

Ph.D. in Political Theory  
CERSDU – L.U.I.S.S. Guido Carli  
XXI Cycle

**The Project of Political Inclusion of Cosmopolitan Democracy:  
Democracy and Human Beings in Global Governance**

Supervisors: Dr. Sebastiano Maffettone  
Dr. Gianfranco Pellegrino

Candidate: Daniele La Cagnina

## **Content**

Introduction	3
<b>Part 1. The sovereign state as the centre of political power</b>	
Chapter 1.1. The Westphalia System	13
Chapter 1.2. Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Thought	17
Chapter 1.3. Twentieth-century International Political Theory	29
Chapter 1.4. Self-Determination and Non-intervention	36
<b>Part 2. From the world of states to the citizens of the world</b>	
Chapter 2.1. Inclusion and world arrangement: steps forward and failures	41
Chapter 2.2. Something goes wrong in the current system of global governance: the 'democratic deficit'	55
Chapter 2.3. Recent failures in the global governance system: concentrated power and wide-spread suffering	61
Chapter 2.4. Cosmopolitan Democracy and the question of inclusion and exclusion	81
Chapter 2.5. The project of Cosmopolitan Democracy: interrelated levels of governance and the world constitution	85
Conclusions	89
Bibliography	96

## *Introduction*

«The world is in crisis». This sentence is common and has often been used to describe the dynamics of the global situation in different respects and moments of occurrence. Recently, this expression has become a daily 'label' of a historical moment which lasts at least for the past decades. In truth, the alarm does not seem to be completely unjustified. Indeed, beside the well-known issues that run from the Middle East question to the relations between East and West or to the development of post-colonial states, new occasions of threats and insecurities have appeared on the international scenario. Apart from their obvious contingent specificities, these challenges to the 'quite flow' of the global coexistence are not new in themselves and their cause, if not their logic, can be easily traced back and interpreted accordingly to past dynamics. Yet, what is new is the context in which they occur that shape the happening of both old and current issues in an original fashion. As Nelson Mandela noted:

In the globalized world in which we live, events in one corner of the planet can have an immense effect upon the fortunes of others far away and not at all involved in those events [...] This state of affairs should remind us that as we affect the fate of one another, we also have a common responsibility in the world [...] Together, we all live in a global neighbourhood and [...] we need a globalization of responsibility as well. Above all, that is the challenge of the next century<sup>1</sup>.

On this background, the following dissertation deals with the evolution of the debate within the discipline of international relations. In particular, it focuses on the contemporary critique of the sovereignty criteria as guiding principle of organizing the international realm. Furthermore, the dissertation investigates the most recent discussions on the necessity of reforming the system of global governance and in this sense inquires the possibility of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Having in mind the new globalized world order, some scholars have in fact called for a radical change in approaching the global issues and requested a radical re-thinking of the global political organization of international relations. Their claims have being articulated in a political project that sets the path towards a Cosmopolitan Democracy. As Daniele

---

<sup>1</sup>N. Mandela, 'The Challenge of the Next Century: The Globalization of Responsibility', in *NPQ: New Perspective Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 34-5, 2000.

Archibugi, one of the founders of Cosmopolitan Democracy, puts it, this political project may be intended as “the attempt to reconcile the globalization phenomenon with the success obtained by the democratic system. It takes its stances from the recognition that a state-based democracy, the only one we know until now, risks to be made empty by the processes of globalization”<sup>2</sup>.

*Basic premises: the question of inclusion and exclusion*

A fundamental dilemma challenges politics since its origin: the problem of how to deal with inclusion and exclusion. All political arrangements rest ultimately on a distinction between members and non-members. Thus, this fundamental question, taken in itself, says nothing about the nature of those arrangements, because all political assets rely upon this basic distinction. As consequence, it is not enough to address the question of inclusion and exclusion but, it is rather necessary to look within the concrete political arrangements to understand how the insider/outsider puzzle is effectively tackled.

Almost 2300 years ago, first the Cynics and later the Stoics, regarded an ethical good life as one in which human rationality was made to conform to the rational order of nature. They elaborated the idea of the law of nature, that is, a universal moral law which corresponds to the rational capacities of all human beings. These human capacities of reasoning ultimately provided the grounds for fellowship in a world community. Contrary to the Cynics, the Stoics did not believe that this theory of virtue justified the abandoning of the public life. This was because human society was seen as an end of the individual’s moral duty. In other words, the Stoics considered that the human capacities for reasoning could be fully developed only within the society, and the freedom of the person required a harmonization of interests in the community. In this respect, the law performed the important function of providing a common standard for all, representing a rational ordering of life to which all could subject themselves. As consequence of this view, the Stoics ultimately recommended for the good of human beings to take part to the political life of the society. Despite the necessity of this commitment, their conception of the ideal political community overcame the limitations associated with concrete forms of government. In this way,

---

<sup>2</sup>D. Archibugi, ‘Sogni cosmopolitici e incubi mattutini’, in Sebastiano Maffettone e Gianfranco Pellegrino, *Etica delle relazioni internazionali*, Marco Editore, Cosenza, 2004, p.323 (my trans.)

they have offered a vision that transcended national borders and was inclusive of all persons. Yet, the Stoic philosophy remained little more than a general ethical world view which failed to offer any concrete conception of norms, agents, and institutions of a global political community.

Crucially for the present discussion, starting from the modern era till the present days, the dominant answer to the central political question of inclusion and exclusion was rather different from the Stoics' idea. In this respect, it has been certainly not for reasons of chance if the common sense currently shares that foreigners are different from our fellow nationals. In this sense, it is nowadays almost granted that 'they' have different claims upon us while 'we' have different obligations towards them. However, beyond the popular belief, such distinction is long-standing and well-established in scholarly discourses on politics too and it has been associated with the idea of sovereign polities which claim to be autonomous from external influences. Although not in an straightforward way, this assertion also greatly influenced the debate concerning international relations and international theory. In particular, it decisively contributed to shape a clear distinction between international sphere and domestic realm. On the one hand, domestic politics was seen as a context where questions of political obligations towards co-nationals were central. Social life was, in fact, considered impossible without this fact being recognized. International relations, on the other hand, concerned relationships between states, and realism, the most important theory dealing with the inter-state relationship, stressed the extent to which whatever obligations states had towards each other rested ultimately on contingent factors, most importantly mutual self-interest. Although it was only during the inter-war years, and more importantly, after the Second World War, that international relations came to be seen as a distinct field of study with its own concepts and theories, for much of the last century this separation was more or less taken for granted by scholars. In particular, the most recent discipline of international relations focuses on the assumption of the so-called "Democratic Peace" thesis which states that democratic regimes do not fight against each other<sup>3</sup>. According to a causal logic that goes from the internal to the external realm, the supporters of this theory have

---

<sup>3</sup>M. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol.12, No.3 and 4, 1983, pp.205-235 and 323-354; B. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993; B. Russett and J. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, Norton, New York, 2001.

thus drawn a strong connection between the nature of the domestic order and the concrete peaceful respect of international obligations.

Yet, over the last thirty years, a distinctive discourse has emerged which, contrary to 'classical' international relations theory, does not treat this subject as a separate matter from political science, and which refuses to think of issues of obligation as falling naturally into categories such as domestic and international. The creators of this discourse come from, and sometimes consider themselves still to be located in a variety of backgrounds in political and social theory, moral philosophy, economics, and international relations. But, all together, they have made of international relations something new so that the term 'International Political Theory' is often employed to describe this new approach and distinguish it from classical international relations theory<sup>4</sup>. The main point of these authors is that the political doctrine of sovereignty rests on process of exclusion and inclusion which may, and actually does, cut across considerations of right and justice<sup>5</sup>. The sovereignty system imposes, in fact, a particular form of inclusion and exclusion which has dramatic consequences because it encourages a particular mode of thinking about the world in which notions of right and justice are parochialized.

Following the critical current of International Political Theory, Cosmopolitan Democracy assumes that such clear distinction between domestic and international sphere cannot be sustained anymore. Both these domains have to be judged according to the same standard provided by the notion of democracy, in particular according to the principles of non-violence, popular control and political equality<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, the strengthening of the processes of globalization which took place in the last decades has enhanced the importance of the external factors in both qualitative and quantitative terms. This has decisively modified the ways in which power is exerted within all states. In the end, it is not enough to push on the side of the internal democratization if the logic of democracy and the rule of law are not extended internationally. The international system has in fact a direct and decisive influence on the nature of domestic regimes, although this nexus has not to be indeed in an

---

<sup>4</sup>For a deeper explanation of the difference between classical international relations theory and international political theory see., Chris Brown, *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, international political theory today*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp.11-14

<sup>5</sup>See. R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

<sup>6</sup>D. Archibugi, *Cittadini del mondo, verso una democrazia cosmopolitica*, il Saggiatore, Milano 2009, pp.40-42

absolute sense. What Cosmopolitan democracy suggests is then a project of democratization which looks in both directions. This task does not at all require simply to export domestic models of democracy at the transnational level. More significantly, it demands the conceptualization and effective enforcement of suitable democratic strategies fitted with the new globalized context in which international relations currently take place.

The idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy to extend democracy to both the domestic and global level certainly “marks a goal but it also suggests a route”. In this sense Archibugi wrote,

the necessity of such a route is founded on the assumption that an ethical adhesion is developed that makes the citizens more and more participating of what happens to other individuals and communities even when those are geographically and culturally distant from their own. In fact, what draws up the destinies of peoples are not the interests, [but, rather, the human beings' perception] of a feeling of solidarity that often crosses the state borders.<sup>7</sup>

On this fundamental presumption of an ethical adhesion of all human beings, Cosmopolitan Democracy has given an answer to the basic problem of politics which decisively favors the improvement of the mechanisms of inclusion.

### *Structure of the thesis*

The chapters of the thesis discuss a historical account of how politics has traditionally faced the founding question of inclusion and exclusion. In particular, most of the attention is paid to describe how the conventional division between domestic and international sphere has affected the models which have been developed to govern the relationships between states. In this way, a general explanation of the classical theory of international relations is provided. Then, in opposition to traditional reasoning, the argument of Cosmopolitan Democracy will be presented.

The thesis is divided in two parts. Part 1. deals with the idea of the state as the centre of political authority. This notion is conventionally considered to represent the foundation of the modern era of politics. In this respect, chapter 1.1. describes the so-

---

<sup>7</sup>D. Archibugi, ‘La Democrazia Cosmopolitica: Una Visione Partecipante’, in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Vol. 35, No. 2, August, 2005, p. 264

called Westphalia System of sovereign states which, settled in 1648, is regarded as installing the ground rules of the European international order for the subsequent three centuries. The chapter gives an account of the notion of the state's sovereignty according to the principle of no internal equals and no external superiors. Furthermore, it explains the two characteristic discourses associated with Westphalia, the 'law of nation' and the 'society of states'.

The subject of chapter 1.2. is instead centered on the international thought of the Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment era. This is treated in three sections. In section a) the attention focuses on the Enlightenment and its strong cosmopolitan concern. In contrast to the notion of the society of states, the political thinkers of the time conceptualized the idea of a society of all human beings. Furthermore, from out of the opposition to the general view of the interstate-war as still a possible expression of the dynamics of the society of states, they gave rise to the tradition of the 'Peace Project'. Many, if not most of the categories of contemporary political theory emerge one way or another from the Enlightenment. In this respect, the section investigates the work of the preminent figure of the time, Immanuel Kant. In particular, it outlines some aspects of his thought which grandly influenced the way in which the debate on international relations and, crucially, Cosmopolitan Democracy, has been shaped. In section b) the chapter speaks of post-Enlightenment particularistic views of politics. It especially refers to the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, the account of the writers of the state and the nation, and the thought of Friederich Hegel. Finally, in section c) the main concern is the shift in the thought on international relations determined by Industrialization. It investigates the influence exerted by trade on the nature of international relations. In particular, it presents the argument developed by liberal political economy and the counter-assertions of neo-mercantilists and socialists theorists. The liberal assumption that trade favors peaceful relationships between states is still object of quarrel, particular in light of globalization and the current and generalized economic crisis.

Chapter 1.3. is devoted to 'realism' and 'liberal internationalism', the two mainstream of international relations theory of twentieth century. The chapter is divided in two sections. In particular, the doctrine of liberal internationalism is presented in section a). After the end of First World War, this strain of thought worked out a plan for a new setting of international relations, relying upon the idea of a fundamental harmony of the people's interests. Thus, granting wide trust to the force of world opinion,



liberal internationalism envisaged a new conception of diplomacy and a different institutional asset made concrete in the work of the League of Nations. After having illustrated this plan, the section highlights both the influence it exerted on the twenty first-century theory of international relations and its points of resonance with the Westphalia System, in particular on the prevalent role assigned to the state. In section b) the realist critique to liberal assumptions is described. Furthermore, the position of Rational Choice theory is presented, especially underlining its challenge to the common belief of the doctrine of international relations as a separate subject from political theory.

Part 1. ends with an examination of self-determination and non-intervention, two key, but controversial norms of contemporary international relations. This is the content of chapter 1.4. which also raises some important questions related with these norms. In particular, with respect to self-determination, it analyzes the puzzle aspects of its relationship with democracy, while, as regards non-intervention, it enquires the hard distinction between intervention and influence.

In Part 2., the problems raised in Part 1. will receive an answer according to the perspective of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Moreover, Part 2. examines the presumptions of this approach to global politics and the main points of its proposal. It further highlights the consequent implications of this perspective for the manner in which questions are faced within contemporary international political theory. On this suggestions, it finally presents concrete proposals for an effective reform of the current system of global governance.

Chapter 2.1. takes into account the historical evolution of the political organization of human beings. In this respect, it notices the improvement of the mechanisms of decisional participation settled to respond to the problem of inclusion and exclusion. Within the state boundaries this process has been successfully brought to high levels through the constant development of the democratic regime. Even in the relations between states we have attended at a certain affirmation of the rule of law. This was first embedded in the idea of the ‘concert of states’, then, developed in the ‘League of Nations’, and currently it is encompassed in the UN Charter. At the same time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked the recognition of the individual as a legitimate subject of political concern. However, outside the borders the results are more ambiguous and certainly not democratic.

In this respect, Chapter 2.2. deals with the problem of the democratization of the world arrangement. With particular regard to the contemporary UN apparatus, David Held and Anthony McGrew have emphasized the distance between the stated goals of global governance and the reality of the evolution of international affairs. As a matter of fact, since the end of the Second World War and the advent of the UN Charter great attention has been paid on providing a body of norms and institutions to protect human security and development. But contrary to the declared intentions, we have attended at the constant spread of both global inequalities and social exclusion along with the escalation of several military conflicts<sup>8</sup>. The discourse is further extended to encompass what the supporters of Cosmopolitan Democracy term ‘the democratic deficit’ of global governance.

Aiming at both corroborating this general depiction and showing on concrete case studies the on-going international situation, chapter 2.3. presents a reading of some events of the latest evolution of the political world context. In particular, it focalizes on recent cases of conflict and the contemporary economic crisis. The account aims to make evident the failure of the actual system of global governance as a means for maintaining a peaceful world order and securing human freedom, development and well-being. The chapter is divided in two sections. In section a) the analysis of some of the most recent political events is developed. There are three the main objects of concern here. First, the policy of ‘war on terror’ developed by the former US President George W. Bush together with some puzzling aspects of the new policy of the president-elect Barack Obama. Secondly, the 2008 ‘Cast Lead’ military operation of Israel in the Gaza Strip and, finally, the 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This depiction aims at showing that, as observed among others by Jürgen Habermas, beside the state-centered logic, a problematic unilateral and nationalistic approach to international issues is currently taking place. As consequence, Hayden noticed, “any role that global governance can have in achieving human development through poverty reduction and the provision of both welfare and human security often is marginalized by the self-interested considerations of the realist power system”.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, as described in section b), in the most recent time, the contemporary economic crisis brings up strong concerns

---

<sup>8</sup>D. Held and A. McGrew, ‘The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction’, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *The Global Transformations Reader*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 14

<sup>9</sup>Patrick Hayden, *Cosmopolitan Global Politics*, Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005, p. 24

even on the real success of the global economic promotion. At the same time, it confirms the validity of the illustration of Held and McGrew on “how the current system of global governance privilege its market enhancing functions over its market correcting ones”<sup>10</sup>. More significantly, it imposes with greater strength the urgency of finding an answer to the question of the ‘democratic deficit’ of global governance raised by the advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy.

In chapter 2.4. the central question of the relationship between the domestic and international realm receives an answer according to the perspective of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In light of this depiction and in a critical mood towards the Democratic Peace thesis, the chapter also makes some considerations on the connection between democracy and the global system.

Chapter 2.5. describes the institutional architecture of Cosmopolitan Democracy as conceived by Daniele Archibugi. Specific attention is here paid to the attempt to revitalize the Kantian tripartition through the division of political management in different levels, from the local to the global. It is also here investigated the plan of Cosmopolitan Democracy for the replacement of the principle of sovereignty with a new global constitutionalism. Moreover, it deals with the emergence of new political subjects. Multinational corporations, global movements and the same international organizations work across the borders and outside of a simple state-based logic. In particular, the global movements develop an ever more significant transnational participation of the world citizens to the global affairs. In this respect, the chapter raises the fundamental problem of their legitimation.

Finally, the conclusion addresses some objections raised against the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy. These are critiques which are directed at the very basis of the thought on Cosmopolitan Democracy. They are divided in three categories. The first set of counter-assertions is mainly sustained by the realists who regard Cosmopolitan Democracy as a political impossibility. The second order of complains refers to the transnational democracy as being a too-high-time-demanding plan destined to lose itself in the remote future. Finally, the last groups of objections contest that a global civil society does not exist and on this ground they challenge the proposals of Cosmopolitan Democracy.

---

<sup>10</sup>Held and McGrew, footnote n.8, p.14

«The world is in crisis». Today, more than ever, we are haunted by this grave and apparently inescapable certainty. As such, the same idea of crisis commonly evokes moments of perturbation, difficulty, suffering. Yet, it represents more simply a sudden modification of a no-more-sustainable morbid state that in such a way asks for an urgent intervention. In this perspective, it may be said that it is the work of the man that turns against its master, shouts ‘that’s enough’, and obliges him to rebuild. Once endangered in this light, a crisis appears not only as a defeat but also as an opportunity for a more profitable general rearrangement. In fact, in such critical circumstances, they are not only the certainties of the individuals to be weakened, but also the ties that hold together the structures of consolidated power. In similar cases, then, it is necessary to avoid states and individual to be pushed by the dismay towards both forms of nationalistic closures and populist and authoritarian policies. Nevertheless, “repeating that the strength is the main source of political legitimacy it not enough, it is necessary to wonder if the strength is tameable”<sup>11</sup>. In this respect, the modest opinion of the author of this dissertation joins those of more authoritative scholars that the project for Cosmopolitan Democracy is at the same time the best approach to firmly maintain this intent and move closer to an effective realization.

---

<sup>11</sup>Archibugi, footnote n. 2, p.330 (my trans.)

## *1. The sovereign state as the centre of political power*

The discourse of (Western) political theory, over the last three or four hundred years, has been associated with the idea of sovereign states that are legally autonomous, territorial, political entities which are “hard shelled”, with clearly defined and effective borders, but which engage in regular, systematized relations one with another<sup>12</sup>. The next chapter will be devoted to describe the international architecture drawn from this conception which is commonly defined as the ‘Westphalia System’ of sovereign states. Then, it will be given an account of the theoretical developments that took place in international relations debate starting from this arrangement.

### *1.1 The Westphalia System*

In the 1648 the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck were signed, bringing to an end, at least nominally, the Thirty Years War in Germany. These treaties which taken together are known as the Peace of Westphalia are conventionally believed to inaugurate a new era of international relations commonly defined as the ‘Westphalia System’ of sovereign states. The Westphalian territorial state involved a double-headed notion of sovereignty; rulers were sovereign in so far they accepted no internal equals and no external superiors, and to get to this point the medieval claims of universal rulers had to be undermined. But in this respect the Peace of Westphalia was not of great significance because the power of the Emperor had been already divorced from ideational factors. More important in this sense was the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which brought to an end the first series of wars of religion in Germany. There was established the famous principle of *cuius regio ejus religio* according to which the ruler was entitled to enforce religious uniformity within his realm. This represents the key break with the medieval political practice. The significance of the Peace of Westphalia is thus not so much that it established new principles, rather that after the 1648 challenges to the principles set up over the previous century became very few. In short, the universal claims of church and empire were no more significant, although the latter would continue until ended by Napoleon a century later.

---

<sup>12</sup>Brown, footnote n. 4, p.21

The notion of sovereignty as absolute power was not a characteristic of the medieval thought. Practical feudal politics are indeed all about the dispersal of power. They were supportive of mixed forms of government and opposed to any concentration of power, much less territorially based. The only exception to the medieval rejection of the notion of sovereignty as absolute power concerned the sovereignty of God. Yet, the main factor which contributed to reshape the discourse on sovereignty stemmed from a different source, namely the reception of Roman political and legal thought associated with the Renaissance and the rise of humanism<sup>13</sup>. The Roman tradition was significant in two important respects. First, the Roman legal notion of property was highly influential. For the Romans property was indeed absolute. If you owned something that meant it was up on you to do what you like with that property, unless you used it to harm someone else. This is completely different from the feudal notion of property which cannot be disposed of without the approval of the overlord. The point about the Roman notion of property – *dominium* – is that it provides a model of sovereignty for the new princes of the Westphalia era. In this sense, the new sovereigns regarded their territories as their property, and the system as a whole as a system of property ownership<sup>14</sup>. This meant that they claimed the right to do what they wanted within their territory without external interference and as property-owners they also defended in principle the right of other property-owners to do what they wanted with their property.

The Roman influence was also significant in a second respect. For the medievals, influenced by the Greek thought and, especially, notions of natural law, violence between political communities was always regrettable, although it may occasionally be necessary. Essentially, if and only if the innocent were protected and there was a reasonable prospect that, by violence and in no other way, a wrong could be righted. The ‘Just War’ theorized by Aquinas and others reinforced this account which, however, was believed to be endorsed by philosophical authorities such as Plato and Aristotle, as well as by the requirements of Christianity. The Romans saw things rather differently. The Roman Republic was an expansionist entity and what constituted a sufficient reason for war was defined very loosely. In particular, a pre-emptive war was justified. In this respect, Richard Tuck noted that during the sixteenth century and beyond a contest took place between natural lawyers, who

---

<sup>13</sup>J. Carroll, *Humanism*, Fontana Press, London, 1993;

<sup>14</sup>F. Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty as a *Dominion*: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’, in Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995.

supported the traditional notion of the common interest in peace and justice, and the humanists, who were more favorable to the claims of the new sovereign states<sup>15</sup>. In this context, he argued, Grotius, who is often identified as the father of international law, was supportive of the idea that the sovereign was entitled to make war if he thought it appropriated. Grotius was a natural lawyer but the foundations of natural law were for him to be found in the right of self-preservation and the right to own property. In other words, for Grotius, natural law is a morality that should be seen as based on coexistence between self-regarding individuals rather than founded on human sociality and the common good, except if the latter is defined as the mutual possession of the rights previously quoted<sup>16</sup>. Non-interference in each other's affairs is the basic principle here. This precept is transferred by Grotius to international relations in *The Law of War and Peace*, one of the founding texts of the Westphalia System<sup>17</sup>. Thus, states have a right of self-defense in all circumstances, not simple a right of defense against a direct attack, but a more general right to preserve their security, which implied pre-emption and the right to punish offenders. Yet, another recognized founder of international law, Samuel Pufendorf, moved quite away from Grotius position. While accepting the shift of natural rights, Pufendorf stressed indeed the importance of duties as well rights including, crucially a duty of benevolence. The moral law, he asserted, cannot simply rest upon a selfish understanding of right. There must be some other factor if the relations between individuals and states, are not to be understood as taking place out of morality. These authors are commonly taken to be the founders of international law but they saw themselves rather as natural lawyers and their work on the relations between states emerged out of their wider interest in natural law. However, they were succeeded by figures who were much more directly concerned with the law of nations, the latter aimed at regulating the coexistence within a recognized 'society of states'. In this respect, two main characters are Christian Wolff and Emmerich de Vattel. Wolff applied natural law to nations, but considering this sphere as a separate branch of natural law. His major contribution is his conception of foundations of 'international' law through the construct of a universal state, a *civita maxima*. In the words of Terry Nardin, "we must imagine that states comprise a society governed by natural law, and that this natural society

---

<sup>15</sup>R. Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999

<sup>16</sup>T. Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983

<sup>17</sup>H. Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, translated by A. C. Campbell, *On the Law of War and Peace*, London, 1814

constitutes a universal state”<sup>18</sup>. In this context, international law is an authoritative body of rules that govern the relations of states. Yet, in the absence of a real sovereign who could declare and interpret these rulers, it is necessary to posit a fictional collective sovereignty. Thus, the universal state holds “a kind of sovereignty over each state considered individually”<sup>19</sup>. Similarly, Vattel set out the law of nations, but he was also concerned with diplomatic practice. He is regarded as the one that better than any other has described in formal terms the nature of the Westphalia System and a key figure in the study of international society<sup>20</sup>. In this sense, the equality of states, the legitimacy of the balance of power, and the distinction between *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello* are all central notions of Westphalian international political discourse that are absent in previous discussions, but present in Vattel’s work. The legal principle of sovereign equality is established by analogy with the natural equality of persons and reflects diplomatic practice and protocol. As result, the ruling princes as to consider each other as fraternal equals, irrespective of the size of their domains. This principle is protected against any hegemonic attempt of any other state through the balance of power that may be justly preserved even by preventive war. Yet, even in the actual case of the outbreak of a war, international law is not suspended. Legal equality implies that the law of war apply to all, regardless of issues of *ius ad bellum*. Thus, the soldiers of an unjust ruler are in any event as entitled to its protection as those of a just. Vattel also provided the first defense of what would be known at the end of the twenty century as the ‘morality of states’. This approach posits that the states of the Westphalia System relate to each other in moral terms and not simply as fellow power-holders<sup>21</sup>. The natural law element remains thus present in Vattel’s approach because he is unwilling to base the foundations of international law simply on diplomatic customs and state treatises. There must be, he argued, some ground beyond this against which customs and treaties can be judged. After Vattel and during the following 200 years, this position was abandon and international law became a positive discourse made of codified state practices and treaties, reflecting what states did rather than providing a justification or a critique of their actions. The major figure of this period, who set out an account of international society in Vattelian terms, was Edmund Burke. He is an interesting figure in so far he linked the existence of a

---

<sup>18</sup>Nardin, footnote n. 16, p.67

<sup>19</sup>Brown, footnote n. 4, p. 33

<sup>20</sup>H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, Macmillan, London, (1977) 1995

<sup>21</sup>R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986



society of states to a common cultural background. On his account, international society worked in the eighteenth century because the state-members shared a common cultural and religious background. Before the French Revolution, he argued, the states of Europe formed indeed one great republic ruled by a common system of laws and customs. Evidently here Wolff's theoretical invention of a *civita maxima* is thought as if it were real. This is what the Revolution has undermined, and hence intervention against it was justified. In this way, even if the French revolutions had been sincerely ready to commit themselves to the rules of international law, their commitment would have been of no value because they did not share the presuppositions upon which those rules were based. In the end, coexistence and non-intervention were possible only for those who share such presumptions. The real test for Burke's position would have come when the European states system became a global system and multicultural. Yet, the main issue of his reflection of whether a system of co-existence may operate in a world where there are different conceptions of the Good is still source of puzzles and object of debate. In chapter 2 we will see how Cosmopolitan Democracy has answered to this puzzle.

