

LIBERA UNIVERSITA INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STUDI SOCIALI GUIDO CARLI

Ph.D. Program in Political Theory

Centre for Ethics and Global Politics

Cycle XXI

On recognition in the contemporary world

Ph.D. Thesis

Rome, April 2010

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	4
Introduction	5
Ch. I. The Global Context	8
A. David Held and the Global Transformations	8
B. Imanuel Wallerstein's World-system perspective	13
C. Colonialism and the 'endangered world'	17
Ch. II. Delineating power	20
A. Michael Mann's model of social power	21
B. A rough proposal for a new hypothetical model	27
C. The problem of power and recognition.....	31
Ch. III. Understanding the values	36
A. Basic claim and the idea of values	36
<i>The concept of value</i>	37
B. Main theories of values.....	40
<i>Schwartz's theory of values</i>	41
C. Other perspectives to values and the claim on recognition.....	47
<i>Cultural and societal values</i>	48
<i>Ronald Inglehart's study of values</i>	49
<i>Identity and values</i>	53
<i>Recognition of values</i>	55
Ch. IV. Exploring the concept of recognition	57
IV. I. Overview of the main theories of recognition and their implications for recognition in the contemporary world	57
A. Hegel's conception of recognition in Honneth's interpretation.....	57
<i>Another interpretation of Hegel's conception of recognition</i>	64

B. Taylor's conception of recognition.....	66
IV. II. A proposal of a rough model of recognition	70
A. Three levels of recognition.....	70
B. Two directions of recognition (inter- and intra-).....	72
C. The phenomenology of recognition	73
<i>Hermeneutical understanding as the central moment in the phenomenology of</i>	
<i>recognition</i>	<i>75</i>
D. The basic model of recognition.....	77
Ch V. Exploring the framework of cosmopolitanism within the	
sociological and psychological/social-philosophical perspective	82
A. Sociological perspective to cosmopolitanism: B. S. Turner, Z. Skrbis, G. Delanty.....	84
<i>Turner's defence of the social.....</i>	<i>84</i>
<i>Skrbis et al.: Trying to delineate the dimensions of the cosmopolitan disposition.....</i>	<i>86</i>
<i>Delanty's critical cosmopolitanism.....</i>	<i>90</i>
B. Extending the notion of cosmopolitanism to the psychological (social-philosophical)	
perspective.....	96
<i>The hermeneutics of the cosmopolitan.....</i>	<i>96</i>
<i>Gilligan's double conception of morality.....</i>	<i>99</i>
Conclusion.....	102
LITERATURE.....	105

Acknowledgments

This work is the outcome of a diverse experience. An important step in shaping the ideas was a rich experience in the open minded and multicultural surrounding of the Luiss community. The friendship established with people from different cultural backgrounds, with different views, but with an open view to the whole world was particularly enriching for me. I am grateful to all the people who joined this community and helped it become real, the friendly faculty and the vision of Professor Sebastiano Maffettone.

I would particularly like to mention my dear friends, Daniela Casula, Devrim, Ivana, Paul and Dhruv, and our colleagues and faculty, Daniele Santoro, Raffaele Marchetti and Aakash Singh, who were always open for discussion. I am happy to have had a chance to learn from and discuss with Alessandro Ferrara, and with two kind persons David Rasmussen and Hauke Brunkhorst, who were very supportive for me from early on.

My gratitude also goes to many people in Croatia and the Former Yugoslavia, particularly to those who created small but important circles of tolerance and understanding in the midst of war in the Balkans. I am happy to have learnt from their humanity and acuteness to injustice. Many thanks to Suzana, Vedrana and Rade Kalanj.

I had a very pleasant academic and living experience in the cosmopolitan city of Berlin. Many people contributed to that and I am sincerely grateful to them.

Throughout my life and study I had a big support from my family, my parents to whom I owe my deep gratitude.

I would like to dedicate this work to many of those around the world who strongly need recognition.

Introduction

In this work our aim is to analyse the broad framework in which the problematic of recognition takes place today. The process of recognition is crucial for human beings, as it is primarily through this process that people get constituted as persons. As Charles Taylor says, recognition is not a courtesy we owe people, it is a vital human need¹. Recognition as we conceptualise it here is primarily a process of constitution of interrelations of understanding and respect among human beings. Through the process of recognition people get to realise their identities and this is the basis for their constitution as moral human beings. The significance of the process of recognition is thus broad and multifaceted, and for the contemporary world there are important implications. We thus aim to analyse different aspects of human existence and different societal features to articulate better the place of and the need for recognition in the contemporary world. This we will primarily do through delineating several concepts that strongly relate to the concept of recognition, particularly in the contemporary world.

In observing the world, we will identify the processes that significantly shape the world of today. We will find the rising interdependence and interconnectedness of different features and parts of the world today, even time and space compression². On the other hand, the great differences between the cultures and societies, inequalities and historical injustices are brought also closer. In this world many cultures and societies have not had a chance for true realisation, they were not given proper recognition, both historically and in present times.

In such compression and interdependence of the world, where the diversity of cultural and societal settings come into close contact, these injustices become more evident and the

¹ Charles Taylor, 1994. 'The Politics of Recognition', in: Amy Gutman (ed) *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, p. 26.

² This understanding of global processes is mainly pointed in contemporary social theory.

conflicts easily arise. This strongly calls for better relations. We look at these global processes and some injustices in the first chapter.

By this we come to tackle the problem of power. Power relations seem to be disturbing the process of recognition and this is particularly relevant at the global level today. We thus aim to explore the concept of power, particularly as a model for better understanding the global relations. We try to show that the apprehension of power is an important condition for the possibility of true recognition, and in particular the constellation of power globally. This we explore in the second chapter.

In the third chapter we focus on the concept of values which we find highly relevant for the process of recognition. As said, the process of recognition is primarily the process of the constitution of the identity of people. The values, for which we claim, and with Charles Taylor explore, are the defining feature of the identity of people. We thus claim that the values are an important object of recognition. As we look at the world we are interested in how do values appear across the societies and cultures. We will see that there is a potential for universal human dignity, as some values seem to create the basis of all human beings. However, there are differences in priorities given to these values, and other cultural and societal values seem to largely differ. These different values have to be recognised. The process of thus becomes complex. We are to realise ourselves, that is, to be recognised today, not any more only within a smaller and rather homogeneous community, but in the world of different cultures and societies with their different values. We thus propose, by exploring the conceptualisations of recognition particularly by Hegel and Charles Taylor, that the basis for a better world are primarily the relations of recognition between different cultures and societies. These relations of recognition with different others should primarily be based on understanding and respect for their different values. We term this intercultural and intersocietal recognition. This also involves the relations between groups and institutions.

These relations of intercultural and intersocietal recognition are to be the basis for the global arrangement of institutions and potentially a global political framework. This forms another line of recognition, more a vertical line, that we call global intrasocietal recognition. It is to occur between the citizens and the world, where the world should be represented by just institutions that recognise the citizens with respect to their cultural and societal backgrounds, and which citizens would in turn recognise. We observe these conceptualisations and the original theoretical foundations of recognition in the fourth chapter.

In exploring the problematic of recognition in the contemporary world we find a parallel concept of cosmopolitanism relevant. We explore this concept to understand better the bases and the framework of recognition. This we do in the fifth chapter.

Ch. I. The Global Context

To begin with we shall now turn the look to the world of today, also in the historical perspective of its creation, with some of the determining processes concerning the problematic of recognition and the realisation of the identities. We shall here take a closer look at some global transformations processes which support the thesis of the rising degree of interrelatedness and interdependence at the global level, while at the same time the threats and the injustices rise. This sets the framework where the need for recognition primarily appears.

This effort will be mainly helped by considering David Held's analysis of the globalisation processes and the world-system perspective of Immanuel Wallerstein.

A. David Held and the Global Transformations

In his indepth analysis of globalisation processes, the contemporary British philosopher David Held³ has the merit of analysing the phenomenon of globalisation by taking into consideration several perspectives when clarifying its political, military, economic, financial, corporative, migrational, cultural and environmental dimensions. All of these processes actually follow the thesis of greater interrelatedness and interdependence of the world. To show how the processes of globalisation is a consequence of the assumption that the world is characterised by an increasing degree of interrelatedness and interdependence, we will focus on the political and military dimensions of the globalisation process. It is worth noting that D. Held's perspective is more positive and enthusiastic about the globalisation overall than our own. However his analysis gives the basis for debate about such trend of globalisation.

³ David Held is a British political theorist who teaches at London School of Economics and Political Science. Here we refer to D. Held, 1999. *Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture*.

The overall view of primarily political interconnectedness is supported by the from the following Held's observation:

'Today, virtually all nation-states have gradually become enmeshed in and functionally part of a larger pattern of global transformations and global flows⁴. Transnational networks and relations have developed across virtually all areas of human activity. Goods, capital, people, knowledge, communications and weapons, as well as crime, pollutants, fashions and beliefs, rapidly move across territorial boundaries⁵. Far from this being a world of 'discrete civilisations', or simply an international society of states, it has become *a fundamentally interconnected global order, marked by intense patterns of exchange as well as by clear patterns of power, hierarchy and unevenness.*⁶

The last sentence of this quotation triggers us to concentrate on the problematic in which some societies or cultural groups rest 'on the other side of power', that is, the problematic of unequal chances for recognition.

Overall, in line with A. Giddens's understanding we could define globalisation 'as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa'⁷, that local happenings can shape events very distant from the initial localities.

In the view of political globalisation processes what actually happens is that political decisions and actions in one part of the world can rapidly acquire worldwide ramifications.⁸

D. Held summarises the historical forms of political globalisation by categorising them on the basis of their main four features: extensity (how widespread it is), intensity (how profound it is), velocity (how quickly it happens) and impact propensity (what impact/influence it makes).

⁴ *ibid.* from Nierop, 1994, p. 171

⁵ D. Held, 1999. from A. McGrew, 1992.

⁶ D. Held, 1999. p. 49. (please note that the emphasis has been added by the author)

⁷ Anthony Giddens, 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. p. 64.

⁸ D. Held, 1999. p. 49.

	Early modern (14th-18th century)	Modern (19th-20th century)	Contemporary (1945 on)
Extensity	Largely intraterritorial and intraregional, but beginnings of imperial expansion	Global empires Global system of nation-states emerges	Global states system Global political order emerges Regionalisation of politics and interregionalism
Intensity	Low volume, but nodes of intensity when political and/or economic competitors meet and clash	Increasing volume and expansion of flows/connections	Unprecedented level of flows, agreements and networks (formal and informal) and connections
Velocity	Limited, sporadic	Increasing	Speeding up of global political interaction as 'real time' communication emerges
Impact propensity	Low, but with concentrated nodes of impact	Increasing institutional and structural consequences	High: interconnectedness, sensitivity and vulnerability

Table 1. D. Held's summary of historical forms of political globalisation⁹

What this overview provided by D. Held primarily shows is that in the global domain, and this primarily among the nation states, there is a remarkable growth in the extensity, intensity, velocity and the impact propensity of the political processes.

Now, while there are stronger ties in the global political domain (which could also be questioned from the perspective of the balance of political power worldwide), we can also observe stronger military globalisation and even more important global militarisation, which may be a direct and increasing threat to such political closing. These two military processes are quite interrelated but there is a certain difference, as D. Held has helpfully explained¹⁰, but they both show a significant increase. Global militarization refers primarily to the process of increasing levels of total world military armaments, armed forces and military expenditures.

⁹ *ibid.* p. 79, please note that here the author chooses to report only the part of the summary table that she considers as helpful in further developing her analysis.

¹⁰ *ibid.* p. 88.

On the other hand, military globalisation refers to the process of 'military connectedness that transcends the world's major regions' which is reflected in stronger global military relations, networks and interactions. We contend that in the end both of these processes are equally dangerous.

What actually happens globally in the military domain is, as D. Held described, the geopolitical rivalry and imperialism of the great powers, the emergence of a world trade in arms together with the worldwide diffusion of more sophisticated military technologies, while, as he argues, we are assisting to the evolution of international alliance systems, international security strategies and the institutionalisation of the global regimes with jurisdiction over military and security affairs¹¹. These facts are in evident contradiction with the view to what extent they actually promote peace and security worldwide, since on the contrary they favour a further increase of the military power¹².

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

The following table helps to summarise the dominant features of military globalisation in the view of D. Held:

	Early modern (14th-18th century)	Modern (19th-20th century)	Contemporary (1945 on)
Extensity	Largely intraregional arms flow Age of Discovery and expansionism	Consolidation of global empires and rivalries Beginnings of global arms trade and multilateral regulation	Global states system Global arms dynamic Interpenetration of global and regional security complexes
Intensity	Low volume of flows/connections because of poor infrastructural capacity	High volume and velocity of flows/connections	Unprecedented level of flows/connectivity across all military/security domains
Velocity	Measured in centuries/decades	Low to high	High: rapid diffusion
Impact propensity	Low: mercantilism and autarchy	High sensitivity/vulnerability	High sensitivity/growing vulnerability

Table 2. D. Held's summary of dominant features of military globalisation¹³

What this table primarily shows is *the rise* in extensity (how widespread it is), intensity (how profound it is), velocity (how quickly it's happening) and impact propensity (what impact/influence it makes) of military globalisation. This in other words means that there is a rise in military relations and networks, as well as in the diffusion of military technology, which all causes growing vulnerability among the states, since, as Held states 'as the innovators¹⁴ develop and deploy leading edge military technology, other states are confronted with a pronounced security dilemma: either they strive to acquire the latest hardware and systems or, failing to do so, their potential military power, and in consequence their military

¹³ *ibid.* p. 135, please note that only a part of the summary table is reproduced here.

¹⁴ The concept 'global arms dynamic' in the table refers primarily to the military technological innovation.

security, may be eroded'¹⁵. And neither of this overall brings a greater security to just any citizen of the world, because there is either a gap in the 'quality' of military technology, which is a threat for the citizens of those who are militarily less powerful, or there is simply more of these technology all around the world, and then any citizen is more endangered, as it is a threat to the overall peace in the world.

From these assumptions we can conclude that the interconnectedness and interdependence of the world is certainly growing, primarily in the political (and economic) terms, while there is also a rise in the military potentials of all states, which is a greater threat to this more interrelated world, in particularly to those societies which are in the subordinated position of the power relations.

Another perspective which could be helpful in enhancing our understanding of the contemporary world is Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system perspective, to which we now turn.

B. Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system perspective

Immanuel Wallerstein's¹⁶ world-system school is a helpful perspective for approaching the problematic of today's world. It is strongly critical of today's capitalist global system (world-system in his words) and it calls for a historical perspective of considering the global processes.

In those respects it is close to the approach we would like to put forward in this work, in treating the problematic of recognition.

¹⁵ D. Held, 1999. p. 103

¹⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein is an American sociologist that founded the Fernard Braudel research centre.

Immanuel Wallerstein is the founder of the intellectual school of world-systems theory¹⁷ in which he combines social sciences (primarily sociology) with history and calls for a historical perspective for the analysis of the current global context. I. Wallerstein is best known for his three-volume 'The Modern World-System'¹⁸, where he argues that our current global circumstances should be analyzed within the context of centuries-long politico-economic processes that have their origins in the sixteenth century, since it was then that the capitalist world-economy started to emerge. I. Wallerstein thus adopts an approach that employs a long-term perspective in dealing with certain problems in history and the social sciences, calling it in Fernand Braudel's term *la long durée* (long term).

The three major intellectual building blocks of world-system theory, as conceived by I. Wallerstein, are the Annales school (with the long term perspective), K. Marx, and the dependency theory¹⁹.

In the view of I. Wallerstein, 'a world-system is a social system that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in

¹⁷ Wallerstein's *theory* is actually an analytical approach to the modern world-system.

¹⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*. 3 volumes (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980, 1988).

¹⁹ The dependency theory is a neo-Marxist explanation of development processes, which focuses on the understanding of 'periphery' by looking at core-periphery relations. One of the main proponents of the New Dependency Studies is the Brazilian Fernando Henrique Cardoso. (More on Dependency 'Theory' can be found also Alvin Y. So. 1990. *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency and World-System Theories*.)

others... Life within it is largely self-contained, and the dynamics of its development are largely internal'.²⁰

A world-system today is what I. Wallerstein terms a 'world economy'. It is integrated through the market rather than through a political center, and in it two or more regions are interdependent with respect to necessities (like food, fuel, and protection), and two or more polities compete for domination without the emergence of one single center forever.²¹

I. Wallerstein defines a world-system as one in which there is extensive division of labor, which is not merely functional, that is, occupational, but geographical. This means that 'the range of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout the world-system'²². This is in part the consequence of ecological considerations, but for the most part, as I. Wallerstein states, 'it is a function of the social organization of work, one which magnifies and legitimizes the ability of some groups within the system to exploit the labor of others, that is, to receive a larger share of the surplus'²³. Followingly, this division of labour refers to the forces and relations of production of the world economy as a whole and it leads to the existence of two interdependent regions: *core* and *periphery*. These are geographically and culturally different. The *core-states* focus on capital-intensive production and are thus the advantaged areas of the world-economy, the states are strong, while the *periphery* focuses on labour-intensive production, where the states are usually weak. There are also semiperipheral areas which are in between the core and the periphery and act as buffer zones. Semiperipheral states are of moderate strength and have a mix of the kinds of activities and institutions that exist in them.

