATO as being associated with common ideology and able and willing to spread their values in their area of operation, but always on the basis of their interests. According to the constructivist line of thinking, the environment is culturally influenced the very moment Alliances enter the territory of operations. On the contrary, the EU is a liberal construct. The European Union is a unique type of constitutional and political entity. Sebastiano Maffettone has described the European model in a pluralist cultural vision in which people from all civilizations have the right, and perhaps the necessity, to follow different cultural paths connected to their own traditions that will partially overlap within the constitutional and political domain. He sees the European Union's evolution as bringing together two convergent features, first, the progressive change of a regional inter-governmental structure into a supranational one, and second, a strong commitment to respect human rights. As this, in his view, is a privileged realization of the global normative claim to respect for human rights.¹¹

In the following sections I will first discuss the question of cooperation between states in general and between organizations like NATO and the EU in particular, and secondly, the complexities of the international environment in which NATO and the EU operate. The main question I wish to address is “What are the forces that drive states to join the alliances, looking closer at NATO and the EU?”

1.5.1 International Relations and Cooperation

The realist theory clearly explains international relations, which the main actors in international relations are and the primary goals of the international community. Let me lay out the key principals of realism. Firstly, sovereign nation states are the key actors in international relations. As defined in the Westphalia system, sovereignty and territorial integrity are the main attributes of a nation state which is described as rational and unitary. The primary goal for states is national security and survival and their main preoccupation is to pursue their national interests. Thucydides, Hobbes and Machiavelli claimed the struggle for power is the driving force behind societies. The focus is on military capabilities (hard power) to maintain the state's monopoly on security.

¹¹ Maffettone (2009: 230-257)

Realism sees inter-state relations as a zero-sum game relationship, so cooperation does not add value. Key elements are deterrence, containment and balance of power or hegemony. For realists there is nothing above the state. There is no world government and it is unlikely that there will be for the foreseeable future. That is why the world is anarchic. Anarchy leads to distrust and self-help, as Kenneth Waltz put it. As the world is anarchical, realists consider security as the most important element. Security encompasses national security, regime security, societal security with non-state collectives (national, ethnic, religious...), and human security. As Waltz assumes that states seek to ensure their survival, their real aims may vary endlessly, but in a world without security, survival is the essential prerequisite. Although Waltz recognises the existence of non-state actors, he dismisses their impact because he considers states to be the most powerful actors on the world stage, with the most influence and power to set the rules. Thus, states define the international system. Cooperation is limited in international relations because of the insecurity caused by uncertainty about each other's intentions and actions. States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence but prefer to take care of their own security. Waltz sees virtue in anarchy as it avoids the high costs of organization in a hierarchic order. In a state of anarchy, all states preserve their autonomy.¹² In a multi-polar balancing of power, Waltz explains that states will persuade alliance partners by adapting to them. He argues that in order to ensure their security, states are willing to align themselves with anyone.¹³ The main concern in anarchy in international relations is that there is no supra-national government to influence the behaviour of the states.

Throughout the Cold War, realism was the dominant theoretical tradition which described international affairs as a struggle for power among states with their own interests. At the time, realism offered a simple explanation for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena. Its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of American-Soviet rivalry. It was generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. Realist thought evolved considerably throughout the Cold War. "Classical"

¹² Waltz (1979:105-6)

¹³ Ibid.

realists such as Hans Morgenthau, one of the founding fathers of the realist school of thought in the 20th century, argued that the nation-state is the main actor in international relations. He believed that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight wars. He saw the virtue of international relations in a multi-polar balance-of-power system, while he perceived the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous at the time.¹⁴

Neo-realism, also called “structural” realism, emerged at the end of the WWII. It re-emphasised the importance of systemic factors and underlined the role of conflict in international relations. What is crucial for this discussion is that both classical realism and neo-realism assume that national security is the dominant priority on the list of national interests. However while realism situates the reasons for conflict at the micro-level, neo-realism locates the security dilemma in the anarchical structure of international relations.¹⁵ The "neorealist" theory advanced by Kenneth Waltz only focused on the utility of the international system and ignored human nature. For Waltz, the international system consisted of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive. Because the system is anarchic¹⁶, i.e., there is no central authority to protect states from one another, each state has to survive on its own. Waltz argued that this condition would lead weaker states to seek a balance against, rather than “bandwagon¹⁷ with” more powerful rivals. Potentially mutual benefits and aims, however, might provide the binding element necessary for inter-state and regional cooperation.¹⁸

In the 1970s, the great controversy among realists was over the policy of “détente”, which called for ignoring the inherent brutality of the Soviet regime in an effort to reach accommodation with it. Critics of the “détente” did not oppose negotiations

14 Walt (1998)

15 Waltz (1979:42-4)

16 Neo-realism holds that the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, which is anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities, measured by the number of great powers within the international system. The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is decentralized, having no formal central authority, and is composed of formally equal sovereign states. These states act according to the logic of self-help, they pursue their own interests and will not subordinate their interests to others'. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neorealism_in_international_relations

17 The general bandwagon rule is that conduct or beliefs spread among people with "the probability of any individual adopting it increasing with the proportion who have already done so". is generally understood to be the decision by a state to align itself with the threatening power in order to either neutralize the threat or benefit from the spoils of victory (Walt :1987)

18 Walt (1998)

with the Soviets. However, they argued that negotiations needed to be on much stiffer terms and accompanied by pressure for internal change. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the realists were generally opposed to NATO membership for the new Eastern European democracies and noticeably reluctant to support the independence movements in Ukraine and other Soviet republics. For the promotion of democratic change, the goal should not be revolution, but rather evolutionary change. That is the best chance for true long-term stability. However, the role leaders play in any peace process is a calculation of their own self-interest. The pressure for changes in the nature of states gets complicated the more the state has genuine common interests with them, as the US does, for example, with Egypt on Arab-Israeli peace or with China on managing the global economy.¹⁹

In the National Interest essay “World without the West”, Steven Weber argues that in contrast to the US-driven international order, we are seeing the emergence of an alternative world order described as neo-Westphalian²⁰ with primacy given to the state as the actor and state sovereignty integrated into existing “liberal” international institutions. The international order is not defined by any appeal to international standards or values, but by contractually defined obligations. States negotiate treaties and accept their contractual obligations. The international order is driven by the obligations freely accepted by states while individuals only interact with the international order through the national state to which they belong. It puts a great stress on sovereignty.²¹

States in global cooperation can be the only subjects of international relations and the only sovereigns. According to the social contract theory, the legitimacy of liberal-democratic institutions depends on the ideal consensus of the members of the basic structure. If we extend such a thesis to the global community, then by the day, it becomes increasingly clear that the relevant subjects cannot be just states. Maffettone exposes two paradigms as follows.

19 Wolfowitz (2009)

20 Under the Westphalia system of international order, each nation is understood to be sovereign and its borders are seen as inviolate.

21 The Rise of the Rest II: How the Ascent of Russia and China Affects Global Business and Security, (2008).

Within contemporary liberal political philosophy, statism often exploits the symmetry between states on one side and “basic structures” on the other. He thinks that the main reasons for which statism is less tempting today than in the past are substantially two: The first of these reasons suggests that the level of global cooperation has overcome the level at which states can be the only subjects of international relations and the only sovereigns. The second reason assumes that, within the standard contemporary vision of politics, a significant element of liberal-democracy is implicit.

Another concept is Cosmopolitanism, which is typically individualistic, because it sees the relations among persons on the planet as the very starting point of every inquiry and practice. In the words of Sebastiano Maffettone cosmopolitanism is egalitarian maintaining that all people must be treated equally. Problems with pure Cosmopolitanism are of economic, political and cultural nature. All things considered, pure Cosmopolitanism tends to force a unifying and rationalistic view of humanity that does not exist in practice. For its institutional significance, the EU model of normative regionalism does not constitute simply an example of (statist) trans-national project. At the same time, due to its regional impact, it cannot be taken as an example of pure Cosmopolitanism.²²

NATO and the EU are conglomerates of bureaucracies. The bureaucratic political model introduced by Graham Allison focuses on governmental foreign policy. The validity of his model in the field of crises in foreign affairs was evaluated using the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and the Iran Hostage crisis (1979-81). The NATO and the EU bureaucratic systems can be explained through his evaluation of the decision-making process using the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behaviour Model (OMB), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM). The second two models combined compose the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM). The outcomes are the result of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national governments. The “outcomes” which these three models attempt to explain are the actions of national governments which hamper the decision making process. Highly differentiated national decision-making structures confront decision-making in international affairs, i.e. in NATO and in the

²² Maffettone (2009: 230-257)

EU. Thus, the challenges are not solely driven by external actors but also by internal discrepancies which cause tensions.²³ Therefore, in the bureaucratic politics model, decisions taken by international organizations are the result of the confrontation between numerous actors, each with their own agenda, and the need to pursue it to the highest degree.²⁴

The black box theory comes to mind according to which the state's political outcome is related to its characteristics and behaviour within (interior/inner). The theory argues that international relations are essentially a product of interactions between states, and the main relationships are of interest in studying international events.



Thus the existence of competing factions means that no individual actor can assert his will on the final outcome, although the point of view depends on where and who you are. The response of the international community to the humanitarian crisis in Libya underlines the importance of stances. The military solutions advocated by the United States, the United Kingdom and France and further supported by NATO's rejection of any means other than the military, the drawn out process and the opposition of the African Union who voted in favour of diplomatic means, clearly illustrates perfectly Allison's idea of 'stances'.²⁵ Allison's theory of different factions, with different issues, each having a powerful influence on the final decision also makes sense in the context of discussions on the same security issues in NATO and in the EU which result in different decisions. Differences in approaches to crisis management and crisis resolution overall are a consequence of all the elements discussed further in text.²⁶

It is only possible to make an educated guess or hypothesis as to what was happening inside the black box because the result is an international event. Thus, NATO and the EU processes are internalized inside each and externalized between the two.

²³Allison (1969: 689-718).

²⁴ Allison and Zelikow (1999)

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

1.5.2 NATO: Realism and Constructivism

NATO is a particular international institution, reflecting a particular configuration of power in the international system. Its role has evolved in response to changes in the structure of the international system. Understanding the place of NATO in international relations requires an understanding of the system of which it is a part. It is only being possible to predict its future by using assumptions about the changing character of the international system. It is often stated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This is only partially true. The creation of the Alliance²⁷ was part of a broader effort to achieve three goals: deter Soviet expansionism, prevent the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encourage European political integration.

NATO has taken an objective threat perception out of the realist school of thought. In the post-WWII context, the European powers were faced with threat of a Soviet Union that possessed vastly superior military capabilities to any single European state and had displayed expansionist tendencies. Soviet ideology was profoundly different from democratic liberalism. The perceived insecurity of Europe's geopolitical environment had an impact on Europe's economic recovery since it was unlikely to attract any long term investments. By institutionalising a transatlantic security guarantee, NATO recreated an approximate balance of power in Europe. Further Soviet expansion was deterred by an accumulation of power by NATO that implied that any Soviet attempt to move further west would carry costs that would exceed any potential benefit. NATO provided the necessary security reassurance for Europe that underpinned European economic recovery.

For the realists, the security focus is on military capabilities. Security is traditionally linked to military power, seen as the main provider of security. NATO is a collective provider of security for all its member states today, as it has been for more than half a century. In a globalized environment, security has to be understood as a dynamic concept, as the amalgamation of state actions and interaction amongst states. Non-

²⁷ See <http://www.nato.int/history/index.html>

state entities with sufficient power to influence and cause changes to the politics of international relations could play a role in rapidly changing patterns of security situations and, more importantly, of security perceptions. The NATO Strategic Concept (2010) encapsulates the new risks and threats of the complex international security environment. The sole prioritization of risks/threats is a highly controversial process while a common perception is not feasible since every country has a different perception of what constitutes risk/threat. Risk assessment is a subjective process and it is most unlikely there will be a commonly agreed assessment.

In a realist perspective, states are mainly preoccupied with security and power which they seek to achieve with an appropriate foreign policy that minimizes risk and maximises benefits. National interest is a driving force in international relations. Although realism recognises the importance of the moral significance of political action, it maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.²⁸

Critics of realism do not think that a business-like management of "relations between states" should lead us to neglect issues regarding the "nature of states." In reality, the internal makeup of states has a huge effect on their external behaviour. In Moscow, the US President Obama deliberately spoke over the heads of the Kremlin's leaders to tell Russians, "Governments which serve their own people survive and thrive; governments which serve only their own power do not." In Cairo, he stated, "Government of the people and by the people sets a single standard for all who would hold power." In Ghana, he was even clearer: "No person wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality and bribery. That is not democracy; that is tyranny, and now is the time for it to end." To be a realist in the true sense of the term means addressing the nature of states and not ignoring the reality that democratic reform is a powerful force to advance its states interests. Foreign policy should then reflect national interests. In addition, the realists and their critics differ over what the national interest is.²⁹

28 Morgenthau (1993: 1-24)

29 Wolfowitz (2009)

Nowadays, state power indicates economic and military power, but states are not the only actors with power. Entities like governmental organizations, military alliances like NATO, multinational organizations and non-governmental organizations all play an important role in international affairs, not to mention the impact of various non-state actors such as terrorist or criminal groups. Power is influence over other actors in international relations. Historical examples include the Concert of Europe, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Aligned Movement etc.

Realist scholars emphasise the role of power and the use of force in international relations. They see war as the result of an anarchic structure. They focus mainly on security-related forms of regionalism. A common and unified Western defence was established in order to enhance the member states' relative security and survival vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Such cooperation was hardly anything more than the institutionalisation of an alliance against a common threat or against the hegemonic sphere of interest of a great power. In this optic, international politics is the struggle for power. Conflict is inherent, normal and unavoidable. Balance-of-power is seen as a "necessary outgrowth" of international relations³⁰ as proven by the founding of NATO.

As mentioned in the introduction, international organizations are the sum of the member states, which poses a strain on the decision making process. Differences in member-states' perception of issues at hand affect the ability of international organizations to respond to security challenge in a timely manner. For example, NATO is a product of realism founded on an objective threat perception. Since its foundation, the policy articles about NATO put the Alliance on the brink of disaster. Yet as we know, NATO is the most successful multilateral alliance in modern history. Forecasts of an Alliance crisis and collapse have proved highly misleading.³¹ Owing to differences of opinion amongst members, the Alliance cannot agree what NATO's purpose is in 21st century. NATO is a purely defensive organization designed to act against the enemy. To respond to new security challenges, NATO is moving away from realism to become a more constructivist organization.

30 Waltz (1979:16-9)

31 Keohane (1988).

Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas and culture. Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a product of specific historical processes. Constructivism is particularly attentive to the causes of change. From a constructivist perspective, the central issue in the post-Cold War world was how different groups conceived their identities and interests. Although power is not irrelevant, constructivism emphasizes how ideas and identities are shaped, how they evolve, and how they influence the way states understand and respond to their situation. Therefore, it matters whether Europeans define themselves primarily in national or continental terms or whether the United States embraces or rejects its identity as a "global policeman." Anarchy is not an adequate explanation for conflict between states, but how what states make of it. Other constructivists focus on the role of norms, arguing that international law and other normative principles have eroded earlier notions of sovereignty and changed the legitimate purposes for which state power may be employed. The common theme is the ability to explain how political actors define themselves and their interests, and thus modify their behaviour.³²

The Atlanticists³³, for example, also lack a broad consensus on what people want the western alliance to be, which is particularly problematic for NATO. If there is a threat to the alliance, writes Patrick Porter, it lies partly in its messianic restlessness; its persistent desire to intervene everywhere and on every occasion; its ideological fundamentalism; its own self-perception of itself as the guardian of international order; and above all 'its self-defeating pursuit of relevance'.³⁴ The main reason in Christopher Coker's opinion lies in the fact that a very different social imaginaries are contending for the moral high ground. The liberal 'West is still strongly internationalist and expansionist in that it sees its values as universal and suitable for export because democracy is making the world a safer place.

32 Walt (1998)

33 Atlanticism is a philosophy of cooperation among Western European and North American nations (specifically the United States and Canada) regarding political, economic, and defence issues, with the purpose to maintain the security of the participating countries, and to protect the values that unite them: "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

34 Porter (2011)

The cosmopolitan ‘West’ is largely behavioural. It derives from transnational values and it translates into specific norms of behaviour. When they crystallize through institutionalization, institutionalized norms become part of an objective reality for its members. The problem is that EU and the US cannot always agree, and therefore work together as one. The US too has norms but they impact on identity formation (they are constitutive); instead, the EU’s norms define standards of appropriate behaviour (they are regulatory). The existence of two such different normative regimes brings the Western powers into conflict, as was the case in Libya, where Germany and Poland were distinctly ‘off-side’ aligning themselves with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) who could not bring themselves in the UN to vote for the mission or against it. In 1991, the West persuaded the UN to recognise that states have responsibilities as well as rights, and that states that fail to acknowledge the former raise legitimate international concerns. The UN General Assembly accepted ‘the right to intervene’ in catastrophic situations. Later, in 2005, it also endorsed the “responsibility to protect” victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. This was the spirit behind NATO’s intervention in Libya. The invasion of Iraq came at the very height of America’s unipolar moment, which is now over and has been for some time. The chief challenge the West may find in Libya over the next few years is the one it found in Bosnia and even Kosovo, i.e. that liberalism and democracy are not always compatible. Liberalism, either as a conception of political liberty or as a doctrine for economic policy, may have coincided with the rise of democracy. However, it has never been unambiguously linked to its practise. Repeatedly, the West has been disappointed to find constituencies in places like Gaza electing distinctly illiberal groups like Hamas.³⁵

Constitutional liberalism is more than just electing a government, or offering ‘people power’. It is liberal because it recognises individual rights and responsibilities; it is constitutional because it recognises the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. The western understanding of democracy is very unlikely to take root in the post-Arab Spring in the Middle East. As Michael Doyle contends, Kant distrusted unconstrained,

35 Coker (2011)

democratic majoritarianism³⁶. His argument offers no support for the claim that NATO, as a security alliance, relies on the understanding that every time the participatory politics is likely to be peaceful. Thucydides associated popular rule with aggression; Machiavelli with imperialism; most recently, we have associated it with ethnic cleansing in places like the Balkans.³⁷

Which of these broad perspectives sheds the most light on contemporary international affairs? Realism remains the most compelling general framework to understand international relations. States continue to pay close attention to the balance of power and to worry about the possibility of major conflict. Among other things, this perpetual preoccupation with power and security explains why many Asians and Europeans are now eager to preserve - and possibly strengthen - the U.S. military presence in their regions. The end of the Cold War did not bring with it the end of power politics, and realism is likely to remain an useful instrument in our intellectual toolbox.³⁸

Under such circumstance, efficient long-term cooperation at the international level is a difficult and slow process since there are no regulatory mechanisms. The essentially competitive nature of inter-state relations also inhibits effective cooperation. States favour self-help measures and relative short-term gains above cooperation and absolute long-term gains. The lack of trust among states often leads to misunderstandings resulting in “security dilemma”³⁹ situations.⁴⁰

36 Majoritarianism is a traditional political philosophy or agenda which asserts that a majority (sometimes categorized by religion, language, social class or some other identifying factor) of the population is entitled to a certain degree of primacy in society, and has the right to make decisions that affect the society. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarianism>

37 Coker (2011)

38 Walt (1998)

39 Security dilemma situations refer to a particular variant of the so-called “prisoners’ dilemma”, a theoretical game terminology referring to a special constellation of payoffs in which individual rational choice ultimately leads to a collective sub-optimal outcome.

40 Waltz (1979)

1.5.3 The EU: Liberalism and Democratic Peace Theory

Reason, from its throne of supreme legislating authority, absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty, even though peace cannot be established or secured except by a compact among nations.

Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, 1795

The principal challenge to realism came from a broad family of liberal theories. Liberalism is the counter pole to realism. States are irrational and non-unitary or “federalist”, international law has normative power so norms do make a difference; the primary goal is mutual security in a broad framework of national interests and using a wide variety of tools, political, diplomatic and economic, which underlie soft power. The difference compared to realism is in the number of actors and interests that liberals recognize, and in their interdependence. The institutions provide security as a condition for prosperity.

One school of liberal thought argued that economic interdependence would discourage states from using force against each other because warfare would threaten both sides’ prosperity. The second school, often associated with the former US President Woodrow Wilson, believed that the spread of democracy was the key to world peace. This idea was based on the claim that democratic states were inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states. A third, more recent school of thought argued that international institutions such as the International Energy Agency and the International Monetary Fund could help overcome selfish behaviour by states, mainly by encouraging them to sacrifice immediate gains for the greater benefits of lasting cooperation. Although some liberals flirted with the idea that new transnational actors, especially corporations, were gradually encroaching on the power of states, liberalism generally sees states as the central players in the international affairs.⁴¹

With regards to the uniqueness of the European Union, Sebastiano Maffettone uses the Kantian paradigm which is based on the ideas of association and federation. The idea is that of a peaceful union among free states, a political, economic and

41 Walt (1998)

institutional association, which does not automatically turn into a *Weltrepublik*, a World republic. The common values of Europe correspond to the conditions of democracy, constitutionalism and freedom that are part of Kant's theory. To quote Maffettone again, a 'democratic deficit' is an alleged feature of the EU and the relative strength of the single states vis-à-vis the EU. Democratic institutions and constitutional guarantees depend on the collective identity of Europeans although European citizens have feelings and affection for their pre-EU countries. Maffettone brings Kantian legacy into focus in order to define the modern day identity of the EU, to overcome the difficulties posed by the main cleavages the EU is called upon to tackle, such as the complex relationship between "demos" and "ethnos", its intrinsically dual nature (half pact between different nations, half federal state), and the problems posed by the present and future process of enlargement (starting with the possible accession of Turkey).⁴²

The Eurocentric perspective on the contemporary international system has been divided into three long cycles of relative stability and peace, interrupted by two (World War I and II together) shorter but intense periods of near total warfare. These periods, 1648-1789 and 1815-1914, were times of relative structural stability, at least from the point of the European powers. There were frequent wars resulting in marginal territorial rearrangements and limited political and economic changes. The drastic reordering of political and territorial structures took place after major peace conferences: Westphalia (1648), Vienna (1815), Versailles (1919) and Yalta/Potsdam (1945). Those conferences were the result of great and destructive wars; each constituted a milestone in the evolution and shaping of the modern international system. During these periods, peace and stability were, in relative terms, the products of ideologically compatible regimes, functioning as if they were in concert.⁴³

Although initially European integration was a security project, over the years the European states engaged in closer cooperation because of the prevailing economic forces. Through cooperation, they developed their own preferences still exist today. Paradoxically, for decades, US security protection for Europe reduced the danger of

42 Maffettone: (2009: 230-257)

43 Di Dimitris (2000: 164-5)

regional rivalries and reinforced "liberal peace" so these economic factors preserved their importance.

Each of the competing perspectives discussed in this paragraph captures an important aspect of world politics. To explain this thesis, we should remain cognizant of realism's emphasis on the inescapable role of power and at the same time keep in mind liberalism's awareness of the importance of domestic forces which influence states' foreign policies.⁴⁴ A number of important writings focused on the characteristics of states, governmental organizations, or individual leaders. The democratic liberal theory fits into this chapter on the EU, as do the efforts of scholars such as Graham Allison to use organizational theory and bureaucratic politics to explain the foreign policy behaviour of the state in order to identify other factors that might lead them to behave outside the confines of the realist or liberal approach.⁴⁵

International relations can only be explained in the current geopolitical constellation of forces that make them. When the balance of power shifted in favour of the West, Francis Fukuyama famously stated that humankind had now reached the "end of history", meaning that capitalist/liberal democracy would be the last model of societal organization. In the era of Western predominance, by far the most interesting and important development has been the lively debate on "democratic peace." The theory became more influential as the number of democracies began to increase and as evidence of their relationships began to accumulate. The democratic peace theory is a refinement of the earlier claim that democracies were inherently more peaceful than autocratic states. It rests on the belief that although democracies seem to fight wars as often as other states, they rarely, if ever, fight one another: they go to war only for just causes. Scholars such as Michael Doyle put forward the influential idea that "democracies don't fight each other".⁴⁶ However, the evidence that democracies do not fight each other is confined only to the post-1945 era and for this reason cannot be credibly tested.

44 Doyle (1997)

45 Walt (1998)

46 Walt. (1998)

In an international community, with its increasingly dense network of international organizations and institutions that have developed over the last several decades, managing common transnational problems in an increasingly interdependent and globalized world has become extremely difficult. Stephen Kotkin⁴⁷ uses a liberal argument, i.e. that there can be no embryonic international community without its members accepting a set of values and goals such as peace, prosperity, development, and, though not necessarily, pluralistic democracy, accountability and effective governance.

Democracy, interdependence, and intergovernmental organizations, each has an independent pacifying effect. One cannot speak about projects for world peace in an historical or contemporary perspective, especially talking about the European Union, without referring to Immanuel Kant's political treatise *Perpetual Peace*. The project for world peace through the establishment of a league of states has followers among today's leading political theorists such as John Rawls, who defended a voluntary league of states. Furthermore the democratic peace theory has sparked a lively scholarly debate between proponents of liberal international relations and realists on how to explain the absence of war between two states.⁴⁸ None of the Kant's views on politics, peace or history, have lost their relevance.

Sebastiano Maffettone's idea, which I easily relate to, is that the EU has inherited from the Enlightenment, and from Kant, a project for a lasting and stable peace (a "perpetual" peace in Kant's words), with the key addition that this type of peace presupposes the creation of fundamental political, institutional and economic conditions. The EU has reached this peace through the implementation of a set of precisely this kind of conditions. Kant explains in his essay⁴⁹ three types of principles capable of solving the conflicts that racked Europe at the time. The first postulated that states were to be set up as "republics", in Kant's words (today, we would say liberal democratic states), guaranteeing personal freedoms, the rule of law and the separation of powers, which are at the basis of modern democratic states. The second,

47 Kotkin (2008)

48 See for example, Brown, Michael, S. Lynn-Jones, and S. Miller (eds.) (1996), *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

49 Kant (1797)

which is directly linked to the first, postulated the assertion of legal conditions and organisation through which a “pacific union”, in Kant’s words, could be achieved among the people. The third postulated the creation of an international community based on commerce and free trade. The European entity is a result of a gradual construction of a Kantian network of political, institutional and economic relations that statesmen, such as those mentioned above, managed to create over the years.⁵⁰

Referring to an “empirical law in international relations”, realists have attributed the peacefulness of democracies to the specific conditions of the bipolar world in the Cold War while the liberals attributed it to the inherent characteristics of democratic states, institutions and shared norms.⁵¹ Further debate was initiated by a series of articles by Michael Doyle⁵² on Kant’s political philosophy and its contemporary relevance. Kant’s claim that liberal states have peaceful international relations with other liberal states was revived in the 1980s. In a much-cited article, Michael Doyle argued that liberal state has created a “separate peace”. According to Doyle, there are elements of the Kantian legacy: restraint among liberal states and “international imprudence” in relations with non-liberal states.⁵³ Kant’s argumentation for perpetual peace rests on two pillars: peace through law and peace through institutions. Both of these are necessary conditions and a sufficient guarantee for lasting peace. Viewed from this perspective, the European Union is the closest to a real-world Kantian peace federation, even though it remains a regional organization.

Let me briefly explain Kant’s Theory of Perpetual Peace⁵⁴. Accepting the Hobbesian view that the state of nature was synonymous with a state of war because force was

50 Maffettone (2009: 230-257)

51 Levy (1988: 653-73)

52 Doyle (1983: 323-353)

53 Baylis (2008: 110-112)

54 Perpetual Peace was written as a just treaty that could be signed by nations. Six preliminary propositions for a perpetual peace among states are:

- No treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war.
- No independent states, large or small, shall come under the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation.
- Standing armies shall in time be totally abolished.
- National debts shall not be contracted with a view to the external friction of states.
- No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state.

the sole resource available to man in the defence of his rights, Kant nonetheless argued that man had the rational power to create peace through “legislation”. Kant wrote that permanent peace becomes possible if all men are subject to a civil constitution as a basis for to domestic law (*jus civitatis*), international law (*jus gentium*), and the law of the human race (*jus cosmopolitanum*). The construction of peace becomes possible as men in each state first pursue a social compact that provides a civil republican constitution which protects human rights, and then joins with other republics in “a federation of free states”, committed to mutually beneficial trade and cooperation.⁵⁵

To understand Kant’s view on international relations, it is important to start with his political philosophy according to which bringing peace is a moral duty. “Reason, as the highest legislative power, absolutely condemns war as a test of rights and sets up peace as an immediate duty.” At the domestic and international level, the state of nature for Kant is “one of war”, firstly in the absence of sovereignty and later in lawlessness. In such anarchic conditions, a supreme power is a necessity. International law, enforced by an agency or institution, should govern external relations. As Kant argued, peace can only be achieved through institutions, a peaceful federation, most probably he had in mind a kind of “VölkerStaat” or even “Föderative Vereinigung”.⁵⁶

Kant envisaged a confederation of republican states slow but gradually evolving into a federation, “beginning with a small number of like-minded states and eventually encompassing the entire globe”.⁵⁷ Kantian peace federations must hence have four objectives in today’s international relations: abolishing war permanently, the rule of law between states, legal guarantees for individual human rights inside states, and democratically legitimized political rule.