### *1.2. Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Thought*

The transition to the Westphalian political order was accompanied by a progressively general acceptance of the legitimacy of a system of sovereign states. Yet, from the Enlightenment, this acceptance disappeared and a critical strain raised in international thought. Most of these figures considered the society of states as a poor substitute of a proper society of all human beings. Some thinkers, instead, accepted the basic idea of a system of independent units but wished to reshape these units according to a new principle, that of 'nationality'. Finally, others scholars, influenced by the rise of industrialism, put their attention on material factors affirming the lack of fit between a system of independent states and an increasingly interdependent economy.

### a) *Cosmopolitanism and Kant*

For what concerns the first group of these intellectuals their identifying feature was a strong cosmopolitan commitment. The basic suggestion that accompanied the evolution of cosmopolitanism from its Hellenic roots until its modern version is a shift in the understanding of one's fundamental political identity. Instead of defining the latter according to particular political units, these commentators stated the idea that one is a citizen of the whole world, regarding humanity as one's fellows. However, it is interesting to notice that the main factor common to some of the authors previously quoted and to the Enlightenment as a whole was a cosmopolitan attitude coupled with the Westphalian division of the world into sovereign states. Thus, for example, Wolff and Vattel's support to the principle of sovereignty was clearly anti-cosmopolitan, but the cosmopolitan element was present in the notion of a *civita maxima*. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment theorists of cosmopolitanism were not satisfied by the simple idea of a society of states because it implied the acceptance of the legitimacy of inter-states war which was still regarded as a destructive and horrifying force. From out of this rejection of war emerged the Enlightenment tradition of the 'Peace Project'. In this respect, a more extended consideration of Kant's work, so important for late twentieth-century cosmopolitanism, is required, since some of its conceptions are still fundamental for the development of the approach of Cosmopolitan Democracy.

Kant's attention to international relations is what made him one of the most important thinkers of the Enlightenment. This is also the reason why he remains a central figure in the progress of contemporary international political theory, as in the context of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Whereas Hobbes, Locke and even Rousseau shaped their political account within bounded polities and, then, dealt with the relations between them starting from these particular entities, Kant adopted a radically different approach. His thoughts on international relations are in fact fundamental in his thoughts on politics in general. Such way of reasoning supported his greater aspiration to formulate a coherent and consistent account of the moral and social world, taken as a whole, through the integration of the moral, legal and political sphere. At this aim, Kant provided an account of: the moral law to which individuals should conform in their personal behavior and in their social relations; the political framework needed

for social relations based on the moral law to take place; the relations between polities required if a moral life is to be possible.

For what concerns Kant's deontological moral theory, outlined in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, this is based on his conception of 'practical reason'. This is the rational human capacity of practical deliberation which, for him, constitutes the autonomous sources of moral principles and values. In other words, morality consists of the exercise by humans of their autonomous reason to choose principles of actions, in the forms of 'maxims', that reflect the demands of duty. Via the notion of practical reasoning, Kant drew thus a strong correlation between morality and individual freedom. The structure of this relation is revealed in the form of the imperative which characterizes the functioning of practical reasoning. In this respect, Kant distinguished between hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. The former are commands concerning a course of action regarded as a means to some other end and, hence, they are conditional upon the end that is desired. While, the latter are commands regarded as necessary irrespective of any particular end. They are unconditionally good in themselves and, thus, objectively necessary in their own right. In reason of this account, Kant stated his famous formulation of the categorical imperative as an expression of the unqualified moral goodness found only in the 'good will'. Kant defined the latter as the autonomous human disposition or volition to fill the requirements of duty for the sake of duty, that is, out of the rational respect for the moral law itself<sup>22</sup>. In other words, the good will represents, for him, a universal disposition that all human beings are capable of exhibiting and acting upon in all circumstances. In the end, then, the categorical imperative provides the basis for moral principles that are valid for all persons anywhere.

Kant presented the content of the categorical imperative in three formulations, the highest of all moral principles, known as the 'formula of the universal law', the 'formula of humanity', and the 'formula of autonomy'. The first states that it should be possible to make of our maxim a universal law<sup>23</sup>. In other words, the principle which we choose to guide our action should possess the form of law and thus being universalizable. The second contains the duty to respect humanity, whether in our own person or in the person of any other human being, using it always as an end and

---

<sup>22</sup>I. Kant, *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals*, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997 p.25

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p.15

never merely as a means<sup>24</sup>. This is the only unconditional or objective end that is necessarily shared by all human beings. As consequence, it has an intrinsic rather than relative value. Finally, the last formulation suggests that the categorical imperative shows the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law<sup>25</sup>. This emphasizes that the universalized maxims or laws on which we act are self-defined and self-imposed. This notion can be further expanded to comprise the idea that the human beings must form the basis for a political order in which they are subjects to law they themselves make<sup>26</sup>.

This three-parted notion of the categorical imperative leads Kant to develop the conception of an ideal moral community called the “kingdom of ends”. As the author defined it, this is “a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws”. An individual is a member of the kingdom of ends “when he gives universal law in it but it is also himself subject to these laws”<sup>27</sup>. Although the kingdom of ends will always remain an ideal condition that could not be concretely achieved, however, it provides a conceptual model for the notion of political community. The reason for things to be so is that, as clarified above, morality is about the exercise of the good will, doing the right thing for the right reason. Because of this latter point, the political realm cannot make us behave morally. Morality is in fact a matter of choice and if people do the right thing simply because it is a command of law rather than because it is the right thing to do, they are not behaving morally. In this sense, a true kingdom of ends is unattainable in the real political world. Yet, a properly constituted political and legal order can make it *possible* for us to behave morally. Moreover, obliging us to obey just laws, it can produce a world in which human beings behave as they would behave if they were, indeed, governed by the moral law. In the end, then, a well-settled political and legal arrangement provides the context for a life lived in accordance with morality. At this point, to understand what was, for Kant, the appropriate form of a rightly established political community we have to analyze his account of the nature of civil society which he conceptualized, following the social contract tradition, in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Here Kant held that every man has an “innate or natural right to freedom” by virtue of his humanity<sup>28</sup>. This natural right to

---

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p.38

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p.39

<sup>26</sup>Brown, footnote n. 4, p.43

<sup>27</sup>Kant, footnote n. 22, p.41

<sup>28</sup>I. Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Kant's Political Writings*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.30

freedom implies the natural right to equality. Kant expressed this notion in terms of the “universal principle of right” which claims the freedom of each to be consistent with everyone else’s freedom<sup>29</sup>. Contrary to Hobbes, he did not represent the state of nature as a condition of war in itself. It was, however, a situation in which the rights of the individual were not secured. Hence, for a matter of justice, it was necessary to form a society in which exists a coercive public law. It is thus through the system of law and its coercive force that individual rights, including decisively freedom and equality, are effectively recognized and possessed. In the end, a properly constituted political community is, then, composed of free and equal human beings, each regarded as a legislative citizen who freely participate in making the laws which are directed towards the full realization of the dignity of every other member. In order for this to be so, the only restrictions on individual’s will or actions that are permissible in a political setting are those required to allow the freedom of each individual to be consistent with the freedom of everyone else. In other words, freedom must be limited only according to the recognition of the intrinsic value of humanity. This is in fact the only condition that makes freedom general and thus in accordance with the principle of reciprocity and equal treatment. Furthermore, as disclosed before, in Kant’s view a civil organization is an association of individuals united under a system of public laws and thus under the “rightful conditions” of justice. In this respect, he said, each just state contains three authorities that constituted “its general united will” or the basis for its government. These branches are the legislative, the executive, and the judicial which must be organized according to the principle of the separation of powers<sup>30</sup>. In light of this depiction, it can be asserted, then, that Kant ultimately presented the core political principles of the modern model of limited constitutional government based on the rule of law. This is intended in a essentially negative way, in the sense that the state has to provided only the conditions for the realization of individual rights or, as above differently argued, the framework within which morality is possible. Kant pushed the argument further in that he made this ideal political model correspond with the republican form of government which is thereby assumed as the most legitimate embodiment of the constitutional state. This is because the republican constitution assumes the freedom of individual citizens as the basis for the exercise of the state power and endorses a view of the rule of law as generally binding. At the same time,

---

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p.24

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp.90-96

the key functional element of the republic is a representative system of government within which all individual citizens, through their delegates, have the opportunity to exercise their right to freedom by participating in the creation and enforcement of the laws of their state<sup>31</sup>.

Much of this republican ideal represented a quite standard feature of the Enlightenment political project in general. What was more unusual and of wider significance for the particular sake of this thesis is Kant's insistence that the rule of law should have been extended to the relations of states if it was to be effective domestically. In this sense, he regarded war as the consequence of the lack of the rule of law internationally. Furthermore, he added, war at the international level undermines a properly constituted political order both directly, by the human misery it causes, and indirectly, because it promotes despotic rule. As consequence, Hobbes was wrong to think that an international 'state of nature' could be mitigated by effective domestic government alone. On the contrary, international relations should be brought within the framework of law. This idea occupies a central role in one of Kant's most debated political works, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch*. Here, the Prussian philosopher set out his principles of international law and his idea of a suitable and peaceful international order. The first part of *Perpetual Peace* concerns with the appropriate legal principles for a non-ideal world in which war is still a feature of international relations. These "Provisional Articles" were designed to push the relations between states in a peaceful direction by interdicting those practices in war which create continuing enmity between people and outlawing those provisions in peace treaties that provided the reasons for the next war. It is noteworthy that these are very much the same principles upon which the UN is founded and our contemporary legal order is based. The second part of *Perpetual Peace*, instead, contains the "Three Definitive Articles" of Kant's proposal. The first definite article states that the civil constitution of every state ought to be republican, in the sense noted above. The second definite article says that the international order should be based on a federation of free states. Finally, the third definitive article requires the creation of a cosmopolitan law aimed at guaranteeing the right of "hospitality", a "universal right of humanity", to all individuals<sup>32</sup>. These definitive articles are Kant's principles of international right or justice. Each of them encompass one of the three

---

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp.112-113

<sup>32</sup>I. Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, in *Kant's Political Writings*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.99-108.

overlapping components of the juridical framework of public law taken as a whole. The first of them, the *ius civitatis*, that is, the municipal or civil law, regulates the relationship between individuals and their own state. In particular, it concerns the construction of a domestic order consistent with the freedom and equality of their citizens, as above described. The second, the *ius gentium*, that is, international law or the law of nations, presides over the external relations between independent and equal states. As we have seen, this should culminate in the formation of a treaty-based federation. At the same time, it is also supportive of the creation of appropriate international organizations. All this is conceived by Kant in order to strengthen the cohesion between just states which voluntarily agree upon binding law and institutions of governance. Finally, the third, the *ius cosmopolitanicum*, that is, the cosmopolitan law, is deputed to the relationships of states, of states and individuals, and of individuals to each others. It follows from their common membership in the universal state of mankind<sup>33</sup>. In this way, all the three relationships which needed to be covered are actually covered thereby. Kant's view for the establishment of perpetual peace is thus a complete project.

At this point, some remarks on this account are due. First of all, a republican constitution is required because, as explained above, only this constitution is compatible with the conditions demanded by the moral law. But, Kant also argued that republicanism is conducive to peace, because when the executive is submitted to the popular will, the general interests are allowed to prevail. Crucially, he suggested, in fact, that people do not desire war since they pay most of its consequences. Thus, a republican asset can lead to peace since it consents to this will to be freely expressed and enforced. On this ground, it has been inferred that a republican regime ought not have too much difficulty in forming a federation based on the rejection of war with other republics. The basic idea of a general peaceful attitude of people which stands behind such argument has been highly criticized. However, it has been an important pillar of successive sophisticated approaches, as it was for example for liberal internationalism in the twentieth-century. At the same time, it still keeps a central role in the elaboration of contemporary hypotheses. For instance, Michael Doyle and others, relying upon Kant's suggestion, have conceptualized the so-called 'Democratic Peace' thesis which asserts that constitutionally secure liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. Yet, similar assertions do not solve

---

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp.98-99

fundamental questions about the relationship that have to be kept between republican and non-republican regimes, thus leaving open, when not enhancing, the possibility of the outbreak of war at the international level. This kind of suggestions and the problems they arise will be further analyzed in the second part of this thesis.

A second interesting remark refers to Kant's conception of a federation of free states. In particular, this is not to be confused with advocacy of a world state or world government. Kant rejected this step for a variety of reasons. In different passages of his work on perpetual peace, he sustained in fact that a world republic would be unmanageable because laws loose their force at a distance. At the same time, it would be unattainable since it is not currently the 'will of nations'. Finally, it would be not only unnecessary but, even dangerous if brought effectively in place, because the concentration of power is always a reason of worry<sup>34</sup>. In any event, whatever Kant's reasons for refuting a world government, the distinction of the latter from the federal organization is an important comment since cosmopolitanism is often mistakenly assumed to be proponent of a world state. On the contrary, as it will be shown in the second part of this thesis, cosmopolitanism is not inherently opposed to the state in itself. Rather it is generally concerned to develop varied modes of governance – from the local to the global – with the goal of supporting the rights and interests of individuals as human beings. Indeed, states may represent one way of governance well-suited to this end. In this respect, Kant's solution, although explicitly cosmopolitan in thought, is essentially statist since the rule of law internationally is to be achieved in a world of states. Besides this, Kant's notion of republic has moved the constitutional government far beyond a merely instrumental role. In a significant way, in fact, he suggested that such governments are morally necessary for the realization of individual rights and the formalization of systems of justice.

Finally, a last remark concerns the cosmopolitan article. It got substance in regarding all individuals as holders of the right to be treated not with hostility when finding themselves in a foreign country. It resulted in the corresponding duty which obliged both states and native persons to grant hospitality to the strangers. The world inhabitants own this right without distinction, in virtue of their possess of equal moral status. It is in effect both a natural and legal right that guaranteed freedom of movement, social intercourse, and commerce between different people. This was so on the moral basis of the more fundamental unity of all human beings conceived as a

---

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p.96



single community spread across the commonly shared surface of the globe. “In this way”, Kant wrote, “continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations which eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution”<sup>35</sup>. The cosmopolitan design is thus further extended to encompass a body of law, universally binding, that codifies the rights and obligations of all persons and states. In this way Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan law embodies the universalism of his moral theory while seeking formal codification of individuals’ fundamental rights irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity, social status, or religious beliefs.

### *b) Nationalism*

Although cosmopolitanism was the prevailing theme of Enlightenment, in any case there was also an anti-cosmopolitan thought that became stronger until coming to be dominant in the nineteenth century. Partially, this was the result of the republican strain of thought proper of the Enlightenment period which was associated with the notion of popular government. But, in the nineteenth century, the love of country endorsed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau became associated with the romantic critique of the Enlightenment to turn into the doctrine of nationalism. This position stressed the importance of belonging to a community. In this respect, a key figure was the folklorist Jonathan Gottfried Herder. In his view, language defined a people and shaped its thought and hence its way of life. As consequence, any kind of universal cosmopolitan culture could only mean the dominance of one culture over the others. This approach combined with the patriotic republicanism of the French Revolution and the resistance to this republicanism once it turned into imperialism, finally flew into the doctrine of ‘nationalism’ – the belief that the world is composed of discrete peoples who in the form of nations are entitled to rule themselves. Nationalism was not immediately contrary to cosmopolitan thought. Mazzini, for example, explicitly considered love of country as perfectly compatible with love for humanity. But, history has largely demonstrated that nationalism is more often an enormous divisible force. The importance of nationalism is that it provided a justification of sovereign states not simply based on dynastic legitimacy and the property right of kings and princes.

---

<sup>35</sup>Ibid, pp.105-106

Yet, in this period not all the defenses of particularistic politics were immediately linked to nationalism. In this sense, Hegel, in his account of the rational, ethical state, shared the romantic critique of cosmopolitanism and the idea that human beings need to be part of a community without falling strictly into nationalism. To be true, the Hegelian ethical state might also be a national state but this is not a necessary connection and Hegel rejected any account which implies that there are fundamental differences between human beings. Thus, although cosmopolitanism must not be set in opposition to the concrete life of the state, human beings are in a fundamental way equal. At the same time, Hegel recognized an element of affection required from part of the citizen, but directed to the concrete institutions of the ethical state and not to the myth of the Nation. In this way, he provided a justification for the division of the world into separate polities that did not rest on the illusory concept of the Nation. Moreover, the Hegelian account of the state-system can be employed to give ethical content to the notion of international society. In this respect, Hegel understood history as the growing self-understanding of *Geist* (spirit) which is possible through the emergence of ever more complex and ethically adherent institutions, culminating in the rational, ethical state of the modern age. Contrary to conventional liberal thought, for Hegel, the state was not the site of policy decision-making. Its role was rather to reconcile individuals with each other in a context, like Kant's, which is crucially characterized by the rule of law and the separation of powers. With respect to the main concerns of this thesis, the final sections of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* are particularly relevant here<sup>36</sup>. In those sections, Hegel set up in fact his account of an international scenario made up by such ethical states. He believed that the states need other states in order to function properly. Just as individuals cannot develop their individuality except by coming into relation with other individuals so states can only develop their individuality by living in a world of other states. However, beyond this analogy, the crucial point is that for Hegel states cannot surrender their sovereignty and war must always remain a possibility. As consequence, any project of 'Perpetual Peace', like Kant's, is destined for failing. Such project rely in fact on states agreeing to limit themselves and any such agreement is subject to contingency and thus liable to collapse when and if circumstances change.

---

<sup>36</sup>F. Hegel, 'Elements of the Philosophy of Rights', in Allen w. Wood (ed.), *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991

### *c) Industrial Revolution and International Relations*

At the early nineteenth century, we might say that the central features of the Westphalia System and all the major critiques and defenses of a system of sovereign states were already been developed. In any case, the Industrial Revolution and the rise of industrialism determined a new look at notions such as that of sovereignty. Before the rise of industrial society, international trade was a relatively unimportant aspect of a state's life. The doctrine dominated by the mercantilist thought, regarded trade a political as much as an economic activity. Mutual benefits through trade were unattainable and the aim of politics in trading relations with foreigners was then to avoid losses and achieve gains. It was in reason of this view that a shared belief was widespread that trade, and more in general contact with foreigners, promoted conflict. The founders of liberal political economy, especially Adam Smith and David Ricardo, removed the intellectual foundations of this point of view, so that the intellectual case in favor of general gains from trade became very strong. This became the basis for a new look at inter-state relations. In this sense, Richard Cobden, the most important English advocate of free trade, believed that the states system which was applied to international affairs of Europe in the preceding century was no more suitable to the circumstances of his time. His particular contribution was the firm belief that the old form of international interaction based on the balance of power was made outmoded. He was also highly critical of the idea that the protection of trade could be a legitimate reason for state action. In line with later liberal internationalists, trade rested, in his view, on the cheapness of commodities which is compromised by high military spending. War as such is thus a disaster for a nation and the most important way in which it can exercise influence is rather by being a moral example for the rest of the world. Yet, unlike some later campaigners, Cobden was not supportive of a world government or even a pacific union of republican states. On his account the forces of modernity would create a peaceful world if left to their own devices<sup>37</sup>. As consequence, there was no necessity for institutional innovation and non-intervention was all that was required for peace because it was the only provision necessary to allow the beneficial effects of trade to be felt.

However, this approach was not shared by neo-mercantilist critics. In this sense, one of the main representatives of this theoretical branch, Friederich List, regarded free

---

<sup>37</sup>R. Cobden, *The Political Writings of Richard Cobden*, T. Fisher Unwin (ed.), London, 1903

trade as an appropriate strategy for the dominant economic power, but highly disadvantageous for everyone else. Moreover, he encouraged the creation of a customs union for the German states<sup>38</sup>. In this respect, his account represented an interesting development in particular for the notion that there is a specific optimal size for sovereign states as economic units. This suggestion was based on the principle that successful industry requires a larger domestic market than that which could be provided by individual states.

Despite the divergence on concrete trade policies, protectionists and liberals shared, however, a generally favorable approach to industrial capitalism. Less favorably disposed were the socialist critics of the new economic order. But, it was only in later nineteenth century that, thanks to the shift from an economic system mainly based on small-scale manufacturing concerns to large-scale industry, the possibility was made for the state to be seen as representing the interests of national capital. This development further allowed these critics to state a distinctive account of international relations. This is not to say that mid-nineteenth-century socialists, including Marx and Hegel, did not have a great concern with international relations, but simply that, in a epoch where the owner was also the manager and the possibility for such enterprises to capture the state was remote, the link between state and national capital was not immediately caught. The guidelines of the new distinctive socialist approach are well illustrated by the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding. On his view, the national economies of the advanced capitalist powers were dominated by oligopolies in such a way that capitalists no longer competed with each other within the national economy, but instead they competed with foreign capitals which also formed national blocks. At the same time, they sought to extend the area of their monopoly profits and this led to imperialism in the sense of a general tendency to expand. In this scenario, the state represented the instrument through which these oligopolies could get both their defensive and aggressive goals. In this sense, on Hilferding's account, tariff policy was not seen simply as a defensive strategy aimed at restricting the international competition between national oligopolies, but also as a tool that could be employed aggressively to expand the national territory<sup>39</sup>. In other words, Hilferding regarded imperialism as the foreign policy of financial capital and, along with other Marxist writers of the time such as Rosa Luxemburg, was concerned by the increasing

---

<sup>38</sup>F. List, *The National System of Political Economy*, Frank Cass (ed.), 1966

<sup>39</sup>R. Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, Tom Bottomore (ed.), Routledge, Kegan Paul, London, 1981

militarism of international relations which finally brought to the outbreak of the First World War. Although the intent of Hilferding's reasoning was far from being supportive of nationalist thought, he shared the notion of the state as the expression of national economy. In fact, Hilferding's depiction could be easily used to set up a plan of economic nationalism and he also provided a good reason for taking the state as the key actor in international relations.

Yet, this account of international relations as a scenario of struggles between competing national oligopolies, contrasted strikingly with the liberal position. In this respect, Norman Angell argued, in *The Great Illusion*, that a condition of international interdependence was actually on place already in the early twentieth century.<sup>40</sup> As consequence, it no longer made sense to think that states could improve their position by violent conflict with one another. There is a debate here that will reappear in twentieth century international thought and still has not been resolved in the early twenty-first century, although now it is globalization that is said to generate the illusion that nation-based economic policies can be profitable.

### *1.3. Twentieth-century International Political Theory*

The late twentieth-century debates took place within a different context from that earlier described. In this sense, the most striking feature of international thought in the twentieth century was not so much any innovation in content but rather the emergence of International Relations as a discrete field of academic study. This change was largely conceived in response to the horrors of war, especially to the shock of the 1914-18 war. In this respect, it could be well-argued that the Great War actually followed the conceptions of international relations which had dominated this subject for the previous centuries. The war was indeed fought by states exercising their sovereign right to resort to violence in accordance with old established principles of international law. It was won by a coalition of states united only by their determination to prevent one state from achieving military dominance over the continent, a motivation which could be understood at any time in the previous three centuries. Finally, it was a war generated by the conflict propensity associated with nationalism, as it was the case for almost of all major wars of the preceding century.

---

<sup>40</sup>N. Angell, *The Great Illusion*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1909

What was changed by the First World War was the liberal view that modern industrial society was safe from such violent and irrational behaviors thanks to the peace-generating qualities of international economic relations. This statement made then necessary the creation of the discipline of International Relations to fill the gap between the real nature of international relations and their erroneous understanding. Yet, this need of a distinctive discipline of International Relation was not so widely shared. On the contrary, it was largely confined to liberal circles in Britain and America. At the first time, America took the leadership of this new approach thanks mainly to the figure of the US President Woodrow Wilson who was really committed to the new ideas. But, the failure of the US to ratify the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations meant that this leadership passed to the British liberal establishment. The significance of the fact that the new discourse was shaped by Anglo-American liberal thinking is considerable. These thinkers had in fact a different view of the nature of the state if compared with continental liberalism and this had a deep impact on the discipline. In particular, they understood the state as an institution designed to solve the problem of collective action rather than an institution which was central to the constitution of the collectivity itself and to individual personality. In other words, liberal internationalists rejected the Hegelian notion, shared by many continental liberals, that the state is an institution which brings meaning into the lives of individuals, giving them a sense of their worth as equal citizens. Instead, in open contrast with Hegel's depiction, these English-speaking theorists assumed that the state was an entity which existed in civil society rather than beyond. In this sense, it is significant that such liberals did not use the term 'the state', preferring a more administrative term as 'the government'. This orientation towards the state continues to have considerable importance for the discipline of International Relations and the liberal presuppositions that underlie this field can be found in both liberal internationalism and realism, the two main strains which dominated the twenty-century international thought.