Among the most important structures of the current world-system is according to

²⁰ I. Wallerstein, 1976. *The modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. p. 229

²¹ Walter L. Goldfrank 2000. 'Paradigm Regained? The Rules of Wallerstein's World-System Method', *Journal of World-Systems Research*. Vol. 6. N. 2 p.150-195

²² I. Wallerstein, 1976. p. 230

²³ *ibid.*

Wallerstein's perspective a power hierarchy between the *core* and the *periphery*. In this power hierarchy powerful and wealthy core societies dominate and exploit weak and poor peripheral societies. Technology is a central factor in the positioning of a region in the core or the periphery, so advanced or developed countries are the core, and the less developed are in the periphery. Peripheral countries are structurally constrained to experience a kind of development that reproduces their subordinate status, while the strong states reinforce and increase the differential flow of surplus to the core zone. This is the central process in the world-system, the process of *unequal exchange*, which is the systematic transfer of surplus from semiproletarian sectors in the periphery to the high-technology, industrialized core²⁴. This leads to a process of *capital accumulation* at a global scale, and necessarily involves the appropriation and transformation of peripheral surplus.²⁵

Wallerstein's world-systems theory provided a model for understanding both change in the global system and the relationship between its parts. He was among the first theorists to suggest that we depart from the relatively newly developed unit of the nation-state and to study global interaction instead.

Wallerstein's approach is helpful in taking the global whole at once into account. And thus this perspective can be useful in understanding the global context of today. As some societies in the world economy remain at the periphery, and participating in unequal and we could say unfair exchange, they are not being given a proper chance for the societal development. There arises the need for better recognition of these societies.

²⁴ W. L. Goldfrank, 2000.

²⁵ Dependency theorists first articulated a relationship of 'unequal exchange' in which the rich nations of the world enforced trade relationships with the poor, in which the former extracted surpluses from the latter. Building up on this Wallerstein conceptualised his world-system perspective with three categories: core, periphery, and semi-periphery, where the relationship between core and periphery was a straightforward description of dependence and exploitation between rich and poor. See more in Alvin Y. So (1990). *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency and World-System Theories*.

C. Colonialism and the 'endangered world'

As we have mentioned earlier the realisation of the identity is an important process how for individuals, so also for the societies and cultures, as it is largely also through them that the individuals, belonging to a particular society or culture, get to be realised.²⁶ We shall now take a deeper look at how, in one of the central cases in the history of humankind, such realisation has been disabled. It is the process of colonisation that has strongly affected the possibility for realising the identities of people who were colonised. Our primary concern are the societies and cultures, but we do not neglect individuals.

In the slave system, that was organised from the late seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century some 15 million people²⁷ were taken to the Americas to be purchased for the work in the plantations and the mines, primarily. The system was very cruel, it was turning the people into commodities. It was the system of the 'triangular trade':

'The slave system was organised in the famous 'triangular trade': ships laden with manufactured goods, such as guns or household implements, sailed from ports such as Bristol and Liverpool, Bordeaux and Le Havre, to the coasts of West Africa. there Africans were either forcibly abducted or were purchase from local chiefs or traders in return for the goods. Then the ships sailed to the Caribbean or the coasts of North or South America, where the slaves were sold for cash. This was used to purchase the products of the plantations, which were then brought back for sale in Europe.²⁸

So, the slaves were bought and sold as commodities which is the utmost denigration of human dignity. And this was also done, supporting the wars in Africa, while backing the arising

²⁶ Some further exploration of this issue will be done in the chapter on Values (Ch. III).

²⁷ See Stephen Castels & Mark J. Miller. 1998. *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, p. 53, from Appleyard, R. T. 1991. *International Migration: Challenge for the Nineties*, p. 11.

²⁸ S. Castels & M. J. Miller. 1998. p. 53

economic system of the New World. According to S. Castles & M. J. Miller the motive force of the colonial system was the emergence of global empires, 'which began to construct a world market, dominated by merchant capital'²⁹. This is the setting and the foundations on which the world economy of today is based.

The following passage helps to show the cruelty of the system:

'Slaves were transported great distances by specialised traders, and bought and sold as commodities. Slaves were economic property and were subjected to harsh forms of control to maximise their output. The great majority were exploited in plantations, which produced for export, as part of an internationally integrated agricultural and manufacturing system.'³⁰

'For the women, hard labour in the mines, plantations and households was frequently accompanied by sexual exploitation. The children of slaves remained the chattels of the owners.'³¹

Chattel slavery, as the system is called for the fact that people were turned into moveable possession, formed the basis of commodity production in the plantations and mines of the New World.³² The system grew fast. By 1770 there were nearly 2.5 million slaves in the Americas, producing a third of total value of European commerce³³, rising to the estimated 15

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ *ibid.* from Fox-Genovese, E. and Genovese, E. D. 1983. *Fruits of Merchant Capital. Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism*, and Blackburn, R. 1988. *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776-1848*.

³¹ S. Castels & M. J. Miller. 1998. p. 53

³² According to S. Castles & M. J. Miller, the production of sugar, tobacco, coffee, cotton and gold by slave labour was crucial to the economic and political power of Britain and France – the dominant states of the eighteenth century – and played a major role for Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.

³³ S. Castels & M. J. Miller. 1998. p. 53, from Blackburn, R. 1988. *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776-1848*, p. 5.

million by 1850.³⁴ The slave system was later replaced by indenture or the 'coolie system', which involved recruitment of large groups of workers, sometimes by force, and their transportation to another area to work under very strict conditions.³⁵ According to Potts³⁶ indentured workers were used in 40 countries by all the major colonial powers. By her estimations the system involved from 12 to 37 million workers between 1834 and 1941 (when indentureship was finally abolished in the Dutch colonies).

With this, we hope we provided with an exhaustive of the way the modern world was organised for more than two and a half centuries. This organisation set a very different basis for the economic, political, but also cultural and social development of different societies and communities. While this organisation turned to be beneficial to Western societies, it was detrimental to the development of the rest of the world. This unbalance has largely affected also the potential of non-Western societies to develop in a more authentic way, and thus to build their own culture.

In this chapter we tried to outline some of the features of the contemporary world which show the need for recognition, in particular the recognition of those who are subordinated and deprived in this world. In the following chapter this will be somewhat expanded with a more concrete claim to be made.

³⁴ Slavery was abolished in 1834 in British colonies, 1863 in Dutch colonies and 1865 in the southern states of the USA. S. Castels & M. J. Miller. 1998., p. 53, from Cohen, R. 1991. 'East-West and European migration in a global context', *New Community* 18, Vol. 1.

³⁵ S. Castels & M. J. Miller. 1998. p. 53. By this system British colonial authorities recruited workers from the Indian sub-continent for the work on sugar plantations of Trinidad, Guyana and other Caribbean countries. Other groups of workers were employed in plantations, mines and railway construction in Malaya, East Africa and Fiji. Dutch colonial authorities used Chinese labour on construction projects in the Dutch East Indies, etc.

³⁶ in S. Castels & M. J. Miller. 1998. from Potts, L. 1990. *The World Labour Market: A History of Migration*.

Ch. II. Delineating power

It is the ideal situation that all citizens are free and equal from the start, as it is Rawls's basic assumption of the original position. In reality though, the differences that exist strongly, and shape the relations, need to be tackled for the possibility to think the ideal situation.

To manage the big differences we need the categorical tool. On one hand, to keep protected those differences that are ontic, essential for the being, and that could be turned into the advantage. And on the other hand, we particularly need the categorical tool, for those 'destructive differences', that increase the non-essential inequality (that could also be named injustice), to make them apprehended, delineated, and thus possibly nivellated.

As it is from the differences that the power significantly stems, it is the analysis of power that can reveal the 'good' and the 'bad' differences, and thus create the possibility for potential ideal conditions (those of justice).

It is our claim that the apprehension of power is the condition of possibility for true recognition. Why this is so?

It is because the power masks the true standing point, or the true position, of particular societies or cultural groups, while this true position should be the basis for recognition. In other words, power determines the conditions in which the identities need to be constituted. So, in order for true recognition of particular groups or societies to be possible, we need to delineate the constellation of power, and bring it to awareness.

One example of this could be the historical process of colonisation. The colonisation, as it has been described in the first chapter, strongly determined the conditions in which the societies, communities of Africa in particular have been constituted. For the true recognition of an ex-colonial country or even a continent, to be possible, this process of colonisation, which is fundamentally the power process, needs to be apprehended, that is, brought to

awareness. Without such apprehension these countries, societies remain in the deprived position, as their underdevelopment and significantly conflictual situation can be ascribed only to them.

So, we need the apprehension of power globally for the possibility of constitution of the identities that are being formed in the world today³⁷.

We will therefore in this chapter try to set the framework in which such apprehension of power might take place. Firstly, we shall take a closer look at the model of power that the sociologist Michael Mann proposes, as it sets a good analytical model for the analysis of power in the world today. Michael Mann, who has been teaching at the London School of Economics and Political Science at the time of the publication of the first of his three volume book, *The Sources of Social Power*, analyses in it the historical dynamic of social power.³⁸

Then we shall propose a rough analytical model of power as analytical tool for the power in the contemporary world and further observe the problematic of power in the contemporary world.

A. Michael Mann's model of social power

In M. Mann's sense power is understood as the power of institutions which are multiple, overlapping and intersected socio-spatial networks that comprise a society³⁹. M. Mann is eager not to accept the societies as unitary forms, as he has a broader historical picture in mind, looking at the formations that have been developing and declining throughout the history. So, according to him, 'a general account of societies, their structure, and their history

³⁷ And here we particularly mean the collective identities.

³⁸ Michael Mann, 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*, 3 Vol. Michael Mann is now he a Distinguished Professor at UCLA, University of California, Los Angeles. <http://www.soc.ucla.edu/people/faculty?lid=729>

³⁹ M. Mann, 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. 1, 'A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760', Chapter I., 'Societies as organized power networks'

can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what [he calls] the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships'⁴⁰. M. Mann analysing the sources of social power actually analyses the societies. For him, societies are the overlapping networks of social interaction and also the organisations, institutional means of attaining human goals. Though we do not fully conform to M. Mann's understanding of societies (as in other parts of this work we tend to observe them as rather stable units), we would like to present and possibly use his analytical tool for another framework of analysis, that is analysis of power in the world today.

M. Mann basically starts from the premise that human beings in pursuing their goals create institutions which eventually form the power sources. He looks at these goals as emergent needs, as a chain reaction in which the new needs emerge in the course of primary need satisfaction. And thus he concentrates on emergent *organisational power sources*.

First, he defines several of these organisational types of power. In its most general sense, M. Mann understands power as 'the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one's environment'⁴¹. Social power for him carries two more specific senses: distributive and collective aspect. While restricting the meaning of power to the mastery over other people, we have a *distributive* aspect of power (power over), since the relationship of power by A over B is a 'zero-sum game' (a fixed amount of power can be distributed among participants). A second *collective* aspect of power is where persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature (power to). As M. Mann notes, in most relations both aspects of power, distributive and collective, operate simultaneously and are intertwined.

Further, M. Mann distinguishes extensive and intensive power, and authoritative and diffused power, where these two lines of distinction often combine.

⁴⁰ *ibid.* p. 2

⁴¹ *ibid.* p. 6

Extensive power refers to 'the ability to organise large numbers of people over far-flung territories in order to engage in minimally stable cooperation'⁴², while the *intensive power* refers to 'the ability to organise tightly and command a high level of mobilisation or commitment from the participants'⁴³ (no matter if the area and numbers covered are great or small). 'Power is intensive if much of the subject's life is controlled or if he or she can be pushed far without loss of compliance (ultimately to death).'⁴⁴ To make more clear distinction, M. Mann further distinguishes *authoritative power*, which is willed by groups and institutions, and comprises definite commands and conscious obedience, and on the other hand, *diffused power* which spreads in a more spontaneous, unconscious, decentered way throughout a population, typically comprising an understanding that social practices in which it results are natural or moral or result from self-evident common interest (so are not explicitly commanded). The well-known example of diffused power would be the contemporary world capitalist market. Since this type of power is generally more spontaneous and unconscious it is harder to be tackled, and hence can be more dangerous.

M. Mann identifies four ideal-typical forms of organisational reach by combining these two lines of the distinction of power, with the following examples:

	<i>Authoritative</i>	<i>Diffused</i>
<i>Intensive</i>	Army command structure	A general strike
<i>Extensive</i>	Militaristic empire	Market exchange

Figure 1. Michael Mann's identification of four forms of organisational reach⁴⁵

⁴² *ibid.* p. 7

⁴³ *ibid.*

⁴⁴ *ibid.* p. 8

⁴⁵ Taken over from M. Mann, 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol.1., p. 9

Now, we come to the main model of power, as M. Mann conceived it. It is the model with the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military and political, and it can be presented by a scheme (see Figure 2).

Ideological power derives from three interrelated notions; the necessity of socially defined meaning, then from norms ('shared understandings of how people should act morally in their relation with each other') and from aesthetic/ritual practices (a distinctive power can be conveyed through song, dance, visual art form, or ritual). Where meaning, norms, and aesthetic and ritual practices are monopolised by a distinctive group, it may possess considerable extensive and intensive power.⁴⁶ Religious movements are the most obvious example M. Mann suggests. Ideological organisation is principally 'socio-spatially transcendent', in that 'it transcends the existing institutions of ideological, economic, military, and political power and generates a 'sacred' form of authority, set apart from and above more secular authority structures'⁴⁷. So, this source of power is generally based on diffused organisation of power but with authoritative aspects.

Economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature. A class is a grouping formed around these tasks and a dominant class can obtain general collective and distributive power in societies. A dominant class is the one that monopolises control over production, distribution, exchange and consumption relations, which on the other hand combine a high level of intensive and extensive power. Economic power is generally diffuse (not controllable from a center⁴⁸). Economic organisation comprises circuits of production, distribution, exchange and consumption, circuits which are

⁴⁶ *ibid.* p. 22-23

⁴⁷ *ibid.* p. 23

⁴⁸ Which means that class structure may not be unitary, or a single hierarchy of economic power.

principally extensive, but also involve intensive (practical, everyday) labour – in Marx's term the praxis – of the mass of the population.⁴⁹

Military power derives from the necessity of organized physical defence and its usefulness for aggression. Military power has both intensive and extensive aspects, as it on one hand concerns questions of life and death, and on the other as it involves the organisation of defence and offense in large geographical and social spaces. Those who monopolise it (as military elites) can obtain collective and distributive power. Military organisation is essentially concentrated-coercive since it mobilises violence, the most concentrated, and probably bluntest, instrument of human power. This form of power is also authoritative.⁵⁰

Political power, according to M. Mann, derives primarily from the utility of centralized, institutionalised and territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relation. Political organisation can be domestic, where the state is territorially centralised and territorially-bounded, and the 'states can thus attain greater autonomous power when social life generates emergent possibilities for enhanced cooperation and exploitation of a centralised form over a confined territorial area'⁵¹. In this sense it depends predominantly upon techniques of authoritative power. On the other hand the political-power organisation can be a geopolitical diplomacy, where the states territorial boundaries give rise to an area of regulated interstate relations.⁵²

So, the model is based on goal-oriented people who form many different social relationships which in turn coalesce around the most powerful organisational means to form road

⁴⁹ *ibid.* p. 24-25

⁵⁰ *ibid.* p. 25-26

⁵¹ *ibid.* p. 27

⁵² *ibid.*




Figure 2. Michael Mann's causal IEMP model⁵³

⁵³ Taken over from M. Mann, 1986. *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol. 1, p. 29

institutional networks of determinate and stable shape. These combine intensive and extensive power, as well as authoritative and diffused power. According to M. Mann, the four sources of social power are each centered on a different means of organisation, while the four sources are understood as ideal types. Tendencies toward forming a singular network derive from the emergent need to institutionalise social relations, where 'the character of each is likely to be influenced by the character of all, and all are necessary for each'. The more institutionalised these interrelations, the more the various power networks converge toward a more unitary society. However, according to M. Mann many networks remain interstitial both to the four power sources and to the dominant configurations. This means that beyond the four power sources around which the most important networks form, remain areas of social interaction, aiming to achieve new goals, which were poorly institutionalised into the dominant configurations, and these eventually produce a more powerful emergent network, 'centered on one or more of the four power sources, and induce a reorganisation of social life and a new dominant configuration'⁵⁴. And this is how M. Mann sees the historical process to be continuing. We find M. Mann's model significant for better understanding of the power relations in the world today.

B. A rough proposal for a new hypothetical model

For further research of the global complexity we shall here outline a new rough hypothetical model, that we in part base on M. Mann's model. It is thought as a trial to devise ideal-typical constructions as methodological tool in the analysis of power in the contemporary world. For this consideration two basic axes of power⁵⁵ are employed. Each axis comprises a rather

⁵⁴ *ibid.* p. 30

⁵⁵ Power is here principally conceived in compliance with Michael Mann's definition of power as the power of institutions which are multiple, overlapping and intersected socio-spatial networks that comprise a society

distinctive complexity of several characteristic dimensions. These two axes, however, are taken ideal-typically and not as completely separate entities. As it will be seen different spheres of the societal complexity create the nexuses of power.