The European Union is more than merely another organization in which countries cooperate with each other voluntarily. Rather it represents a new type of institution

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- No state shall, during war, permit such acts of hostility which would make mutual confidence in the subsequent peace impossible: such are the employment of assassins, prisoners, breach of capitulation, and incitement to treason in the opposing state.

55 Pubantz (2004)

56 Doyle (1986)

57 Williams (1992)

that is classified as a supranational organization. The EU has its own mechanisms for law making, monitoring compliance, and enforcement of the laws. The EU laws thus constitute a legal framework; they are situated between national and international law. However, this applies only to the first pillar of the EU, to the Economic and Monetary Union. All other areas remain in the framework of national laws. Just as Kant believed there was no place for war between states that had a legal civil order and respect for moral law, so is the EU an example of shared values. Kant argued that if citizens of a republic have a direct interest in peace to safeguard their prosperity and welfare, they will always oppose war. Kant was not thinking of some kind of world republic or “supra-state” any more than the members of the European Union are. He wanted to find a practical and realistic way for states to coexist peacefully.

Kant could not envisage how the world would change and or that the 21st century would be confronted with, what Rumsfeld had described as the “known unknowns” and even the “unknown unknowns” of the complex security environment. For the EU to enjoy security, there would have to be an alliance of states that agreed on certain principles and rules, on peaceful coexistence, and the concerns about would have to apply beyond its territory - to its neighbours and globally.

The European Union, as a form of supra-national democracy in a Union of sovereign member states, in some ways enshrines the essence of Kant`s federation of sovereign democracies.⁵⁸ In International Relations, the European Union is seen as a sort of Kantian Federation of Free States, in which democratic countries have renounced the use of force as a means to settle disputes, thus creating a security community: a `separate world of stable peace`. Consolidated democracies are fundamental if they want to achieve the political solidity necessary not only to maintain peace on their own territory but also to assume responsibility for promoting peace beyond their borders. The EU was an attempt to overcome destructive nationalism, to foster peace among its member states and to promote peace, security, and progress globally.

The Preamble of the Treaty on the European Union states:

58 Prodi (2009)

*“Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy..., thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.”*⁵⁹

And further on it reads:

*“The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:... to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;”*⁶⁰

As the Europe after the WWII has become perpetually peaceful in a Kantian sense, the EU has embraced the responsibilities for the security and stability beyond its borders as well as globally. The EU meets the first two criteria of the Kantian peace federation, i.e. the goal being to abolish war among its peoples permanently and the rule of law among states. Regarding the final two criteria, the EU is without doubt very similar to the Kantian model of a peace federation as an exclusive federation whose membership is restricted to democratic European states. A world of democratic states joined in international organizations, economically interdependent because of extensive globalization, has become the accepted interpretation of what constitutes a “Kantian” prescription for perpetual peace in the 21st century.

⁵⁹ Treaty on the European Union (1992)

⁶⁰ Ibid.

2. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN 21ST CENTURY

[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know.

Donald Rumsfeld, Former United States Secretary of Defence

2.1 Introduction

In a hypercompetitive world, unexpected surprises that pose a challenge to the peace and security of states and regions are very likely. No security strategy can account for every eventuality that may threaten a society. The international community often overestimates what we know and underestimates uncertainty, not only for NATO and the EU when dealing with security issues, but for the international community as a whole as there is no acceptable defence against the asymmetry of the “Black Swans”⁶¹ as they are fundamentally unpredictable.

For millennia, people lived in isolated communities, unaware of the existence of their more distant neighbours. Migrations and sporadic collisions with outsiders took place in a setting of total ignorance of the world at large, writes Brzezinski in his latest book the “Strategic Vision”. More recently, space exploration has dramatized the new appreciation of the relative »smallness« of the earth, while photographs from outer space taken at night have conveyed the vivid contrast between the illuminated concentrations of urbanized humanity, described as the West, and the darker, less technologically advanced, but increasingly crowded regions of the rest of the world.⁶² Map of Earth at night points at particularly developed or populated areas of the Earth's surface, including the seaboard of Europe, the eastern United States, and Japan. Particularly dark areas include the central parts of South America, Africa, Asia, and Australia.

61 Black Swan Theory is a philosophical and mathematical theory founded by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, describing randomness and uncertainty. The theory was described in his book *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*.⁶¹ The "black swan theory" refers only to unexpected events of large magnitude and consequence and they play larger roles than regular occurrences.

62 Brzezinski (2012 8-9)



Source: NASA/GSFC, NOAA/NGDC, DMSP Digital Archive

New wars' are involving actors other than states projecting new risks and threats to security of the international community. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "the definition of international security has expanded since the end of the Cold War to include more issues and actors. Effectively confronting the threats of the 21st century requires careful engagement with this extended constituency and a new kind of integrated strategic thinking."⁶³


As historically the EU was conceived as a peace project, it considered conflict resolution as an objective of its foreign policy. The Treaty on European Union explicitly states that the EU's aim is to promote peace and that its role in the world should reflect the principles behind its creation, development and enlargement. The preservation of peace, the prevention of conflict and the strengthening of international security are among the Union's core foreign priorities.⁶⁴ Until recently, the EU used to see the resolution of violent mass conflicts predominantly in terms of negotiations between the leading players who were subject to pressure from powerful external actors interested in a peaceful solution to the conflict. To adjust to the new circumstances the EU has been engaging with civil society to understand, support and influence the change from the inside. The EU is best equipped to transform the structural features of violent conflict and eradicate what Johan Galtung defines as the

⁶³ <http://csis.org/category/topics/Defence-and-security/international-security>

⁶⁴ The Treaty on European Union, Article 3 (1), Article 21 (1), Article 21 (2 c).

seeds of structural violence: social injustice, unequal development and discrimination. The EU's approach conceptually fits the profile of a third-generation 'peace-building approach'⁶⁵ which covers the wider economic, political and social dimensions before, during and after a violent conflict.⁶⁶

In the following chart, the elements of encompassing threats are portrayed:



Source: www.gcsp.ch

In responding to multiple threats, NATO and the EU should work closely together. The elements listed below are a cause of anxiety for the international community, weakening national power and increasing the unpredictability of the security environment. The consequences of the imbalances caused by multiple threats are threatening states, organisations, and individuals. Facing this challenge through a NATO-EU partnership is a “win-win” situation for both when facing common threats.

For a decade, the top Pentagon management has benefited from the work of the Office of Net Assessment analysis on long-term trends or threats that have not yet emerged. The Office of Net Assessment, which is a subordinate body of the National Security Council, was established to deal with “Black Swans”; that is to say unanticipated

⁶⁵ See more in Richmond, O. *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*, Palgrave, New York, 2002,

⁶⁶ Tocci (2008: 1-27)

national security surprises. The group of experts at the RAND Corporation, a federally funded research and development centre, has for decades provided cutting-edge analysis for leaders in the Pentagon where, in an attempt to plan for surprises before they happen, the urgent often crowds out the important. The Office of Net Assessment offers senior leaders insights and new perspectives on an uncertain future by conducting studies and engaging top intellectuals and cutting-edge thinkers in many fields. No team could predict that the Pentagon would be dealing with an unexpected war in Libya, an earthquake, a tsunami, nuclear meltdown in Japan, or with as complex a challenge as the uprising of peoples in North Africa and the Middle East.⁶⁷

As with the butterfly effect, a small variance in the initial data can greatly change the outcome; this is especially true for geopolitics in a highly competitive world where future events that could shape the contemporary security landscape have not been predicted. The containment-oriented strategies that prevailed during the era of superpower rivalry are ineffective against a wave of intra-state conflicts and asymmetric threats. With the cross-cutting global risks, i.e. changed security environment after the end of Cold War, Globalization, the Economic Crisis, a shift in the world's centre of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region, the equilibrium of world peace has become increasingly fragile. Contemporary Security Risks, as some would describe those underlying the global risks, e.g., resource security related, demographic challenges, illegal trade, organized crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, occupy NATO and the EU member states and its partners collectively and individually.

2.2 The Complexities of the 21st Century Security Environment


During the Cold War, from roughly 1946 to 1991, military competition and confrontation between two superpowers and their allies dominated international politics. Political and military tensions, proxy wars instigated by the power struggle⁶⁸, economic competition between the Communist world and the Western world,

⁶⁷ Carafano (2011)

⁶⁸ The Korean War (1950-1953), Suez Crisis (1956-1957), Vietnam War (1957-1975), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989), among others, being the case in point.

prevailed. The predominant focus of the Cold War era was on security from nuclear war as well as on avoiding direct confrontation between the superpowers and their allies. The main dangers were those of external subversion from the opposite bloc. The security issues were relatively straightforward in comparison to today.

While the Cold War was about defence and deterrence, the new nature of war derives from asymmetrical threats, non-state actors and rogue states as primary security concerns. The level of complexity of the new security environment makes it difficult for a single actor to respond adequately and presents an unprecedented challenge for the international community and its system of alliances which must act to ensure advantages for all.⁶⁹ The growth of intra-state conflicts has been quite significant after the WWII, that is another reason for closer cooperation.



Source: Uppsala University. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/graphs/type_year.gif Accessed September 12, 2009.

The legacy of the Cold War was a series of deep-rooted conflicts, some in a latent phase, i.e. invisible on the surface but very deeply rooted. The international community has to use different tools to find sustainable, durable and flexible solutions to complex and diverse conflict areas. The greater the number of actors playing a role in international relations, the greater the complexity and the lower the degree of predictability. Greater complexity requires greater adaptability. Darwin talked about

⁶⁹ Mutualism relationships are characterized by positive reciprocal relationship between two species for survival. There are two types of mutualism relationships. Symbiotic relationship, which is an obligate relationship, where the two species live in close proximity and at least one of the species need to contribute in order to survive. In non-symbiotic relationships, the two species may not live together or may not be dependent of each other, but they come together at times for certain mutual benefits. See more at: <http://www.buzzle.com/articles/mutualism-relationships.html>

the survival of the most adaptable species, not about the survival of the strongest which could fail to adapt and become extinct.

Wars have become wicked problems⁷⁰ which can be overcome only when they cease to be important or the problem resolves itself. The presence of the international community remains essential as does any action beyond purely military action, for example economic development and good governance. Since “war is the continuation of politics by other means,”⁷¹ the responsible behaviour of nation states is crucial to sustaining peace and avoid war.

“Post-modern” Security Concepts:

- Security Governance – Security Sector Governance
- Human Security: “freedom from fear and freedom from want for all persons” UNDP 1994 Human Development Report
- Cyber-Security, Climate Security
- “Responsibility to Protect”, Protection of Civilians
- “Responsibility when protecting” (IBSA initiative 2011)

As there is no official consensus between NATO and the EU on what is a risk, it is necessary to define the term in order to evaluate transnational organized crime. Risk can be described as having “two dimensions...probability and impact.” Probability is the likelihood of an uncertain event occurring. Impact (or consequence) is what will “happen were the risk to become reality.” For example, the probability of a terrorist attack might be low but the consequences unacceptably high. Also, the relative probability of harm being caused by a failed state outside the Alliance may be higher than from a terrorist attack but the direct consequences are more limited. Since risk implies an uncertain outcome, an additional difficulty arises – the problem of (un)certainty. Predicting future events involves making estimates. As time progresses and the information surrounding a risk becomes clearer, probability of the risk occurring may increase beyond an acceptable level and/or the options for mitigation

70 The phrase often used by academic strategic thinkers. "Wicked problem" is a phrase used in social planning to describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems.

71 Clausewitz by M. Howard (1976)

and 'Action' will be reduced to a 'Reaction' alone. Thus, NATO and the EU have become reactive agents, forced by events to find the best ways to respond to security threats. Addressing global risks requires new capabilities in terms of response mechanisms at the global level. With global risks playing out both at the global and national levels, and with different stakeholders being affected in different ways, the world faces a significant challenge in coordinating national and global responses. None of these risks and threats can be addressed by a single actor.

While risks are increasingly globalized and interrelated, global governance possibilities are highly fragmented. There is a growing sense of paralysis when responding to global challenges. The United States' National Intelligence Council and the European Union's Institute for Security Studies came to the conclusion that current governance frameworks will be unable to keep pace with looming global challenges unless extensive reforms are implemented. Increasingly, emerging economies feel that, quite unjustly, they have insufficient influence in the international institutions in their current configuration, i.e. the United Nations Security Council. Yet there is uncertainty over the ability and willingness of the rising powers to shoulder a greater share of global responsibilities, as well as reluctance on the part of established powers to recognize the limits of their own power. To meet these challenges, improved global governance is essential. It is a 21st century paradox that the conditions that make improved global governance so crucial - divergent interests, conflicting incentives and differing norms and values - are also those that make its realization so difficult and complex.⁷²

Economic inequality and the failure of global governance impair both the effectiveness of risk response and overall resilience at the global level. Both risks have a strong impact on longer-term developments and thus investment against these central risks is certain to have a positive effect on overall risk resilience. However, we can never anticipate or prepare for all the risks. In an increasingly connected world, there is a plethora of risks that are beyond the planning and assessment capacities of decision-makers and risk experts alike. To be prepared for these future challenges and to continue to seize opportunities in rapidly changing strategic environments,

⁷² World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2011

organizations and their member states must continue to invest in their ability to adapt and learn, thereby building more resilient systems.⁷³

Since the two organizations, NATO and the EU, are part of the international community, other stakeholders in the international security will be discussed as well. The role of the UN, NATO, the EU and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in global stability efforts will be examined before analysing the NATO - EU partnership in more detail. To understand the complex, interconnected, and interdependent international system, it is crucial to discuss the collective efforts of international actors in sustaining peace and stability.

In the new model which replaced the military power strategy prevalent during the Cold War, each security agent in the international community contributes a different element of the whole in order to address the particular issues of the conflict spectrum. These efforts are characterized as the “comprehensive approach”, “unity of effort”, “integrated approach”, “whole of government approach” or similar terms. It is well known that only combined efforts, made in a sustainable manner, can possibly ensure peace. The main issue is how to improve coordination among these actors in order to address many, if not all, the challenges of crisis management.

Most moderate risks to state security, stability, and sovereignty are dealt with by the individual nation, using national capabilities. The problem lies in risks that affect several nations or are beyond the ability of a single nation. Additionally, if NATO fails to provide support to member nations when they may be at significant risk (though perhaps not certain risk), the credibility of the Alliance may be so damaged that future enemies will not be deterred by the threat of Alliance force. It is this credible response that has been the basis for the Alliance since its inception.

This said, a significant risk to NATO is a one that cannot or should not be dealt with using the internal structures of an individual Alliance nation, or one that results in an unacceptable risk to the credibility of the Alliance; moreover, the EU’s lack of credible force enable it to act on challenges to its member states undermines both

⁷³ Ibid.

organizations. The contemporary security environment will be discussed by looking at NATO and the EU. What kind of security challenges is the 21st century bringing to international relations?

2.3 Cross-cutting global risks

The 21st century paradox is that as the world grows closer together, it is also growing apart. In “What next for NATO” Brzezinski wrote that the world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state, nor by the coercive aspirations of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansionist military power. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its history, is experiencing increasing popular unrest made more menacing by the growing availability of weapons of mass destruction, not just to states but also to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity’s recent political awakening.⁷⁴

The cross-cutting global risks, including the changed security environment after the Cold War, globalization, the economic crisis and the shift in the world’s centre of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region will be discussed.

2.3.1 Globalization

Over the past thirty years the world’s major powers have all embraced globalization, an economic system that promised to raise living standards across the world and created common interests amongst the world’s most powerful nations. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US was the dominant global power, which added to the stability of the international system. Former US President Clinton’s belief in the possibility of a win-win world was not a personal eccentricity. One of the most influential political ideas of the thirty years between 1988 and 2008 was the theory of ‘democratic peace’. The idea was that capitalism, democracy and technology would advance simultaneously and global peace would be the end-product. In a world where

74 Brzezinski (2009)

all the major powers embraced democracy and market economics, and globalization and high technology drew people together, war might become a thing of the past.⁷⁵

The US lost its unipolar moment with eruption of the 2008 economic crisis. It became clear that world is confronted by truly global challenges, such as nuclear proliferation, caused by rivalry and division between nations. The European Union, the other main pillar of the Western world, is going through its most serious crisis since its foundation in 1957. The steady progress towards 'ever closer union' in Europe over the past fifty years was built on a win-win logic. The single currency and the expanded membership fitted perfectly with the logic of globalization. Economic and political barriers between nations were put aside. But the threat of contagious debt crises across Europe is threatening to unravel European integration.⁷⁶

National security is being challenged by the forces of globalization; no single problem can any longer be viewed in isolation. Globalization has abolished both the protection that borders or geographical isolation from a crisis areas used to provide, as well as the distinction between security at home and security abroad. Although some argue that the positive effect of interdependence will help to facilitate dialogue between states, thus enhancing global security, the fact is that the negative aspect of globalization is often associated with fragmentation, rapid social change, increased economic inequality, and challenges to cultural identity that contribute to conflicts within and between states. The ambivalent effect of globalization not only strengthens national security, and powerful states' unilateral and pre-emptive strategies, but also encourages multilateralism inside weaker states as groups seek to provide for their own security.

Globalization has removed the protection that borders or geographical isolation once offered. Because of globalization, the recent turmoil in the Middle East has had an impact not only in the region but worldwide. There is a tendency for countries recovering from conflict to fall into another one, if the appropriate behavioural and structural transformation processes are not in place. Political crises caused by lack of freedom of expression, longevity of regimes, the weakening or absence of a middle

⁷⁵ Rachman (2010: 4-5)

⁷⁶ Ibid.

class, the systemic and systematic rise of corruption, the crystallization of popular hatred on a ruling elite, rulers' military connections and the alienation of one-party systems, have driven the Middle East and North Africa to instability. According to the domino theory, every Arab regime will be affected.

In societies which have been long subjected to tyranny, the moral culture that provides an essential source of social order is often severely damaged or absent. The sudden collapse of the police states in these nations, whether in post-Taliban Afghanistan, or in post-Saddam Iraq, tends to bring with it an explosive growth in antisocial behaviours. Thus basic security must be established. But in the long run, security forces alone cannot maintain order. Newly liberated societies require citizens with a strong set of shared ethics and moderate political opinions to legitimate the new, hopefully better order.⁷⁷

Many of the security threats arise from what are essentially inequities in the global distribution of power, authority, and wealth and the processes of globalization. Threats are then seen as emanating from disaffected governments and groups, from people on the move, from phenomena that cannot be suppressed at their source by weak or non-existent states.

Over the past decade, six of the world's ten fastest-growing countries were African. In eight of the past ten years, Africa has grown faster than East Asia, including Japan. Even allowing for the knock-on effect of the northern hemisphere's slowdown, the IMF expects Africa to grow by nearly 6% in 2012, about the same as Asia.⁷⁸

Globalization has generated sustained economic growth for a generation. It has reshaped the world, making it far more interconnected and interdependent. Populist responses to economic disparities, i.e. in North Africa and the Middle East, call for the international community and the new emerging economies to take up a leadership role. Emerging economies are increasing their political, economic and military power. A key question in determining the scale and scope of the retrenchment from globalization will be the extent to which emerging economies are ready to defend the open international system that facilitated their rise in the first place.

⁷⁷ Etzioni (2007:1-43)

⁷⁸ The Economist, 3 December 2011


Economic difficulties mean policy-makers are increasingly tempted to resort to protectionist measures and anti-globalization rhetoric. Unemployment and unequal wealth distribution in both advanced and emerging countries also deprive large parts of society of the benefits of globalization. This may result in socio-political unrest and a socio-economic backlash against globalization. There are early signs of this in the rise of extremist parties in Europe, at both ends of the political spectrum. Similar sentiments are being heard in some emerging economies, such as in North Africa. While experts regard full retrenchment from globalization as a low-probability scenario, even marginal restrictions to the global movement of goods, people and ideas could lead to an economic downturn. Such restrictions could simultaneously exacerbate other risks by limiting opportunities for countries to spread risks and share resources across borders.⁷⁹ Autocracy, corruption and strife will not disappear overnight.

“Today, power in the world is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chess-board, military power is largely unipolar and the United States is likely to remain supreme for some time. But on the middle chess-board, economic power has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan and China as the major players, and with others gaining in importance...The bottom chess-board is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside government control, and it includes non-state actors as diverse as bankers...at one extreme and terrorists...or hackers...at the other.”⁸⁰

There has been a seismic shift in the World's economy. The 21st century has been marked by an important geopolitical event: December 11, 2001 – the date on which China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

⁷⁹ World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2011

⁸⁰ Nye (2011)



We all concentrate on China's rise as a great power and we tend to forget about Japan as another great power. Its economy remains the second largest in the world, a remarkable fact given its relatively small population, smaller territory, and lack of natural resources. Meanwhile, the Japanese military is one of the world's most modern. Although Japan spends barely more than 1 % of its national wealth on defence, that means \$40 billion a year, among the three or four highest defence budgets in the world. Japan is not only a genuine great power but increasingly displays great power ambitions.⁸¹ Japan is the third largest economy and has the third largest navy in the Pacific. Article 9 of Japan's constitution restricts Japanese militarization but the perception has been modified. It remains to be seen in which direction Japan will evolve.

Trade between China and India has increased over 200-fold since 1990 and topped USD 60bn in 2010. In principle, they co-operate on bids for access to commodities in Africa. Yet, India is China's only land neighbour with whom there is still a border dispute and water rights are already a source of concern. Beijing sees the US/India civil nuclear agreement as driven in part by Washington's desire to "contain" China, while India frets about China's ties with Pakistan. Notably, Beijing's recent offer to refurbish the Pakistani port of Gwadar in return for naval facilities there is seen by

⁸¹ Kagan (2008)

India as: "...part of China's so-called string of pearls, a chain of ports in Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan that New Delhi thinks is designed to encircle India."⁸²

The continuing turmoil in the Middle East and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to see military force as an arbiter of disputes both between states and within states, as well as a weapon used by terrorist movements. Interventionism is also seen as an element of disempowerment of the states in question. The conventional arms race continues and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons influence the security strategies of states where authoritarian leaders remain in power and cultural differences and diverse values prevent global agreement on a wide range of important issues.⁸³ The Middle East is of supreme importance to Europe and the US for its oil and gas resources. Other concerns include drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism.

The dilemma for the Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is that the national governments they seek to help are unable to stand on their own. At best, Western armies can create the political space to build viable governments. But this has proved difficult enough even where the fighting has stopped and the main political forces have been co-operative. It may be impossible under sustained fire.⁸⁴

Western countries will still have a supreme interest in cooperating with countries that share part of a vision on 'League of Democracies' like with India and negotiating from a position of strength with those like China that never will. The main challenge for western societies is to defend the positions that must be defended, and to negotiate on the rest. The imperial era of the West is over. Countries like China have long measured themselves against the West and have improved greatly as a consequence. For both parties the challenge will be resisting the "winner-takes-all" mentality and learning to bring out the best in each other by bringing out the best in themselves.⁸⁵

82 "China struts larger on the world stage", Financial Times editorial, 24 May 2011


83 Baylis (2008:230-240)

84 Daniels (2007)

85 Coker (2011)

2.3.2 Economic Crisis

There are two aspects to the economic crisis, firstly, it has immediate leads to the social fragmentation of societies and secondly, it impacts on the defence capabilities of European states because of defence budget constraints. Despite the economic crisis, Europe remains the largest economy in the world. The graph below shows the ten largest economies in the world by GDP in 2010, considering the EU as a single entity.



Source: September 2011 update of the International Monetary Fund's *World Economic Outlook Database*. [Figure for EU](#) and [for the countries of the world](#), Accessed September 22, 2011.

As suggested by the World Economic Forum's Global Risk Report 2011, the economic crisis has reduced global economic resilience, while increasing geopolitical tension, and has heightened social concerns. Both governments and societies are less able than ever to cope with global challenges. Issues of economic disparity and equity, at both the national and the international level, can cause resurgent nationalism and populism as well as social fragmentation. Global imbalances and currency volatility, fiscal crisis and asset price collapse threaten social and political stability as well as economic development. The tension is increasing also between the wealth and influence of emerging economies and the high levels of debt in advanced economies. Coordinated global action presents a challenge, given the conflicting interests of different states.⁸⁶

Economic disparity is closely associated with corruption, demographic challenges, fragile states, global imbalances and asset-price collapse. It influences illicit trade, migration, food (in)security, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass

⁸⁶ World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2011

destruction. It plays out between and inside countries. Despite robust growth in some emerging economies, many countries remain trapped in a cycle of poverty which has serious implications, ranging from a lack of access to basic social infrastructure, such as good education, healthcare and sanitation, to the political fragility of the state.⁸⁷

The second aspect of the 2008 financial crisis has proved to be a challenge for defence, in view of the associated budget cuts, changes in the security environment and the ongoing demand for expeditionary operations. Defence investments have to be balanced with those factors. New policies suited to an increasingly globalized world are being explored in the international arena. Discussions on smart power have implications for the way in which defence capabilities will develop in order to meet global security needs for security. Defence is changing from a narrow focus on “hard power” to a broader sense of anything that can help in achieving defence and security objectives including “soft power”.⁸⁸ Without a substantial increase in global economic growth public sector budgets will come under pressure as governments are forced to repay massive debts. Major defence projects will be the most vulnerable. The message for the military sector across NATO could hardly be clearer. Budget contraction in NATO nations may ultimately weaken NATO’s defensive capability. Some countries outside NATO, notably China and India, have recently been increasing their defence expenditure, a trend which will probably continue once global economic recovery is apparent.⁸⁹

A primary challenge for Europe and the United States is how to steer a path out of debt by striking the right balance between austerity and security and foreign policy support. This means efforts to ensure that the US is able to exert strong influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to influence the Iranian situation, relationships with Russia, as well as relations with China. Just as America must learn to exert its influence differently, the Europeans must be ready to shoulder greater responsibility despite their tight budgetary constraints.⁹⁰

87 Ibid.

88 See the “Security in the age of austerity” (2011)

89 Asmus (2009)

90 See the “Security in the age of austerity” Conference (2011)

In his speech on “NATO’s future”, former US Defence Secretary Gates, confirmed his doubts about NATO becoming a two-tiered Alliance with members who specialize in “soft’ humanitarian, development and peacekeeping tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions. An Alliance is divided between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of Alliance’s commitments and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership but do not share the risks or the costs. The austerity measures imposed on European defence budgets underscore a lack of will as well as a lack of resources. Defence budgets were inadequately funded even before and there were already shortfalls in capabilities. Despite the demands of the mission in Afghanistan - the first ground war fought in NATO history -, total European Defence spending declined by nearly 15% in the decade following 9/11. The result is that investment in future modernization and other capabilities not directly related to Afghanistan is being squeezed out.⁹¹

It will be essential for future European security to apply the agreed NATO benchmarks for defence spending. Fiscal, political and demographic realities are not helping to support balanced defence spending. Today, just five of the 28 allies – the US, the UK, France, Greece and Albania – exceed the agreed 2% of GDP spending on Defence.⁹²

Asia’s share of world military spending is expected to increase from 24% in 2007 to over 32% by 2016: some analysts suggest that China’s defence budget is double the official figure and China’s military is undergoing a major modernisation programme as a result. In India, the recent surge in defence spending has been on a massive scale, amounting to a 24% increase in the 2009-2010 budget alone, making India the world’s third largest spender on defence in terms of the purchasing power of their currency. Another challenge relates to the changing nature of the security threat. During the Cold War we had the advantage of knowing with some certainty who, what and where the enemy was. Today, the enemy is more often than not a terrorist organisation or a “rogue nation,” and NATO forces are just as likely to be drafted to a conflict zone to act as peacemakers on humanitarian missions as they are to be called upon to fight a conventional war. Thus, the long term economic viability of major

⁹¹ Gates (2011)

⁹² Ibid.

military programmes will be questioned and choices will have to be made between force recruitment and purchasing new equipment.⁹³

Speaking to a 2010 Reserve Officers Association Conference in Washington, Adm. Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that he is concerned that one of the results of the economic mess will be instability in places where we might predict problems, as well as in other places where planners might not expect calamity. The floundering global economy has already forced reductions in US defence spending, which is likely drive up global instability. As Washington continues to combat the crisis with corporate bailouts and economic stimulus bills, Mullen assumed, "there will not be an institution in our government that will not be affected." He repeatedly informed the audience that the military is at the epicentre of a coming series of national and worldwide changes.⁹⁴

The financial and economic crisis has led all European states to cut defence spending to some extent. Despite reform efforts to make their militaries more efficient, many have a problem with diminishing defence capabilities. Many states have advocated greater defence cooperation and pooling and sharing of military resources among European states. A brief overview of some European states and the defence reviews listed below, offers an insight into the challenge of providing defence capabilities in Europe.⁹⁵

In light of the financial crisis, in September 2010 France unveiled a revised triennial defence spending law for the period 2011-2013. Total defence spending for that period will amount to €91.6bn, instead of the €95.3bn, initially planned in Military Programming Law. Between 2011 and 2013, the French armed forces will thus need to save €3.5bn. This proposal from the Defence Ministry was validated by the adoption of the budget on 29th December 2010. Since restructuration efforts and significant cuts are already part of the implementation of the 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security, no further cuts in the force structure are planned as a direct consequence of the financial crisis. With regard to international cooperation in military engagements, the French government is actively searching for cooperation

93 Asmus (2009)

94 Bennett (2011)

95 See "The impact of the financial crisis on European Defence" (2011)

opportunities rather than reacting passively to the pressures of the financial situation and the resulting political environment.

