



The Impact of US' Neo-Orientalism
On the
Future of Nation-State in Iraq in the light of IS crisis

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Abstract

First, this study intends to inquire into this question: does the US support a unified Iraq? If we look at the historical discourse of US policy towards Iraq, the answer would be: Yes. But to an adequate answer, my methodology tries to understand how far knowledge and power can meet to give us a clear answer. I was so confused till I read Edward Said's Orientalism. When I started reading this book a realization has grown in my mind that Said methodology will help me answer my question. But still this methodology is not sufficient to address the recent political dynamics whether in Iraq itself, or that shapes the relationship between the US and Iraq. Thus, there was a need to adopt other paradigm. This is Mohammed Salama's work of *Islam, Orientalism and Intellectual History*. To reach a detailed answer to the above guiding question I go through various methodological approaches, and each of them matches a supportive question. At the same, these concerns tell us that it's difficult to study how Iraq is perceived in the US without studying the themes about Arab and Islam in the same periphery.

However, I find it relevance to demonstrate the significance of this study. This study is a scientific attempt to test the hypothesis which presumes that the US Orientalism can directly affect the political future of specific country (Iraq as a case study). Thus, I was keen to read as much as possible works that have been done about the implications of Orientalism on politics. The first chapter demonstrates the relationship between Orientalism and politics but what is significant is that I was eager to understand the implications of Orientalism on strategy-making process. Some concepts are presented for the first time in this study such as 'soft Orientalism' and 'Hard Orientalism'; a twofold distinction is clearly set out between the political view of neo-orientalism and the old definition of the concept on one hand, and between the old type of orientalists and the new one on the other. In that sense, the thesis is designed to fulfill the methodological requirement to tackle this question in one hand. While on the other, it is designed to inquire into the question that concerns the impact of neo-orientalism on the US strategy towards a unified Iraq. It is important to explain why I chose Iraq as an object of contemporary American Orientalism? I believe that Iraq has occupied central core of American interest in the Middle East since Gulf War in 1990, even before, and after September 11th in specific. We can notice that before 2003 Iraq was linked to terrorism, despotism, tyranny and accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Iraq was also perceived as a major source

destabilizing the region. It is this image that has guided the US foreign policy towards Iraq for more than a decade where it has invested soft power to legitimize its hard power which was demonstrated through its invasion of Iraq in 2003 to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein and to initiate the political project of Democratization.

Although, the most important obstacle this study faces is that how methodologically a link can be established between Orientalism, which mostly perceived as linguistic or literature studies, and strategic analysis regarding the future of Iraq. Conclusions about Orientalism cannot be circulated on various political peripheries. Because the first think orientalism deals with is power. Thus, the impact of orientalism on foreign policy should be analyzed in the light of state's capacity to apply its themes. Orientalism has different implications on politics from case study to another. In some countries, its impact is limited to the domestic politics since the political trends of that country has no intention of playing a major role in international politics.

This study promotes two essential arguments:

1. Orientalism's findings and themes in the US have sophisticated implications on the future of a state like Iraq.
2. The US supports a unified Iraq if it meets its strategic expectations as will be discussed later in the seventh chapter.

The hypotheses will be proven by qualitative methods of primary and secondary sources. The analysis of recent literature on Orientalism, Islamophobia, and its impact on US foreign policy will be undergone in Arabic, and English. Also, recent press will be observed and included. In addition, the primary sources written by international and intergovernmental institutions, national governments, Iraqis institutions, foreign policy reports, and think tanks will determine a main part of the analysis. Further, the analysis of strategies towards Iraq focusing on the policy area of the so-called Islamic State in the region will be conducted.

This study will be structured into seven chapters. Each one will tackle sub-question listings to fulfill the methodological requirements. This study is a scientific attempt to test the hypothesis which presumes that the US Orientalism can directly affect the political future of other state (Iraq). in that sense, the thesis is designed to fulfill the methodological requirement to tackle this question in one hand. While on the other, it is designed to inquire into the question that concerns the impact of neo-orientalism on the US strategy towards a unified Iraq.

Preface Transliteration

Arabic terms are transliterated according to the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) transliteration system. Frequently used words such as Muslim, Muhammad (the Prophet), Quran, Sunna, Sharia, fiqh, madhab, umma, ijtiḥad and jihad.

Translation

All the translations from Arabic are mine. Arabic original titles are provided in brackets when they are first referred to, and the subsequent citations from these titles are to the English translation, for ease of reference.

Bibliography

Listings of bibliography are designed according to Harvard style. Also, Harvard style is used to cite information sources in the body of the text.

Key Words

Orientalism, Islamophobia, Iraq, Political Liberalism, Occidentalism, Perceptions on Islam in the West, Secularism in Iraq, Political dynamics in Iraq, Non-State Actors in Iraq, Sectarian strife, Nation-state in Iraq, The self-proclaimed Islamic State, Democracy, the US strategy towards Iraq, the Middle East.

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To my father;
Mother;
My wife Dr. Reem Azzez Jaber;
To my beloved country Iraq.

List of Abbreviations:

NME: New Middle East

GME: Great Middle East

IS: The so-called Islamic State

ISIS: The self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Sham

ISF: Iraqi Security Forces

US: United States of America

CDA: Civic Democratic Alliance

CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority

INA: Iraqi National Accord

INC: Iraqi National Congress

IGC: Iraqi Governing Council

SCIRI: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq

UN: United Nations Organization

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigations

WSJ: Wall Street Journal

NYT: New York Times

CNN: The Cable News Network

VP: Vice President

PTSD: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder

TMT: Terror Management Theory

TEC: Temporary exclusion orders

WWI: The First World War

WWII: The Second World War

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party

PYD: Partiya Yekîtiya Democrat

IHrC: Islamic Human Rights Commission

TWP: The Washington Post

MSNBC: Microsoft and NBC Cable Network

Iraq NIE: Iraq National Intelligence Estimate

UNMOVIC: The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction.

CENTCOM: United States Central Command

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Background

When the early nineties swept the world of new changes has been overshadowed by the various states and regions and have had repercussions in the form of international balance, which affected the roles of some international powers, and after the occurrence of variables, for example, the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower in the international balance, has been encouraged some power to increase their influence, especially in the Middle East and West Asia to be one of the most affected regions by the change that happened in the map of world powers, and this change has made the U.S. as the dominant power of international interactions and this, in itself form an important variable, a U.S. interest in the Middle East and its strategy has become cornerstone for the conduct of international interactions, especially after the events of September 11 which have motivated united states of America to enlarge the strategy of the war on terror. In this regard the Middle East has received the most of the waves of this strategy especially towards Iraq when US invaded it in March 2003 to oust the former regime.

It is important to explain why I chose Iraq as an object of contemporary American Orientalism? I believe that Iraq has occupied central core of American interest in the Middle East since Gulf War in 1990, even before, and after September 11th in specific. We can notice that before 2003 Iraq was linked to terrorism, despotism, tyranny and accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Iraq was also perceived as a major source destabilizing the region. It is this image that has guided the US foreign policy towards Iraq for more than a decade where it has invested soft power to legitimize its hard power which was demonstrated through its invasion of Iraq in 2003 to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein and to initiate the political project of Democratization. This project is promoted as a motivation for Arabic societies to achieve political awakening. Democratization project is mapped to lead change in the socio-political situation in the Arab World. I believe that Iraq is still important for the American strategy, and will play a crucial role in the regional politics.

The results of this action have many consequences and changes in domestic and regional sphere. Despite all the difficulties Iraq works hardly to achieve progress and prosperity by building institutions that respect democratic values and human rights started from adopted the constitution which establish the new regime of new Iraq depending on the democratic and transparency spirits to the elected government which looking for national reconciliation as a way to the peace and stability

and to spread the justice and equality among the people and increase the role on independent judiciary system.

Although, despite all these efforts to honor the democratic experience in post-2003 Iraq, terrorism, political instability and non-state actors were the fundamental dynamics of political reality. Along these obstacles there were other domestic and regional challenges that hinder Iraq to be the adequate model of democracy and prosperity for the whole region. Thus, in the aftermath of repeated violently actions in Iraq, US has realized that it is difficult to have Iraq as a model for the Great Middle East Initiative. This argument flourished in Washington and clearly emerged by the US decision to withdraw troops from Iraq in 2011. This decision has been subjected as US reluctance to involve in Iraq's issues during Obama's administration. Some scholars go to blame this strategic choice as the main cause of power vacuum in Iraq that gives the so-called Islamic State with the opportunity to occupy Mosul in July, 2014.

Therefore, the study will focus on the future of Iraq under conditions of internal and regional rapid changes and ask whether Iraq will lead successful role in the regional balance of power. Especially after the wave of change within the middle East which consider a normal result for the social interaction seeking for better life, taking note the role of some regional and the international powers and their willingness to accept and deal with a distinct role of a strong Iraq.

Introduction

First, this study intends to inquire into this question: does the US support a unified Iraq? The question was raised by many Iraqi and foreigner friends who question US intentions by invading Iraq in 2003. To answer this question, my methodology tries to understand how far knowledge and power can meet to give us a clear answer. I was so confused till I read Edward Said's Orientalism. Professor Francesca Corrao asked me to review this book and submit a paper as the requirement for passing the course of Middle Eastern studies. This course was part of the Ph.D. program in political theory at Luiss University. When I started reading this book a realization has grown in my mind that Said methodology will help me answer my question. But still this methodology is not sufficient to address the recent political dynamics whether in Iraq itself, or that which shape the relationship between the US and Iraq. Thus, there was a need to adopt other methodology. This is Mohammed Salama's work of *Islam, Orientalism and Intellectual History*. However, a different approach to

explain the definitions, implications, and the spheres of influence of Orientalism will be presented in this study.

To reach a detailed answer to the above guiding question I go through various methodological approaches, and each of them matches a supportive question. These approaches will be discussed later in the structure of this study.

Now, I would extend the introduction into technical sections. Each one endorses specific part of my methodology.

Why this topic is interesting to me:

From the first moment when I joined the faculty of political science I have realized the need of change for freedom of mind, freedom of expression, people participation in decision making process. And even we need to change our way of thinking about current issues and problems whether Iraq has witnessed or the region; because I believe that the outstanding current issues will not be solved without real change in our logic and political culture.

After 2003, the things became more clear to me especially when I participated in the first free legislative election in my country in a way that provides me with a different sense about the right and role of each citizen to change and participate in decision making process and in counting the government performance to achieve our common goal of progress and prosperity. When I have been joining the ministry of foreign affairs and after participating in many delegations and international conferences in Asia and Europe, my political perception has been widened. Hence, I started to ask: should I think differently concerning the US motives in Iraq War in 2003. Does the US really support democracy in Iraq? Or there are some latent motives which can be perceived through conspiracy theory. I have the right like any other Iraqi citizen to think and investigate about the future of my country. Why US? Because obviously, it is the unique super power that intervened militarily in Iraq since the new world order has seen the light in 1990.

The significance of this study:

This study is a unique attempt to test the hypothesis which presumes that the US Orientalism can directly affect the political future of other state (Iraq). Thus, I was keen to read as much as possible works that have been done about the implications of Orientalism on politics. The first chapter demonstrates the relationship between Orientalism and politics but what is significant is that

I was eager to understand the implications of Orientalism on strategy-making process. Some concepts are presented for the first time in this study such as ‘soft Orientalism’ and ‘Hard Orientalism’; a twofold distinction is clearly set out between the political view of neo-orientalism and the old definition of the concept on one hand, and between the old type of orientalists and the new one on the other. In that sense, the thesis is designed to fulfill the methodological requirement to tackle this question in one hand. While on the other, it is designed to inquire into the question that concerns the impact of neo-orientalism on the US strategy towards a unified Iraq.

The Problematic of study:

The methodological Concerns on studying the picture of Iraq in the US perspective have been grown. At the same, these concerns tell us that it’s difficult to study how Iraq is perceived in the US without studying the themes about Arab and Islam in the same periphery.

Furthermore, this study will focus on the future of a state (Iraq) in a region is known very well by instability and crisis. The serious problem with this topic is; we cannot control the enormous various variables that control the environment of study, as well as the interaction within domestic political arena in Iraq and the circumstances hat shape US strategy towards it.

The most important obstacle is that how methodologically a link can be established between Orientalism, which mostly perceived as linguistic, or literature studies, and strategic analysis regarding the future of Iraq. Some would argue that the wide scope of orientalism studies should not be blocked in political dynamics of specific country.

Conclusions about Orientalism cannot be circulated on various political peripheries. Because the first think orientalism deals with is power. Thus, the impact of orientalism on foreign policy should be analyzed in the light of state’s capacity to apply its themes. Orientalism has different implication on politics from case study to another. In some countries, its impact is limited to the domestic politics since the political trends of that country has no intention of playing a major role in international politics.

One would notice that it is difficult to transfer from approach to another in testing one essential hypothesis. The reader of this work will notice that there is shift from historical to normative and then to empirical methods. This problem might weaken the structural shape of the thesis. To this problem, I will explain later why and which approaches I use to test my hypothesis.

Another problem is that it is difficult to make apparent difference between orientalism in the US and in the rest of the Western world. Thus, I will concentrate my study as much as possible on the US orientalism while at the same time I will not neglect the sphere of Orientalism in Europe.

The Hypothesis of research:

The new circumstances in the Middle East will lead the region toward new era in political development and political culture, a new generation of leadership and more participation from people in decision making process, all these factors will affect the prospect balance of power in the region and will draw new map of power distribution. This study promotes two essential arguments:

1. Orientalism findings and themes in the US have sophisticated implications on the future of a state like Iraq.
2. The US supports a unified Iraq if it meets its strategic expectations as will be discussed later in the seventh chapter.

Research question listings:

I would like to tackle questions such as what is Orientalism, and how will affect the political future in Middle East and Iraq in particular? Do Americans believe that democracy will flourish in Iraq? And the main question, does the US still supports a unified Iraq?

Other questions will search about the concept of orientalism and how it works out, and to what extent it affects the American politics. How far IS' rise in Iraq will participate in creating specific themes about Iraq in the US?

The objectives of the study:

This research will examine the real impact of Orientalism on political discourse of US strategy towards Iraq. So, I will argue that:

- 1- To highlight the experience of Iraq in establishing the democratic regime from 2003.
- 2- How Orientalism affects the politics in the US?
- 3- The general theme on Iraq and the Middle East in the US perspective.
- 4- How Orientalism can affect the political future of another country.
- 5- To study the capabilities of Iraq and the prospect atmosphere for political development.

Methodology of study

The hypotheses will be proven by qualitative methods of primary and secondary sources. The analysis of recent literature on Orientalism, Islamophobia, and its impact on US foreign policy will be undergone in Arabic, and English. Also, recent press will be observed and included. In addition, the primary sources written by international and intergovernmental institutions, national governments, Iraqi institutions, foreign policy reports, and think tanks will determine a main part of the analysis. Further, the analysis of strategies towards Iraq focusing on the policy area of the so-called Islamic State in the region will be conducted.

Empirical and normative approaches will be deployed in this study. For example, empirical approaches, will be discussed later, explaining ‘what is’ the subject of study through observation and analysis. My study is designed to test the hypothesis by examining the results of various approaches, traditional or modern, of the empirical research. This study pays close attention to other variables that might affect the result of research such as Iraqi political dynamics post 2003, the political culture in Iraq, and the mechanism to understand these variables in the US periphery. Thus, normative political theory approaches ‘what ought to be’ revisited the historical discourse of Orientalism and how that epistemological process has created image about concepts and political values in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. Thus, concepts such as democracy, political liberalism and civilizational interaction have been visited in the third chapter.

Furthermore, I will try to drop out political theory findings into the political reality of Iraq and how that affects the general image in the US towards Islam in general. To this end, I will deploy some approaches, traditional and modern, to check out my hypothesis. These approaches are **Philosophical Approach:** an effort to clarify thought about the nature of the subject and about ends and means in studying it. I will use this approach in two chapters the first and third trying to understand the concepts of Orientalism, democracy, and political liberalism.

The historical Approach: which focused on the historical facts that guide the relationship between orientalism and US foreign policy in one hand, and to how far it affects US strategy towards Iraq in the period 1979-2011. This approach also sheds light on the political and social dynamics in Iraq to analyse any situation that match the findings of US Orientalism.

Behavioral approach: this approach focuses on the behavior of ordinary man. It considers the behavior of individual in political situation as the basis. This approach will be combined with the

Post-Behavioural Approach that Searches for how this behavior has been applied to knowledge. Furthermore, it focuses on how this relationship between knowledge and behavior affects the social conducts for tackling political problems such as that of Islamophobia. I support the findings of this approach by the sociological approach that focuses on the individual itself and how he/she receives and perceives the common knowledge. This approach identifies specific spots in the individual mind which deal with fear and hope. For example, I will be keen in the sixth chapter to understand the impact of Islamophobia on the political choices of the American individual especially towards Iraq.

The Systemic analysis approach: in this approach, I will try to understand the impacts of US strategy towards post-2003 Iraq as inputs to what have happened in this country till IS' rise in June 2014. Thus, I will test the hypothesis that says that US invaded Iraq with sings of negative themes on the prospect of democracy in it. The outcomes of this approach, the fifth chapter, will be deployed as inputs, along the results of the sixth chapter, of the seventh chapter. In this chapter I will use the outcomes of the systemic approach as inputs of the 'foresight approach.' I will not draw case scenarios by this approach, instead I will depend on the regional political reality whether in Iraq or in the whole region. From this reality along the US strategic expectations I answer the question: does the US still support a unified Iraq?

Types of resources will be used

In this section, I would like to highlight two points: the first is about whom define Orientalism? In this regard, I concentrate the work on two essential scholars are Edward Said and Mohammed Salama. Furthermore, I will study the works of those along Abdujabar Naji, an Iraqi scholar, works on the same concept.

The second point concerns with the selection of the studied scholars, and their texts. I will pay close attention to the biography of each reference to understand how ideas have been affected by external factors. In this study, I will try to figure out the American response to the rise of IS in the Middle East in various levels. The first and the most important is the academic or intellectual level whereby experts play a significant role for providing knowledge concerning such foreign and unfamiliar political crisis to the American people. The field of study is the American intellectual and public periphery and how it delivers the images concerning IS. Explores the intellectual works presented to Americans in different ways such as books, articles and mostly online journals. Thus, this study

represents a reading to the most influential and recent works concerning IS, Iraq, Islamophobia and Orientalism by American experts and columnists in most prestigious journals such as: Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, USA Today, Time Magazine, The Washington Post, New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and Chicago Tribune. I was keen to cover the whole series of articles and papers concerning IS in these Journals in the period June 2014 to April 2016. Secondly, I was so keen in selecting the experts and intellectuals on topics relevant to the field of study. In this part, I have visited the works of the most important intellectuals concerning the field of study.

Other requirements have been taken into consideration such as: the scholar should be living, or should have lived, in the US or have a significant resonance in the US periphery. For instance, experts (who have strong public presence through their works on the field of study) have been received so much attention in this study.

Finally, I will be so keen to follow up the existing literature about political development in Iraq whether in Iraq or in the US. In that sense, I will visit statements and writings of the most influential politicians in the US who play significant role in shaping its strategy towards Iraq.

The structure and Research Methodology:

This part of the introduction demonstrates the structure of this study and why it takes this sequence. This study will be structured into seven chapters. Each one will tackle sub-question listings to fulfill the methodological requirements. The chapters are:

The first chapter's title is *Orientalism "The Concept"*. This chapter is divided into three sections, each one deals with specific notion concerning Orientalism. In this chapter I will focus on the term "Orientalism" and its meaning from diverse perspectives. I will start with Edward Said's definition, then, move on to the most important critiques to his theory. My aim is to understand: how Said explained the relationship between Knowledge and Power. It's also of interest to mention the Arab response to Orientalism, especially when the call for counter intellectual discourse (Occidentalism) has been raised two decades ago. The most important part of this chapter will highlight the fact of how intellectual history in the West created a tarnishing image of the Arab World in particular and Islam in general. To this end I will focus on Mohammad Salama's theory. In his theorization, he refers to September 11, 2001, event and the aggressive public discourse on Islam in the West, and how this image has directed the United States government's foreign policy in the Middle East. I will try to find out a mechanism to explain how the Iraq war came about? In addition, I would like to

enquire whether its foreign policy was governed by certain intellectual discourse like Orientalism. In the last section I am going to tackle a critical question 'Does Neo-Orientalism exists?'

The second chapter' title is *How Iraq has been perceived by the United States of America before and after 2003?* This chapter aims to explore the effects that guided US policy towards Iraq before 2003 and the image on Iraq in the public sphere of the United States. To this end I have to shine the light on Iraq during Saddam Hussein regime; the kind of relationship existed between the individual and the authority. I would like to understand US policies towards Iraq in the period 1980-2003 and ask whether this policy complied with the intellectual discourse concerning Iraq in the United States. Did this policy pay attention to the domestic behavior of the regime? How far Orientalism has directed this relationship?

In the last section, I would like to cover the Iraq's image in the American public opinion post 2003. Secondly, I would ask whether such a perception creates a moral obligation in the Unites States to continue its commitments in Iraq and to keep it unified and on democracy track.

My methodology will concentrate on three aspects:

- The first deploys psycho-analysis method. In this regard, I am going to use Milgram's theory of *Obedience* to understand the relationship between the individual and the authority in Iraq during Saddam's regime. What are the psychological effects Saddam had installed on the Iraqi person?
- The second is a historical method according to which the chapter will exhibit the historical discourse of American policy towards Iraq since 1979.
- The third one is Salama's methodology which concentrates on how conception on Iraq has been created in America in the aftermath of the invasion. To this end, media coverage and intellectual works will be covered in the third section.

The third chapter's title is *The Intellectual dialogue and the perception of Arab-Muslim World*. This chapter questions the perception built about the Arab-Muslim world by political theory in the West.

Three representations are fundamental to the debate:

- 1- The prospect of political liberalism.
- 2- The prospect of democracy.
- 3- The clash of civilization and Arab-Muslim world, scopes for cooperation or conflict.

To tackle these representations, the chapter is constructed into three sections:

- The first section will discuss John Rawls's theory of political liberalism. In addition, it tries to ask the extent to which this theory fits the socio-political context of the Middle East. In addition, it also asks the extent to which political liberalism theory is related to secularism.
- The second section is about the prospect of democracy in the Middle East. In this regard, two perspectives are going to be raised. The first are those which are pessimist about the prospect of democracy and modernity in the Muslim world. Bernard Lewis is the key intellectual of this trend. In contrast the second trend, as John Esposito suggests, is to encourage and honor the prospect of democracy in the Muslim world.
- The third section will discuss the clash of civilization and the prospect of peace and cooperation in the global order. Two intellectual orientations will be raised: first, those who support the arguments of Samuel Huntington's theory of clash; this aspect argues about the right to intervene in the Muslim world and orient them towards western values. The second are those who oppose such a prospect of clash; they discuss fundamental notions of multiculturalism and pluralism to ensure mutual respect and cooperation in the global sphere. Within this orientation the model of Rawls's *Law of Peoples* will be the key note of global stability and toleration.

The fourth chapter's title is *Islamophobia the concept and its implications on Politics in the U.S.* This chapter tackles some serious questions concerning orientalism's spheres of interaction and effectiveness on United States' politics, domestic or abroad, towards Muslims in the aftermath of the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The focus of the Chapter rests on the following theme:

- 1- The concept of Islamophobia as an instance of Orientalism's deep involvement in constructing the public perception towards Muslims issues whether in the United States or in the Middle East.
- 2- Islamophobia as a point of reference in the U.S' politics whether on the private or official levels such as the race of the US Presidential elections 2016.

The thematic selection stated above aims to answer specific questions such as:

- How Islamophobia works or interacts in the social and political spheres?
- Does islamophobia affect the political tendencies of the American individual especially in the presidential election?
- Is Islamophobia a by-product of institutional interaction in the public sphere?
- Is Islamophobia measurable in the U.S?

To answer the questions above, the structure of this chapter will be distributed in three sections. The distribution has been done according to Chris Allen's methodology. Allen identifies three components of Islamophobia:

- The first is the Symbolic forms, which discusses the concept.
- The second component includes the '*modes of operation*' through which the Islamophobic message is sustained.
- The third component of Islamophobia is exclusionary practices against Muslims and Islam in social, economic and political spheres. "Exclusionary practices must also include the subjection to violence as a tool of exclusion."

The fifth chapter's title is *The Rise of ISIS in Iraq: Causes and Effects*. The vital aim of this chapter is to answer to Orientalism/Islamophobic view concerning the rise of ISIS in Iraq. This discussion cannot be tackled without paying a close attention to the questions that have been raised in the third chapter of this thesis. In general, this chapter will try to answer the following questions:

- 3- The Iraqi case especially since American invasion, and June 2014 in particular when ISIS occupied Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq after Baghdad.
- 4- What are the essential causes of the failure of secularism in post-2003 Iraq?
- 5- Is secularism's failure related to the raising of IS crisis in Iraq?
- 6- What was the role of United States in the political turmoil in Iraq?
- 7- Is it true that Iraqis are incompatible to democracy (Lewis' argument), or the current socio-political circumstances have led to the political turmoil and the rise of ISIS in Iraq?

To answer the question above, the chapter will be divided into two sections:

- The First Section centers on the intellectual response to the debate concerning the three questions of the third chapter. One would argue that it is necessary to highlight the intellectual debate in Iraq around these questions since Iraq is the key object of this thesis. Furthermore, it is necessary for the upcoming chapters to understand the collective perception in Iraq about democracy, secularism and modernity. Furthermore, what the key Iraqi intellectuals feel about these questions and how to deal with such an important issue such as constitutional democracy. My intention is to answer to Huntington's theory of clash of civilizations to which the reader can conclude that the inevitable

result of democratic experience in any Islamic country is failure. This failure, according to Huntington, is due to Islamic peculiarities and Arabic particularism.

- The Second Section tackles the experience of secularism in Iraq post 2003. To this end, I am going to analyze and study the experience of political process in Iraq in the aftermath of American invasion. Therefore, my intention is to discover what kind of challenges and checks have faced the political liberalism along with democracy in Iraq. I do believe that the failure of secularism especially in the state's institutional level (political secularism) have been one of the most important factors which led to the rise of ISIS. Although, this factor has been interacted with another serious one which is the failure of American project in Iraq. In other words, U.S' administrations have failed to understand the social and political particularities in Iraq. And thus, this failure has led to a catastrophic result which is the domination of Islamic political parties on the political life in Iraq. Through the arguments above I will try to find out the relationship between secularism's failure and the decline of political liberalism which been manifested through IS's crisis.

The sixth chapter's title is *Politics in the US in the aftermath of the Rise of ISIS*. In this chapter three sections will be designed to tackle specific topic and to answer a specific question:

- 1- The first section concerning IS' strategy to which it tries to endure the political entity it creates in Iraq and Syria. To this end, two essential works will be discussed: Abu Bakr Naji's 'management of Barbarism' and As-Suri's Global Islamic Resistance. The idea is to answer whether IS threat is limited to the Middle East or globally that might reach United States at home.
- 2- The second section will try to explore the public perception in the United States concerning IS. To this end, a cluster of important American intellectuals and scholars' works will be analyzed. In this part, I would like to understand the sphere of intellectuals' role in creating the collective perception towards the crisis.
- 3- The third section will highlight the consequences of the collective perception concerning IS on either the domestic politics or foreign policy of U.S towards Iraq.

In this chapter, I will try to figure out the American response to the rise of IS in the Middle East in various levels. The first and the most important is the academic or intellectual level whereby experts play a significant role for providing knowledge concerning such foreign and unfamiliar political crisis to the American people. Thus, it is very important to cover out:

-what kind of information the ordinary American receives everyday concerning this problem.

- By whom, to whom and in what mechanism this phenomenon has been analyzed and circulated in the public sphere.

-what are the consequences of this process and knowledge on the political perception and preferences towards Islam and Muslims in the public sphere.

The seventh chapter' title is *The US strategy to defeat IS and the Future of Iraq's nation-state*.

In this chapter, my intention is to inquire into an important question: Does the US support a unified Iraq? The question will be answered in the light of the self-proclaimed IS' rise in Iraq and Syria. In this sense, there is a need to tackle three serious questions to understand the US' position towards a unified Iraq. The questions are:

- 1- What are the Middle East's narratives in the US perspective?
- 2- How does the US strategically perceive the balance of power in the Middle East?
- 3- Does the US really intend to defeat and terminate IS from Iraq's political reality?

One would ask why the structure takes this sequence. The idea is to travel from the concept of Orientalism (first chapter) to political theory (third chapter) passing across the historical discourse (second chapter) of bilateral relationship between Iraq and the US. My intention first is to pay attention to the relationship between Orientalism and US foreign policy towards Iraq in the period 1979-2011. Then, in the third chapter, my intention is to understand how the West in general, the US in particular, perceives the sphere of political change and compatibility to democracy in the Middle East. What is significant here, if Islamophobia (the fourth chapter) has grown rapidly in the US in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, events, which is apparently linked to a negative picture on Islam and Muslims, then why the US has invaded Iraq in 2003. To answer such question the fifth chapter will be dedicated to analyze the US post-war experience in Iraq; and, how this experience is related to the success or failure of Iraq's political experience post 2003 and the rise of IS. But, it will be necessary to shed much more light on IS strategy (sixth chapter) and the US response, whether locally or abroad, to the aggressive actions of IS. All, these inquires and question listings are deployed to answer a fundamental question is: does the US still support a unified Iraq?

First Chapter

Orientalism "The Concept"

In this chapter I will focus on the term "Orientalism" and its meaning from diverse perspectives. I will start with Edward Said's definition, then, move on to the most important critiques to his theory. My aim is to understand: how Said explained the relationship between Knowledge and Power. It's also of interest to mention the Arab response to Orientalism, especially when the call for counter intellectual discourse (Occidentalism) has been raised more than two decades ago. The most important part of this chapter will highlight the fact of how intellectual history in the West created a tarnishing image of the Arab World in particular and Islam in general. To this end I will focus on Mohammad Salama's theory. In his theorization he refers to September 11, 2001, event and the aggressive public discourse on Islam in the West, and how this image has directed the United States government's foreign policy in the Middle East. I will try to find out a mechanism to explain how the Iraq war came about? In addition, I would like to enquire whether its foreign policy was governed by certain intellectual discourse like Orientalism.

1.1 First Section: Orientalism the perspective of Said's Vision:

In this section I am going to analyze Said's theory of Orientalism: what does Orientalism mean to him? In doing so, I will try to define the term "Orientalism". In discussing Said's theory, we need to recognize two intellectual directions to realize the impact his theory has had in both East and West:

- First is the critique of theory in the West from different perspectives; to this end I will highlight some contradictions in Said's arguments.
- Second, is about the idiom of Occidentalism and the notions Arabs use to understand and respond to Orientalism.

In short, this section aims to closely analyze the concept of Orientalism not only for Said but also for both West and East.

1.1.1 Edward Said's Thesis:

Dictionary defines Orientalism as the knowledge of the Orient, about its culture, society, language and history¹. Oxford dictionary identifies it "as a way of writing to describe the Orient, of identifying the "other" surrounded by different conditions (time, place and customs)" (1961: 200).

In this way of conceptualization, Orientalism is inevitably bound to the East; An East that can be "far," "middle," "near". But the concept always applies to a certain place, the people living there and their cultures (Buchowski: 2006: p465)².

As a concept, Bernard Lewis defines it in two ways (Bernard Lewis, 1993, 101):

- One, as a school of painting—that of a group of artists, mostly from western Europe, who visited the Middle East and North Africa and depicted what they saw or imagined, sometimes in a rather romantic and extravagant manner.
- Second, as a branch of scholarship. The word, and the academic discipline which it denotes, dates from the great expansion of scholarship in Western Europe from the time of the Renaissance onwards."There were Hellenists who studied Greek, Latinists who studied Latin, Hebraists who studied Hebrew; the first two groups were sometimes called classicists, and the latter were called the Orientalists. Basically these early scholars were philologists concerned with the recovery, study, publication, and interpretation of texts"

For Said orientalism is, first of all, a set of discursive practices through which the West structured the imagined the East politically, socially, military, ideologically, scientifically and artistically. The Orient as such exists and real people live in the concerned region, "but the European representation of these people is a typical cultural creation that enables those powerful to legitimize their domination over those subjugated and conquered"(Buchowski: 2006, 463). For Wolff and Todorova the concept revolves around the issue of alterity and around the epistemological validity of the "other". Thus, as Buchowski concludes, the concept is concerned

¹ In his dictionary, Johnson defines the word Orient as: 1. Rising of the sun. 2. Eastern, oriental. 3. Bright, shining, glittering, gaudy, sparkling. Oriental (adj), he defines as: Eastern, placed in the east; proceeding from the east. Oriental, he defines as: an inhabitant of the eastern parts of the world. In English literature the words orient and oriental were used variously to identify orient pearl, orient flames, 'true orients', orient kings, orient science, the 'orient moon of Islam', oriental carpets, oriental stitch, oriental Jews, oriental poppy, oriental leprosy and oriental porcelain. Macfei A.L., 2002, "*Orientalism*". Pearson Education, p20.

² Over the course of the nineteenth century, Europeans and Americans would increasingly come to see the Orient as divided into two distinct units: a "Near East" comprising southeastern Europe, the lands along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and their hinterlands) and other parts of western Asia nearer to Europe, and a "Far East" encompassing India, southeast Asia, China and Japan (Lockman, 1996, p66).

with: the modes by which the other is created; a universal cognitive category in the factory of social and individual identity that divides the universe into “us” and “them; an analytical concept that enables authors to construct narration.

In another direction, James Clifford, a leading anthropologist, sees *Orientalism* as a personal protest, a narrow polemic dominated by immediate political goals and a pervasive coercive cultural discourse (Clifford, 2002, 263). According to Clifford, Orientalism is both a general discursive formation related to material and historical relations of domination as well as a range of specific texts, ideas, or actions may refer to the scholarly discipline of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that encompassed the study of languages, literatures, religions, philosophies, histories, art, and laws of Asian societies especially ancient ones (Clifford, 2002; Bevir, 2010 997).

But to set the definition straight to my methodology, I need to visit Edward Said's work. In his 1978 work *Orientalism*, Said defines Orientalism in three interdependent ways (Mani & Frankenburg, 1985, 184)³:

- A. Academic discipline to identify the Orient as that mysterious "Other" that eludes rational analysis. Western academics and observers continue to see the Orient, and to define it, in polar opposites: we in the West are rational; the Orient is violent and inexplicable.
- B. Ontological and epistemological distinction.
- C. Colonial policy describes orientalism as a ‘distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts’. Such texts contributed to the formulation of colonial law as a western style to dominate the East.