A possible question that we can try to answer to develop our methodology to analyse power relations in the contemporary world might be formulated as follows: do power dimensions combine, and if yes, how do they combine to form even stronger clusters of power? This model is in a way an extension of M. Mann's model, but is here complemented by further research in literature and some more empirical research studies.

The first axis of power that we see relevant for today's world is composed of the three dimensions. These are: religion, ethnicity/nation and the politics.⁵⁶

RELIGION – ETHNICITY/ NATION – POLITICS

The bases for this axis of power we find in several characteristics of these particular dimensions. Firstly, the differentiation that Anthony Smith⁵⁷, a well-known theoretician of ethnicity and nationalism, makes between the ethnic and civic concept of nation is useful here. Civic nation is primarily understood as an association of people with equal and shared political rights, and allegiance to similar political procedures, while ethnic nation is in turn based on a presumed common ancestry, shared historical memories, myths, symbols, and values, similar perceptions and sentiments, and usually an association with a specific 'homeland' and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. The ethnic concept of nation is thus more based on imagination, values and sentiments which are deeply

⁵⁶ Grounds for the first axes of this hypothetical model might be found in some of the research studies done in some of the Former Yugoslavian countries. See Srđan Vrcan, 2004. Religion and politics – The symptomatic example of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s', in Vujadinović et al., ed. *Between Authoritarianism and Democracy*. Book II. *Civil Society and Political Culture*) regarding the first axis of power; and mostly M. Mann's research and the IEMP model of organised power regarding the second axis.

⁵⁷ Anthony D. Smith is Professor Emeritus of Nationalism and Ethnicity at the London School of Economics, and is considered one of the founders of the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies. Here we particularly refer to his book: Anthony D. Smith, 1991. *National Identity*.

embedded in the individual conscious but also subconscious part of personality. They are thus not rationally very controllable by the individual. This conception of ethnic identity may well combine with religion, that is religiosity as a personal religious commitment. Religiosity has been particularly explored by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark⁵⁸, two sociologists of religion, who distinguished five dimensions of religiosity: religious belief, religious experience, religious practice, religious knowledge, and ethical-consequential dimension. The dimensions of religious belief and religious experience, which are probably the central dimensions of religiosity, are strongly based on deep emotional experience and values. When this combines with the ethnic identity as based in common memories, sentiments and values, and on the other hand the dimension of politics, it easily happens that people who share this religious commitment and ethnic identity can easily be manipulated for certain political goals. This creates a fertile ground for ideology construction and can eventually lead to ethnic/national conflicts that can have large and dreadful consequences.⁵⁹

The other axis or rather nexus of power we see as composed primarily of two lines that have a common ground in the economic dimension of power. We could outline this axis in the following way:

⁵⁸ Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark are particularly known for the five dimensional model of religiosity. In Sabino Acquaviva & Enzo Pace. 1996. *Sociologija religije [Sociology of Religion]*.

⁵⁹ The war in the Balkans in 1990s could to a large extent be interpreted as conflicts where such process of power based on ethnic and religious sentiments manipulated by politics occurred. However, examples for this could be found worldwide. For the case of the Balkans, please see Srđan Vrcan, 2004. Religion and politics – The symptomatic example of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s', in Vujadinović et al., ed. *Between Authoritarianism and Democracy*. Book II. *Civil Society and Political Culture*.

LAW – POLITICS

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ECONOMY – TECHNOLOGY – MILITARY

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Natural resources

The first line comprises the dimensions: economic – technological – military. As it has been shown in the previous text the military dimension in the contemporary pervades the contemporary world still with an increasing tendency. When combined with the technological development, the military technology, as has also been shown, becomes very sophisticated and potentially dangerous. When boosted by the market-oriented economy as it has been the case worldwide, this line of power becomes very strong in the global context. The wars in which this military technology is or can be used are many, and this creates an ever more dangerous world, in which the human lives become 'very cheap', and this in particularly in less developed countries.

Another line of the second axis of power we see in the combination of the dimensions: economic (- natural resources) – legal – political. This line of power is probably much more latent than the first one. It could be understood as a tendency in global relations to use the legal framework to 'legitimise' certain actions which follow particular geostrategic interests, and are largely grounded in the political and economic framework. It seems that many actions in the Middle East and Central Asia, could be viewed in this way.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ The grounds for this line of thought may be found in the analysis of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former advisor to Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, and the professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University. The main reference is his book: Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1998. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. Another source used as a ground for this reasoning is William Engdahl and his book *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*. 2004. See also Hauke Brunkhorst. 2005. *Solidarity. From civic friendship to a global legal community*.

It is important to mention finally an additional line of power, which seems to be present in the contemporary world. It is the domain of terrorism. This line of power is not easily explained. Most broadly it has been understood the use of the means of coercion in order to create fear/terror. It is often related to ideological goals, and usually deliberately target or disregard the safety non-combatants, that is civilians. In M. Mann's terms it could be understood as a form of diffused power, as it is rather decentered and sporadic, but it seems to have a tendency to become more organised. It also seems that in the modern world it combines with other dimensions of power, particularly with religion.

This rough model employs thus several new dimensions of power (in comparison to M. Mann) that we believe could set the ground for better interpreting some aspects of the global relations and processes.

C. The problem of power and recognition

We outlined here some models of power that could help in understanding some complex global relations and processes. We see as a problem of power in the globalising world the fact that at the global level the extensivity of power rises to an enormous degree, while the intensivity can still hardly be tackled, because of the complexity not only of different societal dimensions, but also because of the diversity of social backgrounds and paths of social change. So the power can become an even more potentially dangerous aspect.

The problem of power could also be viewed from the perspective of the impact of the Western system⁶¹ on other parts of the world and other cultures. Although the combination of

⁶¹ Maurice Duverger (1972) defines the Western system as a totality composed by the same political institutions, analogous economic structures, similar phase of development, similar moral and religious principles, and finally, similar cultural traditions. Though some differences do exist between particular countries on certain dimensions, Duverger singles out five crucial elements to define the Western system more precisely, and these are: *the elections*, which are based on the rivalry among the candidates/ parties; *limiting the power of a*

economic efficacy and political freedoms, being characteristic for the Western system, did set the basis for its own prosperity, it does not exclude the possibility that its rise also set a framework for the development of other systems that had a different path of social change. Socio-economic processes of other parts of the world, especially the so called developing countries, seem to be more and more determined by the rise of the Western system, that in a way created the dominant model. This certainly raises a question of a possibility and desirability of adapting that model to other cultures of the world.

As another ‘manifestation’ of the constellation of power relations within the global complexity, related to the above, is the exclusion of different parts of the world (sectoral and regional segregation) and also de-socialisation of individuals, which directly tackle the problematic of recognition. H. Brunkhorst, while treating the subject of social exclusion, has helpfully distinguished among three dimensions of the problem⁶²

economic – through the excommunicating reduction of human beings to bodies, economic exclusion literally robs human rights of their object;

socio-cultural – from the educational system and the system of postal addresses, illiteracy and ghettoization, condemn the economically impoverished masses for the most part to ‘political ineffectiveness and apathy’;

legal – through ‘unlawful force, unconstitutional inequality, denial of legal protection, impunity for the staffs of oppression’, destroys the democratic legitimation of authoritative institutions.

government, where members of the governments have only a public field under control while the private field stays out of their reach; *economic freedom*, meaning that means of production are an object of private appropriation by particular individuals or groups of individuals, while the others have only their working force to rent to the first; *rationalism*; and *humanistic culture*, that originates in Greek civilisation, but was spread mostly by the Roman Empire.

⁶² H. Brunkhorst. 2005. *Solidarity. From civic friendship to a global legal community*. p. 124

One of the main problems of social exclusion is the phenomenon of chain reaction, which means that the effective exclusion from one functional system often results in the exclusion from all functional systems. As the functional system integration of the global society rises, social integration of its regions becomes weaker.⁶³ The social exclusion is a problem of misrecognition, as being excluded from different societal systems or frameworks these people are not given a chance for the normal, authentic constitution of their identities.

Another way we see the problem of power is closely related to the institutional setting. Let us be briefly reminded of P. Berger & T. Luckmann's⁶⁴ model of institutionalisation which will help us to pose the problem of some institutions (and thus institutional power in the world today).

In their well known book 'The Social Construction of Reality' in the process of institutionalisation they see an important moment of habituation or adaptation/adjustment. According to these authors, all human actions are subject to adaptation/adjustment, and when this tendency of human actions to adaptation/adjustment is applied to actions that include social relationships, it is then possible to talk about the beginning of an institution. Institutionalisation thus occurs whenever there is mutual typification/standardisation according to type of habituated actions by types of actors, where reciprocity of institutional typification, as well as the fact that in an institution not only actions but also actors are typical, needs to be pointed out. The first moment is thus exteriorisation, or the 'production of the society' from a group of individuals and their actions. What we are primarily interested here are the institutions that have been created in the West and that arose as a product of habituated actions of the people from the West, as a materialisation of their values.

⁶³ Hauke Brunkhorst deals with this problem in his book *Solidarity. From civic friendship to a global legal community*.

⁶⁴ Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*.

Now, an institution assumes the character of objectivity through mutual typifications of its members, which means that an institution in this way crystallizes, and is perceived as something that exists beyond individual people who in that moment accidentally 'embody' them. In other words, institutions are now perceived as if having their own reality, the reality that confronts an individual as external, coercive (compulsory) fact, which is especially expressed when these institutions are passed on to a generation that did not participate in their creation, having *coercive power* over him through the sheer force of its factuality, as well as through control mechanisms attributed usually to some of them. And here it starts to become more evident what is the problem at stake. This power over individuals is now not any more only the West, but it involves large parts of the population of the world, as many of these institutions operate globally. Followingly, the society, that is primarily the Western institutions are significantly perceived as objective reality in many parts of the world, but these institutions do not actually embody the 'habituated actions' of all the people over which they now act.⁶⁵

And in the third moment of internalisation through which the objective social world is projected into consciousness during socialization, it is for many people 'an estranged social world', since it does not reflect their own values and habits. This is largely also a problem of misrecognition, as these people are not being recognised for their own values through these institutions.

So, the institutionalization processes which are the processes of continual crystallizations of different types of norms, organizations and frameworks that then regulate the processes of exchange of various goods should today be adjusted to the global context in which they

⁶⁵ An example for this process could be the IMF or the World Bank which largely operate globally, but arose primarily out of the Western values and 'habituated actions'.

operate, that is to the diversity of cultural and societal backgrounds and their systems of norms and values.

It is thus important to realise how the historical processes of power, domination, and largely institutionalisation created unfavourable conditions for some societies and cultures, blocking them from their more authentic evolvment. This would mean that, to create the conditions for authentic evolvment of these societies or to enable the constitution of their more authentic identities – which is the defining process of recognition, the processes of power which disabled their authentic evolvment and have strongly affected them in a negative way, need to be brought to awareness. That is, they need to be apprehended, so that these societies and cultures could be constituted in a more authentic way. We could thus conclude that the apprehension of power is the precondition for the process of recognition, and in this chapter by analysing the models of power we tried to contribute to a better understanding of global power relations.

Ch. III. Understanding the values

A. Basic claim and the idea of values

Why are values important?

Values are the standards by which we direct our lives. Values constitute that what has meaning for us. In that sense values are an important part of our identity, the identity that is being shaped as an interplay between individual desires, needs and inclinations (partly also shaped through socialisation) and the broader community standards that have primarily been acquired through socialisation, or we could call this the cultural and societal experience.

In the contemporary world, we can observe a great diversity of communities, different cultural and societal settings. It is in these different settings that the individuals constitute their identities and their value systems. These settings can differ to a large extent. On one hand, the structure of basic human values could be largely similar, while on the other, by the difference of cultural and societal settings, cultural and societal values and the value systems could differ. It is our claim that for a more just world people, that is their identities, need to be recognised both in their universal part, or universal values, as well as in their particular part, more particular values. This implies, as we will see more in detail later on, that these values need to be known, understood and respected.

What we thus aim to explore here is the nature of values and particularly the basic human values and to try to understand more closely the limit of the universal and the particular values. We shall also explore and show in what sense the values are actually the constituents of the identity, which is central to our claim that we need to recognise the values of people for their identities to be truly constituted.

We shall now start with considering the concept of values in the domain of psychology where the values are systematically studied.

The concept of value

Values, that are internalised social representations or moral beliefs that people appeal to as the ultimate rationale for their actions, are also social agreements about what is right, good, or to be cherished.⁶⁶ Values can be conceptualised at two levels. At the individual level, values are an internalization of sociocultural goals that provide a means of self-regulation of impulses that would otherwise bring individuals in conflict with the needs of the groups and structures within which they live⁶⁷ (though individuals in a society are likely to differ in the relative importance assigned to a particular value). The discussion of values is thus intimately tied with the social life.

At the group level, values are scripts or cultural ideals held in common by members of a group or the group's 'social mind'. It is the differences in these cultural ideals, and especially those with a moral component, that determine and distinguish different social systems.⁶⁸

At the individual level, values contain cognitive and affective elements. Individuals take on values as a part of socialization into a family, group and the society. Once taken on, values remain relatively fixed over time. Values are codes or general principles guiding action.

In his classic book on 'The nature of human values', Milton Rokeach⁶⁹ defines values as an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or

⁶⁶ Daphna Oyserman. 2002. Values, psychological perspectives. In N. Smelser & P. Baltes. (Editors-in-chief) *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Vol 22 (p.16150-16153).

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁸ In this sense Weber's Protestant 'ethic' and 'spirit' of capitalism describe value systems.

⁶⁹ Milton Rokeach. 1973. *The nature of human values*. Milton Rokeach was a psychologist who taught at the universities in USA, and is well known for his research on human values.

socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state existence. Rokeach defines a value system as an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance.⁷⁰

Similarly, S. H. Schwartz⁷¹ defined values as beliefs about some desirable goals, or end-states, which serve as guiding principles in people's lives and vary in importance. Other researchers often equate values with ideals, which are embodied in people's goals.

When we think of our values we think of what is important to us in life. Each person holds numerous values (e.g. security, benevolence, achievement) with varying degrees of importance. A particular value can thus be very important to one person but unimportant to another. Here we'll give the summary of the main features of the notion of values, that could be found in literature on values and that most authors adopt. The baseline of this list of features has been summarised by S. H. Schwartz⁷², but here is an extended version of it.

(1) Values are beliefs, consisting of a cognitive and affective component, and to a certain extent a behavioural one. Values are thus inextricably linked to affect, which means when values are activated, they become infused with feeling.⁷³

(2) Values are relatively enduring concepts or beliefs. Values are rather stable so that value systems can form, since they, as already said, do not appear separately but in a system.

(3) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action.⁷⁴ They are a preference or a conception of something that is personally or socially preferable.

⁷⁰ M. Rokeach, 1973. p. 5.

⁷¹ Shalom H. Schwartz, 1992. Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 25 (p.1-65).

⁷² S. H. Schwartz. 2006. Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications [Basic Human Values: Theory, Measurement, and Applications]. *Revue française de sociologie*, 42, 249-288.

⁷³ This feature of values S. H. Schwartz exemplifies by people for whom independence is an important value become aroused if their independence is threatened, or despair when they are helpless to protect it, or are happy when they can enjoy it.

(4) Values transcend specific actions and situations. This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.

(5) Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events.⁷⁵ But the impact of values in everyday decisions is rarely conscious. Values enter awareness when the actions or judgments one is considering have conflicting implications for different values one cherishes.

(6) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. Values of people form an ordered system of value priorities that characterize them as individuals (value system). This hierarchical feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes.

(7) The *relative* importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behaviour typically has implications for more than one value.⁷⁶ Consequently, it is the tradeoffs among the competing values that are implicated simultaneously in the attitude or behaviour that guides them. Each value contributes to action as a function both of its relevance to the action – and hence the likelihood of its activation – and of its importance to the actor.

The list that I have reported above encompasses the features that can be attributed to all value. What distinguishes one value from another is the type of goal or motivation that the value expresses.

⁷⁴ This feature of values S. H. Schwartz exemplifies by people for whom social order or justice are important values are motivated to pursue these goals.

⁷⁵ This feature of values S. H. Schwartz exemplifies by people decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, based on possible consequences for their cherished values.

⁷⁶ This feature of values S. H. Schwartz exemplifies by attending church might express and promote tradition, conformity, and security values at the expense of hedonism and stimulation values.

B. Main theories of values

The concept of value has been theorised in the three domains: philosophy, sociology and psychology. First, we shall explore two theories of values in contemporary psychology that have been broadly accepted. These are the theories of Milton Rokeach and Shalom H. Schwartz. Along with the theory researchers in psychology have been prone to develop the instruments to measure the values.

The first theory of value that we consider is the theory proposed in 1973 by Milton Rokeach in his work titled 'The nature of human values'. According to his theory of values, aside from the main features of values already named above, M. Rokeach conceives values as principally terminal or instrumental, where the first reflect the end-state and the latter a mode of conduct. The Rokeach Value Survey was developed to include a set of terminal values (e.g., true friendship, wisdom, equality) and instrumental values (e.g., broadminded, capable and independent). M. Rokeach made a further refinement in distinguishing terminal values as personal and social, and he furthermore recognized that they can be self-centred, society-centred, intrapersonal or interpersonal in focus. Regarding instrumental values, M. Rokeach distinguished between moral and competence values. Moral values are regarded as interpersonal in focus, whereas competence values (also referred to as self-actualization values by M. Rokeach) as personal. These distinct foci are important, as they imply different affective outcomes when violated. (e.g. when moral values are violated, feelings of guilt are induced, whereas as a consequence of violating competence values, feelings of shame about personal inadequacy result) The instrument to measure the values is basically a scale, and the respondents are asked to rank each of two sets of 18 abstract values from the most to the least important (thus the value system can be identified). This was the first widely applied theory and instrument of values.