The German defence budget has been underfinanced for quite some time. Defence equipment was not purchased in sufficient quantities. The MoD bound itself to generate savings of €8.3 bn from its defence budget between 2011 and 2014. Options for savings will be identified through better pooling and sharing in the EU and NATO. Most importantly, Germany, together with Sweden, has introduced the Ghent Initiative which assesses options for pooling and sharing. In December 2010 the Initiative was welcomed by the European Council and thus Europeanized. CSDP member states will analyse their national capabilities on the basis of three criteria: firstly, the extent to which the interoperability of those capabilities that must remain under national control could be increased, secondly which capabilities allow options for pooling and thirdly which capabilities and support structures offer potential for role and task-sharing through intensified cooperation.

Moreover, the Weimar initiative by France, Germany and Poland aims to strengthen CSDP capabilities through increased multi-lateralization and pooling of forces. This initiative has been welcomed by the EU's High Representative. On the bilateral level, the French and German Planning Staffs have analysed options for pooling and sharing. This process has not delivered any visible results so far.

Italy's international engagement has had to be adjusted in light of financial pressures. The current national debt savings programme includes a 10% cut in each Ministry's budget. Spending on international missions has had to be adjusted under the financial pressures. Italy's contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was increased from €310m to €364m in 2010, but its contribution in Lebanon, the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, as well as for the training of Iraqi security forces had been significantly reduced by the end of 2011.

Poland's National Security Strategy identifies energy dependence as the greatest external threat to national security. Large-scale armed conflict is considered unlikely. However, regional and local conflicts, such as in the South Caucasus or the Balkans, may require Polish involvement and are considered more likely than in the past.

Poland shifted its troops from various military missions to increase contributions in Afghanistan. On the issue of pooling and sharing, Warsaw has, since 2010, been engaged in a close dialogue with Germany and France as part of the Weimar Triangle. Poland, Germany and France sent a letter to the EU High Representative in December 2010 calling for the improvement of capacities to plan and conduct operations and missions, strengthen cooperation among their militaries and create synergies in a time of scarce resources.

In 2009, the Spanish defence budget was cut for the first time in ten years. The total defence spending including funds for civilian employees, secret services, research institutes and defence procurement, earmarked in the budget of the Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Trade, totalled €11bn. Despite financial pressure on the armed forces, the Spanish government is not actively engaging with the idea of pooling and sharing. Spain follows the European Air Transport Command (EATC) initiative, driven by Belgium, Germany, France and The Netherlands, as an observer. Spain affirms it wants to maintain full-spectrum independent capabilities.

Sweden's threat assessment focuses on regional conflicts and instability, organized crime, international crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security challenges which they consider can only be met through international cooperation. Sweden is not a NATO member, which enhances the significance of Stockholm's commitment to the EU. The 2005-2007 Defence Bill, entitled "Our Future Defence", defined the Swedish level of ambition as the ability to lead or participate in two large-scale international missions simultaneously, with each mission requiring the deployment of an entire battalion. Additionally, there should be further capacity to allow for three smaller missions. This target of up to about 2,300 troops would mean that current Swedish deployment would be at least doubled. Finnish troops form part of the same units and share facilities with Swedish forces making a coordinated approach all the more functional.

Finland is a strong proponent of closer defence cooperation, as illustrated by the Ghent Initiative, its long-term participation in Nordic defence cooperation and the recent signing of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) Memorandum of Understanding in 2009. A proposal to set up a shared surveillance initiative over the

North Sea is attracting broad Nordic support. Finland decided to work more closely with Estonia on its National Air Defence Modernisation Plan (NADMP), the completion of which is scheduled for 2015. Cooperation over the system to repel and counter hostile air attacks will enable Finnish and Estonian forces to coordinate air defence strategies. Finland has signalled its interest in a coordinated exit-strategy from Afghanistan, with Sweden and other Nordic states such as Denmark, which would cover troop reductions and the ultimate withdrawal.

In the context of pooling and sharing, in 2009 Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway signed the NORDEFECO Memorandum of Understanding in a bid to expand military and industrial cooperation in the region. Nordic cooperation has long-term objectives, including common weapon procurement and more communality in military operations and equipment. Key cooperation projects include the EU's Nordic Battle Group, joint development of the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea project, and the feasibility of improving the Nordic defence industry's capabilities through common weapon programmes. Sweden has also proposed putting helicopters, or other military assets, at the disposal of Danish, Norwegian, or Finnish crews for international missions. Nordic countries made positive progress in pooling and sharing in the fields of common transport and common logistics. In December 2010, Germany and Sweden confirmed they would launch a process in which EU member states would seek more joint responsibility for military matters. The Nordic Defence cooperation effort has been extended to the Baltic States and there is clear mutual interest in expanding cooperation with the UK, Germany and Poland.

The United Kingdom's "Strategic Defence and Security Review" (SDSR) made clear that the UK wishes to maintain its global reach. However, it assumes that above a certain limited scale of operations, e.g., Sierra Leone, the UK is likely to be involved only if it is part of an international coalition (usually led by the US). The potential scenarios vary from major inter-state warfare to intra-state 'wars among the people'.

The United Kingdom insists upon its NATO-first policy. As far as CSDP is concerned, the British government views member states' inconsistencies about political security interests and the will to project power as hampering pooling and sharing. Creating interdependencies with these states would constrain rather than

multiply political and military options. The European Defence Agency's (EDA) performance has been strongly highly criticised: its aims and working methods arouse suspicion in the new Government which also has reservations about initiatives such as Ghent or Weimar as it doesn't see the potential for added value.

The Belgian armed forces are already engaged in a number of pooling and sharing initiatives and intend to make further use of this option. Discussions are starting on Danish pooling and sharing options but with a preference for a NATO framework rather than the EU, because of its caveats concerning CSDP and its close alliance with the US.

Owing to decades-long tension with neighbouring Turkey over territorial disputes, including the divided island of Cyprus, territorial waters, airspace and the continental shelf in the Aegean, debt-ridden Greece has the EU's biggest military budget in terms of percentage of GDP. Greece is currently considering options for pooling and sharing redundant capabilities at the EU level. Greece's defence budget was 2% of GDP in 2010, down from 3% in 2009: it was cut by around 18% in 2010 (- €1.1bn) and reduced by a further 19% in 2011.

In spite of the financial crisis, Hungary has decided to increase its defence budget slightly. In 2009, it was decided to increase the defence budget by 0.2% of GDP over the following four years to reach over 1.3% of GDP by 2013. Instead of maintaining the ambition to have full spectrum capabilities, the Hungarian army will specialize and include the development of niche capabilities such as NBC defence. The cooperative division of labour with small nations, such as Austria, Slovakia, Finland or Belgium which are similarly affected by the crisis, are listed as a policy priority. Hungary included pooling and sharing as a priority item on the agenda during its EU Presidency in 2011 and strengthening the Ghent-Process.

With the Netherlands' new coalition government, cuts of between €400m and €2.1bn are being discussed for the defence ministry in 2011. The base defence budget for 2011 stands at €8.4bn. Even without the upcoming cuts, the new cabinet's defence spending was to decrease to €8.1bn by 2015. The Netherlands is a long-time advocate of closer defence cooperation with France, Germany, Belgium, through pooling and

sharing of capabilities mostly in the NATO framework. France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands recently put 200 transport aircraft under a single command at an air-base in the Dutch city of Eindhoven. It remains unclear to date whether The Hague is interested in further cooperative steps in the wake of the financial crisis.⁹⁶

The challenge for defence in times of budget cuts, the changes in the security environment and the demand for expeditionary operations will occupy the European nations for some time to come. The main challenge for NATO and the EU member states will be how to spend the available resources to optimize their forces. Many nations have already assessed their options, and as a result, are investigating pooling and sharing in partnerships.

As the former US State Secretary of Defence Gates warned the NATO Allies, to avoid becoming a collective military irrelevance, member nations must examine new approaches to boosting combat capabilities by improving procurement, training, logistics, and the sustained forces. He emphasised the need for “Smart Defence” initiatives. There is no substitute for nations providing the resources necessary for the military capabilities the Alliance needs when faced with a security challenge. Ultimately, nations must be responsible for their fair share of common defence. It is expected that Europe will reverse the current trend of decline in European defence capabilities by better allocating the existing resources and following through on commitments.⁹⁷

Although “pooling and sharing” adds to the European defence capabilities, it does not bring the creation of a European army any closer: that will in any case be “a political decision” as noted by the European Defence Agency (EDA) Chief Executive Officer Claude-France Arnould at the Agency’s annual conference in January 2012. The consequences of the financial crisis remain to be seen: “what we can assume is that successfully addressing these challenges will be no easier once the crisis is over”.

⁹⁶ European Parliament (2011)

⁹⁷ Gates (2010)

2.3.3 Competitiveness between the Regions: the Asia-Pacific Century

“We are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people”

Fareed Zakaria, 2011

“In 1750, Asia had more than half of the world population and product. By 1900, after the Industrial Revolution in Europe and America, Asia’s share shrank to one-fifth of world product. By 2050, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share.”

Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (2011)

The shift in the world’s centre of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region is a concern for Europe. As the United States looks ahead, it faces two central challenges in foreign policy, writes Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security adviser: “enlarging the zone of prosperity and democracy in the West while balancing the rise of China and allaying the fears of the United States’ Asian allies. Neither challenge can be addressed in isolation, for today, the fates of the West and the East are intertwined.”⁹⁸ The future conduct of and relationship among new revisionist powers will further intensify the strategic uncertainty.

The 20th century was often referred to as the European century, now the focus is this new era is moving eastwards. The twentieth century was an Atlantic century, while the twenty-first is going to be a Pacific one. Asia and the Pacific⁹⁹ are rapidly emerging scientific and research powerhouses, and the region’s competitiveness is now the global standard in respect to industrial production and high tech industries. The focus of security analysts and hard power strategic planners has recently moved towards developments in Asia and the Pacific. They have not yet observed a full-blown arms race, but in terms of military spending and confrontational psychology,

98 Brzezinski (2012)

99 The Asia-Pacific is the region from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas spanning two oceans – the Pacific and the Indian - 'that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia. The stretch of sea from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together, India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's population. See State Sec. Clinton’s article in FP, 2011.

the premises of an arms race are there. The Indo-Pacific will become the centre of global geopolitics, with the 'Asian Mediterranean' (from the South China Sea to the Bay of Bengal) being the most important area of all.¹⁰⁰ As former US Secretary of Defence Gates stated, "the future of geopolitics will be decided in Asia, not in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States should be right at the centre of the action."¹⁰¹

The move in the centre of gravity is a paradigm shift of truly historic proportions that has unfolded with unsettling rapidity. Within a third of a century, the world centre of gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. For the first time in 500 years the global agenda, metaphorically at least, is no longer set by Europe. By virtually any matrix the economic, political, military, the global agenda is increasingly set in Asia.¹⁰² China lies at the heart of this phenomenon and the explosive growth of the Chinese economy since 1980 both reflects and contributes to the second great wave of globalization that the world is experiencing. That wave is deepening levels of economic interdependency, a fact illustrated by the distorted trade relationship between the United States and China.

The European Union constitutes the single largest market for the export-driven Chinese economy and the disturbingly deep structural weaknesses that have manifested themselves in the Euro zone have translated directly into a downturn in the Chinese economy. At the same time, there are those who point to China's \$3 trillion USD foreign exchange reserve and wonder aloud whether Beijing will come to the EU's rescue if for no other reason than to re-animate their principal market. However, the Chinese are pragmatists and they will exploit the EU's weaknesses to their advantage. Sentiment will not enter the picture. Thus, the continued vitality of the EU is dependent, to a significant degree, on China at the very time when some in NATO see China as a security threat.

With Asia growing at a phenomenal pace, the continent is set to be the key economic player of the current century, yet at the same time it has still to find a stable footing in

¹⁰⁰ Rogers (2011)

¹⁰¹ Clinton (2011)

¹⁰² Final comments on Asia-Pacific Century were discussed with Dr. James Boutillier, a Special Advisor (Policy) at the Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters in Esquimalt, Canada, an expert on the regional security in Asia-Pacific Rim, March 2012.

the international economic and political order. The desire of the West is that China must become a "responsible" member of the international community since it has significant power but its international actions are not commensurate with its power. We can see this in complaints about China's alleged obstructionist posture when it comes to sanctions on Iran and Syria. The Chinese, of course, maintain that a basic tenet of their foreign policy is non-intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. They are as hypocritical as almost every other great power when it comes to upholding that policy.


The responsibility will be on the West to take this opportunity to strengthen cooperation and partnership ties with a continent, which is experiencing such rapid expansion and growth.¹⁰³ There is on point to be aware of that China perceives that the United States is creating Cold War-style containment security architecture in East Asia and denying them the "respect" they deserve. Moreover, they see the world press as subject to manipulation by western interests. These anxieties, coupled with increased levels of nationalism, make China, in western eyes, intractable and difficult.

Further, the West is confronted with the structural shifts and trends in global energy and financial markets. In Africa, in the Middle East and in Asia, groups of countries and emerging economies are at a point in their development where their energy demand is going to continue to grow.¹⁰⁴ As Churchill would have no doubt counselled, Europeans should look once again at the utility of their armed forces, but today he would say they should look at their economic strength to protect their interests.

103 Kaplan (2010)

104 Comments by Flynt Leverett a Senior Director for Middle East Affairs at the National Security Council, Middle East expert on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff, and Senior Analyst at the CIA in 1992-2003, in a panel on "The Rise of the Rest II: How the Ascent of Russia and China Affects Global Business and Security". Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, July 1, 2008. <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0052.html/>

The Economics:




Source: Clingendael Institute, Den Hague.

Energy dependence, the increasing cost of natural resources driven by increasing demand and decreasing supply, and the lack of energy infrastructure are the driving forces behind Western economic and foreign policies. Such a situation provides opportunities for countries like Russia or countries in the Middle East to exert more power.¹⁰⁵ In the Russian case, Moscow's energy and foreign policy are largely indistinguishable. This is fine when energy prices are buoyant, but when they linger for long periods around \$100 USD per barrel, Moscow's options are limited. It is also important to note that 50% of the world demand for energy over the next quarter century is likely to originate out of China. Indeed, achieving energy sustainability and invulnerability is one of Beijing's great goals. The Chinese are deeply concerned that their energy supplies could be interdicted in the event of hostilities.

The following two graphs on global demographics provide some perspective of the dynamics and balance of the world's population.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.


Demographics:



Source: Clingendael Institute, Den Hague.

In 1900, Europe accounted for 20 % of the world’s population. Today, this figure is down to 12 %. It is estimated that by 2050 it will drop to 7 %, and by the end of the 21st century to 4 %. Today, India and China together account for 37 % of the world’s population.

World population distribution by region



Source: Clingendael Institute, Den Hague.

When discussing China, it is important to understand that Chinese culture has no resonance with most NATO members. Despite differences between Italians and Germans and Slovaks, there is a certain underlying European culture. That, of course, is not true in the case of China. So even if there were no critical levels of mistrust in relations with China, the lack of a common cultural basis makes engaging China much more challenging.

In view of the EU's economic weight, it could take on more important role in world affairs. The EU is a global trading power with a € 11.2 trillion EU market and € 12 billion external aid budget, in the 2011 estimations. Foreign Direct Investment inflow to the EU at 27 was € 54 billion in 2010. FDI (outflow EU27) € 107 billion (2010) EU investment in US: € 28 billion (2010) European firms employ 4 million US workers EU Security Strategy (2003 + 2008 update). The main problem is how to use this economic power more strategically. This said, the main question concerns the EU's strategic reach: will it only be regional or will it also be able to play an important role globally, possibly together with NATO? Although enlargement itself was successful, the EU's main failure was its weak response to the Arab revolutions. The key challenges for the future are the strategic partnerships with Russia, China and the United States. The EU is currently challenged by trade relations with India and has taken a very rigid approach to finding a framework for these exchanges.

The US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, proclaimed in her Foreign Policy, that US grand strategy is to move from conflict in the Middle East and Southwest Asia to deeper engagement in the dynamic Far East, shifting from an over-concentration on Japan and Korea to a more distributed posture across East Asia and throughout the Pacific and Indian oceans. The strategy entails ensuring alliances in the region.¹⁰⁶ The United States has increased its military presence in Southeast Asia so as to patrol the shallow littoral waters that permeate Southeast Asia, to expand cooperation with Australia in the Indian Ocean, and to increase the number of exercises and port visits conducted in the region by the US military. Despite financial constraints, the United States has made it clear that it will continue funding for "air superiority and mobility, long-range strike, nuclear deterrence, maritime access, space and cyber, and

106 Clinton (2011)

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance", i.e. all the technologies that will be needed to contain China.¹⁰⁷

If China behaves as though America is weak, and seeks to push it back, a querulous but well-tended relationship could slide into competition and confrontation and bring about a cold-war stand-off or rivalry for influence in neighbouring states. This does not serve China's interests.¹⁰⁸

China's role as a world power is growing at unprecedented speed despite the internal and external economic imbalances that will cause serious concern in the future. The Chinese government is gradually developing a strategic vision of its national interests in the global context, combining diplomatic and security objectives with economic goals.¹⁰⁹ China poses a challenge not only economically but also militarily as it is increasing its military forces. This is especially true in those areas with the highest concentrations of technology - the latest generation of fighters, aircraft carriers and submarines. China's defence budget has increased at a double-digit rate for twenty years. China claims to be a great power, though one that is animated by peaceful intentions. Claims on the disputed areas in the South China Sea are intensifying, as are initiatives to exploit seabed resources.¹¹⁰

About an arms race in Asia, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London suggests that arms purchases in Asia are going to exceed those in Europe in 2012. The principal area where an arms race is unfolding is at sea with Asian navies becoming larger and more sophisticated as well as acquiring a significant number of submarines. Also of note is the appearance of mini-carriers in Japan and South Korea and the burgeoning carrier programmes in India and China.

It is hard to define China's ambitions in the world. We know that it has broader strategic interests commensurate with its economic rise: to build its military capabilities, especially its navy, to push back US forces in the South China Sea, to consolidate an alliance with Pakistan, safeguard supply lines to and from the oil-rich Gulf; and possibly to capitalise on Europe's present weakness and undercut the

107 Denmark (2012)

108 The Economist, 15 January 2011

109 Reisen (2011)

110 Tana (2011)

Atlantic alliance. Philip Stephens comments that China is not bidding to fill the role of global hegemon recently vacated by the US. There are too many natural constraints on its power: geography, India and Japan as well as the US.¹¹¹

China, although favouring democracy at the international level, opposes hegemony, for example the unilateral rule of the United States. It argues for hegemony at the national level in the name of order and security. In this ongoing political debate, the United States is accusing China of being irresponsible, of protecting the rule-breakers in the name of sovereignty. Whereas China in accusing the United States of being unilateralist and interventionist, not to mention hypocritical and of applying norms and values to others that it does not accept for itself.¹¹² As the debate underlines, the international community is not characterized only by economic and to some degree military competition, but also by political competition over the priorities to be assigned to common norms and values.¹¹³

The main strategic challenge for the US is posed by China which has positioned itself as a leading economic power that other states, both in Asia and globally, increasingly rely upon for trade and aid. Chinese economic power complicates the power dynamics across the region; states are reluctant to engage in extended disputes with China if economic relations are threatened. Chinese investments come with “no strings attached,” which has undermined international efforts to pressure states like Iran, Burma, North Korea and Sudan to halt proliferation or enact democratic reforms. China’s economic support can replace what the US, Europe, or organizations like the IMF could provide, but it lessens the already meagre effect of international punishment on regimes which misbehave. The remarkable Chinese economic growth over the past decade and the expansion of its military capabilities is attracting the attention of other countries in the region and of the US and encouraging them to engage intensively in the region. Thus the networks of US-backed regional alliances will balance the threat of Chinese unilateralism.

While Beijing has emphasized its peaceful intentions repeatedly its foreign policy since 2010 has been perceived by Southern Asian claimants and others, like the

111 Stephens (2011)

112 The Rise of the Rest II (2008).

113 Ibid.

Japanese, to be arrogant and intimidating. Its only now, in 2012, that the Chinese have begun to enter a damage control phase, attempting to reassure their neighbours that their intentions really are peaceful. The disconnect between their foreign policy and their rhetoric is puzzling and some would say that the true face of China was revealed over the past two years.


Most contemporary debate on Asian security focuses on the Western Pacific Rim. The interests of the key players in the region, China, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN nations and, above all, the United States, are concentrated along the line where the waters of the Pacific hit the coast of East Asia. To the west of that line are India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which are all important players as are Australia, New Zealand and Oceania.¹¹⁴

It is only in the last two years that the South China Sea, bordered by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan has become of such strategic importance. One-third of the world's maritime trade traverses the South China Sea which is rich in oil and natural gas and is a major route linking the oil fields of the Middle East and the factories of East Asia; it carries more than 80 % of China's oil imports and a large percentage of Japan's and South Korea's. Because of the importance of these waters, several countries (e.g.. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) claim sovereignty over part of them. Yet China claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea declaring it to be a "core interest." The United States has increased its naval presence in Southeast Asia as to patrol the shallow littoral waters that characterize much of the region.¹¹⁵

In recent years China has reached a settlement with neighbouring states on a number of disputed land borders but there are still many more to be resolved.

114 Trenin (2010)

115 Denmark (2012)



Source: Yeu Ninje (2006) – released under GNU Free Documentation Licence

As we can see, China has expanded its strategic interests in a way that is commensurate with its economic rise. It is building its military capabilities, especially naval, to challenge US forces in East Asian waters; sustain its alliance with Pakistan, safeguard supply lines to and from the oil rich regions of Africa and the Middle East; and possibly capitalize on Europe’s present weakness to undercut the Atlantic alliance.¹¹⁶

The international community, and the United States in particular, expect China to act responsibly, the reason being that China's influence is such that it can no longer avoid contributing positively to global peace and stability. Although China has contributed to anti-piracy patrols and peacekeeping, it has too frequently gone beyond the mission’s goal or it has opposed any intervention in the affairs of sovereign states.

The US's treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are at the centre of its strategic turnaround to the Asia-Pacific. The US efforts to reach out to China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries are all part of a more

¹¹⁶ Discussion with prof. James Boutillier, February 5, 2012.

comprehensive approach to the region, expanding trade and investment, establishing a broad-based military presence and promoting democracy and human rights. These bilateral security alliances will ensure a political consensus on the core objectives, address new challenges and guarantee deterrence against provocation from the full spectrum of state and non-state actors.¹¹⁷

Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether it is defending the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering North Korea's proliferation attempt, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players. The US military presence in the region, including its military bases in Japan and South Korea, has long guaranteed regional security and stability, and the US remains focused on safeguarding its full economic and strategic interests. Focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific. The region is already generating more than half the global output and nearly half the global trade.¹¹⁸ After the announcement at the beginning of 2012 of the new US military strategy, "US Military Force in the 21st Century", the complex set of missions and activities undertaken across the globe and of varying scope, duration and strategic priority will continue. This will place a premium on flexible and adaptable forces that can respond quickly and effectively to a variety of contingencies and potential adversaries.¹¹⁹ As the resources are scarce, investment in the Asia-Pacific is a vital US national interest.

Europe is the US's traditional ally, a partner of first resort, as the State Secretary Clinton points out, expected to work alongside the US on nearly every urgent global challenge and supported by US investments aimed at updating the Alliance structures.¹²⁰ Furthermore, the democratization processes in the Middle East and North Africa underline the importance for the US and Europe of maintaining their partnerships as the region transforms.

117 Clinton (2011).

118 Ibid.

119 Pellerin (2012).

120 Clinton (2011)

Although the US will stay involved globally, the relocation or downsizing of its European capabilities is a result of its pursuit of its national interests. As an Atlantic and Pacific power, the United States still relies on European partnerships but must also address the challenge of building partnerships and institutions across the Pacific in line with American interests and values, just as it did with the partnerships across the Atlantic. In order to adapt to these changes the United States will adopt a broader geographic, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.¹²¹

In his defence strategy briefing at the Pentagon on 5th January 2012, the US President stated that, at a time of national transition, the United States was reshaping defence priorities and military force to sustain US global leadership and respond to changing security and fiscal needs. Looking beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and long-term nation-building with large military footprints, Obama said that the United States would be able to ensure its security with smaller conventional ground forces and by investing in capabilities that included intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and the ability to operate in environments controlled by adversaries.¹²²

The significance of the shift of US interest from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region will also have profound implications for Europe, for NATO and for the European Union because, if the US were to withdraw the majority of their forces from Europe, the Europeans would finally have to provide for their own security. The transatlantic relationship continues to constitute the fundamental element of the Alliance. NATO is a global security provider as well as a regional collective defence guarantor.

2.3.4 Resource Security

Zero Sum logic, in which one country's gain looks like another's loss, has led to a sharp rise in tension between China and the United States. It is threatening the future of the European Union, as countries squabble over the cost of managing a single currency. Competitive rivalry blocks the world's ability to find co-operative solutions to nuclear proliferation, as the major powers manoeuvre for advantage rather than

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Pellerin (2012)

acting decisively to combat a common threat. Zero-sum logic also affects other important international challenges – such as energy, food and water shortages - as the world’s biggest powers struggle to secure resources.¹²³

Resource scarcity and the increasing demand for energy are causing volatility and energy and commodity prices are continuing to rise. As the availability of natural resources decreases, a rapidly growing global population is putting unsustainable pressure on resources. Demand for water, food and energy is expected to rise by 30-50% in the next two decades. Shortages could cause social and political instability, geopolitical conflict and irreparable environmental damage. Any strategy that focuses on one part of the water-food-energy nexus without considering the links between them risks provoking serious unintended consequences. Water resources and energy security are becoming more likely potential sources of conflict.

Water security, food security and energy security are chronic impediments to economic growth and to social stability. Economic growth and population growth are common drivers in all the risks mentioned above, especially as improved living conditions in emerging economies result in more resource-intensive consumption patterns. Environmental pressures also increase resource insecurity and range from climate changes to extreme weather events that alter rainfall and affect crop production. Failures in managing shared resources, such as trans-border water and energy sources and food trade agreements, create tensions that can lead to conflict. Beyond the food-energy-water nexus addressed above, this cluster of risks involves extreme commodity price volatility and extreme energy price volatility. There is a relatively uncontroversial assertion according to which the demand for natural resources will increase in the medium term because of a combination of population growth and projected increases in per-capita consumption, but there is uncertainty as to whether supply can keep pace. This leads some experts to argue that, in the long-term, the world should expect at best, sustained increases in commodity prices, and at worst, shortages of key resources.¹²⁴

123 Rachman (2010:2-4)

124 World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2011

Throughout history, resources have been a major source of conflict and it is one from which the world is certainly not immune today. For example, between 2000 and 2008, there were 50 cases in which water was identified as a factor in some form of conflict, with Darfur frequently cited as one example of conflict driven by climate change.¹²⁵


Brahma Chellaney argues that the battles of yesterday were fought over land, those of today are over energy. Yet, the battles of tomorrow may be over water. Nowhere is that danger greater than in water-distressed Asia. Water stress is set to become Asia's defining crisis of the twenty-first century, creating obstacles to continued rapid economic growth, stoking interstate tensions over shared resources, exacerbating long-time territorial disputes, and imposing further hardships on the poor. China and India account for 37 % of the world's population but command just 10.8 % of its water.¹²⁶ Furthermore, much of India's water comes from the Tibetan plateau. Disputes over water are closely related to food security – already an increasingly important international issue.