Views also disputed over the first deploying effort to the concept of Orientalism. The most important are:

- First, according to Said, Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient. This was the time when European states had begun to carve out economic and political spheres of influence, and later formed colonial empires, in Asia, Africa and the Americas from about 1500 A.D onward. Along the way, those states (particularly Britain, Netherlands, and France) had begun to exercise direct or indirect rule over growing

³‘Orientalism’ was thus defined by Said as ‘the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it’ (quoted in Vaughan, 2005, 50).

numbers of Muslims. This domination also was extended to the domain of knowledge dissemination which generated certain images of the Orient in the West.⁴

- Second, Oxford dictionary refers to the first attempt at using this concept in 1767. Those dictionaries defined Orientalism as a result of scientific effort to explore the Orient.

- Third, it's argued that this concept emerged due to recommendations of the first conference held by Orientalists in France in 1873, followed by five other conferences, the last one being in Florence in 1879.

- Fourth, as Professor Abdujabar Naji argues that this concept was created by the Arabs in the late of nineteenth century in response to European campaigns in the Orient (Arab land) (Naji, 2013, 64).

One can argue that all mention of the concept deal with the interaction between two different civilizations that the practical spark of Orientalism goes back deeply in the history on the first organized contact between civilizations in West and East. This kind of contact goes back to the explorations of the Greek with Alexander the great and Roman Empire in the orient territory. Officials and experts (military and political experts) of Roman Empire Based in the orient ensured the control of the empire over the colonies, and also provided Rome with the latest news and analysis about the orient and the oriental people.

1.1.2 Said's Arguments:

Said in his thesis submitted a wide variety of **arguments**:

First, *the objective universality*: knowledge of subject 'Orientals' is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, (since power requires more knowledge of the subject), and an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control (Said, 1987, p37). The idea was to advance the secularization over the whole world population which would in turn lead to ideological and sectarian conflict.

Second, the exercise of the cultural strengths manifested when The Oriental is depicted as something one judge; disciplines and illustrates (as in a zoological manual). The discourse shows a distinct cultural bias where the whole of human reality is divided in the rational part (the west) and the violent part (the Orient), this in turn translates into a difference between the Christian part of the world and the Muslim world. Thus, indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into

⁴more information in: Lockman Z., 1996, Ibid, 67.

clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races. The thesis also highlights the absolute and systematic difference based on biological and racial inferiority between the Occident and the Orient (Samiei, 2010, 150). Moreover, Said argues that it was only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented the West with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and economic levels (Said, 1987, 75)⁵. It was further argued that Islamic peculiarities are the main reason for the static status of Arabic mind and societies. To overcome this challenge the west has to dominate over the orient through hard and soft powers. This is the main contradiction, because if as argued, it is true that the Arabic mind is static and has an unchanging belief system then the mere application of the western (and supposedly universal) culture in the Islamic society will fail in its task.

The **third** argument, the Orientalism discourse is a result of the historical confrontation between the civilizations, and the imbalance between them is obviously a function of the changing historical patterns. This result motivates the West to see the Orient as a library or archive of *information*. What bind the archive together is a cluster of ideas and a unifying set of values that explains the behavior of Orientals and which would aid in creating a new mentality. As the dangers of confrontation grow, so will the prestige of Orientalism discourse grows by establishing more institutions. The fact that *knowledge*—no matter how special— is regulated first by the local concerns of a specialist, and only later by the general concerns of a social system of authority, creates the **fourth** argument in which Said concludes that there is no free knowledge and most of the Orientalists are agents and part of the institutional discourse for dealing with the orient⁶. However, number of Orientalism prestigious institutions gives us a hint as to how much the east is important for the west, and the West would aim to cooperate with the orient, as well as to control its resources. The Orientalists believe that there is no end to the pattern of confrontation without eliminating the sources of it (religious and culture); this leads to new patterns of confrontation within the fabric of both parties.

The **fifth** argument concludes that the relationship between Orientalism and authority lies within the paradigm of *power structure*. In Said's quest to reconstruct the power (political, intellectual, cultural, moral), he developed a mechanism to explain how far the European culture was able to

⁵ Volney (1757–1820), saw “the spirit of Islamism” as the original source of the abuses of government and as a cause of people's ignorance and indolence as the will of god. Curtis M. (2009). *Orientalism and Islam European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India*, Cambridge University Press, p18.

⁶ See also: Allain J. (2004). Orientalism and International Law: The Middle East as the Underclass of the International Legal Order. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Volume 17, Issue 02, June, P393.

manage and produce the orient politically by drawing the portrait of Orientalism as a political vision to promote the difference between the familiar (the West, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them") (Scott, 2011, 322). Said asserted that one of the most important features of Orientalism is its aim to recreate the orient in a political manner, where the Orientalists played a great role in the colonial discourse of British and French in creating the political map of the Middle East after WW1; as well, in cultural manner which is quite evident in the "Americanizing Project" which is a cornerstone of American policy toward the rest of the "Other" world.

The *final argument* is about the static status of the Orientalism discourse, Edward Said attempts to show that all European discourses on the Orient are complicit with the European imperialist project. There may be "manifest" differences in the discourses, but the underlying "latent" Orientalism is "more or less constant". "This does not do justice to the marked differences in approach, attitude, presentation, and conclusions found in the works of various orientalists" (Heehs, 2003, 180). This argument splits the world into two parts according to the rules of the ideological power game. He puts all western societies under the same tenet of hostility and hatred of "the other". Practically it's very difficult to neglect the differences within the western countries, especially if the west has no common ideal sanctity form. In principle he is right about the existence of latent Orientalism but it cannot be generalized over the whole population.

1.1.3. Critiques to Said's theory "Orientalism":

Some Intellectual has challenged and critiqued Said's theory, their critiques come up from an academic point of view. Bernard Lewis restricts the term "*Orientalism*" to that of *academic Orientalism*, Said, on the other hand, extends the usage of the term to include the more popular, non-academic writings on the Orient, including novels and travel diaries, apart from government documents by scholar-administrators. "Said's concern is more with western *attitudes* toward the Orient" (Lewis, 1982, 48). After the publication of Said's critical work on the western's discourse of knowledge on the Orient, many western and oriental authors started to review this work, thereafter, they directed quite a lot of theoretical criticism to the work. The most important one though is by Bernard Lewis. He pointed out that Said's work lacks objectivity, and disagreed with Said, by

arguing that the intellectual space is marked by academic objectivity and there is no room for bias⁷, As well Lewis refuses the idea of remarkable rise of modern Orientalist scholarship and the acquisition of vast Eastern empires by Britain and France (Lewis, 1993, 118). The understanding of the Orient according to Said, does not confirm to the picture of the real orient. Lewis also criticizes him for reducing the Orient merely to the Arabic and Islamic part, as well for making an arbitrary selection of orientalists, by a series of writers and politicians, such as Chateaubriand, Nerval and Cromer, who had nothing to do with Orientalism. Lewis also mentions that these studies were well established in Britain and France long before the (erroneously early) date that Said assigns to the British and French expansion. Arabic studies in Germany and Holland had begun about the same time as in France, and earlier than in Britain. On those grounds alone Said's thesis, that *orientalism was a product of imperialism, was mistaken* according to Lewis. Lewis contends that no doubt it was true that there were some Orientalists who, objectively or subjectively, served or profited from the imperial domination. But as an explanation of the Orientalist enterprise as a whole, it is absurdly inadequate. Another charge leveled against the Orientalists is that of bias against the peoples they study, even of a built-in hostility towards them. Beyond the question of bias there lies the larger epistemological problem of how far it is possible for scholars of one society to study and interpret the society of another? And does the orientalist, now under attack as an agent of empire, study the Orient? Lewis gives two explanations: "that higher civilizations frequently engage in the study of lower civilizations and that knowledge is power. Neither explanation is entirely satisfactory. Lewis adds that European study of the Islam began at a time when European civilization was manifestly inferior to that of the Muslim world (Lewis, 1993, 116-118). According to Lewis explanation, there is a room for Occidentalism, somehow Lewis agrees with Said about the balance of power game which shows that historical confrontation creates the necessity of knowing the other (knowledge). Then the question arises as to why should the weaker needs to study the other? It could be? Either required to confront the strong defending his values and property or for better dealing with him (cooperation - struggle).

⁷Bernard Lewis's rebuttal of Said's critique of orientalism, in his article entitled 'The Question of Orientalism' in the *New York Review of Books* (1982), Lewis challenges Said's right to indict, not just one or two orientalists accused of racial prejudice and bias, but a whole profession (Lewis, 1982, 49).

There are many other authors who criticize Said's theory, some concentrate on the scientific discipline of this work, others point out some structural problems. J.H. Plumb, a professor of history (1979), argues that Said's *Orientalism*, unfortunately, was almost impossible to read, while Emanuel Sivan concentrates on Arabic reviewers (Sadek Jalal al-Azm, Nadem al-Bitar) to Said's Book and finds out that he fails to pay proper respect to the great achievements of Orientalism; he engages at times in extreme subjectivism, almost denying the fact that it is possible for a Westerner to describe the East objectively. Sivan also argues that, Said's attack on orientalism, seen as an essential ingredient of the European mind, encourages backward-looking. Both agree that Said's study of orientalism is unscientific⁸. In another view; Mohd Hazim Shah finds problems in the structure of the approach. One problem, in particular, relates to the question of "structure" and "agency", and the relationship between them. When Said maintains that an individual scholar is part of a social-institutional framework, and that the knowledge produced cannot therefore be free from the interests of such a framework, Said denies the possibility of individual agency to create knowledge that does not serve the interest of "structure" or that go against the current of that structure or that goes against it. In fact, even in this case, we cannot deny the impact of Orientalism studies in directing the official policies of the west towards the East through the cumulative knowledge that grounds such decision making process. Prejudice and bias exist on the side of the East too regarding the West, although Said's *Orientalism* has been criticized for its "anti-Westernism". For example, the Egyptian philosopher, Fu'ad Zakaria does not see Said's work as doing a favor to the Arab world but rather working against their interest (Shah in Graf, Fathi & Paul, 2011, 55). Yet, Shah also defends Said on the grounds that Orientalism, as a discipline is concerned with Islam and the Arabs simply cannot be compared with classical philology, and that the European interest in Islam is derived from the fear of a cultural formidable competitor of Christianity. As for Lewis's remark that Said had not attacked Soviet orientalists, for their attacks on Prophet Muhammad, this was because Soviet orientalists attacked also Christianity, Judaism and other religions. The objection of Lewis that Said ignored German orientalism and rather linked it with British and French imperialism does not work on the ground, even when Said ignored other samples of orientalism it does not mean orientalism has no link with imperialism or with foreign policy.

⁸ For more information, see: Macfei, 2002, *ibid*, pp120-129.

Reader could conclude that Said presented his theory of Orientalism, and his theory on the relationship between knowledge and power, came from his personal life as *firstly* as a Palestinian who could not claim his right of his Family land; he was born in Palestine in 1935 and grew up on other territory since Palestine does not exist as an autonomous nation-state, he was looking for the right of his people to claim their political and moral rights and be recognized by the International community. His own experience taught him the Western states foreign policy of supporting Israel while neglecting the right of his people of Justice and Peace, this policy descended from the general image they have about the Oriental mind and culture (Arabs and Muslims). *Second*, he was a Professor in one of prestigious Universities in United States of America so he noticed how far this unified image of the Orient (specifically towards Muslims and Arabs in Middle East) affects the individual behavior as well the authority in western Countries. So this image has created a cultural and political response for both the East and the West.

1.1.4 Occidentalism as a Cultural resistance:

The "Object" of Occidentalism can be traced back to the beginning of twentieth century when Arabs took upon themselves to confront the Western intellectual tide through Academic responses which classified Orientalists in white and black lists (Iraqi case). These responses could not formulate a comprehensive approach as a critique to Orientalism, despite the fact that the Arabic approach has some believes with Orientalism in refusing the 'Other' to protect Islamic values, so they tried to immunize the Orientals by creating a general image about the West in a way that pushed the individuals to refuse Western culture; these responses have included scientific research writing about Western societies critically rather than interactively, despite this they could not present a model to the rest of the world rather they concentrated their workson creating an image of the West as morally degenerate entity.

In this regard, Orientals have asserted their independence from the western cultural and political hegemony and established a new multi vocal field of intellectual discourse; orientalism's predicament is an ambiguous one that should be seen not in terms of a simple anti-imperialism but rather as system of the uncertainties generated by the new global situation. According to Said pure scholarship does not exist, knowledge is inextricably tied to power. "When it becomes institutionalized, culturally accumulated and overtly restricted in its definitions, it must be actively

opposed through counter knowledge" (Clifford, 2002, 256). This counter approach led to the coining of another term "Occidentalism" as a reaction and resistance against the subject of orientalism discourse. Hanafi's *Istighrabis* a new scholarly discipline calling for a science of Occidentalism (Al-Azm in Graf, Fathi & Paul, 2011, 3-4):

- (a) Amounts to a reaffirmation by means of an emulation of the much denounced and much despised original Western science of Orientalism.
- (b) Emanates from a politics of resentment and a barely aged sense of inferiority.
- (c) Confirms all over again the much derided and disparaged "essentialism" of the original Orientalist project by reifying anew "Orient" and "Occident" to the point of "struggle of civilizations".
- (d) Occidentalism refers to a specific kind of discourse emanating from the Arab and Muslim worlds whose main purpose is to denigrate, denounce and condemn the West in every conceivable way.

In this field most Arab thinkers believe that Orientalism is the ideological factory that supplies imperialist with the tools to destroy Islamic values; and its main corners (economic ambition, cultural superiority, domination) of which work for religious motives (Hussein, 2011,167)⁹. In this context, Arabs perceive a connection between Orientalism and Christianization, accusing all Orientalists as being agents and missionaries, so the Occidentalists spread Anti-West sentiments within Arabic and Muslim societies. Therefore, Occidentalism as a reflection to the western policies on the orient can be seen as a process of generating knowledge in different fields to object the occident in the same way of Orientalism, hence the purpose is to create an Arabic Intellectual approach to refute the tutelage that "the Occident has been the teacher and the orient is the pupil." To this end Hanafi believes that Arabs have the opportunity for the renaissance while there is a preposition often heard in the west that the west is in decline (as a moral or cultural project); Arabs can be creative if and only if they are liberated from the mythical domination of the west, and must not be fooled by the idea of the universal culture which is a myth disseminated to fool the dominated. As Said argues that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism, but it could be an

⁹See also: - Sa'adoun Samouk, *Briefing Summary on some Orientalists Works*.

- Hussein Al-hawary (1933). *Dhararham Akthar min Nafa'ahom (the trouble they caused more than welfare of)*, Alhilar, N.2, 42.

- Hussein Y. and Faris A. (2012). *Madàkhal fi Al-Istishraq (Introduction to Orientalism)*, Mousil University, First edition.

- Mostafa S., *Al-Istishraq wa Al-Mustashrkon (Orientalism and Orientalists)*, dar Al-waraq for publishing, Islamic Library, S. A.

- Mazin M. (1997). *Al-gharb Min Al-dakhil (inside the West)*, Abha, Saudi Arabia.

answer to the bias and domination ambition of the west. Steve Tonesson observes that "there is really' is something we may call a western cultural hegemony or cultural imperialism; hence, Orientalism is scientific form and Occidentalism is a program for revenge as a consequence of failing to designate what Islam "Really" is"(Martin, 2007, 264). In this sense, Occidentalism is a stereotyping in reverse as Sadek Al-Azam called "Orientalism in reverse"; can be seen merely as what Orientals hate about the West and it emerged as a specific kind of anti-modernism. In this sense the Egyptian philosopher Fu'ad Zakaria divides the anti-Orientalists into two main categories:

- The first school of criticism is religious and apologetic, a defense of the integrity and perfection of Islam against what they see as an attack by hostile forces, variously described as Christians, missionaries, Jews, Marxists, atheists, and the like, seeking to undermine and discredit Islam in order to impose their own beliefs.
- The second group, according to Zakaria, attacks Orientalism from a political-cultural stand-point and not from a religious point of view.

Hassan Hanafi's Occidentalism belongs to the second group. Hanafi encourages an ideological response to Huntington's theory of the 'clash of civilization'. Here, there is an ambiguity in the interaction between "Orientalism" and "Occidentalism"; it's a clash of paradigm depend upon the personal imprints of the author and the receiver (oriental or occidental) in the context of the general framework of cultural differences which reflects struggle of ideas and interpretation. The main concern of this process is the decisive link of politics with the humanities and ethnocentric notions as religion, caste, and way of thinking and daily life as well as the accumulated discourse of historical confrontation patterns. In this view, Occidentalism is a type of cultural resistance to the neo-imperialism structure, and a self-rebuilding or confirming process. It's an approach of facing the universal project without denying it.

But the main question is: is Occidentalism possible? Hussein Mohammad finds it probable that if Arabs direct their compass to the right direction by investing Western knowledge to their interests, then Occidentalism is not an approach of clash but a mechanism for positive interaction which consists of both give and take without ignoring the primacy of each civilization (Hussein, 2011, 263).¹⁰ At the same time Hussein asserted that there is a lacks of power in the Orient to invest

¹⁰ Some other Arabic authors call for dialogue, for that see:
- Mazin M., *Al-gharb Min Al-dakhil*, *ibid*, p115.

Occidentalism's Knowledge, also there is no good connection between the authority and the Occidentalists. This (Take & Give) process will not succeed without minimum degree of equivalence between East and West, the process requires that both civilizations have enough and equal (power and knowledge), without this balance the struggle will continue until and unless one of them accepts the superiority of the other.

The balance of knowledge and power between civilizations does not mean similarity in universal culture, because the differences shape both of them. According to Hanafi (I am) derives its existence from the difference with the (Other) and as the dispute on differences increase so will the clashes. Contrarily the more possibilities of dialogue increase so will the disputes be neutralized and the differences will be more understandable.

Furthermore, it needs to be asked if Hanafi's Occidentalism is the right initiative to confront Orientalism's approach or to increase dialogue. In this regard some Arabic authors like Naji Abdul Jabar argue that the call for Occidentalism was raised when Hanafi realized the static status of the Arabic response to Orientalism which failed to defend Islam. Naji Notes the following about Occidentalism (Naji, 2013, 575):

- Most of Arabic studies concentrate on Orientalists theories that attack Islam.
- Ignoring the new dimensions of contemporary Orientalism.
- The number of Arabic intellectualshas increased who believe in adopting new approach closer to western values.
- Expanding The Struggle between Components of the Muslim community cross borders.

These factors refer to disagreement among Orientals (Arabs and Muslims) about which approach Occidentalism should follow. Some of them support Hanafi's approach (I am exists with the differences with the 'Other' with the assumption that the Other does not accept my values). Another group sees the necessity of expanding dialogue with the 'Other' to convince him about the real picture (who I am?); this matter will need an Internal reform in the intellectual system of East in a way that does not neglect the mother culture by accepting the universal values of the "Other", at the same time this group believes that increasing the number of Arab and Muslim thinkers in Western societies will play a crucial role in modernizing the approach of Orientalism while the first group

- Samir Al-khalil and others (1992). *Al-tasameh ba'en Al-shark we Al-gharb (Tolerance between the East and the West)*, Beirut, Alsagy publisher.

- Mohammed Al-hamad (2001). *Hiwar Alaomam (Dialogue of Nations)*, Damascus: Dar Al-Madaa.

sees Arab intellectuals in western societies as a challenge to both West and East, and this will not prevent the Historical inevitability of conflict.¹¹

As discussed above, Orientalism is not a geographical factor, as its core it is a cultural interaction process. Steve Tonneson disagrees with this formulation. He calls for the third alternative that brings in the best of either civilization without emphasizing on their differences, trying to find as much as possible features and linkages in common as human nature and social needs to face mutual challenges and threats which have increased over time. This way of working promotes global civilization and creates a world based on shared human values without domination. "The differences highlighted by cultural relativists should be seen as exceptions to the general rule and should never exaggerate the synthetically humanistic option that may perhaps be considered as idealistic but it is not at all to avoid realism which has a margin of competition and self-imagining" (Tonnesson: 1993, 11).

1.1.5 The formulation of the Other's image:

For Munzer Kilani the 'Other' is perceived through the eloquence of 'alterity' whose statements belong to the observer himself. He gives stance for anthropology that creates and spreads images about the cultures and peoples. Anthropology is a tool of the general knowledge of the individual in the west; it defines the differences between 'we' and 'they'. Kilani concludes that (Kilani in Labib, 2008, 13-15):

- First, the Western culture became the universal reference as a result of colonization and domination end. Thus, anthropologist needs a sufficient experience in universality to widen his fields of study to include the 'Other.'
- Second, Orientalism suffers of 'dominating self' in the anthropological speech; this 'Self' does not want to acknowledge the dialectical process in the molding of identities. In this perspective, he criticizes Said's theory of denying the presence of a reciprocal relation between the 'domination self' and the subject of the speech 'other'. Haider Ali warns against the danger of basing one's identity on the denial and elimination of the identity of the Other (Ali in Labib, 2008, 20).This

¹¹Some Arabic authors starts criticizing Occidentalism approach like:

- Al-sheikh Ahmed (1999). *Min Naqid Al-istishrak ila Naqid Al-istighrab (From the Orientalism Criticism to Occidentalism Criticism)*, Cairo, Arabic center of Western studies.
- Ali Alnamla, (2010). *Al-sharq wa Al-gharb*, Beirut, Besan Publisher.

process of domination by the West creates another Arabic or Islamic alterity, whether based on a national axiom or a confessional one.

- Third, anthropology approved that there is no sole identity. Thus, every 'self' has elements in common with the 'other'. It is a call of cooperation to respect differences and interact peacefully.

Lindstorm Lamont identifies the process of "Auto-Orientalism" which is parallel to the Occidentalism discourse. Walter Mignolo and Fernando Coronil argued that the Orientalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could not have been conceived without a previous idea of Occidentalism (quoted in Boetca, 2015, 81). Their conceptualization as successive ideological strategies of the modern world-system – or of what Mignolo (2000) labels “global designs” – allows for ideal-typical reconstruction of the colonial difference in terms of ethnicization processes. Hence, for Boetca, Global designs are understood as organized around concepts of race, ethnicity, or both. Global designs provide the ground for the "civilization Mission"; Western culture increasingly conceived as a mark of universal civilization, it signaled the transition to the new global design. The Enlightenment postulates of scientific progress and modernity, conceived as the overcoming of tradition. Secularization thus brought about a shift of emphasis from the notion of a spatial boundary between Christians in Europe and barbarians in the colonies to the one of a time lag between modern civilization and the primitive colonial world. In the Occidentalist imaginary, the secular task is the core of the civilizing mission. Thus, the result of denial was that the West acted colonially in the Orient in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they claim to bring modernity to the Orient but they deviated from this aim. The US promised to transform the Middle East to democracy, but on their own way, and they did not give stance to the Arab to build their own democracy. They insist to control the political transformation process in a way that increased the wave of hatred against the US in the Orient and have led to destabilize the region. In Occidentalist perspectives, the question of democratization only took centre-stage toward the end of the twentieth century, as the ideology of developmentalism, was slowly translated into the language of globalization, neo-liberalism and anti-statism (Boetca, 2015, 108). These discourses of neoliberal globalization operated as the end of ideological alternatives to the West universal project that promotes cosmopolitan orientations. Boetca refers in the table 3.1 that the global designs have shifted from "developed vs undeveloped" to "Democratic vs undemocratic" in the 21st century. This shift means that the socio-political conditions are on the fore of otherness process. One can conclude that the shift in otherness discourse creates sub-terms or references of knowledge about

the other; as Lindstrom Lamont (In Carrier, 2003, 33) asserts that the Orient, and Orientalism, necessarily presume an Occident and a parallel discourse of Occidentalism. Within this sort of classificatory dualism, orientalist discourse automatically provides commentary on Occidentalism. In this context, Lindstrom proposed the terms 'ethno-orientalism' and 'ethno-occidentalism'. "These terms label discourses about the self and about the other, while the term auto-orientalism refers to self-discourse among Orientals, so that stories of the other explicitly transform into stories of the self." This process holds a comparison that involving the constructing of "negative self-definition", by which self is defined in terms of the other. Carrier identifies this process as 'Cargoism' when the oriental is assimilated to the self-but not to the whole self. "Is like an earlier version of an occidental" (Carrier, 2003, 48). In accordance with this argument, the idea of the 'I' emerging as the result of a process of the doubling or folding of the 'I' upon itself to constitute an absolute interiority (Venn, 2000, 86). For Venn, this interiority posits the question of an 'ethics of the self' which as part of self-formation process of particular 'I' before particular others. Thus, the self-exhibition process assumes that the two subjectivities (the self and the other's image) grow together, and confirm the necessity of 'identity'. Venn concludes that nowadays 'fundamentalism' is provoked because of the failures of the Occidentalized, and the absence of the self-exhibition of the West's other in the contemporarily global design. In this perspective, identity and diversity drew the conclusion that cultures were incommensurable, and the project of universal enlightenment is a delusion (Quoted in Venn, 2000, 119). For Venn this project on one hand, could reduce cultural differences and encourage peaceful encounters. On the other hand, this project universalizes the West's discourse over the other cultures. In response to this claim, modernity plays a vital role in constructing the other's image within the Occidentalism process, and invokes changes in the societal and the political behavior of the oriental and that may affect the self-exhibition in comparing with the west. This change would interrupt the traditional mechanisms of collective-self, and pave the way to the moderate-self that seeks to converge with the other without neglecting its specific position in the global design.

Hanafi criticizes this type of attitude towards the 'Other'; he considered Occidentalism as a reading 'I' in the other's mirror. His term concentrates on the ego of 'I' as a self-exhibition process. Hanafi concluded that the other is an occasion to show the ego (Hanafi, 25). In this argument, the imagination of the other may seek revenge by Occidentalism. The denial of the other is based on one's image of it. This image is a 'probable delusion' and would be so difficult to measure its

distance from reality (Labib, 2008, 52). Thus, the West denial of the East offers the Arab or Muslims the means for identifying and resisting both the 'Otherness' and 'moderated I'. This 'I' is seen by the Orientals as detached 'I' from East reality as a result of Cloning-Occidentalism which may resist or challenge the traditional shape of 'I'. 'Constructive hatred', for Labib, is fabricated within image creation process, especially when the other is considered as an offensive ideology over historical accumulation. Hence, Labib Tahar (2008, 63-79) asserts that the otherness approach must take into consideration:

- First, the civilization extensions of other's culture before looking of its historical relations with the other cultures.
- Second, the multiplicity of the Other's picture, also its development for each group according to their status in every historical moment.
- Third, the formation of the images exchanged between the Muslims of the East and Christians in the West belonged exclusively to the crusade period. Amin Maalouf concluded his book *"The Crusades Through Arab Eyes"* with this remark: "the Arab world knew Europeans as barbarians and conquered them, but later those Europeans controlled the world and they do not consider the crusades a mere episode of the past... Arabs and Muslims, in general, are influenced by the events that were supposed to end seven centuries ago" (Maalouf, 1984, 262).

Despite this conclusion, Labib (2008) finds that the Gulf war in 1991 was a test of the hardest Arab divergence whereby the 'ego and the other' appeared in a familiar picture. This war had negated Rudyard Kepling's (1892) statement that "the West and the East will never meet." One can conclude that, this war reflects the historical moment when the self-image or Auto-Orientalism and Orientalism converge in a common area of interest whereby both the West and the East can reach and share the same values under the umbrella of the global design. This convergence located in the official Occidentalism to face the threat of the self-identity ignorance exhibited by some of the concerned part (we) and not by the other. In this perspective, the political discourse had the priority in relation with the other over the cultural and identity boundaries. Despite the fact that, in the gulf war in 1990, USA was no more seen the aggressive other for the official interpretation of the other in the Middle East, the West-East convergence was built on political necessity, thus had no roots among the Orientals; so popular Occidentalism still understands the other (West) as the aggressive other.

for the difference between official Occidentalism and popular Occidentalism, Chen refers to the double sides of Occidentalism, he gives an example of popular discourse of Occidentalism in China that formed of anti-official Occidentalism and thus a critique of Mao's anti-urbanism, which is itself a result of, and a reaction to, Chinese Auto-Orientalism. This process was preconditioned by the parameters of Maoist political discourse, which categorized anything opposed to its political dominance as "Western" or "Westernized" (Chen, 1995, 27). Chen gives an example of this process, which is *He shang Tv show*. In addition to unsettling its Chinese viewers with its depictions of a dying and declining "Orient," *He shang* further shocked its audiences with a passionate account of an Occidental Other, which, it suggests, represents youthfulness, adventure, energy, power, technology, and modernity. *He Shang* abounded in problematic images of China and its oppositional Others. Indeed, Chen asserts the need of rewriting of the world history out of self-writing of history, which would need to neglect the self-ego to reach the real edge of convergence with the other. His constructing Occidentalism provides a politically and culturally motivated image of the cultural 'Other'. This Occidentalist discourse in *He Shang* becomes even more striking when viewed in the context of much current Third World discourse against a claimed Eurocentric Western domination like what Samir Amin observed of *Eurocentrism*, as a Western ideology of cultural, religious, literary, and linguistic reconstructions of universal project. This type of auto-orientalism imports ideas from Eurocentrism. Therefore, such a trend became an immediate target for another political campaign against "cultural imperialism" not just in China but also in the Middle East countries. As a result of the intersection between auto-orientalism and Occidentalism in the self-exhibition process, the Orientals in the Arab land are confused regarding their "Identity"; they protect these political entities (Nation States) the artificial products of European Orientalism, ignoring their collective identity as Arabs or Muslims. This part of the approach calls up the theme of 'the Other'. Nuemann asserts that there are four paths to understand the Otherness project (1999, 3-9). These paths are ethnographic, the psychological, the Continental philosophical path, and the "Eastern excursion. The Ethnographic Path, in the postwar period, it was mainly left to social anthropology to carry out a range of studies of self/other relations whose sophistication far surpassed what had been done in the other social sciences. The Psychological path is the identification approach between an "us" and a "them", which has belabored "ethnocentrism". It sees self-categorization as an explanation of how individuals are turned into groups. The Continental Philosophical path, one meets the self and the other as raw material for a possible dialectical. In

Habermasian "discourse ethics," the self and other are still ideally lodged in "ideal speech situations." While Charles Taylor's book *Sources of the Self* (1989), proposes that "self-reflection can be found along basic dimensions such as, the idea of obligation to others, and the idea of presentation of self" (quoted in Neumann, 1999, 10).

The fourth path is "Eastern Excursion", which theorizing of collective identity whereby Strangers play an important role in collective identity. Neumann Concludes that "The East" is indeed Europe's other and it is continuously being recycled in order to represent European identities, therefore, the question is not whether the East will be used in the forging of new European identities but how this is being done. Amin Maalouf answers such a question by asserting that:

All human societies since the dawn of time have been affected by the tendency to consider others only in terms of religious and ethnic differences, but in today's 'global village' such an attitude is no longer tolerable because it compromises the chances of coexistence in every town, and leads to irreparable rifts and a violent future for the whole humanity (Maalouf, 2011, 188).

For Maalouf a wiser response not a matter of ignoring the differences, remembering that not all neither the 'other' nor the 'we' is the same. He advises the West that (Maalouf, 2011, 191-99):

- First, to apply to other people the same principles of greatness it applied to its own, and to avoid the mistakes of colonial times, when the relations between the West and other were built on unhealthy motive, since the genuine desire to civilize the 'Other' was constantly in conflict with the cynical desire to subjugate him.
- Second, the present is a proper historical moment for the West to confirm their self-esteem in showing itself as a true reflection to its own values to encourage the other to integrate in the contemporarily world. By mentioning the West's other he refers to the Arabs, as they scour their past to keep believing in themselves and that stick them to their traditional identity (Arabism and Islam) as a place of refuge for dignity. He gives an example of the European countries whereby immigrants from different cultural and ethnical backgrounds break down this diversity and live in peace and coexistence.

Maalouf criticizes both the Arabs and the West (US and Europe) concerning Arabs deteriorated position in the global design, the political turmoil in the Middle East and the discrimination in hosted (Western) and original societies against the Arab and Muslim immigrants. Therefore, the West should respect the 'Other' and not to impose their model as a definitive fact.

This part concluded that the Self-Other classification process can be categorized to:

- 1- On the individual's level, the differences boundaries between 'I' and the 'Other' are psychologically and physically determined.
- 2- On the social level, cultural and religious boundaries play the significant role in the self-creating process.
- 3- On the state level, political and ethnical barriers take priority in shaping the policies towards the 'Other'.
- 4- On the global design level, ideologies and ethics such as justice, human rights and democracy split the world into two parties, those who respect these ethics and applied it and those who lack of it.

1.2. Second Section: knowledge discourse:

1.2.1 Knowledge representations:

Edward Said contends that since the middle of the eighteenth century there had been two principal elements in the relationship between the East and the West (Said, 1978, 41):

- One was a growing of systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge reinforced by the colonial encounter, exploited by the developing sciences of ethnology, comparative anatomy, philology, and history; furthermore, to this systematic knowledge was added a sizable body of literature produced by novelists, poets, translators, and gifted travelers.
- Second feature of Oriental-European relations was that Europe was always in a position of strength not to say domination.