What we shall examine in more detail here is another theory of values and that is Shalom Schwartz's theory of basic human values⁷⁷, a Hebrew scholar who, starting from Rokeach's theory and instrument developed his own, using more complex statistical methods and methodological tools. His theory is important since it has been verified in about 70 nations worldwide, and shows a rather stable and universal structure of values that seems to be common to all people, basically regardless of the culture or society they come from.

Schwartz's theory of values

S. H. Schwartz aimed to identify those values which are stable across cultures. Thus he identifies ten motivationally distinct value orientations and specifies the dynamics of conflict and congruence among these values. Some values contradict one another (e.g., benevolence and power) whereas others are compatible (e.g., conformity and security). The 'structure' of values refers to these relations of conflict and congruence among values, and not to their relative importance. If value structures are similar across culturally diverse groups, this would suggest that there is a universal organization of human motivations. Of course, even if the types of human motivation that values express and the structure of relations among them are universal, individuals and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they attribute to their values. That is, individuals and groups have different value 'priorities' or 'hierarchies', they have different value systems.

Defining values as desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives, S. H. Schwartz claims that the crucial content aspect

⁷⁷ See S. H. Schwartz. 2006. Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications [Basic Human Values: Theory, Measurement, and Applications]. *Revue française de sociologie*, 42, 249-288. Or S. H. Schwartz. 1992. Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 25) (pp. 1-65). New York: Academic Press.

that distinguishes among values is the type of motivational goal they express. In order to coordinate with others in the pursuit of the goals that are important to them, groups and individuals represent these requirements cognitively (linguistically) as specific values about which they communicate. S. H. Schwartz derives ten, motivationally distinct, broad and basic values from three universal requirements of the human condition: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups.

The ten basic values were intended to include all the core values recognized in cultures around the world. These ten values cover the distinct content categories Schwartz found in earlier value theories, in value questionnaires from different cultures, and in religious and philosophical discussions of values.

Each basic value can be characterized by describing its central motivational goal. Table 3 lists the ten values, each defined in terms of its central goal. Specific, single value items that primarily represent each basic value appear in parentheses, following it. A specific value item represents a basic value when actions that express the specific value item or lead to its attainment promote the central goal of the basic value.

Table 3. The values from S. H. Schwartz's model of basic values, with the definitions of motivational types of values in terms of their goals⁷⁸

POWER: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image)

ACHIEVEMENT: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards. (successful, capable, ambitious, influential)

HEDONISM: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgence)

STIMULATION: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. (daring, a varied life, an exciting life)

SELF-DIRECTION: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring. (creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals)

UNIVERSALISM: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature. (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment)

BENEVOLENCE: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact. (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible)

TRADITION: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self. (humble, accepting my portion in life, devout, respect for tradition, moderate)

CONFORMITY: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms. (politeness, obedient, self-discipline, honouring parents and elders)

SECURITY: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. (family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favours)

Multidimensional analyses of the relations among the single value items within 210 samples from 67 countries⁷⁹ provide replications that support the discrimination of the postulated ten

⁷⁸ This overview of values was taken over from S. H. Schwartz, 2006. Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications [Basic Human Values: Theory, Measurement, and Applications]. *Revue française de sociologie*, 42, 249-288.

⁷⁹ Samples include those representative of a nation or a region in it (16 samples), school teachers (74), undergraduate students from a variety of fields (111), adolescents (10), and adult convenience

basic values. Comparisons of the analyses within each society also establish that the 46 value items listed in Table 1 have nearly equivalent meanings across cultures. These 46 items serve to index the ten distinct basic values in the SVS (Schwartz Value Survey)⁸⁰.

In addition to identifying ten motivational basic values, S. H. Schwartz's value theory explicates a structural aspect of values, namely, the dynamic relations among them. Actions in pursuit of any value have psychological, practical, and social consequences that may conflict or may be congruent with the pursuit of other values. The circular structure in Figure 1, as S. H. Schwartz explains, portrays the overall pattern of 'relations of conflict and congruity' among values postulated by the theory. The circular arrangement of the values represents a motivational continuum, which means that the closer any two values in either direction around the circle, the more similar their underlying motivations are. The more distant any two values, the more antagonistic their underlying motivations. The conflicts and congruities among all ten basic values yield an integrated structure of values. This structure can be summarized with two orthogonal dimensions. One is self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence: on this dimension, power and achievement values oppose universalism and benevolence values. While both of the former emphasize the pursuit of self-interests, the latter involve concern for the welfare and interests of others. The other dimension is openness to change vs. conservatism: on this dimension, self-direction and stimulation values oppose security, conformity and tradition values. Both of the former emphasize independent action, thought and feeling and readiness for new experience, whereas all of the latter emphasize self-restriction, order and resistance to change, according to Schwartz. Hedonism shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement.

samples (22). A total of 64,271 respondents came from countries located on all continents.

⁸⁰ Schwartz Value Survey is the instrument that Schwartz developed to empirically test and develop his theory. It is now widely used by social and cross-cultural psychologists for studying individual differences in values.




Figure 3. S. H. Schwartz's theoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of value ⁸¹

⁸¹ Taken over from S. H. Schwartz. 2006. Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications [Basic Human Values: Theory, Measurement, and Applications]. *Revue française de sociologie*, 42. p. 249-288.




Figure 4. S. H. Schwartz's representation of basic human values as individual level value structure averaged across 68 countries (obtained from a 2-dimensional smallest space analysis)¹

¹ Taken over from Schwartz, S. H. (2006). Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications [Basic Human Values: Theory, Measurement, and Applications]. *Revue française de sociologie*, 42. p. 249-288.

This basic structure has been found in samples from 68 nations⁸². It points to the broad underlying motivations that may constitute a universal principle that organizes value systems. People may differ substantially in the importance they attribute to values that comprise the ten basic values, but their values are apparently organized by the same structure of motivational oppositions and compatibilities.

It seems that S. H. Schwartz circled up a rather consistent theory of basic human values. At this stage we are unable to verify this theory. We would though propose some caution with the tradition and conformity values, since such names seem to mask a somewhat Westernised perspective to the values of people from non-Western communities.

C. Other perspectives to values and the claim on recognition

Values have been conceptualised differently in the history of human thought. Here we adopted the understanding of values as conceptualised in psychology and social sciences.

In philosophy there have been several paths of thought that have dealt with the notion of values. Starting with axiology as a theory of values of Herman Lotze (Lotze, 1817-1881) who tried to ground the central ontological status of values in philosophy, particularly through the concept of validity ('Gelten'), there followed the neokantians, Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), and the phenomenological line with the representatives Max Scheler (1874-1928) and Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1952). This latter path, on the traces of Husserl's phenomenology tried to develop an ethics from the 'general complex of phenomenologically founded axiology'⁸³. For neokantians the existence of values consisted in their validity ('Gelten') while for phenomenologists the values 'substantially exist'

⁸² S. H. Schwartz. 2006

⁸³ From Milenko Perović, a philosopher heading the Department of Philosophy at the University of Novi Sad, Republic of Serbia. From his book: M. Perović. 2001. *Etika [Ethics]*, Chapter 'On the concept of values and the problem of grounding the moral-ethical'.

(independently of their subjects and the existing being)⁸⁴. In philosophy values are thus primarily conceptualised ontologically, as universals. Some of these understanding shall be relevant for us in its social-philosophical and phenomenological line of thought.

To these diverse understandings it is important to add the understanding of values in some areas of sociology, as cultural and societal values. These values, that characterise cultures and societies are also important for the claim on the recognition of values, so we shall now explore them.

Cultural and societal values

As we said earlier values are primarily the ideas about what is good, right, fair, and just, and these ideas are largely shared within groups, cultures, or societies. The values identify those objects, conditions or characteristics that members of the society consider important, that is, valuable.

Cultural and societal values are important in integrating the society/culture as they are shared by the members of the culture or society, and they create expectations and predictability. Cultural and societal values are also important for personal identity of its members and their sense of worth. Values are important in understanding why people do what they do, as they are rather enduring principles that determine their cognitive, affective and behavioural characteristics.

Cultural values become over time roots of traditions and customs that are important for people in their everyday life. Another view of cultural values are those of great achievement as in arts, literature, music, etc. Societal values also include socio-economic and political values, which are principally the values of societal institutions. An example of societal values could also be the arrangement of the society as more socialist or more

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

capitalist. This distinction is often based on the difference of a collectivist vs. individualistic cultural orientation (this dimension will be more explained later).

We will now take a closer look at a research study which has been quite influential in the Western academia, and which may be taken to show a diversity of cultural values.

Ronald Inglehart's study of values

In the research of Ronald Inglehart, who is principally a sociologist, the primary interest was the link between the economic development and the changes in cultural values. To test his hypotheses R. Inglehart used the so called World Value Survey⁸⁵, a survey which has been applied worldwide in about 80 countries, in a number of waves (usually every 4-5 years).

One of the central R. Inglehart's thesis is that in post-industrial societies, which are centred on services and where people deal more with other people and symbols than with things or machinery, the innovation and the freedom to exercise individual judgment are essential, that is self-expression becomes central.⁸⁶ (Self-expression is closely related to individualism as it will be explained later). Also, people in advanced industrial societies, which are wealthy and usually have a good welfare state, are more used to take survival for granted. In that sense their value priorities shift from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being and quality-of-life. R. Inglehart is a modernisation theorist⁸⁷ and his theses and research interests have to be taken in that view.

⁸⁵ World Values Survey web sites at <http://wvs.isr.umich.edu> and <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>

⁸⁶ Ronald Inglehart & Wayne E. Baker, 2000. 'Modernisation, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 65 (February): p. 19-51

⁸⁷ The central claim of modernisation theory is that economic development is linked with coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes in culture and social and political life.

R. Inglehart observes that different societies follow different trajectories even when subjected to the same force of economic development, and this largely because of the cultural heritage (and values) that shape how a particular society develops. In that sense some authors see the world divided into eight major civilisations or 'cultural zones' based on cultural differences that have persisted for centuries. (This is mainly Huntington's scheme)⁸⁸ These zones were principally shaped by religious traditions, and according to these authors they are still powerful today. The zones are Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American zones. The cultural differences could surely be found also on a smaller scale but here we will use the empirical data to briefly observe the differences at this scale. Different scholars have observed that distinctive cultural traits endure over long periods of time and continue to shape a society's political and economic performance.⁸⁹

R. Inglehart found large and coherent cross-cultural differences across societies, where the worldviews of the peoples of rich societies differ systematically from those of low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and religious norms and beliefs. R. Inglehart identifies two dimensions that reflect cross-national polarisation; the first dimension is traditional vs. secular rational orientation toward authority and the second dimension is survival vs. self-expression values. Among traditional values there is the importance of God, importance for children to be reared so to learn obedience and religious faith (rather than independence and determination), the importance of national pride, and more respect for authority. The secular-rational values emphasise the opposite. Survival values emphasise principally the priority of economic and physical security over self-expression and quality-of-life, but also for example greater reliance on government to be responsible to ensure that

⁸⁸ Samuel Huntington has principally outlined this scheme in his book *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, according to R. Inglehart & W. E. Baker. 2000.

⁸⁹ R. Inglehart & W. E. Baker, 2000.

everyone is provided for, then favourability to state ownership (of business and industry), or even not justifying homosexuality. Self-expression values emphasise the opposite. We believe that in R. Inglehart's instrument there is a great mix of values on these two dimensions, and that the instrument could be better constructed. But his research has been quite influential so we believe it is worth mentioning.




Figure 5. Ronald Inglehart's Values Map, based on World Value Survey, and showing locations of 65 societies on two dimension of cross-cultural variation⁹⁰

⁹⁰ This map appears in different sources and publications. This one has been taken from the electronic source, the official website of World Value Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/library/set_illustrations.html (accessed April 15, 2010)

As hypothesised, what can be primarily seen from the map is that self-expression values are much more widespread among the publics of rich countries than in poor ones. Or, for example, that Confucian, Protestant and also Ex-communist countries are high on rational-secular values. The time-series analysis basically showed that in the period from 1981 to 1998 most countries moved from survival values to self-expression values (the big exception to that are Ex-communist countries where the collapse of economic, social and political systems occurred). On the other dimension, traditional vs. secular-rational, the results were diverse but there was mostly the persistence of traditional values, which was not really in line with the modernisation hypothesis.

Another highly relevant dimension on which cultures and societies largely differ is individualism vs. collectivism. As we mentioned earlier, individualism is closely related to self-expression values (it has been confirmed in some studies)⁹¹. We shall now briefly explain these two dimensions, individualism and collectivism.

Individualism has been defined as a focus on rights above duties, a concern for oneself and immediate family, an emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, and basing identity on one's personal accomplishments.⁹² D. Oyserman finds that individualism implies open expression and attainment of one's personal goals as important sources of well-being, orientation toward a person (rather than the situation) thus seeing individualism as promoting decontextualized, as opposed to situation-specific, reasoning style, and lastly, individualism implies a somewhat ambivalent stance toward relationships (individuals need relationships and group memberships to attain self-relevant goals, so they balance off relationships' costs

⁹¹ Ronald Inglehart & Daphna Oyserman. 2004. 'Individualism, autonomy and self-expression: the human development syndrome', in H. Vinken, J. Soeters, and P. Ester (Eds.). *Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective*.

⁹² *ibid.* Modern usage of the term individualism is closely connected with the work of Hofstede, G. 1980. *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Beverly Hills CA: Sage.

and benefits, thus leaving relationships when the costs of participation exceed the benefits; the relationships and group memberships are consequently impermanent and non-intensive).

On the other hand, collectivism is based on the assumption that groups bind and mutually obligate individuals, so that common fate and common goals are above personal ones. The sacrifice for common good is valued, and group membership is a central aspect of identity. Collectivism further implies that life carrying out social roles and obligations is important for life satisfaction, the meaning is contextualised to social contexts, and the exchanges within the group/society are based on equality or even generosity principles.⁹³

Here we wanted to show some differences that can appear between cultures and societies in their values. Values are an integral part of every culture, as they show what is good, beneficial, important, useful, beautiful, desirable, or appropriate, and as they are the basis of behaviour and traditions.

We will now try to see more closely how values relate to identity, as recognition is primarily a process of the constitution of the identity.

Identity and values

We are through what we value

We shall now examine the relation between the concept of the identity and the concept of values. Our claim is that the identity is primarily constituted through values, through what we value, what has meaning for us. As Charles Taylor notes in his lengthy discussion on modern identity, the 'modern identity' is what it is to be human agent, a person or a self, and this identity is inextricably intertwined with the good. Thus the selfhood and morality are closely intertwined.⁹⁴ In this context, Taylor speaks of 'moral and spiricual' intuitions, but here under 'moral' he has a broader understanding including not only justice and respect of other people's

⁹³ R. Inglehart & D. Oyserman. 2004.

⁹⁴ Charles Taylor, 1989. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. p. 3.

life, well-being and dignity, but includes also 'what underlies our own dignity, or questions about what makes our lives meaningful or fulfilling'⁹⁵. For C. Taylor, what these have in common with with moral issues, and what he calls also 'spiritual', is that they all involve 'strong evaluation', that is, 'discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered vlaind by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged'⁹⁶. This is very close to what we have identified as values – a set of rather enduring principles or beliefs about what is right, good and desirable.

For C. Taylor, these moral intuitions are uncommonly deep, powerful and universal. So, Taylor sees the modern identity to be grounded in these moral and spiritual intuitions, that is strong evaluations.

The question of identity of 'Who am I?' can be answered by an understanding of 'what is of crucial importance to us'⁹⁷. 'To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.'⁹⁸

From this it can easily be derived that the identity is constituted in our values, strong evaluations of what is good, valuable, desirable. The identity is thus based on such standards. An example that C. Taylor gives shows us the importance of the cultural and social identity in this respect.

'People may see their identity as defined partly by some moral or spiritual commitment, say as a Catholic, or an anarchist... What they are saying by this is

⁹⁵ *ibid.* p. 4.

⁹⁶ *ibid.*

⁹⁷ *ibid.* p. 27.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*

not just that they are strongly attached to this spiritual view or background; rather it is that this provides the frame within which they can determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable or of value.⁹⁹

So, this particular cultural or social identity provides them the standards or the values which they accept in order to evaluate the importance of things for them. Thus we can also see the importance of the cultural identity and also some cultural values.

C. Taylor circles up about this essential link between the identity and a kind of value orientation. 'To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary.'¹⁰⁰

Recognition of values

So, as a rather stable set of general convictions and ideas of what is right, good and desirable, values are basic determinations of man and the foundation of man's identity. Values as central constituents of the identity are also strongly relevant for the process of recognition which is actually the process of the in which the identity is being constituted. We thus believe that for the identities to be constituted it is the values that need to be recognised.