With energy demand on the rise and sources of supply dwindling, we are, in fact, entering a new Geo-Energy Era, causing disputes over vital resources, making oil prices rise, and putting the global economy at risk. Energy and conflict will be bound ever more tightly together, lending increasing importance to the key geographical flashpoints in our resource-constrained world. The Iranian threat to block the Strait of Hormuz in response to Washington's new economic sanctions caused high oil prices to destabilize the energy markets at the beginning of 2012. In the new Geo-Energy Era, the control of energy and over its transport to markets will often lie at the heart of recurring global crises.¹²⁷

125 Gleick et al. (2008)

126 Chellaney (2011)

127 Klare (2012)



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg

In an energy-conscious world, the Straits of Hormuz may possess greater strategic significance than any passageway on the planet. Every day, according to the U.S. Department of Energy, tankers carrying 20% of the world's oil produced daily by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, passes through this vital artery. The Straits of Hormuz, as the sole maritime link between the oil-rich Gulf region and the rest of the world, is only one of several hot spots where energy, politics, and geography meet. The East and South China Seas, the Caspian Sea basin, and an energy-rich Arctic that is losing its sea-ice, are other strategically important areas in which countries are vying for control over the production and transportation of energy, and arguing about national borders and/or about the right of passage. In the years to come, the location of energy supplies and of energy supply routes will be pivotal points on the global strategic map. Key production areas, like the Persian Gulf, will remain critically important, but so will oil chokepoints like the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca, between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, and the sea lines of communication connecting production areas to overseas

markets. Increasingly, the major powers led by the United States, Russia, and China will restructure their militaries to fight these areas.¹²⁸

The South China Sea with its oil and gas deposits has long been on the radar screens of those who follow Asian affairs. Some of the islands in this energy-rich area are claimed by every one of the surrounding countries, including China which claims them all and has demonstrated a willingness to use military force to assert dominance in the region. Initially a regional matter, involving China and various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) tension then broke out between the world's two leading powers. During a visit to the Chinese capital in July 2011, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, commented that the ongoing incidents could lead to a miscalculation and events that no one had anticipated. The United States has conducted a series of highly visible military exercises in the South China Sea, including some joint manoeuvres with ships from Vietnam and the Philippines, to which China responded with naval manoeuvres of its own. It is a perfect formula for "incidents" at sea in the future. A new U.S. strategy aims at confronting Chinese power in Asia and the Pacific. The US military presence in this region is to be maintained to ensure "maritime security" in the South China Sea.¹²⁹

The Caspian Basin has the world's largest undeveloped reserves of oil and natural gas. There is a conflict of interests between Russia, Iran, and the former republics of the USSR, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan which have ties to the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and, increasingly, China. All have stakes in the region as well as internal problems or unresolved border disputes with their neighbours. The region's energy infrastructure is woefully inadequate, so oil and gas must travel by pipeline or rail. Russia, long the dominant power in the region, is seeking to control the transportation routes in order to have a near monopoly over the marketing of all this energy; it is using traditional diplomacy, strong-arm tactics, and outright bribery of regional leaders to convince them to ship their energy via Russia. The US is sponsoring the construction of alternative pipelines that avoid Russian territory by crossing

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to the Mediterranean (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), while Beijing is building its own pipelines linking the Caspian area to western China. All these pipelines cross areas of ethnic unrest and pass near a number of contested regions such as rebellious Chechnya and breakaway South Ossetia. As a result, both China and the U.S. have wedded their pipeline operations to military assistance for countries along the routes. The European Union hopes to build a new natural gas pipeline called Nabucco from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Austria. Russia has proposed a competing conduit called South Stream. All of these efforts are linked to the geopolitical interests of the major powers, ensuring that the Caspian region will remain a potential source of international crisis and conflict.¹³⁰

A major factor in today's globalized economy is the universal dependence on oil and natural gas. The process of globalization and the growth of world economies significantly increase demand for natural resources. The disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests even though the security of energy resources is not a primary concern for NATO but it is associated with continuing effort to raise awareness and gather intelligence. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Allies noted a report on "NATO's Role in Energy Security" and identified guiding principles and options; recommendations for further activities were reiterated at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009 and the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. NATO's role would lie in the key areas of information and intelligence pooling and sharing, projecting stability, promoting international and regional cooperation and contributing to consequence management the protection of critical infrastructure.

During Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime surveillance and escort operation in the Mediterranean established in October 2001 in response to terrorism, Alliance's maritime forces have been ensuring the security of the key resource routes in the Mediterranean. Allies also cooperate with partner countries and relevant experts in various frameworks, e.g. the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), NATO's Science for Peace and Security Programme etc. Some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean, with

¹³⁰ Ibid.

major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain. Since October 2001 as part of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships have been patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean in order to detect and deter terrorist activity. The operation was expanded in March 2004 to cover the Straits of Gibraltar and the entire Mediterranean, providing escorts to non-military shipping and since 2003 it has included the compliant boarding of suspicious vessels. It also carries out preparatory route surveys in chokepoints (i.e. narrow waterways and straits) as well as in important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.¹³¹

In the “Sahara Trade Winds to Hydrogen” project, NATO is promoting cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, including Morocco and Mauritania to develop cutting-edge hydrogen technology to store and transport renewable energy produced by wind turbines. Another project, the “Seismic Hazard and Risk Assessment for Southern Caucasus-Eastern Turkey Energy Corridors”, involves scientists from Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan monitoring and assessing seismic risks along two vital energy supply lines, the Baku-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum natural gas pipeline.¹³²

NATO wants to protect critical energy infrastructure, transit areas and lines, while cooperating with partners and other organizations involved with energy security. To this end, NATO is seeking to expand the dialogue with other actors involved in energy security, such as the European Union and the International Energy Agency, as well as to deepen partnerships with the academic community and the private sector.¹³³

2.4 Contemporary Security Threats

The causes of international conflict are often related to poverty and underdevelopment, so that issues of poverty, stability, development, and peace have become increasingly seen as linked in an overall pattern of insecurity. Insurgents, revolutionaries, and terrorists are more adept than militaries at learning this new style of war. New warfare evolves with the political, social, and economic structures of the

131 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-61EFE61A-7442710B/natolive/topics_49208.htm

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

time. The recent trend has been that major armed conflicts have originated internally rather than between states. The mobilization of people on the basis of their identity, and the distribution of economic, social and political resources within society are powerful elements that are often combined in conflicts. Conflicts of this kind are clearly very different from the more straightforward wars between states. The main concern for the international community, and in this respect for two major global players, NATO and the EU, is the persistence of these intra-state conflicts, alternating between latent phases to sustained violence over years or decades with implications reaching far beyond geographical borders. Increasingly, complex interdependence among states causes spill-over across frontiers and causes regional or even global instabilities which are a concern for the major security players, the United Nations, NATO and the EU.

Existing uncertainties in the international security environment challenge the international community's defences that have not yet been modified to face different forms of attack. The main security concerns for the international community, and especially for NATO and the EU are, for example, resource security, demography and migration, terrorism and organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-security and energy security.

The following sub-paragraph looks at the threats with severe, unexpected or underestimated consequences that pose a challenge to international security.

2.4.1 Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Trade

Illicit trade, organized crime and corruption are chronic risks that are considered highly likely and they heavily influence three other important global risks, i.e. fragile states, terrorism and geopolitical conflict, which all have a significant negative impact on global stability. Economic disparity provides an environment in which illicit trade, corruption and organized crime can flourish in advanced and emerging economies. In turn, the proceeds of these activities strengthen the power of the privileged, while undermining economic development by raising the costs of legitimate business, thus increasing inequalities both inside and between countries. A cluster of risks, including state fragility, illegal trade, organized crime and corruption caused by a networked

world, failures in governance and economically weak states, constitute a threat to development, undermine the rule of law and keep countries trapped in cycles of poverty and instability.¹³⁴

Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability: the international community has therefore joined together to fight it and strengthen partnerships between countries across the globe who share similar security concerns. Terrorism leads to the polarization of relations at national and international level and deepens nationalist and religious intolerance. The complexity of the issue does not allow for simple solutions but instead requires enhanced practical cooperation in counter-terrorism and criminal matters.

Transnational organised crime is economically motivated and seeks to weaken but not destroy state institutions. Terrorism is politically motivated and seeks to create fear and destroy the state or at least change the political system fundamentally.

Some common characteristics are:

- Terrorist groups pursue criminal activities to finance their own activities and organised crime groups use terror tactics to shape their operational environment.
- Transnational networks that link ordinary people also link members of terrorist networks and criminal organisations. Therefore, globalisation acts as a force multiplier providing new resources and opportunities but also as enables non-state actors who may wish to challenge the security of a state.

Transnational Organized Crime already constitutes a significant risk for the Alliance. Owing to globalization, technology and the limited ability of failing states to address the issue, the present trend will continue to increase in the future. The primary source of Transnational Organized Crime is trafficking. As shown in the graph below, it is a worldwide problem that has to be approached holistically. Trafficking represents the primary source of income for transnational organized crime.

¹³⁴ World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2011



When examining migration, terrorism, organized crime and drug smuggling, the Middle East is a key factor for both Europe and North Africa. Further revolutionary movements in the Middle East and North Africa for economic reasons (unemployment, absence of professional prospects), social forces (injustice, inequality, humiliation) and political structures (continuing frustration about viable channels of expression) are to be anticipated and will have cross border and wider effects which could cause states to fail. Uneven economic development and economic decline cause criminalization and/or de-legitimation of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, widespread violation of human rights, the security apparatus as ‘a state within a state’, all of which leads to a massive movement of refugees and internally displaced people with regional or even global knock-on effects. Failed states do not control their borders and have no authority over sections of territory which serve as a breeding ground for extremist and criminal groups, and create a growing risk of civil war. Organised crime can then extend its activities by providing a range of illegal services and goods¹³⁵. The connections between international organised crime and terrorist groups have become more and more apparent, i.e. in Afghanistan, where the Taliban use opium trafficking to fund their

135 e.g. assassinations, blackmailing, bombings, bookmaking, kidnappings, prostitution, drug, arms or organs trafficking, identity document forgery, illegal dumping of toxic waste, illegal trading of nuclear materials, military equipment or nuclear weapons smuggling, passport fraud, providing illegal immigration and cheap labour, trading in endangered species, trafficking in human beings, money laundering and political corruption.

activities.¹³⁶ NATO Allies have achieved much in the past decade in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, however effective a military campaign, whatever the number of Afghan soldiers and police officers trained, it will be useless if the political strategy fails. Indeed, the only purpose of military campaigns is to create the conditions for a just political solution and sustainable development.

The consequences of failing states¹³⁷ are a real concern for the international community. The collapse of states generates a kind of anarchy, where actors can interfere to create an environment favourable to their interests, for example in Iraq, where Shiite Iran is seeking to expand its influence, taking advantage of the situation produced by the ethnic and religious clashes. This threat to the regional geopolitical balance has potentially serious consequences for NATO and its partners in the Middle East. As a result of the poverty and inequality, even basic security cannot be assured and this leads to the loss of effective control over territory and the inability to provide even basic public goods and welfare. Economic crises caused by a fast-growing populations and demographical changes give the rise to strong migration flows which are destabilising factor for the hosting countries as they may generate insecurity and heavier welfare costs.¹³⁸

Africa provides the main examples of recent failed states. Among the weakest states, Somalia has been ungoverned for two decades. “Out of a population of nearly 10 million, as many as 3 million are thought to need humanitarian assistance. Another 2 million have been uprooted in the conflict, and political infighting has paralyzed the nascent government.”¹³⁹ One of the consequences is the growing threat posed by modern piracy. Since the region is of important economic and security interest and high additional costs and delays are to be expected, the protection of the sea lines of communication is an important security issue for NATO and for the EU. States, IOs, NGOs and the whole shipping community are interested in protecting shipping from piracy. The protection of the SLOCs is essential and might heavily affect other security challenges. Since 2005, numerous pirate attacks have been reported off the

136 Emerging Threats to NATO (2011)

137 See Weber (1996: 27)

138 Emerging Threats to NATO (2011)

139 Dickinson (2011)

coast of Somalia. In 2008, the Security Council issued a Resolution authorizing warships to enter Somali territorial waters to combat piracy. World Food Program (WFP) officials renewed their plea for warships to provide escort of Somalia. NATO launched in 2009 an operation Ocean Shield¹⁴⁰, to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa, building on the experience gained during Operation Allied Protector, NATO's previous counter-piracy mission. NATO's capacity building effort will aim to assist regional states, upon their request, in developing their own ability to combat piracy activities. This element of the operation is designed to complement the efforts of the EU Naval Force in Operation Atalanta¹⁴¹ undertaken in 2008 to in the Horn of Africa to counter-piracy mission and to deal with a Somali crises, and it makes a part of a larger global action.

Piracy activity worldwide in 2009:



The slide shows Piracy activity worldwide in 2009 and the primary areas of concern. 406 incidents reported in 2009 as a continuation of the upward trend from previous

140 Operation Ocean Shield, commenced 17 August 2009 after the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the mission with reference to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1846 and 1851. Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO (Operation Allied Provider in 2008 and Operation Allied Protector until mid August 2009), Operation Ocean Shield focuses on at-sea counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.

141 Formally the "European Union Naval Force Somalia", supported by the UNSC Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 in 2008.

years; there was a significantly increased level of violence and 217 incidents occurred off the coast of Somalia. Although operations against piracy in the Horn of Africa are peripheral in scope with minor global influence they present an a good case study for how NATO and the EU can effectively work together in cooperation with wide range of other actors.

Piracy activity worldwide in 2010:



The areas of primary concerns are the same as in 2009. However, the numbers of both incidents and hijackings are significantly lower than in the same period in 2009.

Piracy has an Indian Ocean address. The pirates get their gasoline from Yemen, they launder their money in the Persian Gulf, and they raise havoc throughout the Sea of Oman, the Arabian Sea off the Horn of Africa. Piracy tends to be most pronounced when global trade is at its high point. Piracy also has the potential to lead to naval cooperation between India and Pakistan, China and America, because it is such an obvious example of anarchy. The US Navy is operating in unofficial concert with the like-minded navies of democratic countries, like India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and others. What unites all these countries is the challenge of managing a rising China. That requires naval and air forces in the region. The very fact that China will be Vietnam's biggest trading partner, that it will be Indonesia's biggest trading partner,

it will be almost every country in the region's biggest trading partner, means that countries like Vietnam need the presence of the US Navy and Air Force as a natural balancer to keep from being enveloped by China. In other words, the stronger China becomes, the more useful US air and naval power becomes to countries like Vietnam. The American role has to be, it can't be the world's policeman. It has to find a way to leverage these countries and to get these rim-land, mostly democratic countries, to spend more money on their own Defence in return for us maintaining a robust naval presence. We cannot have energy security without a great navy because the sea lines of communication have to be protected.¹⁴²

What does that mean for NATO and the EU? The upward trend has been reversed although the root causes have not been solved. Since protecting SLOC is impossible for one country alone, NATO work together with the EU to protect the SLOC against piracy; they must come up with a in a comprehensive approach which also addresses the root causes. In Operation Active Endeavour, NATO forces are being employed to search for terrorist activity, with a specific focus on WMD trafficking. Thus, in maritime surveillance, NATO offers specific capabilities in the detection, identification, monitoring, surveillance and tracking of ships which might be involved in illicit trafficking. NATO has the capabilities required to develop and share intelligence on transnational organised criminal networks, especially those operating in international waters where law enforcement is hard for the other organisations.

The Alliance's new Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and more broadly to international stability and prosperity. There is a strong commitment to enhance the ability to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through analysis of the threat, more consultations with partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including the training of local forces to fight terrorism themselves.¹⁴³

Since August 2003, NATO has been leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Government of Afghanistan to expand its authority and guarantee security, thereby helping to remove the conditions in which

¹⁴² Kaplan (2010)

¹⁴³ "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation"(2010)

terrorism could thrive. While not a counter-terrorism operation, ISAF translates NATO's determination to help the people of Afghanistan build a stable, secure and democratic state, free from the threat of terrorism. In addition, many NATO Allies have forces involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, the ongoing US-led military counter-terrorism operation whose major activities are in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁴

The central political duty of NATO is to keep insisting on both military and financial support for ongoing missions. The basic operating principle has to be that every ally contributes to the extent that it can and that no ally is altogether passive. A NATO pull-out from Afghanistan would be viewed worldwide as a repetition of the earlier Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. It would undermine NATO's credibility, and could allow Taliban extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan to gain control over more than 200 million people and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. A reasonable conclusion is that a stable Afghanistan cannot be achieved primarily by military means. This goal will require a combination of a military effort that denies victory to the Taliban and a sustained international financial effort to improve the well-being of the Afghan people and the efficacy of the Afghan government. This is both more modest and more realistic than earlier notions of building a modern democracy in a society in which only the urban sectors are more or less quasi-modern and the rural areas are in many respects still quite medieval. Now that the elimination of Al Qaeda's safe haven has been defined as the key objective, local accommodations with compliant Taliban elements no longer need be excluded. NATO's military disengagement at some point will follow.¹⁴⁵

The fight against terrorism is high on NATO's agenda¹⁴⁶. Both the new Strategic Concept¹⁴⁷ and the Lisbon Summit Declaration¹⁴⁸ recognize terrorism as a serious threat to the security and safety of the Alliance and its members. Building on the ability to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against this threat, including through the

144 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50325.htm

145 Brzezinski (2009:2-20)

146 See more on the role of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), NATO Crisis Management System, Network of civil experts, NATO's capabilities, The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T), all designed to define partnership roles as well as instruments to fight terrorism and manage its consequences. Training and education, science cooperation reinforces these efforts at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50325.htm.

147 Strategic Concept, Lisbon (2010:(paragraph 19, point 9)

148 Lisbon Summit Declaration (2010:paragraph 39)

use of advanced technologies, NATO regularly consults with its Partners. Terrorism is a multi-faceted global threat that demands a collective response from the international community.

After the attacks of 11th September 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's collective Defence clause, for the first time in its history. NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division will address a number of initiatives - political, operational, conceptual, military, technological and scientific - to deal with a growing range of non-traditional risks and challenges. A Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan was adopted to protect populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction.

A permanent transatlantic consultation forum is discussing the use of military and civilian capabilities in fighting terrorism or managing the consequences of an attack, in a network of partnerships which promote cooperation with other states and international organizations.¹⁴⁹

2.4.2 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In terms of non-conventional global security threats, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation are imminent concerns. Waltz argues for the virtues of a world with more nuclear weapon states, because their existence has led to nuclear deterrence which resulted in nuclear peace. Nevertheless, the danger lays in the possibility that non-state actors who are irrational players might get hold of nuclear weapons. In its 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed that it was, and would remain, a nuclear alliance with a nuclear strategy based on deterrence rather than defence and prevention. When the Cold War ended, the international community began to rethink the nuclear question, not only with regard to deterrence but how to defend themselves and prevent less responsible nations and non-state actors from using nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. The fact that an ever increasing number of nations are acquiring nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is a major concern for the international community, but even more dangerous is the number of less stable,

¹⁴⁹ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50325.htm

volatile nations that are also seeking them. The 2011 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Report estimates the world's nuclear powers, e.g., Britain, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the U.S., possess more than 20,500 warheads. The threat from the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons is increased by the spread of technology, knowledge, and so called 'dual use equipment' which makes proliferation amongst terrorist groups and non-state actors easier.

Future key players in the WMD world will be a combination of nuclear state actors, rogue or weak-states and non-state actors. Thucydides' three principles of why nations go to war, namely honour, fear and interest, explain clearly why state and non-state actors will keep or seek to acquire WMD.¹⁵⁰ Nuclear state actors base their deterrent capability on a balance of conventional and non-conventional weapons. More recently they have also used non-conventional weapons to offset a decline in their conventional forces. The mere possession of WMD offers weaker states the ability to compete with regional and global powers that outperform them diplomatically, militarily and economically and to deter any use of force against the state.¹⁵¹

Non-state actors or terrorist groups have different objectives, ranging from those who uphold extremist religious principles to racist militia groups, revolutionaries and armed opposition groups. WMD would serve all the traditional purposes of terrorism - symbolism, propaganda, and psychological impact, irrespective of the success or failure of the mission¹⁵².

There is no argument about the high potentially significant impact of WMD but there is a broad range of assessments of the likelihood of WMD materializing as a global risk. The chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk could occur in two ways. One is through terrorist attacks and the other through geopolitical conflict. While WMD covers a range of weapons, the key WMD risk is felt by most experts to be that of nuclear proliferation, both among states and non-state actors, closely followed by the potential use of biological weapons. Regimes have proven effective at

150 Kagan (1995:52-53)

151 USAWC Strategy research project nuclear deterrence in the third Millennium 2002.

152 Strategic Culture and Violent Non State Actors (2008)

restricting the spread of WMD. The norm of non-use of nuclear weapon has become well established. Contrary to widespread fears in the 1960s, only a handful of states currently have nuclear arsenals. Some states such as South Africa and Libya renounced their nuclear ambitions altogether.¹⁵³

While the expansion of nuclear-powered electricity does not pose a weapons proliferation risk per se, it is still likely to raise concerns with regard to dual-use technologies, thereby highlighting imperfections in global energy governance. In parallel, delay in the ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) risks undermining the “reset” in relations between the Russian Federation and the United States. North Korea's nuclear status and uncertainties surrounding the Iranian intention to develop its civilian nuclear programmes remain a concern for the international community. Meanwhile, technological barriers to manufacturing and delivering WMD have been falling, and illegal transfers of technology have occurred repeatedly, including in the nuclear realm. According to some experts, the risk of acquisition of WMD materials by non-state actors and their willingness to use these tools, is considerable and could increase. While a fully-fledged nuclear programme is far beyond the ability of any non-state actor, much nuclear material remains insecure.¹⁵⁴

In 1999 the Alliance launched the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative which was designed to integrate the political and military aspects of the response to WMD proliferation and also established the Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre in the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD). The aim of the latter was to encourage dialogue and common understanding of WMD issues among member countries and to assess the risks in order to improve the Alliance's ability to respond effectively if a threat occurred. Both NATO's New Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration describe “the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, as a threat to global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions”. Thus, NATO's objective is to prevent the proliferation of WMD by State and non-State actors through arms control,

¹⁵³ World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2011

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

disarmament and non-proliferation, harmonizing defence capabilities and supporting non-proliferation.¹⁵⁵

Nuclear alliances in Europe and Asia have been successful in avoiding nuclear exchanges to date but have not yet been able to prevent nuclear and other WMD proliferation. While a nuclear exchange among current nuclear states appears unlikely, the proliferation of nuclear and WMD technology makes the threat from a rogue state or non-state actor less unlikely. History has shown that sanctions, treaties and other diplomatic tools have little effect on rogue regimes, states and terrorists. Resolutions and sanctions against dictatorial regimes such as in Libya, Iraq, Iran or North Korea have had no real success. Thus, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO must retain its own.¹⁵⁶

“The spread of WMD and their means of delivery and the possibility that terrorists will acquire them are the principal threats facing the Alliance over the next 10-15 years”.¹⁵⁷

2.4.3 Cyber Security

In an era of unprecedented dependence on communications technologies, new fields of warfare have emerged. Non-state actors in the post-cold war period have moved to transform both cyberspace and the global media into crucial battlegrounds, so that war is now fought in a number of different realities simultaneously.¹⁵⁸ Today's global economy and national security are increasingly dependent on a digital information infrastructure, to which must be added the increasing interdependence of information systems, making it difficult to know what the repercussions of failure in one part of the system will be for another. In 2010 it is difficult to imagine a major business or organization that does not rely on advanced Information and Communications Technology (ICT).

155 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50325.htm

156 Emerging Threats to NATO (2011)

157 “NATO's Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats”, 01 September 2009

158 Baylis (2008: 211-4)

As dependence on this complex system increases, so too does society's vulnerability to its misuse, and so too does the severity of the consequences of an attack or system failure. A Chatham House report, for example, argued that keeping the Internet open for business and free from major disruption is now on a par with keeping the sea and air lanes open. Owing to its complex nature, military means alone, are not sufficient to defend against the cyber threat, interagency work is essential, as are international cooperation and the involvement of key private enterprises. Against the background of rapidly developing technology, NATO and the EU are pursuing their efforts to confront the wide range of cyber- threats.

Cyber-attacks are mainly carried out via wired or wireless computer networks, known as Cyberspace, on entities such as energy and power plants, banks or communication satellites and they can be a threat not only to a single organisation but to whole nations. The effects of cyber-attacks have evolved rapidly moving from the first attacks that simply blocked e-mail accounts to today's potentially devastating effects, giving rise to the term Weapons of Mass *Disruption*. In 2007 when Estonia, a country heavily reliant on computer networks, suffered a three-week wave of cyber-attacks that affected systems from government networks to banks and emergency services, the international community recognised the scale of this new threat.

The Pentagon and United Kingdom Ministry of Defence have adopted a cyber-warfare policy and have extended conventional battle space to include cyberspace. Sanctions and conventional force will be used to neutralise the cyber-warfare capabilities of foreign powers or irregular forces in case of a cyber-attack. Modern warfare doctrine is based on network-centric warfare, using strength against weakness, combining violent and non-violent means and disrupting the enemy's command and control, and decision-making capabilities. This is intended to create doubt in the mind of the enemy or potential enemy about his strategy by making him unsure what the response might be. Thus, conventional forces must remain an option in cyber-warfare, even to the point of the offensive use of conventional forces to counter a cyber-warfare capability.¹⁵⁹

Cyber-warfare exists within the "fog of war" where it is understood that action will be taken on the basis of probability, assumptions and the risks of inaction and according

159 Norton (2011)

to the rules of war. This is an open question and fundamental to the issue in hand. What are the rules of war for the new reality of combined battle space and cyberspace?

Following on from US and UK comments, NATO must consider the question of cyber-warfare and Article V, “if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked. Attack on one is attack on all”. Would NATO stand by a member state if it were as knocked out by a major state-sponsored cyber-attack in which no armed force were used?¹⁶⁰

Cyber-security issues range from the rapid spread of cyber theft to the little-understood possibility of all-out cyber warfare. Awareness is growing that the real world is vulnerable to security threats from the virtual world, but the complexity of “cyber security” issues means that there is no common definition and the risks may be underestimated. Cyber security encompasses online data and information security and critical information infrastructure breakdown, and ranges from petty online theft by disenfranchised youths to government-led provocations with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Society’s increasing dependence on Information and Communications Technology infrastructure creates vulnerabilities and corresponding opportunities that are exploited by the unscrupulous, this ranges from low-level, individual computer hacking to transnational organized crime, ideological and political extremism, and state-sponsored cyber-attacks such as those perpetrated against Estonia in 2007. The cyber war against Estonia offered a glimpse of the potential chaos and devastation that could befall a nation. At the same time, the attacks served as a wake-up call for NATO and since it has been considered one of the most serious threats for the Alliance.

As the Internet makes it easy to deny deniability, the very nature of a cyber-attack offers ample opportunities for an attacker to disguise his involvement. That means

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

that, an attack carried out by non-state actors, i.e. by organised criminal cyber groups or by private military companies, could have the same impact / effect on NATO and its nations as an attack by a hostile state. Even worse, as the illicit economy expands, there is a danger of an increasing symbiosis between transnational organized crime and non-state actors, including terrorist groups, and thus of opportunities for cooperation that could represent an even more destructive threat to the global environment. Hacking, for example, can be used by transnational organized crime – in this case criminality can be linked to international terrorism, and terrorism can be used as a tool of state aggression.

Four distinct global risk-related activities stand out:

- Cyber theft has become a growing industry particularly in countries where economic disparity has recently been combined with access to global communication technologies. Actors in this field range from entrepreneurial individuals to shell corporations built with the hope of economic gains offset by acceptable risks.
- Cyber espionage, from the private or public sector, has repeatedly been shown in the past two decades, to have been used not only by countries generally understood as enemies but also by friendly allies.
- Cyber war has stirred controversy among civilian and military leaders. While an open war in cyber space is possible, experts indicate that the interplay between cyber war and physical war poses a more likely risk for society, with aggression online not only associated with but also provoking conventional attacks.
- Cyber terrorism is a concern over the openness of the Internet, security and privacy. Many have inferred that there is therefore a high risk of cyber-attacks from terrorist organizations' or they will be used for doctrinal, recruitment, and operational communication purposes. However, these practices do not indicate any capacity for large-scale cyber terrorist attacks.