But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West (Said, 1978, 108). Orientalism organized itself systematically as the acquisition of Oriental material and its regulated dissemination as a form of specialized knowledge. On the other hand, it domesticated this

knowledge to the West, filtering it through regulatory codes, classifications, periodical reviews, dictionaries, grammars, commentaries and translations, all of which together formed a simulacrum of the Orient and reproduced it materially in the West, for the West. Thus for a writer to use the word *Oriental* as a reference was sufficient for the reader to identify a specific body of information about the Orient. This information seemed to be morally neutral and objectively valid; it seemed to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location, "Orientalist ideas could enter into alliance with general philosophical; and in many ways the professional contributors to Oriental knowledge were anxious to couch their formulations and ideas"(Said, 1978, 206). Said asserted that "whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant. Theses of Oriental backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West most easily associated themselves early in the nineteenth century with ideas about the biological bases of racial inequality. Latent Orientalism was profoundly conservative—dedicated, that is, to its self-preservation, transmitted from one generation to another; it was a part of the culture, as much a language about a part of reality as geometry or physics. Modern Islam, according to von Grunebaum, has turned away from the West because it remains faithful to its original sense of itself; and yet Islam can modernize itself only by a self-reinterpretation from a Western point of view—which, of course, Von Grunebaum shows is impossible, as quoted in Said's orientalism. If the oriental or Muslim is static and resistance of change then the orientalism discourse has this feature as well particularly in the scope of oriental mind; the change then in orientalism discourse dealing with the new circumstances especially in political field and how western civilization has to act within this new atmosphere. Then this mean that Orientalism discourse has also this feature and any shift that may occur within the discourse will rely on the new circumstances as well the need for more efforts in studying and observing the challenge the orient represents. This fear of Islam, Arabic mind and culture constitutes the core of contemporarily studies (as post-colonial studies).Bernard Lewis argues that this fear of Arabs is reflected from the importance of the factor of religion in the current affairs of the Muslim world. Lewis contends that the West should not explain a Muslim political phenomenon is about as accurate and as enlightening (Lewis in Curtis, 1986, 70). For Said the fear of Islam represents the most important motive for going on in generating more knowledge about the Orient. John Rogers explains Orientalism as the works that usually trace the roots of ethnic and cultural nationalism to the social and religious reform

movements that are seen as indigenous responses to the impact of colonial rule. Rogers states that "post-Orientalists place great importance on the role of the British in the construction of new identities through the power of a colonial discourse on India. Some post-Orientalists see the colonial ideology of caste as a central component of the new knowledge concerning India (Rogers, 1994, 10-1). The modern sociology of knowledge places religion as a subcategory of ethnicity. Religion, unlike ethnicity and caste, is seen as optional rather than inherent, this assumption in modern societies while in classical one like Muslim its prohibited to touch the superiority of religious rules which are over individual liberality.

A set of identities now identified in scholarly rhetoric as ethnic, but which were described in the nineteenth and twentieth century by various other terms, including race, nationality, community, and class, came to be regarded as the central mark of social and political identity. "The postmodern view is the premise that the concept of Oriental despotism has been used less for understanding and analyzing the realities of Eastern societies and politics objectively than for buttressing arguments for colonial or imperialist control by the West over those societies, or for Western political purposes" (Curtis, 2009, 68).

So, we can understand that the knowledge discourse formulates the orientalism's scope and directs it in two directions:

- *First* towards the "other" both as the orient's social – political atmosphere and the oriental's morals and belief.
- *Second*: about the occidental society. In this sense, orientalism is not just an intellectual studies but is merely a discourse or a process where the information builds an image about the object within the context of the general stereotype of public understanding of other's reality; this process produces the perspectives and directs the behavior of each normal member of the society, scholar, expert and policy maker; as well as this process aims to reshape the Orient for instance through the project of Americanizing the other.

Said's (1978) critique of orientalism in the social sciences offers a number of insights on how and why systematic misconceptions and willful constructions of "the other" perpetuate themselves under the garb of "positive" knowledge. However, Carol and Veer state that:

The main consequence of this strategy is that the internal dynamics of the western intellectual tradition anchored in the dramatic changes in the rational basis of social thought that occurred over the centuries when the social sciences came into existence and engaged in many self-critical exercises (Carol & veer, 1993, 45-47).

Today when social sciences scholars claim to understand and interpret the Orient without having resolved their internal dilemmas and without having understood the societal contradictions that produce them, we notice attempts to use the Orient as a counterfoil of self-reflection by the West. The post-modern motive for knowing the orient is the challenges within the competition of international powers, for instance: how U.S Administration could attract the orient and help in fighting better terrorism. According to Said the main reason of knowing the Orient is to control over it, but this control may not mean destroying it culturally or politically, but it also means controlling the process of evolution or development in different aspects especially socially. Carol in further, contends that East-West encounters did produce "correct" knowledge or what Said calls "positive" knowledge that allows conquerors to subjugate and control people politically and to exploit them economically. Knowledge thus generated was used and transmitted to the core of imperialism; as Said claims (1978: 322). Carol and Veer argue that one should not forget that such an accommodation did not occur without resistance (Carol & Veer: 1993, 60-63).

For Said, this is the first instance of the way knowledge of the Orient legitimizes power over it, knowledge of Orientals is what makes their management easy and profitable, "Western knowledge of the Orient — was a rationalization of colonial rule, was justified in advance by Orientalism" (kerr, 2008, 225). Thus, to ensure dominance over the orient, knowledge about this object should meet the political ends. To this end, Orientalism should reconcile with the concept of despotism as genuine feature in Muslims political life. Eastern despotism makes manifest the nature of allpolitical power and of its processes of subjectification (Haldar, 2007, 42). The "new order" that emerged in the 1990s has allowed Orientalism, understood as a way of thinking about and the practices of making the "Other", to escape the confines of space and time. Orientalism is also a specter that haunts people's minds and serves as a tool for concocting social distinctions across state borders as well as within them. In this sense, Keer argues that with these changes in political designs of world order; the meaning of Orientalism acquires new dimensions. Douglas Kerr raises several questions: Is a post-Orientalizing anthropology possible, "anthropology after peoples and

culture'? The answer is "yes" Parallel to the construction of identity; a process in which people's cultures and the places they live in, have been reshaped or reconstructed by dominated power.

In this regard, Linda Hutcheon argued that post-colonial studies refer to a larger context of "strategic formation" in which may aim to change the reality. This strategic formation acquires knowledge as discourse which manifests the way the Orient had been represented in the "West" whether in the colonial period or as a consequence of post-colonial studies. This takes into perspective the culture of the colonized, both when colonized and after, as a record of the impact on and resistance to the traumatic imperial legacy and discourse, but this discourse has an impact both upon its victims and perpetrators (Hutcheon in Ashcroft, 2001 93). For Elleke Boehmer the Neo-orientalist underpinnings of post-colonial literary criticism from the West, in particular its location in neo-imperialism center, as Aijaz Ahmed puts it in a typically strenuous essay, the whole of the eastern world singularized into an oppositionality, is idealized as the site of alterity and authenticity. In this scenario, it is significant that post-colonial studies have emerged at a time when global capitalism continues to create general economic and power imbalance between different parts of the world, in other words, this produces a new colonial marginalization and dependency (Elleke in Ashcroft, 2001, 153).

I can see that both concepts "Orientalism" and "post-colonial studies" share the same intellectual discourse, if we assume that the object of analysis is the same either the orient or the oriental, as in both terms share the same object, tools, pillars and aims; both terms try to analyze and discover what the orient and the oriental really is and to manage the process of changing and modernizing its whether its political reality and values. In this work I do not aim to compare these terms but to find the common features in studying the Orient to understand the knowledge structure. Both Orientalism and post-colonial studies share the same will to control the orient and change it.

Social scientists used the term "modernization" to denote the process of transition from a traditional to a modern society. Zachary Lockman asserts that this process can be perceived as either universal or unilinear. It was universal because every society on earth had to undergo more or less the same, often painful, disruptive and destabilizing process of transition if it was to escape tradition and reach the promised land of modernity (Lockman, 1996, 134). Modernity was seen as coherent system, a package deal, with a well-defined set of attributes which could be sharply distinguished from the set of attributes typical of traditional societies. Whereas the latter were

essentially rural, agricultural, illiterate, authoritarian and based on personal and oral modes of communication, modern societies were urban, industrial, literate, and participatory based on communications through various mass media spaces. Lockman argue that traditional societies were static, while modern societies were typified by physical and social mobility and the fostering of a “mobile personality.” In this perspective, the main question should be how to bring Enlightenment as a form of self-improvement to the fore of social life to achieve modernity. Srinivas asserts that the Enlightenment is also reduced to a facade of will to power. The problem is that enlightenment in the Middle East has been perceived as political tool to attack cultural particularity of Muslims. As argued by Clifford enlightenment is not just a philosophical position taken by intellectuals but also an institutional event and a model of interaction that entails the creation of a new epistemological infrastructure. This structure can be recognized as *Enlightenment Orientalism* which "is imagined as a process that circulated images of the East for dreaming with it by constructing and pluralizing views of it, inventing and reimagining it, in short, it is a western style developed for translating the Orient” (Srinivas, 2012, 2-3).

It can be concluded that knowledge discourse is static and dynamic at the same time because the static status comes from the stereotypes done for imagining the "Object" as static itself, but at the same time this knowledge needs to be tested, and also provide the base for more knowledge since it is knowledge that produces knowledge. But this knowledge is divided upon the purpose of each kind. This can be represented in three categories:

- *First*, the popular knowledge that is a set of presentations to provide an image about the object.
- *Second*, positive knowledge, that produces a set of themes about the political-social framework of the Orient to increase the chances of cooperation, or as Lockman explains "seemed reasonable to conclude that to achieve progress the Orient must emulate the West. Western influence could therefore easily be seen as a wholly positive force which would bring the blessings of modern civilization to an exhausted, stagnant and defective Muslim world unable to revive itself by its own efforts" (Lockman: 1996, 89).
- *Third*, strategic knowledge; which provides a certain vision to deal with the critical and sensitive issue to control the Orient or at least to keep the West's position as a super- power.

1.2.2. Who provides knowledge?

In this part, I will explore what are those institutions or individuals who carry this mission on of providing sufficient knowledge about the 'Other'. I will tackle the fact that not only social scientists are involved in this process but so are all specialists working on the Orient as an object of inquiry. For Said Orientalism is also an influential academic tradition (when one refers to an academic specialist who is called an Orientalist), as well as:

An area of concern defined by travelers, commercial enterprises, governments, military expeditions, readers of novels and accounts of exotic adventure, natural historians, and pilgrims to whom the Orient is a specific kind of knowledge about specific places, people, and civilizations (Said, 1978, 204).

Said's understanding of Orientalism is based on discourse analysis which is unfair to the author; his analysis is not interested in what they have to say or how they feel as subjects but is concerned merely with statements as related to other statements in a field of discursive formation. "What is portrayed theoretically is a "Discursive formation" as opposed to ideas, citations, conventions" (Clifford, 2002, 267-270). It remains the professional Orientalist's job to piece together a portrait, a restored picture as it were, of the Orient or the Oriental; narratives are supplied and constructed by scholars (Said, 1987, 152). Orientalist ideas took a number of different forms:

- *First*, what was *inherited* from the past?
- *Second*, the *imperial adventure* with such experiences as a body of knowledge in the West, because the Oriental-European relationship was determined by an unstoppable European expansion in search of markets, resources, and colonies.
- *Thirds*, institutional peace of knowledge.

Said's thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, re-disposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology. The matter of Oriental studies is arcane; it is of import to people who already have an interest in the Orient but want to know the Orient better. So the Orientalist is necessary as a mediator between what is far

undiscovered in the East and what is needed to be understood by those who reside in the West. Therefore, the Orientalist is required to *present* the Orient through a series of representative fragments. According to Said, the orientalist should acquire rationality in his findings towards the 'other'; this rationality could not be met without: precise understanding of the object of inquiry; and demands personal experience and testimony to a certain extent. Hence, the orientalist's contribution in the library of Orientalism could not be scrutinized outside the current library of orientalism archive of ideas and perceptions towards the other. Any new idea presented by the oriental faces higher potentiality of failure before the systematic knowledge. In this regard, most of orientalists should reconcile with the current orientalism' ideas. One can notice that, how to name an expert of Middle East as orientalis if he has no direct relationship with the region and has been never there. To answer I can conclude that there are many reasons neglect the need of old type of Orientalism which contends the need of physical experience in the East. But most important is that most of the experts in the United States, for example, find themselves before a huge cluster of information concerning the object of inquiry (the Middle East' issues). This cluster of information is a by-product of systematic relationship between knowledge and authority. In this regard, the expert finds it very difficult to oppose the current findings towards the 'other' because either he believes in it or has no sufficient power to challenge these findings.

Although, Said here asserts the necessity of a personal experience of daily life directly in the Orient to know the people better and understand their caste. To this end the Orientalist has to live among them to put together the pieces of his portrait in a proper manner so that he can represent to his society the real picture of the other's world. This tradition can be seen as connected to classical Orientalism, when the travel to the Orient was so expensive and difficult that only a few people took it upon themselves not only to travel but also through their writings describe that part of the world. Somehow there is a contradiction in Said's approach. In one end he emphasizes the need for personal experience but on the other hand despite the fulfillment of this criterion he accuses that their works lack credibility and neutrality via-a-vis the imperialist powers. Today the necessity for Orientalist to travel to the orient holds less importance due to many factors: *first*, the world has become a small village. *Secondly*, there has been an accumulation of discursive information which have been inherited over decades, "for decades the Orientalists had spoken about the Orient, they had translated texts, they had explained civilizations, religions, dynasties, cultures, mentalities—as academic objects. The Orientalist is being accused as a kind of secret agent inside the Orient" (Said,

1978, 224). Here indeed is the Orientalist as an agent, the man of fieldwork experience. Kerr asserts that to acquire knowledge of the Orient, the Orientalist has to become part of the orient in one hand, and part of the power which backed his mission (kerr, 2008, 232). If the orientalist is a secret agent inside the Orient, then he has no intention to interpret and present the right picture of it. This is crucial because, if this is true, then Said presented a wrong argument about discursive information. Or it can be the case that they have to keep going to the Orient because they cannot just depend on the discursive information. Within this process the Orientalist need always to update the manifest part of *orientalism*. In this point, I will concentrate in upcoming chapters about American Orientalists who are specialists on Iraq and the approach they follow to submit their knowledge.

Going back to the Orientalists, even if some travelers to the Orient had mixed motives in submitting their narratives; they did provide empirical information and acute direct observations, which were valid and also helpful for political scientists developing comparative concepts of political structures. In this sense, Curtis agrees that the western powers have always deployed the orient for political ends. He adds that the political deployment of orient's perceived knowledge included inaccurate observations, and a number of self-serving motivations for negative presentations of the Orient (Curtis, 2009, 76). Elena Andreeva find out that orientalists' function is not limited to the mission of providing knowledge about the Orientals; but also making a contribution to the social history of the Orientals (Andreeva, 2007, 41). The aim of Orientalists criticism towards the Orientals is two-folds: self-superiority and to justify domination over the orient.

This fact does not neglect the finding that most nineteenth-century Orientalist scholars devoted themselves to the pursuit of *objective knowledge* and had no direct or indirect involvement in policy-making; and in fact many of them produced scholarly work of lasting value, some even expressed admiration for Islam while others disparaged it (Lockman, 1996, 89).

According to Said's theory the deepening involvement of the United States in the Arab region came as a result of the emergence of the United States as a global superpower. The government officials in the United States argued forcefully that the United States needed to develop a much larger pool of expertise on the rest of the world, and especially those parts of the former colonial world where the US was becoming deeply involved but about which very few Americans had much knowledge about. Lockman asserts that when the United States government sought to beef up its expertise on the Arab World, it drew heavily on the small number of young men who had grown up in the

region. Some of the experts on the Arab world filled key diplomatic and policymaking posts in the United States' government (Lockman, 1996, 121-122). Michael Douglas has no other explanation. He contends that U.S. diplomats stationed in the Middle East helped reinforce the orientalist views (Douglas, 2008, 28). Sadik Al-Azm asserts that:

What come to distort America's vision in the area and determine the wrong-headed policies pursued there is that massive prison house of Orientalist discourse and language built over the centuries and now fully absorbed by all Western (and particularly American) decision makers, policy framers, administrators, rulers, diplomats, experts, specialists, academics, functionaries, military commanders, assistants, etc., dealing with that part of the world (Al-Azm in Graf, Fathi & Paul, 2011, 24).

This knowledge is built on foundations of sand, according to al-Azm, since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political elites, modernization and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely inadequate to describe what took place recently in the Middle East. In addition, Hamilton Gibb argued, the Middle East now much too important to be left to the Orientalists alone; it had become necessary to have Orientalists and social scientists work together to produce knowledge. "It was the *Orientalist's function*, he explained to bring together and correlate the findings of the separate social studies, the orientalist's function is to furnish that [central] core out of his knowledge and understanding of the invisibles the values, attitudes and mental processes characteristic of the "great culture" (quoted in Lockman, 1996, 130).

In conclusion, it seems that the Orientalist has two functions: the *first*, as a mediator of discursive information (product) and as a producer of knowledge. The knowledge he produces is accumulated from what he receives. Producing positive or negative knowledge towards the 'other' depends on who analyzes and for what motives his analysis have been carrying on. This conclusion highlights another contradiction in Said's theory, because he sees Orientalism as a continuous process which needs always information to feed the accumulated knowledge, while in the second hand, he accused this Process to be related for those who closed to power. In fact it can be seen that the Orientals themselves participate in the Orientalism process; they can challenge or contend the perceived images on the East. But in general some notes can be found about orientalists to answer

questions of (who, why and how). For contemporary Orientalism the Orientalist is a specialist in one field concerning the Orient, in this regard (the International Congress of Orientalists had already agreed to abandon the use of the word in 1973) (Macfei, 2002, 111). The movement to abolish the term "Orientalist" was, however, successful and the term "Orientalist" was formally abolished. In its place the congress agreed to call itself the "International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa and replaced the term Orientalism with specialists of social sciences (Lewis, 1993, 4). Within this view the Orientalist is not just an academic specialist but also includes politicians, journalists who are involved in the process and influence the public opinion in the Occident.

1.2.3 Knowledge's functions and goals:

In this part, I would like to explore what kind of roles that knowledge bears on its shoulders concerning the Orient and to what ends. Said argues that one of the most important function of "Orientalism" is to provide a cluster of *representations*, to what we can call a discursive consistency. Such a consistency was a form of cultural praxis, a system of opportunities for making statements about the Orient. Said suggests that the system is not a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence, but it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting. In other words, representations have purposes; they are effective much of the time. Because Orientalists' profession requires that they present the society with images and findings on the Orient. And to a very large extent the Orientalist provides his own society with representations of the Orient (Said, 1978, 274):

- (a) That bears his distinctive imprint;
- (b) That illustrates his conception of what the Orient can or ought to be;
- (c) That consciously contests someone else's view of the Orient;
- (d) That provides Orientalism's discourse with what, at that moment, it seems most in need of;
- (e) That responds to certain cultural, professional, national, political, and economic requirements of the epoch.

According to this theme, orientalism discourse has the following goals to be accomplished:

- Orientalists they acted recommended public policy on the basis of generalizations (*representations*); and, provided comparative approaches within the *self-imagining* process.

- Orientalism must re-orient the Orient in a way to invest its power for the interests of the West's values and goals. It should also instruct the orient in the path of modernity, and to bring it closer to western civilization.
- Provides surveys about the Orient and the oriental character and use it to submit urgent representations about its culture, religion, mind and history. At the same time all these fictions of the Orient have a static image within the latent orientalism discourse, but still there is a need to update the knowledge with new impressions in order to correct or assert the current image. As Said points out, this image emphasized distinctive differences between races, civilizations, languages and suggested that it was (or pretended to be) radical and *ineradicable*.
- The main aim is to control the orient in a way that paves the road to the western domination in general, and in this regard will be very difficult to identify who represents the West Europe or United States of America, as both share the same cultural, religious and civilized constituents. I think the most important factor for this task is the strategic capability within the political process of restructuring the Orient. As Said argues that the orientalism discourse played a vital role in shaping the political map of the Arabic region after WW1.

From this perspective I can see two main phases that define the functions of Orientalism:

- *The first* is a strategic invention process which gives the West the ability to reconstruct or re-orient the Orient.
- *Second*, as an advisory discourse, it aims to discover and recognize the Orient in a proper way for providing precise knowledge to answer the question of how to deal with the Orient as a threat or an opportunity, to protect Western's interests in the region.

1.2.4 The Knowledge's Implications:

One of the most important implications of knowledge was that it cast a *general image* on the Orient, and that is also fundamentally a strategic aim, because if Orientalism believes in historical confrontation then it works to strengthen the solidarity by building a constant position within the internal fabric of the West. Lockman states that:

Such an image of the Oriental people's and lands also continued to be shaped by such classics as the Thousand and One Nights, refracted through a multitude of travelers' accounts, literary

works, and adventure stories for adults and children set in an Orient that was strange, exotic and sometimes threatening (Lockman, 1995, 70).

Therefore, this claim cannot be separated from the ambition of changing the 'Other' in away enforces them to assimilate with the universal Westernization. The implication would be the emergence of *new educated Muslim elites* which would promote gradual reform and modernization.

There are three findings to this claim:

- First, it claims that the only acceptable forms should be in assimilation with the West.
- Second, the orient cannot be developed without a direct involvement by the western powers.
- Third, while Orientalism discourse can create oriental elites who believe in Westernization; one can imagine that there will be increased resistance to Westernization in the orient.

Varine-Mignona Regina describes this way of thinking about alien culture as ethnocentrism which judges other cultures by a person's own culture (Varine-Mingona, 2008, 14). So in the general moral imaginary about the "West" it is seen through a predatory will to rule and dominate the world through a systematic manufacture and denial of other cultures. As a result of this assumption the world will be classified culturally according to the western perspective of "Good" sense. Respectively, perception in the west on the other will be built upon self-centric narrative (McClean & Mcmillan, 2009, 6). Hence, the sense of good towards the other is self-constructed criteria whereby other's interpretation of good is excluded. In this sense, orientalism enormously systematic, cosmological in scope, incestuously self-referential emerges as much more than a mere intellectual tradition (Clifford, 2002, 261). Clifford finds out that the key theoretical implication raised by Orientalism concerns the forms of thought and representation for dealing with the alien under the pretext of suspicion.

For Brnard and Attwell "Orientalism" has traveled across disciplines and historical periods, and influence the contemporary understandings of Arab and Islamic world (Birnard & Attwell, 2013, 2-4). Thus, the most important implication of Orientalism is an identity politics that equates cultural location with epistemological and political position; it emphasizes the West's position in global design and creates a fundamental imbalance of power between the West and the East. One of the claims of Said is that the western intervention in the Middle East is seen not as an exercise of imperial power but as that demanded by reason. So he asked that the same democratic American people that opposed the Vietnam War and fought for civil rights could unquestioningly support the

state of Israel despite the injustice done to the Palestinian people. What cause this fiction and this kind of support was due to the representational dynamics that made these false claims acceptable, these claims depended on the root of inherited knowledge that accused Arabs and Islam of violence and backwardness¹².

The system of ideological fictions according to Al-Azam has serious implications. For the United States today is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: The Middle East experts who advise policymakers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person (Al-Azam, 2010, 12). Therefore, the inadequate U.S' policies towards Muslims' issues have been faced by growing resistance. This resistance is the Orient's rejection to the universal project opposed by western's power which being neglect the cultural particularity of the other. Hazim Shah refers to this implication as inter-cultural, inter-civilizational, and hence international; the impact of this implication can be seen especially on the relationship between Islamic and Western countries post-colonialism (Shah in Graf, Fathi & Paul, 2011, 64).

One of the most important implications of Orientalism shreds the fabric between Arabism and Islam, and in the process of imagining a new opponent to the super-European powers which created the current Middle East's political map as a consequence of Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. Each country starts to expand the national values at the expense of Pan-Arab, what our grand-father refused and fight against, we stand for to protect and maintain (the nation state in the Arab land is a political product, is seen as artificial product of Orientalism) that came up in cross with Islamic and Arabic values. Today, Arabs may face the same problem; they could not understand the real motives of the political change in their land, while they still accused the West "conspiracy theory" of any political movement. In the fourth, fifth and sixth chapter, I will focus on the *political implication* to highlight any possible change in the political map of the Middle East, and which players are going to have the main effect in this course.

¹² For more information about this inherited knowledge on Arabs, one can follow most American popular TV-shows and programs on CNN and in other Media. For instance, watch the report on "Does Islam promote violence?" broadcasted on CNN News channel. watch <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzusSqcotDw>.

1.3. Third Section: United States neo-Orientalism's (Salama's Mechanism):

In this section I am going to tackle a critical question 'Does Neo-Orientalism exists?' Prof. Abduljabar Naji¹³ gave an impression that the classical Orientalism reached its final station, while the core and function still running because the process never stopped but shifted the compass towards Islam in particular after the bloody event on September 11th. Postcolonial studies mostly concentrate on Pan-Arabism and socio-political situation under national identities. However, the mechanism that shaped West-East relation still stands as Said identifies it. Prof. Naji sees Neo-Orientalism as a train, which, does not deviate from the track. He asserted that Orientalism launched at the moment of announcing the new religion. So from this historical and religious point, the West started its mechanism to explore Islam as a religion and political entity would challenge their supremacy, he sees Orientalism as a doctrine to counter Islam and will last as long the tow civilization exists. This process perceives Islam as a threat to the universal values. This Image had affected George Bush's policy towards Arab and Iraq specifically. *Orientalism* marks both the *cultural clash* and the cultural practice that works *de-constructively from within* hegemonic discourse. The work positions itself as a direct response to the continuing effects of Orientalism by those designated as its objects from the context of increased cultural entrenchment after the attacks of September 11th. In this sense, Minoli Salgado recognizes Orientalism as an intellectual perform which interacted with the paradoxes of extremist, exclusionary and incompatible contemporary interpellations that work to position Middle Eastern as “either Aladdin or a terrorist”. The Western audience is simultaneously displaced from its position as a passive consumer of Orientalism productions, to active agents. Hence, neo-Orientalism is blurring the boundaries between "producers and consumers, agents and victims" (both Occidental and oriental) in the creation of diasporized Orientalism (Salgado, 2011, 203-204). The role of cultural producers -such as artists, writers, critics, publishers and media- in the generation of reductive and polarized presentations of “Orientals”, and of resisting the forms of poststructuralist relativism that work to sidestep these

¹³ Prof. Naji Abduljabar, a specialist on Orientalism and Islamic studies, he got his Phd from University of London in 1970 his supervisor was Prof. Lewis Bernard. He has many books on Orientalism like: *Orientalism in History (Istishrak fi Iltarikh: 2013 Beirut)*, *Baghdad in the Works of Foreigner Travelers (Baghdad fi Mulafat Alrahala Al'ajanib)*, *Development of Orientalism (Ta'ttwer Al-Istishrak)*.

concerns, is both important as well as necessary as mode of *critical engagement* that deliberately draws upon essentialist tropes in the interests of a *wider political project*.

According to this view the historical moment that restores Orientalism discourse is event of September 11th, when the whole world saw innocent people being killed and acknowledged that such an event was planned and executed by Muslims. This again woke an old believe deeply rooted in Western's mind as Mohamed Salama referred to. Salama asserts that "Islamophobia is deep-rooted that has been persisting for centuries and have come to haunt us today in the shadow of September 11th" (Salama, 2011, 213).

1.3.1 Salama's Mechanism in explaining Neo-orientalism:

Mohammad Salama's '*Islam, Orientalism, and Intellectual History*', is an exploration of the development of two linked oppositional binaries in the context of their shared discursive journey over the past four hundred years or so. The first of these pairs is "fiction" and "history," whose break has been researched by such luminaries of cultural studies as Peter Gay, Perry Anderson, Hayden White, and Michel de Certeau, all of whom appear in this volume. The second, pioneered by Edward Said, situates "Islam" in opposition to the "West." The influence of Said's work is clear in the title of the book, and pervades the study thoroughly. Yet, in giving this genealogy (R. Getz, 2011, 1) Salama's explanation of written history and human experience is the one that both identifies the origins and mechanisms of Islamophobia, and shows how they contributed to the encoding of Islamic nationalism. Together, they shape a global discourse in which the events of 9/11 and overseas intervention on the part of the United States and Europe are allowed free reign, and thus profoundly influence the experiences of daily life. Salama posed difficult questions about how the discourse on Islam, in the West, was produced and maintained, and tries to explain the History of Misunderstanding (Islamophobia and discrimination) and how it is rooted in the West, from a personal experience. Because of as an Egyptian/ Muslim his credibility was in question to gain a visa to work for American University, he had to stay three months in Canada waiting for the Visa. From this perspective he tries to explain how and why the number of Muslim immigrants declined in the United States. To this purpose he analyzed the American Intellectual History on the Orient (he identifies Orient according to Said) to understand how the image on Islam was created. In the epilogue of his work he shows an image of the mural on top of the Congress Library. This

mural mentions the twelve civilizations, including Islam that participated positively in the global heritage. Salama states that earlier United States viewed Islam differently from the way it views it today, while mentioning the difference he also does not fail to mention the idea of Islamophobia that persisted even in 18th century citing the evidence by Lancaster where he draws attention to a fearful prospect of a Muslim becoming president of the U.S. (Salama, 2011, 211).

Salama tries to adopt a historical approach in his attempt to analyze modern encounter between Islam and the West, which broadly touch upon Enlightenment, Modernity, Colonialism and the postcolonial periods. To this end, he cites the debates concerning Obama's religious background in his quest for the presidency. He also analyses the mention of the word "Crusade" in the speech of Bush in his description of the war on terror; the word that refers to medieval Christian military campaigns against Islam. Bush modified his tone and announced that, the USA is not in war with "Good Muslims." Salama thinks that Orientalism is still alive as a discourse and has only been metamorphosed in a new speech. Here, we obviously can see the effect of Orientalism on decision makers in the United States, especially when they strongly see their belief as a pivotal to shape the policy towards the 'Other'. In his book, Salama poses a set of fundamental questions about what and to whom does the term 'Islam' refer to, and what are the implication of such reference? How can 'the West' speak meaningfully about Islam when there are many references on the subject, and there being no absolute accepted concept that channels our knowledge? How do Muslims in return understand 'the West'? If there is no absolute that is accepted for validity, then certainly struggles or disputes over Islam's religiosity and meaning will continue to arise. Moreover, how would someone identify a good Muslim within a perspective that creates a tarnishing image of them, and who is responsible to re-orient the Muslim population toward being a good person.

Salama has asserted the connection between knowledge validity and intellectual history assuming that Western Europe reconstructed its past to *suit its present interests* whereas the Arab-Muslim world has become plagued with nationalism. He also argues that Arab nationalism has veered from the path of social justice and political responsibility, creating instead tyrannies and abuses of authorities. So he sees "absolutist state" of corruption and political failure as a consequence of colonial policy to justify the neo-imperialism of the West to control over the Orient. In doing so, nationalisms create an illusion of continuity and stasis, and enables social diseases like despotism and corruption. The USA to some extent makes it evident that the forms of cultural exchange brought about by colonialism were themselves both the causes and effects of the modes of

economic domination and political tyranny that constituted the basis of colonial relations in the Arab-Muslim world. A crucial element of this crooked line of continuous hegemony is the transfer of colonial power from Western Europe to America during the 1950s. This is most exemplified in the latter unflinching support of Israel in the latest incarnations of the Middle East conflict and the most recent involvements of the two Bush Administrations in oil rich Iraq. Through complex legacies, the US inherited British and French colonial paradigms in the Arab-Muslim world (Salama, 2011, 193):

- First, he accused British and French colonies on Arab land and their Orientalists who were considered as the main source of knowledge about the Orient.
- Secondly Salama affirms the idea of discursive knowledge that became later as a common heritage of the whole West. According to him the United States is continuing what British started with Islam two hundred years ago. Such process of insubordination also means that there is no finality in terms of the knowledge about these stories but grows simultaneously with power.

Thus, according to the reasoning of cause and effect, terrorism can be seen as a consequence of United States' foreign policy. The West had an important role to play in nourishing those ideologies that provided a fertile ground for terrorism and helped them to thrive. The United States has created opponents through its mechanism of forcing its political will over many countries as seen through many national and international decisions made in the last 50 years. In this regard, the West has restored the referent 'Islam' to a functional code of knowledge in a way to justify responses to the global threat. The attacks of September 11th, which resulted in the deliberate brutal killings of thousands of innocent Americans, have raised many questions about Islam. Those questions range from investigations of the relationship of Islam, both as a religion and as a social practice, to the discourse of violence encountered by more aggressive violence when United States invaded two countries Afghanistan, as a source of the extremist religious organization (ideologically dreadful) in the world, and Iraq, which was being run by one of the most dangerous tyrant (considered as both politically and strategically dangerous) in the Middle East. It is worthwhile to notice that the United States treated both of them through hard power because it had already categorized them in the same cluster of danger represented by "Other".

From the cases above, Salama raises a pertinent question as how Orientalists correlate between these bloody actions and Islam in general without enough investigation and evidence, especially

after September 11th. This is the critical moment that replaced Soviet Union by Islam as the prominent source of threat for the West. The accomplices of power can and do produce and promote ideas tailored to serve an existing political agenda. Salama critiques the Mass Media (will be discussed later in the fourth chapter) for creating and promoting the tarnished image of Islam bereft of historical evidence. The experts on Islam have abandoned their responsibility to epistemology or verification of the knowledge claims, thus the public is being educated through the mass media and an Islamophobia is growing which is related to the fear and anxiety of the 'Other' who is an alien. Salama continues his analysis by adding another implication of Orientalism on Social fabric in the West. Social anxieties come about when a public discourse (like art, fiction, audio-visual media), which is usually considered the main source of knowledge on an unfamiliar topic or concept- transmits fear that is shared collectively without any credible rational basis or verification of that external danger or when there is a correlation between political interest and social phobias. In this regard Salama states that "media coverage does not consist of mere reporting of news or events, but of impressions influenced by partisan corporation interests and political biases" (Salama, 2011, 193). Clarence Lusane shares Salama conclusion. He refers to The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) study discovered that there was a strong correlation between the principle news source that individuals watched or listened to and their holding one or more of the misconceptions. He classified the media outlets that were identified as the principle source of news for individuals were ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox, NBC, PBS/National Public Radio, and the print media generally. As it turned out, those who held the most misconceptions, and were most likely to support the administration received their major news information from the Fox network, while those who were least likely to have any of the misconceptions got their news from PBS/NPR. Clarence's research demonstrated that one or more misconception was held by 80 percent of Fox watchers, 71 percent of CBS, 61 percent of ABC, 55 percent of NBC, 55 percent of CNN, 47 percent of those who read the print media, and 23 percent of PBS/NRP consumers (Clarence, 2006, 110). This evidence is used by Salama to further the claim of how an image about Islam and the alien subject is created through the mass media and it feeds into the discourse of Islamophobia rather than going through sheer evidence. For deep inquiry concerning this topic the fourth chapter will shed light on Foucault's ideological hegemony; and how perceptions are created in relation with power.