On one hand, values are, according to Hans Joas¹⁰¹ being founded in the experience of self-development and self-transcendence. On the other hand, values also come as a result of socialisation, a process of diverse social experiences in which an individual participates. As values are being created through different social, cultural and societal experiences, certain values and their priority are different among people, and thus people differ in realising their identity. These differences could be seen in cultural and societal values, which have been

⁹⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.* p. 28.

¹⁰¹ Hans Joas, 1999. *Die Entstehung der Werte.*

created through a specific socio-historical experience of a particular community or society. So, while the basic human values seem to be universal, the value systems, or the organisation of values and their relative importance differs, and also the cultural and societal values. Because of these differences in the organisation of value systems, cultural and societal values people from different societies/cultures interpret the world in different terms. It is from there that the misunderstanding between people pertaining to different cultures/societies often prevails. This misunderstanding sometimes arises into conflict even the war conflict. In order to avoid such bigger misunderstanding we believe it is important that people from different cultures and societies get to know and understand their different value systems, their different cultural and societal values. Knowledge, understanding and respect of each other's values is actually what we consider as the process recognition, here primarily the intercultural and intersocietal recognition.

Ch. IV. Exploring the concept of recognition

In this chapter we shall first explore principally Hegel's conception and model of recognition and then Charles Taylor's conception of recognition. In the second part we shall try to give a proposal for a rough model of recognition in the world of today.

IV. I. Overview of the main theories of recognition and their implications for recognition in the contemporary world

A. Hegel's conception of recognition in Honneth's interpretation

Hegel in his early writings brings out the conception of recognition. As A. Honneth suggests, it has been from the period of Classical politics of Aristotle to the medieval Christian doctrine of natural law that 'human beings were conceived of fundamentally as entities capable of life in community, as a *zoon politikon*, as beings who had to rely on the social framework of a political community for the realisation of their inner nature'¹⁰². Only in the ethical community of the *polis* or *civitas*, where the virtues were shared intersubjectively, could the social character of human nature genuinely develop. Hegel develops his thought mainly in continuation to this tradition, and though developing the moment of social struggle tackled by Machiavelli and Hobbes, he refrains from ontologising the concept of the social contract, as it could alone 'put an end to the war of all against all, a war that subjects wage for their own individual self-preservation'¹⁰³.

Hegel pleads for the break with the grip of atomistic misconceptions, that influenced the whole tradition of modern natural law, and he sees this in the presupposition that for

¹⁰² Axel Honneth 1995. *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, p.7

¹⁰³ *ibid.* p.10

human socialisation the existence of subjects isolated from each other is a basic starting point. From this Hegel sees the impossibility for ethical unity.¹⁰⁴

Hegel liked the idea that in 'publicly practised customs members of the community could also witness the intersubjective expression of their own particularity'¹⁰⁵, which he finds in the doctrine of city-states of antiquity.

Two important premises of Hegel's approach relevant for our understanding are: firstly, that 'the public life would have to be regarded not as the result of the mutual restriction of private spheres of liberty, but rather as the opportunity for the fulfilment of every single individual's freedom'¹⁰⁶. And second, the view that mores and customs, '*Sitte*', which are being employed communicatively within a social community, are 'the social medium through which the integration of universal and individual freedom is to occur'¹⁰⁷. And only these attitudes that are actually acted out intersubjectively can provide a sound basis for the exercise of that extended freedom.

What Hegel has in mind, as an aim, for which he tries to find the categorical tools in order to explain philosophically, is the 'organisation of society whose ethical cohesion would lie in a form of solidarity based on the recognition of the individual freedom of all citizens'¹⁰⁸.

Hegel quoting Aristotle: 'The nation [*Volk*] comes by nature before the individual. If the individual in isolation is not anything self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole nation in one unity, just as other parts are to their whole.'¹⁰⁹ Related to that, in a somewhat

¹⁰⁴ This point is described in A. Honneth, chapter 'Crime and Ethical Life', in *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.* p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.* p.14

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.* from G.W.F. Hegel, *Natural Law*, p. 113. [*Werke*, 2: 505. Aristotle's quote is from *Politics* 1253a, 25-9, where he speaks of the '*polis*' rather than the 'nation']

different form, we may say that today for people from different cultures and societies to be realised they must relate to each other and to the whole world in one unity.¹¹⁰

Exploring this relation of the individual and the whole in Hegel, where the relations between the individuals are relevant, A. Honneth well states that it is important that the emergence of ethical life be conceived as an interpenetration of socialization and individuation so that it could be assumed ' that the organic coherence of the resulting form of society lies in the intersubjective recognition of the particularity of all individuals'¹¹¹. As we see here there are principally two planes, or two directions that could be discerned in the process of recognition. These are the individuation and the socialisation which we shall later use in our further analysis.

For Hegel is further important the 'reciprocal effect' between individuals that he sees to be underlying the legal relations¹¹², which principally says that by mutually requiring one another to act freely while at the same time limiting their own sphere of action to the other's advantage, subjects form a common consciousness which can then attain objective validity in legal relations.¹¹³ Hegel then sees 'a society's ethical relations as representing forms of practical intersubjectivity in which the movement of recognition guarantees the complementary agreement and thus the necessary mutuality of opposed subjects'. In Hegel's understanding of recognition there is a dynamic process through which the individual moves; as once recognised for its abilities and qualities, and thus reconciled with the other, the subject gets to self-recognise its own distinctive identity, and again becomes opposed to the other as something particular. Then within the framework of an ethically established relationship of mutual recognition, subjects are evolving their particular identity, through conflict and

¹¹⁰ This will be developed later.

¹¹¹ A. Honneth, 1995. p. 16.

¹¹² This he employs from Fichte.

¹¹³ A. Honneth, 1995. p. 16. from J. G. Fichte, 1791 'Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre', in Immanuel Hermann Fichte (ed.), *Fichtes Werke*, vol. III.

reconciliation, as they are seeking to get recognised in a more demanding form of their individuality. So, Hegel sees this social struggle as a moral medium that leads towards more mature forms of ethical relations.

A. Honneth well identified the basic model that could be found in Hegel's writings. It starts from the first social relations, where the growth of 'individuality' occurs in two stages of mutual recognition. First it is the relationship in the family, between parents and children where subjects recognise each other as 'living and emotionally needy beings'. However, the family needs to bring children eventually to independence from that 'practical feeling'. In the second stage, for Hegel, the relations are already becoming legal where subjects recognise each other as 'bearers of legitimate claims to possessions', thus constituting each other as property owners. These two stages are for Hegel 'natural' form of ethical life as they are marked by the 'principle of singularity'. In this second stage of legal relations Hegel lies an interest in the concept of 'crime' that he sees as an expression of destruction that occurs in social life at the moments of conflict between the individual and the already established ethical relations, as the subject, in these legal relations, is in some aspects emptied and formalised. That is, the subject is not satisfactorily recognised in these 'abstract' legal relations. For Hegel these relations here lack the executive power of state authority to make them 'real'.¹¹⁴ An important step is the struggle for honour, where the honour is the stance that the individual takes toward itself when he/she identifies positively with all his/her traits and peculiarities, and the struggle occurs as the individual can only completely identify with itself as he/she is being approved and supported in its peculiarities by the other. 'Honour' is thus structurally tied to the process of intersubjective recognition. The individuals have to be intersubjectively recognised in their particularity to gain their identity as 'whole persons', but through this their mutual dependence also rises.

¹¹⁴ This moment of 'crime' is for Hegel the first sequence that he explicitly sees as a 'struggle', which is further important for Honneth to develop his claim as a 'struggle for recognition'.

Once 'they have taken challenges posed by different crimes, individuals no longer oppose each other as egocentric actors, but as 'members of a whole"¹¹⁵. So, for Hegel, out of the destruction of legal forms of recognition arises the consciousness of mutual dependence, and this is the basis for an ethical community. In 'absolute ethical life' the intersubjective foundation is based on the intuition of the individual in every other individual. 'The individual intuits himself [/herself] as himself [/herself] in every other individual'.¹¹⁶ These relations of recognition extend into the sphere of the affective, for which A. Honneth uses the term 'solidarity', and seem to provide 'communicative basis upon which individuals, who have been isolated from each other by legal relations, can be reunited within the context of an ethical community'¹¹⁷.

So, in Hegel's model of recognition there is a distinction between three forms of recognition that differ from each other with regard to the 'how' as well as the 'what' of practical confirmation:

'in the affective relationship of recognition found in the family, human individuals are recognized as concrete creatures of need; in the cognitive-formal relationship of recognition found in law, they are recognized as abstract legal persons; and finally, in the emotionally enlightened relationship of recognition found in the State, they are recognized as concrete universals, that is, as subjects who are socialized in their particularity.'¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ A. Honneth, 1995. p. 24.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.* from Hegel, *System of Ethical Life*, p. 144. [*System del' Sittlichkeit*, 54.]

¹¹⁷ A. Honneth, 1995. p. 24.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.* p. 25.




Figure 3: Hegel's model of recognition, as summarised by A. Honneth¹¹⁹

In such a stage theory of social recognition, proposed by Hegel, different modes of recognition correspond to different concepts of the person, and this follows a sequence of ever more demanding media of recognition.

In his later development of the concept of recognition Hegel focused more on the concept of consciousness and the spirit. Hegel then conceives the emergence of a State community as the process by which the Spirit is formed. In this context, for Hegel recognition refers 'to the cognitive step taken by a consciousness that has already developed 'ideally' into a totality, at the moment in which it 'perceives itself - in another such totality, consciousness - to be the totality it is'¹²⁰. In this moment, where the individuals mutually violate each other's subjective claims so that they could know whether the respective others also re-identify

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*

¹²⁰ *ibid.* p. 27. from Hegel, 'First Philosophy of Spirit', p. 236. [*System der spekulativen Philosophie*, 217].

themselves as a 'totality', A. Honneth identifies the moment of conflict or struggle on which he further bases his theory.¹²¹

It is important to add that for Hegel, in the *System of Ethical Life*, 'conflict represents a sort of mechanism of social integration into community, which forces subjects to cognize each other mutually in such a way that their individual consciousness of totality has ultimately become interwoven, together with that of everyone else, into a 'universal' consciousness'¹²². This now 'absolute' consciousness provides Hegel with the intellectual basis for a future, ideal community 'that is produced by mutual recognition as a medium of social universalization, 'the spirit of a people' is formed, and to that extent the 'living substance' of its ethics is formed as well.¹²³

This is now an important basis on which to think the World today. We are approaching a moment where the ethical relations of recognition have to be established globally, as the world is strongly interconnected and interdependent. In the world of diverse cultural and societal backgrounds, where the individual has to intuit him/herself as him/herself in every other individual, becomes far more complex, as the particularities that need to be recognised are far bigger.

Let us now take a look at another interpretation of Hegel's conception of recognition that will help us extend this thought on the recognition in the world further.

¹²¹ A. Honneth, 1995. p. 27. Honneth's approach can be summarised as follows 'The possibility for sensing, interpreting, and realising one's needs and desires as a fully autonomous and individuated person – the very possibility of identity-formation – depends crucially on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. These three modes of relating practically to oneself can only be acquired and maintained intersubjectively, through being granted recognition by others whom one also recognises. As a result, the conditions for self-realisation turn out to be dependent on the establishment of relationships of mutual recognition.' in A. Honneth, 1995. p. xi.

¹²² *ibid.* p. 28.

¹²³ *ibid.* p. 28.

*Another interpretation of Hegel's conception of recognition*¹²⁴

In an interesting interpretation of Hegel's conception of recognition, Patrice Canivez¹²⁵ begins from Hegel's quote in the Philosophy of Right.

§ 27

'The absolute character or, if you like, the absolute impulse of the free spirit (§ 21) is, as has been observed, that its freedom shall be for it an object. It is to be objective in a two-fold sense: it is the rational system of itself, and this system is to be directly real (§ 26). There is thus actualised as idea what the will is implicitly. Hence, the abstract conception of the idea of the will is in general *the free will which wills the free will*.'¹²⁶

P. Canivez interprets this as the 'will is really free when it wants the universality of free will', meaning that the individual will can be free only when it wants the free will for all. This Hegel resolves through the idea of the State and the law, in a way that such universality of free will can be realised in the State that guarantees equal rights to all citizens. Following Hegel the statement would then be: I am fully recognised as the citizen by the State as much as I recognise the State – so it is a double-sided relation of vertical recognition. So, only when

¹²⁴ This interpretation corresponds in a significant part to Honneth's interpretation of Hegel in his writings from Jena, that is his *Realphilosophie*. (Chapter 3. 'The Struggle for Recognition: On the Social Theory in Hegel's Jena Realphilosophie' in A. Honneth, 1995. *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*)

¹²⁵ Patrice Canivez is a french political philosopher, to whom I am grateful for this understanding of Hegel's idea of recognition. P. Canivez presented and discussed this problematic at the seminar 'Social and Political Philosophy' at the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, March 2009.

¹²⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/> (accessed May, 2006). In original § 27 'Die absolute Bestimmung oder, wenn man will, der absolute Trieb des freien Geistes (§ 21), daß ihm seine Freiheit Gegenstand sei – objektiv sowohl in dem Sinne, daß sie als das vernünftige System seiner selbst, als in dem Sinne, daß dies unmittelbare Wirklichkeit sei (§ 26) –, um für sich, als Idee zu sein, was der Wille an sich ist: der abstrakte Begriff der Idee des Willens ist überhaupt der freie Wille, der den freien Willen will.'

all the citizens recognise the State can the State give freedom to its citizens – thus recognising them and making them equal before the law.

In the state each individual is recognised by the law as a person – as a holder of subjective rights, and at the same time the individual must be recognised by the law and institutions of the State not only as a citizen, but as a citizen who wants all rights for all. So, we can see that in Hegel's thought the universality can be realised only through all the particular (wills) that will the universal.

What is important for Hegel is the harmonised relation between the vertical and the horizontal line of recognition. The vertical line is represented by the relation between the individual and the State, while the horizontal line is represented by the relation between individuals/citizens, that is the civic society. This harmony between the vertical and the horizontal line is to be achieved at each level of Hegel's hierarchy: family, civil society and State. So there is an internal dialectic inherent in recognition between the vertical and horizontal line.

Analogously to Hegel's idea of recognition within a State, we may think today the process of recognition within the World, as the forming political and legal community. This would mean that I am to be fully recognised as the citizen in as much as I recognise the World – and here the World is all the cultures and societies that compose the world of today. So, to be recognised as a citizen (of the world), also as a citizen of a particular society and culture, I need to recognise all other cultures and societies (and all other citizens). As, following Hegel's primary idea that the will is free when it wants the universality of free will, we need to want freedom and free will of all the citizens from different societies and cultures – since many of the citizens are realised as citizens primarily in particular cultures and societies.

B. Taylor's conception of recognition

*Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.*¹²⁷

The basic conception of recognition is that 'our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence'¹²⁸. The identity is understood as a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being (in C. Taylor's terminology strong evaluations, and in our values). Misrecognition of others can thus cause that a person or a group 'suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning picture of themselves'. 'Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.'¹²⁹ This understanding is important to see how relevant the process of recognition is for the constitution of the identity. The examples that easily come to mind are the black or other colonised people who could have easily internalised a picture of their own inferiority because the white society has for generations projected a demeaning picture of them.

In his famous text C. Taylor further analyses how it came about that the problematic of recognition have the sense it has for us. In his understanding there were two changes that made 'the modern preoccupation with identity and recognition inevitable'. Firstly, the concept of honour, which was intrinsically linked to inequalities is, with the collapse of social hierarchies, superseded by the more universalist and egalitarian concept of dignity (inherent dignity of human beings), which C. Taylor sees as more compatible with a democratic society. 'Democracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, which has taken various

¹²⁷ Charles Taylor, 1994. 'The Politics of Recognition', in: Amy Gutman (ed) *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, p. 26.

¹²⁸ *ibid.* p. 25.

¹²⁹ *ibid.*

forms over the years, and has now returned in the form of demands for the equal status of cultures and genders'¹³⁰, as C. Taylor observes.

The second change that brought to the intensification of importance of recognition is the new understanding of individual identity that emerges at the end of the eighteenth century, and that C. Taylor calls individualised identity, or 'one that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself'. This notion rises along with the ideal of 'authenticity', that 'of being true to myself and my own particular way of doing'. This ideal of authenticity develops as a push to 'being in touch with our feelings', if we are to be true and full human beings. So this push takes on an independent and crucial moral significance. The source is now deep within us, and not any more in some other source (like God, for example). C. Taylor sees this change as a part of a big subjective turn of modern culture, that is towards a new form of inwardness. As the important figures in bringing this change C. Taylor sees first Rousseau, for whom the moral significance lies in the intimate contact with ourselves, and then Herder, for whom 'each of us has an original way of being human: each person has his or her own 'measure'¹³¹. With them the ideal of authenticity became crucial and then it is considered that to be human, to really live the life is to do it in 'my' own way. Now the moral importance is accorded to this inner contact with myself. And with this comes the principle of originality, that each of our inner voices has something new to say. 'Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realising a potentiality that is properly my own.'¹³² So, the self-realisation comes from the originality which we find in the deep contact with our inner nature. This is the background understanding to the modern ideal of authenticity, as well as to the

¹³⁰ *ibid.* p. 27.