#### *a) Liberal Internationalism*

Liberal internationalism consists of the application of liberal principles to international affairs. In the aftermath of the First World War this effort focused on two tasks, determining what had produced the 1914 war and conceiving mechanisms

and principles that would have prevented its occurrence. The first element of this twofold project concerned domestic politics. A firm liberal belief, shared as we have seen above by Kant among others, was that people do not want war. People are led into war by autocrats or, as John Stuart Mill noted, because their legitimate aspirations to nationhood are blocked by undemocratic, multinational, imperial system. As consequence, an obvious answer to this situation was to promote democratic political systems and the general acceptance of the principle of self-determination. In other words, liberal internationalists stated that if all regimes were national and liberal-democratic there would be no war. The second component of liberal internationalism was its critique of pre-1914 international structure. In this respect, the basic thesis was that the anarchy of pre-1914 system of international relations undermined the prospects for peace. In particular, most of the blame expressed by liberal internationalists was directed to secret diplomacy because this led to a system of alliances that committed nations to courses of action that were not sanctioned by parliaments. Moreover, they argued, there was no mechanism in 1914 to prevent war except for the balance of power, a notion which liberals associated with unprincipled power-politics. In contrast to this state of affairs, liberal internationalism suggested the establishment of new principles of international relations, such as open covenants openly discussed. But, above all, they called for a new institutional arrangement of international relations and, in particular, for the creation of a League of Nations. In their view, the League would have provided public assurances of security founded on the collective will of all nations. Hence the term 'collective security'. In other words, every country would have guaranteed the security of every other country and thus there would have been no need of military alliances or the balance of power. In the end, law would have so replaced war as the underlying principle of the system.

These projects of reform were liberal in two main senses. In political terms, they were liberal since they enforced the belief that constitutional government and the rule of law were principles of universal applicability. In philosophical sense, they were liberal as far as they were grounded on the assumption of an underlying harmony of people's real interests. Liberal internationalists were obviously aware that in some circumstances interests can effectively clash but in their analysis this was the product of pressures of particular interests or due to simple ignorance. However, such kind of events were designed to disappear when the real interests of people were made manifest.

From an economic standpoint, it is interesting to notice that liberal internationalists rejected the view that war in 1914 was caused by economic rivalries. For this reason the makers of the new world order in 1919, unlike their successors in 1945, did not feel necessary to set up regulatory international economic institutions, largely because they believed that economic relationships would look after themselves. In this respect, their main aim was then to get back rather than transform the pre-war situation.

Liberal internationalism ideas remained powerful all over the twentieth century and still have wide resonance into the twenty-first. In this sense, even though some of the settled norms of the current international order can be tracked back to the Westphalia System, the 1919 ideas can be seen to have considerably shifted the meaning of these norms. Thus, for example, although the principle of state sovereignty is certainly still a settled norm of the contemporary international order, after 1919, this notion is no longer associated with the right of the state to make war at will as instead it was for much of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the current and strongly debated 'Democratic Peace' thesis, again suggests links with the principles of 1919. Also this thesis, focusing on questions of whether and how the principles of democracy and the rule of law are or should be settled norms within the current international order, can be said to deal with the same puzzles faced by liberal internationalists. Yet, what is striking, and main object of critique from Cosmopolitan Democracy, is how much of the older Westphalia System this liberal doctrine and its influence have endorsed in the current international order. At the heart of this objection is the liberal acceptance of the sovereign state as the central actor in international relations. In fact, although many liberal internationalists have wanted to orient the behavior of states in a particular peaceful direction, they have not attempted to overcome the central role of the state as such.

#### *b) Realism*

The rise of the dictators in the 1930s, and, then, the outbreak of the Second World War, seemed simultaneously to undermine the explanatory capacity of 1919 ideas and to make irrelevant their normative power. In this sense, the liberal assumption that the people are naturally peaceful was undermined by the conquest of the power of Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy. These regimes in fact not only had come to power by quasi-democratic means. More significantly, they remained in



power thanks to the mobilization of popular support that was granted to them although they actually glorified war. The fact that Nazism and Fascism remained a popular force in spite of this posture, evidently represented a terrific objection to liberal thinking which was felt in particular with respect to the liberal support for the League of Nations and the rule of law. The basic premise of liberal internationalism was in fact that the force of world opinion would have supported the work of the League of Nations and that no state would have been able to act against this force. In reason of this, international disputes would have been solved peacefully because this was what the people really wanted. The behavior of Hitler and Mussolini showed that these ideas were simply wrong. As consequence of this evidence, in the 1930s, a critique of liberal internationalism emerged. In this respect, a key figure was Reinhold Niebuhr. According to his view, comprehensively articulated in his *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, liberals exaggerated the capacity of men to behave in truly moral terms. He held that men have the capacity to be good, but that this capacity is always in conflict with aggressive drives which are also present in human nature. For Niebuhr, these drives get to a full development in society and it was unrealistic to think that they could be controlled in bodies such as the League of Nations to the goal of international peace<sup>41</sup>. This position later became the basis for post-1945 American realism in the hands of George Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau. In particular, the latter's text, *Politics Among Nations*,<sup>42</sup> represented the single most important source for realist thinking about international relations for the next generation until at least the 1970s. Equally important in the UK was the work of Edward Hallett Carr who provided a new vocabulary for international relations theory. He renamed liberal internationalism as 'utopianism' and contrasted this approach with 'realism'. Carr's central point was that the liberal doctrine of the harmony of people's interests did not take into account the real conflict that was to be found in international relations between 'the haves' and 'the have-nots'. In his view, a central feature of the world is 'scarcity' – there are not enough goods and resources for all. As consequence, Carr argued, those who have them promote law and regulative policies in order to keep them. On the other side, those who have not them, have no such respect for the law, nor it should be reasonable that they should, because it is the law that keeps them in

---

<sup>41</sup>R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932

<sup>42</sup>H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1948, trans. it, *Politica tra le nazioni. La lotta per il potere e la pace*, il Mulino, Bologna, (1948) 1997

their lower condition. With respect to this analysis, Carr concluded then that it was utopian to suggest that the have-nots could be brought to realize that they ought to behave legally and morally. On the contrary, politics had to be based on an understanding of this conflictual situation<sup>43</sup>.

Realists of this generation explicitly saw themselves as holders of the wisdom of the old European states-system. In this sense, the names of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grotius and Vattel were often recurrent in the work of these authors and the sense that they were drawing on a European tradition of statecraft was widely shared. Yet, the realists' use of the European tradition of statecraft was actually highly selective. For example, the humanist, republican side of Machiavelli did not fit with the realist picture of the world. Indeed, none of the American or British realists of this period adopted a theory of the state that was republican, nor they portrayed the state as a positive force in people's lives. The characteristic realist virtue is 'prudence' which certainly played a part in the European tradition of statecraft. But the notion that glory and prestige were also important is largely missing from the realist thinkers. In this respect, Morgenthau treated 'prestige' essentially as an instrument of foreign policy rather than as something to be valued in its own terms. The essential point that needs to be made here is that although the differences between realists and liberals, nonetheless they were essentially working within the same broad and mainly (Anglo-American) liberal framework. The realist theory of the state relate in fact back to the ideas developed by pro-liberals such as Hobbes and Locke who saw the state as a problem-solving mechanism aimed at problems of domestic order.

This position became even clearer later in the life of realist thought in international relations when rational choice models of political behavior come to dominate. With the advent of rational choice on the theoretical panorama of international relations, it begun also to be challenged the belief that this discipline was a *sui generis* subject made of concepts and theories specific to the field. The selective use of past authorities, noted above, was partially a product of this intent to keep international relations in a separate category from domestic policy. In this sense, the humanist, republican side of Machiavelli was seen as applicable to politics internally, rather than to external relations of states. Similarly, the relevance of the work of figures such as Kant and Hegel was restricted to internal affairs of states. In any event, from 1970s onward, especially the American study on international relations has been dominated by the

---

<sup>43</sup>E. H. Carr, *The twenty Years Crisis*, Macmillan, London, 1939

same broad theory employed by American political scientists, namely, Rational Choice theory. Its presumption is that politics can be understood in terms of the goal-directed behavior of individuals who are assumed to act rationally in the minimal sense. That is, individuals make ends-means calculations aimed at maximizing the benefits or minimize the losses expected from particular situations. This perspective, sometimes termed neo-utilitarianism, came to American International Relations thanks in particular to the work of Kenneth Waltz and the neo-realist school. Waltz's version of realism focused on the structure of the international system. The central idea of Waltz's 'theory of international politics' is grounded on the basic distinction between 'hierarchical systems' and 'anarchical systems'. The latter are made up of like-units which are differentiated in terms of capabilities but not in terms of functions. The former are composed of functionally differentiated institutions. The members of an anarchical system are assumed to be egoist actors who seek, at minimum, to preserve themselves. When they succeed in this task and there is no guarantee that they will, their actions will result in the creation of balances of power<sup>44</sup>. In this way Waltz draws a sharp distinction between international and domestic politics, following classical realism in this. But he does so by the use of a reasoning which is common to both spheres. Moreover, the same kind of reasoning can be employed to produce a rather different result. Thus, it is possible to argue that egoists can actually cooperate under conditions of anarchy. From out of this consideration has emerged the neo-liberal alternative to neo-realism. The contest between these two strains of thought have occupied the US international relations debate for the last twenty years. For the purposes of this discussion two features of this rational choice dominance are particularly noteworthy. First, as Joseph Grieco has suggested, there is a clear difference between neo-liberals who assume that states seek absolute-gains and neo-realists who assume they seek relative-gains, but this difference, although real, is relatively unimportant in a wider perspective<sup>45</sup>.. In this sense, although neo-realism is usually seen as in opposition to neo-liberalism, both views are in a deep sense liberal. As matter of fact, they not only replay a classical debate between Hobbesian and Lockean forms of reasoning, but at the same time, more fundamentally they work both on the shared assumptions that states are egoist

---

<sup>44</sup>K. Walt, 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', in *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 44, 1990, pp. 21-37

<sup>45</sup>J. M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', in *International Organization*, Vol.42, 1988, pp. 485-508

and exist in order to solve problems of collective action. The second important feature of the dominance of rational choice thinking is the way in which a number of fundamental questions about international relations have been marginalized. Since the origins of Westphalia System, a key question for international thought has concerned the nature of the obligations that individual human beings have towards their fellow citizens as opposed to those they have towards the rest of humanity. This question of inclusion and exclusion remained central to international discourses across the centuries and is still at the hearth of contemporary international relations. In particular, it currently receives specification in discourses such as those of international human rights regime, borders and refugees and global economic equality. But, it is a question which is very difficult to ask from the perspectives of neo-realist and neo-liberal thought, because the first premise of both these approaches is that states are rational egoists. As consequence, this main question of inclusion and exclusion as well as the puzzles related to it are relegated to a separate, marginalized and inferior discourse.

Predictably, the dominance of neo-realism and neo-liberalism has produced counter-movements but in spite of the rise of a great body of unorthodox thought the strength of rational choice apparatus has not to be underestimated. The fate of 'constructivism', the most popular of these counter-views, is indicative in this sense. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, constructivism was a radical doctrine that challenged in a fundamental way the rational choice approach. Relying on Wittgenstein's notion of a language game, authors such as Anthony Giddens, with his concept of 'structuration', Berger and Luckmann, with their social-psychological constructivist analysis, together with early constructivists as Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf produced accounts of the world which were in open contrast with the studies of Waltz and the others scholars of rational choice<sup>46</sup>. Yet, as Kubalkova pointed out, constructivism has currently become a part of the mainstream which it originally criticized. In this respect, the most important recent book in the area, Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*<sup>47</sup>, is strongly accused to pay a high tribute to Waltz's 1979 text, *Theory of International Relations*, at the point that its content is often regarded more as a particular area of rational choice thinking rather than as a real challenge to its doctrine. In short, the rest of this thesis will be

---

<sup>46</sup>A. Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics*, Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000; N. Onuf, *World of Our Making*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC, 1989

<sup>47</sup>A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999

devoted both to investigate the approach of Cosmopolitan Democracy, which is certainly part of this wider unorthodox field of thought, and to sustain its validity. But, the support that will be given to this work has not to be mistaken for the prediction that the rational choice approach is going to lose its dominance on the field in the short run. On the contrary, Cosmopolitan Democracy and, more in general, international political theory are minority discourses which are likely to remain so for the near future. However, this does prevent us neither from studying their reasoning, nor from defending their significance, nor from working for their future prevalence.

#### *1.4. Self-determination and Non-intervention*

Looking at the last sections, it could be well argued that there is actually one problem, although many theories. This is the problem of finding the right relationship between the universal and the particular in international relations. With respect to the current international order, this problem appears in terms of the clash between the inherited norms of the Westphalia System and the most recently established norms of the so-called system of Global Governance. While the former privileges the particularistic values associated with the state, the latter promotes universal values in the area of human rights, global environmental politics, global justice, and so on. The recognition of this fundamental clash will stand at the background of the remaining chapters of this thesis. But, before coming to the study of the manifestations of this central problematic of international political theory, here the Westphalia norms of self-determination and non-intervention will be examined. Furthermore, some puzzling points significant for the proceeding of this discussion will be also analyzed.

To begin with self-determination, a clarification seems immediately useful. The norms of self-determination and non-intervention are generally considered as the key arguments in defense of sovereignty. Thus, their combination is usually seen as providing the ground for a Westphalian asset of international relations. But, strictly speaking, self-determination is not a Westphalian norm. However, over the last hundred years, the two notions have become so closely linked that they are usually treated together at the point that some of the most important defenses of one notion rely upon the other for their force. The basic idea behind self-determination was set out 150 years ago by John Stuart Mill in his *Considerations on Representative*

*Government*, where the author stated that “the question of government ought to be decided by the governed” The clear simplicity of this claim makes evident that although this notion has been often associated with nationalism, it can be accepted even by those who are not nationalists. As the same Mill declared, in fact, “any division of the human race”<sup>48</sup>, whatever is the grounding-principle through which this division has been settled, should be free to determine its own fate. However, a proposition so enounced raises numerous problems and they have recurred with some frequency over the last century and half. First, can it really be possible that any division of the human race could have the right of self-determination? Second, what of the case when one division may wish to associate with another which, however, does not wish to associate with it? Third, it seems that, implicitly, self-determination involves the right to a particular territory but what if two different divisions of the human race claim the same territory? And what of those division of human race which are not linked to a particular territory, as the gypsies for example? Mill had a solution to these problems because it is clear from else where in his work that he did not actually believe that any division of the human race was entitled to self-determination. In his view, only progressive, historic nations had this right and the less developed required the protection of the betters. This solution has never been widely accepted but, looking at the historical developments until the current international legal assets, no better solutions seem effectively to have been immediately available. A look at the application of the right of self-determination in the contemporary international legal and political arrangement is reveling in this sense. In fact, although, in practice, this right has been attributed to all colonies, it has been also ensured that self-determination took place within the boundaries determined by the colonial powers. In the same way, the claims of self-determination in the case of the break up of composite states, such as the old Soviet Union or the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have been satisfied in reason of the pre-existing boundaries of those federal systems. The questions that this reading of the right of self-determination have generated, and the puzzles that its actual implementation have produced, are well known to anyone with a minimal knowledge even only of the most recent happenings of world politics. On one side, they relate to the problem of coexistence between highly particularistic ‘divisions of the human race’, as tribes,

---

<sup>48</sup>J. S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, Harpers and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1862, p. 361

ethnic, cultural or religious groups. Where, such human micro-entities have found themselves to live together in a political arrangement unilaterally settled by the extern and based on the modern state idea of almost homogenous communities, many occasions of conflict have raised. This conflictuality seems to be an appropriate characteristic for many post-colonial African states. On the other side, we assist to the outbreak of periodical crises in some specific areas of the Euro-Asian zone, as for example in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. The problems the common understanding of the principle of self-determination presents in those cases are linked with the presence of overwhelming majorities within established borders which enclose communities that do not necessarily want to live together.

However, Mill's suggestion that 'the question of government ought to be decided by the governed' arises another set of problems which concerns the relationship between self-determination and democracy. The idea that the will of the people and not the property right of the prince determine the legitimacy of a government is precisely what makes the norm of self-determination not properly a provision of the Westphalia System. But, in this respect, two main questions are opened. How do the people decide the question of government? And, can we really assume that once self-determination is granted, free and democratic institutions would be the only choice the people will make? As regard to the first problem, it is clear that popular choice presumes the existence of a defined electorate. But, especially on transnational questions and on those matters which concern narrower communities, it is frequently properly this definition to be at dispute. In these cases, the definition of the appropriate political community has become even more fundamental. Who should decide on the track of the new European railway Lisbon-Moscow? The people who lives in the territory that the railway should cross, the states embraced by the project, the EU, or an Euro-Russian Committee constituted ad hoc? At a domestic level the democratic political arrangements have found a solution to these problems. Through the work of legislative assemblies and constitutional organs, these ordainments determine the relative decisional weight of the different actors involved and solve the various conflict of competences. But, at an extra-bounders level there are no global institutions comparable to these. As result, since democracy can only come into play once this kind of questions have been solved, it seems that outside of the state ambit, there is no democratic answer to these problems.

The second puzzling aspect of the relationship between self-determination and democracy, refers to the reasonable possibility that the people, if given the power of choice, would not choose free institutions. In this prospect, it can be inferred that a democratic arrangement has not more legitimacy than any other regime. At the same time, it suggests that the relationship between self-determination and free institutions is not given as such, but it is rather linked to contingent factors of specific circumstances. In reason of that, it has been argued that democracy can be only imported but not exported. In other words, a process of democratization would be impossible without the support of internal pressures. This also means that each people walks on its personal political path, being linked both to the particular conditions of occurrence, development and consolidation of these pressures within it and their expression into a specific political project.

However, this does not reduce the importance of the influence of the international sphere which remains a decisive factor, although not according a singular general rule. The idea of exporting democracy is long-standing and was a common feature of Athenian democrats, French revolutionaries and Russian Bolsheviks. Sustained even by sophisticated theoretical apparatuses, as that of the so-called 'Democratic Peace' theory, this purpose has been also a distinctive trait of the American foreign policy in many occasions. Recently, it has been effectively implemented by the former US President George W. Bush's approach to international relations. This question arises strong worries and wide theoretical problems often concentrated on the threat of the dominance of the stronger on the weaker. In this respect, the norm of self-determination seems, however, to require that who intends to export democracy should assure that his intervention would be welcomed and instead would not be considered by the people involved as a mere shift from an authoritative regime to an external imposition.

The idea of exporting democracy is one of the aspects of international relations debate which more evidently shows the strong connection existing between the right of self-determination and the other, more fundamental stronghold of the Westphalia System: the norm of non-intervention. In this respect, since the beginning of the Westphalia System the assumption has been that sovereignty implies non-intervention. This is to say that external bodies, including states, have no right to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state. As we have seen, sovereignty involves internal supremacy and external equal legal status, and the latter is summarized by the notion of non-



intervention. This legal status is confirmed by the UN Charter according to Article 2(4), which forbids the use of force by the states unless in self-defense or with the authority of the Security Council, and Article 2(7) which declares that the domestic jurisdiction of states has to be respected. But, as both the historical experience shows and the same idea of exporting democracy confirms, the norm of non-intervention have been repeatedly challenged when not effectively violated over the last 350 years. This tendency is so evident that Stephen Krasner coined the term 'organized hypocrisy' to describe the actual, very ultimate meaning of norm.

The most important difficulty in this respect is distinguishing between intervention which is illegitimate, and influence which, on the contrary, has to be considered legitimate. Clearly, states attempt to influence each other all the time and would be absurd to suggest that this most basic political and diplomatic activity is improper. The problem is that the means which states employ to influence each other are not confined to persuasion or reasoned arguments. As matter of fact, the exercise of influence almost in all circumstances implies the exercise of political power, and frequently can flow into violent actions directed toward the civil society of another state. There are no obvious way to set a clear boundary between intervention and influence. One possible solution is to draw a distinction in absolute terms. In this way, intervention would take place only when the power of decision is taken away from the state intervened against, that is to say, when military force is used and actual control established. This is a clear separation, but it may be too restrictive. There are in fact many cases where superior power is exercised without actual control in which the exercise of influence seems to have crossed the border of legitimacy.

This section has established that neither self-determination nor non-intervention are simple notions. Both are difficult to define in operational terms and both generate deep problems. The next chapter will be devoted to describe the idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy, an alternative approach to the Westphalian conception of international relations. This view answers in a radically different manner to both the problems here faced and the main question of inclusion and exclusion debated across all the previous paragraphs.

## *2. From the world of states to the citizens of the world*

### *2.1. Inclusion and world arrangement: steps forward and failures*

The analysis of the historical evolution of Western political arrangement in general, shows an interesting trend, namely, the enhance of the recognized actors and the mechanisms of participation.

At the domestic level, the success, although not complete, has been certainly large. From the epoch of the sovereigns, who reigned in virtue of God's will or for dynastic reasons, we shifted to a system which has progressively involved an increasing number of individuals in the choice of the legitimate government. At the beginning, few persons were designed to this task according to the amount of their wealth. But, thanks to the work of some enlightened thinkers and at the cost of hard struggles fought by the peoples, finally, we got a system which deals with us no more as mere subjects, but as citizen and grants us the right to select who is entitled to govern. The right to vote was guaranteed first to all the adult males, then, it has been extended to all citizens without discriminations.

The basic idea of this system is grounded on a simple consideration. The decisions taken by the government affect the life of every singular member of the political community. As consequence, each citizen, as an interested-subject, ought to have the right to vote for those who will take such decisions and have granted the means to affect their action. In reason of this, it has been stated that the government must be submitted to the popular control.

In parallel with this conception, the rule of law has been constitutionally enacted together with a set of shared norms aimed at regulating the interaction between the state's institutions, the relationships of these with the citizens, and those of each of the latter with the others. The preeminence assigned to the rule of law endorsed the resolution of the conflicts between these internal actors, according to non-violent means. At the same time, it provided all citizens with an equal set of rights, in particular, as seen, concerning their political participation.

These founding principles of what we currently call democracy were initially employed only in the Western countries. Yet, they spread quantitatively in a way that currently makes the democratic system of government the most adopted political regime among the world states. At the same time, this asset developed qualitatively into more and more sophisticated systems. Nowadays, for example, in some European democratic states is under discussion the further extension of the political participation to foreigners who have resided for a stable period within those countries and have regularly paid taxes.

If this has been the history of the political asset internally to the states, for what concerns the arrangement they gave to their relations, things have run differently. Certainly, from the all-embracing conceptions of the empire and the church, some results have been gained even on this stage. The idea of the empire attempted to reduce all political issues to internal questions promoting the view of a single world arrangement. Thus, through a process of self-recognition, it acknowledged itself both as the only legitimated universal political actor and the exclusive source of this legitimation.

As we have seen, the Peace of Westphalia definitively challenged this principle, placing the equal international status of autonomous polities beside their internal supremacy as main pillar of their absolute sovereignty. On this ground, the idea of a society of states was conceptualized together with the international law aimed at its governing. Yet, in this asset, the duty to respect international obligations, in particular, for what concern war and the use of violence, remained strongly limited by the state right of self-defense which they held in all circumstances. This right, so widely conceived, allowed states to make war almost whenever they thought it appropriate to preserve their security and the general balance of power, even through pre-emption.

The cosmopolitan thought of the Enlightenment looked for a solution to what its exponents believed to be a narrow-minded view of politics of international relations. Crucially, we have noted, for Kant, the question of finding a way for restraining inter-state war and putting on place a system of international relations respectful of its obligations was a central condition for both the just internal development of states and the complete progress of human beings. At this aim, he elaborated his three-parted project for perpetual peace which was directed to both the domestic institutionalization of republican regimes and the extension of the rule of law at the transnational level. Despite Kant's proposal for the world asset was essentially state-

based, as expressed in his idea of a federation of republics voluntarily binding themselves up to a shared international law. At the same time, his fundamental cosmopolitan formulation guaranteed the recognition of all individuals as the ultimate sources of moral and political concerns in general. Hence, he provided a ground for entitling all human beings as legitimate actors of international relations dynamics alongside with the states.

Yet, after the imperialistic attempt of Napoleon, it began a process of strengthening of the role of the state's sovereignty at the international level that will continue throughout the nineteenth and twenty century.

In particular, at the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, the notion of international co-operation to promote 'collective security' originated from out of the idea of the so-called 'concert' of the European great powers. This conception, sanctioned with the renewed treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, gave rise to the practice of the Congresses of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain for the control of the European political situation.

This system which lasted for four international gatherings from Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 to Verona in 1822, resulted from out of the convergence at the Congress of the Austrian and English positions. The Austrian Chancellor Metternich, promoter of the European equilibrium, pushed toward a policy of concert for the government of the continent. On the point, despite the contrast between England and Austria about the principle of intervention, he found the full support of Castlereagh. The English Minister of Foreign Affairs, in fact, theorized the non-intervention in the domestic matters of the other states and, as such, he was well-disposed towards the theory of the equilibrium. The thought of the Austria-England axle finally resulted victorious making so concrete the new line of the equilibrium of the great states. On the ground of these assumptions, it was further considered essential to return they own territories to the legitimate sovereigns and, where this was not possible, to proceed according to the rules of the equilibrium. In this context, the skilful French Minister of Foreign Affairs Talleyrand, properly pressing for the restoration of the legitimate rulers, allowed the defeted-France not only to participate to the 'inner negotiations' of the Congress, but also to maintain a role of high profile as fundamental partener in the European balance of powers.

In the reorganization of the continent the two leading axioms were thus, legitimacy and European equilibrium, where legitimacy has not to be intended as justice, but as

international accord on the ways and goals of the foreign politics. These two principles are well-exemplified by Henry Kissinger. About the concept of legitimacy, he said that “an order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is ‘legitimate’”. Moreover, he added, the order “must not seem oppressive or unacceptable to any major actors” because, if it does, that actor will pursue a “revolutionary” course<sup>49</sup>. While, as regards the equilibrium, he affirmed that “the security of a domestic order resides in the preponderant power of authority, that of the international order in the balance of forces and its expression, the equilibrium”<sup>50</sup>.