1.3.2 Neo-Orientalism's pillars:

In this part, I will concentrate on Neo-Orientalism's pillars but before that let's shed some light on who identifies these pillars and how? According to both Said and Salama, Orientalism is an Intellectual discourse and the factory of knowledge for policy makers in United States, providing necessary information, views and consolations to direct American foreign policy in contemporary world. The new political reality in the Middle East after WW1 -when Arabic nation states were created- does not change the core of Orientalism but shifted its main concerns, because after centuries of producing knowledge on Islam the Intellectual discourse became more interested in socio-political situation in these new states. In this ever-changing world, the codes of relationship between West and Islam have also changed. This happened especially after September 11th when the western world started perceiving Islam as a growing threat. There was numerous ink spent to create a bad image of Islam and to provide solutions to deal with this threat.

Yet, the question remains: who was responsible for this and towards what end? And could these people be called Orientalists in the same vein as before? I doubt that classical word like Orientalist would be right to understand this kind of phenomenon. I prefer rather the term specialists to understand those who take on their shoulder the Orientalist task of constructing and producing knowledge and disseminating it. In many ways "Orientalism" foregrounds the conceptual contradiction that Dennis Porter has identified at the heart of Orientalism when he observes that Said claims, on the one hand, that true knowledge is impossible and, on the other, that all knowledge is political (Salgado, 2011, 200-1). The Orientalism Production in the West in General and USA in particular, has shown a great bias and radical image towards the culture of the Middle East; this process has played a great role in shaping the popular sense toward Muslims and Islam. It creates a greater chance for cultural clash by creating an atmosphere of hatred regarding anything and everything related to Islam without having a real grasp over what it is and constitutes of. It is merely based on perceptions and on one angle of reality. The event of September 11th and its political and military aftermath involving Afghanistan and Iraq, the stage is set for a dichotomy of Islam–West, rivalry, and enmity, in the manner of the previous Cold War. Thus debates, such as the one on Orientalism, in this new geopolitical and geo-cultural context, assumes the dimension and

proportion of an “ideological warfare”, in which, the lines between politics, ideology, scholarship, and academic objectivity become blurred (Graf, 2011, 64). In this sense, Orientalism will continue to attract attention since the idea of a “clash of civilizations” between the Arab-Islamic world and the metropolitan West, remains alarmingly prevalent. Stephan Morton states in his article “*Terrorism, Orientalism and Imperialism*” that the discourse of terror as an instance of present day colonial discourse. Yet, on the other hand many humanitarian scholars have found in Orientalism a suggestive model for trying to grasp the full imaginative geography of colonial and new colonial forms of rule (Birnard & Attwell, 2013, 4). This view shows the main Pillars of *Neo-Orientalism*. It no longer talks only about controlling the Muslim land through hard but, it reaffirms the concept of *soft Orientalism* that calls for knowing the Orient in a proper way at the same time aiming to achieve a progress in political development of the Middle East.

Before talking about the pillars, I would like to emphasize the correlation between knowledge and power as enunciated by Said and Salama. For Said, Knowledge is *an intellectual discourse* that sets a general image supporting colonial policy to dominate over the Orient, while Salama argues that knowledge is an intellectual history of misunderstanding Islam in the Western society in a way that sets into motion a cluster of notions that direct United States Foreign Policy especially post September 11th. Orientalism, like other branches of area studies, aims to understand and analyze Middle Eastern affairs in an academic milieu. In Edward Said’s view, however, the discipline of Orientalism is a crystallization of a hostile ideology. A coherent and cumulative knowledge creates *abiding ideology*¹⁴ which implies that a fixed set of principles leads policymakers inevitably and invariably to a particular course of action that may hold three notions of globalization (American Exceptionalism, Imperial projects and Hegemony) (Hunt, 2009, 210). Orientalism traces the various phases of relationship between the West and Islam, from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, through the colonial period and the rise of modern Orientalist scholarship in this context. Michael Hunt quotes Curzon and Cromer who assumed that British policies with regards to the different aspects of the Orient depended on a refined knowledge of it, this same continued up until the end of European imperial hegemony in the Orient after World War II through the emergence of US dominance. One avenue of scholarship investigates the role of religious faith and technological advantage as a source of a sense of superiority, apart from the overtly racial characterization of the

¹⁴A coherent set of notions and figures are being deeply in latent side of Western vision on the Orient. These notions are an questionable.

other to explain how ideas about Other's cultures frequently cast them in subordinate positions and in the process completely dehumanizes them. Hunt concludes that Orientalist insights have helped illuminate U.S. relations with Middle East.

Generally, scholars were influenced by some crucial factors which guided their reasons and fields of study on the Orient, some of it as follows:

- 1- Institutions that finance the scholarships.
- 2- New orientalists have built their work on cumulative knowledge.
- 3- Orientalism studies seem to be themselves a product of certain political tendencies.
- 4- Orientalism is aided by general cultural pressures that tend to make the sense of difference between the East (backward) and West (developed) more rigid.
- 5- Some scholars are agents of political institutions.

Pillars of United States Neo-Orientalism: I divide the pillars into two main categories:

- First, *Soft-Orientalism* which calls for development in Middle East, especially in political field, using soft tools to this end through International Organizations, Media and direct assistance at the bilateral level. Culturally, this type of Orientalism seeks to strengthen the notion of American Exceptionalism or the project of Americanizing the World.

- Second, *Hard-Orientalism* aims to achieve strategic goals like hegemony over economic resources of the Orient, fight the War on terror and find any opportunity to alter the existing World Order to suit the purpose of the US and present it as the protector and promoter of universal values of democracy, human rights and liberty.

The first pillar aims to look at the ways in which political development and good governance can be achieved. In this regard, Sadowski argues that the collapse of communism and the victory over Iraq sparked a wave of triumphal declaration that all viable systemic alternatives to western liberalism had been exhausted and discredited. The people of the developing countries must then acknowledge that liberal democracy is the only plausible form of governance in the modern world. Accordingly, support for democratization should be henceforth the central objective for US Diplomacy and foreign affairs. This issue is most clearly posed in the Islamic world (Sadowski, 1993, 15). During the last decade, the world has witnessed an extraordinary series of events where democratic forces

have challenged authoritarian regimes. In some cases, this trend has opened the door to the establishment of democratic governments. Yet it is important to look at the contrary picture of this quest toward achieving political development which has led to International interference in the domestic affairs of different states. I will use the example of Iraq to study this case.

Moreover, I would like to shed some light on the most important contemporary orientalist's works in Middle East socio-political context, and how they set their assumptions in this regard. Here, I do not intend to answer to this kind of theories, this task will be dedicated in the third chapter. For example, western experts argued that in Islamic societies the most important reason which caused the decline of civil society in political life is due to peculiarities of Islam. It is due to this reason that Samuel Huntington believes that the prospects for democratic development seem low. Another cluster of notions is shown in some important theories studying the relationship between societies and the political behavior in both domestic and foreign environments.

Jurgen Habermas' concept of the public sphere describes a space of institutions and practices between the private interests of everyday life in civil society and the realm of state power. The transformation of the public sphere involved private interests assuming direct political functions, as powerful corporations came to control and manipulate the media and state. His most known work to date, the *Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), Habermas voiced criticism of the process of modernization, in which he saw an inflexible direction forced by economic and administrative rationalization. Habermas outlined how our everyday life is penetrated by formal systems which are parallel to the development of the welfare state, corporate capitalism and mass consumption. John Rawls in his work, *The Law of Peoples* (1993), presents his comprehensive theory of international politics. Rawls's theory comes from the postulate that "well-ordered people are either "liberal" or "decent". In Rawls's view, liberal people have to "tolerate" what he calls "decent peoples" who differ from "liberal peoples" in that they may retain a certain state religion. Thus, the "peoples" that are contrary to what he describes as "liberal" or "decent" are classified under the term "outlaw state" or "communities which suffer under inadequate conditions" or "benevolent absolutisms", based on the circumstances of those countries. These people do not deserve the right of mutual respect and tolerance, as the case of liberal and decent peoples. Rawls's ideas on the classification of "peoples" between "liberal", "decent" (non-democratic countries friendly to the Western World) and "outlaw" or "rogue state" (enemy states of the Western world and its allies) influenced U.S. administration

division of the world, starting from 1994, and specifically during the Clinton's administration, between United States' allies, friends and the "group of rogue states," nominally: "North Korea, Iraq (at that time), Cuba, Iran and Libya. Then, it is, clear that this concept of moral and social philosophy as described by Rawls became a political justification for classifying international relations in accordance with the U.S. administration for geopolitical vision of the world.

I found the following conclusion to explain the movement of political awakening (Brzezinski term) in the Middle East since November 2011, according to Habermas and Rawls:

- *The Media, social media webs* have played a vital role in pushing the people to revolt against authority by demanding basic rights. The correlation between the modern media tools and the youth spirit became the first spark of the revolution. For that, Media is considered one of the tools of Neo – Orientalism by those who try to oppose Democracy in the Middle East, as according to Habermas.
- Inequality and absence of people in decision making process were the main reasons that encouraged them to announce their demands in public, as according to Rawls.
- We still have to exercise some apprehensions related to the western perspective on the political development in the Middle East. Considering that, the new political leaderships who are assigned authority through elections, hold visions totally different from Western ideals, in this case Rawls would consider them as “rogue states”.
- Various evolution movements within the societies will bring new directions in foreign policy and in international relations as well. So in this way, I believe that this political development in the region will bring new opportunities for Iraq to play a greater active role. Even Iraq will be affected by these developments to bring about reforms even in the domestic spheres.

I can conclude that Rawls and Habermas urged towards necessary political reforms in the Middle East to stabilize the region. But one can notice that American efforts to support political reforms are considered as a part of self-image process, because the American call for development is a reflection to their ideals and notions without taking into consideration the socio-political particularities of Arabic societies. As I mentioned, *soft-Orientalism* is a promised process that seeks to motivate Oriental people politically. This is a part of a larger project that aims to orient the world according to a single cluster of idea that would be acceptable politically, yet the cultural project of it

remains under question mark. The attention is devoted to Americanization (the first pillar). Knowledge in this area has been helpful in thinking about U.S. political ideology and has offered a fresh outsider's perspective on the USA's place in the world. Global history has been enriched with the soft way of exercising power by US and the hard questions it has raised regarding its policies in the International arena. This path affirms the US as a world changer, yet it receives continuous resistance from the rest of the world.

Michael Hunt argues that closely related to Americanization is a renewal of interest in imperialism in American thinking as well as policy practice, especially in the wake of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These operations have imagined modes of dominance that seek to rationalize undemocratic exercise of control and have sparked imperial question that even the most freedom-minded U.S. policymakers have had a difficult time accepting domination over other peoples (Hunt, 2009, 206-207). According to Scowcroft, American exceptionalism is based on human dignity for better life in which everyone ought to be like Americans. For Brzezinski, American successful society can rightfully be viewed as relevant to others, but the American way cannot be duplicated everywhere, so others have to improve themselves by their own way (Brzezinski & Scowcroft, 2008, 248). Brzezinski believes that each society has its own values and cultural history that differs from others in a way that the United States should have no power to dogmatize its cultural path. United States needs to be tolerant in its foreign policy and reconsider the notion of American Exceptionalism which divides the world into two categories: People are either Americans or are potential Americans who want to live as Americans.

I will locate the Second and third pillars in the strategic category under Hard-Orientalism, when the tarnishing general image of the Arab and Islam legitimizes the practice of hard power in the Middle East for different reasons.¹⁵ The *second* pillar is the war on terrorism; direct military interventions. The global "war on terror" has allowed western leaders to cast struggle for spreading universal

¹⁵ Taustad highlight the term of new barbarism (*The 'new barbarism' thesis implies explanations of political violence that omit political and economic interests and contexts when describing violence, and presents violence as a result of traits embedded in local cultures*) as Imaginaries of 'terrorism' and 'Arab mind' backwardness can be seen as closely connected. New barbarism and neo-Orientalist imaginaries may serve as hegemonic strategies when the production of enemy imaginaries contributes to legitimize continuous colonial economic or political projects, as can be witnessed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Taustad, 2003, 592). Hence, resistance also involves resistance to the imaginaries produced by the hegemonic power. The imaginary of the 'Arab mind', Raphael Patai in *The Arab Mind* is a telling example of this approach. Patai leans on psychological cultural explanations when he describes the stagnation and backwardness of Arabs, claiming that 'the problem' is rooted in mental configurations.

values of democracy, human rights, and good governance. In criticizing the discourse of terrorism, Edward Said does not of course deny that the acts of terrorism do not take place, rather he questions the way in which the discourse of terrorism is used by the United States and its allies to describe violent acts of resistance to imperial occupation instead of addressing the violence of imperial occupation itself. In the *Essential Terrorist*, an article published titled "Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question" (1988), Said observed how terrorism displaced Communism as public enemy number one in American public discourse, and how this elevation of terrorism in American public discourse deflected careful scrutiny of the government's domestic and foreign policies (Said, 1988, 149).

Stephen Morton in turn questions the credibility of the war on terror. He asks:

If orientalism provides the sovereign power of the colonial state with discourse of otherness to justify the suspension of the rule of civil law in times of crisis, the contemporary discourse of terrorism would seem to serve a similar function. For the contemporary postcolonial terrorist is often invoked as the cause of the expansion of US and British military power in the twenty-first century, in a way that has invoked the war in Afghanistan and the military occupation of Iraq as well as British and American political support for Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Lebanon (Morton, 2007, 37).

Thus, the war on terror is no more than a political propaganda to achieve broader strategic gains in the Middle East. But here one needs to distinguish between the republicans and the democrats in perceiving policies towards Middle East's issues. In this sense, the influence of the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party, encourage imposing 'democratic revolution' in the Middle East by armed force, is well documented. While democrats' methodology in tackling Middle East's issues pour no alternative to orientalism's findings while they only deploy more soft tools in achieving political ends in the region. The evidence became clear concerning American policies towards Iraq since 1979 which resulted by the American invasion to Iraq in 2003 under certain claims of fighting terrorism, toppling Saddam Hussein's Regime and rebuilding a state of law which respects

principles of human rights and democracy^{*}, but the driving motivation for new American endeavor in Iraq may include other perspectives and goals such as (Fouad, 2003, 3):

- 1- Modernizing the Arab world.
- 2- The fight between Arab rulers and insurgents for American concern.
- 3- USA itself has no longer believes that security could be secured in one's own land (National Security Strategy) without intervening abroad.
- 4- The battle for secular, modernist order in the Arab world is an endeavor for Arab themselves, but great power will tip the scales in favor of change.

To explore the relationship between Orientalism and American policy towards Iraq, I will shed light in the second chapter on the historical background of American policy towards Iraq in the period 1979-2011. While the fifth chapter will question the relationship between the experience of political liberalism and secularism in post-2003 Iraq and American policy; trying to understand why self-proclaimed (IS) has emerged in Iraq in the light of Rawls theory of political liberalism.

The third pillar is the strategic balance of power or spheres of influence in the Middle East. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc and indeed of the USSR itself in 1989 – 91 offered the US the opportunity to redesign the world order. United States seems not ready to abandon this order. To this end, the global strategy adopted by the administration of the G.W. Bush in response to 11/9 marked a dramatic radicalization of US unilateralism, particularly in the shape of Bush's doctrine affirming Washington's right unilaterally to mount preventive wars to eliminate potential terrorist threats; this Unilateralism represented in many respects a return to US grand strategy of the 20th century, as George Kennan the premier theorist of US foreign policy referred "thus it was essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single continental land power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian landmass"(Kennan, 1951, 5).

Alex Callinicos argues that America's pre-emptive attacks such as the invasion and occupation of Iraq must be understood in the context of grand strategy. President Bush administration was seeking

^{*}The Canadian Michael Ignatieff, a Harvard professor and human rights specialist, deployed sophisticated in an essay in January 2003 in the *New York Times Magazine*, he adopted a disaffected tone, the merits of the US empire, which he essentially described as an "empire of good". The US global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known, "The case for empire is that it has become, in a place like Iraq, the last hope for democracy and stability alike."

to use one of the main comparative advantages of the US military supremacy to perpetuate a favorable global balance of forces. So the war of Iraq seems to enhance US capacity to deny access to Middle Eastern oil to actual or potential rivals such as the European Union and China, allowing the US to entrench its strategic dominance of Western Asia and its vast energy reserves. Callinicos cited a draft of Pentagon Defense Planning Guidance document was published by the New York Times in March 1992:

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power . . . we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role (Callinicos, 2005, 603).

Some argue that the US occupied Iraq to install a government that ensures total US dominance not only on Iraq but also to control the balance of power in the whole Middle East (Herring & Rangwala, 2005, 682). Most of the Iraqis believe that US invaded Iraq for making it a strategic base to operate its regional agendas such as the containment strategy towards Iran and Syria. This assumption supports the arguments of Said when he said that, western super powers have Manifest crucial aims in dominating over the orient, drawing the political map and strategic balance of power in the Middle East for their favor. Said gave evidences of British and French policies in 20th century when they signed Sykes – Picot agreement and how it designed the area of interests for European powers and the establishment of modern Arabic countries within new political borders. Salama asserts that the United States of America has inherited the heritage of *dominance* over the Middle East from Europe and installed this ambition in its intellectual and political discourse alike.

The fourth pillar is the political dynamics in the Middle East. Here, a crucial question is being raised around American policies towards the Middle East which is: does U.S aim to draw a new political map in the Middle East? Some would refer to the project of *Greater Middle East*. At the same time this Question does not mean that the Iraqi experience post Saddam Hussein has been directed only by the US to bring such project to reality, rather national actors and conditions under domestic social-political frameworks have also played a very important role in the context of

rebuilding the political process in Iraq. To go further in exploring the potentiality of bringing these pillars to the political reality of the Middle East, the fifth chapter will tackle the debate concerning American policy towards Muslims countries, Iraq as case study, especially in the aftermath of IS crisis.

Conclusion

Political Orientalism is one of the fields and impacts of general orientalism which concerns the political atmosphere of the oriental societies. This raises the following question: "How to deal with it?" And the answer could be found only by forecasting other's attitudes, potential behavior towards essential cases, and monitoring the consequences of their domestic political process. At the same time, the general discourse of Orientalism exercises a political influence over the subject (both the Americans as consumers of Orientalism and the Muslims as the object of orientalism), having played a great role in creating the general popular perception that influences the decision making process. Orientalism as a concept does not focus just on specific geographical or cultural patterns of the orient, but also tries to create the idioms deployed by authors and the institutions behind him. Both are situated in the larger social-political structure of the West. The main shift that can be discerned in the transition from classical to contemporary orientalism is that while the former tried to dominate the orient through the exercise of hard power, the latter aims to modernize the orient in the way that engages both sides in the debate, creates a cooperation that paves a way for a common ground that is shaped in the mould of the universal project. This project legitimizes the control over the orient through the exercise of smart and soft power, since the West has the control over the knowledge and this provides it with the advantage and superiority over the orient. So in this conception all sorts of cultural differences are not discarded but they are also made within new politico-cultural conditions of global rationality. Another shift that can be discerned is that the Orientalist is no longer a mere traveler who speaks Arabic. This old definition of 'Orientalist' has been replaced by an intellectual or an expert who is a specialist and who provides observations and intellectual works on the Orient. Their knowledge can be traced and documented as vital resource in the decision making process concerning the Foreign Policy.

Another conclusion challenges the conspiracy theory concerning Orientalism. I do believe that the weakness in social and political realities in the Arab world is due to our failure in interpreting our values. This failure creates a fear about facing our heritage as Muslims or Arab in the world

civilization. But still no one can deny the western perception of which the change in the Arab world is perceived as impossible mission since Muslims cannot be detached from the Islamic peculiarities. Although a contradiction can be noticed in Orientalism findings since the Orientalists believe that the only way to changed social reality in the Arab world is through adopt and assimilating the West. This process resides in the core of the neo-orientalism discourse to dominate the orient by making the Orientals believe that there is no other alternative to westernization in the global designs. Thus, any change in the Middle East should be in favor of the western interests. One of the most serious consequences to this western exclusiveness could be the creation of a new political map to the Middle East based on the ethnic-sectarian belonging. No one can deny that Orientalism was the main cause in shifting the political reality in the Middle East towards national state in the aftermath of WW1. Even the current political map might meet some new changes due to the involvement of the United States in the region.

But the question is: for what motive Neo-Orientalism is pushing for towards the Middle East? Is it the old classic one of domination or there is new vision in dealing with the Middle East's people? Here, I think it would seek to control rather than completely dominate the orient. It would call for the perpetuation of a general image that has been set within their intellectual tradition and this has been enhanced due to the events of September 11th and the following notion of war on terror which did not make a distinction between Islam as religion or the political deployment of Islam by the terrorists. This image is a consequence of the Orientalism as a discourse of exploring the "Other". This "Other" does not always called on a foe; the image varies according to the circumstances. The correlation between "Other" and "Enemy" tries to maintain a historical continuity of the struggle between Islam and the West; this confrontation is not only between the East and the West but also is within the West itself whereby the presence of the Muslims immigration increases in the West. Oliver Roy¹⁶ argues that European Islam is not a reformed Islam because it's uncontested; this assumption may open new doors for clash or confrontation, especially within European societies. The fact that Huntington's neo-Orientalism can hold such intellectual weight at the turn of the twenty-first century has everything to do with the status of the United States in the New World

¹⁶ Roy is the author of numerous books on subjects including Iran, Islam, Asian Politics. These works include *Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah*, *Today's Turkey: A European State?* and *The Illusions of September 11*.

Order. We see instead a new version of Orientalism, one that revitalizes, in a subtler form, the insistence that fixed cultural differences must structure the organization of political power.

From this perspective, in the upcoming chapters I will map out:

- First, the effect of intellectual discourse on American strategy towards Iraq since 1979.
- Second, I will try to find out the main players in imaging Iraq in American public opinion.
- Third, I will quote the theory put forward by Salama according to which "the West writes the history in its own terms and for its own interests."

These inquiries raise the question as to which extent Iraq and United States will meet each other interests despite the tarnished image on Islam and Arabism. Because if cooperation whether on bilateral or collective level with the US is possible, then Arabs can find a path to dissolve the notorious image on them in the West. So if we are able to overcome the ideological barriers with United States then it might be possible to undermine and defeat the images created by Orientalism. But first I need to find out what kind of intellectual barriers Muslims in general and Iraqis in particular face in their relation with the West in general and America in particular. Thus, in the third chapter I will focus on western political philosophy according to which perceptions on Muslims were created. To this extent, Rawls' *Political Liberalism*, Bernard Lewis' thesis of Muslims incompatibility with democracy and Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* will be studied to shed light on change prospect in the Middle East. Furthermore, I will highlight the most important intellectual works in the American strategic thought concerning the failure of secularism and the emergence of IS in Iraq and Syria. To this end, I will focus on the most important specialists, experts on Middle East studies. They are not Orientalists in the classical sense of the word, but they perform the Orientalist' function in assembling images, solving puzzles of the Middle East politics and submitting visions about how foreign policy should be shaped and managed. The work titled "America and the World" of Brzezinski and Scowcroft gives a clear example of how these specialists effect foreign policy. This work as conversations on the future of American foreign policy, presents a survey on the critical issues that United States faces in its relationship with the rest of the world including Middle East, Arab and Islam in particular. In chapter two they have paid attention to the Iraqi case and have provided solutions to the President of United States regarding American policy and how to achieve progress in the Socio-Political situation in Iraq while in the

other parts of the book they addressed different cases in international politics like Islam, American Exceptionalism, Globalization and dignity, and war on terror. The unique goal of this effort is to improve United States' Foreign policy and to enhance its global image. In general Orientalism has two very important effects: culturally it creates a general image of Islam and Arab; and strategically it directs United States' Foreign policy concerning the Middle East issues.

Finally, it is important to explain why I chose Iraq as an object of contemporary American Orientalism? I believe that Iraq has occupied central core of American interest in the Middle East since Gulf War in 1990, even before, and after September 11th in specific. We can notice that before 2003 Iraq was linked to terrorism, despotism, tyranny and accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Iraq was also perceived as a major source destabilizing the region. It is this image that has guided the US foreign policy towards Iraq for more than a decade where it has invested soft power to legitimize its hard power which was demonstrated through its invasion of Iraq in 2003 to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein and to initiate the political project of Democratization. This project is promoted as a motivation for Arabic societies to achieve political awakening. Democratization project is mapped to lead change in the socio-political situation in the Arab World. I believe that Iraq is still important for the American strategy, and will play a crucial role in the regional politics.

The Second Chapter

How Iraq has been perceived by the United States of America before and after 2003?

This chapter aims to explore the effects that guided US policy towards Iraq before 2003 and the image on Iraq in the public sphere of the United States. To this end I have to shine the light on Iraq during Saddam Hussein regime; the kind of relationship existed between the individual and the authority. I would like to understand US policies towards Iraq in the period 1980-2003 and ask whether this policy complied with the intellectual discourse concerning Iraq in the United States. Did this policy pay attention to the domestic behavior of the regime? How far Orientalism has directed this relationship?

In the last section, I would like to cover the Iraq's image in the American public opinion post 2003. Secondly, I would ask whether such a perception creates a moral obligation in the United States to continue its commitments in Iraq and to keep it unified and on democracy track.

My methodology will concentrate on three aspects:

- The first deploys psycho-analysis method. In this regard, I am going to use Milgram's theory of *Obedience* to understand the relationship between the individual and the authority in Iraq during Saddam's regime. What are the psychological effects Saddam had installed on the Iraqi person?
- The second is a historical method according to which the chapter will exhibit the historical discourse of American policy towards Iraq since 1979.
- The third one is Salama's methodology which concentrates on how conception on Iraq has been created in America in the aftermath of the invasion. To this end, media coverage and intellectual works will be covered in the third section.

2.1 First Section: Saddam Hussein Regime, dictatorship and Obedience Process: Milgram Mechanism

*Men have sought to make a world from their own conception and to draw from their own minds all the material which they employed, but if, instead of doing so, they had consulted experience and observation, they would have the facts and not opinions to reason about.*¹⁷

¹⁷ Francis Bacon, 1620, in his book the *Great Instauration*.

This section aims to understand the atmosphere in which the Iraqi individual had been living in during Saddam Hussein regime; what are the psychological and social consequences of Saddam legacy in Iraq? How far has this legacy affected the political process and National building post-Saddam? To explain and tackle these questions the method adopted in this section is the famous Milgram Stanley paradigm of *Agentic State*. This method will hopefully help to explain the authoritarian policies and measures adopted by the regime against its own people. Furthermore, this will help us to find out both the cultural and psychological room of *Voluntary Obedience* within the Iraqi character. Despite of these aims I use this mechanism because it gives us the opportunity to analyze the structure of power and the institutional context that the regime established to strength its rule over the people. Also Milgram theory study the individual as the agent of this institutional context; and this mechanism help us to figure out the psychological and societal consequences of Saddam legacy post 2003.

Stanley Milgram's experiment suggests high rates of compliance to authority whereby there was a demonstrable proof of torture of innocent victims to a great extent (Blass, 2004). Almost everyone can be totally obedient or can resist authority pressures. It all depended on the situational variables introduced in each study (Zimbardo, 2004, 5). Philip Zimbardo used this research to demonstrate the psychological behavior and this will form the basis to understand the relationship between authority and the individual in Iraq during 24 years of Saddam ruling the country. To find the possibility of obedience in Iraqi society, we need to understand the important sociological studies on the psychological character of the Iraqi individual tackled by the most important sociologist in the modern history of Iraq, Prof. Ali Al-Wardy.

2.1.1 The agentic state (Plato, Tyranny):

Milgram tried to understand how far subject would psychologically obey to orders without ethical barriers under the claim of avoiding harm or survival; he called the society of this experiment by 'agentic state'. Here entire set of activities carried out by the subject (Individual) comes to be pervaded by the relationship to the experimenter as who attends to the instructions. This enhances the likelihood of obedience of the agent. Agentic state described by Milgram is the tyrannical state ruled by one person contrary to the general good. Plato and Sigmond Freud saw tyranny as internally imposed and sometimes willingly accepted by a population ignorant of its true

needs (Boesche, 1996, 445). This ignorance comes due to absence of inner control and unawareness of their own private interests; they have already justified their actions as the same that has been ordered by authority. But tyrannies have in fact oppressed individuals, in similar ways, in any century especially by the use of force through execution or by imposing certain general principals on the populace and to justify the actions of the tyrant.

Roger Boesche quoted Aristotle who defines Tyranny "is just that arbitrary power of an individual who is responsible to no one, and governs with view to its own advantage not to that of its subjects" ruling over unwilling subjects. While for Arendt Tyranny is that form of government that least meets human needs, and uses fear and violence to sustain their role.

According to Stanley Milgram and Plato, the characteristics of Tyranny are:

- Rule by dictator (totalitarian).
- Rule over an unwilling population.
- Arbitrary rule unrestrained by constitutional bodies or an independent judicial body.
- The rule is in the interest of the tyrant and not for the general good.

And the subject of tyrannical government is:

- Most in need.
- Least developed.
- Least mentally healthy.
- Must be isolated from one another to be powerless and incapable of political opposition.

In his theory Milgram tried to understand individual's behavior (the subject) within the agentic state (tyranny), and under what conditions can he abandon his free will to achieve the authority's goals by engaging in bad actions contrary to his ethics and lacking moral control (Milgram, 1974, 123). To understand thus he explores the following set of questions:

- What conditions govern the transition of a person from an autonomous to a tyranny state? (Antecedent).
- Once the person has transited to the tyrannical state, what behavioral and psychological properties of the person are altered? (Consequences).
- What keeps a person in the tyrannical state? (Binding factors).

First, Antecedent conditions: parental regulations are the source of moral imperatives. The aim of authority is to create a specific ethical content to be followed, in a way that the recipients are children and they have to obey instructions¹⁸. More profoundly the authority drew an Institutional setting whereby the subject learns how to function within this framework, so individual's actions regulated by the instructions that descend from the top of the hierarchical system¹⁹. Furthermore, compliance to authority has been generally rewarded, while the resistant is punished, to ensure the continuance of the hierarchy. The net result is an internalization of the set of axioms of the social order, the chief axiom being "do what the man in charge says". It is from this perspective that the authority needs to identify itself. Police and military uniforms are the most conspicuous signs of authority. The individual identifies authority by noting the absence of competing authorities, and thinks that the experimenter is the right man and should be followed.

Second question highlighted by Milgram, explains how the subject is affected as part of the authority system. Milgram argues that the free will of individual to enter the space of authority has psychological consequences, it may create a sense of commitment (*voluntary*)²⁰ and obligation which will play a part in binding the subject to the position of his role. Thereby the authority tries to contain the society by moral index to justify the sense of voluntary commitment, sometimes the authority creates external enemies to attract people and rally them around this common enemy; this was the case with Saddam Hussein Regime.

At the same time, the authority needs to use violence "coercive measures" to enforce the subject to be subordinated under *coherence* claim (when all parts of the system are functioning in harmony without opposition). In this case, obedience stops when the threat of the gun disappears. This is, unlike the case of voluntary obedience which depends on the individual sense of commitment. It's

¹⁸ Zimbardo adds that "Dispositional analyses of anti-social, or non-normative, behaviors always include strategies for behavior modification to make the deviant individuals fit better by education or therapy, or to exclude them from society by imprisonment, exile or execution. The focus on people as causes for evil then exonerates societal structures and political decision-making for contributing to the more fundamental circumstances that create poverty, marginal existence for some citizens, racism, sexism and elitism" (Zimbardo in Miller: 2004, 22).

¹⁹ Subject cannot choose a role, and he has to practice continuously from youth onwards, what the authorities dictate to him. This behavior over time becomes a habit and a part of one's nature unconsciously, and the subject does not show himself as he really is (Boesche, 1996, 45).

²⁰ When the person has learned a lot from associating and spending time with the beast, he calls it wisdom knowing nothing about the truth in which of these convictions and desires is noble or base, good or bad, just or unjust he applies all the names following the great animal opinions (Boesche R., 1996, 37).

very important for the tyrannical regime to ground its morals within the societal order²¹, because when the subject believes that the tyranny is a just order then he/ she will sacrifice for it. When the child has been raised (family/school) to believe that one man can rule forever, because he is the only saver of the general good, then the whole population has to follow him. In this context, Plato claimed that the tyrant and his city suffer from disharmony in both parts of the soul and in the classes of the city (Boesche, 1996, 28), and there is no difference between the tyrant and the subject. The overarching ideology is the perception of a legitimate source of social control, and tyranny is more than a frightening abuse of power but most lean upon a political culture that teaches us how to behave to think and feel.²² (Arendt, 1958, 42). The ideological justification is vital in obtaining obedience (for that purpose Saddam Hussein tried to get an ideological content dependent upon the patriotic duty to fight his opposition, while he moved slightly to launch his religious campaign after the second Gulf war and claimed that he was a descendent of the prophet to give to himself a religious justification).

Furthermore, results are shown by loss of responsibility: man feels responsible to the authority but feels no responsibility for the content of the actions that the authority prescribes. The subordinate person feels a sense of pride or shame depending on how adequately he has performed the actions called for by the authority under perceptions such as loyalty, duty, discipline. For a man to feel responsible for his actions, he must sense it as a duty, so actions are no longer limited by the conscience of the subject at the moment he accepted to act, no matter he did it voluntary or under fear, this process will create a culture within the society, this culture failed in inculcating *internal controls* on actions that have their origin in authority. For instance, a pilot who dropped the chemical bombs on Halabja in Kurdistan of Iraq obeyed the authority order by using chemical weapons in attacking civilians with whom he shared citizenship. He did not evaluate the goodness of this action. On the contrary he felt obliged to do his duty and considered those victims as betrayers of authority. It is so difficult to recognize the reason he obeyed this evil order, but one can argue that he might anxious of not obeying the authority; that will cost him his social position or harm his family. This kind of behavior is related to the self-image within a society and within the

²¹ See also about socialization process in: Ibid, p 36.

²² No human life not even the life of the hermit in nature's wildness is possible without a world which is directly or indirectly affected by it. H. Arendt (1958). Human conditions, 2nd edition, University of Chicago press, p42.

subject itself. He tries to get closer to his internal beliefs that also regulates his may success and may lose his soul, because a person's ego ideal can be an important source of internal inhibitory regulation to assess the consequences of his actions, but once the person shifts into the agentic state this *evaluation mechanism* is wholly absent (Boesche, 1996, 43), this shift causes harm to the mental health of the subject damaging his self-control process.