Further contributing to confusion about cyber security's landscape is the constant innovation in each of the above fields and the potential new connections among them. Nevertheless, understanding the range of negative consequences is central to managing effective risk response. The pervasiveness of the Internet and importance of

related technologies to everyday life and business means that should a major disruption occur, it is likely to have high impact globally.¹⁶¹

During the Lisbon Summit it was agreed that NATO would improve its capabilities as well as “work closely with other actors, such as the UN and the EU...to develop a NATO in depth cyber defence policy and to prepare an action plan for its implementation”¹⁶²

NATO’s cyber defence policy is a response to the cyber-dependence of its societies and the vulnerability of its militaries. NATO operations rely on cyber-enabled networks. Cyber space is international by nature and no one country can deal effectively with cyber threats on its own. NATO must cooperate with its partners, and other multilateral or international organizations, such as the European Union whose areas of strength in cyber-defence complement those of the Alliance. The Computer Incident Response Centre will be fully operational in 2012, and the Cooperative Cyber-Defence Centre of Excellence, formally established in 2008 in Tallinn, Estonia, is now running. The concept of “in-depth cyber defence,” which was endorsed at the Lisbon summit, is not intended to be a military-only, or even a military-centric, strategy. It necessarily cuts across the portfolios of a variety of actors, as it spans the technology employed, the awareness of users, and the physical protection of key elements of our hardware. The policies would bring civilian and military capabilities together.¹⁶³

In particular, the European Commission is setting up Computer Emergency Response Teams for EU Institutions and has established a Joint Research Centre to develop ways to harmonise actions and provide better protection against cyber-attacks. The National Cyber Security Strategy Guide elaborated by the International Telecommunication Union of the United Nations could provide a good point of reference for NATO nations.

161 World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2011

162 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, PRESS RELEASE PR/CP(2010)0155, LISBON SUMMIT DECLARATION (2010)

163 Abrial (2011)

Today's security environment is global and NATO as well as the EU are involved and engaged in global security operations. Consequently, the risk of a cyber-attack may increase. Contemporary peace support and counter-insurgency operations are confronted by a range of violent actors, ranging from traditional separatist movements and rebel groups to warlords, gangs and traffickers of drugs, arms, and even humans. These groups rely on the fragility of the state and regional context in which they are operating. As NATO and the EU aim to stabilize this very environment, transnational organized crime groups perceive NATO and the EU as an existential threat. These groups might then launch counter measures, ranging from spreading disinformation to intelligence-gathering, and furthermore large-scale attacks on critical infrastructures might then be directed not only against the Alliance and its partners in the area, but also against NATO capitals and state installations as well as against populations in Europe and/or America.

3. NATO AND THE EU: DIFFERENCE OF BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but rather the one most adaptable to change.”

(Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, 1859)

3.1 Introduction

NATO is the only defence alliance capable of responding effectively to any military threats. NATO will be involved out of area when the threat is global. The EU is a non-military organization although it is building up its own capabilities to be able to act in the framework of the Petersberg tasks. It is also increasing the police forces in order to engage in crisis management operations. From this perspective there are no competing ideologies in Europe but only complex interdependence. As neo-liberalism is a preferable model to competitive liberalism, the main goal for NATO and the EU is to protect their member states and populations from non-state actors in order to achieve common goals. Cooperation is mutually beneficial: it is cooperation to secure the Alliance territory and populations against external threats. The changing nature of security threats is the main reason why NATO and the EU should cooperate and cooperation should reduce the competitiveness between them and between the bureaucracies of the European States. Until that happens, the existing threats will encourage them to work more closely together.

The complexity of today's security environment demands an appropriate response from the international community in order to guarantee the progress of their populations. The international community does not have any mechanism in place to enable it to act in a coordinated way since the national interests of its actors often prevail over the search for a common response to common security issues and challenges. Currently, the response of the international community to the outbreak of

a crisis is unilateral or, increasingly often, a coalition of the willing. As will be explained below, in a globalized world the butterfly effect¹⁶⁴ often comes to the fore.

Soon after the end of the Cold War, the existence of NATO was questioned. What kind of NATO was required after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact which had been the main reason for NATO's existence? Should NATO have an expeditionary, state-building role, or a conflict prevention role against a possible destabilization of world peace and more fundamentally, was NATO required at all? Today the European Union is uncertain of its future as it confronts the economic crisis as well as a European order on the brink of fragmentation and with its armies depleted by peripheral wars. The bureaucracies of NATO and the EU are markedly different as they were established in different historical settings and with different purposes: NATO as a political–military and the EU as a political–economic alliance, both recognizing the national sovereignty of their members although NATO is a multinational treaty organization and the EU an organization of a supranational nature.

Although NATO and the EU share a majority of members (21), at times their decisions are in contrast owing to a process of internal confrontation and bargaining which occurs in the framework of their unique organizational structures and different operating procedures. Each actor has his own position on issues depending on what his agenda is at the time and on what action is expected of him to implement the decision.

3.2 NATO – A Political/Military Alliance

3.2.1 Background

The Alliance has long been defined by its historical and geographical condition. Like the UN, NATO was a vision developed in the fire of World War II. In April 1949, the

¹⁶⁴ Term attributed to Edward Norton Lorenz, a mathematician and meteorologist, it was applied in Chaos Theory to suggest that the wing movements of a butterfly might have significant repercussions on wind strength and movements throughout the weather systems of the world, and theoretically, could cause tornadoes halfway around the world. See more : The Edward Norton Lorenz's speech: "Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil Set off a tornado in Texas." <http://www.wisegEEK.com/what-is-the-butterfly-effect.htm> . Accessed October 20, 2011.

North Atlantic Treaty established a council between various state-parties in Washington D.C. This treaty created a formal organization (NATO) to safeguard the freedom, peace, common heritage and civilization of the North Atlantic area following the Second World War, subject to the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁶⁵

NATO was one of the two key instruments to foster transnational cooperation in the western relic of Europe. Although the Western Europeans themselves recognized the need to overcome their historical divisions, their initial post-war efforts centred as much on keeping Germany down as on advancing Western integration. It was the United States that, through the Marshall Plan, made Western Europe's economic recovery a genuinely transnational effort, one that even included the western parts of occupied Germany.¹⁶⁶

The founding articles of NATO can be summarized as follows:

- Article 1: Any international dispute involving NATO parties must be settled using every means possible to ensure international peace, consistent always with the purposes of the United Nations.
- Article 2: Peaceful relations will be strengthened by actively promoting better understanding and economic collaboration between the parties.
- Articles 3 and 4: Each party will act using self-help and mutual assistance, develop individual and collective resistance to attack, and consult whenever necessary on the security or territorial integrity of any party deemed to be threatened.
- Articles 5 and 6: An armed attack against one party will be considered an attack against all parties. Collective assistance, including the use of armed force, will be used to restore the security of the NATO area. This will always be reported to the UN and terminated once the UN has 'taken the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security'.
- Article 7: NATO does not exist to usurp the primary international authority of the UN.
- Article 8: Disputes between NATO parties shall not affect the treaty.

¹⁶⁵ Noyes (2004)

¹⁶⁶ Brzezinski (2009: 2-20)

- Articles 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14: A council will be established, according to the constitutions of the parties. The treaty may be reviewed after 10 years; any party may resign from the treaty after 20 years. The treaty will be archived with the U.S. government.
- Article 10: by unanimous decision, NATO may welcome any European state to be party to the Treaty.¹⁶⁷

The First NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, gave a more informal appraisal of these articles when he claimed they were for ‘keeping the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in’. This effectively sum NATO’s three key objectives, namely to form a common and unified Western defence posture against the Soviet Union, to restructure the Western military landscape after the fall of Nazi Germany, and to encourage America to be part of a security organization which was ‘permanent, substantial, visible, and codified by treaty’.¹⁶⁸

American journalist and strategist Walter Lippmann eloquently defined the Atlantic Alliance as both a security community and a strategic system. The Alliance was not only a vital highway, but also an ‘inland sea of a community of nations allied by geography, history and vital necessity.’ Lippmann saw the Alliance not as an ever-expanding frontier of liberal democratic values, but as a geographically delimited civilisation. This American-dominated institution, arising from America’s underwriting of European security, was partly a European creation.¹⁶⁹

Although NATO was created primarily to provide assurance against the looming Soviet threat, its political effect in Western Europe was to promote reconciliation with the former Axis powers Germany and Italy, while fostering an enduring acceptance of transatlantic interdependence. None of this would have happened without NATO. It’s transnational integrated but militarily US dominated structures made the inclusion of German forces more palatable to the French even before the eventual admission into the alliance, in 1955, of West Germany as a full-fledged member. The institutionalization of NATO and the later emergence of the European Economic

¹⁶⁷ The Washington Treaty in full can be accessed at www.nato.int

¹⁶⁸ Rajan (2003: 1)

¹⁶⁹ Porter (2011)

Community (which subsequently evolved into the EU) thus, meant that the civil war within the West was finally over. The reality is that in the vulnerable decades after World War II, conflict was avoided largely because the United States stayed committed to defending Europe and NATO remained united.¹⁷⁰ As stated in the hypothesis NATO remains the only actor capable to deal with worst excesses of the realist world. Let us look in more detail into realist theory.

The work of Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War is a timeless source of inspiration to realists about the importance of global anarchy in shaping interstate relations. These insights anticipate neorealist arguments on order and changes in world politics. Kenneth Waltz (1979) argues that Thucydides' history represents an early recognition of “the anarchic character of international politics” which “accounts for the striking resemblance of the quality of international life throughout the millennia”; and hence, we see the relevance of Thucydides for an era of nuclear weapons.”¹⁷¹

Realists assume that states best judge threats by measuring them against the relative power of other states. States will try to deter potential expansionists by countering power, through mobilization or alliances, e.g. NATO is a product of latter. Because states fear power, they fear powerful states regardless of the characteristics of the domestic regime. No “democratic peace” is to be expected, and even fellow democracies tend to seek some form of equilibrium against those with most power. Because states jealously guard their power and sovereignty, international institutions can provide a useful forum for states which are already committed to cooperation, but cannot become reliable independent sources of security. Neo-realists do not pay much attention to non-state actors, which leaves terrorism outside their focus Stephen Walt created a variant of realism, arguing that threats to a given state are measured by other states' intentions as well as by their capabilities. This balance-of-threat (as opposed to balance-of-power) assumption generates the distinctive prediction that states may seek a counterweight to the aggressive agenda of a state with less threatening behaviour as against a larger democratically governed state.¹⁷²

170 Brzezinski (2009:2-20)

171 Garst (1989: 3-27)

172 Gerard (2006: 39-45) .

With the end of the Cold war NATO became the framework for stabilizing a suddenly unstable geopolitical situation in central and Eastern Europe. From its beginnings in 1949, NATO successfully acted as the guarantor of collective defence in Europe and North America until the fall of the Berlin Wall when its usefulness came into question. It is now easy to forget that even after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in 1989-90, the emancipation of Eastern Europe, the reappearance of independent Baltic States, and the reunification of Germany, the resented Russian army remained deployed, as during the Cold War, on the banks of the Elbe and, until 1994, in the former Soviet satellite states. The uncertainties regarding regional security, border issues, and fundamental political identity in the former Soviet bloc were complex. The emerging EU is in no position to offer reassuring security, only NATO could stably fill the void.¹⁷³ However, NATO managed to define a new role for itself by transforming from a primarily collective defence oriented military body to a more politically orientated organization, focusing on collective security in the new, larger Euro-Atlantic area of interest. This was successfully achieved through a mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, ranging from the Peace Support Operation (PSO) in the Balkans to a large number of partnership and dialogue initiatives. The terrorist attacks against the US on 9/11, 2001 and subsequent events, such as the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, have forced the Alliance, once again, to re-consider its role in the new emerging geo-strategic scenarios.

NATO was founded by the Western democracies to confront the Soviet Union, a totalitarian superpower. However, NATO also became part of an American grand strategy aimed at making the US the unchallengeable guardian of world order, through a global military presence. This strategy went well beyond simply overcoming adversaries. It sought to spread a democratic and market ideology. Europeans, exhausted and broken by war, were offered the combination of NATO protection and the Marshall Plan. Under a strong US shield Europe was able to build strong welfare states.¹⁷⁴ For the United States, NATO was a vehicle for US reach into Eastern Europe and even towards Russia’s ‘near abroad.’ For other states, NATO was a convenient way of purchasing the guarantees of America’s protective shield and nuclear umbrella at a low price. In short, Europe purchased security on the cheap.

173 Brzezinski (2009:2-20)

174 Porter (2011)

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a crisis erupted in NATO in its hour of victory: how to survive now that its original justification had disappeared. Then, to keep its vigour, make Europe whole and free under American supervision, and to counterbalance the fear of Franco-German domination, NATO enlarged. The 1991 Alliance of 16 states expanded in 1999 to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, another enlargement came with the accession in 2004 of seven Northern European and Eastern European countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania and most recently, Albania and Croatia joined in the Alliance in 2009.

An enlarged NATO has proved itself by far preferable to the instability or even violence. NATO enlargement was historically timely and the right thing to do. In the early years of the 21st century, the almost total geopolitical overlap between membership in NATO and membership in the EU made it clear that Europe was finally both secure and united. NATO today is without doubt the most powerful military and political alliance in the world. Its 28 members come from the globe's two most productive, technologically advanced, socially modern, economically stable, and politically democratic regions. Its member states' 900 million people account for only 13 % of the world's population but 45 % of global GDP.¹⁷⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO Allies have had to deal with different types of conflicts. No longer was the main effort to deter the outbreak of an alliance-versus-alliance conventional war that might escalate to nuclear war. Since the early 1990s, the Allies have had to focus on the prevention and containment of ethnic and political conflicts within and between states. NATO has significantly transformed and the process is continuing to facilitate the projection of allied military power beyond the traditional region of its commitments and activities, and to adapt to both urgent crisis response and long-term stabilization and reconstruction tasks.

A wealth of experience is available from NATO's post-conflict deployments in Bosnia (Implementation Force - IFOR/ Stabilization Force - SFOR) and Kosovo

175 Brzezinski (2009:2-20)

(Kosovo Force - KFOR), as well as from its current operations in Afghanistan where, since August 2003, NATO has been in command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and from the more recent experience in Libya. NATO has also fulfilled limited training functions in Iraq and has had relevant experience elsewhere, including earthquake disaster relief in Pakistan. NATO now also operates the NATO Reaction Force (NRF), created following the Prague Summit of November 2002. In the theatres in which NATO forces have been deployed, both for combat and post-combat purposes, they have proved the worth of 60 years commitment to forging a mutually reinforcing common capability from the contributions of many different countries.¹⁷⁶

The Declaration on Alliance Security states: “Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber-attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.”¹⁷⁷ Recognising the need for a comprehensive approach to crisis resolution, the North Atlantic Council was tasked to develop pragmatic proposals during the Riga Summit in November 2006.

At the Riga Summit, the Allies confirmed what they had recognized in practice since the early 1990s: that other organizations had capabilities and mandates that NATO lacked. The two organizations with which NATO had worked most closely were the United Nations and the European Union. At the Bucharest Summit, the Alliance’s leaders endorsed an action plan for the development and implementation of NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. Since then NATO has improved its own crisis management instruments in order to strengthen its ability to work with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local authorities.

¹⁷⁶ Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence. Lessons Learned and Best Practices (2008)

¹⁷⁷ Declaration on Alliance Security, Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009.

The 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon agreed on a new security concept that framed the way the alliance would address the full range of emerging threats to collective peace and security. As outlined in the new NATO Strategic Concept, the success of NATO and the European Union (EU) will be in the spread of global peace and security and in identifying new transnational challenges such as: weak states, potential breeding grounds for terrorism and potential conduits for weapons, drug and human trafficking; the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); and cyber security. To underline its determination to put new security challenges and a growing range of non-traditional risks at the centre of Allied attention, NATO created the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) in August 2010. It provides NATO with a Strategic Analysis Capability to monitor and anticipate international developments that could affect Allied security. The Division's focus is on terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, cyber defence, and energy security.¹⁷⁸

While this is an important accomplishment, it will be the Chicago Summit in May 2012 that will demonstrate whether the Alliance can deliver on its commitments. The Secretary General stated that the Chicago Summit should reinforce transatlantic cohesion, demonstrate the added value of Europe as a partner to US, and tackle the European commitment to fair burden-sharing. Chicago should clearly show where and how the Lisbon agenda is being implemented. The Chicago Summit will also address the topic of “smart Defence” as an overall effort to maintain security with fewer resources, but more cooperation and greater coherence.¹⁷⁹ The emphasis should also be on NATO's new partnerships and its possible further involvement in the Middle East and North Africa.

To ensure the success of an operation an integrated civil-military effort is essential. Moreover in NATO's efforts to deal with current security challenges, mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect among the relevant organizations and actors are crucial. The well-known aphorism that “everybody wants to coordinate but nobody wants to be coordinated” is not true in the case of the Alliance. NATO is actively pursuing extensive civil-military interaction with other relevant organizations and actors, especially with primary providers of essential civil means to stabilize and

¹⁷⁸ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_65107.htm

¹⁷⁹ ACT's presentation at NDC, December 10, 2011

reconstruct, while respecting the autonomy of the decision-making process of each organization.¹⁸⁰

Although NATO takes full account of all the military and non-military aspects of a NATO engagement, and is working to improve practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organizations and actors in the planning and conduct of operations it also promotes a sense of common purpose and resolve. All effects on the local population and on reconstruction and development are factored into military planning while the Alliance also has certain civil capabilities, notably in civil emergency planning, the defence aspects of security sector reform, and partnership cooperation programmes. However, its mission does not include state-building, social, and economic development.

The NATO Alliance has formally embraced a comprehensive approach which recognizes the importance of combining different instruments and techniques used by different actors in order to achieve overall objectives, i.e. peace, stability and development. The change in NATO's responsibilities and tasks since the early 1990s has led to some cases of very effective cooperation with the UN, the EU, and many other international organizations. Experience from Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that contemporary challenges require the involvement of the international community using a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments.

Experts have advanced many suggestions for greater effectiveness in the conduct of operations. These include pre-operational planning conferences, discussions of lessons learned, and enhanced public information policies. There is institutionalized interaction at the political and strategic levels between NATO- and the UN and NATO and the EU. Future development could bring all three organizations together to discuss current operations and to establish a permanent multilateral staff made up of representatives of all the major international security organizations. A solution would be in establishing a "contact group" of international organizations along the lines of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) established for Afghanistan or a permanent assembly of international organizations and NGOs modelled on the Inter-

¹⁸⁰ See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm. Accessed on November 10, 2011.

Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which brings together the key UN and non-UN organizations involved in humanitarian assistance. A standing assembly would allow NATO and its partners to deepen their expertise in operations ranging from crisis-monitoring and preventive measures to possible intervention, if necessary followed by stabilization and reconstruction. Conducting joint activities in the framework of a shared institution could also help organizations devise a common analytical approach and agree on a division of labour in future operations. These bolder proposals suggest what the comprehensive approach might imply, if it was pursued in a truly comprehensive way. However, certain states inside and outside NATO, as well as policy-makers in some organizations, might resist pursuing even the less ambitious concepts.¹⁸¹

In assessing NATO's evolving role, one has to take into account the historical fact that in the course of its 60 years the alliance has institutionalized three truly monumental transformations in world affairs. Firstly, it was the end of the centuries-long "civil war" within the West for transoceanic and European supremacy. Secondly, the United States' committed to a post-WWII defence of Europe against Soviet domination. Thirdly, the peaceful termination of the Cold War ended the geopolitical division of Europe and created the preconditions for a larger democratic European Union.¹⁸²

The overall NATO plan should aim at improving the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments, as well as practical cooperation with other actors. In that sense a shared understanding about the roles, responsibilities, boundaries and procedures among all the main actors is necessary.

3.3 The European Union – A Political/Economic Alliance

Europe in itself is an original project. At the end of WWII, Europe was devastated economically, politically and socially. From the seemingly impossible emerged the political will and determination to overcome extreme forms of nationalism and create a federation of Europe. While the roots of the European project were political in nature, its goals were economic. Indeed, the first move was to revitalize the whole of

¹⁸¹ Yost (2007)

¹⁸² Brzezinski (2009)

the European economy at the time, starting with the coal and steel community. That was More than 60 years ago. While the EU has modernized and expanded in ways that its founders may not have envisioned, the architecture that underpins the Union has not adapted to the realities of a globalized twenty-first century.¹⁸³

The integrative power of normative regionalism depends strongly on the background conditions to which it applies, suggests Sebastiano Maffettone in his article “Their legacy of the Enlightenment and the Exemplarity of the EU Model”. Standard background conditions that usually are taken as favourable to realize the integrative power of normative regionalism are like the following ones:

- Relative compatibility of the member states, when the states are supposed to share some common history, have a relatively equal economic, strategic and political perspective;
- There are in all members states elites interested in reaching a common goal and there is no strong popular resistance, but some progressive capacity of creating common institutions able to respond to the most important public demands;
- There are sufficient overlapping values concerning respect for some basic human rights;
- There exists a similarity among cultures;
- Regionalism is part of a much more complex “cosmocracy”, within which many different actors exercise their influence, not only states but also international organizations, transnational companies, NGO’s, social movements, single individuals.

The exemplary value of the EU experience depends solely on the fact that the EU has high integrative power from all these points of view. Of course, this level of integrative power varies from region to region. Consequently, the normative significance of the EU model of regionalism is limited because not all regional areas of the world share these fundamental background conditions.¹⁸⁴

183 Mirtchev (2012)

184 Maffettone : (2009 : 230-257)

3.3.1 Background

Let us begin with the European Community (EC). The EC was crucial for the recovery of the European states after WWII and for their security relations with each other. European integration was a security project driven by the idea of establishing a United States of Europe, a community of sovereign European states that were to work closely together to avoid another European war. The view that the break out of the Second World War was caused by fragmentation, disorganization and diversification amongst the European countries was already present in the early years of WWII. Hence, creating a new Europe, a Europe whose peoples gave up some of their sovereign rights to promote the federal nature of the European organizations, was a way of avoiding extreme forms of nationalism.

As the war came to its conclusion, the following ideas began to emerge¹⁸⁵:

- that the new Europe should be based on loose relations, primarily in the field of economics and international division of labour;
- Europe should include the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union;
- Europe should be limited to France and its neighbouring countries;
- ties with the US should be strengthened;
- Europe should be strong enough not to be under the influence of other major countries, including the US; and
- European countries should issue a common currency, abolish customs barriers, and create a common foreign policy with armed forces at its disposal.

The idea of a united Europe was born out of fear of a revival of Nazism and a German resurgence. So real were those fears that they made the designers of post-war Europe willing to give up national sovereignty and submit to supranational decision-making mechanisms. This thinking was fostered by the world's new balance of power, the political superiority and economic exhaustion of Western European countries..¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Arah (1995: 53-66)

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

Integration processes in Western Europe were based on the recognition that Western European countries had lost their influence in world affairs to the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were determined to avoid military conflict at any cost; and wanted freedom, justice and better international relations.¹⁸⁷

The need to change Europe's role in international relations radically resulted in the creation of international organizations with similar goals. The American vision of European economic development helped identify the most appropriate form and content of cooperation amongst the European countries. With US economic assistance, as prescribed by George Marshall in his 5th June 1947 speech, a common plan for economic recovery would revive the European economy. Twelve billion dollars were offered in the Marshall Plan. Successful economic recovery would impair parliamentary takeovers by pro-communist parties in the West. In order to prevent the spread of communism from Eastern Europe, the US was prepared to support the economic reconstruction of Germany and to that end persuaded the United Kingdom and France to merge the three zones of occupation into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), arguing that economic reconstruction in France, the United Kingdom and Italy would not be successful without Germany.¹⁸⁸

This offer, addressed to all the European countries did not elicit a single response. The meeting between the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on 3rd December 1947 rejected the proposal since the Marshall Plan would interfere with national sovereignty. The fact that the Soviets might have used their influence to divide Europe further encouraged the Western European countries to find common economic and political solutions during the Cold War.¹⁸⁹

This is the context in which to understand the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the introduction of the Truman Doctrine¹⁹⁰, which outlined clear lines of separation between the blocs, confirming US predictions that if Greece

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.

189 Ibid.

190 This is the first manifestation of the domino theory after the Second World War, when the Truman administration by providing economic and military assistance to support the Greek monarchy in fight against the Communist rebels; with the US help Turkish resistance against Soviet political pressure was significantly strengthened. R.J. Art, *America's Foreign Policy*, 130-132, *Foreign Policy in World Politics, States and Regions*, Englewood Cliffs, N. 1989.

and Turkey were to fall under Soviet control, a path would be opened to the oil reserves in the Middle East which would threaten the independence of Western Europe which was highly dependent on energy resources.¹⁹¹ The United States of Europe has again become again a subject of serious consideration.¹⁹²

European economic cooperation developed through a number of Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). The ECSC was an attempt by some of the continental countries of Europe to create an economic and political bond to ensure that those countries who signed the Treaty would never again go to war with each other. The ECSC was the first organization to be based on the principles of supra-nationalism and governed by a High Authority which was to be an independent executive checked by a Court of Justice. Broad areas of competence were defined to ensure the Treaty objectives of the treaty were met and that the common market functioned smoothly. In 1967 the institutions of the three communities merged. From this point on, there was a single Commission, a single Council of Ministers and a single European Parliament (EP). Originally the members of the EP were chosen by members of the national parliaments, but since 1979 the Members of the European Parliament have been chosen directly by the citizens of the Member States who they represent.¹⁹³

Although limited to a narrow functional area of cooperation and inspired by a fear of renewed military conflict in the European context, the European Coal and Steel Community raised the spectre of a loss of national sovereignty and the transfer of power to supranational institutions. West Germany, as a result of its active involvement in the European integration process, engendered its own political rehabilitation and restoration of state sovereignty¹⁹⁴

Discussions on the European Defence Community (EDC) were intense until 30th August 1954, when the French Assembly rejected the ratification of 27th May 1952

191 W.Churchill emphasized in his speech in Zurich on 19 sept 1946, to establish United States of Europe, the French-German relations have to be consolidated. Churchill's concept did not predict an active role of United Kingdom but only as a supportive member of the integrational processes (Borchardt European unification, p 11, The Community of Europe, PP 30-35.

192 Arah (1995).

193 Ibid.

194 Ibid.

EDC Treaty. This treaty defined the EDC as a transitional international organization with common institutions, armed forces and budgets. European Defence Forces were to be composed of contingents provided by signatory states. The signatories would have to renounce their own security forces except those required for personal protection and police units. The reality of French foreign policy was reflected in the vision of a militarily weak Germany and a militarily independent France which would relate with its neighbours only as much as would be necessary to maintain a leading position in Europe.¹⁹⁵ In response to the failure of the European Defence Community, the Treaty of Brussels was amended to allow for the accession of West Germany and Italy. The Western Union Defence Organization was also renamed the Western European Union.

Complex international relations, varying between the tendency to strengthen state sovereignty on the one hand and the urgency of efficient economic development on the other hand, resulted in the establishment of diverse international organizations. Thus, the Western Union (WU) was established to protect personal and political rights and freedoms, democracy, constitutional tradition and the legitimacy of its member states. From 1954 onwards, the renamed Western European Union (WEU) connected Member States militarily to effect collective security for its member states, although it remained essentially a paper organization.¹⁹⁶ Throughout, its existence has been overshadowed by NATO and through it American military involvement in Europe.

The failed attempt to establish the EDC generated the idea of establishing a European Political Union (EPU) as the foundation of a European federation. The process of European integration at this time stopped short of collective Defence, of Defence and foreign policy and of relinquishing too much state sovereignty.¹⁹⁷

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, effective in November 1993, legally comprised three pillars: The European Communities pillar handled economic, social and environmental policies, bringing together the three communities (Eroatom, ECSC, EEC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar took care of foreign policy and military matters, and the third was Justice and Home Affairs. The

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid.

EEC was renamed and became the European Community (EC). It created economic and monetary union, put in place new community policies, including education and culture, and increased the powers of the European Parliament. The Treaty created a new political and economic structure for the community known as the European Union (EU).

Thus, article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union affirms:

"This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe..."