With regards to the principle of sovereignty two main considerations can be made with respect to the system of Vienna. On one side, this strategy turned out into the enforcement of the principle of sovereignty. This was so, first, because the great states were the only recognized actors for the management of international issues. Secondly, because after the end of the Congress, the rulers of Europe wanted to stabilize the situation of compromise reached through the principle of legitimacy. In this sense, it was of primary importance to guarantee the regime of the European ‘states’. Apart from few exceptions, all the states had monarchic assets, only some of which with constitutions granted by the sovereigns. The majority were instead absolute monarchies, free from any tie with their own subjects or, as it begins to be intended after the French revolution, with their own citizens. Hence, to guarantee the existing regimes meant to guarantee the principle of legitimacy against the liberals and against all those people speaking of national or popular will in the attempt to limit the royal power. Properly at this aim, in the autumn of 1815, the Russian emperor Alexander I persuaded two other autocratic rulers among the victorious nations – the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria – to join him in a Holy Alliance to promote a peaceful community of Christian countries. Europe was thus constrained to rely for its rearrangement upon reactionary criteria aimed at maintaining both the absolutistic and religious order and the dynastic principle.

The second remark deals with the norm of non-intervention. As we have said, this idea has been conceptualized since the Peace of Westphalia, but the attempt of Napoleon and, more importantly, the need of stifling the liberal forces, put the notion under question. The main issue confronting both alliances was thus whether the powers should intervene when legitimate rulers were threatened by internal

---

<sup>49</sup>H. Kissinger, *A World Restored. Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1977, p.145

<sup>50</sup>Ibid, p.114

revolution. The members of the Holy Alliance tended to say yes. Thus, for example, Austria won approval when intervening to protect the crowded heads of Naples and Piedmont in 1821. On the contrary, Britain was a strong supporter of non-intervention. It was on this ground that at the congress of Verona it opposed plans for intervention in Spain and Latin America, subsequently withdrawing from the Quadruple Alliance.

This event brought the congress system officially to an end, leading to the division of Europe in those two opposing alliances, the Entente and the Central Powers which, assembled even though secret deals, will confront themselves during the First World War. Yet, the principle of regular cooperation between countries on international issues was been established and will not be forgotten. What Metternich and Castlereagh had succeeded in doing, it was to stabilize an order generally accepted that, properly in virtue of the relationships of strength, held latent the tensions and reduced to the minimum the necessity to use force in the international matters of Europe. In the end, if one side the Congress of Vienna represented certainly a moment of internal political restoration, at the same time, it was a case of progress, crucially for the idea of 'European concert'.

However, the course of history has shown that this asset could not be durable. A first set of problems concern its organization. No stable institutions were established neither something was said about the timing of the occurrence of the congresses nor the kind of circumstances required for their call were clearly defined. Furthermore, the system had no common army and the enforcement of its decision was left to the military force of the single states. But these are relatively unimportant problems since when the situation was of particular concern the European powers demonstrated to be able to act quite promptly and efficaciously. Yet, the system's own nature, in its timing and reasons of construction, constitute motives of weakness in itself. In fact, being created in response to the particular danger rose by Napoleon and being further developed as based on a coalition of states which assembled for specific threats, it was close to what we actually define a confederation. As such, it shared the defects associated with this and its being decisively linked for both its duration and extent to the contingent circumstances of the puzzle it is called to solve. In this sense, "history

teaches us [...] that coalition begins to disintegrate from the moment that the common danger is removed”<sup>51</sup>.

With respect to the basic questions of inclusion and participation which are here at stake, another crucial critique can be moved to the decision-making structure of Vienna. Beyond the fact that no rights were granted to the individuals as such, the decisions of the Congress were only made by the five great powers (Austria, France, Prussia, Russia and the United Kingdom), and even not all the countries of Europe could extend their rights at the Congress. For example, Italy became a mere “geographical expression” as divided into eight parts under the control of different powers, while Poland was under the influence of Russia after the Congress. The arrangements that made the five great powers finally will lead to future disputes and instability.

Finally, the Congress of Vienna preserved the balance of power in Europe, but it could not check the spread of revolutionary movements on the continent. A simple congress of states in fact could not eliminate the consequences of the Napoleonic period. The empire built by the general Bonaparte had contributed to a progressive political and economic interdependence of the European continent that was ignored by the projects of the great powers. They simply attempted to put a dynamical industrial and financial situation which had its main centre in London, close to a stagnant and retrograde domestic conformation.

In reaction to the inadequacy of this old view, the idea of the Nation come to substitute the dynastic principle as main justification of the earth’s division in separate polities. As matter of fact, in the second half of the nineteenth century, almost all the European sovereigns were constrained to grant their citizens a Constitution.

The notion of the Nation was also particularly fitted with the needs of the emergent European business class. In this sense, the mercantilist accounts underlined the urgency of constructing national economic strategies to gain the highest benefits (and avoid the losses) in the international struggle for trade and markets. In other words, trade was profitable only for one or some of the parts involved. As consequence, it would have been opportune for the nation-states to set policies that would have allowed them to be in the end in the number of the gainers. Trade was thereby a good

---

<sup>51</sup>H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822*, Constable & co. Ltd., London, 1946, p. 260

instrument for the growth of the nation's well-being, but the right measures have to be employed by the state.

However, the idea of free trade, sustained by the English since the last decades of the seventeenth century, proved to be widely successful. In this sense, the development of the liberal economic theory integrated the general favorable predisposition towards commerce with the stronger belief that trade was an advantageous enterprise for all those who engaged with it. In reason of this common gains, liberals inferred that two nations linked by a trade relationship were pushed to maintain peaceful bonds between them. Trade had thus not only a positive effect on the state's wealth but, more significantly, it was regarded as a pacifying factor of international relations. In this context, the role reserved to the states was essentially intended in a negative acceptation. This meant that no international economic organization was thought to be necessary and the profitable dynamics of trade had more simply to be left alone to reveal themselves. Although, the socialists pointed out the links between the increase in the extent of the capital, and the enhance of militarism and imperialism in the Europe of the early twenty century, this kind of positions remained always a minority thought. Thus, even after the end of the First World War, the cause of the conflict was never associated with economic reasons and thus exclusively ascribed to the political modes commonly employed in international relations.

The beginning of the twenty century had seen the development of international law with the first Geneva conventions of 1899, establishing laws about humanitarian relief during war, and the 1907 international Hague Conventions, governing rules of war and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. But, these sets of norms had reveled itself as unsufficeint to restrain countries from a dramatic fighting. The 1914-18 'Great War' was indeed the first major conflict in Europe between industrialized countries and the first time that the mass industrial production was dedicated to war. It had a deep impact on the social, economic and political systems of Europe. Crucially, despite it begun, as many wars in the past, as a conflict for the dominance in the European scenario, it turned into a global fight which moved the international political fulcrum towards the other side of the Atlantic. Its result was an unprecedented casualty level with eight million members of armed services and ten million civilian dead, thereby, inflicting also hard psychological and physical damages to the world. As consequence, strong anti-war sentiments rose across the globe and it was supposed that the First World War should have put an end to all wars.



At this aim, the origins of the conflict were largely investigated, however, as said, leaving out the economic realm from the sphere of the detected causes. In this sense, the preeminent idea was still that trade was a pacifying factor of the relations between states since it favored their interdependence and mutual benefits. The war was thus rather ascribed to the political structure of international relations. In particular, its system of alliances and secret diplomacy was hardly blamed since both it allowed the states to enter freely into war for their own benefit and pushed them into a never-ending competition for military supremacy. The main remedy to this situation was believed to be the creation of an international organization, whose aim was to prevent future war through disarmament, open diplomacy, international co-operation, restrictions on the right to wage war, and penalties that made war unattractive to nations. United States President Woodrow Wilson enthusiastically promoted this idea as a means of avoiding any repetition of the disaster of the World War I. The creation of a League of Nations was thus one of the central innovations of Wilson's Fourteen Points for a peaceful world order. Specifically the final point provided: “a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike”<sup>52</sup>. The Paris Peace Conference, convened to build a lasting peace after the First World War, approved the proposal to create the League of Nations on 25 January 1919. The Covenant of the League of Nations was drafted by a special commission, and the League was established by Part I of the Treaty of Versailles. The League's goals encompassed disarmament, preventing war through collective security, settling disputes between countries through negotiation, diplomacy and improving global quality of life. But, they also included upholding the new found Rights of Man such as right of non-whites, rights of women, rights of soldiers, right of refugees<sup>53</sup>.

The founding of the League of Nations seemed to realize concretely Kant's project for a perpetual peace. As Habermas noticed, “Wilson never appealed directly to Kant's work ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’,” but, the “intellectual debt to Kant is shown not only by the political goals but even more by the composition and organization of the

---

<sup>52</sup>The Avalon Project, *President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points*, in Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, retrieved on 19-04-2008, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/wilson14.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp)

<sup>53</sup>The Avalon Project, *The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919*, in Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, retrieved on 19-04-2008, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject\\_menus/versailles\\_menu.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp)

League of Nations”<sup>54</sup>. In the end, what Wilson attempted to do, in line with Kant’s suggestions, was to establish a league of nations with a clear liberal character. This trait is expressed, primarily, in its composition. On 28 June 1919, 44 states signed the Covenant, including 31 nations which had taken part in the war on the side of the Triple Entente or joined it during the conflict. At the same time, the defeated-Germany and the communist Soviet Union were initially excluded from the League. Moreover, the setting of the system according to liberal terms was granted, first, by the leading role taken by the US for its same conceptualization. Then, after that the US withdraw its support to the League, it was endorsed by the central position held by France and the UK within the organization. According to Wilson’s intentions a league so constituted would have put on place a multilateral international apparatus. This structure, opportunely equipped with its own institutions, would have solved the controversies between its members through an arbitration which they voluntarily recognized as binding upon them. The basic idea here is the rejection of war and the substitution of violence with the rule of law as means for the resolution of the states disputes. In this respect, the prohibition of war overturned an essential feature of international law up to that point. Namely, the idea that the states were entitled to wage war almost at will, hence representing a gigantic step forward in international relations<sup>55</sup>. Moreover, the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles imposed a certain limitation of the state sovereignty to meet the rights of certain categories of individuals. Yet, Wilson’s project went further, bringing to the extreme consequences the Kantian assumption on the necessity of liberal domestic assets for the peaceful flow of the relations between states. In this sense, Wilson’s idea implied the realization of the peoples’ self-determination from the external, even through the redefinition of the boundaries to create homogenous state-communities. In his conception, going along with the wishes of self-determination, for example, of most of the nationalities of the dissolved Austrian-Hungarian Empire, would have made the citizens of the new polities closer to the liberal political system. This would have further allowed the natural propensity of people toward peace to express itself, thereby, granting the necessary support for the League and its apparatus.

Yet, as Francois Fejto noticed, the too faster break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and, more in general, the easy concession of the right of self-determination

---

<sup>54</sup>J. Habermas, *The Divided West*, Ciaran Cronin (trans.), Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp.156-157

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p.156

without any attention to the minorities present in the new states, will generate properly does tensions that will bring to the Second World War and create situations of instability still not solved. However, more directly, the popular support gained in the course of 1920s and 1930s by the Fascist party in Italy and the Nazi party in Germany, dismissed in fact the basic assumptions of liberal internationalism. Finally, the outbreak of the Second World War demonstrated that the League had failed in its primary purpose which was to avoid any future world war. Again, the reasons of this failure may be connected to the origins and the general weakness of the organization.

The origins of the League as an institution created by the Allied Powers as part of the peace settlement to end the First World War, led to it being viewed as a 'league of victors'. It also tied the League to the Treaty of Versailles, so that when the Treaty became discredited and unpopular, this reflected on the League of Nations.

Furthermore, the League's supposed neutrality tended to manifest itself as indecision. It required a unanimous vote of its nine-, later fifteen-, members of the Council to enact a resolution. Hence, conclusive and effective action was difficult, if not impossible. It was also slow in coming to its decisions as certain decisions required the unanimous consent of the entire Assembly. This problem mainly stemmed from the fact that the main members of the League of Nations were not willing to accept the possibility that their fate would be decided by other countries and had, therefore, in effect, by enforcing unanimous voting, given themselves the power of veto.

Representation at the League was also often a problem. Though it was intended to encompass all nations, many never joined, or their time as part of the League was short. Most notably missing was the position that the United States of America was supposed to play in the League, not only in terms of helping to ensure world peace and security but also in financing the League. The U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had been a driving force behind the League's formation and strongly influenced the form it took, but the United States Senate voted not to join on 19 November 1919. Moreover, as already noticed, Germany and the Soviet Union initially were not allowed to join the League, the first because it was seen as the aggressor in the World War I, the second because of its communist views.

The absence of the US accentuated another leak of the organization. The League of Nations, lacked an armed force of its own. It depended on the Great Powers to enforce its resolutions, keep to economic sanctions which the League ordered, or provide an army, when needed for the League to use. However, the Great Powers were often very

reluctant to do so. Sanctions could also hurt the League members, so they were unwilling to comply with them. The League's two most important powers after the withdrawal of the US participation, Britain and France, were hesitant to use sanctions and even more disinclined to resort to military action on behalf of the League. Immediately after World War I, pacifism was a strong force both in the populations and the governments of the two countries. The British Conservatives were especially tepid on the League and preferred, when in government, to negotiate treaties without the involvement of the organization. Moreover, the League's advocacy of disarmament for Britain, France and its other members, while at the same time advocating collective security, meant that the League was unwittingly, depriving itself of the only forceful means by which its authority would be upheld. In fact, if the League was to force countries to abide by international law, it would require the Royal Navy and the French Army to do the enforcing.

Finally, an important weakness grew from the contradiction between the idea of collective security, that formed the basis of the League, and international relations between individual states. The collective security system the League used meant that nations were required to act against states they considered friends, and in a way that might endanger their national interests, to support states that they had no normal affinity with<sup>56</sup>. This weakness was exposed during the Abyssinia Crisis when Britain and France had to balance attempts to maintain the security they had attempted to create for themselves in Europe “in order to defend against the enemies of internal order”<sup>57</sup>, in which Italy's support played a pivotal role, with their obligations to Abyssinia as a member of the League. Ultimately, Britain and France both abandoned the concept of collective security in favour of appeasement in the face of growing German militarism under Adolf Hitler.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the League of Nations simply faded away between the humiliation of seeing one of its members, Austria, taken over by Germany in 1938 without even a formal protest, and the absurdity of expelling the USSR after the outbreak of World War Two in 1939 (an event that neither the USSR nor the League were involved in). It was properly in reason of its ineffectiveness that, when the Allies finally began to prepare for the end of World War Two, they rejected any idea of restoring the League. Instead, they moved to establish a new organisation,

---

<sup>56</sup>F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946*, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1986, p.253

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p.254

the United Nations. At this aim, representatives of fifty countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944. The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 Member States. The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of other signatories. In parallel with the organization of the political international relations, the negotiators this time did not fail to take notice even of the economic sectors and the questions related to it. At this aim, they assembled in Bretton Woods on July 1944 to establish common rules for trade and financial relations. From out of this the first example in the world history of a totally-shared monetary order was developed to regulate the monetary relations among independent nation-states. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was created to give stability to the implemented system of fixed exchanges based on the US dollar. Then, in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed to liberalize the international commerce. The structure created at Bretton Woods were able to support the international economic relations and thus resist unchanged till 1971, when the Smithsonian Agreement marked the end of the gold exchange standard and the beginning of a system of flexible exchanges. It is however noteworthy that the institutions ideated at Bretton Woods survived after the end of gold standard. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are still active, while the General Agreement was substituted by the World Trade Organization in the 1995.

However, a significant number of the old League's aims and methods were transmitted into the new organisation in 1945. Among these were not only such key and effective institutions as the International Court and the International Labour Organisation, but also the working assumptions of the secretariat, and some key operations - including those that would soon come to be called 'peacekeeping' operations. Most notably, the strongest line of conjunction between the two organizations stands in the survival of the motive and sustaining force of the more general process began in Vienna. This

meant, the strengthening of the expectation of international involvement in the preservation of global security.

Their inclusiveness in terms of membership and the equal votes that all states received in the assemblies reflect the principles of universality and equality among states on which the organizations were built. In order to deal with their main goal of international security, both organizations embraced the principle of collective security. In this sense, an aggression by one state against another would trigger a collective response against the aggressor state by all members of the organization. The similarities across the two systems can also be found in the rules that were shaped by these common principles. The principle of collective security in fact led to similarities in the rules regarding the type of collective responses that could be taken against aggressor states. Both allowed for peaceful means to resolve disputes among states. They both also included procedures through which states could become subject to economic sanctions and to collective military action. The organizations also envisioned inspection mechanisms to control aggressive states that were deemed to have reached dangerously high levels of armament.

As the League and the UN embraced similar major principles and rules, they were both confronted with the same kind of tensions between some of the principles and the need to build effective organizations, as well as between the principles themselves. One such tension developed between the principle of universality and the need to have a more effective (that is, smaller and more flexible) forum for dealing with urgent threats to international security. However, as soon as such a forum was considered, the organizations also had to deal with the question of its membership. The founders of both system recognized that great powers should be permanent members of such a forum because they were the principal potential enforcers of collective decisions. Yet, the structure of the United Nations was to give a much stronger position to the traditional great powers through the UN Security Council. The power of veto on the decisions of the Council was thus assigned only to the five permanent members. At the same time, the requirement of the unanimity vote was changed in favour of a majority system (of nine on fifteen). This has led to a second tension, one between the principle of equality among state and the principles of power politics. At the same time, the strengthening of the effectiveness of the organization determined also the departure from the principle of strict neutrality which was usually enforced by the League. Examples of this change are offered by the UN operations in

those states that were dissolving into civil war, as, for instance, in Congo from 1960 to 1964. Dealing with such internal fights was a more ambitious and demanding task than the traditional role of assisting consenting states to observe ceasefires. Last, but not least, both organizations had to deal with the tension between the principle of collective security, which implies that a state may have to conform to the general will of other members, and the principle of sovereignty, which implies that there is no higher authority than the state. In this respect, an important difference between the norms of the interwar era and the present-day ones is evident in terms of the understanding of sovereignty. Even though the principle of sovereignty remained important after World War II, its power has somewhat eroded. Thus, for example, in the interwar era, primarily because of the UK objections to weapons inspections in Germany, the League's Disarmament Committee was never truly able to function. The UK position was based on the normative argument that, as long as the Treaty of Versailles returned sovereignty to Germany, it was not appropriate to undermine such sovereignty with disclosure requirements. In contrast, the multiple inspections the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency performed in Iraq, as well as in other countries, suggest a change in the balance between norms supporting state sovereignty and the need to create effective organizations. But, the most often cited example of such erosion is related to the emergence and increasing relevance of the human rights regime. This system assigned to individuals a sets of rights that can be exhibited and should be respected, independently from any state membership, in the recognition of the essential universal equality of all human beings. Properly in virtue of the acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of humanity, the recent institution of the International Criminal Court has further weakened the notion of international sovereignty. This has indeed put under question one of its more ensured implications, namely, the immunity of the rulers for the actions performed in the course of their mandate.

The constant increasing of the number of its members, which nowadays comprises all world countries, together with the enhance of its competences, which took place in parallel with the strengthening of the globalization, have widely modified the perception of the UN apparatus. In this sense, it is no more regarded simply as an arrangement of international relations between states, but, more significantly, as a system of global governance. The reason of this general success stands certainly in the provisions on which it is grounded. In this respect, many constitutionalists have

asserted the possibility to consider the UN Charter as the premise for a Constitution of the whole international society<sup>58</sup>, pushing thus forward the Kantian dreams for a cosmopolitan order. At the same time, the increase of its ability of both holding global responsibility and obtaining general trust was due the apparent ‘democratization’ of the organization decisively implemented in the 1950s, as the General Assembly began to assert itself after a decade of US domination. Although after the end of the Cold War, many were the hopes for a further extension of this process, the question of the UN reform (in democratic terms) is currently object of strong quarrel which often undermines the trust on the system and its capability to deal independently with the great powers.

## *2.2. Something goes wrong in the current system of global governance: the ‘democratic deficit’*

In respect with the question of the UN democratization, the advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy stress the argument that the state-centered logic which still nowadays characterizes the world political arrangement favors more the representation of the state-interests than of those of the individual citizens. In this respect, Archibugi argued, “the state governments[,including, crucially, those democratic,]have shown to be too weak or even too much conniving at an imperialist world policy view to oppose against it”. Moreover, he continued, “the existing international organizations, starting with the United Nations, are essentially inter-governmental and they don’t possess yet the necessary legitimacy to oppose to the dominant states.”<sup>59</sup> Although we are far from living in an anarchical international scenario still, in the normative literature on global governance and, particularly, in the strain of Cosmopolitan Democracy, the present system is regarded as distorted in so far as it reflects a hierarchy of power which too frequently promotes the interests of the most powerful states and global social forces at the expense of the majority of world inhabitants.<sup>60</sup> As Patrick Hayden noticed, “participation in the creation of government policy that some citizens enjoy in the internal affairs of their respective

---

<sup>58</sup>Habermas, footnote n. 54

<sup>59</sup>Archibugi, footnote, p. 327 (my trans.)

<sup>60</sup>D. Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitical Democracy’, in Daniele Archibugi (ed.), *Debating Cosmopolitics*, London, 2003, p.8



countries and the accountability provided by democratic elections do not extend similarly to international affairs, leading to widespread concerns about what is referred to as the ‘democratic deficit’ of global governance”<sup>61</sup>. In this regards, Archibugi denounced that many decisions taken at the global level, while they grandly affect the world inhabitants lives, lack of any significant accountability and are rather taken by “hidden operators over whom neither individuals nor the states they belong exert any control”<sup>62</sup>. “This is the real deficit of democracy”, he better clarified, “the existence of organized transnational interests far removed from any popular mandate”<sup>63</sup>. In the last stance, then, these authors suggest that we actually live a gigantic contradiction. On one side, the democratic system of political organization spreads quantitatively becoming the predominant form of government and the only legitimated one in most of the world states. But, on the other side, democracy failed in affirming its regulative principles and values at the international arena. “In one word, democracy got important goals within the states, but of little relevance in the international sphere”<sup>64</sup>. Moreover, according to these thinkers, the situation is further exacerbated because of the strengthening of the processes of ‘globalization’. Thus, while the destiny of world political communities overlaps every day more intensively making the boundaries between outside and inside ever weaker, the chance for the state to succeed in dealing with questions which no more can be governed by a simple borders-based logic, drastically decreases<sup>65</sup>. In other words, the state centrism which traditionally characterizes the representation of the interests and their enforcement at the international level, fails to address profitably questions that the globalization puts outside of the state’s capability of resolution<sup>66</sup>. As consequence of this political asset, it grows the distance between the intergovernmental management of the international scenario and the true needs of the real interest-holders, namely, the citizens of an international society which tends progressively to coincide with the whole globe. This is particularly striking in a world mainly led by democracies which as such should see government as representative and responsible.

With respect to this aspect of the question, Hayden wrote,

---

<sup>61</sup>Hayden, footnote n.9, p. 23

<sup>62</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.2, p.322 (my trans.)

<sup>63</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.60, p.9

<sup>64</sup>D. Archibugi, *La democrazia cosmopolitica*, Asterios Editore, 2000, p. 16 (my trans.)

<sup>65</sup>D. Held and a. G. McGrew, *Governing the Globalization*, Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, trans it, *Governare la Globalizzazione*, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005

<sup>66</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.2, p. 323 (my trans.)

The new supranational layers of governance created by the nation-states seeking to promote or regulate the effects of globalization generally have few mechanisms of accountability accessible to the general population; these global institutions are for the most part accountable only to states and operate according to nondemocratic principles (disproportionately to any popular size). Other influential global actors, whether from the private sector (transnational corporations) or from civil society (nongovernmental organizations), are also often unaccountable to or unrepresentative of a variety of members of international society.<sup>67</sup>

Relying upon an analogous analysis of the contemporary arrangement of international relations, Held and McGrew further extended the point underlining a surprising feature of politics outside the borders. They noticed the contrast between the substantial failure of the political global asset and the considerable success of public and private agencies in promoting economic globalization<sup>68</sup>. According to Ulrich Beck, this is because while the transnational economic interests and the military power may rely upon well-functioning global organizations, the political parties are still expression of a national logic<sup>69</sup>. As regards this incongruity, Archibugi sentenced that “the forms of political representation have remained unbearably confined within the frontiers of the state even in an epoch in which the civil and economic society works thickly on a transnational base.”<sup>70</sup> In conclusion, according to the perspective of Cosmopolitan Democracy, the contemporary global governance system as mainly based on the principle of nation-state sovereignty not only shows itself to be unable to master phenomena more and more not only universal but global. But, at the same time, it crystallizes at the global arena a situation of ‘democratic deficit’. This gets substance in the simultaneous lack of any accountability granted to the main international operators with respect to the world citizens, and the almost complete negation of any possible representation of the latter’s own reasons.