Third question is about the binding factors that keep the subject within a hierarchical structure; once people are brought into a social hierarchy there must be some cementic mechanism to endow the structure with at least minimal stability. One of the main factors affecting a subject in such a situation is the sequential nature of the action, whereby the subject tries to justify to himself what he has done so far. Thereby he goes to the end because he has no other window. Furthermore, the subject cannot break off alone as Erving Goffman (1959) pointed out that every social situation is built upon a working consensus among the participants, and once a definition of the situation has been agreed there shall be no challenge to it; disruption of the accepted definition by one participant has the character of moral transgression, and since the subject refuse to obey the authority, or reject its claim to competence a severe social impropriety is involved *punishment*. In hierarchy any attempt to alter the defined structure will be experienced as amoral transgression and will evoke anxiety. This situation will cause harm and embarrassment that many people are unable to face up and many of them find obedience a less painful alternative. This *anxiety* fears experienced by the subject are anticipatory in nature, and anxiety in social life is generated from the forbidden actions and it thereby creates an emotional barrier. In this perspective, Milgram noticed that most of the Individuals in his experiment were feared to be replaced in the position of who was receiving the electric shock, through obeying the orders they avoided the punishment that will cost them physical and social damage.

2.1.2. The character of Iraqi Individual:

One of the most important sociologists in Iraq Ali Al-Wardy spent decades analyzing the psychology of the Iraqi subject and how this subject treats the authority and society. The interesting thing is how far the theory of Al-Wardy could comply with Milgram's mechanism in explaining the psychology of obedience within the character of the Iraqi subject, how far an Iraqi subject voluntary submitted to Saddam Hussein's authority.

Al-Wardy argued that one of the most important characters of the Iraqi subject is ‘*Duplication*’ which allows the subject to adopt the dominated rules and principles in his society. In the Iraqi case most of these principles derived from tribe and religion, in which they are all contradictory. The individual in one hand has to be a perfect Muslim while on the other has to be a perfect man of his tribe. This duplication, according to Al-Wardy gives an account to the subject to justify for himself the bad actions he committed against his co-citizenship in favor of the authority and his self-interest (Alwardy, 1951, 49).

From a psychological point of view, if the conscious of the subject is not able to express his real desires because the society enforced upon him to deny these desires, then he has to forget his ideal character and has to find another one to comply with the societal conditions (socialization process). For this reason, the Iraqi subject is enforced to have two kinds of social behavior: the winner (the fighter), and the defeated (the farmer). This character refers to a high propensity towards obedience when the Iraqi individual faces a greater threat to his life or interest in a way that allows him to accept the obedience and thus to survive and avoid the danger, but he will seize any potential opportunity to resist and disobey orders of authority (Al-Jahidh, 94). The Iraqi society is a Muslim conservative society, whereby the religious clerics play a great role in preserving the traditions; most religious leaders were encouraging in obeying the authority. The holy Qur’an mentions in one of its chapters: ‘*obey God, the Prophet and those in charges*’²³. Most of the religious leaders interpret this text depending upon their own interests which mostly favor the political elite. This text does not suggest that Muslims have to obey leaders and follow them without any control or check over the goodness of their actions. The authority deployed such quotations to justify power and coherence to control over the populace by creating a moral periphery that stands in tune with actions. Such justificatory process aims to increase the space of voluntary actions.

In the absence of moral supervision, we can expect that the Iraqi individual tends to his own desires, no matter how far they comply with moralities. Sometimes he resists these values when he is out of authority control (religious and political authority) (Al-Wardy, 2007, 72).

²³ This is not an official translation (author's own translation), Qur’an, Surat Al-NAJIM.

Saddam Hussein Regime (Psychology of Obedience):

According to Ali Al-Wardy the Iraqi subject has shown a great tendency to obey Saddam's authority for many reasons that comply with Milgram's mechanism:

- First, the Iraqi subject was totally under fear and anxiety because of the coercive measures taken by the authority over unwilling people; these measures included killing and exile without trials.²⁴

Iraqis did not enjoy free speech or could not criticize the Ba'ath Party due to the presence of such threats; the subjects merely had to obey orders without thinking about the result of their actions.²⁵

“The Baath have saddled Iraq with two kinds of tyranny,” writes Kanan Makiya in *Republic of Fear*, 1989, “the despot and his means of violence on the one hand, and his bureaucracy on the other.” As to the first of these, Saddam rules over his closest aides with the same brand of terror that he applies on the Iraq's populace. Iraq's guns, however, have mostly been reserved for use on its citizens. “Saddam Hussein exists in every corner, every place, every eyebrow and every heart in Iraq,” (Kaplan & Kristol, 2003, 22). Lawrence Kaplan puts the argument straight to record by quoting Human Rights Watch reported in 1998 that Iraq had more unresolved “disappearances” than any other United Nations member state, over sixteen thousand, according to the U.N. official reports. In recent years, several reports of mass executions of adult males have been revealed. On the contrary, Baghdad charged that the Kurds, like the Shiites, had aided the Iranian war effort. For this sin, the Kurds became the first ethnic group, since the Holocaust, to be gassed by their own government. The Kurds have put the total figure of dead closer to 200,000. Whatever the number, this much is evident that Saddam's “Al-Anfal” campaign reached near-genocidal proportions.

- Second reason, is the symbolic domination which aimed to glorify the commander and his personality, in which most of poet, drama, cinema and literally productions concentrated on Saddam's wisdom and courage (Al-Tayee, 2008, 75). During Saddam Hussein's regime the authority controlled the media, there were no private televisions and in the whole of Iraq there were only two TV channels whose main job was to broadcast Saddam Hussein's words and meetings. The process of through which the Arab leaders feed individuals through television proceeds somewhat as follows: with its powerful psychological impact on viewers, television contributes to the construction of values and creates likelihood that such values will be exhibited in action.

²⁴ Watch youtube documentary film on Saddam Hussein regime: Saddam Hussein terror and Iraq, [Http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=igmQ57Twcw8](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=igmQ57Twcw8). June 15, 2014.

²⁵ See also: Dr. Alimara Asaad (2012). *Obedience and Compliance*, Swedish Support Studies center, Psychological Studies.

Michael Nehme asserts that individuals construct their values by interpreting the social and political dimensions of their leaders' comments and speeches. This provides experiences that form an individual's knowledge. From this knowledge, the individual determines what behaviors are valued to his specific group (Nehme, 2003, 97). The core of this culture was Saddam; Saddam is Iraq, when he speaks Iraq was speaking, he runs the state according to his desires.²⁶ The essential consequence of this culture was the maximization of the voluntary behavior atmosphere both in the subject's conscious and in the society. The subject could only go beyond the authority by risking being a target of it. This voluntary spirit lets the subject define himself as being part of the authority structure, and his destiny is related to its existence. It is clear that the Saddam Regime was successful in this aim. What Iraqi society has witnessed post 2003- after the downfall of the regime- provides credibility to this, many subjects still believe in Saddam Hussein as a leader and a figure to be idolized even after a decade of his death. Many citizens aimed to be in his position and dreamt of becoming him.

Freud was aware of the contrast between the social and narcissistic levels of the individual's state of being. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* Freud explained that:

In the individual mental life, someone else was invariably involved, as model, object, or opponent. Individuals merge in the group to lose their sense of limits; this takes place within what is psychologically known as the principle of direct induction of emotion. The individual loses his control of criticism, a feeling intensified by mutual interaction. Freud adds to these characteristics the pattern of lacking in self-consciousness, devoid of self-respect and a sense of responsibility (Quoted in Nehme, 2003, 99).

This applies to masses in relation to their leaders, where people put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal.

-The third reason is how the authority distinguishes itself towards the subject. In brief the authority was only Saddam, in which all aspects of social life were pervaded and politicized by the political leadership and an extensive security apparatus working in the name of the totalitarian ideology. Therefore, the subject had no choice or alternatives in competing with the authority and had no

²⁶ See also: Etheredge, L. (2011). *Middle East, Region in Transition, Iraq*. Britannica Educational Publishing. P54.

tools to resist it. Economically everything was controlled by the authority; either the individual cooperates with it to get good positions within the social structure or he would be punished.²⁷ Saddam who had never served in the Iraqi army or had no culture in military affairs, in January 1976, got the rank of general in the Iraqi army and was shown in public wearing the military uniform, carrying on his chest the honor medals. These means provided him with opportunities to exercise control over the Iraqi army much more than before (Baram, 1989, 471).

2.1.3. Saddam's political biography:

Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 to a poor peasant family near Tikrit, some hundred miles north of Baghdad. Hajj Ibrahim, his stepfather, reportedly was abusive psychologically and physically to young Saddam. The failure of the mother to nurture and bond with her infant son and the subsequent abuse at the hands of his stepfather would have profoundly wounded Saddam's emerging self-esteem, producing what has been identified as "*the wounded self*" (Post, 2003, 336).

Tulfah²⁸ tutored the young Saddam in the blend of socialism, and pan-Arab nationalism that distinguished Baathist politics. A pamphlet that Tulfah authored, "Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews and Flies (Kaplan & Kristol, 2003, 15-16). Saddam, who later became a devoted fan of The Godfather, would visit Ba'ath opponents and slaughter them along with their families. At age twenty, inspired by Nasser, Saddam joined the Arab Baath socialist party in Iraq and quickly impressed party officials with his dedication. The twenty-two-year-old Saddam was called to Ba'ath party headquarters and given the mission to lead a five-man team to assassinate Abdul-kareem Qassem. The mission failed, reportedly because of a crucial error in judgment by Saddam. But Saddam escaped to Syria. During his exile, Saddam went to Egypt to study law. He returned to Iraq after 1963, when Qassem was ousted by the Baaths, and was elected to the National Command. Michel Aflaq, designated Saddam Hussein as his successor (Post, 2003, 337-338). Within nine months of taking power, all Baathists were expelled from the government. Saddam was then put in charge of the party's paramilitary arm and instructed to plan for another

²⁷ See also: Farouk – Sluglett, Marion / Sluglett, Peter, 1990, 1991: Iraq since 1958, from revolution to the dictatorship. London. p227.

²⁸ **Khayrallah** was Saddam's Uncle. He was to become not only Saddam's father figure but also his political mentor. He tutored his young charge in his view of Arab history and the ideology of nationalism and the Baath party that envisaged the creation of a new Arab nation that would defeat the colonialist and imperialist powers and achieve Arab independence, unity, and socialism. Saddam prepared as a product of Occidentalism, ignored that his political identity is an artificial product of Orientalism, for serving his dreams of control (Post, 2006, P336).

takeover the following year. On September 4, 1964, the day before the coup was to take place the police uncovered the plot and sought Saddam's arrest. In July 1966, Saddam escaped and assumed his political activity with The Baathists; they were going to attempt one more violent takeover of the government, and Saddam would again play a key role (Shield, 2005, 29). The first act of the new regime was to establish the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which assumed supreme authority. The RCC elected al-Bakr president of the republic, and he invited an-Nayif to form a cabinet. Saddam was appointed vice-president. "Saddam's relatives in al-Awja were throwing their newly ascendant kinsman's name around, seizing farms, ordering people off their land," writes Mark Bowden in the Atlantic Monthly article "Tales of the Tyrant" (Bowden, 2002). To move its agenda forward, the Baath regime launched a political campaign that harped on themes of disloyalty. Suddenly the government was on the lookout for what it called "harmful pre-revolutionary values and practices." These included exploitation, social inequities, religious loyalties, apathy, and lack of civil spirit. In addition, the Ba'ath's ruling group was bound by close family and tribal ties. On July 16, 1979, President al-Bakr resigned, and Saddam Hussein officially replaced him as president of the republic, secretary general of the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, chairman of the RCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces.

Saddam Hussein's vision and perceptions of future showed clear evidences of becoming a dictator²⁹. At this point, though, the regime was still not committed to a purely sectarian policy, and indeed it never officially adopted one. In fact, the reality was the opposite, when the discrimination based on two folds, tribal and ethnic barriers, stood to political loyalty to Saddam. Sami Zubaida refers to this phenomenon as "Crony Capitalism": Opportunities, loans, licenses and contracts were distributed in accordance with logic of allegiance. First evidence could be seen in 1970/71 when around 60,000–70,000 Failis (Shi'- Kurds) were unceremoniously expelled and their properties expropriated. Then again in 1980/81, around 200,000 Shi'is were declared aliens and deported to Iran (Abdullah, 2006, 33).

2.1.3.1 The president Saddam, New era of Terror and violence

²⁹ "Haneen Group", the terrorist organization founded by Saddam Hussein personally in the mid-sixties of the last century, was developed after the advent of the Ba'ath to power again (Miller & Mylroie, 1991, 107).

After the resignation of al-Bakr³⁰ in July 1979, Saddam Hussein replaced him as the president of the state; he captured in his hand all the authorities. Saddam Hussein announced his intention to celebrate the occasion of his appointment as president of the republic, and approximately one thousand cadres of the Ba'ath Party were invited to attend this celebration. But in fact he held a partisan court³¹. Saddam read out the names included in the list called "list of the damned" the names of the conspirators as he proclaimed, including leading members of the party and members of the government as well as five members of the Revolutionary Command Council. Saddam decided for the death penalty of 22 of the accused and the orders had to be executed by the Ba'ath Party members themselves. He also ordered some of the leading members of the party and the government to implement the death penalty against their colleagues (Makiya, 1989, 4). To compare Saddam Hussein to Hitler Kanan Makiya in his book, *Republic of Fear*, asserts that such an idea, in its various details, did not find a place within Hitler's mind. Saddam imposed his actions on the party members and made them part to his evil actions. Makiya in his book tried to understand the space for individual rights during Saddam's regime especially by the institutions of violence, as he called it (Amn institutions: police and intelligence), and how this feeling of fear and anxiety would diminish sharply the subject's dignity and enforce him to obey the authority to avoid embarrassment and save his family honor (Khalil, 1991, 104).

Continuing this policy, in Algiers on March 6, 1975, Saddam signed an agreement with the Shah that recognized a number of Iranian boundary claims. This agreement ended Iranian assistance to the Kurds and insured his control and brutal policies against his own people (Shield, 2005, 41). But this agreement did not stand for long, Saddam found out that Iraq was a prime target of Khomeini's revolution in Iran; he repeatedly urged Iraqis to overthrow the "atheist" Ba'athist regime (Abdulah, 2006, 35). The war waged in 1980, lasting for eight-year period that ended in stalemate and left a million people dead. During Gulf war, at a cabinet meeting, Saddam asked his ministers to candidly give their advice, and the minister of health suggested that Saddam temporarily step down and resume the presidency after peace had been established. Saddam reportedly thanked him for his candor and ordered his arrest. This incident had a powerful impact on the other ministers who were unanimous in their insistence that Saddam remain in power. Thus

³⁰ The first president of Iraq after the revolution of Baath party was taking place in 1968.

³¹ Watch on youtube: Saddam Hussein, Salat Al-khold: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1-f-A3Pgcs>. [Accessed on 17 June, 2014].

Saddam, due to his own actions, was deprived of the controls of wise counsel from within his leadership circle (Post, 2003, 344). Saddam brutal policies had crucial implications some on the public sphere and others on the private sphere. Abdullah asserts that Saddam aggressive policies whether on domestic or foreign politics made whole generations reached adulthood without knowing the meaning of peace. This had a massive psychological impact on the population. Entire generations grew disturbingly, accustomed to dealing with death, suffering and the breakdown of ethical values (Abdulah, 2006, 46).

On the foreign policy level Saddam Hussein developed a new, Iraqi-centered and imperial brand of Pan-Arabism. This message sought to legitimize political maneuvers that clearly contradicted Arab solidarity or seemed to detach Iraq from the struggle against Israel. The invasions of Iran and Kuwait are two examples of such maneuvers. Another ideal professed by the new regime was secularism, or the separation of the mosque and the state. After the government "Islamized" much of its rhetoric during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War, Saddam Hussein led the Ba'ath party in introducing some Islamic principles into the Iraqi legal system. During the war, Saddam's rhetoric was fully Islamized in a way unparalleled by any other Arab secular leader. Amazia Baram finds out that Saddam presented himself as the modern-day champion of Islam (mujaddid al-din) (Baram, 2000, 10).

Baram adds that Saddam was seeking legitimacy through Islamizing his rhetoric. But a similar and perhaps more effective strategy, was the selective return to tribal values. What was in common between his Islamization and tribalism is sectarianism. Hence, he introduced some of young men of Saddam's tribe into key positions in the security institutions. Tribal loyalty, combined with meaningful social and economic benefits, creates a strong bond. On the contrary Thabit Abdullah (2006, 54) finds out that the majority of Ba'ath party comrades and even of general security services were Shi'as, due to the recruit policy of urban population in a way that intensified the aura of fear and terror. To clarify Abdullah findings one needs to know that Saddam perceived Shiites as potential danger, thus, to encounter this threat two policies were essential: deploying coercive measures and extending the scope of voluntary obedience. At the beginning of Baathism' era they enforced either anti-tribalism or anti-sectarianism (al-ta'ifiyya), policies. Semi-covert support for both tribal shaykhs and tribal identity in general appeared explicitly for the first time in the Ba'athi

media in the last stages of the Iran-Iraq War and the interwar period (1988-90). The reason for this ideological volte-face may have been twofold (Baram, 1997, 7):

-First, the Arab tribal identity of the Iraqis could serve as yet another buffer between the Iraqi and the Iranian Shi'ia.

-Second, the regime was in great need of support in the tribal country- side.³²

Along with this tribal policy, Abbas Kadhim sees that Saddam also emphasized a sectarian discrimination, "Saddam used all the aggressive tools against the members of Al-hawza in Al-najaf, the sanctity Province in Iraq, by killing, chasing, exiling against leaders especially Al-imam Al-khoyee and Mohamed Baqir Alsader, the most important modern philosopher in Iraq (Khadim, 2013, 46). It must also be noted that the Ba'thists had succeeded in the past in extracting collaboration from prominent figures in the Mujtahid establishment and recruited a number of agents within the lower levels of the clergy, through the use of coercive and non-coercive means. This was done to ensure a control and justification from within the religious discourse. To this end Saddam launched his religious campaign on these pillars: 1- all his speeches started with "Bi ism Allah {in the name of Go}", and finished it by the phrase "Allah Akbar –{god is the greatest}"; 2- Claimed that he was a descendent of Imam Ali, Cousin of the Prophet Mohammed and his son in Law. 3- He also was known to his people by many names—the Anointed One, Glorious Leader, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, field marshal of the armies, doctor of Iraq's laws.

But the regime's deep legitimacy crisis what somehow related to: the lack of majority rule, in Iraq the single largest community - the Shiites - has never had a leading role in policy making; and the growing atrocity committed by Saddam regime against the people. For instance, between 1987 and 1988, a ten-part genocide operation, *ul Anfal*, cost the lives of 120,000-180,000 Kurds. Between March and April 1991, an estimated 40,000-60,000 Iraqis were killed during the suppression of the anti-regime *intifada*. The number of Iraqis living in exile is estimated at 3 million (Alkhafaji, 2000, 66-70).

³² For more information about Saddam's tribal policy, see also: Dodge Toby, 2003, *Inventing Iraq the Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, Columbia University Press, PP: 157-172.

2.1.4. The 1991 uprising '*Intifadhah*':

Saddam Hussein's record of brutally suppressing even mild dissent is well-known. When the March 1991 uprising confronted his regime with the most serious internal challenge it had ever faced, government forces responded with atrocities on a predictably massive scale. Thousands of civilians lost their lives; the regime used helicopters to attack unarmed civilians as they fled the cities. The fate of thousands of Kurds and Shiites who were seized during the suppression of the uprising remained unknown. Over 100,000 Kurds and Shiites who fled conflict zones remain displaced inside Iraq, and another 70,000 civilians were in refugee camps in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. They have yet to return home since they are afraid or because their homes have been destroyed. The Shi'a holy cities of Karbala and al-Najaf, from which many of these Iraqis fled, were under tight military control and largely closed to independent observers who could monitor rights conditions. Religious life was sharply restricted. In the remote marshes along the southern border with Iran, thousands of Shiites who fled during the uprising lack adequate food, hygiene and medical care and were at risk of Iraqi military operations in the area. The suppression of the uprising resulted in the exodus of over ten percent of the country's population. Iran received 1.4 million Iraqis, Turkey 450,000, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait received together some 35,000, while smaller numbers escaped to Syria and Jordan. Kurds, who constituted more than 90 percent of those who fled, now account for less than a quarter of those remaining abroad.³³ The chief factor in the repatriation of Kurds is the existence of a zone inside Iraq that is controlled by Kurdish rebels and enjoys a measure of Allied military protection. Shi'a refugees, lacking any comparable safe haven in the south, are less eager to reenter Iraq. Some specialists try to explain the reasons that motivated Saddam followers to obey his cruelty in oppressing the *Intifada*.

Wendell Steavenson (in Christopher, 2009, 221) in conversations with the former regime's members addressed the question: "Why? Why did you go along with the cruelty?" The answer was: "What could I do?" "It was like this!" "This was usual then!"

Zimbardo explains that social order has a deep-rooted psychological affect on the individual's behavior. Zimbardo's mechanism explained why Saddam comrades went along with cruelty. Zimbardo asserts that:

³³ Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath'. June 1992 by Human Rights Watch, Printed in the United States of America. Available at: <https://books.google.iq/books?id=zWVRzLncwIoC&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=> [Accessed on 6 June, 2013].

Any environmental, social conditions that contribute to making some members of society feel that they are anonymous, that no one recognizes their individuality and thus their humanity, make them potential assassins and vandals, a danger to the personal property (Zimbardo, 1975, 35).

So, how can subjects survive if violence and threat of execution and persecution is a daily life probability? This is compounded by one's own participation in the reign of terror. The officers were basically deliberating about whether to resist or collaborate with the regime; they had to think about their selves and families before taking any decision.

This explains why citizens and soldiers, as shown in the photo below, were killing their follow kin and citizens. But were they acting voluntarily while doing so? The uprising only happened after 23 years of Ba'ath party and 12 years of Saddam Hussein ruling. Therefore, the soldiers would have been saturated with the regime's ideas. It is very important to understand the ethnic diversity of the Iraqi society because the regime used this diversity for its own purpose. For instance, Saddam claimed that this uprising was receiving support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the process turning the rebels as being collaborators of the enemy, thus evoking the threat to the nation itself which found purchase with the soldiers defending the regime. Furthermore, Saddam's handpicked commanders made the poor soldiers obey their command without giving due time or the freedom to understand the consequences of their actions. Thereby the rush made the soldier blind to see the truth, either to obey or to be punished of death penalty.

One more motive to obey that; the subject (Soldier) believed that the opponent cannot reach him while he is closed and within the authority area, the contrary was true, for the authority was very easy to punish him without hesitation. Political scientist James Q. Wilson and criminologist George Killing outlined their novel theory about the twin causes of crime in a popular Atlantic Monthly article (March, 1982). "Crime is a product of individual criminals and situational conditions of public disorder. When people see abandoned cars in the streets, graffiti everywhere and broken windows not covered, it is a sign that no one really cares about that neighborhood. That perception of public disorder or disarray then lowers inhibitions against further destructive or criminal actions of those who are not ordinarily criminal" (quoted in Zimbardo, 2004, 6). According to Wilson this soldier in the photo below believed that his actions had no legal or moral consequences because the

authority itself authorizes him to kill under its name. And as long the regime will last as much he (the subject) guarantees no legal or moral responsibilities after him.



A member of the Iraqi army was firing on rebels.³⁴

To conclude this section, I would like to examine firstly how Saddam successfully enlarged the space of voluntary action within the self-esteem of the subject (Iraqi Individual); second, Saddam as a product of Occidentalism.

Concerning the first, an examination of the record of Saddam Hussein's leadership of Iraq for the past 34 years reveals a judicious political calculator, who was by no means irrational, but was dangerous to the extreme.³⁵ According to Plato most of the cognitive contradictions within the tyranny belong to the personality of the tyrant itself who is literally unbalanced and suffers from conflicting desires within his soul and cannot find lasting satisfaction, thus he is always seeking for his desires no matter how far he harms the general good. In the case of Saddam Hussein, he had a difficult childhood as he was raised in a village with low literacy levels, he did not have parental control which allowed the streets to shape his character and it endorsed the mantra "who is more powerful who impose his desires on his friends". The first several years of life are crucial to the development of healthy self-esteem; the first years produced in him what has been identified as "the wounded self."

This unhealthy mentality of Saddam was one of the reasons for distortions of the values within the society which affected badly the moral content of the subject. Nehme Michael asserts that:

³⁴From Wikipedia, the freeencyclopedia: uprising in Iraq in 1991.

³⁵See more in: Jerrold M. Post and Amatzia Baram (2003). Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam: Until Operation Iraqi freedom, in: Barry R. Schneider, *know the enemy"profiles of the adversary leaders and their strategic cultures'*, 2nd ed, p163.

Irrational aggression by individuals or groups against an alleged opponent could be explained by fear. In addition to biological and love needs, people have a symbolic appetite for ideas and suitable actions and reactions to reconcile their fears. Rational and irrational fears are like an obsession or a paranoid system; they are translated into method whereby normal feelings of sympathy are denatured, numbed, or killed so that people can act with cruelty toward others. However, concepts like mania, paranoia, omnipotence, neurosis, and psychosis should be applied with caution to political fears of groups and societies (Nehme, 2003, 86).

Nehme added that from a psychological perspective, structural interaction has an impact on the minds of individuals, and that occurs in all societies, even the most primitive ones. All civilizations have been accompanied by a heightening of the superego development as a consequence of structural interaction. To this extent, Milgram's finding that 26 out of 40 participants complied with directives to continue administering painful bears some similarity to the Iraqi officers' plight. However, the officers contended that refusal to execute innocent civilians could result in their own deaths or harm to their families. Similar to Milgram's participants who during their debriefing interviews laughed while earnestly volunteering that they were not sadistic, the former Baathists whom Steavenson interviewed smiled nervously while emphasizing that they had no choice other than to inflict torture (Searight, 2010, 4). It seems that those officers had an idea of the cruelty of their actions, but they don't care about it. As Ali Al-Wardy explains, most of the individuals suffer from *duplication* according to which they were motivated to ignore any moral or normative standards before the threat they face. Their recognition of the cruelty does not stop them of practicing it. One would argue how this explains the voluntary commitment? Claiming that coercive measures or violence are not motives of voluntary role. Actually, the voluntary commitment of the individual towards the authority may not appear in the early stages of the relationship. It would take time for the individual to be part of the hierarchical system. Voluntary obedience may be initiated within the ethical content of the individual through the symbolic domination of the authority over the populace; this process by institutional structure over time grounds in the societal order the justification of the authority. From this perspective, it is difficult for the individual to refuse or challenge such principles, at the same time most of the people abandon their ego in favor of the authority. But one would argue why some people stood up against Saddam's regime in 1991? According to the theories of both Milgram and Ali Al-Wardy, there is a room to disobey the authority. Milgram explains that the individual may disobey in the case of coercion obedience. Ones

the institutional structure drops down the individual will challenge the authority. In the case of the voluntary obedience the individual will continue obeying the authority because he believes that it is the right choice for the general good. Al-Wardy explains the disobedience through psychological words. He emphasizes that no matter how strong the authority is there is always a room for disobedience within the character of the Iraqi individual. According to al-Wardy, the circumstances according to which the individual behavior is shaped.

Finally, it can be concluded that Milgram's mechanism could explain how the Iraqi subject was enforced to obey the authority either under anxiety or voluntarily explaining the symbolic domination of the society. It is for this reason, Saddam adopted an attractive rhetoric for both the audiences where domestically or abroad. For the domestic arena (he was the leader, the father, the strongest, the believer), while for abroad (he was the believer, the commander of necessity, the principles man). For offering a better explanation Zimbardo created a model that combines Plato and Milgram mechanisms to explain the mutual affect among the subject and the society in the process of obedience. The more one learns about the Iraqi dictator, the clearer it becomes that he epitomizes—no less than Osama bin Laden— sheer malice. "Here, after all, is a man who has imposed a violent, totalitarian regime on the people of Iraq. He has imprisoned, tortured, gassed, shot and bombed thousands of his own subjects and launched wars of aggression against his neighbors" (Kaplan & Kristol, 2003, 14).

Some labeled Saddam as a "madman of the Middle East" and a "megalomaniac" but Post Jerrold Found out that "there is no evidence that Saddam was suffering from a psychotic disorder. He acted only after judicious consideration, and could be extremely patient; indeed, he used time as a weapon. While psychologically he was in touch with reality, he was often politically out of touch with it. In pursuing his goals, Saddam used aggression instrumentally. He used whatever force was necessary, went to extremes of violence, even to the extent of including the use of weapons of mass destruction. He had a strong paranoia. Post conceptualized this paranoia as *malignant narcissism*, this was the personality configuration of the destructive charismatic, who unifies and rallies his downtrodden supporters by blaming outside enemies. Saddam Hussein genuinely saw himself as one of the great leaders of history (Post, 2003, 345). While he was driven by dreams of glory, his political perspective was narrow and distorted. He was able to justify extremes of aggression on the basis of revolutionary needs. For Post Saddam Hussein was a ruthless political calculator who goes

to whatever lengths necessary to achieve his goals. He continued to cast the conflict as a struggle between Iraq and the United States willing to defy the imperialist United States.

Hermann asserts that Saddam Hussein is unique sample of leaders, and his focus was always to accomplish his own goals. Indeed, in Saddam's eyes, he was the country. Hermann continues his explanation that Saddam was likely to internalize threats to the state as threats to his power and prestige. As a consequence, he was likely to take most actions on his own without consultation (Hermann, 2003, 377-378). Margaret Hermann explained that leaders with Hussein's motive scores (moderate in task focus and leaning toward high in the need for power) often display: a certain charismatic charm but are highly Machiavellian in their use of this charm; can be very good to those who are loyal to them and facilitate them in retaining power. So, he was irrational, totalitarian in policy making process, and unjust toward his own people, on the other hand he was charm and nice to his supporters.

Baram may suggest why some tribes did or did not join the Intifada. A relevant reason for tribes' remaining on the sideline may be the fact that the regime had been harping on Tribal-Arab chords, warning against Iranian designs on Iraq and the Arabs. These tribes saw themselves as Arab, retaining their old Arab cultural traits. This Arab pedigree and culture was no less important to them than their Shi'a affiliation (Baram, 1997, 10). Somehow it can be, argued that he was just in distributing cruelty over the whole population regardless of their ethnicity or sector, but at the same time he was focusing on people in the South and the Kurds in the North since they were more dangerous to his prestige and power. Therefore, he depended on family loyalty to protect his throne, at the same time tried to convince others that this tribal policy was adopted for the general good. The duplication in his character was so magnificent and clear, he pretended to be secular while using religion in his political agenda, he tried to be a modern leader but in truth he was dependent on the tribe to run the State. It can be concluded that he was a person without morals and principles; his loyalty was just for himself and his needs.

Hence, according to the theories of both Milgram and Al-Wardy, Iraqi people had shown a strong tendency to obey Saddam's regulations, under certain conditions of fear, anxiety, and necessity.

Regarding the Second point, many opponents characterize the regime as fascist, while its supporters invoke its Pan-Arab and anti-American rhetoric as evidence of an independent nationalist stance. Saddam repeatedly, in his speeches and actions, tried to show both Arab and Muslim world that he was "*the commander of necessity*" to face the imperialism of United States of America. He was a

product of Occidentalism since the early years of his political career; he was raised under such claims against the West. Therefore, Occidentalism was a principle tool for Saddam propaganda. This is quite evident from the many speeches of his where his rhetoric is full of hatred and aggression towards the West in general and USA in particular. He described them as "The Evils", "Enemy of God". In addition, his rhetoric was addressed towards the Arab and the Muslim World. First, by mentioning "Allah Akbar" god is great in all his speeches. Second, he had repeatedly mentioned these phrases "Viva Palestine, an Arabic Free Land" and "Viva Arabic Nation".

But the question remains that if he was against orientalism then how could he stick to the modern map of Iraq which is a product of the Orientalism? He was totally devoid of morals and principles; he collaborated with the USA during the Gulf War, they provided him with weapons to kill Muslims across the borders. But later it was the same USA which became his worst enemy.

In a few words the Iraq history during Saddam Hussein Regime is:

(Coup d'état and violent takeover the power, "AL-Khold Sala" when he murdered his follow colleagues in the Ba'ath party, the Gulf war lasted for 8 years, he assassinated his political opponents, ethnic and sectarian discrimination, tribal policy and family reign, breaching human rights and mass graves, the invasion of Kuwait and second Gulf War, chapter Seven of UN charter and Sanctions, economic collapse and embargo, the third Gulf War 2003). This was a history full of aggression and violence. Saddam's main goal was to assure his prestige and to maintain control over the state.

2. Second Section: United States' Policy towards Iraq (1979-2003)

This section will explore the historical background of the United States policy towards Iraq before 2003. What are the main features of this policy, the main factor that guided it and the main key players of policy making? This section is divided into four parts; each one covers an administration's policy starting from Regan to the second Bush. This section will also explore whether US's policy had used Orientalism language during this period or not.

2.2.1. The prologue of Iraqi-American cooperation:

Starting with President Truman, American administrations used Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Twin Pillars of the Gulf, to contain Soviet ambitions. Nothing in its foreign policy vision prepared the US administration for the crumbling of the shah's regime in Iran. Washington watched helplessly the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini on February 1, 1979. On November 4, a group of Khomeini followers seized the American embassy in Teheran, and turned the diplomats into hostages for the subsequent 444 Days. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, was worried about the imbalance in the Gulf. Iraq, one of the most radical regimes in the Middle East, was a staunch ally of the Soviet Union. Crucially, both superpowers had a common concern: the 'export' of what was perceived as a subversive form of aggressive Islamic 'fundamentalism' to excite Islamic communities in nearby regions of the Soviet Empire (Milton & Hinchcliffe, 2001, 93). The general assumption among policymakers was that U.S. interests lay in keeping either side (Iraq - Iran) from building up too much strength or becoming a preeminent military power in the region. No one in Washington was under any illusions about Saddam Hussein dictatorial and repressive rule (McAlister, 2001, 243). Paul D. Wolfowitz, deputy assistant secretary of defence for regional planning and Howard Teicher, a junior analyst, argued that Iraq was the real danger in the region. Wolfowitz wrote that "Iraq has become military pre-eminent . . . and may in the future use its military force against such states as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia" (Timmerman, 1991, 76-77).