¹³¹ *ibid.* p. 30.

¹³² *ibid.* p. 31

goals of self-fulfilment and self-realisation with which the ideal of authenticity usually comes.

Herder, according to C. Taylor, applied this ideal not only to individuals but also to a *Volk* which also needs to be true to itself, that is to its own culture. In that sense, following our early example of colonisation, the once colonised people (communities, societies) need to be given a chance to be 'unimpeded', or as C. Taylor says, 'European colonialism ought to be rolled back'¹³³.

Now we come to the point which is crucial for the link between identity and recognition, and it is in C. Taylor's words 'the dialogical character' of the human life. 'We become full human agent, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression,... which we only learn through our exchanges with others'¹³⁴, in particularly with others who matter to us ('the significant others'). So, discovering of my own identity principally goes through a dialogue with the others, as C. Taylor usually says, or through a *relation* with others, as we would rather say. (The relation we see as more comprehensive term, encompassing many aspects which can go beyond the dialogue as such) It is thus better to say that 'my own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others'. This is a crucial understanding that is relevant for the notion of recognition which is thus seen as an overall process of relations with the other through which we shape our own identity, which is also a way of our self-realisation. The process of recognition can be observed on this intimate plane that we shall call individual (and interindividual) level and on the social plane, that we shall observe as social/cultural level and the societal level.

C. Taylor further differentiates between two approaches to 'the politics of equal recognition'. The first is 'the politics of universalism' or 'the politics of universal dignity'

¹³³ *ibid.*

¹³⁴ *ibid.* p. 32.

(based on a change from honour to dignity), which is grounded in the understanding of equal dignity of all citizens, while the content of this politics has been the equalisation of rights and entitlements. The other approach is 'the politics of difference' (which arises out of the development of modern notion of individual identity), by which everyone should be recognised for his or her particular identity. It is thus recognition of distinctness, particularities. The two approaches however coincide over the principle of universal equality, which in a way underlines both of these approaches. For 'the politics of difference' it means that a universal potential is at its basis, 'namely, the potential for forming and defining one's own identity, as an individual, and also as a culture' and that 'this potentiality must be respected equally in everyone'¹³⁵. This discussion is important, but we believe we need to go a step back before the political level, and look more closely at the normative and phenomenological aspect to recognition.

¹³⁵ *ibid.* p. 42.

IV. II. A proposal of a rough model of recognition

What we shall try to do in this chapter is to explore a model of recognition that could roughly be structured in three levels and two directions, thus forming a matrix of six fields.

We distinguish two directions as inter- or between the subjects and intra- or within the subject, though these directions are ideal types and they strongly intertwine. The two directions basically can occur at the three levels that we observe. These comprise the level of the individual, social/cultural level and the societal level or the level of the society.

The six fields of the matrix model are also the ideal types, as in reality they are rarely found 'clean' – they overlap and are intertwined.

Though we observe two directions it is important to note that we understand recognition, that is a constitution of one's identity, as primarily taking place in interrelation with the other, and it is often from this interrelation of recognition that the recognition of oneself often follows.

A. Three levels of recognition

We observe the process of recognition at the three main levels; individual, social/cultural and societal.

These three levels are taken to correspond to the main subjects of recognition that is, the individual, the social group/culture, and the society. The last two strongly overlap as, as B. Parekh observes, there is no society without a culture nor a culture which is not associated with some society¹³⁶. However, cultures can appear within the (national) society, thus usually forming cultural groups, or they can appear as transgressing the (national) societies. We understand culture primarily in Parekh's terms as 'a historically created system of meaning

¹³⁶ Bikhu Parekh, 2002. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, p. 146.

and significance or, what comes to the same thing, a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives'¹³⁷. Culture is articulated at several levels. At the most basic level it is reflected in the language which partially reflects the way of understanding the world, embodying also the proverbs, maxims, myths, rituals, symbols, collective memories, jokes, body language, modes of non-linguistic communication, and also customs and traditions.¹³⁸ Then at a slightly different level culture is embodied in its arts, music, oral and written literature, moral life, ideals of excellence, exemplar individuals and the vision of the good life. At the third level culture concerns the structure and order of human life, and is thus articulated in the rules and norms 'that govern such basic activities and social relations as how, where, when and with whom one eats, associates, how one mourns and disposes of the dead, and treats one's parents'¹³⁹ or others. The society refers primarily to the structure of relations between the human beings who form it, and the structure of practices, while the culture refers largely to the content and legitimising principles of these relations. The society is primarily structured through institutions which usually arise from a particular culture. However, we shall try roughly to discern these two levels.

On the other hand, here it could be asked about the state (nation) – why it was not included – what is relevant is that we wanted to emphasise the complexity of the whole societal system in the process of recognition, and not just of the political (sub-) system. The process of recognition, particularly the intersocietal recognition, involves the relation of the two or more societies at their different levels or within different subsystems, which is strongly relevant for the global relations of recognition.

¹³⁷ *ibid.* p. 143.

¹³⁸ *ibid.*

¹³⁹ *ibid.* p. 144.

B. Two directions of recognition (inter- and intra-)

As we have mentioned before, people strive, by nature, to realise their identities. But the identities get to realise through a dialectic of recognition by others and the self-directed recognition or self-recognition. This means that on one hand we are directed to the others with whom we step into relations, relations through which the process of recognition takes place. In Hegelian terms, 'the full human flourishing is dependent on the existence of well-established, 'ethical' relations – in particular, relations of love, law and 'ethical life' [Sittlichkeit] – which can only be established through a struggle for recognition'.¹⁴⁰ 'The individual intuits himself as himself in every other individual.'¹⁴¹

On the other hand, there needs to be a self-recognition, a process of recognising oneself in one's own needs, desires and particularly one's own values. This is a parallel process to the one where we get to be recognised by the other. The two processes are in a dialectic relation since we often strive to have the most possible recognised by the other, but then usually follows a process of self-recognition in which certain aspects that haven't been recognised in the interrelation need to be recognised.

It is important to notice that we speak of the two directions as ideal types because the process of recognition significantly works as a parallel process within – an individual, social group/culture or society, and between – the two or more individuals, social groups/cultures or societies.

¹⁴⁰ Axel Honneth, 1995. *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. p. xi

¹⁴¹ *ibid.* p. 25

C. The phenomenology of recognition

As we said true recognition, that is a constitution of one's identity, primarily takes place in interrelation with the other, from which often follows self-recognition.

In the phenomenology of recognition we shall observe several moments that we shall thus primarily look in the interrelation, though most of them could be also applicable to the self-relation. These moments are strongly intertwined and should generally be observed together. These comprise: knowing (the other), understanding (the other), 'sich hineinleben' into the role of the other ('step into the shoes of the other'), and respect (for the other). These moments usually go together, that is they rarely appear completely isolated. They are, as said, strongly intertwined, since knowing, acquaintance with the other, usually implies the understanding of the other and the third moment that we call 'sich hineinleben' into the role of the other also usually happens together with the understanding and knowing of the other, as a way of understanding the other. Respect for the other usually involves both knowing and understanding the other (though not necessarily). In the case of self-relation, knowing and understanding oneself are closely linked. These moments are, as said, particularly relevant in the intersubjective, and then intercultural (and intersocietal) relation, so we will here consider them primarily in these terms.

What strongly characterises these moments, and especially three of them (knowing, understanding and respect), are the values of the other which are the object of knowledge, understanding and respect. To understand the other we need to know his/her values, as values are the central constituents of one's identity, as described earlier, and are the relevant and rather enduring principles of one. This usually implies the respect for the values of the other.

These moments become particularly important when we speak of intercultural and intersocietal recognition.

The moment that we call 'sich hineinleben' into the position of the other or 'stepping into the shoes of the other' actually implies a sympathetic understanding of the world of thought of the other, from within. This is particularly important in understanding the other cultures and societies. The other moment of respect means primarily, at the level of individuals, respecting the autonomy of individuals including their right to run their lives as they please. At the level of culture it means a respect for community's right to its culture and for the content and character of that culture, as Parekh notes.¹⁴² Respecting a community's right to its culture is important as it implies that human beings forming a community that is important for their identity should be free to decide how to live. This also implies the respect for their historical path, as their identity has been formed through it. Also, the respect for the content and character of culture is important. 'Since every culture gives stability and meaning to human life, holds its members together as a community, displays creative energy, and so on, it deserves respect.'¹⁴³ At the societal level, there is primarily the institutions of the society which have to be respected as they materialise the values of that society.

The historical evolvment of particular culture or society thus also needs to be known, understood and respected in order to say that we have knowledge of, understanding of and respect for someone, since the historical path strongly constitutes what one is today, it is a part of their identity. This also implies knowledge and understanding of power relations that determined (or still might determine) the position of a particular culture or society, and thus the constitution (or the unjust constitution) of the identities of people. Thus also it is very important to know and understand the current setting or context in which one is settled in relations with others, a current dynamic, which still determines the constitution of the identities of people. The current context is also important to be apprehended in terms of the

¹⁴² Bikhu Parekh, 2002. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, p. 176.

¹⁴³ *ibid.* p. 177.

constellation of power relations. This is as we said important for the possibility of true recognition.

The recognition of one culture or a society primarily occurs in interrelation with the other cultures or societies which is strongly based on understanding or more specifically hermeneutical understanding to which we now turn.

Hermeneutical understanding as the central moment in the phenomenology of recognition

The concept of hermeneutical understanding is based on the following premise: understanding the other helps to better understand ourselves. In Gadamer's terms, 'productive dialogical understanding is thus an intersubjective 'fusion of horizons', which is transformative for both the Self and the Other because one takes seriously the truth-claims of the Other, as well as being aware of the prejudices of one's own tradition'¹⁴⁴. Through confronting the other our viewpoint is challenged and thus our prejudices come to critical self-consciousness. 'The hermeneutic phenomenon is at work in the history of cultures as well as individuals, for it is in times of intense contact with other cultures (Greece with Persia or Latin Europe with Islam) that a people becomes most acutely aware of the limits and questionableness of its deepest assumptions.'¹⁴⁵

According to Gadamer 'the Being-in-dialogue means to-be-out-of-oneself, to think with the other and to return to oneself as someone else'¹⁴⁶. This is close to what we have in mind with the idea of 'taking the position of the other', we have to step into the shoes of other which in turn also changes us, so that we understand the other. Gadamer understands the hermeneutical dimension as 'ulteriority of self-consciousness, which means not to annul it, but

¹⁴⁴ Ali Hassan Zaidi, 2007. 'A Critical Misunderstanding: Islam and Dialogue in the Human Sciences', *International Sociology*, Vol 22(4), p. 411-434

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.* from D. Linge, 1976. 'Editor's Introduction', in H. G. Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. and trans. D. Linge. p. xi-viii.

¹⁴⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1978. *Istina i metoda [Wahrheit und Methode, Truth and Method]*, p. 364

to preserve it in understanding the otherness of the other'¹⁴⁷. As A. Šarčević¹⁴⁸ notes Gadamer evoked the platonic dialogue not just between different personalities but also between different cultures and traditions, and different periods in history. Gadamer presupposes multiple significance, the hope to cognise the other in his *alteritas*, in a different historical and spiritual [Geistes] situation or context.¹⁴⁹ Everything that is different evokes to understand it.

A. Šarčević further notes that it is Gadamer's belief that only in language, in dialogue, in understanding, is raised the issue of justice, the issue of 'truthful' state and community, as the Being that can be understood is language.¹⁵⁰ Hermeneutics tries to understand – it is the act of understanding; sensibly to gripe the plurality of forms of acting and thinking, the forms of *ethos*, the figuration of *ethos*, that renders the essence of the human basic constitution. Philosophical hermeneutics pretends for the understanding of other as other. Understanding always includes the understanding of other's thinking, saying. And its untold aim is the endeavour on agreement (*Verständigung*) that relates to the subject-matter.¹⁵¹ We thus believe that understanding is one of the central moments in the process of recognition, which is primarily based on the relation with the other.

The phenomenology of recognition we actually see as based on the following premises:

- people strive by nature to realise their identities, this means to realise the potentials of their identities.
- only a realised identity can have the free will and thus be a moral human being.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁸ Abdulah Šarčević is hermeneutician, philosopher from Bosnia and Herzegovina who wrote the epilogue to H.G. Gadamer's *Truth and Method [Istina i metoda]*. Here the reference is Abdulah Šarčević, 2000. 'Hermeneutika, drugo drugoga, jezička zajednica' [Hermeneutics, the otherness of the other, linguistic community], *Filozofska istraživanja [Philosophical investigations]*, Annum 20, Vol. 4, p. 593-614.

¹⁴⁹ *ibid*.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid*.

¹⁵¹ *ibid*.

- the identity is primarily constituted through values, through what we value, what has meaning for us.

- recognition is the constitutive process of the identity, both recognition by the other and self-recognition.

From this follows that recognition, and thus a recognition of one's values, primarily by others, but also through self-recognition, is a necessary process for a realisation of identity, which sets the basis for a moral human being. What is relevant today, as we shall explore, is that the interrelations with others through which our identities get constituted and are to be realised are diverse others from different cultures and societies.

D. The basic model of recognition

The three levels of recognition, individual, social/cultural and societal combine with two directions of recognition at each level, the intra- direction or the vertical line of recognition and the inter- direction or the horizontal line of recognition.

<i>levels/directions</i>	<i>intra-</i>	<i>inter-</i>
<i>individual</i>	intraindividual	interindividual
<i>social/cultural</i>	intrasocial/ intracultural	intersocial/ intercultural
<i>societal</i>	intrasocietal	intersocietal

Table 1. Overview of the basic model of recognition

At the individual level we get constituted primarily through the relation with others. As we have seen in Hegel and Honneth's model the individual intuits oneself in the other individual. Parallely though there is a self-relation or self-recognition, which, though based on the

relations with others, also occurs within the individual. Self-recognition or intra- direction of recognition means that we partially get to realise our identity through a relation with ourselves. By this relation it is implied that we encompass all aspects of our being, which at the individual level means that we acknowledge our physical, sensual, cognitive and moral aspect. (These aspects are taken as ideal types as they actually intertwine) Some of the needs need to be satisfied for each of these aspects, or the values self-acknowledged. Some of this satisfaction and acknowledgment happens in relations with others but some happens by the individual itself, especially through the development of self-consciousness. And this is the dialectical relation of self-recognition and the recognition by others, since the two can never be fully separated.

At the social and cultural level it is the social and cultural groups that relate and through their interrelation these groups are partially being constituted, which also means that the identities of the individuals from these groups are being constituted. In this interrelation there should be knowledge, understanding and respect for each other's social and cultural values, so that these identities do not be malformed. Also, parallely there is a process of intra-social or intra-cultural recognition which means that within the groups and cultures there needs to be respect and understanding of its members, also in their values.

Today at the level of the society we can observe both relations between the societies and also the relations within the society. Let us first here look at the intra- direction of recognition within the society.

Today what occurs within the society (or in some societies – should be occurring) is close to what Hegel had in mind with the state. We call it intrasocietal national recognition, as it primarily occurs within the societies which are nation states, and also to discern it from the global level of intrasocietal recognition of which we will soon speak. So, the intrasocietal national recognition involves actually the other two levels, individual and social/cultural, and

their intra- and inter- directions of recognition. On one hand, it is a process of intersocial and intercultural recognition¹⁵² where the social and cultural groups relate to each other. But it is also the vertical line of recognition where the institutions of the society should recognise its citizens, with respect to their different social and cultural affiliations and belongings. The citizens should thus be recognised in their universal and particular, social and cultural values and rights. Their differences would have to be known, understood and respected, which we believe is a basis to ensure them a human dignity (which we see not only in a universalistic but also in a particularistic mode). As it could be implied in Hegel's understanding within the state, citizens would in turn need to recognise the institutions of the society, that are thus supposed to be fair and just.

Then we come to the level of societies and cultures in the world. At this primarily horizontal level people, groups and institutions from different societies and cultures would need to recognise each other. This means that they would need to be acquainted with, understand and respect (institutions would primarily do it through their actions and principles) people, groups and institutions from other societies and cultures and also in their different (and universal) values. This we call intersocietal and intercultural recognition at the global level.¹⁵³ In this interrelation different historical backgrounds would need to be apprehended, in particular as they involve the power relations in which people, groups, particular cultures and societies have been subordinated to the power of some institutions.¹⁵⁴ Intersocietal recognition would also mean that the societies relate at their different societal levels. This means that at socioeconomic, political, social welfare and other societal levels there should be mutual knowledge, understanding and respect (before any judgment), in this case this would

¹⁵² Within a society in this case. Though intercultural recognition can go beyond the society.

¹⁵³ The cultures are here implied as transgressing the society.

¹⁵⁴ This rests on the previous thesis that power should be apprehended, delineated in order to have the possibility for true recognition, since the power masks the true position/situation of the subordinated one.

imply societal, primarily institutional values. These multilayered and multidimensional relations through different societal levels ('subsystems'¹⁵⁵) are important as the lives of the citizens (in a particular society) are strongly determined by institutional processes at each of these levels, and these endorse the values and customs of the people in a particular society. In a way we could say they represent the *Sittlichkeiten* of these different societies (and cultures). Intersocietal and intercultural recognition are also dialectically related to intrasocietal or intracultural line of recognition, as understanding another society can make us challenge our self-definitions (as C. Taylor says)¹⁵⁶.