Fifty years after its establishment the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty which officially established the European Economic Community, expired as planned on 23rd July 2002. Before it expired it had been amended on various occasions by the following treaties: the Merger Treaty (Brussels 1965), treaties amending certain financial provisions (1970 and 1975), the Treaty on Greenland (1984), the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht, 1992), the Single European Act (1986), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Treaties of Accession (1972, 1979, 1985 and 1994).¹⁹⁸

Further treaties have attempted to consolidate and clarify the previous treaties. The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001 and effective as of 1st February 2003 consolidated and merged the EU and EC treaties into one document. As integration has continued, the political power of the EU regarding common policy areas has grown. The range of policies over which the EU has influence is now very wide and includes agriculture, environment, trade, competition, consumer affairs and culture.

Over the past two decades, the European Union and its Member States have sought to construct a common foreign, security and military policy. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, launched in 1991, now incorporates a European Security and Defence Policy" (ESDP) which has been operational since 2003. In June 1999, the European Council decided to "give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence" (EU Council 1999/1: 33) and to be able to defend the EU's borders. This youngest EU integration project is designed to develop a comprehensive

¹⁹⁸ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm

understanding of security policy and a narrowly defined political mandate focusing on international crisis and conflict management.

During the conception of the ESDP project, the build-up of independent EU military capabilities was the main concern. However, from the outset the EU member states recognized the need for a crisis reaction system that included both a military and a civilian component. The range of intervention capabilities, which was developed under the ESDP, is unique in that it combines hard military and soft diplomatic means. In its diversity, the EU's range of instruments far outstrips that of other international organizations, such as the OSCE or NATO. On the other hand, the political mandate of ESDP is somewhat limited. The ESDP missions are described in the so-called "Petersberg Tasks"¹⁹⁹ of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. These include "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" (Treaty of the European Union (TEU) Article 17.2). The ESDP project includes "all questions relating to the security of the Union" (TEU Article 17.1). However, the Treaty also emphasizes that the development of a common Defence policy is only a possibility for the future and is not covered by ESDP projects. This particular structure and orientation distinguishes ESDP from other international security regimes as well as from the security and defence policies of its member states. Consequently, European integration is also *sui generis* in terms of its security and Defence policy.²⁰⁰

The NATO - EU strategic partnership is based on the "European Union-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)" and the "Berlin Plus" arrangements. The "Berlin Plus" arrangements, concluded on 17th March 2003, laid the foundations for NATO-EU cooperation in the field of crisis management. They enable the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not committed. The main elements of these arrangements can be summarised as follows²⁰¹:

- assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities with a view to effective use in the context of military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;

199 The Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. (Article 17(2) TEU).

200 Flechtner (2006: 157-173)

201 Foreign and security policy, Implementation of the CFSP and ESDP (2012)

- the NATO post of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) - who will command Berlin Plus EU operations (and who is always a European) - and NATO European command options;
- assured access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities (communication units, headquarters, etc.) for EU-led crisis management operations;
- NATO-EU agreement on security including exchange of classified information under the rules of mutual protection);
- procedures to follow for the management of NATO assets and capabilities (release, monitoring, return and recall);
- NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation calling on NATO assets and capabilities;
- integration, in NATO's longstanding defence planning system, of the military requirements and capabilities which may be needed for EU-led military operations, in order to guarantee the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.

Until now, two CSDP operations have been conducted under the 'Berlin Plus' framework: operation Concordia that took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led operation Allied Harmony in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, 2003), and the ongoing operation Althea that took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. The operational cooperation between the EU and NATO in the framework of the 'Berlin Plus' operations was hampered whenever the quarrels at the political institutional level influenced the operational level. Before operation Concordia, Turkish-Greek differences prolonged the negotiations on the 'Berlin Plus' agreement and thus postponed the European takeover. Before operation Althea, negotiations were stretched since the US did not have enough confidence in the military muscle of the young ESDP. In reaction to the EU accession of Cyprus and Malta, Turkey prevented any meeting of EU and NATO military committees throughout the period September 2004 to March 2005.²⁰²

The EU has been built through a series of binding treaties, and EU member states have committed to a process of integration by harmonizing laws and adopting common policies on an extensive range of issues. For most economic and social

²⁰² Koenig (2010)

issues, EU member states have largely pooled their national sovereignty, and EU decision making has a supranational quality. Decisions in other areas, such as foreign policy, require unanimous consensus among member states. The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009, is the EU's latest attempt to reform its governing institutions and decision-making processes in order to enable an enlarged EU to function more effectively. In addition, the Treaty seeks to give the EU a stronger and more coherent voice and identity on the world stage, and to increase democracy and transparency within the EU. To help accomplish these goals, the Lisbon Treaty established two new leadership positions. The new President of the European Council now chairs the meetings of the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, serves as coordinator and spokesman for their work, and seeks to ensure policy continuity and facilitate consensus. The Treaty also created the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to serve essentially as the EU's chief diplomat.²⁰³

Among other key measures, the Lisbon Treaty simplifies the EU's majority voting system and expands its use to policy areas previously subject to member state unanimity in the Council of Ministers in order to improve the efficiency of EU decision making. Nevertheless, in practice, member states will probably still strive for consensus on sensitive policy issues (such as police cooperation, immigration, and countering terrorism) that are usually viewed as central to a nation state's sovereignty. At the same time, the mere possibility of a vote may make member state governments more willing to compromise and reach a common policy decision. In addition, the Treaty increases the relative power of the European Parliament within the EU in an effort to improve democratic accountability. It strengthens the Parliament's role in the EU's budgetary process and extends the use of the "co-decision" procedure to more policy areas, including agriculture and home affairs issues, thus giving the Parliament a say equal to that of the member states in the Council of Ministers over the vast majority of EU legislation (with some exceptions, such as most aspects of foreign and defence policy). At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty also gives national parliaments a

203 Archick and Mix (2011)

greater degree of authority to challenge draft EU legislation and allows for the possibility of new legislative proposals based on citizens' initiatives.²⁰⁴

All the reforms mentioned above are crucial to enable Europe to act and to restore public confidence in Europe. The transitional phase was envisaged as lasting 15-20 years, during which the two competing conceptions of the European Union may be visible, one being a federal union and the other a political confederation with a large free trade area.²⁰⁵

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome in October 2004 and identified key institutional changes for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which became part of the EU's Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty strengthened CFSP and created a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). CSDP (formerly known as European Security and Defence Policy - ESDP) was launched at the Cologne European Council in June 1999 as an integral part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP, which is based in the EU institutions in Brussels, includes a Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the Crisis Management Planning Department, the EU Military Staff, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the European Defence Agency.²⁰⁶

The complex institutional design of the Treaty of Lisbon codifies a basic political compromise. Instead of delegating sovereignty to the Union on foreign policy issues, a stronger institutional centre of gravity was established where the EU serves as a catalyst for the convergence of their foreign policies. The Lisbon Treaty attributes to the President of the European Council, the High Representative (HR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) most of the foreign and security policy tasks previously fulfilled by the rotating Presidency.

The Petersberg Tasks (1992) were expanded to include disarmament, military advice, post-conflict stabilisation, the fight against terrorism, and actions carried out on the

204 Ibid.

205 D'Estaing (2009)

206 EU Institute for security studies, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/topics/csdp/browse/9/>.n Accessed on December 2, 2011.

territory of third-party countries. A mutual defence clause was included in the Treaty, strengthening development in common European defence initiatives. Member states, in case of armed aggression on their territory, are held to provide “aid and assistance by all means in their power”. The incorporation of mutual defence into the Treaty was a major step forward because it established a link with Article V of the 1948 Brussels Treaty establishing a legal precedent for automatic armed assistance. The Lisbon Treaty also enshrines the role of NATO as the foundation for the collective defence of states that are members of both NATO and the EU.²⁰⁷

The change from the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was not merely semantic. The EU’s ability to undertake crisis operations was reinforced by Permanent Structured Co-operation whereby groups of EU member-states move collectively to fulfil, “higher criteria for military capabilities’ and make binding commitments with each other to undertake the most challenging missions”. It was also agreed that the European Council could entrust an EU-led operation to a group of member-states that were willing and able to undertake such a mission.²⁰⁸ As of September 2011, fourteen CSDP missions have been completed and fourteen more are still ongoing (six in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe, three in the Middle East, one in Central Asia and four in Africa) all of which are important and all of which include an important civilian component.

Indeed, if there is one area where the European Union could very rapidly make a big difference in a response to an international crisis it is by contributing to the so-called Comprehensive Approach. The generation and application of security, governance and development services, expertise, structures and resources over time and distance in partnership with host nations, allied and partner governments and partner institutions, both governmental and non-governmental would be possible through refined EU’s decision-making structures.²⁰⁹ Crisis management systems and structures are being refined to enable better civil-military co-operation. In November 2009, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate was formed to create better

207 Gya (2009)

208 Ibid.

209 Lindley-French (2011)

synergies between the Situation Centre, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the EU Military Staff in order to implement a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management.²¹⁰

In December, 2010, the European Council adopted a range of conclusions on European military capability development that built on the November 2010 Franco-British agreement for a better balance between efficiency and effectiveness at a time of austerity. The message was clear: the principal concern of CFSP defence integration was the effective management of defence shrinkage. To that end, the European Council emphasised an exchange of information on defence budget cuts, the exploration of capability pooling and sharing options, the further development of civil-military synergies and cooperation with NATO on the development of military capabilities.²¹¹

On November 2, 2010, the United Kingdom and France agreed on a Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty. On the face of it, the accord is military-technical; i.e. to develop co-operation between British and French Armed Forces, promote the sharing and pooling of materials and equipment and to the build joint facilities through industrial and technological co-operation.²¹²

Though the necessity of an independent European security policy is continually emphasized by the EU, the political concept behind ESDP remains vague. The official arguments promoting the common security project only rarely focus on security itself. Instead, the EU tends to present ESDP as an integrated foreign policy venture. The foreign policy argument runs that if the EU is to assume its role as a major player on the international stage it must have an independent security policy (EU Council 1999/1: Annex III). Only the strengthening of its security and military capabilities will enable the EU to take on the role of a leading global actor as a partner to the United States or as an independent actor in a multi-polar world order. Proponents of the integration rationale believe that a common European security and Defence policy is necessary to complete the Union's political integration. The integration of member

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid.

states' security and defence policies, which are traditionally viewed as the basis of national sovereignty, is one of the missing links in a completely unified EU.²¹³

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted in December 2003 and constitutes a milestone in the development of CSDP. It analyses the risks and threats to European security and identifies the responsibilities of the EU in this context. According to ESS, addressing the threats to European security is one of the EU security policy's strategic objectives. The ESS maintains two distinct approaches to European security policy: a defence-oriented argument and, alternatively, an understanding of EU security policy underlining the commitment to international peace and order. A strategic connection between these two approaches does not exist. The civil and military capabilities of ESDP are not directly associated with either one of the missions, and the role the ESDP capacities will play in the implementation of the new security strategy remains unclear. Consequently, ESS does not provide answers to the core strategic questions in the common security policy project. This is especially evident when looking at the important issue of intervention. A central premise of ESS is: "We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention". However, many questions remain: in which specific security-related cases should the EU intervene? How do intervention policies advance the strategic objectives of the Union? Most importantly, in which cases and under which conditions must the Union rely on hard military power? Answers to such questions depend on how the EU defines its security policy project. ESS consciously avoids confronting these issues and therefore describes its mission as a merely "pre-strategic concept".²¹⁴

213 Flechtner (2006 : 157-173)

214 Ibid.

4. NATO AND THE EU AS A SOURCE OF STABILITY IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD

4.1 Introduction

As stated above, NATO and the EU were established for fundamentally different reasons. Those reasons led their evolution in a different way. The strategies have evolved out of their *raison d'être*, NATO as a military-political organization the EU as economic-political organization. To develop strategy is difficult enough for a single security community and more difficult still for allies in wartime and more difficult for allies on an indefinite basis. It is not a plan, but rather a “blueprint” anticipating moves and counter-moves. It is not policy but rather aspiration and desired outcome which promotes Alliance’s interests.²¹⁵ The idea of grand strategy does not make an impact on some policymakers or military practitioners because life is unpredictable. It is not possible to measure something that may or may not happen. We cannot measure risk or the consequences of unpredictable events. Grand strategies cannot anticipate failure and chaos.

During the last decades, unanticipated events happened in large scale, more global in their reach. Every turbulence in the global landscape has a butterfly effect globally. Organizations have developed tools for single one-layered events and have no tools if the events are multiplied or combined. That is why it is so important to combine efforts based on the advantage of the two most influential organizations, NATO and the EU, in order to respond efficiently. Tools of both organizations are developed from of adaptation to modern day challenges, but the strategies have a limitation on strength and resources and the need to limit operations and war itself. Despite structural changes in the security and defence policies of the member states the will and affirmative purpose to actively engage in crisis areas is still deficient.

The nature of the challenges faced by all 21 members of NATO and the EU are now such that overcoming differences has become far more important than political and other concerns. In the last few years, some efforts have been made to improve

²¹⁵ Porter (2011).

relations between NATO and the EU despite arguments that an effective ESDP is somehow a threat to NATO and that NATO operations somehow weaken the potential for CSDP, interfere with the development of the EU, or presume inordinate US influence in European affairs. The simple fact is that each European military establishment has only one set of forces, and nothing will change that fact. CSDP depends for its potential effectiveness on practical relations with NATO, at least at the working level. Under the 2003 NATO-EU "Berlin-Plus" arrangements, NATO has twice provided assets and capabilities to support EU-led operations: Operation Concordia in the FYROM, in 2003, and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 2004. NATO and the EU have coordinated their efforts in support of the African Union in Darfur, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNAMA in Afghanistan, and elsewhere.²¹⁶ Integrating military and civilian efforts, has already been successfully combined in the EU assuming responsibility from NATO in Bosnia and the EU lead role in FYROM. CSDP is focused on low-end aspects of the Petersberg Tasks, as European ambitions and limitations on resources have greatly reduced the chance of serious competition with NATO. The EU has civilian assets that are outside NATO's scope of activity but are essential to state capacity-building, including police, justice, and rule of law programs. At the same time, the EU is ideally suited for playing other security roles, including paramilitary deployments and police training, as the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan has been doing since 2007. EU is an engine for civilian tasks providing significant capabilities, resources, and personnel, both directly and through member states and NGO. In Afghanistan, the responsibilities for reconstruction, development and governance should be an EU responsibility in conjunction with the UN and its specialized agencies.²¹⁷

The most important change in the way we understand international relations since 2001 attack on the U.S., and following the attacks in Madrid and London, is that non-state actors, many of which are terrorists, threaten security. It was the first time that the alliance has invoked Article V, the NATO self-defence charter that says if one member state is under attack all other member nations would defend it. Ever since the fight on terrorism as a global phenomenon is for NATO a current threat rather than a future risk that has to be dealt in cooperation between all states. Thus, ensuring

216 Yost (2007)

217 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence (2008)

security when contending with non-state actors, requires major changes in strategy. National interests differ and interdependence is uncomfortable but dialogue and cooperation require, in addition to political will, the existence of effective institutions, with capacity to do what is needed in ways that work.

The Alliance and the European Union have one common overarching strategic interest that being peace and stability on the European continent and worldwide. In the following paragraph security strategies of NATO and the EU will be discussed since they present a basis for common cooperation and mutual understanding not only of each other but more importantly the security environment in which they operate.

4.2 NATO's Security Strategy and Military Capabilities

NATO is a Collective Defense Alliance and an actor in a global security network. While NATO is a single institution creating its grand strategy in a highly complex environment, it is also an assemblage of different nation states under the strong influence of an American grand strategy and caught between the disparate interests and agendas of its members. The crucial question is not about NATO's endurance but its coherence and effectiveness. With the Alliances' enlargement and involvement in increasingly complex missions, it becomes harder to forge a common strategy.

In 21st century Alliance has taken global responsibilities with global partners. NATO is becoming more proactive, expeditionary and more diverse in its capabilities, founded on the Euro-Atlantic area, designed to project systemic stability beyond its borders. With its presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its involvement in operations in Sudan and Pakistan, NATO has finally overcome the Euro-centrism that characterized the organization for half a century. Insurgencies may be the face of war in the years ahead.²¹⁸

NATO is redefining itself in a world where challenges are coming from non-state actors and there is a need for more proactive activities, security, stability and reconstruction, to deter future crises from developing. The "Strategic Vision: The

218 Irregular warfare, After smart weapons, smart soldiers, Oct 25th 2007, From The Economist print edition

Military Challenge”²¹⁹ is directing the Alliance’s military long-term vision which faces evolving threats and new challenges. The necessary capabilities are set out to maintain competitive advantage in the “information age” and prevail in any future crisis or conflict which demands new focus on the effects that need to be created in order to achieve the strategic campaign objective. “An effects-based approach” (EBAO) involves the comprehensive integrated application of all instruments of Alliance power, both military and non-military; to create campaign effects which will achieve desired outcomes. The elements of effect-based approach are not new. EBAO involves the coherent planning and execution of actions by all involved organizations with us of all instruments of Alliances power, political, civil and economic at all levels through all phases of operation. NATO is focusing first on security building in newly liberated and failing states, and helping democratization which cannot be rushed and must be largely home-grown.²²⁰

In Iraq the effort is split between the military operations overseen by the generals and the civil and political work conducted by the embassy. In Afghanistan leadership is even more divided. There are two separate Western military commands, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, which provides the bulk of the troops, and the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which concentrates on hunting “high-value targets”. Alongside these are a myriad of poorly coordinated reconstruction agencies. With each announcement of “progress” on the political front, a secure Iraq seems like an every-more distant goal. In Afghanistan security too has been poor and declining. In theory, democracy has been restored and reconstruction has begun after two decades of civil war. In practice, the country remains in mess. No economic development can take place without security, and Afghans need this above all.

Experience from NATO operations has demonstrated to Allies that co-ordination between a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both military and civilian, is essential to achieving key objectives of lasting stability and security. At the Riga Summit, NATO Allies agreed that a comprehensive approach engaging

219 Strategic vision: The Military Challenge (2004)

220 Etzioni (2007: xiii-xviii, 1-43)

all these actors was required to meet the challenges of operational environments such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Military forces play an essential role in crises response operations, not only establishing a safe and secure environment, but also in enabling other institutions to fulfil their duties. This requires mutual understanding of each other's capabilities, strengths and weaknesses. Yet the clear distinction among roles, tasks and responsibilities of different actors does not exist, nor does exist an integrative body to enhance cooperation even before a conflict emerges. Effective coordination depends on joint civil-military mission planning. Military forces can only play a major role in the initial stabilization phase also assuring enough security for other organizations to be deployed and be able to function effectively.

NATO therefore needs to ensure that its own planning and crisis management procedures are coherently applied and that it is able to co-operate with a range of partners for example, the UN, EU, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors, in the planning and conduct of operations. It also needs to convince other actors that, in seeking such co-operation with them, it is not trying to claim any leadership role over them: that would be inappropriate and counterproductive.

NATO's relationship with other large organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union are more or less on the ad hoc basis as in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Darfur. Good governance and development must support security, and that means the EU, UN and NATO as well as other GOs and NGOs working in harmony. The Alliance is taking civil-military cooperation as an instrumental part of operations. Although most armies have now relearned the limits of force and the importance of the “comprehensive approach”, commanders complain that other branches of government have not.²²¹

NATO's strategic concept, unveiled at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, pledged its members to “Active Engagement, Modern Defence.” NATO not a unitary institution –

221 As the American army expands, some thinkers, such as Colonel Nagl, say it needs not just more soldiers—nor even linguists, civil-affairs officers and engineers—but a fully-fledged 20,000-strong corps of advisers that will train and “embed” themselves with allied forces around the world.

members with distinctive as well as overlapping interests / Common: US-led security community / Alliance oriented out of area (e.g., Afghanistan), and incorporate non-traditional security arenas (cyber, terrorism, counter-narcotics). Want increased spending commitments from Europeans. European approach led by Germany-France – more controls/parameters for deployments, a leaner and less expensive alliance (freedom to minimise defence spending), to work harder at cooperating with Russia and more UN consultation: closer to Russia, more robust vision of NATO – reaffirmation of Article 5, centrality of European theatre and focus on Russia as untrustworthy potential adversary, and scope for further enlargement²²²

NATO was never supposed to be permanent – justified originally as a temporary measure when post-war Europe was fragile and Soviet Union massive. The Soviet Union is gone but the Alliance had adopted to the change and found a different kind of mission encompassing global security. The Alliance today stands on shared values of its members, democratic governments, subsequently they share security solidarity and reciprocal long-term interests to stand collectively against common threats. The new NATO Strategic Concept 2010 defines the following emerging security threats:

Emerging Security Threats
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Iran and North Korea)
Terrorism, increased threat through modern technology
Cyber attacks
Exposure of energy supply to risk of disruption (Piracy and cut-offs)
Illegal trafficking as root of instability and conflict beyond NATO borders.
Weapon development through modern technology
Environmental and resource constraints (climate change)

²²² Porter (2011)

For NATO to become proactive rather than reactive in countering verity of security challenges, a common view on regional issues or risk and threats assessment of potential strategic interest, need to be defined. Strategic analysis of potential crises and their probable impact on Alliance's interests, and could result in a NATO engagement, is of high importance. The main obstacle is in framing such a definition at 28 members.

At the Lisbon Summit the issue of the relationship between NATO and the European Union over how their cooperation could progress was discussed without resolve. The two organizations both based in Brussels have difficulty communicating with each other. This inhibits them from having access to each other's military and civilian resources at a time when both organizations are stretched financially and militarily in peacekeeping and combat missions. "The ability of our two organizations to shape our future security environment would be enormous if they worked together," said Herman Van Rompuy, president of the EU's European Council. "It is time to break down the remaining walls between them," he added. There are numerous walls.²²³

It is greatly overestimated the extent to which one nation, even a superpower and even if accorded by UN mandate, can reengineer the regimes of other nations. Coercive regime changes are not successful when applied; internal forces should lead domestic political progress. Beyond providing security is the role of international community in helping such societies to reform and renew their moral cultures. Interventions are best limited to help provide basic security rather than to bring about regime change. Troops should not be used for nation-building or reconstruction but only to support the process.

Let me end with an analysis on why NATO is in a critical stage of its evolution of NATO. The following reasons can be taking into account:

- In the post-Afghan period what next for NATO;
- The United States provides roughly 75% of NATO's operating budget at a time when Washington is under acute fiscal pressure and is focusing its attention in that essentially non-NATO part of the world, the Indo-Pacific region.

223 Ulgen (2010)

- Europe is increasingly self-absorbed, indecisive, and weak not only for financial peril but also a political one.
- There is a deep ambiguity with respect to China. Is it a threat or an opportunity? One can make compelling arguments in either direction. That ambiguity underpins the foreign policies of almost every state that interacts with China. We can see it in unfolding between Washington and Beijing. They need one another desperately, they employ all of the reassuring rhetoric, they go through all of the reassuring motions but their relationship is beset by an instinctive level of mistrust.

NATO, however, has the experience, the expertise, and the means to eventually become the hub of a globe-spanning network of various regional cooperative-security undertakings among states with the growing power to act. The resulting security network would fill the gap which the United Nations by itself cannot feel. In pursuing that strategic mission, NATO would not only be preserving transatlantic political unity, it would also be responding to the 21st century's novel and increasingly urgent security agenda.²²⁴

4.3 The EU's Security Strategy and Civil-Military Capabilities

During 2003 the Iraq Crisis highlighted divisions between Europeans, as well as between Europe and the US, and inspired Europeans to set out a new common view of how to approach security priorities. The resultant European Security Strategy (ESS) presented a vision for a distinct European approach to responding to the Member States' collective security ambitions where civilian and military instruments were brought together in pursuit of the EU's security policy objectives. At the heart of the ESS is an emphasis on the EU as a unique security actor; one that is distinct from other organisations because of the range of instruments it brings to bear in response to security challenges. Hence, because today's conflicts require more integrated responses, it emphasises civilian as well as military instruments. The ESS states that the:

²²⁴ Brzezinski (2009:2-20)

*“...challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact of our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first precondition for development”.*²²⁵

This is something of a departure from the uniqueness that some used to attribute to the EU as a 'civilian power' and presents instead a more comprehensive 'civil-military' approach to responding to security challenges and threats. In fact, this is consistent with the EU's development since its foundation through the Treaty of Rome and its close association thereafter with European security organisations, namely the WEU and NATO. This aim to become a more serious actor in the security field accelerated with Europe's inability to respond to a crisis in its own backyard in the Balkans, and particularly in relation to the war in Kosovo in 1998. Indeed, the latter led directly to the Anglo-French deal at St. Malo. While the EU played a civilian role in the Balkans, with the development of ESDP it began to develop a defence policy as well as a hardening of its civilian crisis management instruments.²²⁶


The core policy challenge for the EU institutions and the Member States is the effective coordination of policies and instruments within a sound concept of civil military coordination. Most of the tools which are necessary to deal with the new security challenges, which require, by nature, a comprehensive approach, are available within the European Union. However, they belong to different EU's institutional levels (Commission, Council Secretariat or Member States). None of the objectives of the European Security Strategy can be achieved without a coordinated approach and the contribution of all relevant sectors of the EU. CSDP does not only have an external crisis management function but it might be a helpful toolbox, capability and knowledge provider, for other security domains as well. Graph below demonstrates that at least one central sub-strategy is missing so far: a clear-cut

²²⁵ The text of the ESS can be found at: http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g

²²⁶ Pullinger (2006)

military strategy. The development of a military strategy has been assessed as premature so far.²²⁷

Overlapping Security Tasks:



In the field of military capabilities, which will complement the other instruments available to the Union, at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 the Member States set themselves the headline goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60,000 persons). It remains essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the European security and defence policy that the Union's military capabilities for crisis management be reinforced so that the Union is in a position to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets and to be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks defined in the Amsterdam Treaty. In Feira, Member States committed themselves to providing by 2003, by way of voluntary cooperation, up to 5.000 police officers, 1 000 of them to be deployable within 30 days, for international missions across the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis-management

227 Rehr and Weisserth (2010)

operations. The EU's police missions range from advice, assistance or training assignments to substituting for local police.²²⁸

Enabling the European Union to assume its responsibilities, permanent political and military bodies were established, i.e. the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC), and the Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS). The PSC exercises "political control and strategic direction" of the EU's military response to the crisis based on the recommendations of the Military Committee about the essential elements (strategic military options including the chain of command, operation concept, operation plan). The PSC has a major role in enhancing consultations, in particular with NATO and the third States involved. The relations to be established between the EUMC and NATO military authorities are defined in the document on the EU/NATO permanent arrangements.²²⁹

In order to monitor and guide the member states' effort to improve their operational capabilities further the "mechanism for evaluating military capabilities" was introduced to ensuring compatibility of the commitments undertaken in the EU or in the NATO planning. In this regard the ministerial meetings with the non-EU European NATO members and other countries participating in the EU-led operations draw together pledges of additional contributions increasing the capabilities available for EU-led crisis-management operations. The coherent development of EU and NATO capabilities and progressive relationship is finding its ground in the arrangements between the two organizations concerning transparency, cooperation and continuing dialogue. Permanent consultations with NATO and the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities (Berlin plus) constitute the future arrangements between the two organisations. Discussing the matters of security, defence and crisis management of common interest are making it possible to find the most appropriate military response to a given crisis and ensure effective crisis management, while fully respecting the decision-making autonomy of NATO and the EU. For the EU to be able, when necessary, to have access to NATO's planning capabilities and to the presumption of availability of NATO's assets and capabilities is

228 Presidency Conclusions. Nice European Council Meeting (2000)

229 Ibid.

of crucial importance in establishing its strategic military options in EU-led operations.²³⁰

Since the Cologne European Council in June 1999, it has been a priority of the EU to develop and introduce the civil and military resources and capabilities. A strong emphasis on the European security and defence policy and on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in that respect was given by the Nice Presidency conclusion in December 2000. An autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field in using of the range of instruments at its disposal provided the EU with the means to assume more responsibility in responding to the security challenges. The EU has a vast range of both civil and military means and instruments, which offer an overall crisis-management and conflict-prevention capabilities. An autonomous capacity to take decisions to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, will enable the EU to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks²³¹.