In April 1980, Brzezinski gave a green light to the new policy of rapprochement with Iraq. Saddam was seen as a stabilizer in a volatile Region, especially after the Iranian revolutionaries seized 50 American hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Iran. At this time, the citizens of the United States were against Iran, not Iraq. Shield (2005, 39) finds that Saddam was strongly pro-Arab, his modernization programs, his stress on law and order, even his taste for tailored, Western style suits created an image of a "modern Middle Easterner."

As a consequence, to political dynamics in the region Saddam tore up Algeria treaty (1975) in public, and the Baathists prepared to go to war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union alarmed at Iranian radicalism, remained neutral during the early phase of the war. During this period Iraq was receiving strong support (financially and military) from the Arab Gulf countries, Jordan and Egypt (Abdulah, 2006, 39). Washington declared itself to be neutral in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, but many in the administration were not displeased with the prospect of a costly struggle between Iran and Iraq. Iraqi behaviour was potentially even more worrisome. In a

psychological profile of the dictator, Baram (1980) found Saddam Hussein to be a high risk taker prone to miscalculations. Perle and Wolfowitz reiterated the view that in spite of its revolutionary ardour, Iran was less of a danger than a nuclear armed Iraq. Therefore, the Osiraq facility was destroyed on June 7, 1981. Early in the year 1982, President Hosni Mubarak told Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel that if Iraq lost the war, the Middle East would be “dangerously destabilized” (Seliktar, 2008, 32-33). A National Security Council report concluded that the Iraqi military would collapse without American help. Thus, Ofira Seliktar argues, the new policy, which also urged reestablishment of diplomatic relation, was strongly supported by the “Arabists” in the State Department (Richard Murphy, the assistant secretary of state for Near East and South East Asia, William Eagleburger, the head of U.S. interest section in Baghdad, Ambassador Richard Fairbanks, and Richard Armitage, assistant secretary for international security affairs in the Department of Defence) Saddam Hussein’s image as a moderate leader made him appealing to governments in the West and the Middle East. As a result, in early 1982, the United States provided civilian and military aid to Iraq in the hopes of countering the spread of the Iranian-backed Islamic revolution. Bruce Jentleson asserts that Arabists in American administration found strong position in the Reagan policy which took Iraq off the list of terrorist states. On 26 November, 1984, Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister of Iraq visited Washington and the two countries agreed to resume their diplomatic relations. On 26 April 1985, the US nominated David Newton as its first ambassador to Iraq since the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In 1983 and 1984 Iraq was granted a credit of almost \$1 billion from the US government to purchase US foodstuffs, in addition to \$500 million from the Export-Import Bank (Jentleson, 2010a, 44). In 1986, William Colby, a former director of the CIA, stated that ‘it is in the interest of the United States, the Western world and even the Soviet Union that Iraq successfully withstands the Iranian assault’ (Halabi, 2009, 84).

To the Americans, the prospect of Iranian Revolutionary Guards marching all the way to Baghdad, threatening Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and thereby controlling the oil of this strategic region, was a scenario of nightmarish proportions. The ideal outcome, from this perspective, was for both sides to grow weaker with neither achieving a clear victory (Abdulah, 2006, 39). To balance the sides, US corporations, such as Hewlett-Packard and Bechtel, were encouraged to sell equipment which was later used in the making of chemical and biological weapons, and in the development of the nuclear program. Throughout the war, the United States turned a blind eye to

Iraq's increasing use of internationally banned chemical weapons. Encouraged by this new American commitment, Iraq launched a series of attacks, including a particularly bloody battle to take back Fao in which mustard gas was used extensively, resulting in a complete rout of the Iranians. The good news was that Iran did not join the USSR's camp. But the US feared that Iran could be vulnerable to Soviet intervention, especially during the autumn of 1980 (Brzezinski 1983, 451). In short, the loss of Iran created a political vacuum in the Persian Gulf. The US had relied on Iran for the balance of power in the area; now Iran had become an enemy that itself needed to be balanced (Halabi, 2009, 81). Halabi argued that the role of Iran as a pro-American policeman in the Persian Gulf was important for several reasons: first, after 1967, Iraq cut its diplomatic relations with the US and joined the camp of the Soviet Union; second, following the Vietnam War, the Congress was not ready to commit American troops to obscure regions in the Third World; third, the US thought that Iran could deter Iraq from expanding into the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula, while such an Iraqi move could be used by the Soviet Union to cut off the West from the Gulf states' oil supplies.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger viewed Iraq as the secret ally of the United States in the struggle against the Khomeini regime in Iran, and against potential dangers posed by the export of the Iranian Islamist revolution around the Gulf and in Lebanon (Cooley, 2005, 163). What Weinberger really had in mind was that U.S. backing of Iraq would prevent Iran from the threat to the U.S. access to Middle Eastern oil. This American tilt was motivated by the fact that Saddam was receiving support from the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and other Arab rulers in the region. Cooley explained this regional support as sectarian political trend to shield against the Shi'a revolutionary threat. Rapprochement between the Reagan administration and Saddam began toward the end of 1983, despite repeated intelligence reports, which George Schultz's State Department often cited in briefings to the White House, of Saddam's use of chemical warfare against both recalcitrant Kurds and Iranian troops on the battlefields. Hence, United States decided to go ahead in supporting Iraq despite notorious political reputation of Saddam. As a consequence, the bilateral relationship had witnessed several official visits between Washington and Baghdad. The most important was Donald Rumsfeld's first trip to Baghdad to meet Saddam came in a new presidential directive dated November 26, 1983. It called for "heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf." I can argue that even with American ignorance to Saddam's brutal violence American policy involved some affirmations to the

Iraqi regime to avoid violating human rights against Kurds and Shiites. Donald Rumsfeld's trips to Baghdad hold a strategic agenda such as Oil pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean and \$500 million in loan guarantees for construction. John Cooley (2005, 168) figures out such projects were essential for American rapprochement with Iraq, to guarantee Saddam's seriousness to engage in these projects and cut the road off the Soviets. But Seliktar concludes that the real precaution was of Iraq nuclear ambitions. The National Security Archive documents show that the U.S. administration was then reconsidering its policy on the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's "nuclear entities." A 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysis concluded that once the war with Iran ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical weapons capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons too. In 1984, two researchers, Joseph D. Douglass and Neil C. Livingstone (1987), published a short monograph, calling attention to Iraq's chemical and biological capability, which they dubbed "the poor man's atomic bomb" (Seliktar, 2008, 39).

Despite all these cautions presented by officials and intellectuals in United States, the Regan Administration went forward with the re-establishment of U.S.–Iraqi diplomatic relations on November 26, 1984. President Ronald Reagan welcomed Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz to the White House. By this time, the Reagan administration was treating Iraq's use of chemical warfare as a "potentially embarrassing public relations problem" which might impede continuing U.S. military and intelligence aid (Cooley, 2005, 170). In 1985, Graham Fuller, national intelligence officer for the Near East and South East Asia, raised the spectre of a Soviet grab of Iran, a long-standing American concern. Fuller and the former CIA chief William Colby argued that in case of an Iranian defeat, the ensuing internal turmoil would invite Soviet interference, a move that Moscow had allegedly contemplated during the turmoil of the fundamentalist revolution. They considered a Soviet–dominated Iran a catalyst for a World War III. Ofira Seliktar finds that "the anxiety about the "Iranian Trotsky" apparently led to a more positive evaluation of the Iraqi leader. The fact is Saddam did not succeed in keeping up American support in his favor. One of the most important factors that led to serious problems between Saddam and United States was Saddam's ideological support for Palestinian Arab *intifada*. In fact, while Saddam tried to keep up US aid, his political survival was much more important for him than achieving any other end (Cooley, 2005, 172). However, Saddam was made to understand that Israel was a real strategic threat to Iraq. At the same time, Israeli leaders were declaring publicly that they supported prolonging the Iran–Iraq war. One of the consequences of this prolonged conflict with Iran was that Saddamsake all the probable

support inside and outside Iraq. It had scattered his energies away from the Arab–Israel conflict. Saddam realized that for better relations with the United States, he had to neutralize his tone towards Israel³⁶.

Saddam Hussein was described in Washington as enlightened leader and a “voice of moderation” in the war with Iran. President Bush reaffirmed the policy of cultivating cooperation with Iraq. National Security Directive 26 of October 1989 affirmed that a theme of “economic and political incentives for Iraq . . . would moderate its behavior and . . . increase our influence with Iraq.”³⁷ But precautions were raised in regional politics along with Saddam's growing rearmament spending on the purchase of sophisticated weapon systems, mainly from France and the USSR. Thereafter, the administration of George H.W. Bush ignored the potentiality of any aggressive move that Saddam would adopt. Laurie Mylroie (1987, 341), one of the scholars who visited Iraq, emphasized the image of Saddam's regime as a moderate that achieved unprecedented stability in Iraq. The Bush foreign policy team, such as Secretary of State James A. Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, changed the policy towards Iraq to accommodate the warnings that arisen when Saddam's regime in July 17, threatened action against Kuwait. On July 19 Hussein ordered large-scale army manoeuvres in the south of Iraq.

2.2.2 The Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990 (the Outbreak of conflict):

The Iraq-Iran war ended in 1988 without any tangible gains for either country, both of them emerged greatly weakened. The Bush administration initially continued the Reagan administration's policy of engagement with Iraq. This was encouraged by fear of Iran's Shiite revolution. After favouring Baghdad in the Iran–Iraq war, Washington assumed that it could ‘tame’ Saddam Hussein because of Iraqi domestic reconstruction priorities. However, the Bush administration jettisoned engagement once Hussein proved this assumption wrong (Dobson & Marsh, 2001, 172). The U.S. was faced with a new situation in the Gulf – Iran and Iraq – both the regimes hostile to the U.S. It continued to contain Iran, but having tilted to Iraq during the war, the U.S. continued this policy in its aftermath, hoping to change Iraqi behaviour and gradually moderate the regime. The Iraqi leader claimed that the United States could become the Middle East's hegemony. Through the Arab gulf

³⁶ See also: Amos Perlmutter, Handel, M., and Bar-Joseph, U, (2003). *Two Minutes over Baghdad*. Second edition, London: Frank Cass.

³⁷ The White House (1989). U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf (U), National Security Directive 26 of October 1989 Document N. 20819.

and its oil,” said Saddam Hussein, “USA will maintain its superiority as a superpower without an equal to compete with it” (Hybel & Kaufman, 2006, 19-20). On May 28, 1990, during an Arab summit meeting held in Baghdad, Saddam criticized Kuwait’s overproduction and low oil prices. He claimed that Baghdad had attempted to resolve the frontier differences peacefully, and had asked Kuwait to reduce its oil production and cancel Iraq’s ten-billion-dollar debt. The Popular Islamic Conference took place on 16 June. Izzat Ibrahim, vice chairman of the RCC addressed seven hundred Islamic conferees to “draw up a united plan for confronting the challenges and conspiracies targeting Iraq in particular and the Arab nation and Muslims in general”(Long, 2004, 88). This development could thwart President Bush’s push to tight the United States’ relationship with Iraq. President Bush thought that with economic and political incentives Saddam's behaviour would be moderated and America could increase influence with Iraq. Long J. M. highlighted two contested assessments towards Saddam's next move towards Kuwait:

- First, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, wondering about Saddam Hussein’s moderation in behaviour.
- Second, A Defence Special Assessment (DSA) concluded on July 25 that Iraq was using diplomatic pressure, and significant military posturing to force Kuwait to comply with recent oil and economic demands.³⁸

Coincidentally Saddam’s threat aggravated in a critical situation brought by three fundamental changes to the U.S. strategic position in the region: the first was the political dynamics in world order represented by the collapse of the Soviet Union; second, the rise of Sunni Islamic fundamentalism; and third, Saddam’s policy represented a challenge to the new *world order* through the threat of controlling oil resources in the Gulf.

Saddam understood this to be crucial to the US position in the Middle East. He blackmailed his neighboring countries and the USA by taking an aggressive action against Kuwait. He accused Kuwait and Saudi Arabia of deliberately overproducing oil and thus lowering the world price. This still did not stop U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly from visiting Saddam in Baghdad on February 12, 1990, and assuring him that the George H. W. Bush administration considered him a “force for moderation” and wanted to improve relations. Cooley argued that any diplomatic approach could not distort Saddam's aggressive tools. While Saddam repeatedly raised his aggressive rhetoric at an Arab conference in Amman on February 24, 1990; he called on the United

³⁸ See also: Clarke, R. (2004). *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*, New York: Free Press, 55.

States to remove its navy and denounced its support for Israel, and called on the Arab states to set up an action plan to create a Pan-Arab power base that could confront the West and Israel (Cooley, 2005, 178-9). Despite all diplomatic efforts to avoid any dramatic end and to encourage Saddam to moderate his behavior; he invaded Kuwait on 2 August, 1990. Baghdad claimed that a coup had taken place in Kuwait and that its deposed leader had called on Iraq for assistance. Analysts have made much of a meeting between Saddam and the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, on 25 July. Did she give a virtual green light to Saddam to pursue his quarrel with Kuwait without fear of United States?

At the same time, Gary Hess (2009, 168-169) raises five assumptions concerning the direct effect of Iraqi action and US policy:

- First, the Iraqi invasion destabilized what Bush earlier described as “the new world order.”
- Second, Iraq’s aggression posed an economic threat to the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and other countries dependent upon imports of Middle Eastern oil.
- Third, if the United States failed to provide leadership, Saddam Hussein would almost certainly get away with the takeover of Kuwait.
- Fourth, the invasion provided a critical test for the United Nations as a vehicle for upholding order in the post-cold war world.
- Fifth, the U.S. objective had to be the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government.

Certainly, The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait put an end to any cooperation between the US and Saddam’s regime. With this invasion, Saddam’s Iraq went on the American blacklist of regimes that dared to challenge the US, such as Castro’s Cuba and North Korea. Martin Indyk, the Special Assistant to the President asserted that ‘the United States would no longer play the game of balancing Iran against Iraq. We will not need to depend on one to counter the other’ (quoted in halabi, 2009, 85). To escalate the response to this aggression act, US started to reconstitute its military presence in the region. Central Command CENTCOM did not have, in or near the region, the military apparatus and personnel necessary to mount an effective campaign against Saddam Hussein’s forces. They were greatly concerned with the extent to which the Iraqi leader’s influence on the oil market would be augmented if he were to march his troops into Saudi Arabia (Hybel & Kaufman, 2006, 63-64). Richard Haass wrote a memo in which he noted that the necessary policy should deploy both economic sanctions and military actions to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Despite all

regional and international diplomatic energy but all efforts had failed to convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. Respectively, Security Council issued Resolution 660 unanimously. The declaration called on Kuwait and Iraq to address their differences via intense negotiations, and invoked Articles 39 and 40 of chapter seven of the United Nations' Charter. Conscious that a belligerent policy against Iraq depended heavily on Saudi Arabia's readiness to accept U.S. troops on its own territory. Operation Plan 90-1002 which deployed around 100,000–200,000 troops of the United States was authorized On August 6, by the Saudi King Fahd (Clarke, 2004, 59). President Bush and Colin Powell made their interference clear by supporting the policy of containment and the imposition of sanctions along with the preparation of an offensive option in case Iraq refuses to comply with the international community. The priority was being given to the policy of containment despite Scowcroft intensive military option. On 12 November, by a vote of 12 to 2, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678. The decree noted that Iraq was given until January 15, 1991 to comply fully with the resolutions already passed regarding the conflict between Kuwait and itself. Failing which the states cooperating with the government of Kuwait had the authority to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement" the resolutions and "restore international peace and security" in the area. On December 28, Saddam declared that he was ready for "serious and constructive dialogue," but continued to link any discussions about his withdrawal from Kuwait to negotiations over the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza (Cooley, 2005, 178-179). This proposal was rejected by the United States and its Western allies, who wanted nothing to do with any idea that might be seen to reward the Iraqi leader and enhance its standing in the region. Unlike all diplomatic efforts that aimed to avoid the expensive cost the war, the Operation *Desert Storm* started on January 16. Saddam chose to respond early on the next day, January 17, as he had threatened earlier, with an attack against Israel with missiles. Cooley asserted that "Saddam wanted to transform Desert Storm into a war between Israel and all of the Arabs." But he failed since the regional atmosphere was not ready to such popular participation out of Arab regimes' control. Finally, on 26 February 1991 Iraq began a full military withdrawal from Kuwait (Doran, 2012, 64). While on February 28, 1991, President Bush declared a cease-fire, and ordered the Desert Storm's supreme commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., not to march on Baghdad or neutralize Saddam Hussein. Instead, Bush senior had made statements and broadcasts encouraging the Kurdish and Shi'a populations of Iraq to revolt. Bush Administration was concerned about the unity of Iraq and the prospective coalition between Iran and the Shiites in Iraq, and how that would affect

the region. It is not clear similarly why the US troops did not march to Baghdad to destroy the regime?

2.2.3 The Uprising in Iraq in 1991:

As the military operation against Iraq concluded in 1991, on March 2, the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 686, which established the framework for peace, including the establishment of a formal ceasefire (United Nations, 1991). Iraqis heeded the exhortation and revolted. Fourteen of Iraq's eighteen provinces engaged in open rebellion, and those few troops loyal to Saddam ran out of ammunition. The southern *intifada* (uprising) broke out on February 28 in Basra, but soon spread like wildfire to the Shi'a strongholds of Najaf, and Karbala. This was not a coordinated rebellion, but rather a series of spontaneous and violent eruptions. The northern uprising was better organized. United under the banner of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), the two major Kurdish political forces—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—imparted some coherence to the rebellion, and by March 19, southern Kurdistan was in Kurdish hands (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004, 88). Later on, the United States lifted ceasefire restrictions on Saddam's helicopter force and allowed it to crush the revolt. David Wurmser (1999, 10) states that America did so for a few reasons:

- First, they feared that the break up of Iraq would disrupt the already fragile stability of the Arab state system.
- Second, the establishment of a Shi'ate entity in part of Iraq, or internal anarchy would invite Iran's intervention.
- Third, the United States believed that a coup led by Saddam's top colonels offered an alternative that addressed all these concerns.³⁹

As a result of the international neglect to Iraqi revolution Saddam had regained control over southern Iraq. The north was not in a better situation. By the end of March, Kurdish forces had been driven out of the major cities and into the mountains bordering Iran and Turkey. Saddam brutal violence to crush the revolution created a humanitarian disaster. In the late of March and April 1991, a quarter millions of Shi'ates and similar number of Kurds were killed by Saddam's regime. On 5 April, in the face of mounting public pressure, the Security Council passed Resolution 688,

³⁹ see also: Kaplan, R. (2013). *The revenge of Geography, What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts And The Battle Against Fate*. Random House Trade Paperback, pp: 16-17.

proposed by France and Belgium, cosponsored by the US and the UK, condemning the Iraqi repression and deeming the cross-border incursions by the resulting refugee flow a threat to international peace and security (United Nations, 1991d). Importantly, Resolution 688 did not contain any clear enforcement mechanism: Russia (and perhaps also China) had indicated during negotiations that it would veto any resolution providing a specific enforcement provision (Cockayne & Maline, 2006, 126). Resolution 688 marked the first time that the Council demanded improvement of a human rights situation as a contribution to international peace and security. Accordingly, on the same day of the adoption of the SC resolution, President Bush announced a plan to airdrop relief supplies to the Kurds in the mountains along the Turkish border. As of July 3 there were still 3,641 coalition soldiers in Iraq, including 1,455 Americans, maintaining security in coordination with Kurdish forces in the 80-kilometer (50-mile) deep zone. Though the Bush administration was criticized for allowing Saddam to remain in power, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, General Colin Powell, maintained: "It was never one of our objectives to change the form of government of the Iraqi people". When asked about the U.S.-led operation in northern Iraq, Powell continued to make the link with the Gulf War objectives: "The war aims had nothing to do with rearranging Iraq and they had nothing to do with establishing a Kurdish regime" (Farkas, 2003, 23).

U.S. policy towards the Kurds was fundamentally motivated by the probability that granting partition to the Iraqi Kurds would provoke conflict in Turkey, and the possibility that conflict would break out among Turkey, Iran and Syria and the Kurds. For the same reason on the March 3, 1991 General Schwartzkopf gave permission to the Iraqis to fly armed helicopters over areas where there was no U.S. presence. The preferred scenario required the defeat of the rebels prior to the overthrow of Saddam. Evelyn Farkas asserts that the United States was clearly influenced by the assessment that the partition of Iraq would create internal and regional conflict. Fragmentation, Baker explained, would have provided Shiite extremists with an opportunity in southern Iraq. Once the humanitarian crisis had been managed, it became even clearer that the United States was more concerned with stability than with human rights, or democratization in Iraq. One would conclude that the United States was worried of a regional sectarian conflict. A conflict would escalate the threat of Islamists radicals from both sects. Paul Wolfowitz maintains, in that respect, the U.S. government was, however, concerned about the potential reaction from the neighboring states.

Thus, the creation of safe havens was a must to slow down the rebellions. Saddam agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN on humanitarian relief (Hiro, 1992, 411).

In the case of Iraq, the Bush administration feared that the breakup of the state would not be peaceful since the prime motivation was the fear that conflict would flare up between the Iraqi army and the people especially the Kurds. Thus strategic and humanitarian motivations were sufficient to provoke a U.S. military response to contain the instability in northern Iraq and prevent spillover of the conflict into the region (Farkas, 2003, 113-115). This approach was followed by the Clinton administration. The new CIA director, James Woolsey, continued to support the INC⁴⁰, even though some within the agency persistently urged him to support a Sunni-based coup instead. But the threat of rebellion did not provoke a fear of Kurdish-Shiite revenge against the Sunnis; rather, it encouraged an open resistance to Saddam's regime. As a result, the summer of 1995 witnessed a massive revolt that erupted from April to June in 1995 within one of the largest Sunni tribes in Iraq. Hence, when the INC's 1,000-strong militia and PUK Peshmerga forces launched their attack on Iraqi troops on March 4, 1995, it was without the support of the U.S.

On September 15, 1995, in testimony before the House Committee on International Affairs chaired by Benjamin Gilman, Martin Indyk stated there was no international support for use of force for the inspections regime. This shift shows a return to policy choices taken in late 1994 and early 1995 with respect to the INC. U.S. policy towards Iraq consistently fails because of its favoured alternative of coup rather than an overt support for an insurgency since only a strong centralised control can run Iraq (Wurmser, 1999, 35). US administration understood that real change can only be brought about by creating a rift among elements of the narrow Sunni clique surrounding Saddam. Posed by the threat that a break of Iraq will create a submission to Iran, the US policy-makers emphasised three priorities: the importance of engagement and democratic enlargement; the promotion of the free market; and concern about regional security problems (Dobson & Marsh, 2001, 139). A coup, assassination, and subsequent installation in Baghdad of a secular Sunni military officer close to Saddam would satisfactorily meet all the aforementioned considerations. This period not only saw a loss of interest of the US in maintaining the northern safe but it also saw the INC efforts as insufficient. Washington's preference for coup over a broad-based revolution illustrates that its policy of the Middle East was guided by the quest for stability. For Iraq

⁴⁰ In June 1992, the first meeting of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) convened in Vienna, Austria under the leadership of exiled Iraqi businessman Ahmed Chalabi. The INC was conceived of as an umbrella organization, uniting (at least nominally) Iraq's disparate opposition groups under a single banner (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004, 88).

Baathism itself was the problem, not only Saddam, this would have been a good way of overthrowing dictatorships in the Middle East. This fundamental question plagued the Clinton Administration and created heavy pressure on it to re-estimate US policy.

2.2.4. Bill Clinton Administration:

The Clinton administration's policy was based on the assumption of an enlarged family of nations committed to democracy, free markets and peace to protect American strategic interests and stabilise the international order. In the opposite there was a bloc of the 'rogue' or 'backlash' states, characterised by their promotion of radical ideologies, suppression of basic human rights and destabilising military programmes, including the development of WMDs. Clinton made it clear that, "any shift in US policy towards Iraq will occur only if Saddam changes his behaviour and through the supervision of the United Nations." (Cooley, 2005: 188). This is the same rhetoric was made by Bush before the 1990-war. At the beginning Clinton policy deploys containment strategy through diplomatic and economic efforts. The containment policy had some objectives: most important was to thwart any attempt of possessing WMD; to prevent Saddam from rebuilding Iraq's conventional military forces. Cooley highlighted four main elements that consists the policy toward Saddam "containment":

- First was a strong military presence.
- Second maintaining UN economic sanctions and embargo.⁴¹
- Third, to create pressure on the UN inspector to destroy the Iraqi nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and the long-range missiles.
- Fourth, the Iraqi opposition was to be supported and encouraged.

Clinton Administration rejected Bush's "imperial" vision of American power, and followed "soft power," based on "sticks and carrots" a notion first articulated by Joseph S. Nye (1990, 31). Later on Clinton administration emphasized the need of *Dual Containment policy*, it was designed to deal with "rogue states" (Iran, Iraq); this had both military and economic components. Such containment policy was aimed at weakening these states and shifting the balance towards US in the gulf. In Iraq, containment, with severe sanctions on oil exports and military imports and the intrusive inspections of weapons programs, gradually weakened the state and its institutions rather than the regime (Marr in Kaim, 2008, 16). Still, sanctions were designed to shrink Saddam's capability of interaction in

⁴¹ Christopher Doran asserts that the sanctions were intended to remove Saddam Hussein from power (Doran, 2012, 61).

regional politics. To this end, by the end of the Clinton tenure, the policy, called “Containment Plus”, was in disarray and required a direct injection of U.S. forces into the Gulf. The main issues that concerned Clinton Administration were, Saddam WMD and regional stability. Saddam's threat was supposed to be contained through the UN mechanisms, yet the administration did not ignore the use of hard power for ensuring enforcement. For instance, following Iraqi troops movement along the Kuwaiti border in early October of 1994, the Clinton administration, also began to move forces. The US administration shifted its compass to the goal of regime change. The agency recruited Ahmed Chalabi, the exiled Iraqi millionaire. He was organizing an umbrella organization of mostly exiled opposition groups, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), funded since 1992 by the CIA. CIA Director James Woolsey was a supporter of both Ahmad al-Chalabi and Ayad Allawi. He believed Saddam Hussein to be behind acts of international terrorism, such as the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York (Clarke, 2004, 76). Regime change was being advocated by showing a threat of an “Islamic bomb” and a “clash of civilizations.” In a high profile *Foreign Policy* article, the national security adviser admitted that Iran and Iraq are “particularly troublesome,” but expressed confidence that “selective pressures” would modify the behaviour of both regimes (Freedman, 2008, 275; Seliktar, 2008, 74). The debate on containment revived interest in Hussein’s rationality. Yet secretly, Chalabi proposed a plan for a “rolling” coup, part military action, in the autonomous Kurdish territory. But for Clinton's administration the use of force was only considered in the context of supporting the goals of containment and UNSC resolutions. Clinton argued against using military force to remove the regime in Baghdad because it was not a stated UN objective. The change was brought in the year 1998 following the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) by Congress in October that year and a growing acceptance that the return of UN inspections was extremely unlikely after Operation Desert Fox. The ILA obliged the administration to make regime change a formal part of its Iraq policy by supporting Iraqi opposition groups and individuals within and outside Iraq and authorised \$97 million to do so. The emphasis on the Iraqi opposition was undermined by in-fighting amongst the oppositions groups organized under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). This compounded the administration’s reluctance to engage in regime change through the INC for a fundamental reason, the administration’s concern that the support for the opposition could divide Iraq (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007 31). The administration was wary of and had little faith in the ability of the Iraqi opposition to engender regime change and devoted minimal time and resources to this objective.

Clinton's policy toward Iraq supported multilateral spirit and reliability for an extent on UN efforts only to moderate Saddam regime for securing region's stability.

2.2.5 The Weapon of Mass Destruction and United Nations' efforts in Iraq:

UN launched a series of resolutions to control the Saddam's regime behaviour. One of the mechanisms was *sanctions*. Sanctions began in 1990 with a series of resolutions intended to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. Security Council resolution 661 requires all member nations of the United Nations to, “prevent the import of all products originating in Iraq or Kuwait” (Bonds, 2014, 373). In 1991, following Iraq's ouster from Kuwait and the end of the Gulf War, the Security Council had passed Resolution 687, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which made it binding on all member states. This resolution required Iraq to relinquish all weapons of mass destruction, abandon its programs for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, as well as missiles with ranges beyond 150 kilometres, and cooperate with U.N. (Lieber, 2005, 132-133; Doran, 2012, 64). So, while the initial Security Council resolution implementing the sanctions explicitly stated that food and medicine imports should not be banned, the 666-resolution established a process in which they would be strictly controlled, limited, delayed and sometimes altogether denied. The U.S. sanctions impacted Iraq due to the economy's heavy reliance on imported food and technology. Economic sanctions were used for a political end, which of course was denied by USA and claimed that the sufferings that occurred did not result from the sanctions but due to the regime itself, and part of the sanctions was justified achieve the overall objective of overthrowing the regime.

United Nations acknowledged that Iraq had no significant stockpiles of chemical weapons after they were last destroyed in 1994 (Bonds, 2014, 376). The “rules” of the game were established early in 1991 when United Nations passed Resolution 697 creating a new body, the United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM) to destroy Iraq's unconventional arsenal. UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors began arriving in Iraq in June 1991, and by late June, had already uncovered evidence of Iraq's extensive and relatively sophisticated nuclear weapons program (Seliktar, 2008, 60). Hussein insisted that Iraq no longer possessed WMD or WMD programmes and after a series of crises in late 1997 and 1998 UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq. By 1998 UNSCOM had achieved a great deal, having supervised the destruction of long-range missiles and missile warheads UNSCOM reported that Iraq still possessed chemical and biological weapons. In February 1998 Clinton insisted that the UN inspectors had much work still to do because "Iraq continues to conceal

chemical and biological weapons and missiles that can deliver them"(Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, 22). There was no doubt in the administration's perception about the existence of Iraqi WMD and the on-going WMD programmes. US administration saved no energy to deploy UN efforts to terminate such program. In July 1997, the Swedish UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus retired. His replacement, the Australian diplomat Richard Butler, took a much tougher position toward the Iraqis. In 1999 the Amorim Report (UN panel) stated that Iraq could not be declared to have fully disarmed its WMD and ballistic missile programmes. But, during the political pressure on Saddam Hussein regime, UN offered a deal to decrease the tragic humanitarian situation in Iraq. In 1996, Saddam accepted the UN's "oil-for-food" deal. The deal, embodied in UNSCR 986, allowed Iraq to export oil worth \$2 billion every six months (this was later increased to \$5.2 billion) and to use the proceeds to import products to meet essential civilian needs (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004, 97). Saddam's acceptance of UNSCR 986 had done nothing to change the underlying dynamics of UNSCOM inspections in Iraq. The Clinton Administration explicitly rejected any link between the lifting of sanctions and Iraq's fulfillment of its disarmament obligations. By the beginning of 1998 the containment policy was under sustained pressure from Baghdad, the UN Security Council and conservative critics in Washington. Clinton allowed Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov to strike a deal with Saddam Hussein that appeared to meet US demands for the return of UNSCOM and the resumption of unimpeded UN inspections (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, 24). In January 1998 Iraq once again obstructed UNSCOM activities and demanded that sanctions be lifted. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan negotiated yet another "last chance" deal in which the Iraqis agreed to allow inspectors to visit sensitive sites, the inspectors left nine months later (Hayes, 2004, 100). By February 1998, Iraq succeeded in winning important concessions on the sanctions front relating to weapons inspections. The departure of UNSCOM in December 1998 denial of a re-entry was seen as a major victory for Saddam in the eyes of the Iraqi people (Post, 2003, 362). This pushed the US hard power as evidenced by operation desert fox that lasted for four days in December 1998.

Wurmser (1999, 3) asserts "November 1997-December 1998 inspections crisis never really ended, of course; rather, it marked the beginning of the U.S. defeat". This comprised of *development of smart sanctions* to target the regime and relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people as much as possible; efforts to install UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, 55). In October 1998, Dennis J. Halliday, assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, resigned in protest over a program that he labeled as "all-out effort to starve to death as many Iraqis as possible.

Issam Alkhafaji (2000, 67) questioned the effectiveness of the sanctions. Could be argued that sanctions were successful in weakening Saddam Hussein regime and that UNSCOM was able to reveal and destroy huge amounts of Iraqi WMD.⁴² On the contrary, Amazia Baram⁴³, citing the economic and diplomatic progress of the regime, asserts that in the year 2000 the domestic and international position of Saddam was most secure and promising since the 1991 Gulf War. This was evidenced by a shift in international perception regarding Iraq.

In August, 2000, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez became the first head of the state since gulf war, to visit Iraq, signalling Iraq's growing acceptance in the international community. Two months later, Iraq was invited to attend the Arab Summit for the first time since the start of the Gulf crisis, indicating a thaw in Arab attitudes towards Iraq. Iraq also developed commercial ties and improved of diplomatic relations with a number of Arab countries, including Gulf countries such as United Arab Emirates, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Since December 1998, there had been no inspections carried out by the UN Special Committee (UNSCOM). "Furthermore, the United States and Britain came under the greatest international pressure to lift or at least greatly relax, the international economic embargo against Baghdad" (Baram, 2000, 9). By 2000 new oil agreements had been signed with Russian, Chinese and French consortia. Jordan and Turkey were preparing to re-open pipelines to Iraq, and the amount of oil Iraq could sell under the oil-for-food programme had rapidly escalated (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, 27). In March 2000, France and Russian federation also pressed the UNSC to lift economic sanctions insisting that the humanitarian impact could no longer be ignored. The five permanent members eventually agreed to UNSC Resolution 1284. This established a new inspection body, the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Baram argued that the resolution retained financial control over most of Iraq's oil revenues, but relaxed the embargo in some important areas. Most significantly, Iraq was given permission to sell unlimited quantities of oil (prior to the agreement, Iraq was transacting \$5.2 billion every 180 days). Yet the US administration felt that Iraq was developing a new arsenal while Saddam was claiming an increased suffering of the populace. Yet the threat of WMD and the necessity of sanctions was that guided the following Bush administration.

⁴² See also: - George Lopez and David Cortright (2004). Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, number 4, July/August issue.

- GPF Report (2002): Humanitarian Implication and options For the Future, Global Policy Forum, August 6.