Now, at the global level we could also speak of roughly saying a vertical line of recognition or as we call it global intrasocietal recognition. This primarily means that the global institutions should recognise all the people of the world, also in their diverse cultural and societal backgrounds. In a way we could say that the global institutions should embody their different *Sittlichkeiten*. These institutions should protect all the people and ensure them the rights, and also be fair in that they provide the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society¹⁵⁷. So, these institutions should take into account the deprived position of particular groups, societies, cultures, especially as these have been subordinated to particular power relations. On the other hand, as it is to be occurring within the State (according to Hegel), there should be a reverse recognition, that is people from all around the world, and also their governments should in turn recognise these institutions. By recognising the global institutions people from different societies actually enable the just institutions, that grant them freedom and rights. These institutions are to be based on good mutual relations between the societies and cultures. While this is somewhat analogous to what Hegel had in

¹⁵⁵ It is the concept used primarily by Niklas Luhmann in defining different domains of the society. See Niklas Luhmann, 1984. *Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie*.

¹⁵⁶ Charles Taylor, 1985. *Philosophical Papers: Volume 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences*.

¹⁵⁷ This is somewhat in line with what Rawls had in mind with the second principle of justice, the difference principle. See John Rawls, 1971. *Theory of Justice*.

mind to be occurring within the State, here the broad cultural and societal diversity should be encompassed.

Ch V. Exploring the framework of cosmopolitanism within the sociological and psychological/social-philosophical perspective

In this chapter we aim to explore the concept of cosmopolitanism as the basic framework in which we settle the concept of recognition in the contemporary world. As we observed the concept of recognition at the individual, social/cultural and societal level, we will here try to follow a similar pattern, while the latter two we shall explore together as they have been mostly settled in the literature in sociology, while the individual level we shall observe mostly from a psychological and social philosophical perspective.

We see the notion of cosmopolitanism as being underlined by the ethical dimension. At the individual level we are primarily all humans. In Kant's view, equal worth of reason and humanity in every person are fundamental to all people. To think of people as having equal moral value is to make a general claim about the basic units of the world comprising persons as free and equal beings, as D. Held points out¹⁵⁸. This is usually referred to as the principle of individualist moral egalitarianism, which implies the respect for every human being as such. This principle however does not exclude the significance of cultural diversity, that is of other identities of individuals. These latter are also the matter of individual human dignity that should be respected, as will be analysed below.

When considering the idea of the state and the phenomenon of state-creation, Hegel believes that this should imply that all citizens have the idea of the state. Hegel states that it is most of all this idea in individuals, that makes a state a state.¹⁵⁹ It can be inferred that, if we are to deal with cosmopolitanism in a political sense, we need to consider first of all the individual orientation of people, that is, if people in any part of the world really have a

¹⁵⁸ David Held. 2005. 'Principles of cosmopolitan order' in G. Brock and H. Brighouse (ed.) *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*.

¹⁵⁹ This idea is mainly expressed in Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*

cosmopolitan orientation, an idea of the world. To tackle this moment we shall discuss what might be at the basis of this orientation, what are the conditions for such possibility (mainly in the section on the psychological and social philosophical perspective to the notion of cosmopolitanism).

Regarding the social, the importance arises mostly in the context of the ever pressing process of globalisation, that is, of the world becoming more interrelated and more interdependent, and at the same time changing more rapidly, as has been explored in the first chapter. This implies the intermingling of different cultural models, different modernities and the rise of new kinds of human sociability, which calls for the mutual recognition between different cultures and societies. The Self and the Other are being brought closer together, and need to constitute the social world within the global processes. They however need a more settled relation, where both are recognised both for their universal values and for their particular values. So, to understand this social world, which is to become a new basis of the political, a broader global conception of reality is needed, but with a distinctive view of the particular. The perspective of the social thus points to the importance of taking the multiplicity of ways in which the social world is being constructed in different 'modernities'¹⁶⁰ and the importance of considering the dynamic relation between the local and the global, the universal and the particular.

Here we thus principally try to consider some of the moments where these two perspectives, individual and social/societal, contribute in conceptualising the notion of cosmopolitanism, which we find as a basis for the political conceptualisation. These perspectives are of course considered ideal-typically, as they strongly intertwine.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Gerard Delanty, 2006. *The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory*. The British Journal of Sociology 57 (1): 25-47

¹⁶¹ Being aware of other different categorisations of cosmopolitanism, such as cosmopolitanism about justice and cosmopolitanism about culture and the self (Samuel Scheffler, 1999. *Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism*. Utilitas,

A. Sociological perspective to cosmopolitanism: B. S. Turner, Z. Skrbis, G. Delanty

To explore the sociological perspective to cosmopolitanism we shall try to examine several points: firstly, understanding of the social in the context of the study of cosmopolitanism and the hermeneutics of the Other, as interpreted by B.S. Turner; then, some of the more empirical moments that cosmopolitanism might comprise, as overviewed by Z. Skrbis et al.; and finally, G. Delanty's conception of critical cosmopolitanism, with the crucial point on multiple modernities and the tendency within modernity to self-problematisation. These points, we believe, in a way represent well the scope of sociology as a discipline, in this case within the study of cosmopolitanism.

Turner's defence of the social

What is the importance of sociology for the study of cosmopolitanism? According to authors such as B. S. Turner and G. Delanty classical sociology is mainly concerned with the study of the social, and not necessarily (national) society, thus being open to a broader perspective. It is a perspective which today, with the strong globalisation processes, entails the whole world. The social, counteracting the negative effects of (utilitarian) individualism, or in Durkheim's conception 'our rational activity [being] dependent on social causes' and the social being the reality *sui generis*, was always a moral field. The social is thus defined by the nature of trust,

11(3): 255-276), or Waldron's categorisation, cosmopolitan right and cosmopolitanism in culture (Jeremy Waldron, 2000. *What is Cosmopolitan?* The Journal of Political Philosophy, 8 (2): 227-243), or Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown (*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/>), political, economic and moral (in the contemporary understanding), we decided for this approach (individual, social/ societal and political perspective) as we believe that in the conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism the perspectives of the individual and the social, which we might call transversal perspectives, are highly relevant, while they haven't been particularly distinguished before.

which underpins the contractual relations of the social sphere and is the medium of reciprocity in the social field¹⁶². This medium of exchange is necessarily transnational.

Containing two interrelated core elements, (1) patterns or chains of social interaction and symbolic exchange, and (2) social institutions into which these patterns of interaction cohere, *the social* is characterised by a dynamic between solidarity (processes that bind us together into communities) and scarcity (processes that divide and break communities). In this it is implied that social institutions are the social forces that bind and unbind communities. Thus the study of the social involves the study of values, cultural practices, trust and normative arrangements that underpin institutions and the systems of social stratification that express scarcity, and which are not limited to the society but are spread throughout the world.

Another moment in (classical) sociology relevant for the study of cosmopolitanism is *the hermeneutics of the Other*, which can also be derived from Weber's hermeneutical idea of sociology¹⁶³ as the study of social meaning of action and interaction. Understanding other cultures must imply a certain level of respect for their truth claims, and a care to understand them correctly and carefully. Thus, understanding the Other requires a careful construction of their meanings and values in social interaction. And this is an important basis for the recognition of the Other. B. S. Turner proposes four stages of cosmopolitan hermeneutics: recognition of the Other, respect for difference, critical mutual evaluation, and care for the Other. We see here certain differentiation in Turner's conceptualisation of the cosmopolitan hermeneutics, where respect for difference is distinguished from the process of recognition of the Other. In our understanding though, as we described earlier, recognition of the other encompasses the respect of the other, and also the respect for difference.

¹⁶² Bryan S. Turner, 2006. *Classical Sociology and Cosmopolitanism: A Critical Defence of the Social*. The British Journal of Sociology 57 (1). p. 133-151

¹⁶³ In the previous part we considered the hermeneutical understanding as primarily derived from Gadamer.

According to B. S. Turner, mutual and free recognition is required if people are to be recognisable as moral agents, which is close to our own understanding. B. S. Turner develops the argument further; in recognition ethics it is not enough simply to recognise the Other, but there must also be mutual opportunities for reflection, dialogue and criticism. By this he calls for 'a critical recognition theory', which he sees as an extension of the tradition of sociological hermeneutics of social action.

So, the social could be understood as a shared reality transnationally where the central moment is understanding the Other which we also identified as the central moment of recognition.

Skrbis et al.: Trying to delineate the dimensions of the cosmopolitan disposition

A somewhat different sociological approach we find in the work of authors like Z. Skrbis et al., U. Hannerz or D. Held, who, among other things, tried to delineate the dimensions of the notion of cosmopolitanism. According to Z. Skrbis et al.¹⁶⁴, while cosmopolitanism represents a tool for radical social imagination and radical projections of cosmopolitan democracy and cosmopolitan citizenship, for purposes of social enquiry it is a diffuse and somewhat vague concept. In trying to conceptualise the notion of cosmopolitanism in a more concrete, operational way, these authors start from a broad premise that, to understand cosmopolitanism today one has to make reference to different societal features of the modern globalised era such as social, cultural, political and economic features, where this era is defined by an unprecedented interconnectedness in which identities, ideas, cultures and politics are embedded in the global and the transnational. One of the main concerns thus for sociologists would be the permeability of borders and thus global interdependencies that give rise to new

¹⁶⁴ Z.oran Skrbis, Gavin Kendall and Ian Woodward. 2004. *Locating Cosmopolitanism: Between Humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category*. *Theory, Culture & Society* 21 (6): 115-136.

kinds of human sociability.¹⁶⁵ Thus for many sociologists thinking 'ourselves beyond the nation', beyond citizenship and beyond the fixities of time and space is becoming increasingly vital.

For many commentators cosmopolitanism is associated with a *conscious openness to the world and to cultural differences*. But the question is what is the sense of this openness? Is it the result of ever greater mobility of people, or exposure to the media, and thus mostly circumstantially induced, or is this openness consciously assumed? And also a question is what qualities constitute this concept?

Z. Skrbis et al. question several issues regarding the notion of cosmopolitanism, which also denote the main spheres of sociological interest regarding cosmopolitanism. Firstly, the determinacy of the concept; many authors keep an idea of cosmopolitanism as an abstract ideal that cannot be positively, empirically defined. Further, there is a problem of identification and attempts to answer the question 'Who is cosmopolitan?'.¹⁶⁶ For Z. Skrbis et al. cosmopolitanism is about mobilities of ideas, objects and images just as much as it is about mobilities of people. It is thus not only embodied, but also 'felt, imagined, consumed and fantasized'. More important for understanding cosmopolitanism is however the third issue that Z. Skrbis calls the problem of attribution or what exactly are the determinants of cosmopolitan disposition and culture.

¹⁶⁵ Some of the examples in that respect could be environmental concerns such as those given by the Chernobyl catastrophe, the AIDS, terrorism and other concerns that reach great parts of the world. Thus for Appadurai the new dynamics of time-space compression give rise to new dimensions that are captured in term such as ethnoscaples, technoscaples, finanscaples, mediascaples and ideoscaples, which go beyond the national boundary. Arjun Appadurai. 1990. *Disjuncture and Difference in the global Cultural Economy*, in M. Featherstone (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage

¹⁶⁶ Behind this questions there are different theses; are these the members of a 'world class' global business elite, who possess the knowledge and skills to command resources and operate beyond borders and across world territories? Or are cosmopolitans refugees who are mobile but usually lack free will to move and may sometimes consciously prefer to be locals and parochials? Or are these expatriates who have chosen to live abroad and may return home; but who may also refuse to engage with the host environment?

Determinants of the cosmopolitan disposition and culture

In trying to delineate the dimensions of cosmopolitanism authors propose different lists of relevant characteristics. For U. Hannerz¹⁶⁷ for example, the relevant characteristics of cosmopolitanism would include: being willing to engage with the cultural Other, developing dynamic and interdependent relationships with locals, having a degree of competence and sense of home, that is, a consciousness of a point of departure, while for D. Held¹⁶⁸, there are three requirements of cultural cosmopolitanism, these including: the recognition of the interconnectedness of political communities, an understanding of overlapping collective fortunes, and an ability to empathise with others and to celebrate difference, diversity and hybridity.

Z. Skrbis et al., in trying to delineate the dimensions of cosmopolitanism, propose an important definitional criteria, which consists in attitudinal characteristics, such as beliefs, attitudes and values, which can be identified as cosmopolitan and with which individuals can identify. This aspect of cosmopolitanism can be defined as 'cosmopolitan disposition', as the one that distinguishes cosmopolitans from non-cosmopolitans¹⁶⁹. This cosmopolitan disposition should principally be understood as an attitude of '**openness**' toward **other cultures**, which would imply the following interrelated aspects: *cultural openness* – as manifested mostly by Urry's dimensions of cosmopolitanism – the capacity to consume diverse cultural symbols and goods, a willingness to take risks by virtue of encountering the Other, the ability to reflexively observe and judge different cultures, the possession of semiotic skills to interpret images of the Other; then *emotional commitment* – demonstrated

¹⁶⁷ cited in Z. Skrbis, G. Kendall and I. Woodward. 2004. *Locating Cosmopolitanism: Between Humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category*. *Theory, Culture & Society* 21 (6): 115-136

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ The 'disposition' is here mostly defined through Bourdieu's concept of the habitus.

by an empathy for and interest in other cultures¹⁷⁰, which fuses intellectual outlooks with dispositions centred on what we might call experiential-sensational aspect – pleasurable personal experiences or exposure to media – which predispose one to react positively to the idea of contact with other cultures; and closely related to the emotional commitment is the *ethical commitment* – orientation towards selflessness, worldliness, that is, an orientation towards more universal values and ideas¹⁷¹.

This moment of openness toward other cultures is actually very important for intercultural and intersocietal recognition, as the possibility of understanding and relating to the other implies that we are open to the other. The emotional component of empathy for the other we partly tackled by the moment in the phenomenology of recognition which we identified as the disposition to 'sich hineinleben' into the position of the other (or 'stepping into the shoes of the other'). Thus we see that the cosmopolitan disposition largely corresponds, or rather complements the process of intercultural and intersocietal recognition.

On the other hand, Skrbis et al. suggest another definitional criteria that consists in identifying the structural conditions within the spheres of cultural production and consumption and other societal systems which tend to nurture these cosmopolitan dispositions. Thus for example diverse cultural symbols that are advertised through media representations or multiculturally framed education contribute to more openness to different cultures, that is thus nurture the cosmopolitan disposition. What is important is that from the 'unreflexive cosmopolitanism' (which might consist in the consumption of media images, consumption of different types of food, cultural and tourist experiences, and unreflexive consumption of ethnic styles in dress or music) follows the authentic/genuine or 'reflexive'

¹⁷⁰ This aspect will be more explained in the following section, where we discuss the psychological perspective to cosmopolitanism.

¹⁷¹ As Z. Skrbis et al. suggest, it is this ethical commitment that drives much of the contemporary environmental, anti-war and anti-globalisation movements.

cosmopolitanism which involves emotional-ethical complexity of openness toward other cultures, which is also an important part in the process of intercultural and intersocietal recognition.

So, determining the cosmopolitan disposition might be helpful to better understand the process of intercultural and intersocietal recognition. The central moments of openness to the Other, or to other cultures, and the willingness to engage with the Other, complemented with the consciousness of the particularities of places, characters, historical trajectories and fates, are thus central to the cosmopolitan disposition and also very relevant for intercultural and intersocietal recognition.

Delanty's critical cosmopolitanism

Another interesting understanding of cosmopolitanism in primarily sociological perspective gives Gerard Delanty. Terming it *critical cosmopolitanism*¹⁷² G. Delanty understands it as 'socially situated' and as 'part of the self-constituting nature of the social world itself'. The emphasis in the sociological perspective to cosmopolitanism is thus on the notion of the social which is observed within the context of globalisation and in which new cultural models take shape. In this approach of critical cosmopolitanism, as G. Delanty points out, the cosmopolitan imagination occurs when and wherever new relations between self, other and world develop in moments of openness. This approach shifts the emphasis to 'internal developmental processes' within the social world.

Cosmopolitanism in this perspective refers to the multiplicity of ways in which the social world is constructed in different modernities and G. Delanty thus terms it also post-universalistic. Delanty's main argument is that 'a sociologically driven critical cosmopolitanism concerns the analysis of cultural modes of mediation by which the social

¹⁷² Gerard Delanty. 2006. *The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory*. The British Journal of Sociology 57 (1): 25-47

world is shaped and where the emphasis is on moments of world openness created out of the encounter of the local with the global¹⁷³.

Reviewing the three basic modes of cosmopolitanism, *moral*, which G. Delanty criticises mainly for a too strong universalistic sense of universal humanity, *political*, principally related to citizenship and democracy but where the rights to citizenship do not exhaust the category of peoplehood, and *cultural*, which offers a less dualistic view of the relation between the particular and the universal, G. Delanty grounds his approach mostly on the last one which he sees as a plurality of cosmopolitan projects by which the global and the local are combined in diverse ways.