If the previous account of both the international relations dynamic and the impact of recent global changes is accepted, then the argument can be taken in a number of

---

<sup>67</sup>Hayden, footnote n.9, pp.24-25

<sup>68</sup>David Held and Anthony McGrew, ‘The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction’, in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *The Global Transformations Reader*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.14

<sup>69</sup>U. Beck, ‘Democracy Beyond the Nation-State’, in *Dissent*, Vol.45, 1999, pp. 53-55

<sup>70</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.64, p.22

directions. In particular, the supporters of Cosmopolitan Democracy have argued for the democratization of international relations. Their position is that the automatic association which traditionally is supposed to link the nation-state and democracy must be broken. Since the power to affect things no longer exists at national level, the idea of self-rule, proper of a democratic regime, must be redirected towards global institutions. As above noted, the UN and other inter-state bodies are, at the moment, in no sense democratic. In response to this situation, these authors argue in favor of a program of political reform in which these institutions are gradually democratized and an active role for individuals is progressively recognized. In this sense, the idea of the advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy is that of spreading democracy not only within but even between and above the states. After all, from an historical point of view, Archibugi stated echoing Stephen Krasner, sovereignty has been an artificial creation, an “organized hypocrisy” that in few cases succeeded in setting limits to the extra-territorial interests of the states.<sup>71</sup> In fact, he elsewhere clarified, “there is no [immediate and direct] threat to the state-interests of Italy, France, or Great Britain if a genocide is committed in Iraq, Iran, or Turkey”<sup>72</sup>. Rather than assuring the non-interference principle, the sovereignty criteria has more manifestly allowed massacres and genocides to be perpetuated with impunity within the states. In response to this evidence, Archibugi called, in unison with Luigi Ferraioli’s point of view, for a general recognition of the clean contraposition between the notion of democracy and the sovereignty principle and, consequently, for the abandon of the latter.<sup>73</sup> At this propos, he said,

If the protection of human life is one of the main inspiring criterions of the global political system’s architecture, [...then], it is necessary to replace the category of sovereignty with that of the *global constitutionalism*, in which the use of the international strength, especially when turned to domestic problems, is not only deliberated but also managed by global institutions”. [...] Experience teaches that, in absence of institutions and procedures fitted to guarantee real humanitarian interventions, it is better that the (western) states abstain from the use of strength. But, [at the same time], this imposes to seek non-violent tools of interference with

---

<sup>71</sup>S. D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, cit. in Archibugi, footnote n. 7, p. 272

<sup>72</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.64, p. 21

<sup>73</sup>Luigi Ferraioli, *La sovranità nel mondo moderno*, Anabasi, Milano, 1995, cit. in Archibugi, footnote n.7, p. 272

the purpose to prevent genocides, to defend human rights and even to affirm the right of the people to choose his/her own government.<sup>74</sup>

The democratic paradox is thus in the end, the crux that intellectuals, in the first place, are call to clear up if we want to obstacle the concentration of power and impede to a simple strength-based logic to have the upper hand in the international scenario at the expense of wide-spread sufferings. In this respect, as Archibugi explained advocating what he calls a ‘cosmopolitical democracy’:

Above all, what distinguishes cosmopolitical democracy from other such projects is its attempt to create institutions which enable the voice of individuals to be heard in global affairs, irrespective of their resonance at home. Democracy as a form of global governance thus needs to be realized on three different interconnected level: within states, between states and at a world level.<sup>75</sup>

It results evident from this clarification that what Comopolitan Democracy plans is certainly not the abandon of the state. Neither it prefigures its imminent collapse nor would welcome its eventual disappearance. Rather, according to this view, the state will appropriately remain an institution of terrific importance in the general schema of the world political organization. At the same time, it will keep its role of privileged referent of individuals’ instances and main place where many of those needs could find an adequate satisfaction. In fact, as Archibugi put out, the state is not necessarily a democratic institution but without a recognized institution as the only authorized one to the legitimated use of force, democracy would not be possible<sup>76</sup>. Moreover, he further admonished, a cosmopolitan democracy cannot be built either “destroying that existing within states” or simply turning the model of domestic democracy as such at the international level. What these theorists rather proposed, then, is a deeper and wider “imaginative effort akin to that of two centuries ago, when we shifted from direct to representative democracy”<sup>77</sup>. This call for a radical change gets substance in pressing the global organization to “add a level of governance” to the already existing national and international stages. This further addition aims at providing individuals with a “more active role” that will be endorsed in the recognition and exert in virtue

---

<sup>74</sup>Archibugi, footnote n. 2, pp. 331-332

<sup>75</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.60, p. 8

<sup>76</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.64, p. 15

<sup>77</sup>Archibugi, footnote, n.2, p. 324

of their “double function [...] of citizens within their belonging state and [...] citizens of the world.” In this sense, Archibugi said, “the cosmopolitical democracy suggests to create institutions and representative channels for all individuals [...] to make the instances of citizens directly represented in the global affairs. This means to found the deliberation on the global matters starting from the more (the majority).”<sup>78</sup> More comprehensively then the final priority of Cosmopolitan Democracy appears double. On one side, it is necessary “to address [the conflicts at global level] towards a global constitutionalism and submit them to jurisdictional organisms, as Kelsen had already wished, that should act on the base of an explicit constitutional mandate”<sup>79</sup>. On the other side, it is essential to establish components of what Held called “cosmopolitan democracy law” or, “a democratic public law entrenched within and across borders”<sup>80</sup>. In this respect, in place of putting as bulwark of people’s autonomy what Archibugi termed “the by-now-Baroque category of sovereignty”<sup>81</sup>, the normative foundation of cosmopolitan democracy law proposes to rely upon what Held referred to as “the principle of autonomy” which requires that all individuals have the ability to participate in political decisions that directly impact upon them<sup>82</sup>.

### *2.3 Recent failures in the global governance system: concentrated power and wide-spread suffering*

#### *a) Political puzzles: super power nationalism, unilateralism, ethnocentrism*

Since 11 September 2001, it has been said, the world is changed and, along with it, we are ourselves no more the same. Quite soon, the worry for the displaying of the anti-Taliban ‘war of coalition’ has been added to the astray and pain of the Towers tragedy’s aftermath. All this was followed, in the proceeding of the events, by the suffering of the population of both sides for the resulting deaths and the angst of most of the observers. The war in Afghanistan has become the first act of a more

---

<sup>78</sup>Ibid. p.327-328

<sup>79</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.7, p. 272

<sup>80</sup>David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 227

<sup>81</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.2, p. 331

<sup>82</sup>David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 147

general US strategy of ‘global war on terror’ ideated in response to “an unprecedented transnational phenomenon”, differing “markedly from other guerrilla or terrorist group”<sup>83</sup>, Al Qaeda. The same feelings has been almost replayed during the US-led invasion of Iraq (2003), but at this time going with a more enhanced sentiment of condemn and refuse for a war from many parts judged as unilateral, unlawful and unjustified. While the manifestations of dissent of the civil society followed one after the other from Europe to Asia to the American continent, touching the same U.S., the international political community limited its response to generic declarations of condemn expressed by single states. More than any decisive influence on the state of affairs, these denounces showed the inability of the international political community to express a common position. At the same, they demonstrated the powerlessness of the settled international institutions and mechanisms to deal successfully with the situation. This is particularly striking because serious doubts exists indeed on the international legacy of the war in Iraq. In fact, as Jürgen Habermas noticed, “the war was neither a case of self-defense against an actual attack or the immediate threat of one, nor it was authorized by any decision of the Security Council according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Neither Resolution 1441 nor any of the seventeen previous (and “spent”) resolutions on Iraq can count as a sufficient authorization.” On the other hand, “the same US president Bush repeatedly declared his intention of *acting without the mandate of the UN* if necessary.” The neoconservatives, Habermas continued, offered a real ‘revolutionary alternative’ “to the domestication of state power through international law. [...]if the regime of international law fails,” they stated, “then the hegemonic imposition of a global liberal order is justified, even by means that are hostile to international law.” More significantly, Habermas put out, “what distinguishes the neoconservatives from the “realist” school of international relations is the vision of an America global political order that has definitively broken with the reformist program of UN human rights policies. While not betraying liberal goals, this vision [ha]s shatter[ed] the civil limits that the UN Charter – with good reason – had placed on their realization”<sup>84</sup>.

Today, even many of those that at the first time shared the US *new* neoconservative international doctrine of ‘good consequences at any cost’ seem to acknowledge that

---

<sup>83</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2002, p. 54.

<sup>84</sup>Jürgen Habermas, ‘Interpreting the Fall of a Monument’, in *Constellations*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2003, p. 366 (*my c.ve*).

“when you look back on the Iraq war and study it and study particularly the neglect and the failure to manage the aftermath, it's hard to look at it as a good thing”<sup>85</sup>. In fact, despite the announced proclaims and declared good intentions of a war waged “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger”<sup>86</sup>, it turned, day by day more evidently, more into a puzzle than a solution. Iraq, although by now clearly devoid of the alleged weapons of mass destruction and out of Saddam’s dictatorship, is far from being disarmed. Rather, the guerrilla attacks together with the coalition military operations make their shocking voice always heard throughout the nation. Iraqis are distant from a free existence, if we share the idea that the concept has to encompass at least a basic degree of daily security and autonomy of choice. Finally, the record the Iraq war marked in the panorama of the international law and state relational procedures leaves the sensation that it has raised a danger to the world order graver than the one it purposed to remove. As if this was not enough, the international terrorism far from being disrupted continues its action not only within the conflict zones but on world scale as in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), London (2005), Sharm el-Sheikh (2005), and Mumbai (2008). Along with its serious after effects in the field of human rights of which Guantanamo is only the most known sign, this puts serious doubts on the efficacy of a global military approach to terror.

The U.S. President-elect Barack Obama has promised a “new dawn of American leadership” that will be marked by much greater emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism than was accorded by George W. Bush. As announced by President Obama, the new US foreign policy will be twofold. In order “to keep the American people safe and to assure prosperity here at home and peace abroad [...] we have to combine military power with strengthened diplomacy,” he said. What has to be put on place, he further clarified, is “a new strategy that skillfully uses, balances, and integrates all elements of American power: our military and diplomacy; our intelligence and law enforcement; our economy and the power of our moral example.” In an implicit repudiation of Bush's unilateralism, he repeatedly stressed U.S. interdependence with the rest of the world, noting that all of the challenges faced by

---

<sup>85</sup>Statement of the Washington Post journalist and Prime Pulitzer Bob Woodward, recently author of *The War Within*, Simon & Schuster, 2008, on tensions and critical turning points in the Iraq war. The statement was addressed during Bob Woodward and Barton Gellman roundtable discussion with Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson on Bush-Cheney years, *Woodward: For Bush Legacy, Iraq Looms Large*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/bush/legacy/roundtable/>

<sup>86</sup>President Bush’s declaration at a Press Conference March 2003, two weeks before the beginning of the war.

Washington were linked by “the fundamental reality that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, our destiny is shared with the world’s.” This fundamental recognition made necessary, according to his view, “to build and forge stronger alliances around the world so that we’re not carrying the burdens and these challenges by ourselves.” The same multilateral commitment to foreign issues is further stressed by different members of Obama’s team. “We know our security, our values, and our interests cannot be protected and advanced by force alone nor, indeed, by Americans [alone]” declared the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. Vice President-elect Joseph Biden, another likely player in the White House foreign policy debate, echoed the same themes. Citing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the emergence of new powers, the dangers of non-proliferation, scarcities of basic resources, the impact of climate change, and the persistence of poverty, he noted that “no one country can control these forces [alone]”<sup>87</sup>. In line with this new cooperative climate the US administration is making an effort to rebuild US alliance around the world. There are indications of the US intention to improve relations and reopen dialogue with Syria, Iran and North Korea, and even with parts of the Taliban. Particularly on the latter, the US President suggested his administration will consider reaching out to moderate elements of the Taliban, much as the American military did with Sunni militias in Iraq. In this sense, Mr. Obama pointed to the success in peeling Iraqi insurgents away from more hard-core elements of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. A strategy that many credit to mean turning the war around in the last two years, or, in the words of the US President himself, “responsibly ending the war in Iraq through a successful transition to Iraqi control”<sup>88</sup>.

Yet, despite the declared and praiseworthy intent, the successful employment of this new multilateral foreign plan have to overcome some hard obstacles that could undermine its scope. Problems exist indeed within the same Obama’s establishment. First, the three main foreign policy-making appointments, Clinton, Gates, and Jones, are considered strong personalities whose views are seen as generally more hawkish than Obama's. Indeed, those picks have caused growing concern among some of

---

<sup>87</sup> *Obama’s National Security Team Announcement*, December 1, 2008, the transcript of President-Elect Barack Obama’s National Security Team announcement as provided by CQ Transcriptions can be found on <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/us/politics/01text-obama.html>

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*; see also, President Barack Obama’s discourse, *Responsibly ending the war*, issued at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina on February 27, 2009, [http://indiedesign.typepad.com/inspire\\_political\\_discour/2009/02/full-text-and-video-of-president-obamas-speech-ending-the-war-in-iraq.html](http://indiedesign.typepad.com/inspire_political_discour/2009/02/full-text-and-video-of-president-obamas-speech-ending-the-war-in-iraq.html)



Obama's veteran supporters who rallied to his candidacy in major part due to his early and outspoken opposition, especially in contrast to Clinton, to the Iraq war. "He really differentiated himself in the [Democratic primary campaign] in his opposition to the war in Iraq," noted Christopher Preble, a foreign policy analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute, "and yet he hasn't reached out to a genuine outsider like he was himself not so long ago"<sup>89</sup>. Conversely, a number of right-wing figures have hailed the nominations, particularly Clinton's, as better than expected. "I'm relieved," neo-conservative Richard Perle declared. "Contrary to expectations, I don't think we would see a lot of change." Neo-conservatives have been particularly enthusiastic about Clinton's appointment, noting that "she was the most hawkish [...] of all the Democratic presidential candidates over the past year"<sup>90</sup>. In second place, despite the opening of a new policy of dialogue, the president talks about the struggle with terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere, staking out positions that at times seemed more comparable to those of his predecessor than many of Mr. Obama's more liberal supporters would like. In particular, he did not rule out the option of snatching terrorism suspects out of hostile countries. On the contrary, he explicitly left open the option for American operatives to capture terrorism suspects abroad even without the cooperation of a country where they were found. In this sense, he stated that "there could be situations — and I emphasize 'could be' because we haven't made a determination yet — where, let's say that we have a well-known Al Qaeda operative that doesn't surface very often, appears in a third country with whom we don't have an extradition relationship or would not be willing to prosecute, but we think is a very dangerous person." In addition, Obama emphasized that "we don't torture" and that he will ensure to "provide anybody that we're detaining an opportunity through habeas corpus to answer to charges"<sup>91</sup>. But, according to the Times, the US President-elect even made clear that "aides did not mean to suggest that everybody held by American forces would be granted habeas corpus or the right to challenge their detention." In line with this position, in fact, in a court filing on 20 February 2009, the Obama administration agreed with the Bush administration position that 600 prisoners in a

---

<sup>89</sup>Cited in Jim Lobe, *U.S.: Diplomacy, Multilateralism Stressed by Obama Team*, Inter Press Service (IPS) – Global News Agency, December 1, 2008, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44937>

<sup>90</sup>Cited in Barron YoungSmith, *Hawks for Hillary. Why are conservatives heaping praise on Obama's new secretary of state?*, The New Republic Monday, December 1, 2008, <http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=7383b582-aaf3-4b35-a042-9b3c10c562fd>

<sup>91</sup>The New York Times, *Obama's Interview Aboard Air Force One*, March 7, 2009, the transcript of the interview can be found on <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama-text.html?pagewanted=all>

cavernous prison on the American air base at Bagram in Afghanistan have no right to seek their release in court<sup>92</sup>. Furthermore, shifting to a different level, other dilemmas are posed by the US administration strategy in itself. On one side, for what concern Iraq, it has to be noted that the programmed withdrawal of troops would take place in a country however not at all pacified, neither unified, nor democratic. Consequently even though the withdrawal of US troops will sound as the ending of the US military task still this will not sign the end of the violence for Iraqis. Moreover, what President Obama calls a 'sustainable presence' implicitly disavows in some way the idea of a rapid and complete removal of the US fighting forces from the field, whose accomplishment should take 16 months at most according to the President's plan<sup>93</sup>. In contrast, its very idea predicts that smaller force will be in Iraq for many years. Until at least 2015 according to many Iraq US veterans<sup>94</sup>. On the other hand, with respect to Afghanistan, President Obama recognized that in comparison to Iraq, "the situation in Afghanistan is, if anything, more complex,." In fact, he noted "you have [there] a less governed region, a history of fierce independence among tribes. Those tribes are multiple and sometimes operate at cross purposes, and so figuring all that out is going to be much more of a challenge"<sup>95</sup>. Preliminary discussions between the Afghanistan government and the Taliban leadership were already under way and certainly they could be developed into more formal talks with the support of the United States. The current discussions represent a step beyond the established policy, which is supported by NATO and Afghanistan's foreign allies, of fighting the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban while leaving the door open for those ready to accept the Constitution, disarm and return to peaceful civilian life. To this end, the Afghanistan government

---

<sup>92</sup>Charlie Savage, *Obama Upholds Detainee Policy in Afghanistan*, The New York Time, February 21, 2009,

[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/washington/22bagram.html?\\_r=2&scp=2&sq=bagram&st=cse](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/washington/22bagram.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=bagram&st=cse), a version of this article appeared in print on February 22, 2009, on page A6 of the New York edition.

<sup>93</sup>For a detailed account of the way-out plan from Iraq see, Barack Obama and Joe Biden's *Plan For Ending the war in Iraq*, <http://www.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/>

<sup>94</sup>Thomas H. Risks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, The Penguin Press, 2009. For a general overview of the book and a brief account of what President Obama calls a 'sustainable presence' see also, Mike Allen, *Iraq Combat Could Outlast Obama's Term*, Copyright Politico, February 8, 2009, [http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/us\\_world/Iraq\\_combat\\_could\\_outlast\\_Obama\\_s\\_term.html?corde\\_r=&pg=1](http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/us_world/Iraq_combat_could_outlast_Obama_s_term.html?corde_r=&pg=1)

<sup>95</sup>The New York Times, *Obama's Interview Aboard Air Force One*, March 7, 2009, the transcript of the interview can be found on <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama-text.html?pagewanted=all>, cited also in Helen Cooper and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, *Obama Ponders Outreach to Elements of Taliban*, The New York Times, March 7, 2009, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama.html?\\_r=1&hp](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama.html?_r=1&hp), a version of this article appeared in print on March 8, 2009, on page A1 of the New York edition.

has conducted a reconciliation effort that however is widely regarded as corrupt and ineffective. While it has brought more than 6,000 former Taliban members to the government's side over the years, the Times noticed, it has failed to win the defection of any senior figures or to make a serious dent in the ranks of the Taliban. Several Western diplomats and officials in Afghanistan including those already in contact with the Taliban, the New York journal further reported, are calling for a far broader political engagement with the Taliban. They say that trying to engage moderate Taliban factions and splitting commanders or groups away from the Taliban leadership also would not work. On the contrary they suggest, according to the Times article, that negotiations have to be conducted with broad consultation among the Taliban leadership and through Pashtun tribal leaders and elders, since the Taliban are all ethnic Pashtun and ultimately answerable to their tribes. "What is required is structured engagement with all Afghan communities, including the Pashtun and therefore representatives of the Taliban, around a new political project"<sup>96</sup>. Finally, a part from any possible analysis or stated declaration, the overwhelming prominence of the military aspect on the diplomatic one is clearly and significantly further testified by the US President-elect recent announce that 17,000 extra Marines and Army infantries will be implied in Afghanistan to battle a growing counter-insurgency<sup>97</sup>. President Obama's escalation is just party of a strategy that could double the number of coalition military in Afghanistan to counter what he judges a deteriorating situation in the country. In the mid time, the gross amount of casualties of both Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts has reached the frightening number of 700,000 killed and 1,500,000 injured<sup>98</sup>.

---

<sup>96</sup>Carlotta Gall, *As U.S. Weighs Taliban Negotiations, Afghans Are Already Talking*, The New York Times, March 11, 2009, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/asia/11taliban.html?\\_r=1&ref=world](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/asia/11taliban.html?_r=1&ref=world), a version of this article appeared in print on March 11, 2009, on page A8 of the New York edition.

<sup>97</sup>The White House, *Statement by the President on Afghanistan*, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 17 February, 2009, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/); for further information on the new Afghan strategy of President Obama see Peter Mansbridge, *U.S. will respect trade pacts 'as we always have': Obama U.S. president says he'll discuss 'comprehensive' Afghanistan strategy with PM*, the President Obama interview at the White House on February 17, 2009 told the Canadian Broadcasting Corp., <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/17/obama-cbc.html>; for an account of the forces compound, and their deployment, see also, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29242187/>

<sup>98</sup>The data are approximated for defect and updated at the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2009. The amount comprises troops, civilians, contractors and journalists. For a more detailed account of the victims of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts see. <http://www.unknownnews.net/casualties.html>

Almost contemporarily with these events, in the Middle East, the violence begun with the explosion of the Second Intifada in the 2000, protracted itself until 2004. Although the resumption of a sterile dialogue between the Israeli government and the new elected presidency of the Palestinian authority, the electoral victory of the armed Islamic party of Hamas on January and the following capture of a corporal of the Israeli army on June 2006, contribute to maintain high the tension. But, it was the overall situation in the area not to be pacific. In the interlude between one alarming declaration of annihilation of the Jewish state from part of the Iran president and a new development in the international debate on alleged future Iran nuclear threats, the sudden deflagration of the Israel-Lebanon conflict took place during the summer 2006. The unusual as much as opportune intervention of the international community has brought in that occasion to a pacified status granted by an international force of interposition. Yet, less more than one year later, the bloodily internal fight between Fatah and Hamas delivered to Israel “a new enemy entity” to struggle causing in response to the conquest of the Hamas forces of the supremacy on Gaza a severe embargo to the Gaze population. Finally, following the death of an Israeli civilian, killed by a rocket fired at Netivot, Israel launched an air offensive it named “Cast Lead” on 27 December 2008, before opening a ground operation from 3 January 2009. Once again, the international political community exhibited its incapacity to intervene concretely in the question. Unfruitful diplomatic efforts came one after the other addressed from time to time by the members of the Quartet on the Middle Orient, US, Russia, UN and EU, from French, as president on duty of the EU, and from Turkey, as the first Israeli trade partner in the Gulf area. While the Arab League was explicitly denouncing the delay of the UN in calling the Security Council, the UN restricted its action to the declaration of the President of the General Assembly Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann who condemned the Israeli attack as ‘an aggression without restrain’. No appropriate operative response however were furnished by the Security Council. The same Council statement, finally issued on 28 December, was completely insufficient because in no way it contributed to solve the controversy or to stop the violence. Neither it made reference to any violations of the international law and human rights of which in the meantime were accused, particularly, the Israeli Army but, similarly, the militants of Hamas<sup>99</sup>. These took in important pillars of

---

<sup>99</sup>In absence of journalists and international observers, first to speak of violations, in particular on the use of not conventional weapons, were the Palestinian bloggers. The denounces were then picked up by

international humanitarian law, including violations of the Geneva Conventions. In particular, both obligations of an occupying force to protect an occupied population, and the broader requirements of the laws of war that prohibit specific acts, including the illegal use of traditional and experimental weapons, the use of human shields, collective punishment, and civilian targeting. The statement limited itself only to equate the culpability of the occupying power and of the counter forces for the violence. It is not by chance, then, if the violence stopped, after 22 days of conflict, only when the Israeli security cabinet, on 17 January, decided *autonomously* to adopt a resolution in favor of an *unilateral* ceasefire in Gaza. The last Israeli soldiers withdrew from the Gaza Strip on 21 January 2009, the day after the inauguration of the new US president, Barack Obama.

“It may not be very clear who actually won this conflict – if such a concept means anything in Gaza – but I think it is pretty clear who lost, and that was the civilian population of Gaza and, to a much lesser extent, the civilian population of southern Israel”, John Holmes, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said at the OCHA-UNRWA Headquarters press briefing on the 19<sup>th</sup> January, 2009. According to the United Nations, the Israeli offensive left 1,330 dead (including 431 children and 112 women) and 5,380 wounded. That brought the total number of dead and injured to over 6,700 on the Palestinian side. More than 4,000 homes were entirely destroyed in Israeli attacks and more than 17,000 others were damaged, according to an estimate from the Palestinian Authority’s central statistics bureau, which calculates the losses at more than two billion dollars<sup>100</sup>. On the Israeli side, 4 civilians and 10 soldiers had been killed and 84 injured during the recent military operation, while 3,000 Palestinian rockets have hit the Israel territory since the beginning of the 2008 causing the death of 8 people in that year<sup>101</sup>. Evidently, the claims for security from part of the Israeli people pose urgent questions about their full satisfaction but, at the same time, raise strong

---

the British daily newspaper Times, by the international organization Human Right Watch, and by several foreign physicians who explicitly spoke of the employ of white phosphor and the experimental use of new potent explosive devices called Dime.

<sup>100</sup>A full report of the UN Press Conference On Gaza Humanitarian Situation can be found on <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/361eea1cc08301c485256cf600606959/1cdd241153ed6c6285257544004fe09f!OpenDocument>. Other statistical information about the Palestinian territories can be found on <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/>

<sup>101</sup>According to the Israeli military's count on December 27. For a more detailed and general account of Israeli victims see. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm>

concerns for the methods implied by the Israeli government that too often resolve into humanitarian crisis suffered on the Palestinian front. Nowadays, the increasing political influence obtained by the extremist right wing at the ultimate Israeli elections (February 2009) contrasts with the estimated growing popular favor gained by Hamas in the Strip after the Israeli military operation. These considerations actually made the agreement proposals of Annapolis<sup>102</sup> less than a mere utopia and their realization seems to be entrusted more to messianic hopes in the new US government than to concrete and effective opportunities. On the other hand, the Israeli intervention for many international observers have been addressed more against the Obama administration than to Hamas. The Washington Post quoted a Bush administration official saying that Israel struck in Gaza “because they want it to be over before the next administration comes in. They can't predict how the next administration will handle it. And this is not the way they want to start with the new administration”<sup>103</sup>. The Israeli officials may or may not be right about President Obama's likelihood of responding differently than Bush on this issue. In any case, the escalation in Gaza will make virtually impossible any serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The current crisis means that any negotiations, whether ostensibly Israeli-Palestinian alone or officially involving the so-called Quartet will not be able to go beyond a return to the pre-airstrike crisis period. A moment in any case of political crisis still far from being solved.