⁴³ See also: Dodge, T. (2010). The failure of sanctions and the evolution of international policy towards Iraq, 1990–2003, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Volume 3, Issue 1, January 21, pp: 83-91.

2.2.6. Bush Administration and the "Regime Change" policy:

Bruce Jentelson argues that the intra-Bush administration politics over Iraq focus on three executive-branch decision-making issues: the WMD threat, Saddam–Al Qaeda links, and strategies for winning the peace. The administration repeatedly and unequivocally claimed that this allegation was true. President Bush cited two main pieces of evidence: one was the attempted purchase of “high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons”; the other, that “Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” The October 2002 Iraq NIE stated that Saddam had chemical and biological weapons and that although he might not yet have nuclear weapons, he likely would within a few years. But this assessment was based on some very suspect sources of information. Some of the responsibility lies with the CIA and other intelligence agencies for failing at their basic tradecraft. Jentelson questions the credibility of Bush's claims on Iraq issue (Jentelson, 2010a, 456-465). However, how could President Bush and Vice President Cheney make their unequivocal claims when the NIE and other intelligence agencies raised doubts? Jentelson asks.

On January 21, 2001, George W. Bush suggested that the new administration was going to take a tough stand on two foreign policy issues: missile defence and ‘rogue’ states. The containment-plus strategy would be followed and in the first six months of the Bush administration Iraq policy focused on shoring up and tightening the sanctions regime (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, 54). Bush expressed his doctrine through the appointment “neoconservative” groups in key security positions. These included Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz (the intellectual force in the group), Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith, and others. In general, this group called for strong unilateralist bent and usage of hard power, if necessary. Despite the fact that neoconservatives wanted regime change in Iraq, the State Department, under Powell’s leadership, advanced an initiative to strengthen containment policy (Marr in Kaim, 2008, 20-21). By August 2001, the administration’s official position was unclear as it was supporting the Iraqi opposition while developing sanctions proposals for UNSC.

Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, advocated for rebalancing of Middle East by overthrowing Saddam regime (Cooley, 2005, 198-199). Christopher Sullivan (2009, 139) concluded that the neoconservatives alone were not wholly responsible for the most controversial aspects of the administration’s foreign

policy. Their influence required support at the senior levels, from Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney. Cheney and Rumsfeld were known as unilateral hawks, interested in the exportation of American values. Francis Fukuyama has observed that raw military power would ultimately prevail. The smart sanctions initiative involved tightening sanctions on military hardware, particularly those related to WMD, while removing most restrictions on materials for civilian use. Only Powell believed that any use of force against Iraq would increase hatred of USA in the Arab land. It was 9/11 that transformed the strategic calculus of the new president. Within a day, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was pressuring the President to attack Iraq as a part of the American response of countering terrorism. In an article for the journal *Foreign Affairs*, which covered a range of subjects, including Iraq, Rice lent unqualified support to the goal of regime change, arguing that Saddam Hussein was ‘determined to develop WMD. Wolfowitz was more explicit about regime change. In July 2001 he described Saddam Hussein as ‘a menace’ who was only interested in ‘overthrowing his neighbours’ and ‘acquiring weapons of mass destruction’(Ryan, 2009, 59). Powell saw 9/11 as an occasion to rebuild damaged relationships. NATO invoked Article V, declaring that an attack on the United States constituted an attack on all NATO members. At a Camp David meeting on September 15, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz both made a strong case for attacking Iraq. Sullivan criticizes Bush's decision to shift the focus to an invasion of Iraq before completing work in Afghanistan (Sullivan, 2009, 152). This decision shattered U.S and international efforts towards al-Qaeda and left most of al Qaeda intact. Thus, this mistake along with war decision gave the terrorists the moment to transport the battle into new lands where all strategic requirements for 'strategy of barbarism management' could be meet. Powell feared the consequences of a strategy of declaring the war on Iraq. Powell urged Bush to consider the potential repercussions an attack on Iraq would have in the Arab world. The region could be destabilized. Powell still thought the UN option to be the best course and refused Cheney's claim for unilateral act involving the United Nations. The debate post 9/11 led “war on terrorism” and war on "Rogue States." The Middle East and the Islamic world became the central focus of the policy. At the heart of this focus was where Iraq and Iran, characterized as part of an "axis of evil." On 17 September, barely a week after the attack, the President quietly ordered military planning against Iraq to begin (Marr in Kaim, 2008, 21). The global war on terror was conceived against the threat to civilized societies worldwide. In the same vein George W. Bush suggested that, "this is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is

civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom."⁴⁴ It was Bin Laden's supposed links with Saddam Hussein that President Bush had primarily in mind as he asserted on 11 March 2002 "the war will not be over when the terrorist networks are disrupted, scattered and discredited but when the sources of the weapons of mass destruction they are seeking to obtain have been removed as well" (Milton & Hinchcliffe, 2003, 124).

Saddam Hussein and his regime came into the frame as 'Public Enemy Number One' in the US hit list of 'the rogue states'. The notion of the *war on terrorism* was combined with the concept of the *pre-emption war*. Some authors referred to the five facets of the Bush administration's new approach to the Middle East: shock and awe; a confrontational approach to rogue states; an uncompromising embrace of democratisation; public diplomacy; and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the emerging doctrine of preventative strike (Dobson & Marsh, 2001, 177). This policy escalated pressure on Saddam regime through the accusation of Iraq engagement with Al-Qaeda and development of WMD. The pressure was imperative in UNSC Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, which brought the UNMOVIC inspectors to Iraq after a four-year period in which there had been no inspections at all. The resolution was the seventeenth in the UNSC's long history of demands that Iraq comply with its disarmament obligations, contained unambiguous language stating that Iraq had been in "material breach" of previous resolutions, that it was being offered a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations, and Iraq must deliver within thirty days a "full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs. In response, on January 27, 2003, Hans Blix reported to the Security Council that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it" (Lieber, 2009, 134-135).

Despite the fact that Saddam regime did not completely comply with UN efforts, the US war on Iraq was not the "war of necessity". Clarence Lusane (2006, 106) asserts that Bush's decision to invade Iraq was built on a mountain of fabrications, distortions, and manipulations. The debate over Iraq escalated after the breakout of Afghanistan war; US policy towards Iraq was dictated by the

⁴⁴ Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001. CNN.com, {Online}. <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>. {accessed on November 15, 2014}.

*National Defence Strategy*⁴⁵ published in September 2002. It reveals a mix of motives and objectives but presents a clear shift from the pre-9/11 policy. The strategy statement begins and ends with a ringing declaration in favour of striking a global balance in favour of democracy and advocated “pre-emptive strike”.

The 9/11 presented the hardliners in the US administration to push for regime change in Iraq, if possible through military means. Three motivations guide this change:

- One was a fundamental conviction that Clinton’s *containment* was not working.
- Second motivation was unacceptability to an oppositional regime in power at such a crucially important region.
- Third the *combination* of the importance of Gulf oil reserves with the possibility that the Saddam Hussein regime might soon develop nuclear weapon was a fatalistic idea.

Regime change in Iraq, in particular, was presented by neo-conservative analysts not just as an essential short-term component of the ‘war on terror’ but as the cornerstone of a greater Middle East initiative that would remake the political map of the Middle East. To support regime change policy, US diplomacy needed valid information about Iraq WMD. Alex Roberto Hybel and Justin Matthew Kaufman assert that the Bush administration did not possess sound information regarding WMDs; thus, they started to assert Al Qaeda linkage with Iraq (Hybel & Kaufman, 2006, 94-95). The National Intelligence Council presented a 92-page report. It contended that Saddam Hussein might decide that only an organization such as al Qaeda would perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct. George Tenet stated that the CIA had, “credible information indicating that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression” (Pincus & Milbank, 2004, 1). David Ryan highlight some major inconsistencies in Tenet’s assertions; CIA already knew Bin Laden had been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan and sought to attract them into his Islamic army (Ryan, 2009, 59). Also Stanley Bedlington (who served as a senior analyst and chief of foreign liaison at the CIA) asserted that “Saddam and Al-Qaida were not ideologically compatible, but on the other hand, their hatred of the United States alone could bring them to work together” (Quoted in Hayes, 2004, 36). Saddam was a secular authoritarian who found the religion as a relief to cover his weakness domestically and to attract Islamists abroad. He would work with Al-Qaida to pressure the United States Administrations, pushed them to comply with his demands, in particular to decline US support to Iraqi political opposition. Saddam and Bin Laden

⁴⁵ Available at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>. {Accessed on September 12, 2014}.

characters would never meet, because both of them were negative and authoritarian. But the growing collaboration between Iraqi Salafists and the secular regime of Saddam Hussein was another case in point. Hussein needed Sunni revivalists to counter Shiite fundamentalists and Kurdish nationalists. Despite this America claims, diplomatic efforts continued to avoid the war, the lack of solid information about Iraq involvement in 11/9 events, and critics dire warnings about the risks of war, including Iraq's likely use of WMD, massive civilian casualties, uprisings by the Arab "street" against American, and chaos in a post-Saddam Iraq. Bush made it clear that this war was indispensable and gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq. On March 19, 2003, major combat operations against Saddam Hussein's regime began, 2003, and in little more than three weeks, coalition forces prevailed in occupying Baghdad (O'Hanlon, 2005, 36). During the long Iraq War (1991–2011), the U.S. government violated well established international humanitarian norms on numerous occasions, for instance through its use of torture and the treatment of prisoners of war, by undertaking efforts to transform the political and the economic structure of the occupied nation, and by undertaking the 2003 invasion; which was a "war of aggression" in the parlance of international law". Eric Bonds concluded that US could not avoid negative outcomes of its course against Iraq, such as the loss of international assistance or even potential criminal charges (2014, 367). And these consequences are not exclusively deliberated with legalism but also shed light on Iraq domestic security and caused a huge wave of guerrilla movement against American forces and Iraqi troops. In brief, United States mistakes in Iraq have led to the growing danger of terrorism not only in Iraq but also across the region. To this extent, one can refer to IS as manifested evidence to the political turmoil in the Middle East.

Conclusion

The United States engagement with Iraq can be summarized in conclusive stages of trying successively first to cooperate (1980–1990), then to damage militarily (1991), then to contain (1991–1995), and then to bring down Saddam through coups and plots (1995–1996), and finally a regime change policy (1998-2003).

In this historical discourse of United States engagement with Iraq many phases of Orientalism can be concluded. As Scowcroft and Powell have asserted, the war on Iraq to outset Saddam would increase the hatred in the Arab land and that definitely would give the extremists a great opportunity to expand the number of their followers and also to have a ground in a country like Iraq which

strategically important. Iraq has become a battle field between US troops and terrorist organizations; this has happened due to the consequences of the war. The US government was not doing enough neither to guarantee the Iraqi unity post Saddam, unlike US government position in 1991, nor to install political liberalism as a ground to political process in Iraq.

To explain this policy, one can refer to US precaution of both Shiite and Sunni extremism. Hence, concerned with the burgeoning threat of Shiite fundamentalism, Reagan administration sided with Iraq in their war with Iran. Not only did the administration provide intelligence on Iranian troop movements, the administration supplemented this assistance by selling “dual use” items to the regime of Saddam Hussein. Reagan used Iraq as a buffer to prohibit the spread of the Islamic (Shiite) revolution that commenced under the Ayatollah Khomeini. Reagan’s successor Bush endeavoured to go beyond the Reagan model and hence it led to the creation of the directive (NSD-26). George Bush intended to utilize the directive to “propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behaviour and to increase American influence on Iraq.” Thereafter, administration policy shifted to a multilateral approach to end the Kuwait crisis and it was later supplemented by rudimentary war aims: the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The neoconservatives had another issue with the Bush administration: the president refused to explicitly state that they intended to remove Saddam Hussein. The president repeatedly rejected this idea and continued to restate the standard line: the UN did not authorize the removal of Saddam (Davis, 2006, 37). Actually, the real motive for not interfering in regime change in 1991, was the threat of shi’ia revolution to the political map of the Middle East, Bush administration understood that the Iranian involvement in Iraq would spark again the aim of spreading Islamic revolution. Any change in the map of the Middle East and in particular the Gulf was represented a severe challenge to US oil interests.

One can notice the role of the Intellectuals in US policy in the case of Iraq. Several notable neoconservatives such as Samuel Huntington, Edward Luttwak, Peter Rosenblatt, Stephan Morris, Aaron Wildavsky, and others, shifted their support to the Democratic nominee Clinton in 1992 election. The essential observation of the neoconservatives was that the US should actively “export Democracy”. Therefore, this group called for unilateralism, asserting that, if American military power used correctly could serve the purpose of promoting US national interests and thus a force for good in the world. Also, the vast majority of the group is highly supportive of Israel and untrusting of the “so-called moderate Arabs” in the region. It is clear that neoconservative

considered Iraq the principle target country for invasion. The leading voice in this debate was Richard Norman Perle.⁴⁶ Davis quoted a policy paper on 1 June 1996, titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” This study calls for a change of regime in Syria, Iran and elsewhere in the region. This represented an early effort to promote the need for the democratic transformation of the Middle East. It can be noted that there was inherent contradiction in the ideological framework of the group. To say that there was lack of trust when it came to the Arab populace. Second, a regimental change would de-stabilise the region. But on the other hand there were articulations like a change of regime in Iraq will provide a ground to secure the transformation of the Middle East.

The public reaction to the Iraq war and occupation has been one of almost universal opposition in the Muslim world and has extended to non-Muslim minorities, especially within its Arab domain. This experience has emphasized the Occidentalism theory; a view that seems to have gained hold among Muslims around the world is that the US policy approach to the management of post-war Iraq has been to maximize the regional dominance of the United States and of Israel. Some Iraqi authors have supported the claim that finds that Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 had religious roots; they believe that Bush represents an extremist religious movement that aims to destroy the Arab world and Islam. Saikal asserts that war represents the convergence of positions articulated primarily by four different active clusters across the Muslim domain (Saikal in Thakur, 2006, 195):

- The first cluster “Islamic liberalism”, comprises moderate Islamists who uphold Islam as a dynamic ideology of political and social transformation. Many of moderate Islamists opine that US behavior in relation to Iraq has been unjustifiable and see the war on terror, as anti-Muslim phenomena.
- The second cluster comprises radical Islamists. They view political and social imposition and the use of violence in certain circumstances as legitimate means to protect and assert their religion and religious-cultural identity and to create the kind of polity they deem Islamic.
- The third cluster consists of neo-fundamentalists or those who adhere to a strict, literal interpretation of Islam. What matters to them most is the text rather than the context. A good example of them was, and still is, the Taliban group.

⁴⁶ Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (2001-2003) during George W. Bush Administration.

- The fourth cluster consists of radical secular Arab/Muslim nationalists, whose goal is a reformation of their societies, free from domination by foreign, especially US, imperialism in one form or another.

Oliver Roy, asserts in an article published in *The New York Times* on July 22, 2005, that, "the conflicts in the Middle East-included Iraq war 2003- had tremendous impact on opinions Muslims. Hence, many of the terrorist group's statements and actions indicate that Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine are hardly the motivating factors behind its recruitment. In his statement he referred to a crucial point that terrorist groups invest the conflict in the Middle East for gaining legitimacy among Muslims. This statement made the case when Iraq territory became a battlefield for the Jihadists to fight US army in Iraq as well as the Iraqi army. They expanded their human resources by attracting many Muslims to come and fight in Iraq for rescuing Islam. This issue will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.

2.3. Third Section: Iraq Perception Post-Saddam Hussein

This Section is going to analyze the public image of Iraq, post Saddam regime, in the US. More recently anthropologists Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins have suggested *how* orientalism made its way into U.S. popular culture. Utilizing insights from postmodern social theory, photojournalism, and cultural anthropology, Lutz and Collins trace the process through which images of the Middle East and other parts of the Third World were generated and disseminated by one of the most widely circulated magazines in the United States (Little, 2008, 10). Another way orientalism propagates is through the prestigious academic institutions; their job is to provide knowledge about the Middle East which is an interesting area for writers, scholars and public because it was comprised of racial and cultural borderlands (Schueller, 2004, 78). Jerry Kroth (an associated Professor of psychology in Santa Clara University) asserts in his book, "*Duped, Delusion and Denial and the end of American dream*," that average Americans spend 9 hours a day using Media and Internet. He explained how the media oriented the American mind and perceptions turning it to a copy machine without being able to judge the real motives of the propaganda since individuals have hardly any idea of those places, have not been there and thus depend on the media for their source of information. In 1996, Kagan and Kristol wrote that their expansive vision of America's role in the world would be undergirded by citizen involvement in the project through appealing to a unique sense of America's destiny. Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy (CSP), to which many

neoconservatives were affiliated, stated on its online home page that "the purpose of the organization was to, "preserve a sense of identity and community among like-minded security policy practitioners, awaiting a day when many of them might be called upon to serve once again in government" (Ryan in Johnstone & Laville, 2010, 161).

2.3.1. Iraq Perception within the Intellectual Discourse in U.S:

During the 1990s (preventive war, regime change in Iraq, the willingness to embrace unilateralism) became the driving force of US foreign policy. If it was not hegemony, then what was the nature of the influence they exerted? There was massive public support for these policies over a sustained period of time. Maria Ryan finds out that opinion polls demonstrated conclusively the importance of 9/11 in generating support for the "war on terror" and the invasion of Iraq. On September 20th, 2001, Bush had made clear his intention to respond to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by force. This also raised his approval rating among the American populace. A New York Times/CBS poll of January 2003 showed that 45 percent of Americans believed that Saddam was "personally involved" with the attacks (Ryan in Johnstone & Laville, 2010, 164). After the Iraq war the media and intellectuals shifted their attention to the concept of "reconciliation", which meant "some combination of political measures meant to heal communal rifts in the Iraqi political order (Philpott in Chaplin & Joustra, 2010, 173). Daniel Philpott contributed to this debate by highlighting the problem of peace building in Iraq, which is, the dilemmas of past injustices in order to construct a stable liberal democracy. For Philpott reconciliation not only describes justice but is also a vision of peace, just as the ethic of reconciliation developed aims to build peace in political orders. After the February 2006 destruction of the Shiite sanctity shrine of Samarra and the wave of retaliation that it sparked, observers began to speak of a full-fledged civil war. It is due to partisans with religious, national, and ethnic identities driven by communal loyalties, fear of domination and the emotions of revenge and hatred that memories of past injustices took hold of the fate. For Gilbert Achcar (2004, 236) the biggest fear of Bush Administration was that the power vacuum in Iraq after war would lead to political outcome out of US control. He explained that the societal mosaic with different tendencies with nothing in common except their hostility to the tyrant would find it difficult to establish a minimum of stability in Iraq. Achcar argued for reconciliation while Perle and Kanan Makiya emphasized that the problem was political while Michael Nehme (2003, 102) made a case for cultural diversity since for him cultural or ethnic differences are at the heart of group conflict. To

quote Michael, "what characterizes multi group societies like the Arab world is not mere diversity but rather inequality in group difference whose meaning is produced, mediated, and sustained by oppressive power relations". Robert Brigham (2008, 77) put forward a question: "how to convince disparate groups together that a future in common is in their best interest." This Dilemma emphasizes the crisis of *National Identity* in Iraq.⁴⁷ For Michael Rear the crisis will remain till the Iraqis agree for new political process (Rear, 2008, 165). Directly after regime change in 2003, some called for dissolving the army, they outlined that the army was made up of Baathist supporters of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration argued that it could create a new army that had no ties to the old regime (Brigham, 2008, 81). This new NIS is seen by Iraq's Sunnis as a "Shiite-Kurdish militia. This dilemma goes along with the security instability caused by terrorism and insurgency.

Along with state-building process, it was asked whether Iraq should follow the Western style of modernization. The biggest challenge facing the new regime in Baghdad is to increase participation and involve the opposition in the political process. Journalist Fareed Zakaria⁴⁸ asserted that Washington should accept a "liberal autocracy" in places like Iraq because this type of government can get the job of nation building done without the distractions of democratic politics. This political challenge would have an important implication on USA to fully define a strategy for achieving a long-term partnership with Iraq that can serve core American interests and help Iraq's fledgling democracy avoid a slide back to civil war (Pollack et al., 2011, 11-12). Khaled Al-Yaquobi (2013, 484-485) asserts that among many challenges Iraq has faced post-Saddam, the issue of national unity is pivotal. He accused Saddam Hussein's regime of damaging the national identity in Iraq through brutal oppression against different groups. For Khaled the US administration's policy caused harm to the National identity in Iraq through the establishment of *Interim Governing Council* based on the ethnic-religious divisions of the Iraqi society. Iraq saw a resurgence of traditional forms of politics characterized by deep social divisions and Iran was blamed for flaming tensions. This unstable situation pushed some specialists like David Wurmser, to ask "Is Tyranny a Path to Stability or to Anarchy?" The assumption was that only a strong central government could

⁴⁷ In the absence of a national identity, it is perhaps to be expected that leaders would attempt to utilize ethnicity as glue which could bind the population of the state together. Whenever, as was true in the case of the identification of Iraq with its Arab inhabitants, ethnicity becomes associated with the state-building process in an ethnically heterogeneous society (especially one in which there is a relatively neat territorial demarcation between ethnic groups), this association becomes a recipe for ethnic mobilization, counter-mobilization, and the resulting conflict between groups. Such has been the case between Arabs and Kurds within Iraq from the very beginning. (Quoted in Rear, 2008, 167).

⁴⁸ Fareed Zakaria (2014). Who lost Iraq? The Iraqis did, with an assist from George W. Bush, The Washington post.

hold Iraq together as a nation and provide stability to the region. Kenneth Pollack asserts that strong Iraqi government is a necessity as long it is not so strong to pose a potential threat to the region. This was the same sentiment echoed by other members of the American journalism. A 1963 Council on Foreign Relations study group, some members of which eventually became senior officials in subsequent administrations, produced a report on the rise of the Ba'ath in Syria and of Nasser in Egypt. "The underlying assumption evident in the report is that the West's emphasis on freedom is inappropriate for the Middle East, where politics is exotic and primitive, rooted in tribalism and local forms of identity—indeed, all forms of political decentralization" (quoted in Wurmser, 1999, 45). Due to this idea US regional policy has accepted repressive and strong states in the region. Intelligence Council issued a report titled "Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq" in January 2003. "It noted that "building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq's tradition of authoritarianism. Iraqi political culture does not foster liberalism or democracy" (Hybel & Kaufman, 2006, 105). This was the same sentiment shared by the first Bush administration.

With the restoration of sovereignty to Iraqis, democratization and nation-building pose daunting tasks. Robert Lieber argues three problems go along in Iraq: the inherent difficulties of developing a political system; encompassing national reconciliation; and the problem of national identity for a country whose borders were arbitrarily drawn by British and French (Lieber, 2005, 141-142). Thus, any ill-calculated strategy to deal with these problems together will destabilize Iraq and could strengthen the extremist's organizations throughout the Arab Middle East. Despite the belief that democracy is the best solution to Iraq crisis, Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack highlighted some critics raise related objections to creating a democratic Iraq (Byman & Pollack in Lennon & Eiss, 2004, 317-318):

- First, acceptable alternatives to democracy exist for Iraq that is considered to be more feasible and more likely to ensure the stability and cohesiveness of the country.
- Second, Iraq is supposed to be not ready for democracy.
- Third, Iraqi society is too fragmented for democracy to take hold. Even if Iraq were to hold elections, in practice such a system would yield an illiberal result.
- Fourth, they insist that the transition to democracy in Iraq would be too perilous and the resulting government too weak.

In conclusion creating democracy in Iraq would require a long-term U.S. commitment to ensure that the country will not slip into dictatorship again. In a Washington Post editorial dated December 20, 2002, titled “Iraq: The Decade After,” Hagel and Biden wrote:

Once he (Saddam Hussein) is gone, expectations are high that coalition forces will remain in large numbers to stabilize Iraq and support a civic administration . . . as many as 75,000 troops may be necessary, at a cost of up to \$20 billion a year . . . Americans are largely unprepared for such an undertaking . . . President (quoted in Kashmeri, 2007, 28).

The threat of radicalism and another form of dictatorship was posed to dictate the need of the US forces to exist. The greatest obstacle to democracy in Iraq is the potential for one group to dominate the country. Indeed, this obstacle of mistrust points out one of the great risks of a poorly designed parliamentary system for Iraq. Furthermore, to these challenges, Toby Dodge (2003, 159) notices another challenge to the US administration is that "the United States, like the British in the 1920s, will succumb to “primordialization.” They will again by picking up the structures of Baathist rule." Dodge (2005, 5) also emphasizes that the difficulties in establishing law and order in the aftermath of the war in 2003 have had roots in the type of campaign that US planners thought they were going to fight, and the type of resistance they assumed they would meet. He upholds that US administration had no sufficient assessment of the Iraqi people and its culture and this is one of the factors led to the failure. Dodge believes that the most worrying reason of violence in Iraq post-Saddam is Iraqi Islamism, with both Sunni and Shia variants. For him Iraqi political discourse has been strongly shaped by the twin ideological influences of Islam and nationalism since the independence in 1932. He accuses US forces of failure to impose order that caused the rise of independent militias. These militias, increasingly organized along sectarian lines, have increased their power and visibility on the streets of Iraq’s major towns and cities. Dodge (2005, 34) also asserts that the political aspirations of the majority of the population (the Shia) will be a defining factor in how post-Saddam Iraq evolves. Dodge argues that Shia political opinion has been shaped by three competing groups: the religious hierarchy based in Najaf and Karbala, the urban middle-class intellectuals, and once thriving entrepreneurial and mercantile class. And this political division, between Shia groups⁴⁹, would play a negative role in Iraq's political stability. The political

⁴⁹ Toby Dodge divided the competition among Shia community into two categories: First, the political (this is in reference to) project, there is a long-standing divide between the Ulema and the wider Shia community in Iraq,

mobilisation of Iraq's Sunnis has been much slower and more decentralised than that of the country's other two main communities. Lacking both the centralised religious institutions of the Shia and the two dominant parties of the Kurds, Sunnis fear that the new order will result in their marginalisation and persecution. The Sunni political void though has been partially filled by the rise of the Muslim brotherhood and the Iraqi Islamic party. Dodge (2013, 5) concludes that the Socio-Political circumstances in Iraq post-Saddam shows a remarkable tendency towards the rise of a new authoritarianism. He referred to a recent example regarding the former Prime Minister Al-Maliki's policy to consolidate his grip on power that involved building a small and cohesive group of functionaries; the 'Malikiyoun'. The 'Malikiyoun' (Malikists) comprises two separate groups: first, close family members, who occupy sensitive positions in the prime minister's office; second, functionaries from his own party (Dawah). By designating weak politicians personally tied to Maliki as acting ministers, Maliki has increased his control over the army, police force and the intelligence services. Having increased his control over the army through the Office of the Commander in Chief and provincial command centres, Maliki then undertook direct management of the most effective fighting force in the country, the Iraq Special Operations Forces, created by the United States. Comprising 4,200 soldiers, this body is considered the best Special Forces organization in the Middle East, Dodge argues.

Beside the Socio-Political problems many intellectuals mention that without internal security, the political process will be badly distorted if not entirely undermined. Another critique raised from the contradiction that the tasks of stability and building democratic system in Iraq need long term US commitments, while some assert that the United States will not be capable of playing the role outlined above because it is no more welcomed for direct intervention and it is not the main player in Iraqi case. The cases of Japan and Germany do not apply to Iraq, whereby both domestic and regional atmospheres were against the presence of U.S troops.

2.3.2. Post-2003 Iraq as conceived by Mass Media in the United States (Public perception):

exacerbated by the mass leftist politics of the 1950s and 1960s and the spread of secularism up to the 1980s. This mirrors an ideological divide in lay Shia life between those who support a broadly secular political platform that argues for greater equality and democracy. Second, a further division exists between the religious hierarchy that remained in Iraq under Saddam, and exiled groups in Iran and elsewhere (Dodge, 2005, 35).

The image on Iraq in United States of America has been conceived as per the political agenda of US administration and also partly by the state quo circumstances of the Middle East and Iraq's behavior in particular. In the 1980s despite the fact that Saddam was a tyrant who had enslaved his own people, tortured them, USA was looking at him as a moderator of the Middle East, a secular whose ideas did not meet the Islamic revolution. Eventually the policy of rapprochement with Iraq was shifted to confrontation because of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Since this aggression US Successive Administrations tried to topple Saddam's regime. Some reviews of editorials published by the New York Times and Washington Post clearly illustrate the print media's complicity in reinforcing the WMD claims by consistently repeating a substantial list of facts (and speculations) regarding Saddam's reconstitution of his WMD programs. Howard Kurtz, the Washington Post's media critic, discovered that, "from August 2002 until the war was launched in March of 2003 there were about 140 front page pieces in the Washington Post making the administration's case for war (Harvey, 2012, 190). Harvey finds out that the collective failure of the US (and British) media was a product of the same basic problem confronting intelligence communities. He asserts that the lack of credible information concerning Iraq was due to the absence of inspectors on the ground with the capacity to generate an alternative intelligence story, then, it was easier to play up the 'fears' associated with WMD than to challenge the historical record. According to him failure of Saddam regime to submit a robust case against Administration's claims, played a significant cause for the expanding of public supports to war policy. Because of Saddam totalitarian policy and the lack of transparency, American journalists and other reporters could not cover realities on the ground.

For this part of the research, my primary source of information was the mainstream media like CNN, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street*, and *Los Angeles Times*. One can figure out that Americans increasingly perceive the Iraq war as a distinct from the fight against terrorism, according to the polls, terrorism and the war in Iraq hold about equal importance in the minds of Americans (Hulse & Connelly, 2006). Saddam's threat was complicated and compound of WMD and the access of terrorists to this threat. The connection between news from the front and the performance of the incumbent is often ambiguous, providing elite discourse with considerable room to shape the formation of political judgments. Thus, the effects of war events and casualty reports on political judgments may flow through citizens' beliefs about the war at hand (Voeten & Brewer, 2006, 809). Adam Bresenisky (2009, 63) asserts that the course of events in a given conflict directly determines public support for war. Most American supported the war as long they

were convinced that Saddam was involved in 9/11 events.⁵⁰ In fact, the majority of the Americans have no chance to acknowledge classified documents or the ability to analyze international affairs. They relied on the media for information tools. In a New York Times/CBS News poll conducted in May 2007, 62 percent of Americans viewed the war in Iraq more negatively since 2003 due to the fact that the war casualties were so expensive for Iraqis and Americans.⁵¹ Still there was a majority support to continue to finance the war as long the Iraqi government met specific goals as well as American troops still there (Sussman, 2007). Another poll conducted by the same network news in July 2007, revealed that 42 percent of Americans said that looking back, taking military action in Iraq was the right thing to do, down from 64 percent of Americans supported the war in 2003. Many of those who supported the invasion made it clear that they are no longer convinced that the United States should remain in Iraq (Megan Thee, 2007). The results of these Polls indicate that US public opinion shifted in the favor of the war because of recent political developments in Iraq. Also they started to be convinced that the presence of US in Iraq will not only solve the problems but also enhance political situation. The deteriorating situation in Iraq is a clear example of a failing foreign policy that is undermining the president's political support and public confidence in aggressive foreign policy actions (Davies, 2008). Also 72 percent disapprove of president's Bush handling of the situation in Iraq. Negative view of Iraq war in American public opinion has escalated to reach 53 percent of those who believe that Iraq war was a mistake (Dugan, 2013). Mueller's (1973) study of public opinion toward the Korean and Vietnam wars, found out that, public support for the U.S. war effort in both conflicts eventually changed, but in ways that seemed explicable and rational, rather than random and mindless (Holsti, 2006, 64).

One can notice that the dissatisfaction towards Iraq war in American Public opinion was directly related to the situation in Iraq, the level of dissatisfaction reached 63 percent in 2007-2008 as to when the violence in Iraq had escalated. Resulting to which Bush Administration had to send

⁵⁰ Public Support ranged between 60 and 70 percent across all major media outlets from December 2002 through March 2003 to American strategy toward Iraq (Harvey, 2012, p182). In the January, 2003, PIPA/KN poll, 68 percent expressed the belief that Iraq played an important role in September 11 (Kull, Ramsey & Lewis, 2004, 570). Kull et al., argue that misperception had found a profound voice in the public mind in the U.S towards Iraq. They quote PIPA/KN Poll (2003) which revealed that Americans have also incorrectly believed that Iraq actually used WMD in the 2003 war against U.S' troops. While another PIPA/KN Poll found out that the majority of American respondents perceived greater world support for Iraq war in 2003.

⁵¹ For more information about partisan support to the Iraq war after 2003, see: Bersinisky, A. (2009). *In Time of War Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq*, The University of Chicago Press, PP: 100-105.

additional troops in Iraq. This dissatisfaction increased again in July 2014 after the ISIS threat⁵². The Poll (Shear & Sussman, 2014) conducted in the same month that 58 percent disapproved the idea of sending troops to Iraq to confront ISIS; they favor the cooperation with Iran in a limited capacity to resolve the situation in Iraq. While 42 percent said the United States still has a responsibility to stop the violence in Iraq. Americans were also split over whether the threat of terrorism against the United States will increase as a result of the violence in Iraq. John Nagl asserts in his articles, published in New York Times, that the first lesson of Iraq war, is, no Qaida presence in Iraq until the American invasion, which caused social order to collapse and provided the terrorist group with powerful recruiting message and a dangerous new base from which to attack. Nagl continues his argument with the finding that political turmoil gives some armed and non-state actors the chance to pursue alternative forms of state building, like, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic State. Nagl contends that both offers very different perception when it comes to their idea of state, there exist a deep contrast in their work. In Iraq too, as in Syria, Libya, Sudan and Yemen, hybrid forms of “localized security”, have emerged as governments have “deputized” national defense and regime protection to a variety of communal militias, further undermining the central state and its armed forces. Yezid Sayigh (2014) figures out that the consequences are graphically illustrated in Iraq and Syria, where rebuilding broken armies and renegotiating the civil-military relationship has been an integral part of reconstructing the state. Many of Foreign policy experts conclude that the withdrawal of American army from Iraq caused a vacuum combined with the disabled Iraqi government. Critics against Obama decision to withdraw forces from Iraq have cited Germany, Japan and South Korea as places where the U.S. military has been, “a stabilizing force.” They contend that the lack of a similar residual troop presence (numbering between 20,000 and 30,000) caused the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to grow and the Iraqi army to fold (Brownlee, 2014).