The EU's civilian capabilities continuously developed in the four priority areas established by the Feira European Council in June 2000: police forces, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Strengthening the rule of law seeks to be compatible with the development of the EU's police capabilities assuming its responsibilities in the sphere of conflict prevention. For that purpose, Member States have decided to develop more effective military capabilities. These developments are an integral part of strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy.²³²

In recent years, the European Union embraced global governance as a way of dispersing its values across the globe. It seeks to bind countries to the EU through associative agreements such as a trilateral "EU - China - Africa initiative" which was first launched in 2008, to promote the idea that anti-corruption, and the rule of law, and the application of International labour Organisation standards when hiring locals are all 'public goods', i.e. they are in the interest of all three parties. The Chinese, for

230 Ibid.

231 The Petersberg tasks were incorporated in the Treaty on European Union, effective on November 1, 1993, and they cover a great range of possible military missions, ranging from the most simple to the most robust military intervention. They are formulated as: Humanitarian and rescue tasks; Peacekeeping tasks; Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

232 Presidency Conclusions. Nice European Council Meeting (2000)

their part, still prefer to bribe local officials, to give support, tacit or overt, to African dictators and to apply different labour laws in the bid to win markets. The Europeans, by contrast, have invented a system of overlapping power networks, involving partnership between states, social advocacy groups and pressure groups such as Transparency International, a Berlin-based global anti-corruption organisation which publishes an annual Corruption Perception Index. In addition, where the cosmopolitan view embraces a network of activist groups and NGOs that share universal assumptions, not all of them share liberal views.²³³


Potential roles for the EU are of essentially of two types. The first relates to military roles that parallel those played by NATO, but limited to non–Article V situations, i.e. situations that do not call for collective defence. All EU member states agree that NATO should continue to shoulder responsibility for collective defence tasks. However, there have been profound disagreements between some NATO members, notably the United States, and some members of both NATO and the EU, notably France, on what other responsibilities NATO should assume and what the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) should do.

The EU has developed an integrated approach in action on Petersberg-type assignments to ensure synergy between civilian and military instruments which is essential for efficiency and consistency of the crisis management. The corner-stone document of strategic thinking and planning within the EU is the European Security Strategy (ESS) aimed at achieving “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, identifying the threats facing the European Union. It also defines its strategic objectives and sets out the political implications for Europe. The EU’s sub-strategies aim at coordinating internal policies between the EU Member States.²³⁴

European Security Strategy and important sub-strategies:

233 Coker (2011)

234 Rehr and Weisserth (2010)



Graphic by Sandawi/Frank 2010 – Modified.

Although, NATO will remain the core of the collective defence of its members and EU will continue to play an important role in crisis management. The commitment of the Member States to such operations is based on their sovereign decisions. All those developments in the ESDP, contributed to the vitality of the Transatlantic link enhancing the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and the management of the crises with due regard for the two organisations' decision-making autonomy.²³⁵

It would be a challenge to trying to create EU defence with 27 member states, but might be affordable for the countries with robust strategic cultures and military means to initiate missions. Further enlargement would be an additional burden on the EU. The importance of a common energy policy should be a priority as well as defending the EU's borders.

In the emergency phase of a crisis, in the interests of transparency, consultation and cooperation between NATO and the EU, the security problems are commonly assessed. In the case of the guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities, the PSC informs the NAC for predetermined NATO assets and capabilities. Throughout the

²³⁵ Presidency Conclusions. Nice European Council Meeting (2000)

period in which the EU conducts an operation without NATO assets, or if NATO conducts a crisis management operation, each organisation will keep the other informed of the general progress of the operation. The Military Staff of the Alliance with responsibility for handling EU requests, should NATO undertake an Article V operation, organisations will seek an acceptable solution for the two organisations in terms of managing priorities and allocating assets may be reached, the final decision lying with NATO. PSC may forward to the NAC a request for the command options relating to the operation; the entire chain of command remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation, after consultation between the two organisations. In that framework the operation commander will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only. NATO will be informed of developments in the situation by the appropriate bodies, in particular the PSC and the Chairman of the Military Committee.²³⁶

For the EU to improve its crisis management capability, of which battle-groups are a part, would respond on the demand for Europe to take its part of the security concerns globally would be the best way for the EU to improve its crisis management capability, of which battle groups are a part.

When it comes to security, the European vision is under threat. Europe has been involved in a historical project of major proportions: the creation of the world's first, and perhaps only, civilian power. Whereas the Americans still see war in Clausewitzian terms as a 'continuation of politics by other means', the Europeans tend to see it differently, as the promotion of international law. America's criteria for 'just wars' are essentially ethical in nature and their application is not subject to verification by international courts of law. They remain a matter of debate at home. The European preference, writes the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, is for 'cosmopolitan law enforcement', not war. In opposition to America's 'moralisation' of war, the Europeans prefer its 'juridification' as war should take the form of policing operations. As a West Point military lawyer, Michael Nelson puts it, the Europeans seem to prefer 'lawfare' to warfare. US prefer to pursue traditional

²³⁶ Ibid.

strategic objectives by using legal manoeuvres, and when the use of force becomes unavoidable, to severely constrain it with legal norms.²³⁷

²³⁷ Coker (2011)

5. NATO AND THE EU: OPTIMIZING THE VALUE OF PARTNERSHIP IN A HYPERCOMPETITIVE WORLD

5.1 Introduction

In support of the topic developed through this thesis, I quote Sebastiano Maffettone on the contemporary importance of state sovereignty, since the state remains the main actor in international relations: “Many of the problems we observe on the international scene derive from a basic international relations paradox. The states, the main characters on the scene, are often jealous (the word of Hobbes’) of their sovereignty. From this sovereignty, however, come the legitimacy and the effectiveness of many actions with international relevance. Globalization continually increases the significance of the amount of legitimacy and effectiveness required by states directly in relation to the rise in quantity and quality of international exchanges involved. On the other hand, states’ reluctance to concede sovereignty to international organizations does not permit them to treat the problem of global governance in a way that could be coherent with the actual necessities.”²³⁸

One of the highest requirements of the international community is to live in a stable and peaceful world. As the world has become more globalized, national security is compromised with truly global challenges. The fact that in the interdependent world no single problem can be seen in isolation has given rise to a notion of collective security. This assumes the existence of a community of nations in which each member of the community has reasonable trust that the others will play by the international rules and will use the system to resolve disputes. A community such as this presumes the transformation of independent actors which were formerly part of an anarchic international environment into partners, or even citizens, operating in a framework of international law, democratic procedures and legitimizing institutions. In this sense, collective security mechanisms work best where there is an overarching sense of government, as one would find in a domestic society.²³⁹ A collective security system is built on the presumption of the common interest prevailing, albeit in harmony with

²³⁸ Maffettone (2009: 230-257)

²³⁹ Pubantz (2004)

the national interests of its members. It is understandable that the sense of common interest might either seem obvious and overwhelming in the wake of a great conflict, such as the two world wars, or be perceived as very real in an alliance where the members face an extremely dangerous external enemy. From 1949 to 1989 the NATO, for example, did not serve merely as a vehicle for confronting the Soviet military threat in Europe, which was immediate and very real. NATO also worked as a mechanism for shading over differences among its European members, and between the European allies and the United States. NATO as a collective security system is also inward-looking, trying to maintain peace among its members. National interests will often be paramount to them, and can be asserted against the common interest when the two are no longer seen as synonymous.²⁴⁰ Even though perpetual peace may not be real yet, Kant emphasized that we must work to realize it as our duty.²⁴¹

The very success we have had in the liberal world, which from our own vantage point is the most successful, in trying to force states to embrace more liberal positions may yet prove self-defeating. Asking people to show more love and respect for things they neither love nor respect may create a deep sense of resentment. One of the most common claims, when the state of the Western Alliance is debated, is that it is divided despite sharing the same values. Another is that the division can best be explained by the fact that European and American values differ significantly. Both arguments are wrong. Both the United States and Europe share the same values, but they instrumentalize them in different, even competing, ways.²⁴²

The basic challenge that the international community now faces is that there are historically unprecedented risks and threats to global security. To address these security challenges, various agencies, governments and organizations explore a range of crisis management systems independently of each other to improve coherence, cooperation and coordination.

240 Ibid.

241 Peace Plans of Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant, <http://www.san.beck.org/GPJ15-Rousseau,Kant.html>. Date: August 2009.

242 Coker (2011)

International organizations ostensibly promote partnerships, but their internal coherence is more important to them than building inter-institutional links. Inter-organizational cooperation is difficult, but not as difficult as intra-organizational cooperation between different member states with their own agendas, interests and objectives creating conditions for competition. Such competition is obvious in relation to NATO and the EU, and it is reflected in relations between them. Although 21 member states are common to the two organizations, because of competition they are both experiencing a crisis of identity in the security field. NATO and the EU, when in the field at the same time, are each assessed relative to the other, which hinders cooperation. The expectation is that NATO should execute only military missions, while the EU should operate as a military force and at the same time take responsibility for civil peace-building. The strategies, motives, resources, priorities, cultures and politics of these actors tend to differ significantly. Despite the seemingly united call for coordination, initiatives do not necessarily pertain to the same priorities and often hide strongly competing political agendas. These differences are part of the very identity of the various actors.²⁴³

Cooperation between NATO and the EU on security issues is mostly on a case-by-case basis and supports their ongoing effort to complement each other's capabilities in order to respond effectively to common security challenges. NATO-EU cooperation dates back to the mid-1990s in the Western Balkans. A few years later, the NATO Summit (Washington, 1999) and the Nice European Council (2000) laid the foundations for cooperation between the two organizations. This strategic partnership between the EU and NATO was formalized on 16 December 2002, through the European Union-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The joint declaration on the ESDP and the "Berlin Plus" arrangements are the basic documents for the EU-NATO strategic partnership in crisis management, founded on the indivisibility of the security dimension in the 21st century.²⁴⁴ With NATO as the foundation of the collective defence of its members, the ESDP has added to the range of instruments already at the EU's disposal the capacity to conduct crisis management

243 Friis (2010)

244 EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Brussels, 16 December 2002.

operations independently. This arrangement strengthens the capabilities of both organizations, reserving a stronger role for Europe.

The EU-NATO Declaration sets out to ensure the fullest possible involvement of the non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP; NATO support to ESDP is complementary to the Alliance's planning capabilities; and both organizations will adopt arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of their common capability requirements.

The principles on which the strategic partnership is based are the following:²⁴⁵

- partnership, which mutually reinforces two organizations of a different nature;
- effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency;
- equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;
- respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;
- respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations.

The "Berlin Plus" arrangements lay the foundations for NATO-EU cooperation in the field of crisis management. They enable the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not committed.

The 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration affirmed, in Paragraph 14, that NATO and the EU have a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning. Both NATO and the EU will mutually reinforce efforts for future cooperative endeavours in crisis management operations. Improved NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by both organizations, will result in greater efficiency. The autonomy of the two organisations will be respected. The NATO Summit concluded that a stronger EU would further contribute to common security.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

While NATO and the EU can be mutually reinforcing in crisis management, they are organizations of a different nature. They consult and cooperate on questions of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is ensured. There are thus meetings between the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC), and ministerial meetings, as well as consultations between the Military Committees; such meetings may be held as required, at the request of either organization. Regular contacts between the highest representatives, Secretariats and Military Staffs of the EU and NATO contribute to transparency and exchanges of information and documents.²⁴⁶ However, the agenda of NAC and PSC meetings excludes any reference to military or intelligence issues. This is despite the fact that NATO and the EU need to deal with such topics, as they work together in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, off the Somali coast and in Afghanistan. Of even more concern is the lack of security arrangements that would, for example, allow NATO forces to rescue EU police trainers in Afghanistan if they came under attack. "Even though the rules do not exist, we help them," said a NATO diplomat. "On the ground, we turn a blind eye to the political deadlock back in Brussels."²⁴⁷

The reason for the deadlock is the divided island of Cyprus. The northern part has been under Turkey's rule since 1974 and is recognized only by Turkey, which in turn does not recognize the southern Republic of Cyprus as a member of the EU since 2004. Since that time the Cyprus-Turkey dispute has become one of the most debilitating and intractable issues inside, and between, NATO and the EU. Turkey prevents high-level formal meetings between the NAC and the PSC on the grounds that Cyprus does not have a NATO security clearance. It is not a member of the Alliance or of NATO's Partnership for Peace, a framework for bilateral security cooperation program between NATO and individual nations. Because each NATO member has a veto, Turkey can block discussions between NATO and the EU over military operations and intelligence issues. It can also stop Cyprus attending these meetings, even though Cyprus is a member of the EU, and stop it participating in EU peacekeeping missions. Security analysts say the deadlock could be broken if the EU

²⁴⁶ Presidency Conclusions. Nice European Council Meeting (2000)

²⁴⁷ Ulgen (2011)

became more flexible toward Turkey, allowing it, for instance, to have a closer relationship with the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA was established in 2004 to coordinate the Union's defence capabilities and procurement, and is not restricted to EU members – Norway, a member of NATO but of the EU, being a case in point. When the EDA proposed the same status for Turkey in 2004, it needed consent from all EU countries. Cyprus blocked it at that time, and again in 2011 when the NATO Secretary General proposed during a visit to Ankara that the EU allow Turkey to be part of the EDA.²⁴⁸

These retaliations damage NATO in its efforts to cooperate with the EU, whose civilian sections like the police, the judiciary and the customs service complement NATO's military resources. They also prevent the EU from exploiting the foreign policy and defence potential set out in the Lisbon Treaty. The solution is for Cyprus to unite. NATO and the EU are working together to break the deadlock, and the UN is stepping up efforts to restart talks over Cyprus. If all three organizations fail in their endeavours, analysts say an ever-confident Turkey might push for international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot part of the island, similar to the status of Taiwan or Kosovo.²⁴⁹ Turkey's role is gaining importance as it is facilitating talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany), with all parties favouring Turkey as a venue. Can Europe, and for that matter NATO, afford not to include Turkey?

There are some other challenges when NATO and the EU work together. P J O'Rourke (1999) admittedly lambasted the Kosovo war: "Kosovo certainly taught the world a lesson. Whenever there's suffering, injustice and oppression, the US will show up six months late and bomb the country next to where it's happening." However, the US did show up, and took on 80% of the airstrikes. More impressive, if even more belated, was the success of the Bosnian operation. The country was demilitarized; one million refugees were returned; and the main instigators of ethnic cleansing were rounded up and sent to the International Criminal Court. The EU shows little enthusiasm for taking its cooperation with NATO any further, which must be a *sine qua non* if the West is ever to accommodate the cosmopolitan imaginary.

248 Dempsey (2010).

249 Ibid.

EU-NATO cooperation has been poor in Afghanistan. Javier Solana did not visit the country until 2008 (after intense British lobbying). One of the most egregious examples of lack of cooperation was the EU Police Training Mission (EUPOL). The mission was so dysfunctional that NATO had to arrange bilateral security agreements with each of its members. One frustrated Canadian ambassador asked why his country, though not a member of the EU, ended up being the mission's fifth largest contributor.²⁵⁰

In a contemporary hypercompetitive world the security of a nation state and of the international community as a whole is threatened by asymmetry of risks and threats, with unpredictable events occurring as “black swans”. It is important for international organizations to adapt to new circumstances. Their strategies must gradually seek to strengthen and revitalize their approach so as to address the array of new and emerging security threats. Conflict management initiatives can be successful only if the follow-on mission leaves the territory more stable and democratic than before. Crisis management demands that military and civil actors be involved in different phases of instability. Civil-Military cooperation (CIMIC) has been a key in achieving such stability. It has been essential to the improved coherence and coordination among the international community when engaged in complex emergencies. Different actors have differing strengths and mandates that underlie a sensible division of labour. State-building and democratization cannot be accomplished solely by military means. Stabilization, reconstruction, economic and social development, and good governance are prerequisites of sustainable security. The EU can provide significant capabilities, resources and personnel, directly and through member states and NGOs, to fulfil civilian tasks. Nevertheless, a constructive intervention requires the contribution of multiple international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Better coordination among international actors can address many of the challenges confronting the international community.

Conflict management is one of the most difficult and complex tasks, with intense pressure to produce results. A complex problem needs a complex international community solution to achieve a sustainable result. Although there is no easy division

250 Coker (2011)


between civil and military labels, strong civil-military coordination to achieve any viable solution is critical. Challenges in such theatres as Afghanistan and Iraq demand an integrated response drawing on civil-military capabilities. The military is only one element of the solution. The synergy of security stakeholders is the key to providing an adequate response to contemporary security challenges. The problem of conflict areas is mostly the cross-border spread of conflict, causing regional or even global instabilities.

A system of greater synergy and harmonization in international emergency management has become known as the Comprehensive Approach. The methodology of the Comprehensive Approach includes common policy and common strategic perspectives. The importance of the transatlantic link to NATO together with cooperation between NATO and the EU/CSDP, supported by UN Security Council resolutions, offer a contemporary model confirming common commitment to peace and security based on common values and interests. The Comprehensive Approach is perceived as a model of unified interagency efforts requiring regular consultations in security affairs, a common political decision-making process, and efforts to achieve desired results. Currently, the international community does not have any formal process in place to create effective interagency responses. Until now, approach has been ad hoc, with no unifying strategy and each actor performing its functions within its own stovepiped system, and failing to cover the whole spectrum of human, political, military, economical and security elements.

A complex crisis may evolve from the initial stages into an essentially military operation (*see graph: Spectrum of Crises*), to establish overall control on the ground; there will then be a transition stage, focusing on restoring public security as a prime condition for a return to normality; and a post-crisis stage of civil reconstruction, with a gradual return to proper operation of local institutions. In this context, the military and police components of a crisis management operation must be part of an integrated planning process for carrying out such operations, to contribute to ensuring a coherent and effective overall response from the EU. As well as enhancing the effectiveness of police missions, parallel efforts are paid to strengthening and restoring local judicial and penal systems. Synergy needs to be developed between actions undertaken in support of the rule of law and those of the police mission. The reconstruction,

restoring and improvement of judiciary and penitentiary systems has to take into account social, ethnic, cultural, economic and political complexities which may require coordination.²⁵¹ It is also true that one cannot speak of lasting stability and security if inequality, social injustice and unemployment are widespread.²⁵²

Spectrum of Crises:



Inter-institutional relations have not yet succeeded in establishing the necessary crisis management architecture. As stated in the US Army Field Manual, 3-07²⁵³: “A comprehensive approach is founded in the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. Integration and collaboration often elude the diverse array of actors involved; a comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain but still critical to achieving success in an operation with a wide representation.” Unity of effort needs to be based on increased organizational flexibility, with appropriate leadership and reduction of prejudices and cultural barriers. The multidisciplinary approach can deal with some highly dynamic crisis environments ranging across the full spectrum of activities, from an initial military intervention to post-conflict nation building. However, lack of coherence and coordination among diverse international and local actors in the international conflict management system has resulted in agencies working in rivalry or at cross purposes,

251 Presidency Conclusions. Nice European Council Meeting (2000)

252 Erdogan (2008)

253 Army Stability Operations Manual (Field Manual 3-07), 2008.

competing for funding and overlapping their efforts with no thought for economies of scale. This has contributed to the poor success rate of international interventions.²⁵⁴

Another aspect of inter-institutional cooperation is burden-sharing, which has developed on the basis of the comparative advantages offered by each of the various international organizations. Institutions nevertheless aspire to embrace the entire spectrum of crisis management activities rather than attempt to coordinate different competences between a number of actors. This raises the issue of duplication of effort in a context of scarce resources.

Inter-institutional relations have not yet led to the establishment of an appropriate crisis management architecture. Partnerships are still ad hoc and uneven. Rather than show the emergence of a community of crisis management actors, they reflect disparities and divergences of political will to act in various regions.²⁵⁵ In order to improve the overall success rate of international conflict management, various organizations, agencies and governments have started exploring a range of models and mechanisms independently of each other with the aim of enhancing overall coherence, cooperation and coordination. All these initiatives have a similar aim, namely to achieve greater synergy among the activities of international and local actors, in relation to the analysis, planning, implementation, management and evaluation of the crisis cycle.²⁵⁶ Such cooperation, coordination, and integration can be an important force multiplier or, more appropriately, an important security multiplier.

Nevertheless, NATO remains the only organization in the world able to generate credible, legitimate military power as conflict escalates. NATO as a military alliance enters the crisis management circle in the phase of emergent violent conflict and follows up through the escalation of violence to the phase of decreased tensions. The EU should be entering the conflict management circle in the phase of decreasing tensions in order to achieve a stable peace with means other than military. Enhancing the EU-NATO relationship would be a very important element in taking the whole

254 De Coning (2007)


255 Tardy (2010)

256 The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for Multinational Experiment 5 (2005)

concept of the Comprehensive Approach much further than has been the case so far. We cannot disregard the well-known sensitivities that exist in the EU-NATO relationship. We have to do much more to move ahead and break the current stalemate.

The 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration states, in Paragraph 4: “Many of today’s security challenges cannot be successfully met by NATO acting alone. Meeting them can best be achieved through a broad partnership with the wider international community, as part of a truly Comprehensive Approach, based on a shared sense of openness and cooperation as well as determination on all sides. We are resolved to promote peace and stability, and to meet the global challenges that increasingly affect the security of all of us, by working together.” For efficiency reasons, joining and coordinating limited or scarce resources may be more cost-effective. Consistency in the agencies deployed is particularly relevant for governments that have several of them in the military, civil affairs, and diplomatic fields. New integrated actors in improved international coordination bring new solutions to the resolution of complex crisis. Different agents, i.e. the UN, NATO, the EU and NGOs, provide different parts of the whole in the collaborative context in which available tools employed by the stakeholders are used. Since the end of the Cold War, NGOs have emerged as an important element in conflict zone interventions, both in conjunction with traditional forms of peacekeeping and, perhaps more importantly, in long-term prevention and peace-building tasks. For the interests and activities of agents like NATO, the EU or the UN in a conflict area, NGOs have a significant value in helping to secure strategic, political and economic objectives. They are involved in a full range of activities, often summarized as “nation-building”. If we look at the UN, it has no standing forces and NATO is the only international organization able to respond to emerging crises with military force. After the military intervention the UN has the means and capabilities for achieving peace and stability of a society torn by conflict. The need for the UN’s peacekeeping missions has increased significantly over the last two decades, as shown in the graph below.

Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping: 1991- present




Prepared by the Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information in consultation with the Military Planning Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations — DPI/2444/Rev.3 — October 2007

The combined efforts of the international community under the umbrella of the Comprehensive Approach are of crucial importance, and the best way to deal with complex emergencies. The desired outcome is a stable state, governed democratically, in which the rule of law functions within international norms, society is developed with due reference to human rights and the economy is run in such a way that the fiscal and monetary arrangements are reliable. In some circumstances, objectives will be better served through a military expeditionary force. Long-term relations will ideally be built up to encourage mutual trust and confidence and help build a second database regarding what can be expected of NGO involvement in conflict or other military-deployment situations. For the EU, this should be executed through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For NATO, this is already undertaken by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and, for actual engagements, by Allied Command Operations (ACO) and subordinate commands.²⁵⁷ In order to cooperate there is a need for all the actors involved to understand each other's procedures, organizations and missions. Synergy of efforts can be achieved among various groups of actors at various levels and at various stages of the conflict. Let us first see what are the levels and the phases of the conflict.

²⁵⁷ Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence. Lessons Learned and Best Practices (2008)

Levels and Phases of Conflict Model



Source: Samarasinghe, Brian Donaldson, and Colleen McGinn (1999)

Level 1: Peaceful Stable Situation – There is a high degree of regime legitimacy. There is no political violence or, at worst, only rarely.

Level 2: Political Tension Situation – There are growing levels of systemic strain and increasing social and political cleavages, often along factional lines. Sporadic violence results in fewer than 50 fatalities from political violence per year.

Level 3: Violent Political Conflict – There is an erosion of political legitimacy of the national government and/or rising acceptance of violent factional politics. Assassinations, terrorist acts, and violent government repression occur, but fatalities from political acts remain below 100 per year.

Level 4: Low-Intensity Conflict – There is open hostility and armed conflict among factional groups, regime repression and insurgency. Fatalities from political are below 1,000 but more than 100 per year, and population displacement or dislocation must be below 5% of the total. If either threshold is exceeded it becomes a high-intensity conflict.

Level 5: High-Intensity Conflict – There is open warfare among rival groups and/or mass destruction and displacement of sectors of the civilian population.

Let me focus on only the most important models of crisis management, employed by nation states, the UN, NATO and the EU²⁵⁸:

- The Whole of Government Approach. This is defined by a specific nation harmonizing the efforts of its various government agencies for more rational use of resources in order to contribute to multinational-level efforts. The Canadian government originally developed the ‘3D’, i.e. defence, development and diplomacy, concept, later adopted by many other governments. Today ‘3D’ has become a catch phrase for the Comprehensive Approach because it concisely captures the core of the concept.
- The UN integrated approach. The UN integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its many capabilities in a mutually supportive manner. With structures in place a common strategic objective is generated, with a comprehensive operational approach among the UN’s political, security, development, human rights and humanitarian actors at the state level.²⁵⁹
- NATO’s Effect-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). NATO's most obvious comparative advantage is in its military capabilities, including its expertise in conducting operations involving the armed forces of the Allies and security partners. As it is incapable of achieving a system-wide effect on its own, NATO can thus participate only in a larger Comprehensive Approach calling for coordinated activity by multiple types of organizations in cooperation with local authorities to promote security and development. It has the potential of at least partly bridging the civilian/military gap.²⁶⁰
- EU’s Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. The European Union has developed a sophisticated crisis management capability, including military, police and civilian capacities, but it has not yet deployed integrated missions where these three elements operate together as one mission. The EU has deployed in parallel missions, alongside other EU presence in the same countries, such as election-

258 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence, Lessons Learned and Best Practices (2008)

259 Friis and Jarmyr (2008)

260 Ibid.

monitoring missions, development and humanitarian missions, and political/diplomatic council and commission representation.²⁶¹

The main obstacles for agents to interact with each other may be conflicting mandates, or bureaucratic rigidity, which sets obstacles to a common understanding of complex emergencies. Some general principles prevent efficient coordination of efforts. One is authority. Within the theatre of a conflict, lines of authority must be established. The demands can be particularly acute when two or more institutions are working together, each with its own procedures and culture. On the non-military side, arrangements for command and cooperation also need to be as clear as possible. Since NATO lacks the experience, personnel or mandate for promoting economic development and neither the UN nor the EU have the capacity to assume coordination of military and developmental tasks, there need to be functional arrangements to combine the two sets of activities into as coherent a whole as possible.²⁶² One often hears that the international community lacks the "political will" of the individual states to take on these tasks, and that leadership is required. However, it is not will that is lacking, but a sense of our collective stake in the future.

NATO and the EU should balance their cooperation in a comprehensive way to meet the new security challenges. The strategies of both organizations build on long-term cooperation, developing activities that serve the interests of others as well as their own. Although NATO is a collective security alliance, its potential is not primarily military. NATO's real power derives from the fact that it combines the United States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant. It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks.²⁶³ It is also important for the EU to continue to develop military capabilities, maintaining defence investments to fill up the capability gaps, in order to build a strong EU pillar for the Alliance.

²⁶¹ *ibid.*

²⁶² Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence. Lessons Learned and Best Practices (2008)

²⁶³ Brzezinski (2009)

The effort by the western nations to promote democratization and globalization has its roots in the inherent faith that Kant was right, that democracies do not fight each other, and that global interdependence will override state sovereignty to create a new international civil society under just “legislation”. In his reflection on the post-Cold War world, `The End of the American Era`, Charles Kupchan reminds us that in many ways even today “the international system is based on might, not right”. Nevertheless, Kant argued that republican liberal states can only bring about perpetual peace in conjunction with an international institution (a peace federation) and with guarantees for human rights.²⁶⁴

There are the Hobbesian realists who posit a world of interested states, and who suggest that perennial concerns for security and power override democratic values in the foreign policy decisions of governments. Today there are those who credit the power of the United States, not the course of world history, with the relative peace and prosperity on the international stage. The reality is that the contemporary world requires some honest give-and-take. We know there is a history of conflict between some countries. We pay less attention to different national histories, to recent progress in resolving conflicts, and to the unease and tensions that persist. Differences in national interests and concerns are reality. We also recognize institutional weaknesses and incapacities.

Let me conclude with Kant`s thoughts on war. War for Kant is the greatest obstacle to morality and the preparation for war is the greatest evil; therefore, we must renounce war. "The morally practical reason utters within us its irrevocable veto: *There shall be no war.*" Yet without a cosmopolitan constitution and the wisdom to submit ourselves voluntarily to its constraint, war/ conflict is inevitable. The obstacles of ambition, love of power, and avarice, stand in the way. The full realization of our destiny, the sovereignty of God on Earth, ultimately depends not on governments but on justice and conscience within us.²⁶⁵

264 The right to hospitality across states. This interrelatedness of Kant`s three definite articles is also stressed by Doyle.