Only few months before the occurrence of this events, in Europe, just at the door of the Union, the Russian intervention in Georgia in the 2008 officially brought back the war on the continent almost ten years after the NATO intervention in Kosovo, taking on new life nationalistic instances evidently not appeased. The pro-Russian separatist administrations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been trying to gain formal independence from Georgia since breaking away in the early 1990s. Tensions in both regions began to escalate after Mikhail Saakashvili was elected Georgian president in 2004, on a promise to re-unite the country. The conflicts had remained largely frozen, despite occasional flare-ups, until August 2008, when a series of clashes between

---

<sup>102</sup>The meetings of Annapolis between the Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and the President of the Palestinian Authority Abum Mazen began on November 2007 and dealt, among other questions, with the foundation of a Palestinian independent state within the end of the 2008. They were interrupted because of the scandal which involved the Israeli Prime Minister. Any discussion was then postponed on the 2009 after the Israeli new political elections (which regularly took place on February 2009) and the deadline of Abu Mazen's mandate (there's great uncertainty on whether and when new elections will be held in Palestine).

<sup>103</sup>

Georgian and South Ossetia forces prompted Georgia to launch an aerial bombardment and ground attack in South Ossetia. Russia, meanwhile, poured thousands of troops into South Ossetia, and launched bombing raids both over the province and on targets in the rest of Georgia with the declared intent of defending the Russian citizen in the area<sup>104</sup>. It is unclear if the Russian forces entered South Ossetia before or after the Georgian attack. What is certain is the great amount of casualties that the conflict caused. Despite limited casualties estimated in some tens<sup>105</sup>, a lot of civilians were driven out of their homes in South Ossetia. Many of them crossed over to the Russian republic of North Ossetia. Residents of Georgian villages in South Ossetia, and the town of Gori, also fled. The heavy fighting left the South Ossetia capital, Tskhinvali, largely in ruins. On 19 August, the UN High Commission for refugees estimated in 158.700 the number of persons displaced because of the conflict with a peak of 200.000 in the heat of the clashes.

However, the outbreak of the war was worthy only of turning the Chinese journey of President Bush for the Olympics games upside down and to earn Russia the firm as much interested condemn of the US for a 'dangerous escalation' which, they said, threatened to jeopardize the peace of the entire region<sup>106</sup>. In no way it succeeded in pushing the world political community on a common position, neither in showing the promptness and effectiveness of the international apparatus of global governance. Since the first clashes in South Ossetia, the Security Council convened for a session of emergence without that the 15 members could find any agreement on a shared declaration of ceasefire. The same irresolution was then replayed during the succeeding sessions when the indecisiveness of the member states got mixed with Russia and Georgia's reciprocal accusations of 'ethnic cleanliness' leaving no space for any possible mediation. The same agreement that Russia and Georgia finally achieved by the mediation of the French Prime Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, President on duty of the EU, despite in the short period had the merit to have silenced the armies, at the long period do not seem to have posed solid bases for a peaceful and lasting solution of the conflict. On the contrary, the relapses of the Georgian crisis

---

<sup>104</sup>See. The discourse of the Russian President Medvedev over the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia held on 26 August 2008. An English version of the discourse can be found on <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27medvedev.html>

<sup>105</sup>Human Right Watch, *Letter to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili regarding civilian casualty figures in South Ossetia*, 10 October 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/10/10/letter-georgian-president-mikheil-saakashvili-regarding-civilian-casualty-figures-so>

<sup>106</sup>The US are the first Georgia's ally and hard supporter of its territorial integrity



threat to stimulate the persistent instability of the region widening to other zones of potential tension of the Caucasus, for instance, to the pro-Russian secessionist provinces of Transnistria in Moldavia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. But, the question does not limit itself at a domestic or regional level. Nor it is bounded to simple nationalistic claims. The slotting of the matter in the more general context of the global struggle for energetic resources, poses to the Western countries *in primis* and potentially to the world, wider problems of resource endowments which affect the energetic security of these countries and their citizens. Yet, the West expectations conflict both with those of the new emerging states and supplier countries, in particular with those of Russia which sees in the matter the chance to carve out again an international role of high profile. Besides the clash of Russian and American strategic and economic interests for the control over raw materials and the routes of energy in the Caucasian area, the war in Georgia poses serious political dilemmas and questions of international law. In particular, what happened in the Balkans in the 1999 with the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has determined the dissolution of frozen conflicts with uncertain consequences. According to Ennio Remondino, reporter from ex-Yugoslavia during the NATO air raids as well as long-experienced specialist of Balkans incidents, the events in Georgia repropose, after those in Kosovo, “the ambiguity in the management of the instances of the ethnic and religious separatism reappeared after the fall of the wall of Berlin”. With the ‘humanitarian interference’ in Yugoslavia, he notes, “Brussels and Washington have replaced the ancient rule of the Westphalia peace on the sacredness of the state borders, with the *unilateral decision* of those who have the *authority* to sustain their will”<sup>107</sup>. As consequence, any attempt of the US and EU to brake the Russian pretensions appears today and actually configures, the employing of a double standard policy. On the other hand, in the 2004, Vladimir Putin had clearly warned the international community on acting unilaterally on the question of Kosovo making oversee otherwise his intention of proceeding on the same ground in Georgia. With respect to this matter, Sabine Freizer has never doubted on the intention of Putin and Medvedev to force Brussels to put on the table the question of the status of the Georgian separatist republics appealing to the principle of self-determination. Moscow, she said, intends to apply in Georgia the same diplomatic strategy employed by the

---

<sup>107</sup>Gabriele Santoro’s interview to Ennio Remondino, *Ennio Remondino: “Con la Georgia è finito l’unilateralismo Usa”* 10 September 2008, <http://gabrielesantoro.blogspot.com/search?q=remondino>



Westerns to lead Kosovo toward the independence through the 1444 resolution of the UN Security Council. The NATO members began posing the question on the table of the international debate. It is not by chance, then, if the French plane explicitly provides for “the opening of international discussions on the way to reach security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”<sup>108</sup>. In front of the UN inactivity and the US impossibility to mediate in a conflict in which they are an interested part, it would be up to Europe to use its neutrality to bring back peace in a country that allows oil to pass from the Caspian to the old continent bypassing Russia. Yet, the record marked by the happenings in Kosovo, in which the European member states of NATO are directly implicated along with the US, reduce the chances of the EU for a credible action. More decisively, any hope placed on the EU is further frustrated by the divisions that go across the 27 members about the nature of the relations with Moscow. On one side, Great Britain, Sweden, Poland, and the Baltic countries, well-known for their aversion to Russia, claim for firmness against the Russian federation. On the opposite side, France, Italy, and Germany are more inclined to dialogue, at least to avoid an head-on collision with a country considered strategic on the energetic ground. In the meantime, while the world is waiting for the moves of the new US administration on the matter, Washington and Moscow have strengthen their respective military alliances in the area, letting easily to prefigure the sensation of a nostalgic return to a logic of contraposition.

In a Working Document for the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Andrey S. Makarychev argued that “[o]ne of the most important effects of Russia’s war against Georgia in August 2008 was a new set of approaches to the future of European security being actively promoted by Dmitry Medvedev and the Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.”<sup>109</sup> In a clear distinction from the European ‘normative’ perspective, he continued, the Russian standpoint towards international society is characterized by a more enhanced ‘decisionist’ trait. On one side, “the EU seems to give priority to the ‘thick’ version of international society, with a clear emphasis on normativism” and “the central importance of an autonomous legal order for constraining the arbitrary and personal exercise of political power”. On the other side, “the Russian stance is a bit more ambiguous: it appears to be “more systemic rather normative”, [waving

---

<sup>108</sup>For a general account of the Georgia peace plan see Charles Bremner, *Full text of the Georgia peace plan - and obstacles to its implementation*, Moscow, Times Online, 13 August 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4522496.ece>

<sup>109</sup>Andrey S. Makarychev, *Russia and its 'New Security Architecture' in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept*, CEPS Working Document No. 310, February 2009, p.1

between] ‘sovereignist’, ‘exceptionalist’, or ‘nationalist’” conceptions and “an ‘internationalist reading’”. At the same time, he added, while the EU is ‘by-large-a-supporter’ of an ‘unitary model’ of international society and argues in favor of “homogenous rules of the game for all state actors”, Russia ‘sympathizes’ with a ‘pluralist’ schema and “the multiplicity of political singularities potentially clashing with each other.” What is particularly noteworthy here is that, according to Makarychev’s suggestion, the latest developments, including the August 2008 war against Georgia, apparently moved Russia further away from the European understanding of international society to what might be presumably dubbed the formation of a “political subject which is absolutely free” from international commitments and thus insensitive to external pressures, including normative ones. In line with this position, “one of the key messages conveyed by the Kremlin in autumn 2008, was meant to question the primordial importance of cooperating with such institutions as NATO, G8 and WTO.”<sup>110</sup>

This search for a *new security architecture* from part of Russia takes the stance from a severe critique of the existing security institutions. Perhaps the most noticeable logical problem looming large at this juncture”, Makarychev noticed, “is that the Kremlins tends to find the roots of the current imperfections in international security in both ‘block approaches’ and ‘unipolarity’.”<sup>111</sup> Yet, despite it is clear that Russia objects to the unipolar US-led world model its current foreign policy discourse and action offer no clear guidance as to what its aims are in this regards. In his view, these confusions and contradictions which affects the Russian international subjectivity are the product of deeper and wider “ontological dislocations” that make the Russian identity “unstable, divided, split and unfixed.” As consequence, Russia’s present international stance is “a mixture of Realpolitik pragmatism” and “liberal assumptions”, “institutional commitments” and “reluctant unilateralism”, “particularist assumptions” and “universal explanations”.<sup>112</sup>

Although, this situation doesn’t allow for a credible prediction of neither what will be the further-steps of Russia’s international policy nor the direction it will take. However, a guide principle results evident from Makarychev’s analysis of Russia’s international action. This principle is made explicit in a strong commitment toward

---

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5

<sup>111</sup>Ibid. p.1; see also, Dmitry Medvedev’s *speech at the World Policy Conference*, Evian, 8 October 2008, <http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/10/207422.shtml>

<sup>112</sup>Ibid. pp. 3-4

state sovereignty and power state decisionism. As matter of fact, although “it is normative credentials that to a significant extent legitimise Russia’s eagerness to be part of the international society,” acting within the “normative/solidarist logic” or a “cosmopolitan” asset based on the “supernational rule of law”, Russia displays a number of contradictions. Within this predominantly normative logic, Russia is in fact supposed to keep integrating in the existing IS structures, however unfair or imperfect they might be. In this sense, normative judgments were one of Russia’s major arguments against the Saakashvili regime in Georgia, Ukraine’s NATO membership and the disenfranchisement of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries, etc. Similarly on this line, Russia tries to convince the international society states that it is democracy that Russia seeks in the international arena, even if this type of democracy is “reduced to the mere plurality of strong states under the guise of ‘multipolarity’.” But, in August 2008 the Kremlin implicitly accepted the US foreign policy philosophy it otherwise lambasted, which gave Russia a chance “not only to confirm its belonging to a ‘normal’ group of countries but – what is of primordial importance – to claim the power to ‘normalise’ (‘discipline and punish’, to put in a Foucauldian way) those who are portrayed as ‘virtual’ (i.e. being subject to external manipulation) governments allegedly deviating from international standards and causing large-scale security problems.” In second place, Russia is more a norm-exploiter than a norm-producer. According to Makarychev’s own words, “it stays far-removed from multiple norm-producing initiatives on a trans-national scale, including – but not limited to – norms that regulate transparency, accountability, sustainable development, good governance, and so on.” Finally, another point of contention relates to the way in which ‘security’ is understood within this normative/solidarist framework. Through several ‘word games’ the Russian leaders attached to the concept of world security an “unnatural number of adjectives[...], as if to fill the ‘empty signifier’ with as many as possible”. Furthermore, they characterized “the novel ‘security architecture’ as both ‘space’ and ‘system’”, and misinterpreted the idea of ‘human security’, intentionally confusing it with the ‘responsibility to protect’.<sup>113</sup> To be true, the IS type that seems to be more desirable to Russia is “a model of international society grounded in the ability of sovereign powers to take political decisions of their own”. Medvedev all too easily drops the language of multilateralism in favor of *unilateral decisionism*: “As far as our military contingent [in South

---

<sup>113</sup>Ibid. pp.6-8

Ossetia] is concerned, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that not a single document, including our joint plan with President Sarkozy, provisions that this contingent would abide by any rules [...] It is up to us to define what troops we need there, where they will be based and what kind of military bases will be deployed over there". What is more, Russian government sometimes incites other governments to act within the logic of sovereign decisions. "We expected that the US administration would intervene in the [Georgian- South Ossetian] conflict and stop the aggressive intentions of the Georgian leadership", said Prime Minister Putin. Medvedev's multiple suggestions that the Western countries need to be pragmatic and guided by their "genuine interests" (presumably comprehended by the Russian President better), as opposed to "imagined ideological clichés", also fit, by and large, the decisionist, rather than normative, foreign policy philosophy<sup>114</sup>. Russia also displayed a similar conduct in case of the collision of two different norms of international law. This may be illustrated, for example, by the Kosovo debates when Putin implicitly argued that in a situation of open conflict between two constitutive principles of international law – territorial integrity and the right of self-determination – Russia supports the first principle and repudiates the second as a left-over from Soviet strategy in the times of colonialism. Although, in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia reversed its preferences. According to Makarychev, these kinds of example show us how "two competing norms open [to Russia] new possibilities for a political type of behaviour based upon sovereign political wills, which might either provoke antagonisms or lead to political negotiations." This means in his view that "the existing international structures do not automatically define which of the two competing norms has to be enacted, and the decision to choose one is always political in the strict sense – i.e. it has to be based rather upon sovereign will than determined by structural circumstances"<sup>115</sup>.

*b) Economic anxieties: nationalism, protectionism*

Although probably defective, the previous depiction clearly shows that the today's world crisis takes the shape of a political emergency which touches in the first

---

<sup>114</sup>Ibid. pp.8-9; see also, Dmitry Medvedev's *interview with BBC*, Sochi, 26 August 2008, <http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205775.shtml>, and, Vladimir Putin's *interview with CNN*, Sochi, 28 August 2008, <http://www.government.ru>

<sup>115</sup>Ibid. p.10

place the global concern for security. Yet, reasons of apprehension are not confined strictly to this domain and they are interlaced with strong economic anxieties. The latter encompasses, for example, the well-known puzzles posed by the world poverty which closely links to that of world migrations, the new pressure exercised on the global economic asset by powerful emerging markets, and the quoted frictions marking the competition for energetic supplying.

But more shockingly, the overall 'Economic Crisis', in which we are all currently involved, throws the world citizens into the prospective of an uncertain future and calls the states to face a breakdown that, as generally recognized, threatens to be harsher than the 1929 Great Depression. The disaster announced itself by a wide-ranging financial collapse which has involved huge private companies and banks and has put in crisis the public management of several states along with the domestic administration of millions of world citizens. Finally, the feared shift of the crisis from the financial sector to the real economy has become substantial, pushing the markets from East to West into a generalized climate of distrust and making concrete the phantom of the global recession.

This general slump obliges the states to engage in a deep and hard second thoughts concerning if not the capitalistic method of economic development in itself, its procedures, regulations and finalities. The overcoming of this impasse affects the future perspectives of the Western states, the further step forward of the developing countries and the often forgotten needs of the Third World nations.

Despite these hard premises the official political statements *seem* to suggest an international mood of cooperation fed by a shared consciousness that the spread of the current economic turmoil needs a coordinated global response. Aiming to this goal, more than 20 of the world's leaders gathered at the White House on 14 November 2008 for a two-day emergency summit on the global crisis situation. But, even as participants began to assemble in what is the largest collection of presidents and prime ministers in almost a decade, doubts are raised that it had achieved anything beyond general declarations of principle to stimulate the world economy and an agreement to meet again. The fact that the gathering brings together representatives of about 85% of the world's economy has prompted inevitable comparisons to the 1944 Bretton Woods meeting when 44 countries assembled in New Hampshire to devise the postwar international monetary system. But many analysts believe that 'Bretton Woods II' will resemble its predecessor only in the scale of the crisis. "I'm confident

that not much concrete action will come out of it,” said Brad Setser, a former US Treasury official and expert on geo-economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. In fact, the disparate nature of the world countries brings potential problems. Bush, before leaving his office, has made it clear that while the US may favor greater regulation, it should be handled *at the national* rather than international level. China, too, has shown little desire to see new global systems reduce its control over its own exchange rate. “The Chinese exchange rate is fundamentally undervalued, but the Chinese government sees that as a matter of *its own sovereignty*,” said Setser<sup>116</sup>. Similarly, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown acknowledged disputes over how, and how fast, to reform international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. “There are very different points of view about what should be done, different interests represented here, different policy positions,” he declared<sup>117</sup>. Furthermore, large international attention is obviously paid to the moves of the US as leading country of the world economy. Some experts believe that this crisis will sound the end of the US world dominant superpower. On the contrary, others sustain that the current turmoil will strengthen the relative position of the US and expose its competitors to the graver weakness<sup>118</sup>. Yet, there’s no doubt that the economic choices of the US government will affect grandly the chances and the timing of the world crisis overcoming and will influence, in some way, the plans of the other countries.

In the context of the liberal consensus, great hopes for the employing of a multilateral approach to the economic crisis are placed on the president-elect Obama. This optimistic expectations have been kept despite prudential protectionist talks expressed by the candidate Obama on the primaries circuit. Yet, his \$787 billion stimulus plan<sup>119</sup> signed into law on 17 February 2009 and, more generally, the international implications of his economic policy have raised concerns on the scope of his multilateral commitment. In this sense, Jagdish Bhagwati sounded an alarm well before the approval of the US economic plan. He noticed the “eloquent silence” of the

---

<sup>116</sup>Cited in Ed Pilkington, *Doubts raised over prospects of success for 'hasty summit'*, The Guardian, NY, 15 November 2008, (*my c.ve*), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/15/economics-global-economy>

<sup>117</sup>Cited in Ed Pilkington and Mark Tran, *Gordon Brown heralds progress at G20 financial crisis talks*, The Guardian, NY, 15 November 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/15/economics-globaleconomy1>

<sup>118</sup>See for example, Oswald Spengler, *Obama, an economic unilateralist*, Asia Times Online, February, 18, 2009, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global\\_Economy/KB18Dj05.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/KB18Dj05.html)

<sup>119</sup>A PDF version of the final text of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act is available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/arra\\_public\\_review/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/arra_public_review/)

President Obama “on trade issues – and his failure to balance his protectionist appointments with powerful trade proponents. Mr. Obama,” he explained “missed the opportunity, provided by the Group of 20’s affirmation of trade’s importance, to affirm that he attaches the highest priority to closing the Doha round<sup>120</sup> and will work on this urgent task throughout his first year. More important,” Bhagwati continued, “Mr. Obama has missed the bus on preventing a slide back into protectionism.” In particular, “his pronouncements on the car bail-out disregard the lessons of the early 1930s”. Similarly, the actual employment of government loans for auto recovery can be qualified as “countervailing action and dispute settlement challenges” inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which merged in 1995 into the World Trade Organization. As predicted by Bhagwati, similar measures have been then adopted all over the world, at least indirectly, in response to the US economic interventions. From Argentina and Brazil to Russia, China and Japan as far as to Australia, all these countries have planned some form of public aid for the auto recovery. On the contrary in Europe, the EU is seemed incapable to provide for a common ground of norms for supporting the European car industry in general. France, Spain, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and Portugal have then implemented singularly their own plans to sustain their own national farms. These measures have raised complains, particularly pressing in Italy, and worries within the same European institutions for what could be configured as unlawful protectionism and disloyal competition among the state members. Properly concerning the matter, the Ministry for the European industry, Guenter Verheugen, had convened the 27 EU ministries on 16 January 2009 finally giving the go-ahead to a coordinated plan of European intervention in favor of the car-sector. Yet, the declension of these aids at the

---

<sup>120</sup>The Doha Development Round is the current trade-negotiation round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which commenced in November 2001. Its objective is to lower trade barriers around the world, which allows countries to increase trade globally. Yet, state participants are divided on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. The most significant differences are between developed nations led by the European Union, the United States, and Japan and the major developing countries led and represented mainly by India, Brazil, China, and South Africa. There is also considerable contention against and between the EU and the U.S. over their maintenance of agricultural subsidies. The Doha Round began with a ministerial-level meeting in Doha, Qatar in 2001. Subsequent ministerial meetings took place in Cancún, (2003), and Hong Kong (2005). Related negotiations took place in Geneva, (2004, 2006, 2008); Paris, (2005); and Potsdam, (2007). The most recent round of negotiations, July 23-29 2008, broke down after failing to reach a compromise on agricultural import rules. After the break down, major negotiations were not expected to resume until 2009. Nevertheless, intense negotiations, mostly between US, China, and India, were held in the end of 2008 in order to agree on negotiation modalities. However, these negotiations did not result in any progress. For an official account of Doha Rounds see. [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/dda\\_e/dda\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm)



domestic level certainly will not quite the quarrel and the European seal on the public lifebelt for the car farms will not impede to the state members to act, once more, separately. “In short, what has to be saved today is not only the European car-sector but the holding stability of the common Market.”<sup>121</sup> Looking through the question and beyond the appearance, the international atmosphere is not then that of an harmonious concert of cooperative states. On the contrary, “protectionism, or the de-globalization, as the scholars of Davos<sup>122</sup> define it, is scarping back again.” This is certainly “testified by the American temptations to make campaign for the “buy American”” But, not only the states tend to writhe within. More impressively, we are assisting to “the people retreating on themselves.” The economic crisis, in fact, pushes individuals toward “forms of short-sighted nationalism” that drives them “to ask to their own governments for protection from foreigners.” This uneasy has recently flowed into social disorders which, “after Greece, France and Russia, [...] have reached the Great Britain with a series of manifestations all over the country from part of English workers asking for “British job for British workers” against the employment of Italian manpower.” It’s particularly surprising and significant as well that “Great Britain, always supporter of free trade, [...] it is now so much disturbed by the competition on its own labor market after times of openness and wide-spread well-being”<sup>123</sup>. These uproars stand to remember us resolutely that behind the economic crisis with its indexes, rates, ranks, flows, parameters, and previsions, there are people and their miseries. “Since it began, 3.6 million people have lost their job in the United States,” the White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs declared on 6 February 2009. Some emerging countries will see their developing rank brusquely decreasing, “a break

---

<sup>121</sup>Adriana Cerretelli, *Auto, Bruxelles apre il dossier aiuti*, il Sole24ore, 16 January 2009, (my tran.), <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/Economia%20e%20Lavoro/2009/01/auto-bruxelles-apre-dossier-aiuti.shtml?uuid=23e9d4ee-e39e-11dd-8bb2-8e7c532a6d51>

<sup>122</sup>In 1971 Davos began hosting the World Economic Forum, an annual winter gathering centered around discussions of the world’s leading economic, political, and social concerns. Scholars of globalization have used the term “Davos culture” to represent the elite group of international business, political, and civil-society leaders who attend the annual meeting. Its five-day 2009 meeting that taken place from 28 January attracted over 2500 participants from 91 countries, including over 1170 CEOs and chairpersons from the world’s most powerful companies. Others included 219 public figures, 40 heads of state, 64 cabinet ministers, and various other high-level business, government, think tank, media, academic, religious, organizational, and union officials. Noticeably different, according to Bloomberg, “was the virtual absence of Wall Street figures” as well as top Obama administration figures, James Hertling and Simon Kennedy, ‘Grimmest’ Davos Ever Brings Anger, *Finger-Pointing at Bankers*, 2 February 2009, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSrfvUUeboBM&refer=home>

<sup>123</sup>Marco Niada, *E’ cominciata la de-globalizzazione: allacciate le cinture*, 02 February 2009, (my trans.) <http://marconiada.blog.ilsole24ore.com/2009/02/e-cominciata-la-deglobalizzazione-allacciate-le-cinture.html#more>



which will be caught not only as a simple breaking but as real recession” and that already caused to 20 millions of Chinese workers the lost of their jobs (almost the entire amount of the Italian labor). The World Bank President, Robert Zoellick announced, moreover, that the actual financial crisis will provoke an increase in the amount of people suffering from malnutrition of 44 millions of unity<sup>124</sup>. The UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon has warned in an open letter to the Washington summit participants that a human tragedy could unfold. “If hundreds of millions of people lose their livelihoods and their hopes for the future are dashed because of a crisis they have absolutely no responsibility for, the human crisis will not remain just economic,”<sup>125</sup> he wrote. What is on play here is not only the sustainability of certain life stiles but, more decisively, entire individual and collective life projects.

#### *2.4. Cosmopolitan Democracy and the question of inclusion and exclusion*

Before coming to the solutions proposed by the supporters of Cosmopolitan Democracy to address the problem of the global deficit of democracy, and to their alternative model of world governance, we have to clarify the main presumptions on which this approach is based. In particular, the attention is here put on its conceptualization of the relationship between the internal and external domain. In this respect, Part 1. of this thesis mainly focused on accounts of international relations which share the basic assumption of the state as an autonomous and isolated political entity. Yet, it has to be noted that this is no more than a theoretical fiction, a simplification useful for building a political theory, but far from a realistic representation of what effectively took place in the course of history. In fact, no state can be rightly regarded as really and completely independent from external influences. The political communities have always reciprocally affected their lives, either though war and trade, or for diplomatic interests, religious reasons or simple desire of knowledge. In this sense, they all have been intrinsically moulded by external influences.

---

<sup>124</sup>See. Robert Zoellick press conference at Washington on 9 October 2008. Some transcriptions of the conference and a video about the potential human crisis spreading out from the current Economic Crisis are available at <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/detail/10355.html>

<sup>125</sup>Ban Ki-moon, *Secretary-General's letter to the G20 Summit*, 12 November 2008, [http://www.unicwash.org/news/sg\\_letter12nov08.htm](http://www.unicwash.org/news/sg_letter12nov08.htm)

From the ancient era to current times the channels of contact have increased with the strengthening of trade relations, the improvement of technics, the expansion of tourism, the development of mass-communications, the enhancing of migrations and so forth. Nowadays, these forms of external intrusion have terrifically increased in quantity and quality with the rise of the process of globalization. With respect to this phenomenon, in a recent work Archibugi argued that “while the traditional dichotomy internal/external assumes the existence of a clear distinction between the two areas, these dimensions become even more connected”. Thereby, the field for the autonomous decision of the state grows every day thinner<sup>126</sup>.