Within the cultural cosmopolitanism G. Delanty places some of the contemporary sociological conceptions of the social which shed some light on the notion of cosmopolitanism. Some examples of cultural cosmopolitanism are thus to be found in Castells' notion of networks, Urry's notion of mobility or Latour's notion of hybridity. But these notions for different reasons still lack the explanatory power for cosmopolitanism. More attention G. Delanty pays to the post-universalistic notion of cosmopolitanism which would be based on the multiple modernities.

So, an interesting point is made from a wider historical sociology in which cosmopolitan possibilities are more evident in a new approach to modernity which would be based on the multiplicity, that is on multiple cultural and political projects based on civilisational transformation. Cosmopolitanism, which is here seen as a plural and post-universalistic notion, is critical and dialogic, recognising alternative cosmopolitan projects in history. This view enables us to see how people were cosmopolitan in the past and how different cosmopolitanisms existed before and despite westernisation. But, beside the plurality of cultural cosmopolitanism, by which the global and the local are combined in diverse ways,

¹⁷³ *ibid.*

critical cosmopolitanism should also be seen in terms of tensions within modernity. Cosmopolitanism thus concerns a dynamic relation between the local and the global, the universal and the particular, that is the interaction of the universal order of the cosmos and the human order of the polis. It is actually this framework that we consider important for recognition, since in our understanding the process of recognition which arises to global intrasocietal recognition actually should imply all other levels of recognition both in horizontal and vertical direction, and in which there is a dynamic relation between primarily the cultural and societal level, and the global level.

Further, for G. Delanty, an important aspect of cosmopolitanism is the emergence of a global public. By the notion of global public, as an aspect of the global that is not outside the social world but inside it, is meant the global context in which communication is filtered. It is the 'always ever present sphere of discourse that contextualises political communication and public discourse today'¹⁷⁴. It is within these global discursive processes that the Self and the Other are articulated and in self-problematising ways, thus constituting the social world. A cosmopolitan-oriented social theory should thus have as its goal the identification of the broader context of the constitution of the social world.

The important point of critical cosmopolitanism is thus the world openness which occurs mainly in situations where 'the global public impinges upon political communication and other kinds of public discourse creating as a result new visions of social order'¹⁷⁵. To an extent this cosmopolitan dynamic goes on even in relatively closed societies, but it is with the enhanced momentum of globalisation and more extensive modes of communication that it takes on a specifically cosmopolitan significance, as G. Delanty points. Cosmopolitan imagination is in this respect more reflexive and internalised than in Kantian view.

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *ibid.*

It is the movement of modernity towards self-transformation, that is, the belief that human agency can radically transform the present in the image of an imagined future. It is through this impetus that different modernities interact, and it constitutes the cosmopolitanism of modernity. Modernity, in whose basis lies uncertainty and no secure foundations for identity, meaning and memory, is a transformative condition which is not global as such but is pushed by globalisation, and can, in Delanty's opinion, be called cosmopolitan, due to its plural nature and interactive logics. 'Cosmopolitanism is the key expression of the tendency within modernity to self-problematisation'¹⁷⁶, and the extent and speed of globalisation, taken as a process that 'intensifies connections, enhances possibilities for cultural translations and deepens the consciousness of globality'¹⁷⁷, has pushed cosmopolitanism to become one of the major expressions of modernity today, as G. Delanty thinks. Thus, in line with Habermas' view, for any culture to be able to reproduce itself it will have to be opened to the world. Our view however is that globalisation should be taken with more caution (as we described in the first chapter), and that it doesn't necessarily bring to cosmopolitanism.

In Delanty's view, cosmopolitan sociology needs to move beyond a view of the social world as empirically given to one that captures emergent cultural forms and the vision of an alternative society. Therefore cosmopolitan imagination is more concerned with openness and societal transformative, than being identifiable with the mere condition of pluralism or the attachments of the individual.

So, the cultural dimension of the kind of cosmopolitanism G. Delanty suggests consists more in the creation and articulation of communicative models of world openness in which societies undergo transformation, where these models arise as a result of responses to the presence of global publics, than simple diversity.

¹⁷⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*

It is interesting to note the three dimensions of cosmopolitanism that can be distinguished in this theoretical perspective. *The historical level of modernity*, where cosmopolitanism arises when different modernities interact and undergo transformation, producing a new field of tensions within the project of modernity. *The macro or societal level of the interaction of societies or societal systems*, where cosmopolitanism comes as an outcome when two or more societies interact and undergo change of a developmental nature in their model of modernity (in this the co-evolution of the societal levels often occurs). And *the micro dimension of cosmopolitanism* concerning individual agency and social identities, that is aspects of cosmopolitanism reflected in internal societal change or reflexive kinds of self-understanding.

In sum, G. Delanty defines cosmopolitanism in relation to the tendency within modernity towards self-problematisation, while with the processes of globalisation this leads to a global public that is present in all of communication and public discourse now central to the constitution of the social world. With this the relations of the Self and Other that pervade the social world are constituted within the broader context of the world as represented by the global public. The critical aspect of cosmopolitanism finally concerns the internal transformation of social and cultural phenomena through self-problematisation and pluralisation. Critical cosmopolitanism thus refers to a developmental change in the social world arising out of competing cultural models.

What is interesting here for the concept of recognition is this transformative moment that happens in the interaction of societies and different modernities, which, as we described in the moment of hermeneutical understanding, calls also for self-problematisation. So, the encounters that are happening at the global level, that is interculturally and intersocietally, are instigating these cultures and societies to change, and this is to happen primarily within the communicative models or the global public. This is interesting for the concept of recognition

in the sense that openness to others from different cultures and societies and communication with these others eventually might lead to a greater societal transformation both within these societies and cultures, and overall on the global level. We are however more sceptic that this is to occur simply by processes of globalisation, and we thus call for more normative view which is actually the one of recognition that is to happen between different cultures and societies with respect to their values and apprehending the power relations that strongly determined the positions of particular cultures and societies.

So, the sociological perspective to cosmopolitanism, though diversely conceived, is generally trying to point to the significance of the social (and the societal) within the global framework. The social/societal, which comprises social¹⁷⁸, cultural, political and economic features, is thus being transformed within the context of globalisation and this transformation occurs transnationally. This calls for better understanding of the other, and thus for the recognition of the other in order for this change to happen in support to the identities that still need to be realised. Concerning a dynamic relation between the local and the global, the universal and the particular (the universal order of the cosmos and the human order of the polis), the sociological perspective thus tries to integrate these levels. This is important for our understanding of recognition particularly the one which we termed intrasocietal global recognition where the relations between different levels and vertical and horizontal directions actually come together.

Now, we shall turn to the psychological and social philosophical perspective of cosmopolitanism.

¹⁷⁸ Here the 'social' features are meant in a more narrow, interpersonal sense.

B. Extending the notion of cosmopolitanism to the psychological (social-philosophical) perspective

The hermeneutics of the cosmopolitan

Question that we bear in mind is: can the cosmopolitan, taken here as the essence of cosmopolitanism, potentially be realised if it doesn't find its bases in the subjective experience of particular individuals? In other words, can cosmopolitanism be conceptualised without taking the subjectivistic perspective into account?

As we have seen with the sociological perspective there have been some analytical attempts to encompass certain attitudinal characteristics of the individual, but it is our belief that they were not considered profoundly enough.

In a historical horizon, already Diogenes the Cynic and the Stoics, although in somewhat different fashion, pointed to the relevance of the orientation of the individual in conceiving the cosmopolitan. The former marked the notion of the cosmopolitan by pointing to the personal attitude of declaring oneself as 'a citizen of the world', as a way of belonging, while the other underlined the importance of helping human beings as such.

In dealing with this perspective we would like to point to a few moments: the moment of universalism-particularism within the construction of (a cosmopolitan) identity, the concept of the relational, and Gilligan's double conception of morality with a particular emphasis on the morality of care and the connected self.

Universalistic vs. particularistic and the individual identity

As already pointed in the sociological perspective (Z. Skrbis et al.), cosmopolitan disposition includes both the 'universal moment' of openness to the Other and reference to universal principles of human nature, as well as consciousness of the particularities of places,

characters, historical trajectories and fates. So, the crucial point is that the notion of 'cosmopolitan' does not neglect or assimilate other particular identities but, grasping each of them, taking their particular significance, cosmopolitan identity integrates them all up to the global level.

Cosmopolitanism at the level of the individual is actually the possibility to empathise with each particular identity, in a certain sense to take part in each particular attachment, especially those different from one's own, and the possibility to do so with any of them. Openness to the Other should thus be understood as the openness to each and every Other. Only thus could we speak of the openness to the World, as the World comprises all the possible Others. Also, to empathise with the particular identities of the Other is generally possible only if one has developed these particular identities of oneself (familial, local, ethnic, religious, national, etc.). What then comprises the cosmopolitan is not the exclusion of any particular identity, but actually evolving through all the particular identities.

Why is this so? Why do we need particular identities to speak of the cosmopolitan?

The cosmopolitan, as we understand it, is not simply universalistic; it is more holistic, as tending to encompass all the particular in their particularity. In a sense, this is similar to what G. Delanty has in mind to be happening on the social level; the self-transformative learning process of the social when faced with all the diversity and interactive processes of migration, media communication influences, etc. The social tends to self-transform and constitute itself as new, by integrating the processual impact of the global within itself. On the individual level, it is also the self-transformative moment of learning and of integrative process of the individual identity that constitute it as cosmopolitan. The possible holeness of identity, to which human beings generally tend, in the contemporary world might actually imply the realisation of the cosmopolitan, that is of all the particular, in the individual.

On the traces of the psychological and sociological perspective we shall try to sketch the essential claim of cosmopolitanism.

Firstly, it is through the social that the human being is essentially being realised. Any individual identity is significantly being formed through individual's relations and interaction with other human beings. In social theory this is often termed socialisation, but it should be understood in a double sense. Not just as an individual adapting itself to the social, but also as being formed by that social. Secondly, the social is today being more diversely constituted than it used to be before. Global interrelatedness and interdependence create the social in a more complex way, instigating many different identities (personal, social/cultural). Thirdly, as the human being tends to be fully realised, through the holeness of all one's potentialities, and since the social, through which a human being is essentially being realised, is more complex today, for a human being to be fully realised it has to be open to all Others, that is, it has to evolve its cosmopolitan identity. In other words, a human being has to be open to all the different social realities if it is to develop its (cosmopolitan) identity, that is, if it is to be fully realised.

The crucial moment here is the notion of *the relational*, for which we claim is the ground on which the cosmopolitan is based. The relational is not simply the interactive behavioural moment of the Self and the Other, but in this concept is implied the self-reflective moment of the Self as being constituted through the Other. Imagination of the Other in oneself and developing our relation to the Other, no matter how distant the Other is, constitute the cognitive and affective moments of the concept of the relational. This moment of imagination as a cognitive-affective stance, particularly in the relation to the distant Other who are beyond our direct experience, is a crucial point of the cosmopolitan. Also, the virtues of respect and toleration of any Other, which are the constitutive moments of the

cosmopolitan, are based on this imaginative moment of the relational.¹⁷⁹ We can thus say that the cosmopolitan finds its ground in the relational. Further more, as the relational constitutes the individual, we can infer that the cosmopolitan, which is based on the relational, is an important moment in the realisation of an individual.

This relational aspect of the Self, Other and the world, thus concerns a strong emotional-ethical and cultural complexity, which is the central moment of the cosmopolitan.

By this we however do not want to diminish the perspective of the humanity of all human beings, as a universal ethical moment, but we wish to point to the more profound understanding of a human being which is to be comprised by the notion of cosmopolitanism.

Gilligan's double conception of morality

Within the distinction of the morality of justice and the morality of care that C. Gilligan introduces¹⁸⁰, this second being grounded in the connected self, we find this second notion of morality to be closely related to our notion of the relational. As C. Gilligan et al propose, in their *mapping of the moral domain*, morality of justice holds up an ideal of reciprocity and equal respect, pertaining to the separate or objective self and being based on impartiality, objectivity and distancing of the self from others, while assuming an ideal relationship of equality. On the other hand, morality of care holds up an ideal of attention and response to need. This notion of morality is grounded in the connected self which is based on interdependence and concern for another's well-being, while assuming an ideal relationship of care and responsiveness to others. In this perspective (the morality of care), the rightness of the decision in a moral dilemma is established in terms of *how it would affect the relationship with other people*. Although not pertaining only to women, this second kind of moral concern,

¹⁷⁹ This in other words means that, to respect and tolerate the distant Other, this Other must first be imagined

¹⁸⁰ Carol Gilligan, Janie V. Ward, Jill McLean Taylor, with Betty Bardige. 2001. *Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of Women's Thinking to Psychological Theory and Education*.

embodied in the connected self, is more characteristic for women. It is probably also the reason why it has been less recognised and explored until recently. Today however, a support for this thesis can be found in different research studies (some of them reported in the same volume of C. Gilligan et al).

On a more substantial level, within the concept of morality as care, C. Gilligan explores the notion of co-feeling, a notion that implies the ability of one to 'participate' in another's feelings, even when they are different from one's own; being aware of oneself as capable of knowing and living with the feelings of others. It is an attitude of engagement rather than an attitude of judgment or observation. Through co-feeling, self and other, become connected and interdependent. With this shift in the conception of self in relation to others, moral questions change according to C. Gilligan.

We won't develop this notion here further, but it is important to consider this kind of moral perspective, morality of care, as which we believe to be important in contemporary understanding of cosmopolitanism, touching upon the care for the Other as one of the central moments of cosmopolitanism (see B. S. Turner 2006). This moment of the morality of care is also related to our conception of the relational which we hypothesised to be the basis of the cosmopolitan.

As the possibility for the realisation of cosmopolitanism lies, among other, in the realisation of the cosmopolitan within each individual, we believe that this individual/psychological (social-philosophical) perspective is very important for conceptualising the notion of cosmopolitanism, and thus also for a cosmopolitan disposition which we find crucial for recognition in the contemporary world.

Framework of cosmopolitanism which we explored from the two perspectives, sociological and psychological/social-philosophical, is very important for the process of recognition.

Relations of the Self, Other and the World that develop in moments of openness are central for cosmopolitanism, and it is principally these relations that constitute the basis for recognition in the contemporary world. The moments of openness to the Other, or to other cultures, and the willingness to engage with the Other, complemented with the consciousness of the particularities of places, characters, historical trajectories and fates, are central to the cosmopolitan disposition. This we find a basis for intercultural and intersocietal recognition.

The different societal features, such as economic, cultural, political and social today more and more create the global social/societal sphere, and pushed by globalisation these processes are highly transformative, both for these societies and for the world as a whole. However, for them to create a more just world they need to encompass particularities of different societies and cultures, and their inner societal processes need to be acknowledged.

Conclusion

In this work we analysed the broad framework in which the problematic of recognition takes place today.

The main assumption is that the identities evolve through the process of recognition. That is, the identities principally get constituted and realised through the dialogical relations with others, which is the interrelational aspect of recognition.

Today the social sphere in which the constitution of the identities is to occur is becoming significantly diverse, culturally and societally diverse, as the world is becoming more interconnected and interdependent. So, the constitution, and realisation, of the identities today should go more through these different others, who come from different cultures and societies of the world. These others bring some new values, some new ways of life through which they were primarily constituted. These values have to be recognised for their more authentic constitution.

In the context of power relations some cultures and societies were misrecognised, as they were not given a proper chance for the constitution of their identities. For a true recognition their particular historical paths and the relations of power which disabled the constitution of their identities have to be apprehended, and they have to be recognised in their more authentic values.

What is thus important to occur is the intercultural and intersocietal recognition which would be based on knowing, understanding and respect of the values, in particular cultural and societal values, between different cultures and societies. These values include the ideas of these cultures and societies about what is right, good, desirable and around which they constitute their personal identities.

For intercultural and intersocietal recognition is crucial the openness toward other cultures and thus an openness toward every possible Other, and the willingness to engage with

the Other. It is this interrelation with the Other through which the process of recognition primarily occurs today. In this cosmopolitan framework there is also a potential for the universal dignity as the basic human values seem to be the same across cultures and societies. However, the particularities which arise from the priorities given to each of these values, and the other cultural and societal values, have to be recognised first.

Significantly, these relations of recognition between different cultural and societal selves and others and also different societal institutions are the basis for new global institutions, which should embody all of these cultural and societal particularities. There is thus a process which we called global intrasocietal recognition where primarily the global institutions should recognise the citizens of the world in their particularities of different cultural and societal backgrounds, and in turn, to maintain ethical relations among themselves the citizens should recognise these (now) the 'cosmopolitan institutions'. It is this parallel process of intercultural and intersocietal recognition, and global intrasocietal recognition that we find very important for the contemporary world.

In conclusion, we need the cosmopolitan disposition primarily as openness to each and every Other, and their particularities, for a possibility of true recognition, that is to frame the contemporary world and the relations in it. In that sense the values that are the central moments of the identities of people need to be further explored in different cultures and societies of the world, in order to give these cultures and societies the true recognition. The process of recognition is transformative for individuals and for cultures and societies, and also for the world as a whole. We hope to see this potential for change as positive and just.

The limit of toleration from which perspective this view might be questioned is justifiable. The process of toleration we see as complementary to the process of recognition, but as toleration involves a negative stance (we tolerate something we don't actually like), it is our belief that first there needs to be a positive stance, primarily of understanding, which is

framed by the process of recognition. This gives us hope for a more peaceful and just world.

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