265 Peace Plans of Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant, <http://www.san.beck.org/GPJ15-Rousseau,Kant.html>. Date: September 2009

5.2 Conclusions

With the security environment becoming highly competitive in the 21st century, as discussed in this thesis, absence of war/conflict is an unlikely future scenario. The international community is seeking to establish a system of regional alliances with a global reach, to balance against potential security threats. Of all the post-WWII institutions in Europe, NATO, dedicated to collective defence and security, and the EU, dedicated to economic and political cooperation, are the two focal organizations that have the potential to maintain security and stability not only in Europe but globally. Despite all the criticisms of their capacity to act and to work together efficiently, they are paradoxically the only actors able to address the complexities of the present security environment. In their capacity to respond to emerging crises they also work in conjunction with broad alliances like the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Partnership for Peace and Global Partner countries, the League of Arab States, and the African Union. Both organizations operate in a highly unpredictable world, which poses the fundamental problem that no strategy can provide any basis for assessment of future events. Given this uncertainty, it makes sense for both organizations to work closely together so as to counter security threats to the international community.

The concluding remarks will follow the sequence of research questions towards the statement of the study hypothesis.

The first question seeks to analyse what is the main rationale and mission of NATO and the EU, in order to establish their complementarities and/or differences. As discussed in this thesis, the bureaucracies of NATO and the EU are quite distinct as they were established in different historical settings and with different purposes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is both a security community and a strategic system established as a common and unified Western defence posture against the Soviet Union. The roots of the European project were political in nature, but its goals were economic. The essential problem of NATO and the EU is that they were designed for the Euro-centric security environment, not to take global responsibilities for providing peace and stability. A common threat assessment existed and kept both institutions alive. The need for change became evident with the breakup of the Soviet

Union and the fall of Berlin Wall. But as is true for all bureaucratic systems, they need time to adapt to change and overcome resistance to it.

This brings us to consider the second question: why have they not worked together closely to date? The factors stated above are to a certain extent causing a disconnect between the two organizations. Of course this is an oversimplification of the issue. The answer to this question should involve reasoning on the sovereignty of states, still the main actors in the international relations. The world has always been driven by power politics, globalization and competition. As Waltz considers, three phenomena are transforming international politics: the spread of democracy, increased national interdependence, and the changing role of international institutions; however, nothing suggests that any of these have caused states to begin subordinating their national interests to international concerns,²⁶⁶ with the exception of EU members passing some national issues over to a supranational body while on the whole remaining sovereign in the political and defence sphere.

States balance their lack of power by joining or creating international organizations. They protect themselves against competition and against threats that might impede their well-being. In the contemporary hypercompetitive world, state identity has become very important. The EU as the world's largest economy is challenged by the rise of Asia-Pacific and by the shift of US national interest towards the Asia-Pacific region. Commerce has become an overarching factor in European and world affairs. Competiveness makes states behave in a selfish mode. The main western powers – France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States – use institutions for their national interests, forcing smaller powers to accommodate them. Thus, France has always been in favour of a comprehensive approach to European security that would bring together all the players in a balanced formation organized around the Atlantic Alliance, the EU, Russia (with the CIS), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These institutions would be complementary, with no hierarchy in terms of importance or authority. This way NATO would be prevented from becoming the single pivotal point in the European strategic environment. With regard to Germany, its foreign and security policy has changed

²⁶⁶ Waltz (2000).

radically since the 1990s. Two major foreign-policy priorities were followed – first, to shoulder greater international responsibility and, second, to define its national interest. Meeting the expectations of its Western partners, Germany’s economic and military might makes it a major player on the international scene, whether it wants this or not. Today Germany plays a humanitarian, economic, and even military role commensurate with its power, making its assets available to multilateral organizations such as NATO and the EU. One of the main factors is that no country feels closer than Germany to Central Europe. Eastern Europe played an important role in the fall of communism and the reunification of Germany, for which it has a sense of moral responsibility, and this is a reason to support the enlargement of both organizations.²⁶⁷ As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the country is in a unique position – not only geographically (as part of Europe but at the same time an island nation) but also historically and culturally (empire, relationship with the US, maritime and military history). There is also an argument that liberal democracy is more ingrained in UK culture than elsewhere in Europe, partly in relation to national resolve to preserve economic influence. The UK is clearly European, but perhaps does not feel as European as others. It has a special and essential relationship with the US, driven by history, culture and language. Finally, the US follows its own national interests and is shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific region, while Europe is changing its stance from a liberal to more realist paradigm and in this respect becoming closer to NATO. Each state is thus becoming an increasingly rational actor in pursuit of its own self-interest. NATO and the EU have another problem:²⁶⁸ their cooperation is stalled because of the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. If we discuss the question of Turkish EU membership, Turkey is hardly a European country in geographical terms. However, the excuse often used by powerful European countries is that, since Turkey is a very populous country, its admission would have a considerable effect on the balance of power in the EU. In addition, using religion against the Turks would mean a step away from the European legacy. The question has been discussed in greater depth in the introduction to this chapter.

Here it is appropriate to discuss the third research question: “As we see in a world bereft of any positive driving force to make NATO and the EU work together more

267 Levesque (1999: 103-9).

268 Maffettone (2009: 230-257).

vigorously, will it require a major crisis to make them do so?” The answer is, yes. At this point the study hypothesis can be evaluated.

The hypothesis states:

“NATO is the only credible actor able to deal with the worst excesses of the realist world. The EU is the only effective corporate actor in Europe able to achieve synergy with NATO in a liberal world. A NATO-EU partnership offers significantly enhanced opportunities to both organizations to better allocate their military and civilian resources in order to manage the security challenges of the 21st century. Moreover, the very complexity of these challenges will drive NATO and the EU to work together increasingly closely.”

The statement made in the hypothesis can be confirmed. An argument in support of it is provided by the following indications of the rather troubled relationship between NATO and the EU.

The EU lacks the capabilities to provide for its own security and sees NATO as a collective defence provider. NATO, whose main ally is the US, has the potential to play a global role in peace and stability management. The EU’s dependence on the Berlin Plus arrangement provides its member states with the necessary means to respond effectively to any major security challenge in the region or its vicinity. The expectation is that NATO should execute only military missions, while the EU should operate as a military force and at the same time take responsibility for civil peace-building.²⁶⁹

One can argue that the EU is an economic-political entity and, as such, need not build its own military capabilities. It is also an argument that NATO with the US will protect Europeans when confronted with a security threat, in compliance with Article 5 of its founding Treaty. The EU has made some progress in building its civil-military capabilities but, taking into account the financial difficulties and constraints on national defence budgets, this process is on the whole at a standstill. Working relations between NATO and the EU can be close. With the Eurozone crisis, it is difficult to see that the situation is going to change fundamentally; unless it does,

²⁶⁹ Friis (2010).

there is no prospect of Europe's cosmopolitan grand concept being sustainable. The European defence ambition is for the continent to develop its own defence capabilities, but this ambition can be realized only with the support of NATO's capabilities in fields such as intelligence and transportation. The EU's military capabilities might grow in 10 years' time to be self-sustaining, but not primarily as a military force. Global deployments should seek to integrate NATO and EU forces. In the future NATO and the EU will cooperate more and more closely because of the unpredictability of security challenges. Global risks need a global response, while economic crises require an emphasis on pooling and sharing, so that it is logical for the two organizations to cooperate more closely. Global threats demand the coordinated response of both. The further institutionalization of cooperation among the European nations – e.g. the Weimar triangle, France and Great Britain, and cooperation between Scandinavian states – will support this process.

NATO, with the US shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific region and downsizing its forces in Europe, demands that the European nations pull together and take charge of their own security. As NATO relies on US capabilities, the reluctance of many European members to provide 2% of GDP for defence will be under pressure. The main concern is that NATO and the EU have so many problems communicating with each other – or even achieving transparent, mutually beneficial cooperation in responding to contemporary security challenges – that no effective approach can be found unless they join forces.

There is ongoing discussion as to why the European Union is not able or willing to provide for its own security but stays dependent on NATO as the provider of collective defence for its members. If we look again at the background of both organizations, we can see that Europeans have always relied on NATO, and particularly on the US. Throughout recent history, the US has always been there to help stabilize Europe, and to support its growth and prosperity. Constant US support has driven some nations to become reluctant to take their fair share of the burden in providing for their own security – a need that nowadays has a global dimension. As the state remains the main actor in international relations, the success or failure of international organizations like NATO and the EU remains dependent on their will to act or participate.

The last and the most challenging question addressed in this thesis is: “How best can NATO and the EU join forces to address the complexity of current and future security challenges?” A short answer can be given. There is not much that can be expected to change in the near future. This thesis has shown that, in their common efforts to establish mutually beneficial cooperation in order to secure their territory and peoples against common external threats, progress has been made. Continuation of the processes already in place is to be supported by both organizations. The strategies, motives, resources, priorities, cultures and politics of NATO and the EU member states differ. Despite the seemingly united striving for coordination, initiatives do not necessarily follow the same priorities. There are competing political agendas in Europe and beyond, and they are here to stay as they are part of the very identity of the various actors.

In the light of this thesis I conclude that nothing but a common threat will bring individual states, NATO and the EU to work together efficiently.

Appendix A: NATO Summit Meetings

Summit Meetings

<p>19-20 Nov.2010</p> <p>Lisbon</p> <p>Portugal</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Publication of a new Strategic Concept, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”; gradual transition process to full Afghan security responsibility to start in 2011, backed by Allied agreement on a long-term partnership with Afghanistan; decision to develop a NATO missile defence system to protect populations and territory in Europe, in addition to deployed troops, against potential ballistic missile attacks, with Russia invited to cooperate as part of a broader “reset” of its relations with NATO; adoption of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, including a greater role in stabilization and reconstruction for the Alliance, together with greater emphasis on training and developing local forces; continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces; adoption of the Lisbon Capabilities Package that identifies critical capabilities needed to address emerging threats; agreement to develop a NATO cyber defence policy and action plan for its implementation; streamlining of NATO’s military command structure as well as the consolidation and rationalization of NATO agencies; new impetus given to relations with partners and NATO’s partnership policy in the broad sense of the term.</p>
<p><u>3-4 April 2009</u></p> <p>Strasbourg/Kehl</p> <p>France/Germany</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Against the backdrop of NATO’s 60th anniversary, adoption of a Declaration on Alliance Security, calling for a new Strategic Concept; adherence to basic principles and shared values, as well as the need for ongoing transformation; in-depth discussion on Afghanistan, NATO’s key priority; welcoming of two new members: Albania and Croatia, and the pursuit of NATO’s open door policy (invitation extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as soon as a solution to the issue surrounding the country’s name is reached); France’s decision to fully participate in NATO structures and the impact of this decision on the Alliance’s relations with the European Union; and NATO’s relations with Russia.</p>
<p><u>2-4 April 2008</u></p> <p>Bucharest</p> <p>Romania</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>At Bucharest, Allied leaders review the evolution of NATO’s main commitments: operations (Afghanistan and Kosovo); enlargement and the invitation of Albania and Croatia to start the accession process (the former</p>

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will also be invited as soon as ongoing negotiations over its name have led to an agreement); the continued development of military capabilities to meet.

28-29 Nov. 2006

Riga Latvia

Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government

Review of progress in Afghanistan in light of the expansion of ISAF to the entire country and call for broader international engagement; Confirmation that the Alliance is prepared to play its part in implementing the security provisions of a settlement on the status of Kosovo; Measures adopted to further improve NATO's military capabilities; NATO Response Force declared operational; Comprehensive Political Guidance published. Initiatives adopted to deepen and extend relations with partners; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia invited to join Partnership for Peace.

22 Feb. 2005

NATO HQ

Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government

Leaders reaffirm their support for building stability in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and commit to strengthening the partnership between NATO and the European Union.

28-29 June 2004

Istanbul, Turkey

Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government

Participation of seven new members to the event (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); Expansion of NATO's operation in Afghanistan by continuing the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country; Agreement to assist the Iraqi Interim Government with the training of its security forces; Maintaining support for stability in the Balkans; Decision to change NATO's defence-planning and force-generation processes, while strengthening contributions to the fight against terrorism, including WMD aspects; Strengthening cooperation with partners and launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region.

21-22 Nov. 2002

Prague, Czech Republic

Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government

Invitation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO's Open Door Policy; Adoption of a series of measures to improve military capabilities (The Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force and the streamlining of the military command structure); Adoption of a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism; Decision to support NATO member

countries in Afghanistan; Endorsement of a package of initiatives to forge new relationships with partners.

28 May 2002
Rome, Italy

Summit Meeting of NATO and Russia at the level of Heads of State and Government

NATO Allies and the Russian Federation create the NATO-Russia Council, where they meet as equal partners, bringing a new quality to NATO-Russia relations. The NATO-Russia Council replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

23-25 April 1999
Washington, US

Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government Commemoration of NATO's 50th Anniversary; Allies reiterate their determination to put an end to the repressive actions by President Milosevic against the local ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo; The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland participate in their first summit meeting; Adoption of the Membership Action Plan; Publication of a revised Strategic Concept; Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO; Launch of the Defence Capabilities Initiative; Strengthening of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue; Launch of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative. Supporting Documents: Communiqués of the North Atlantic Council The Alliance's Strategic Concept

8-9 July 1997
Madrid, Spain

Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government
Invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks; Reaffirmation of NATO's Open Door Policy; Recognition of achievement and commitments represented by the NATO Russia-Founding Act; Signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine; First meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at summit level that replaces the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; An enhanced Partnership for Peace; Updating of the 1991 Strategic Concept and adoption of a new defence posture; Reform of the NATO military command structure; Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

27 May 1997
Paris, France

Summit Meeting of NATO Russia with the participation of Heads of State and Government
Signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The Founding Act states that NATO and Russia are no longer adversaries and establishes the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

- 10-11 Jan. 1994
Brussels, Belgium Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government
Launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative; All North Atlantic Cooperation Council partner countries and members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are invited to participate; Publication of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; Endorsement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and other measures to develop the European Security and Defence Identity; Reaffirmation of Alliance readiness to carry out air strikes in support of UN objectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 7-8 Nov. 1991
Rome, Italy Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government
Publication of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation and of statements on developments in the Soviet Union and the situation in Yugoslavia.
- 5-6 July 1990
London, UK Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government
Publication of the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, outlining proposals for developing cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe across a wide spectrum of political and military activities including the establishment of regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.
- 4 Dec. 1989
Brussels, Belgium Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government
Against the background of fundamental changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the prospect of the end of the division of Europe, US President Bush consults with Alliance leaders following his summit meeting with President Gorbachev in Malta. While the NATO summit meeting is taking place, Warsaw Pact leaders denounce the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.
- 29-30 May 1989
Brussels, Belgium Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government
Declaration commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Alliance setting out Alliance policies and security objectives for the 1990s aimed at maintaining Alliance defence, introducing new arms control initiatives, strengthening political consultation, improving East-West cooperation and meeting global challenges; Adoption of a comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament.

<p><u>2-3 March 1988</u> Brussels, Belgium</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Reaffirmation of the purpose and principles of the Alliance (reference to the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance published in 1967) and of its objectives for East-West relations; Adoption of a blue print for strengthening stability in the whole of Europe through conventional arms control negotiations.</p>
<p><u>21 November 1985</u> Brussels, Belgium</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Special meeting of the North Atlantic Council for consultations with President Reagan on the positive outcome of the US-USSR Geneva Summit on arms control and other areas of cooperation.</p>
<p><u>10 June 1982</u> Bonn, Germany</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Accession of Spain; Adoption of the Bonn Declaration setting out a six-point Programme for Peace in Freedom; Publication of a statement of Alliance's goals and policies on Arms Control and Disarmament and a statement on Integrated NATO Defence.</p>
<p><u>30-31 May 1978</u> Washington, USA</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Review of interim results of long-term initiatives taken at the 1977 London Summit; Confirmation of the validity of the Alliance's complementary aims of maintaining security while pursuing East-West détente; Adoption of 3% target for growth in defence expenditures.</p>
<p>10-11 May 1977 London, UK</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Initiation of study on long-term trends in East-West relations and of a long-term defence programme (LTDP) aimed at improving the defensive capability of NATO member countries.</p>
<p><u>29-30 May 1975</u> Brussels, Belgium</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p> <p>Affirmation of the fundamental importance of the Alliance and of Allied cohesion in the face of international economic pressures following the 1974 oil crisis; Support for successful conclusion of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (to result in 1975, in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act).</p>
<p>26 June 1974</p>	<p>Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government</p>

Brussels, Belgium Signature of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa on 19 June, confirming the dedication of member countries of the Alliance to the aims and ideals of the Treaty in the 25th anniversary of its signature; Consultations on East-West relations in preparation for US-USSR summit talks on strategic nuclear arms limitations.

16-19 Dec 1957

Paris, France

Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government

Reaffirmation of the principles purposes and unity of the Atlantic Alliance; Improvements in the coordination and organisation of NATO forces and in political consultation arrangements; Recognition of the need for closer economic ties and for cooperation in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, designed to eliminate conflict in international policies and encourage economic collaboration.

Appendix B: The EU's and ESDP/CSDP Treaties and Agreements

The EU's Treaties

Treaty of Lisbon (2009)	<p>Purpose: to make the EU more democratic, more efficient and better able to address global problems, such as climate change, with one voice.</p> <p>Main changes: more power for the European Parliament, change of voting procedures in the Council, <u>citizens' initiative</u>, a permanent president of the European Council, a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, a new EU diplomatic service.</p> <p>The Lisbon treaty clarifies which powers: belong to the EU, belong to EU member countries, are shared.</p> <p>The <u>Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe</u> (2004) – with aims similar to the Lisbon Treaty – was signed but never ratified.</p>
Treaty of Nice (2003)	<p>Purpose: to reform the institutions so that the EU could function efficiently after reaching 25 member countries.</p> <p>Main changes: methods for changing the composition of the Commission and redefining the voting system in the Council.</p>
Treaty of Amsterdam (1999)	<p>Purpose: To reform the EU institutions in preparation for the arrival of future member countries.</p> <p>Main changes: amendment, renumbering and consolidation of EU and EEC treaties. More transparent decision-making (increased use of the <u>co-decision voting procedure</u>).</p>
Treaty on European Union - Maastricht Treaty (1993)	<p>Purpose: to prepare for European Monetary Union and introduce elements of a political union (citizenship, common foreign and internal affairs policy).</p> <p>Main changes: establishment of the European Union and introduction of the co-decision procedure, giving Parliament more say in decision-making. New forms of cooperation between EU governments – for example on defence and</p>

	justice and home affairs.
Single European Act (1986)	<p>Purpose: to reform the institutions in preparation for Portugal and Spain's membership and speed up decision-making in preparation for the single market.</p> <p>Main changes: extension of qualified majority voting in the Council (making it harder for a single country to veto proposed legislation), creation of the cooperation and assent procedures, giving Parliament more influence.</p>
Merger Treaty - Brussels Treaty (1967)	<p>Purpose: to streamline the European institutions.</p> <p>Main changes: creation of a single Commission and a single Council to serve the then three European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC). Repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.</p>
Treaties of Rome - EEC and EURATOM treaties (1958)	<p>Purpose: to set up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).</p> <p>Main changes: extension of European integration to include general economic cooperation.</p>
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1952)	<p>Purpose: to create interdependence in coal and steel so that one country could no longer mobilise its armed forces without others knowing. This eased distrust and tensions after WWII. The ECSC treaty expired in 2002. When new countries joined the EU, the founding treaties were amended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1973 (Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom) • 1981 (Greece) • 1986 (Spain, Portugal) • 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden) • 2004 (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). • 2007 (Bulgaria, Romania)

EU's ESDP/CSDP related Treaties and Agreements

September 1947 <u>Treaty of Dunkirk</u>	Signed between <u>France</u> and the <u>United Kingdom</u> in <u>Dunkirk (France)</u> as a <i>Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance</i> against a possible <u>German</u> attack in the aftermath of <u>World War II</u> .
March 1948 <u>Treaty of Brussels</u>	Signed between <u>Belgium</u> , <u>France</u> , <u>Luxembourg</u> , the <u>Netherlands</u> and the <u>United Kingdom</u> , as an expansion to the preceding year's defence pledge, the <u>Dunkirk Treaty</u> signed between Britain and France. As the Treaty of Brussels contained a mutual defence clause, it provided a basis upon which the 1954 <u>Paris Conference</u> established the <u>Western European Union</u> (WEU).
September 1948 <u>Western Union Defense Organization</u>	The Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO) was the defence arm of the Western Union, the precursor to the <u>Western European Union</u> (WEU). The WUDO was also a precursor to the <u>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</u> (NATO), and its headquarters, personnel, and plans provided the nucleus for NATO's military command structure. Following the standing up of NATO's <u>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</u> , the WUDO was disestablished after three years of existence.
May 1952 <u>European Defence Community</u> (EDC)	The European Defense Community (EDC) was a plan proposed in 1950 by <u>René Pleven</u> , the French President of the Council in response to the <u>American</u> call for the rearmament of <u>West Germany</u> . The intention was to form a pan-European defence force as an alternative to Germany's proposed accession to <u>NATO</u> , meant to harness its military potential in case of conflict with the <u>Soviet bloc</u> . The EDC was to include West Germany, <u>France</u> , <u>Italy</u> , and the <u>Benelux</u> countries.
1992 <u>Petersberg tasks</u>	In 1992, the <u>Western European Union</u> adopted the <u>Petersberg tasks</u> . The Petersberg tasks are a list of <u>military</u> and <u>security</u> priorities incorporated within the <u>European Security and Defence Policy</u> , now called the CSDP as of the Treaty of Lisbon, of the <u>European Union</u> . They were formulated as: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Humanitarian</u> and <u>rescue</u> tasks• <u>Peacekeeping</u> tasks• Tasks of combat forces in <u>crisis management</u>, including <u>peace-making</u>.

<p>May 1999 <u>Amsterdam Treaty</u></p>	<p>The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the beginnings of a <u>common foreign and security policy</u> (CFSP) and the reform of the institutions in the run-up to enlargement.</p>
<p>1998 <u>St. Malo</u></p>	<p><u>British</u> and <u>French</u> statement that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".</p>
<p>June 1999 <u>Cologne European Council</u></p>	<p>A <u>High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy</u> (CFSP) was designated. Council decided on a common policy on Russia. Adopted the declaration on Kosovo. In relation to the <u>European Security and Defence Policy</u>, a major element of the CFSP, the council declared that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." (Declared in St Malo by France and Great Britain).</p>
<p>December 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal</p>	<p>The Helsinki Headline Goal was a military capability target set for 2003 with the aim of developing a future European Rapid Reaction Force. There was much interest in the idea of a single <u>EU military force</u>.</p>
<p>December 2001 Leaken Summit</p>	<p>The EU launched the <u>European Capabilities Action Plan</u> (ECAP).</p>
<p>March 2003 <u>Berlin Plus agreement</u></p>	<p>The Berlin Plus agreement is the short title of a comprehensive package of agreements made between <u>NATO</u> and the <u>EU</u> on 16 December 2002.^[1] These agreements were based on conclusions of NATO's <u>1999 Washington summit</u>, sometimes referred to as the <i>CJTF mechanisms</i> and allowed the EU to draw on some of NATO's military assets in its own peacekeeping operations.</p>
<p>December 2003 <u>Brussels European Council</u></p>	<p>The European Security Strategy is the document in which the <u>European Union</u> clarifies its security strategy which is aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a better world, identifying the threats facing the Union, defining</p>

its strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe.

July 2004
European Defence
Agency

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is an agency of the European Union based in Brussels. It is a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) body.

November 2010
Treaty of Lisbon

Renamed the ESDP to *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*. The post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has been created (superseding the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy) Unanimous decisions in the Council of the European Union continue to instruct the EU foreign policy and CSDP matters became available to enhanced cooperation. Lisbon also led to the termination of the Western European Union in 2010.

Abbreviations

A

ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AU	African Union
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations

B

BPM	Bureaucratic Politics Model
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C

CA	Comprehensive Approach
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy

D

DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

E

EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EATC	European Air Transport Command
EBAO	Effect Based Approach to Operations
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EES	European Security Strategy
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EP	European Parliament
ESD	Emerging Security Division

ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESCD	Emerging Security Challenges Division
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPOL	European Police
<u>F</u>	
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
<u>G</u>	
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPM	Governmental Politics Model
<u>I</u>	
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
<u>J</u>	
JCMB	Joint Coordination Monitoring Board
<u>K</u>	
KFOR	Kosovo Force
<u>M</u>	
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
<u>N</u>	
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NADMP	National Air Defence Modernisation Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Nongovernmental organizations
NORDEF	Nordic Defence Cooperation
NRF	NATO Reaction Force
<u>O</u>	
OBM	Organizational Behaviour Model
OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

P

PCRU Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

R

RAM Rational Actor Model

S

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review

SFOR Stabilization Force

SLOC Sea lines of communication

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

U

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP UN Development Programme

UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime

UK United Kingdom

US United States (of America)

W

WFP World Food Programme

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WWII World War II

WTO World Trade Organization

WU Western Union

WEU Western European Union

Definitions

Realism

Realism is based on certain key assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that nation-states are unitary, geographically-based actors in an anarchic international system where there is no higher authority able to regulate interaction between states, since no true authoritative world government exists. Secondly, it assumes that sovereign states, rather than IGOs or NGOs, are the primary actors in international affairs. States, as the highest order, are in competition with one another, and consequently each state is a rational autonomous actor in pursuit of its own self-interest, with the primary goal of maintaining and ensuring its own security—and thus its sovereignty and survival. Realism holds that, in pursuit of their interests, states will attempt to amass resources, and that relations between states are determined by their relative levels of power. That level of power is in turn determined by the state's military and economic capabilities.²⁷⁰

Liberalism

Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behaviour. Unlike realism, where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Thus, preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Liberalism also holds that interaction between states is not limited to the political sphere, but also encompasses economic and cultural relations and influences, whether through commercial firms, organizations or individuals. Thus, liberalism offers plenty of opportunities for cooperation, as opposed to the anarchic international system envisaged by realism.²⁷¹

Security

Security is in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Herd (2008)

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Wolfers (1962)

Global Risk

For a threat to be considered a “global risk” it must have global geographic scope, cross-industry relevance, uncertainty as to how and when it will occur and high levels of economic and/or social impact. Global Scope: Risks that affect no less than three world regions on at least two different continents. While these risks may have regional or even local origin, their impact potentially can be felt globally.²⁷³

Globalization

Distinctive indicators of globalisation

- Globalization stretches social, political and economic activities across political frontiers.
- It intensifies international interdependence as flows of trade, investment, finance, migration and culture increase.
- It “speeds up” the world since new systems of transport and communication mean that people, goods and capital travel much faster and that the diffusion of societies and cultures by information and new ideas is more rapid and more difficult to control
- Local developments in far-away places can have enormous global consequences²⁷⁴

International Community

For the purpose of the thesis the phrase “International community” will be used to define examples of the international community at work, from peacekeeping to human rights to disarmament and development involving Institutions, Governments, intergovernmental (e.g., the United Nations), nongovernmental (e.g., Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group), or with multiple worldwide or regional purposes (e.g., the NATO and the European Union), and non-governmental partners, which effect a stronger sense of interdependence among states, stimulating recognition of the need for cooperation to address international and global problems.²⁷⁵

273 World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2011

274 Wunderlich (2007: 45)

275 See: <http://www.answers.com/topic/international-organization-1#ixzz1eL3TrLLG>. Accessed on October 15, 2011.

Comprehensive Approach

A “Comprehensive Approach is the synergy amongst all actors and actions of the International Community through the coordination and de-confliction of its political, development and security capabilities to face today’s challenges including complex emergencies.”²⁷⁶

- Term which recognizes the need to act together and refers to the collaborative context in which available tools (stake-holders) are used.
- Best seen as a braided rope, in which analysis, planning, decision-making and execution processes are entwined together from the beginning, and run through the entire spectrum of our effort both horizontally and vertically.
- Implies that each actor understands its capabilities and role in the overarching plan.

Failed State

A state that fails "to provide security for the population, to guarantee rights at home or abroad, or to maintain functioning (not merely formal) democratic institutions."²⁷⁷

Based on the assertion of Max Weber, a failing state is a state unable to retain the “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” on its territory or on most of it, clearly the notion of state sovereignty and legitimacy are linked.²⁷⁸

276 Definition agreed by the participants of the Civil Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence: NATO internal Comprehensive Approach Stakeholder Meeting, Enchede, Netherlands, 22 / 23 September 2010.

277 Chomsky (2001)

278 See Weber (1996)

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