This is a problem which concerns all states independently from the nature of their internal regimes, either whether they are democratic or autocratic. In this sense, if on one side, the authoritarian regimes perceives the globalization as a threat since it undermines their control on the population. On the other side, the democratic states are put under pressure since the globalization ask them to answer to questions which are often placed outside of their capacity of resolution. With respect to such pressures, in the previous chapter we have described how much is actual the risk of a closure of the states, even democratic, toward the internal domain in favor of nationalistic, ethnocentric and protectionist positions. At the same time, in the same analysis, we showed also how much concrete is the possibility that such states respond violently to these puzzles.

As Kant already noted, while internally the peaceful coexistence of individuals is granted by the stipulation of the social contract, at the extra-borders level, a similar international social contract is still to be established. Till its codification, it is thus not at all granted that the states, and crucially those democratic, will act according to non-violent means in their relations with the extern. The question of finding a peaceful asset of international relations is further exacerbated since, as said, the interstate system has a direct and decisive influence on the domestic management of power. This means that, “the chance that a state has to become democratic or reinforce its democracy is directly tied to the existing international climate, because the absence of a peaceful climate cuts off the dissent, mortifies the oppositions, limits the internal freedom”<sup>127</sup>.

---

<sup>126</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.6, p.67 (my trans.)

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., p.71 (my trans.)

In reason of this reading of the relationship between the domestic and international realm, Cosmopolitan Democracy draws a strong correlations between the international peace and the internal democratization. However, this nexus has not to be intended in absolute terms. In this sense, the absence of interstate conflicts may well allow the autocratic regimes to consolidate their domestic power. Yet, the link between the two spheres “become explicit in its negative version: the absence of peace, that is a latent or manifest conflictuality, thwarts democracy”<sup>128</sup>.

In the chapters in Part 1., we have illustrated how Kant and the liberal internationalism have tried to solve the problem of the international system basing on the presumption of the popular control of the government. This would have allowed the democratic non-violent presumptions to spread across the borders. Yet, Archibugi argued, the historical accounts and the statistical data on wars, partially deny the liberal assumptions. First, a war is not always in contrast with the interests of the state and its people, in particular when the costs are limited and the benefits high and generally distributed. As crucially the rise of Nazis and Fascists have taught, the real situation is not even to be really advantageous but it suffices to make it so felt. In this cases, a sort of alliance come on place between the public opinion and the state-rulers. Secondly, the amount of wars fought by democracies is almost equal to the numbers of conflicts engaging autocracies<sup>129</sup>.

On the basis of this evidences, the liberal international doctrine has reduced its claims sustaining more simply that two democracies usually do not fight against each other. This is the hypothesis stated by the already quoted ‘Democratic Peace’ thesis. In light of this thought, it would be possible to reach at the international level at least a separated peace among democratic regimes. This peace would be ultimately based on the reciprocal recognition that those countries grant to each other and, consequently, the war ascribed to the lack of reciprocity between democratic and authoritarian states. This theory seems to be more reasonable than its previous version, since it appears plausible that two states that share a certain degree of affinity and acknowledge this resemblance will be less inclined to wage war against each other. Nevertheless, this do not saved it from some decisive defects. As Archibugi noted, first of all, it is well-known that the states give their recognition to other states not

---

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., p.74 (my trans.)

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., p.75. See also, Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, “The Monadic Democratic Puzzle and an ‘End of History’ Partial Solution?”, in *International Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2003, pp. 5-27, cit in *ibid.*, p.75

always for the high value of the war peace, but, more often, for reasons of economic, political or strategic interest. The democratic regimes are not exempt from this logic. The admission to the democratic club it has been bestowed few times with transparency, clearness and in an univocal manner and, more frequently, with interests more or less hidden or evident. Thus, relying too much upon the idea of the reciprocal recognition seems to be a too wide indulgence toward idealism. A second weakness stands in the fact that “the political systems are taken into account according to a dichotomic variable (democratic/autocratic), without considering the existing difference between their own historical evolution”. This has brought to the extension of the concept to varied epochs and circumstances and to the comparison of really different political arrangements. Yet, each state has followed its particular path of political evolution and even the democratic regimes have developed with distinctive features which still nowadays subsist. It is thus difficult when not misleading to compare such diverse realities. Finally, the democratic peace thesis may and sometimes has actually suggested that it would be simply necessary to force all the states to be democratic to obtain a peaceful world order. In this sense, Archibugi said, Norberto Bobbio has further extended the point beyond the war-case to encompass “the entire relationship between interstate system on one side and internal regimes, on the other side” with the extended implication that “if all states were democratic, even the interstate system would be democratic”<sup>130</sup>. The most recent failures of the Bush’s doctrine are only the last example of how much disastrous can be the concrete implementation of such theoretical inferences.

Contrary to this approach, the advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy do not believe that a strong and fixed relation exists between domestic and international system. The reason of this lack of congruence must be identified “in the fact that the democratic countries are too often reluctant to apply even in the foreign policy the principles and values which constitute the internal system”. At the same time, the state members of the current international system enjoy a pact of non-aggression and the recognition of a formal equality. But, because of the democratic deficit which, as we have seen, affects the international scenario, the individuals which internally are granted with the same pact, outside the borders are in no way allowed to participate to the process of decision-making. They are thus regarded no more as citizens but as mere subjects<sup>131</sup>.

---

<sup>130</sup> Archibugi, footnote n.6, pp.80-83

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p.84

In other words, the congruence of the two sphere remains conditioned by the appliance at the international level of a principle of conduct congruent with that used domestically. This implies both the coherent respect of a full developed democratic transnational system and the opening of a space for the representation of individuals. The breaking of the link between internal and external sphere brings the approach of Cosmopolitan Democracy to a further consideration. In this sense, Archibugi revealed, the implications of the question of how democracies behave in their external relations are not limited to the international sphere. Rather, they extend to touch the same very nature of the democratic regimes. In this sense, every time they commit an abuse, even at the expense of an authoritarian state, they distort their essence because they violate their constitutive pact. It is thus necessary to conceptualize a system of pacific coexistence between states with different kinds of regimes, which has to be able to urge the autocratic states to change their system without turn to the unlawful use of the military violence. At the same time, it is essential to correct the “normative error” committed by the Democratic Peace theorists and thus no more confronting democratic and autocratic states, but rather the adherence of the foreign policy of democracies with their domestic conduct<sup>132</sup>.

### *2.5. The project of Cosmopolitan Democracy: interrelated levels of governance and the world constitution*

We have seen in the previous chapter that the Cosmopolitan Democracy gives an answer to the basic question of inclusion and exclusion which decisively resolves in favor of the democratization of the international apparatus. We will study now how Cosmopolitan Democracy has effectively turned this “imaginative effort”<sup>133</sup> into a concrete system of governance.

Looking to the account developed in 2.2. of the current most striking puzzles of the world situation, the extension of democracy at the international level doesn't seem certainly at the top of the state agenda. In particular the US and Russia have showed until now to have a different intent. In this respect, in “Does the Constitutionalization

---

<sup>132</sup>Ibid. p.85-86

<sup>133</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.2

of International Law Still Have a Chance?”,<sup>134</sup> Habermas analyzed Immanuel Kant’s famous idealistic conceptions of a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ supporting a ‘cosmopolitan constitution’. Then, he contrasted Kant’s classical universalist project of a ‘world republic’ and its lesser surrogate, a ‘federalism of free states’, with two other more recent projects - a U.S.-imposed (moralist) unipolar global order of hegemonic liberalism on the one hand, and Carl Schmitt’s (realist) pluripolar antagonism (and volatile balance) of a small number of imperial powers, each of them hegemonizing a hemisphere,<sup>135</sup> on the other hand.<sup>136</sup> Whereas the ‘Bush approach’ has seriously divided the West, the ‘Schmitt approach’ seems to be at the heart of Russia’s policy toward former Soviet republics. Habermas’s sympathies are clearly with Kant,<sup>137</sup> and so are those of the supporters of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In contrast with the US and Russian models, the idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy is thus to spread democracy outside the borders revitalizing the Kantian schema. This means to endorse that all levels of human interaction being covered by this process of democratization. At the same time, this suggests to rely upon a new international constitutionalism, granting the correct accomplishment of this task according to its inspiring democratic principles.

In this sense, Archibugi takes into account five “paradigmatic dimensions”: local field, state realm, interstate domain, regional area and global sphere<sup>138</sup>, which correspond to what Michael Mann has defined as “the socio-spatial nets of social interaction”<sup>139</sup>.

At the local level, his project of Cosmopolitan Democracy pushes for the strengthening of the structure of the local government, particularly where the problems concern portions of different states. This would allow a more direct representation of the interests of the individuals.

The role of the state in the global context is instead conceptualized in a two-fold fashion. On one side, it is considered the “laboratory” where future democratic provisions are firstly conceptualized and put in practice. In this sense, as already

---

<sup>134</sup>Habermas, footnote n.54, p.115

<sup>135</sup>Carl Smith,

<sup>136</sup>Habermas mentions two further counter-models to the Kantian vision (the neoliberal model of a global market society beyond the state and the post-Marxist scenario of a dispersed empire without a power center) but ultimately considers them as unrealistic., see footnote n.125 p.185

<sup>137</sup> See. Habermas, footnote n.54, p.179

<sup>138</sup>Archibugi, footnote n. 6, pp. 98-104

<sup>139</sup>Michel Mann, ‘Has the Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?’, in *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997, pp. 472-496, cit. in Archibugi, footnote n. 117, p. 98

quoted above, within some democratic states it is currently opened the discussion on the further extension of the rights of citizenship (crucially the political rights) to certain categories of foreigners (those who regularly paid taxes and stably lived on the territory). This can constitute the premise for a wider debate on the opportunity of the institutionalization of the “cosmopolitan citizenship” which would allow the international community to meet the need of rights for which refugees, homeless and migrants in general are suffering in the global arena. On the other side, the state can be the “agent” of the process of international democratization. Yet, taking this role means not only embracing a virtuous foreign policy but, fundamentally it implies the will to respect a set of shared international procedures.

The interstate dimension is the one which is particularly affected by the ‘democratic deficit’. Indeed, there is often no guarantee that the interstate organizations will take their decisions respecting the will of the majority of the interest-holders. Such organizations are in fact exclusively composed of states which are assembled according to the principle of their formal equality. This implies that each member-state is granted with one vote independently from the amount of its population, the level of its political or military strength, and the degree of its involvement in the matter at stake. This is, for example, the system of decision-making of the General Assembly of the UN. But, analogously, in the Security Council, the right of veto of the five permanent-members violates all the traditional principles of democracy, as similarly do, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund assigning decisional power exclusively on the base of the state’s wealth. At the same time, the participation of the individuals in the choices of the interstate organizations is extremely limited. Only the European Union has a Parliament, and no other interstate organizations provide for mechanisms to involve the individuals in the choice of the most proper solution for the problems at discussion. Moreover, although it is increasing the involvement of the Non-Governmental Organizations in the interstate structure, till their contribution remains only advisory.

The regional domain is seen as a possible factor of great stability, particularly in those areas where the state institution laid upon varied archaic communities as villages, tribes, or ethnic groups. In this sense, although the European Union represents the most relevant historical case of such kind of arrangement, the regional organizations have spread, above all for trade goals, even, for example, in Africa with the foundation of East African Community.

Finally, the idea of extending the democratic principles at the global level starts from the presumption of the existence of a global governance. The actual form of this governance, as we have illustrated, is imperfect because both fails its goals and lack of any accountability. In this respect, the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy wants to give voice to the individuals independently from the decisional power they possess within their own respective states. Furthermore, in the most recent times, new and old actors are emerged on the global scenario. All these political subjects nowadays have got incomparable means to express their opinion and not necessarily this is represented by their territorial state-government. In other words, Archibugi sentenced, “a transnational active participation is developing, often associated with new forms of organization of the interests”<sup>140</sup>. The increasing desire of participation to the global matters gets expressed not just passively in an increasing number of non-governmental organizations. More concretely, it has got substance in the rising importance acquired by the so-called ‘global movements’ which, since their coming on the scene at the 1999 Seattle WTO Conference, are a constant presence of all the most important international event. Yet, these movements rise a fundamental problem of democratic legitimation. If on one side, the global movements are lacking of any political mandate and thus are deprived of any legitimate right of representation. On the other side, the decisional structures of the non-governmental organizations are in the hands of narrow groups which are not necessarily accountable to the public opinion. As consequence, Archibugi concluded, “it is not enough to evoke the existence of varied interest-holders”, first because it is necessary to define their “relative weight”, secondly because “there is no guarantee that they will come to results more consistent with the general interests”<sup>141</sup>.

In the end, then, the proposal of Cosmopolitan Democracy of involving the interests-holders in the decisional processes, rises crucial questions linked to the puzzles of who, how, and how much should be consulted. At the same time, its conceptualization of the question of government as shared among autonomous but interrelated levels of management has to face the problem of the possible conflicts of competences. The answer of Cosmopolitan Democracy to these puzzles stands in the substitution of the principle of sovereignty with a new global constitutionalism aimed at linking all institutions, at any level, to rules, checks and balances.

---

<sup>140</sup> Archibugi, footnote n.6, p.88

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., p.92



In this respect, Habermas has emphasized three normative innovations which already allegedly endow the UN Charter, in contrast to the Covenant of the League of Nations, with *prima facie* features of a constitution.<sup>142</sup> These three innovations are the explicit connection of the purpose of securing peace with politics of human rights; the linkage of the prohibition of the use of force with a realistic threat of criminal prosecution and sanctions; the inclusive character of the world organization and the universal validity it claims for the law it enacts. What it is here on question then is the further implementation of an already on-going process.

At this propos, the idea that the sovereignty is a dogma at has to be overcome<sup>143</sup> is founded on the presumption that “democracy is incompatible with the presence of a political or institutional subject which is not accountable for its actions”. While, the assumption that the global conflicts may be solved according to constitutional and juridical procedures is rooted in the conviction that “the norms can be respected even without a coercive power of last instance”<sup>144</sup>.

### *Conclusion*

In “Idea for a Universal History form a Cosmopolitan Perspective”<sup>145</sup>, a favorite concept of Kant is that the ultimate purpose of the human race is to achieve the most perfect civic constitution. In this respect, he wishes that a philosophical historian might undertake to give us a history of humanity from this point of view. At the same, Kant says, he should show to what extent humanity in various ages has approached or indeed drawn away from this final purpose and what remains to be done in order to reach it. In a ideal parallelism Archibugi similarly stated referring to what he calls a “cosmopolitical democracy”, that,

The project of cosmopolitical democracy has two components: the first one is more properly analytical, and it is devoted to appraise the state of health of democratic systems in front of the challenges of globalization. The

---

<sup>142</sup>Habermas, footnote 54, p.160.

<sup>143</sup>Hans Kelsen, *Il problema della sovranità e la teoria del diritto internazionale*, Giuffrè, Milano, (1920) 1999.

<sup>144</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.2, pp.105-106

<sup>145</sup>Immanuel Kant., ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective’, in *Kant’s Political Writings*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991

second component is instead essentially normative, and questions itself on how democratic systems should change to preserve their own nature in a world in which the interactions among states have become so remarkable.<sup>146</sup>

In an inexplicit manner, this thesis has followed the remarks of these authors in the analysis of how the basic political question of inclusion and exclusion has been faced in the context of the government of international relations. Thus, first, we described the most significant moments of a run which is characterized by the constant increase in the mechanisms of political inclusion. Then, we account a model for the full realization of this tendency.

On the first point, Kant, drawing his view of the progress of humankind toward its final destination, already suggested that the very idea of this concept necessarily implies the problem of determining an objective measure of this evolution. But, in his analysis, we constantly attend to an endless tending of the political toward the moral so that the political community will never completely meet its moral ideal. However, the general design of nature is revealed in occasional “moments of the instant” which a careful observer can detect to verify the adherence of the legal and political sphere to the moral requirement of a cosmopolitan constitution. In other words, although the problem of the humans progress cannot be solved immediately by direct experience, only through the experience it is possible to find evidences of this advancement.

In accordance with the suggestion of the philosopher of Königsberg, this dissertation seeks through a ‘cosmopolitan reading’ of some significant case-studies, not only to offer some arguments in support of the political inclusion but also to demonstrate that the plan for a Cosmopolitan Democracy is already an on-going evolutionary process shaping in some way the norms and practices of contemporary global politics. In this sense, this thesis has covered a large historical time-frame. In this context, the theoretical run of the international relations theory has been touched together with three main moments of its concrete application. This description documents the constant strengthening of the rule of law and the principles of democracy at the international level until the codification of a system which in itself encompasses the premises of a global constitution. At the same time, the rights of men have been secured even outside the state-borders through the implementation of an extended

---

<sup>146</sup>Archibugi, footnote n. 7, pp. 262-263

Human Rights regime. Furthermore, there are recent proofs that the public attention on the world issues is increasing. The mass demonstrations which took place during the 1999 and 2001 G8 meeting in Seattle and Genoa, together with the public protests that have spread around Europe in 2003 against the US military intervention in Iraq, as well as the recent demonstration in London against the G20 and the current economic crisis, are significant in this sense. In fact, as Archibugi suggested, “despite [that] there is a tendency to exaggerate the citizens’ involvement in matters that do not concern directly their own political community,” these events demonstrate that “it is growing a feeling of affiliation to a planetary community that has assumed a political dimension.”<sup>147</sup> Yet, as the same author denounced, in similar occasions “it is uncertain what are the purposes of both the summit meetings and the anti-summit movements“ and, still now, on the side of the so-called global movements, “the protest prevails on the proposal.”<sup>148</sup> If the path towards a global society has still to be accomplished, the same contemporary political international system cannot be regarded as satisfactory. The guiding-principles of democracy are in fact far from informing its government. In particular, the democratic deficit is felt on the side of the individuals who have no means to make their voice directly eared in the rooms of the international power.

Here the second remark of Kant and Archibugi becomes relevant. In other words, an answer to the problem of the further fulfillment of an incomplete commitment is required. According to Kant, the individuals takes this obligation as a moral requirement. For Archibugi, it is both the coherence toward and the survival of a system, the democratic one, that first to be political is a system of live and thought, which asks for a general re-thinking of the international schemas. Thus, if on the Kantian side the main normative question is how to fill the gap between morality and politics, Archibugi asks to conceptualize new democratic forms of power management appropriate for the new global context. However, in both cases the individuals and the law are at the centre. Hence, Kant’s idea of a progress of the human gender discloses a run whose degree of success in approaching its final purpose, the perfect civil unification of humankind, is reflected in the quality of the changes set in the legal and normative order. Particularly for what is of significance in this dissertation, this means to adjust the latter to fit a cosmopolitan global institutional asset which provides for

---

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., p.265

<sup>148</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.2, p.334

the respect of the people's cosmopolitan right. In this sense, this thesis has endangered the proposal of reform of the current global governance system advanced by the advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Their idea encompasses changes, in democratic terms, of norms and procedures of traditional political and economic world institutions, recognized status for non-governmental subjects, as well as the establishment of new stages for the global representation of the interests of human beings.

Many counter-assertions have been raised against this project and its presumptions. In conclusion, we address three main stands of these critiques. The first category of objections regards Cosmopolitan Democracy as mere idealism. In this category, the realist theorists sustain that power and self-interest are, in the end, the main regulative elements of international relations. As consequence, any project of democratization and popular participation at the international level is destined to remain the utopian account of a world which is never to come<sup>149</sup>. Yet, new actors are currently coming on the stage of world politics and this enrichment puts at risk the sustainability of the realist conclusions. The multiplication of the actors turned, in fact, into a diversification of the goals and instances which denies the central realist paradigm of the state as the unique actor of world politics<sup>150</sup>. Looking at the global panorama in these terms, it is then no more correct the statement that the main international actors rely on power and are contrary to the democratic global governance. It is rather much more correct to say that "there are contrasting interests" some pushing for the concentration of power in few hands and others that ask for a larger participation<sup>151</sup>.

The inapplicability of the plans of Cosmopolitan Democracy is often charged by the realist thought to the world hegemonic role taken nowadays by the US in the political, economic and military ambit. In this respect, the two approaches share a common consciousness of both this predominant force and the risks that this would be used not for the general common good. Yet, their positions split on the answer to this recognized puzzle. Realists rely upon the further strengthening of the principle of sovereignty and the enforcement of a policy of alliances, even between heterogeneous regimes, to re-establish the balance of powers. But, As Archibugi noticed, the failure of the coalition of varied states which opposed against the US-war on Iraq in 2003 seems to deny the efficacy of such strategies. At the same time, in the course of

---

<sup>149</sup>D. Zolo, *Cosmopolis. La prospettiva del governo mondiale*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1995

<sup>150</sup>Morghentau, footnote n.37

<sup>151</sup>Archibugi, footnote n.2, p.129 (my trans.)

history the principle of sovereignty has been used more by the state-governments for maintaining their internal power than by the weaker states to defend against the stronger. If we add that the domestic control of the order granted by the notion of sovereignty has been often endorsed by the state with violent means at the expense of the population, the realist counter-hegemonic project does not appear in the end particularly profitable. In contrast, the action of authoritative global institutions would have had a stronger effect. It would have faced the problem of the Iraq-war on the base of an established and shared legal system prompted to solve these situation in a more comprehensive manner, dealing with the problem of both Iraq internal democratization and the US external aggression. At the same time, the idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy of giving international voice and direct influence in the world decisions to other actors different from the states, may guarantee a strong counter-force against the concentration of power. In fact, Archibugi states, “if [the] interests” that has to be represented “come from who has lesser power, [these] are necessarily anti-hegemonic” and, as such, “better protected in a system in which the power is distributed among several institutions”. The will of guaranteeing such representation is in the end a question of political choice and not at all a pure exercise of consolatory fantasies<sup>152</sup>.

The second order of complains refer to the estimated timing of the concrete realization of an asset in line with the provisions of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In other words, the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy would be a too-demanding plan for a man of our time and probably even of our closer future generations. It would been needed for its effective implementation of a maturation of the political circumstances which would required a two extended time period. On the other hand, as Keynes repeated, in other contexts, “in the long run we are all dead” and a plan that does not attach concretely to the contemporary circumstances is only an illusory option. In this respect, Robert Dahl seems skeptical on the possibility of extending the constitutive principles of democracy to the international institutions<sup>153</sup>. Yet, this set of objections seem to mislead the idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy since they underestimate the progressive character of this approach and the flexibility of its institutional conceptualization. In this sense, Cosmopolitan Democracy asks for working out new forms of application of the democratic principles of government. What is requested

---

<sup>152</sup>Ibid.

<sup>153</sup>Robert A. Dahl, ‘Is Post-national Democracy Possible?’ in Sergio Fabbrini, *Nation, Federalism and Democracy*, Compositori (ed.), Trento, 2001.

are effective democratic models suitable with the new globalize context rather than the mere application of domestic solutions out of the borders. At the same time, in the hard cases the ideal solution stated by Cosmopolitan Democracy may be subjected to a certain degree of compromise to meet the particular difficulties of the concrete circumstances. This would allow the advancement of puzzling situations though intermediated levels of democratization while further developments are waited for the complete realization of the democratic ideal. In this terms may be interpreted, for example, the proposals of the Italian ambassador Paolo Fulci for the enlargement of the UN Security Council. In 1994, he suggested to create a new category of ten seats, elected by the General Assembly and assigned according to a mechanism of 'frequent rotation'. These seats would have been reserved to a group of twenties countries chosen among the most populous nations and the major financial contributors of the organization. At the same time, the remaining ten seats would have been available for the weaker states. In 1997, Fulci modified this project proposing further to reserve one of the new seats (five or more in this revised version) to the EU. The seat would have been occupied by each European members at rotation<sup>154</sup>. In the context of the quarrel here at stake, Pulci's proposals illustrate how is concretely possible to move toward the position of Cosmopolitan Democracy, even in hard questions as the problem of the Security Council enlargement, though a process by degrees. This way of proceeding as a double advantage. In the short period, even if at a minimal stage, it allows to get the goal of extending the right of political participation of the interested-actors. While, in the long-run, it helps to get familiar with possible future further reforms. For example, in the case of the Security Council, the elimination of the right of veto granted to the five permanent-members and the total eligibility of all the Council members.

The final set of critiques affirm that a cosmopolitan democracy could not be really democratic because actually there is no global *demos*. Indeed, an adhesion of world individuals comparable with that existing in the domestic realms does not exist, at least yet<sup>155</sup>. In this respect, Cosmopolitan Democracy is often accused of circularity

---

<sup>154</sup>Andrea De Guttry and Fabrizio Pagani, *Le Nazioni Unite*, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, pp.153 and following

<sup>155</sup>Winfried Thaa, 'Lean Citizenship: The Fading Away of the Political in Transnational Democracy', in *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 7, no. 4, 2001, pp.503-523; Glyn Morgan, 'Democracy, Transnational Institutions, and the Circumstances of Politics', in Bruce Morrison, *Transnational Democracy in Critical and Comparative Perspective*, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp.173-190

because a sense that the world constitutes a community is required before a global democracy could be effective, yet such a sense is unlikely to emerge in the absence of some kind of global democracy. Contemporary liberal democracies emerged from pre-democratic state structures, by analogy, it is sustained, global democracy would require the existence of a global state-structure that could be democratized<sup>156</sup>.

For what concern this last aspect, in the course of this thesis, we have attempted to illustrate three main moments of the international history which, after Westphalia, have represented the arrangement given, in different epochs, to the relations between states. This assets have not been the expression of isolated circumstances, but, rather, the result of a cumulative process of learning which from the idea of 'collective security' has led exactly to an embryonic form of global political arrangement<sup>157</sup>.

With respect to the accuse of circularity, although in many cases a sentiment of adhesion and recognition of a defined set of people has preceded their civil union, this process has not to be intended in an absolute way, because in many occasions the institution have created the demos. This was the case, for example, of the US where a specific political order has shaped the nature of the American identity.

Furthermore, the same basic definition of what constitutes a demos is not univocal because there is no agreement on a set of shared elements defining with certainty what makes a multitude of persons a demos. If we base on general ideas of links of solidarity and mutual recognition of common characters, then, nowadays a community is not necessarily confined within defined territorial borders. Consequently, to draw simply a strong correlation between a people and a community distinguished on a rigid territorial standard is no more the best way to take account of the needs of those persons. It is often repeated against Cosmopolitan Democracy that a global demos does not exist and that even though it were real not necessarily this would be interested in the world matters. In the doubt, we continue to believe that it would be more appropriate to guarantee the people's chance of expressing their own opinion rather than giving for granted their apathy.

---

<sup>156</sup>Brown, footnote n. 4, p.246

<sup>157</sup>Habermas, footnote 54

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### **Books**

- AMOROSO, L., *Senso e consenso. Uno studio kantiano*, Guida, Napoli, 1984.
- ANDERSON-GOLD, S., *Unnecessary Evil. History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, State University of N.Y. Press, N.Y., 2000.
- ANGELL, N., *The Great Illusion*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1909.
- ARCHIBUGI, D., *La democrazia cosmopolitica*, Asterios, 2000.
- ARCHIBUGI, D., *Cittadini del mondo, verso una democrazia cosmopolitica*, il Saggiatore, Milano 2009
- ARCHIBUGI D., FALK R., HELD D., KALDOR D., *Cosmopolis. E' possibile una democrazia soprannazionale?*, Manifestolibri, Roma, 1993.



- ARCHIBUGI, D., HELD, D., KÖHLER, M., *Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.
- ARENDT, H., *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1958; tr. it., *Vita activa. La condizione umana*, Bompiani, Milano, 1989.
- ARENDT, H., *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, The University of Chicago, Chicago, 1982; tr. it., *Teoria del giudizio politico*, Il Melangolo, Genova, 1990.
- ARENDT, H., *Truth and Politics* in «The New Yorker», 25 feb., 1967, pp. 49 – 88; tr. it., *Verità e Menzogna*, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1995.
- BARKAWI, T.- LAFFEY, M., *Democracy, Liberalism, and War*, Lynner Rienner Publisher, 2001.
- BIANCHI, L., (a cura di), *L'idea di cosmopolitismo. Circolazione e metamorfosi*, Liguori, Napoli, 2002.
- BOHMAN J., LUTZ – BACHMANN M. (ed.), *Perpetual Peace: Essay on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- BROWN, C., *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice. International Political Theory Today*, Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002.
- BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society*, Macmillan, London, (1977) 1995.
- CAROTHERS, T., *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 1999.
- CARR, E. H., *The Twenty Years Crisis*, Macmillan, London, 1939.
- CARROLL, J., *Humanism*, Fontana Press, London, 1993.
- COBDEN, R., *The Political Writings of Richard Cobden*, T. Fisher Unwin (ed.), London, 1903.
- DE CAPUA, R., *Kant e il modello cosmopolitico di pace perpetua*, Rubbettino, 1998.
- DERRIDA, J., *Sull'ospitalità*, Baldini&Castoldi, Milano, 2000.
- FALK, R., *The Great Terror War*, Olive Branch Press, 2003.
- FERRAIOLI, L., *La sovranità nel mondo moderno*, Anabasi, Milano, 1995.

- FOYLE, D. C., *Counting the Public In*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1999.
- GAUBATZ, K. T., *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace*, Stanford University Press, 1999.
- GIDDENS, A., *The Third Way and its Critics*, Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000.
- GOLDMANN, L., *Mensch, Gemeinschaft und Welt in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants*, Europa Verlag, Zürich, 1945; tr. it., *Introduzione a Kant. Uomo, comunità e mondo della filosofia di Immanuel Kant*, Sugar, Milano, 1972.
- GOWA, J., *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NY, 1999.
- GROTIOUS, H., *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, translated by A. C. Campbell, *On the Law of War and Peace*, London, 1814.
- GUNARATNA, R., *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2002.
- DE GUTTRY, A. – PAGANI, F., *Le Nazioni Unite*, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005.
- HABERMAS, J., *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie, Suhrkamp*, Frankfurt a. M. 1996; tr. it., *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998.
- HABERMAS, J., *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, H. Luchterlandel Verlag, Neuwied, 1962; tr. it. *Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica*, Laterza, Roma – Bari, 2001.
- HABERMAS, J., *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001.
- HABERMAS, J., *The Divided West*, Ciaran Cronin (trans.), Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.
- HAYDEN, P., *Cosmopolitan Global Politics*, Burlington, Ashgate, VT, 2005.
- HEATER, D., *World Citizenship and Government. The Cosmopolitan Idea in the History of Western Political Thought*, Macmillan, London 1996.

- HEGEL, F., 'Elements of the Philosophy of Rights', in Allen w. Wood (ed.), *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
- HELD, D., *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995.
- HELD, D. – MCGREW, A., 'The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction', in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *The Global Transformations Reader*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002.
- HELD, D. – MCGREW, A., *Governing the Globalization*, Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, trans. it, *Governare la Globalizzazione*, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005.
- HENDERSON, E., *Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?*, Lynner Rienner Publisher, 2002.
- HILFERDING, R., *Finance Capital*, Tom Bottomore (ed.), Routledge, Kegan Paul, London, 1981.
- HOBBS, T., *Leviathan*, Penguin, London, [1651] 1968.
- HOLSTI, K. J., *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
- KANT, I., *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, in *Kant's Political Writings*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
- KANT, I., *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective*, in *Kant's Political Writings*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
- KANT, I., *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Kant's Political Writings*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., ed. Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
- KANT, I., *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals*, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.

- KELLY, G. A., *Idealism, Politics and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969.
- KISSINGER, H. *A World Restored, Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1957.
- KRATOCHWIL, F., ‘Sovereignty as a *Dominion*: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’, in Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995.
- KRASNER, S. D., *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999.
- LIPPMAN, W., *The Phantom Public*, Macmillan, NY, 1927, Transaction Publishers edition, 1993.
- LIST, F., *The National System of Political Economy*, Frank Cass (ed.), 1966.
- LOCKE, J., *The Second Treatise of Government*, Liberal Arts Press, NY, [1690] 1960.
- MARINI, G., *Tre studi sul cosmopolitismo kantiano*, Istituti poligrafici internazionali, Pisa, 1998.
- MARRAMAIO, G., *Dopo il Leviathano. Individuo e comunità*, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2000.
- MARTINEZ, G., *Cosmopolitismo e pace universale. Contributo alla storia dell’idea nell’antichità classica*, Sassari, 1916.
- MILL, J. S., *Considerations on Representative Government*, Harpers and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1862.
- MORGENTHAU, H., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1948, trans. it, *Politica tra le nazioni. La lotta per il potere e la pace*, il Mulino, Bologna, (1948) 1997.
- NARDIN, T., *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983.
- NICOLSON, H., *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822*, Constable & co. ltd., London, 1946.
- NEIBUHR, R., *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1932.

- NORTHEGE, F. S., *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946*, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1986.
- NUSSBAUM, M., *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.
- O'NEILL, B., *Honor, Symbols, and War*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999.
- ONUF, N., *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1989.
- OWEN, J., *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security*, Cornell University Press, 1997.
- PAGE B. – SHAPIRO R., *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.
- RASLER, K. – THOMPSON, W. R., *Puzzles of the Democratic Peace Theory, Geopolitics and the Transformation of World Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan Editor, 2005.
- RASLER, K. – THOMPSON, W. R., *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.
- REITER, D. – STAM, A. C., *Democracy at War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NY, 2002.
- RISKS, T. H., *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, The Penguin Press, 2009
- ROUSSEAU, J. J., *The Social Contract*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, [1762] 1988.
- RUSSET, B., *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993.
- RUSSETT B. – ONEAL, J. R., *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.
- RUSSETT B. – STARR H., *From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the*

- International System*, in «Handbook of War Studies», 2d ed., M. Midlarsky (ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000.
- SALVUCCI, P., *L'uomo di Kant*, Argalia, Urbino, 1975(2).
- SAVI, M., *Il concetto di senso comune in Kant*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1998.
- SEN, A., *Commodities and Capabilities*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999.
- SHUE, H., *Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996.
- TARABORRELLI, A., *Cosmopolitismo: dal cittadino del mondo al mondo dei cittadini. Saggio su Kant*, Asterios Editore, Trieste, 2004.
- TUCK, R., *The Rights of War and Peace*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
- TUNDO, L., *Kant. Utopia e senso della storia. Progresso, cosmopoli, pace*, Edizioni Dedalo, Bari, 1998.
- VINCENT, R. J., *Human Rights and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
- WALKER, R. B. J., *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
- WALTZ, K. N., *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, 2001.
- WALZER, M., *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Basic Books, NY, 1997.
- WENDT, A., *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
- ZOLO, D., *Cosmopolis. La prospettiva del governo mondiale*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1995.

*Articles, Papers and Essays*

- ANDERSON – GOLD, S., ‘Kant’s Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest Good as a Social Goal’, in *International Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol.26, pp. 23 – 32, 1986.
- ANDERSON – GOLD, S., ‘Cosmopolitan Right – Kant’s Key to Perpetual Peace’ in *Kant’s Perpetual Peace. New Interpretative Essays*, Luigi Caranti (Ed.), LUISS University Press, 2006.
- APEL, K. O., ‘Selected Essays’, in *Humanity Books*, ed. Eduardo Mendieta, Amherst, NY, 1996.
- APEL, K. O., ‘Kant’s ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ as Historical Prognosis from the Point of View of Moral Duty”, in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal*, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- APEL, K. O., ‘The Problem of Justice in a Multicultural Society’, in *Questioning Ethics*, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, eds. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, Routledge, NY, 1999.
- ARCHIBUGI, D., ‘Cosmopolitical Democracy’, in Daniele Archibugi (ed.), *Debating Cosmopolitics*, London, 2003.
- ARCHIBUGI, D., ‘Sogni cosmopolitici e incubi mattutini’, in Sebastiano Maffettone e Gianfranco Pellegrino, *Etica delle relazioni internazionali*, Marco Editore, Cosenza, 2004.
- ARCHIBUGI, D., ‘La Democrazia Cosmopolitica: Una Visione Partecipante’, in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Vol. 35, No. 2, August, 2005.
- BECK, U., ‘Democracy Beyond the Nation-State’, in *Dissent*, Vol. 35, 1999, pp. 53-55.
- BUENO de MESQUITA, B., et al., ‘Selection Institution and War Aims’, in *Economics of Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 31-52, Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2006.
- BRADER, T., ‘Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions’, in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 388-405, 2005.

- CEDERMAN, L. E., 'Back to Kant: Reinterpreting The Democratic Peace as a Collective Learning Process', in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, 2000.
- CHAN, S., 'In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise', in *The International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 59-91, 1997.
- DAHL, R. A., 'Is Post-national Democracy Possible?' in Sergio Fabbrini, *Nation, Federalism and Democracy*, Compositori (ed.), Trento, 2001.
- DEVEMPORT, C. – JOHNSTON, H. – MULLER, C., 'Repression and Mobilization', in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 111, No. 5, pp. 1579-1581, 2006.
- DEMENCHONOK, E., 'From the State of War to Perpetual Peace', in *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2007.
- DIXON, W. J., 'Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict', in *American Political Science Review*, Mar 1, 1994.
- DOORENSPLEET, R., 'Reassigning Three Waves of Democratization', in *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 384 – 406
- DOYLE, M., tr. it., 'La voce del popolo. La teoria politica delle implicazioni internazionali della democrazia', in *Teoria politica*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 3 –31, 1995.
- DOYLE, M., 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, eds. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996.
- DOYLE, M., 'Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace', in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 463 – 466, 2005.
- EYERMAN J., HART R. A., 'An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracy Speaks Louder than Words', in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 597 – 616, 1996.



- EYERMAN J., HART R. A., 'Building Bridges Abroad', in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 455 – 56, 1997.
- FARNHAM, B., 'The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception', in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, pp. 395 – 415, 2003.
- FERRAJOLI, L., 'Dai diritti del cittadino ai diritti della persona', in D. Zolo (a cura di), *La cittadinanza. Appartenenza, identità, diritti*, cit., pp. 263 – 292.
- FERRARI, J., 'Du cosmopolitisme chez Kant', in L. Bianchi (a cura di), *L'idea di cosmopolitismo*, cit. pp. 273 – 295.
- FOUCAULT, M., 'Perchè studiare il potere: la questione del soggetto', in *Aut aut*, 205, 1985, pp. 2 – 10.
- GARTNER S., SEGURA G., 'War, Casualties, and Public Opinion', in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 278 – 300, 1998.
- GONNELLI, F., '«Pubblico» e «pubblicità» nella filosofia politica di Kant', in *Almanacchi nuovi. Rivista di filosofia e di questioni sociali*, Vol. 1, pp. 31 – 52, 1997-98.
- GIUGNI, M., 'Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective', in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 111, No. 5, pp. 1581-1583, 2006.
- GRIECO, J. M., 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', in *International Organization*, Vol.42, pp. 485-508, 1988.
- HABERMAS, J., "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, 'with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years' Hindsight", in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Buchman, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- HABERMAS, J., 'Interpreting the Fall of a Monument', in *Constellations*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 364 – 370, 2003.
- HABERMAS, J. – DERRIDA, J., 'February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy,

- Beginning in the Core of Europe’, in *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*, eds. Daniel Levy, Max Pensky, and John Torpey, Verso, NY, 2005.
- HELD, D., ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’, in *Alternatives Social Transformation and Human Governance*, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 415 – 429, 1995,.
- HENDERSON, G. P., ‘The Public and Peace: The Consequences for Citizenship of the Democratic Peace Literature’, in *International Studies Research*, Vol. 8, pp. 199-224, 2005.
- HINSKE, N., ‘...Perchè il popolo colto rivendica con tanta insistenza la libertà di stampa. Pluralismo e libertà di stampa nel pensiero di Kant’, in *Archivio di filosofia*, Vol. 58, No 1 – 3, pp. 281 – 298, 1995.
- KELSEN H., ‘Sovereignty and International Law’, in *The Georgetown Journal*, vol. 48 (1920) 1960; trans it, *Il problema della sovranità e la teoria del diritto internazionale*, Giuffrè, Milano, (1920) 1999.
- KLEINGELD, P., ‘Kant, History, and the Ideas of Moral Development’, in *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol. 16, pp. 59 – 80, 1999.
- LANDOLFI PETRONE, G., ‘Progresso e cosmopolitismo in ‘Der Streit der Fakultäten’ di Kant”, in L. Bianchi (a cura di), *L’idea di cosmopolitismo*, cit. pp. 333 – 356.
- LAURSEN, J. C., ‘Publicity and Cosmopolitanism in late eighteenth-century Germany’, in *History of European Ideas*, Vol. 16, No. 1 – 3, 1993, pp. 117 – 122.
- MACMILLAN, J., ‘Beyond the Separate Democratic Peace’, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 233- 243, 2003.
- MANDELA. N., ‘The Challenge of the Next Century: The Globalization of Responsibility’, in *NPQ: New Perspective Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 34-5, 2000.

- MANN, M., 'Has the Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?', in *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 472-496, 1997.
- MARTIN, R. W. T., 'The Free and Open Press: The Founding of American Democratic Press Liberty, 1640-1800', in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 340-343, 2005.
- MENEGONI, F., 'L'apriori del senso comune di Kant: dal Regno dei fini alla comunità degli uomini', in *Verifiche*, 19, 1990, pp. 13 – 50.
- MERKER, N., (a cura di), «Introduzione», *I. Kant. Stato di diritto e società civile*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1995, pp. 7 – 71.
- MORGAN, G., 'Democracy, Transnational Institutions, and the Circumstances of Politics', in Bruce Morrison, *Transnational Democracy in Critical and Comparative Perspective*, Ashgate Publishing, pp.173-190, 2004.
- MOUSSEAU, M., 'Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace', in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 472 – 507, 2000.
- NUSSBAUM, M., 'Kant and cosmopolitanism', in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (ed.), *Perpetual Peace: Essay on Kant's cosmopolitan Ideal*, pp. 25 – 37.
- NUZZO, A., 'L'idea kantiana della pace perpetua tra morale, diritto e politica', in *Teoria Politica*, Vol. 2, pp. 47 – 62, 1995.
- OWEN, J., 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', in *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 87 – 125, 1994.
- PELLEGRINO, U., 'Etica e politica in Kant', in G. Micheli e G. Santinello (a cura di), *Kant a due secoli dalla 'Critica'*, Padova, pp. 125 – 139, 1984.
- PETRUCCIANI, S., 'Chi è il soggetto del progresso?', in *La cultura*, Vol. 3, pp. 465 – 473, 1997.

- PIRNI, A., 'Kant e il « problema cosmopolitico». Riflessioni a partire da un recente studio di Guliano Marini', in *Teoria*, Vol. 21, pp. 121 – 132, 2000.
- POGGE, T. W., 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty', in *Ethics*, Vol. 103, pp. 61 – 69, 1992.
- QUATTROCCHI, P., 'L'ideale della comunità umana come determinante costitutiva del regno dei fini', in Rigoballo, *Ricerca sul 'regno dei fini Kantiano'*, Bulzoni ed., pp. 191 – 213, Roma, 1974.
- RASLER, K. A. – THOMPSON, R. W., 'The Monadic Democratic Puzzle and an 'End of History' Partial Solution?', in *International Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 5-27, 2003.
- ROSATO, S., 'The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory', in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 4, 2003.
- SAMPSON, R. J., et. al., 'Civil Society Reconsidered: The Durable Nature and Community Structure of Collective Civic Action', in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 111, No. 3, pp. 673-714, 2005.
- SCHAWARTZ, T. – SKINNER, K., 'The Myth of the Democratic Peace', in *Orbis*, Vol.46, Issue 1, pp. 159 – 172, 2002.
- SEN, A., 'Le radici della democrazia', in *Internazionale*, 513, 10, pp. 28 – 35, 2003.
- SOLARI, G., 'Il concetto di società in Kant', in *Rivista di filosofia*, 25, 1934, pp. 26 – 32, Ripubbl. In Id., *Studi storici di filosofia del diritto*, Torino, s.d., pp. 251 – 280, 1949.
- STARR, H., 'Democracy and War: Choice, Learning, and Security Community', in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 207 – 13, 1992.
- SVOLIK, M., 'Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation', in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 909-925, 2006.

- TARABORRELLI, A., 'Cosmopolitan Right – Kant's Key to Perpetual Peace' in *Kant's Perpetual Peace. New Interpretative Essays*, Luigi Caranti (Ed.), LUISS University Press, 2006.
- TENENBAUM, K., 'Kant tra libertà morale e libertà politica', in Id., *I volti della ragione. L'Illuminismo in questione*, cit., pp. 79 – 92.
- THAA, W., 'Lean Citizenship: The Fading Away of the Political in Transnational Democracy', in *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp.503-523, 2001.
- VAN BELLE, D., 'Press Freedom and the Democratic Peace', in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 4, pp. 405 – 14, 1997.
- VENTURELLI, D., 'Libertà, totalità, destinazione in riferimento costante a Kant', in D. Venturelli (a cura di), *Etica e destino*, Il Melangolo, Genova, pp. 97 – 123, 1997.
- VUILLEMIN, J., *On Perpetual Peace and On Hope as Duty*, «PKC», 8, I. 1, pp. 19 – 32, 1995.
- WALT, K., 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', in *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 44, pp.21-37, 1990.
- WILLIAMS, M. C., 'The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism, and the Social Construction of Security Communities', in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp.525-553, 2001.

***Interviews, Official Discourses and Web sites***

- ALLEN, M., *Iraq Combat Could Outlast Obama's Term*, Copyright Politico, February 8, 2009, [http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/us\\_world/Iraq\\_combat\\_could\\_outlast\\_Obama\\_s\\_term.html?corder=&pg=1](http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/us_world/Iraq_combat_could_outlast_Obama_s_term.html?corder=&pg=1)
- The AVALON PROJECT, 'President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points', in *Lillian Goldman Law Library*, Yale Law School,

- retrieved on 19-04-2008,  
[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/wilson14.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp)
- The AVALON PROJECT, 'The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919', in *Lillian Goldman Law Library*, Yale Law School, retrieved on 19-04-2008,  
[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject\\_menus/versailles\\_menu.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp)
- BREMNER, C., *Full text of the Georgia peace plan - and obstacles to its implementation*, Times Online, Moskow, August 13, 2008,  
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4522496.ece>
- CERRETELLI, A., *Auto, Bruxelles apre il dossier aiuti*, il Sole24ore, January 16, 2009,  
<http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/Economia%20e%20Lavoro/2009/01/auto-bruxelles-apre-dossier-aiuti.shtml?uuid=23e9d4ee-e39e-11dd-8bb2-8e7c532a6d51>
- COOPER, H. – STOLBER, S. G. *Obama Ponders Outreach to Elements of Taliban*, The New York Times, March 7, 2009,  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama.html?\\_r=1&hp](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama.html?_r=1&hp), a version of this article appeared in print on March 8, 2009, on page A1 of the New York edition.
- CQ TRANSCRIPTIONS, *Obama's National Security Team Announcement*, December 1, 2008,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/us/politics/01text-obama.html>
- GALL, C., *As U.S. Weighs Taliban Negotiations, Afghans Are Already Talking*, The New York Times, March 11, 2009,  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/asia/11taliban.html?\\_r=1&ref=world](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/asia/11taliban.html?_r=1&ref=world), a version of this article appeared in print on March 11, 2009, on page A8 of the New York edition.

- HERTLING, J., - KENNEDY, S. *'Grimmest' Davos Ever Brings Anger, Finger-Pointing at Bankers*, February 2, 2009, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSrfvUUeboBM&refer=home>
- HUMAN RIGHT WATCH, *Letter to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili regarding civilian casualty figures in South Ossetia*, October 10, 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/10/10/letter-georgian-president-mikheil-saakashvili-regarding-civilian-casualty-figures-so>
- KI-MOON, B., *Secretary-General's letter to the G20 Summit*, 12 November 2008, [http://www.unicwash.org/news/sg\\_letter12nov08.htm](http://www.unicwash.org/news/sg_letter12nov08.htm)
- LOBE, J., *U.S.: Diplomacy, Multilateralism Stressed by Obama Team*, Inter Press Service (IPS) – Global News Agency, December 1, 2008, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44937>
- MAKARYCHEV, A. S. *Russia and its 'New Security Architecture' in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept*, CEPS Working Document No. 310, February 2009
- MANSBRIDGE, P., *U.S. will respect trade pacts 'as we always have': Obama* U.S. president says he'll discuss 'comprehensive' Afghanistan strategy with PM, Obama's interview held in front of the Canadian Broadcasting Corp at the White House on February 17, 2009 <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/17/obama-cbc.html>
- MEDVEDEV, D. A., *Discourse over the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia*, August 26, 2008. An English version of the discourse can be found on <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27medvedev.html>

- MEDVEDEV, D. A., *Speech at the World Policy Conference*, Evian, October 8, 2008,  
<http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/10/207422.shtml>
- MEDVEDEV, D. A., *Interview with BBC*, Sochi, 26 August 2008,  
<http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205775.shtml>
- NIADA, M., *E' cominciata la de-globalizzazione: allacciate le cinture*, February 2, 2009,  
<http://marconiada.blog.ilsole24ore.com/2009/02/e-cominciata-la-deglobalizzazione-allacciate-le-cinture.html#more>
- OBAMA, B. H., *Responsibly ending the war*, discourse issued at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009,  
[http://indiedesign.typepad.com/inspire\\_political\\_discour/2009/02/full-text-and-video-of-president-obamas-speech-ending-the-war-in-iraq.html](http://indiedesign.typepad.com/inspire_political_discour/2009/02/full-text-and-video-of-president-obamas-speech-ending-the-war-in-iraq.html)
- OBAMA, B. H., *Obama's Interview Aboard Air Force One*, The New York Times, March 7, 2009,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08obama-text.html?pagewanted=all>
- OBAMA, B. H. – BIDEN, J., *Plan For Ending the war in Iraq*,  
<http://www.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/>
- PILKINGTON, E., *Doubts raised over prospects of success for 'hasty summit'*, The Guardian, NY, November 15, 2008.  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/15/economics-global-economy>
- PILKINGTON, E. – TRAN, M. *Gordon Brown heralds progress at G20 financial crisis talks*, The Guardian, NY, November 15, 2008,  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/15/economics-globaleconomy1>
- PUTIN, V. *Interview with CNN*, Sochi, 28 August 2008,  
<http://www.government.ru>
- SANTORO, G., *Ennio Remondino: "Con la Georgia è finito l'unilateralismo Usa"*, interview to Ennio Remondino



- September 10, 2008,  
<http://gabrielesantoro.blogspot.com/search?q=remondino>
- SAVAGE, C., *Obama Upholds Detainee Policy in Afghanistan*, The New York Time, February 21, 2009,  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/washington/22bagram.html?\\_r=2&scp=2&sq=bagram&st=cse](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/washington/22bagram.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=bagram&st=cse), a version of this article appeared in print on February 22, 2009, on page A6 of the New York edition.
- SPENGLER, O., *Obama, an economic unilateralist*, Asia Times Online, February 18, 2009,  
[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global\\_Economy/KB18Dj05.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/KB18Dj05.html)
- The UNITED NATIONS, *UN Press Conference On Gaza Humanitarian Situation*  
<http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/361eea1cc08301c485256cf600606959/1cdd241153ed6c6285257544004fe09f!OpenDocument>
- The WHITE HOUSE, *Statement by the President on Afghanistan*, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 17 February, 2009,  
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/)
- The WHITE HOUSE, *American Recovery and Reinvestment Act*,  
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/arra\\_public\\_review/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/arra_public_review/)
- WOODWARD, B. – GELLMAN, B. – ROBINSON, E. *Woodward: For Bush Legacy, Iraq Looms Large*,  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/bush/legacy/roundtable/>
- YOUNGSMITH, B., *Hawks for Hillary. Why are conservatives heaping praise on Obama's new secretary of state?*, The New Republic Monday, December 1, 2008,  
<http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=7383b582-aaf3-4b35-a042-9b3c10c562fd>