Fareed Zakaria blames Iraqi prime minister (al-Maliki) and his ruling party over the insurgency in Iraq. He explains that the exclusion of Sunnis from power by the use of armed forces has caused chaos. For him, "this meant that a structure of Sunni power that had been in the area for centuries

⁵² See figure n1 in: Erik Voeten and Paul R. Brewer (2006). Public Opinion, the War in Iraq, and Presidential Accountability, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50: 809.

collapsed and the turmoil in the Middle East is often called a sectarian war. But really it is better described as “the Sunni revolt across the region, from Iraq to Syria”.⁵³

A group of American experts see the failure in Iraq as a threat; Carter Eskew (2014) adds to this point that:

We now have a state that has finally failed, after being in intensive care since the British mandate of the 1920s. This failure has brought forth a new and very serious threat to our nation: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the cross-boundary force emerging in Iraq.

Joel Rayburn accused the expatriate parties that arrived in Baghdad after April 2003, of deploying sectarian agendas. The enduring dilemma that has put modern Iraq in turmoil- the relationship between the people and the state, the relationship between Kurdistan and Arab Iraq, the relationship between Sunnis and Shiites, the relationship between Baghdad and its 18 provinces - remain unsettled (Rayburn, 2014). Perhaps the best-known instance was in 2006, when then-Senator Joe Biden and Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations called for the division of the country into three autonomous regions, based on sect, with a central government that would “control border defense, foreign affairs and oil revenues.” James Baker et al. (2006, 4) disagrees with Biden-Gelb project of dividing Iraq to three autonomous regions. They assert:

The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central control would be too high; because the regional boundaries cannot be easily drawn. A rapid devolution could result in mass population movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions. Such a division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state.

In Iraq's multi-sectarian political process, developed post-Saddam Hussein, the political agreement contends that the prime minister is a Shiite, the parliament speaker is a Sunni and the president is a Kurd. Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders all have endorsed the new prime ministerial nominee, veteran Shiite lawmaker Haider Abadi, a member of Maliki's Dawah political party. But observers say that one of Abadi's greatest challenges will be to forge consensus among sects that have grown

⁵³Fareed Zakaria (2014). Who lost Iraq? The Iraqis did, with an assist from George W. Bush, {Online}. The Washington post.

deeply wary of one another. Islamic State militants in cities such as Tikrit enjoyed considerable support from Sunni residents opposed to what they view as Shiite domination in Baghdad. In May 2013, the Institute for the Study of War, Washington, wrote that Iraqi Sunnis, "are functionally excluded from government" (Bengali, 2014). Paul Richter (2014) asserts that, "Iraq's Sunni and Shiite communities are captive to the mistrust from the 2006-8 civil war inflamed by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's violent treatment of the Sunnis from 2010 to 2014 and the subsequent Sunni embrace of the Islamic State. Richter and others insist on their misconceptions that the government's security forces, both army and police, are overwhelmingly Shiite; and the Sunni populace has been affected by reports of the Shiite troops and militiamen conducting brutal ethnic cleansing operations. Some American experts contend that the breakup of Mideast countries into ethnic states may be a natural and inevitable outcome of the upheaval that has swept through the region in recent years. A partition of Iraq could draw regional powers Iran and Turkey more deeply into the conflict (Richter, 2014). Anthony H. Cordesman, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, adds additional reasons to question the type of federalism favored by the Biden-Brownback proposal. Creation of separate zones or enclaves could also expose some regions to external threats, including from Iran, and would likely fail to reduce sectarian tensions. James Fallows points out that:

American Army has not won its wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya or anywhere else in the last 20 years, if winning means creating a stable, capable and ideally democratic governing structure that is able and willing to police its own territory. We have lost because we — our civilian leaders, our country — have accepted objectives that are not attainable. Our goal has been to put countries on the road to modernity, to move them toward well-governed, prosperous, democratic. We are guilty of assuming that the United States is not only a "city on a hill" but also the natural model for how human beings should organize political authority. Modern election outcomes in these places are often perverted or produce leaders who have no interest in sustaining accountable governance. Our objective should be "good enough" governance, which means ensuring that a state is capable of keeping order within its own boundaries — at least enough order to contain transnational terrorists (Quoted in Krasner, 2015).

In this context as mentioned in the Rand Corporate Report (Dobbins, 2003, 168) the challenges that the United States faces in Iraq:

- Those are common to societies emerging from totalitarian rule.
- In Iraq's case, the political structures the British created after World War I were left with no tradition of pluralist democracy.
- Politics have always been about authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force.
- The sense of Iraqi national identity does exist, this does not override communal forms of identity along ethnic, geographic, tribal, or religious boundaries.
- Political interaction does not show tendency toward the revisiting of past injustice and oppression that decided against the majority of the population (Shi'ia and Kurds).
- The military, security services, and bureaucracy need to be radically reformed and purged.
- The economy needs a major overhaul to make it competitive in global markets.

Finally, Thomas Friedman identifies another problem which might be so serious to US policy in Iraq, is the public image and acceptability of US in Iraq. He described, in an article published in *The New York Times*, the Iraqi community:

- (1) the Kurds are the only allies of the USA in Iraq in the fight for democracy and freedom".
- (2) The Sunni as Jihadists, Baathists, and tribal militiamen who have led the takeover of Mosul from the Iraqi Government.
- (3) He accuses the Iraqi government of supporting the Shiites' militias and excluding the Sunnis from political process.

In this regard, Larry Diamond argues that this problem is up to the deep Iraqi suspicions of American motives combined with the memory of Arabs' historical confrontation with Western colonialism (Diamond in Fukuyama, 2006, 183). Many other specialists and Journalists agree with Friedman; they say that US administrations failed to install a government, in Iraq, closer to Washington than to Tehran. They continue that America has failed in Iraq for two reasons: the first is related to the official misconception towards Iraq's political and social dynamics; the second concerned to Iraq's cultural and political peculiarities which might be perceived as incompatible to democratic governance. To understand better on what ground American experts analyze and perceive Iraq's politics, in the third chapter I will discuss western political philosophy regarding three main themes: John Rawls' *Political Liberalism*; Bernard Lewis' argument which questions the Muslims incompatibility with democracy; and Huntington's Clash of Civilization.

Conclusion

Astrid Erll argues for 'cultural memory' as essential element on image creation process towards others. Cultural memory is based on communication through media (Erll, 2008, 389). Polls suggest that a majority of Americans have held at least one of three mistaken impressions about Iraq war (2003), contributing too much of the popular support for the war. These impressions were as follows: Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; Saddam Hussein helped in the attacks on September 11; and, finally, that other nations either backed the US-led war or were evenly split between supporting and opposing it (as seen for instance in Gallup polls). The media is supposed to be objective and it is detrimental in becoming a product and also a producer of public consciousness. Lodge and Stroh observe that the process of bringing thoughts and feelings to mind works "through the mechanism of spreading activation" (quoted in Entman, 2003, 418). Spreading activate interpretations within individuals is unconscious psychological process, whereas the spread of interpretative schemas within and across other levels of the system is rarely automatic or unconscious and so forth. Representation of the public in this process flows in both directions. Public opinion is often fed by the political elites who frame the discourse in a particular way to feed their purpose. Robert Entman (1989, 76) asserts that Information processing research shows that people have cognitive structures, called "schemas," which organize their thinking. A person's system of schemas stores substantive beliefs, attitudes, values, and preferences along with rules for linking different ideas. He finds that media messages can indeed move audiences in directions counter to their predominant dispositions. I conclude that the public perception of Iraq has been guided by the authority structure. The Media has been subjected to manipulation, oriented to show the audience specific ideas. The function of this defined image was to get public support to the foreign policy⁵⁴. But what is most important is that how the image of Iraq post-Saddam has been perceived. This image concludes that the current nation-state in Iraq is in real danger. Four main issues are being raised: (1) National identity, (2) American failure in Iraq, (3) Nation building and security instability, (4) ISIS threat on Iraq and the regional stability. But most experts give a room to *National identity* crisis in Iraq. Phebe Marr asserts that the crisis of national identity is not new and exists since the creation of the modern state of Iraq in 1921(Marr in Kaim, 2008, 17-18; Bacik,

⁵⁴ Because the evidence for this threat was not fully manifest, the Bush administration led the public to believe that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and providing substantial support to the al-Qaeda terrorist group. The challenge for the administration was later intensified when the United States occupied Iraq and was unable to find the expected corroborating evidence (Kull, Ramsey & Lewis, 2004, 569).

2008, 176). Marr pays attention to the British mandate in shaping political realities after 1921. Hence the crisis was up to: first, the new leaders, Iraqi and British, largely Arabized the state; second, the British introduced a new political paradigm for governance—a Western-style parliamentary system with a monarchy. Through this process the Sunni elites controlled the state system until 2003. Facing the challenge of centralism in the form of Arab-oriented Iraqi identity, most groups have protected themselves in tribal forums. Marr indicates that "at the beginning, many of Iraq's leaders, mainly Sunni Arabs, were not yet ready to accept the reality of an Iraqi state and yearned to be part of a larger Arab polity.

Martin Harrow (2010, 278-279) gives space to the second important issue in Iraq, one of the four issues I mentioned above, which is the effect of the Iraq war (2003) on expanding terrorism both in the West and in the East. Three hypotheses have been formulated based on arguments appearing in academic articles and newspapers. The most important is that Iraq war will lead to an enhanced threat of Islamic terrorism in the West in the short and long run. Islam in Iraq, Hanna Batatu once said, is more a force for division than integration, since it occasions the deep split between the Shi'i and Sunni Arabs. Thus, the use of violence was the dominant substitution mechanism there (Bacik, 2008, 205). Thus this violence, combined with the distrust that shape the relationship among society segments, have escalated the threat of terrorism in general and of ISIS in particular. The threat is that the political turmoil along with the crisis of national identity may cause a strong wave of change in the region. This change might affect the political map of Iraq and the region alike. It holds within it the seeds of the sectarian war along with the threat of extending the battle into the west. This potential threat will be explored in the next chapters.

Third Chapter

The Intellectual dialogue and the perception of Arab-Muslim World

This chapter questions the perception built about the Arab-Muslim world by political theory in the West. Three representations are fundamental to the debate:

- 1- The prospect of political liberalism.
- 2- The prospect of democracy.
- 3- The clash of civilization and Arab-Muslim world, scopes for cooperation or conflict.

To tackle these representations, the chapter is constructed into three sections:

- The first section will discuss John Rawls's theory of political liberalism. In addition, it tries to ask the extent to which this theory fits the socio-political context of the Middle East. In addition, it also asks the extent to which political liberalism theory is related to secularism.
- The second section is about the prospect of democracy in the Middle East. In this regard, two perspectives are going to be raised. The first are those which are pessimist about the prospect of democracy and modernity in the Muslim world. Bernard Lewis is the key intellectual of this trend. In contrast the second trend, as John Esposito suggests, is to encourage and honor the prospect of democracy in the Muslim world.
- The third section will discuss the clash of civilization and the prospect of peace and cooperation in the global order. Two intellectual orientations will be raised: first, those who support the arguments of Samuel Huntington's theory of clash; this aspect argues about the right to intervene in the Muslim world and orient them towards western values. The second are those who oppose such a prospect of clash; they discuss fundamental notions of multiculturalism and pluralism to ensure mutual respect and cooperation in the global sphere. Within this orientation the model of Rawls's *Law of Peoples* will be the key note of global stability and toleration.

In general, these three essential questions can be classified in the following way:

- The first is about the reasonable conduct of the individual in the public sphere.
- The second is about the institutional arrangements that are necessary, such as constitutional democracy, to install reasonableness in the behavior of both the individual and civil society. It aims

to establish reasonableness in the moral ground of public justification process and to strengthen the sense of justice and civic commitment.

- The third question is about the relations among the units of the international community in the global sphere. It aims to suggest how it is possible to establish and maintain peace and cooperation within the society of peoples.

3.1 First Section: political liberalism and Muslim societies:

In this section political liberalism theory is going to be addressed from different angles and perspectives. The main theme is to understand what does political liberalism mean? Is it valid for Arab-Muslim societies? My intention is to illustrate the characteristics of Rawls' political liberalism theory. The main reason for this illustration is to study the prospect of political liberalism in post-2003 Iraq.

This section consists of two parts: first, is about Rawls' Political Liberalism; second, is about some intellectual responses and discussions to this theory.

3.1.1. Rawls' theory of political liberalism:

Political Liberalism, for Rawls, is the necessary ideology that able to achieve political stability in the most diverse communities in terms of beliefs and doctrines. The main aim of political liberalism is to create a reasonable citizen/person that respects pluralism as a permanent feature of public culture. Pluralism helps create reconcile between different conceptions of justice. Such a view holds that institutions are justifiable to the extent they effectively promote a common sense of good (Rawls, PL, 2005, 134). This raises the question of the *legitimacy* of the general structure of authority with witch the idea of *public reason* is intimately connected. Two points are central to political liberalism:

- First, questions about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are as far as possible to be settled by an appeal to political values alone.
- Second, the political values expressed by its principles and ideals normally have sufficient weight to override all other values that may come in conflict with them.

Still, Rawls argue that it is vital to the idea of political liberalism that it would be unreasonable to use political power to enforce a one's own comprehensive view affirmed as either reasonable or true. To this extent, Rawls asks how is political liberalism possible? The answer to this question has two complementary parts (Rawls, 2005, 139-44):

- The first part says that political values are great and hence cannot be easily overridden: these values govern the basic framework of social life. In *Justice as Fairness* some of these great values are expressed by the principles of justice for the basic structure. Rawls argues that the values of the public reason not only include the appropriate use of fundamental concepts of judgment but also the virtues of reasonableness and fair mindedness.

- Second, is through the Overlapping consensus. Two main points are due regarding the idea of an overlapping consensus: the first is that a consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines depends on reasonable pluralism; the second point is that in a constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be presented as independent and neutral.

Rawls asks how deep does the consensus is from within the citizens' comprehensive doctrines? He asserts that legitimacy is an essential concept to overlapping consensus. Through equal rights and just electoral system political reason must spread. To answer such a question, he discussed four objections likely to be raised against the idea of social unity founded on an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice (Rawls: PL, 147-59):

- First, that an overlapping consensus is a *modus Vivendi*⁵⁵.
- Second, an overlapping consensus is quite different from a *modus Vivendi*. Here, he notes three aspects: the object of consensus; the political conception of justice as a moral conception; and stability. An overlapping consensus, therefore, is not merely a consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of self- or group interests. While the feature of stability highlights a basic contrast between an overlapping consensus and a *modus Vivendi*. The stability depends on happenstance and a balance of relative forces. For the vast majority in society are confident that the distribution of power affirms that the political conception of justice is for their own sake.

⁵⁵*Modus Vivendi* is a Latin phrase that means "mode of living" or "way of life". It often is used to mean an arrangement or agreement that allows conflicting parties to coexist in peace. In science or biology, it is used to describe lifestyles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_vivendi

- A third objection is that an overlapping consensus as a workable political conception must be general and comprehensive. Thus the political conception can be seen as part of a comprehensive doctrine but is not a consequence of that doctrine's nonpolitical values. But who is going to be in charge of this task to guarantee that all nonpolitical values will be reasonable. To this task Rawls allocates the institutions of the basic structure so that intractable conflicts are unlikely to arise; he asserts also the need of agreement over clear and simple principles such as political cooperation and mutual respect. For him the liberal political conception of justice is the most valuable in a democratic regime. The essential virtues of political cooperation that make a constitutional regime possible are tolerance, reasonableness and the sense of fairness.
- The fourth objection is that an overlapping consensus is utopian. It outlines one way in which it seems such a consensus might come about to secure the social stability. The outline is in two stages: the first ends with a constitutional consensus; the second with an overlapping consensus. In constitutional consensus a constitution satisfying certain basic principles establishes democratic electoral procedures for moderating political rivalry within society.

Still the overlapping consensus based on political values enabling to avoid reliance on general and comprehensive doctrines; is required because:

- First, it identifies the fundamental role of political values in expressing the terms of fair social cooperation consistent with mutual respect between citizens regarded as free and equal.
- Second, it uncovers a sufficiently inclusive fit among political and other values seen in a reasonable overlapping consensus.

Over time the initial acquiescence in a constitution satisfy these liberal principles of justice of certain looseness in comprehensive views in favor of *pluralist view*; which is the third doctrine in Rawls' model. This suggests that many if not most citizens come to affirm the principles of justice incorporated in their constitution and political practice without seeing any particular connection between those principles and their other views.

Two requirements are essential to let liberal principles effectively regulate basic political institutions, towards a stable constitutional consensus: first, the fact of reasonable pluralism. The second is connected with the kind of public reason that applies liberal principles of justice. Here, the question is how to transfer the constitutional consensus to an overlapping one? Public reason is

required to accomplish this mission. This public reason must be based on a political conception of justice. Rawls suggests that to ensure stability in the political stage responsibility must be transported from the institutions to the social forces. In other words, through public reason groups tend to enter public discussion and appeal to other groups of different comprehensive doctrines. In this regard, Rawls argued that "groups develop political conceptions in terms of which they can explain and justify their preferred policies to a wider public so as the political majority can be established" (Rawls, PL, 165).

Thus, to ensure that political majority will successfully accept and uphold a collective interpretation of good and justice there must be fundamental legislation that guarantees liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. But the legislation itself requires the public reason as element core of policy-making process. Public reason honors political liberalism which in turn requires that:

- First, that the values of the political are great and not easily overridden.
- Second, that there are many reasonable comprehensive doctrines that understand the wider realm of values to be congruent with or not in conflict with.

A balance of reasons as seen within each citizen's comprehensive doctrine is the basis of citizen's respect for the limits of public reason. Rawls idea of public reason respects the fact that there are various backgrounds of reason as well as understands that the differentiation in doctrines interact with the political reality that each doctrine is endorsed by specific number of people. Hence, the balance between doctrines should be based on a unique framework of rights which should be applied equally to all. Thus, public reason should focus on the citizen rather than the groups. The citizen needs to find himself treated justly before the law and equally receives equal rights. By this framework the citizen has no need to go back to his social group to guarantee rights. If so then the lines between majority and minority blurred. Rawls asks why should citizens in voting on the most fundamental political questions honor the limits of public reason. To this end *liberal legitimacy* is very important due to the fact that in a democracy political power is the power of the public of free and equal citizens as a collective body (Rawls, 2005, 216). Political liberalism requires that the exercise of political power is proper and justified only when it is exercised in accordance with constitutional principles. Citizens affirm the ideal of public reason from within their own reasonable doctrines. From this perspective, public reason is limited and varies from one person to another with respect to his/her doctrine, but two features must be preserved that are political and plural.

Rawls in the discussion of public reason demonstrates three difficulties (Rawls, 2005, 240-44):

- First is that public reason often allows more than one reasonable answer to any particular question.
- A second difficulty is that what public reason requires is that citizens must take into considerations before voting these principles such as a reasonable balance of public political values; the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
- A third difficulty is to specify when a question is successfully resolved by public reason for a political conception of justice to be complete.

The limits of public reason do not apply when the majority tries to export their doctrine or the conception of good to others. The "exclusive view" asserts that reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason; while the "inclusive view" allow the citizens to present what they regard as the basis of political values rooted in their comprehensive doctrine, they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason itself. Rawls finds that the inclusive view seems the correct one. Diverse religious groups oppose one another, one group favoring government public education alone, another group favoring government support for religious schools as well. In this situation those of different faiths may come to doubt the sincerity of one another's allegiance to fundamental political values. The goal is to strengthen mutual trust and public confidence.

To guarantee social stability public confidence should be to which any political project is established. To this end two elements are essential: the political conception of justice and ideal of honoring public reason mutually support one another in establishing a reasonable and stable society in which citizens have the capacity for a sense of justice. Since the citizen is the priority, then the approach to have a well-ordered society must be oriented to create well-educated reasonable citizen. To this end, Rawls sets three grounds related to the capacity for a sense of justice (Rawls, 2005, 316-20):

- First, the collective conception of good.
- Second, proceeds from the fundamental importance of 'self-respect', the idea is that the citizen should mainstream himself as a fully cooperating member of society.
- Third ground is the "a social union of social unions", the idea is that a democratic society can be for each citizen a far more comprehensive good.

The notion of social unions gives to all the citizens the capacity to participate and coordinate various activities. To Rawls social unions encourage people to honor the notion of reciprocity. To accelerate the collectiveness of reciprocity and cooperation, political liberalism, according to Rawls, offers the basic mechanism which is the public justification⁵⁶ that works in tandem with the other three ideas: reasonable, stability for the right reasons and legitimacy. It happens when all the reasonable members of political society carry out a justification of the shared political conception by embedding it in their several reasonable comprehensive views. Thus, a reasonable overlapping consensus is crucial for the process of public justification. This unity created on the basis of the overlapping consensus yields stability for the right reasons as follows "public political discussions are always reasonably decided on the basis of the reasons specified by the most reasonable political conception of justice" (Rawls, PL, 391-2).

According to the statement above, a reasonable citizen should rely on fair political conception of justice and defend legitimacy by holding reasonable doctrines. Rawls discusses three basic features of reasonable persons as citizens:

- First, their willingness to fair terms of social cooperation.
- Second, their willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment
- Third, toleration, since it recognizes the burdens of judgment, and this in turn leads to liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.

Respectively, reasonable citizens hold these conceptions:

- 1) Equality and cooperation;
- 2) Burdens of judgment and reciprocity;
- 3) Reasonable toleration.

Some would argue that the problem in political liberalism rests in the overlapping consensus, since the basic aim is to convince citizens to adopt the right kind of reasons in an electoral process.

⁵⁶ Political liberalism specifies three different kinds of justification and two kinds of consensus, and then connects these by the idea of stability for the right reasons and with the idea of legitimacy. The three kinds of justification in order are: pre tanto of the political conception; second, full justification of that conception by an individual person in society; third, public justification of the political conception by political society. Consider pro tanto justification, takes into account only political values to give a reasonable answer by public reason to all questions concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice. Second, full justification is carried out by an individual citizen as a member of civil society. Thus it is left to each citizen to say how the claims of political justice are to be ordered against nonpolitical values. Third, is the public justification (Rawls, PL, 386).

Political liberalism has a dilemma at its base since it may produce a comprehensive doctrine to prevail as the essential reason for good and justice, since it is the choice of the majority and that result will still be a legitimate one. Thus, I think that we need to work out over the political culture, including the background culture, to produce a reasonable culture to ensure that people will understand secularism or liberalisms as a solution to the status quo of diversity and not as a challenge to their identity as religious institutions try to address. In this regard, public justification is the method to abandon any shape of the majority's domination over the ideal of right reason. This process requires political institutions that honor legitimacy and work out to enhance the notions of pluralism and tolerance in the sphere of political culture. Here, public reason, as Rawls offers in *Law of Peoples*, is the general public tendency of equal citizens of domestic society debating the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice concerning their own government. Political liberalism proposes that, in a constitutional democratic regime, comprehensive doctrines of right are to be replaced in public reason by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens (Rawls, LOP, 2000, 55). Rawls in *Law of Peoples* updated public reason with the ideal of public reason which means that judges, legislators and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, must follow the idea of public reason and explain in terms of the political conception of justice. How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? Citizens are to think that reasonableness of the officials is a natural outcome of the reasonableness of the citizen, since any citizen is a prospective candidate for an official position. Thus collective reasonableness at its core holds the citizen voluntarily to be reasonable satisfying the criterion of reciprocity without a coherent power. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials accountable to it. For Rawls, *Law of Peoples*, liberal peoples have three basic features: the first is institutional, the second is cultural, and the third requires a firm attachment to a political (moral) conception of right and justice. Thus to have a just reasonable system one further feature that needs to be satisfied is *toleration*. Toleration requires that to be reasonable does not enforce you to be liberal. The main condition is that all have to respect the legal legitimacy that guarantees the permanence and constancy of the perception of good. This lack of respect may wound the self-respect of decent non-liberal actors as peoples or citizens and may lead to great reaction. Here it is crucial that the Law of Peoples does not require decent societies to abandon or modify their religious values and adopt liberal ones (Rawls, 2000, 121). Instead it presumes that

diverged doctrines can find a harmonized ground in the social context. Consequently, the idea of *public reason* specifies the basic moral and political values that are to determine two things: first the political behavior of the constitutional democratic government towards its citizens, and second the collective political culture of the society. Thus, the idea of public reason flourishes in a democratic regime. Democracy is the institutional framework of public reason as the moral interpretation to the relationship between power and legitimacy. It has five different aspects:

- (1) The fundamental political questions to which it applies.
- (2) The persons to whom it applies (government officials and candidates for public office).
- (3) Its content as given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice.
- (4) The application of these conceptions in discussions of coercive norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people.
- (5) Citizen's conceptions of justice that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.

Moreover, such reason is public in three ways (Rawls, LOP, 133) as the reason of free and equal citizens: it is the reason of the public;

- Its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice;
- And its nature and content are public, being expressed in public reasoning by a family of reasonable conceptions of political justice.

The idea of public reason does not apply to the background cultures; and it does not acquire a shift in doctrine itself. It requires a shift in the type of self-expression of these doctrines since it means that the differences between citizens arising from their comprehensive doctrines. Public reason respects the principle of pluralism thus it does not ignore the role and the existence of the doctrines. It simply requires all doctrines to be reasonable in their conduct towards each other's. Hence the idea of political legitimacy is based on the criterion of reciprocity and constitutional power. A democratic regime, through overlapping consensus, assumes that constitutional procedures, such as election, enlighten the citizen in ways of maximizing the scope of cooperation and stability. Equal citizens have to think and act reasonably according to the public reason; this rises with respect for civil duty or obligations. Since all agree and accept that the exercise of political power must be reasonable and just, then, no party has any intention or claim to violate this civil agreement.

Furthermore, to the extent of toleration and pluralism, Rawls distinguishes public reason from secular reason. Rawls built his distinction on the argument that since public justification includes comprehensive doctrines in the public debate, then, public reason is not secular in its function. Public reason must be neutral, not religious or secular; it depends on political conception of justice with respect to the citizen's right to introduce into political discussion his doctrine (Rawls, 2000, 143). Rawls refers to this sphere as *the proviso*, whereby the political values of public reason are distinct from other values in that they are realized in and characterize political institutions. Here, compatibility is possible between religious doctrines and a reasonable political conception that supports a reasonable constitutional democratic regime. The significance of the idea of legitimacy and public reason determine the legitimate law. The constitution is, honored as the guarantee to civil peace. Rawls argue that both religious and political issues should be discussed at their own terms and space. The role of public reason encourages social stability. While a constitutional regime can fully ensure rights and liberties for all permissible doctrines, as one equal citizen among others, each of us accept the *obligations of legitimate law*. The respect to these obligations must be installed in the wide view of *public political culture*, provided that in due course proper political reasons are offered for them. Two aspects are discussed in the public culture which are:

- First, the distinction from the background culture.
- The second aspect is that there may be positive reasons for introducing comprehensive doctrines into public political discussion.

3.1.2. Responses to Political Liberalism:

Here, I am going to refer to some explanations of Rawls' Political Liberalism and the prospect of this idea in the Iraqi society post-2003. One would prefer to start with Sebastiano Maffettone's *Introduction to Rawls*, as he offers one of the most important explanations of the theoretical novelty of *Political Liberalism*. Maffettone argues that the most important notion in PL is the conception of legitimacy as "an element that is capable of determining not only the possibility of enforcing justice but also the content of justice itself" (Maffettone, 2010, 212). He raises some difficulties in political liberalism such as its dual aims: to revise certain aspects of TJ, PL can be read in terms of the theme the priority of the right over the good; to present an original philosophical-political view of liberalism. Here, Rawls asserts the transformation he made in PL, to understand the concept of

reasonable pluralism, in which he replaced social justice by political justice. While Maffettone asserts that it is a process that emerges out of two folds: as the result of a theory of social justice, in one hand, and as a result of a theory of a broader political conception that makes greater concessions to realism and to pluralism in the other. Maffettone introduces a notion of legitimacy which supplements that of justification and differs from Rawls's own notion of "legitimacy". Rawls presents original terms of justification which represents human beings as moral persons with two fundamental moral powers: the conception of the good; and a sense of justice. While Maffettone argues that the justificatory process reflects a person's complexity due to the fact that the citizen himself is a member of a group that justifies their public reason based on their comprehensive doctrine. According to Maffettone there is one way to maintain the balance between what is political and what is a doctrine: if reasonable citizens endorse the same political conception. This conception must be clear, reasonable and plural to include all opposing doctrines in the society. In this regard, public justification does not work out entirely to support the political perception because it depends on people's doctrines. The distinction between them is that, Maffettone thinks that it is necessary to introduce the stronger and more flexible notion of legitimation based on right reason (Maffettone, 2010, 225). Maffettone distinguishes legitimation from validity or legality and justification, because legitimation constitutes a right to exercise coercion derives from the consensus of the governed. From my point of view, justice is equally important, as is legitimacy. Both are necessary for public justification to create reasonable citizens. The human reason is the ground for public justification that paves the way to reach political liberalism as an essential moral context of pluralism. In this context, the overlapping consensus explains how collective support for institutions is possible, without coercion, in a pluralistic society. Because justice itself seems to generate what Rawls's calls the problem of "liberal legitimacy" since power cannot be justified on the basis of only one comprehensive doctrine. The core idea here is that citizens have to take into account the reasonable pluralism to justify, or to accept common institutional morality. Over a long-term process, one would argue that, there is a need for comprehensive doctrine to achieve an overlapping consensus⁵⁷, in case the majority shares the same doctrine, but in the latter phases of this process the political conception will be the sole path to create liberal institutions and reasonable citizens. Here, I quoted Maffettone's assumption that there are two requirements and grounds of

⁵⁷Read also: Rawls, J. (1987). The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1-25.

public reason. The requirements are: the first is objective, the constitutional essentials; the second is subjective: it depends on the persons and their political culture. The grounds are: first, reciprocity, it is connected with fair terms of cooperation; second, legitimacy: public institutions are required to offer arguments based on the political values (Maffettone, 2010, 275-6). These grounds and requirements create the moral obligation of the 'duty of civility'. But how can one make secular reasonable officials or create liberal secular institutions, if the overlapping consensus is not sufficient? Without this consensus people may tend to vote irresponsible candidates who are going to impose a specific set of values derived from a certain comprehensive doctrine. So, the comprehensive doctrine itself must be tolerated. Maffettone finds out that public reason is a method of justification and not legitimacy of what represents a necessary condition for the stability of any system of government through a democratic procedure and respect for reciprocity. Thus, he suggests that we begin by disentangling the idea of public reason from the notion of secular reason. Maffettone's answer to the question raised above is the following: the officials are not required to be secular, while the institutions have to be neutral. One can notice that Habermas and Maffettone share the argument that reciprocity is an essential condition for liberal co-existence between different religious communities (Habermas in Held, 2007, 68). Then the question arises as to how tolerant should a democracy be towards its enemies? How should a constitutional state treat the issue of civil disobedience? Under the proviso, of course, the 'disobedient' citizens should plausibly justify their resistance by citing constitutional principles and express it by nonviolent means. These two conditions again specify the limits of political tolerance in a constitutional democracy. For Habermas the legal norms and the constitutional restrictions are what identify the sense of tolerance in the official terms. He states that:

Frequently neutrality of the state is threatened by the predominance of a majority culture, which abuses its historically acquired influence and definitional power to decide according to its own standards what shall be considered the norms and values of the political culture which is expected to be equally shared by all (Habermas in Honderich, 2015, 320).

In this regard, both camps, the religious and the secular, would violate political neutrality. Thus, civic equality ensures neutrality through distributive justice, equal opportunities and cultural rights

such as those related to personal identity. Here, to conclude Maffettone (2010) and Habermas (2015) the problems in post-2003 Iraq are mostly political. The political problems can be recognized as: conflict over the design of political conception of justice and right, and conflict regarding legitimacy. These problems were fed by distrust among different social unions and disputes among religious doctrines. This political conflict has affected political tolerance in Iraq due to the fact that political behavior of diverge social groups lacks burden of judgment. Paul Wheithman, argues that *burden of judgment* provides the person with a reason to participate fully in a social union of social unions through the sense of justice because the goods of a social union are available “to a preeminent degree” in a social union of social unions. This burden of judgment is what orients the person to behave reasonably towards others. This burden is private in its sense but general in its end. Citizens and institutions must take in consideration the “Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good” (Rawls, PL, 204). In Iraq what happened is that most social groups tend to corner themselves towards militarization because either they do not trust the state's institutions or some social powers manipulate the moment to its political end. As a consequence, the concept of justice was not efficiently met by the government. When government fails to equally endorse people's rights the result is distrust. In this way, reciprocate justice will be replaced by reciprocate violence. The problem in Iraq is related to the wide view of political culture that guides public reason since public reason applies to the person's decisions. Then, each decision made by an ordinary citizen must take into consideration the burden of judgment within the moral justification process of his reason. It is the fact that a person's reliance on religious argument can lead her/him interlocutors to doubt whether she acknowledges the political authority of justice as fairness (Wheithman, 2010, 331). In Wheitman's explanation wide view of political culture depends on public political knowledge? The problem here, Iraqis reliance on their comprehensive doctrine shaped their vision towards political commitment. More specifically, toleration and reciprocity were not met since individuals from diverge social groups has no trust in other's comprehensive doctrines. In this regard, an overlapping consensus failed to endorse justice as fairness. Thus, Iraq's political process lacks shared political conception, thus, it fails to provide the ground to the public justification process since each comprehensive doctrine refuses to meet other's political needs.

This kind of partisan behavior damages the burden of liberty in one's conduct. Rawls stresses that liberty is essential part of one's capacity to justify his/her conduct to others. This capacity based on

the moral interest of the priority of liberty⁵⁸. To Rawls, a collection of basic liberties has priority not only over various human ends, but also over other basic rights and primary goods, such as the access to public offices. “The priority of liberty,” suggests Rawls in PL, “implies in practice that a basic liberty can be limited or denied solely for the sake of one or more other basic liberties.” This self-containment of basic liberties is what forms the sense of burden of judgment. Haider critiques of Rawls’s idea of the superiority of liberty are (Haider, 2008, 140-3):

- First, Rawls targets religion and its principles.
- Second, the idea of the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone? The ground for difference in the worth of liberty lies in the difference in citizens’ access to “authority and wealth, and therefore greater” or lesser “means to achieve their aims.”
- Third, liberal institutions are expected to provide “supportive circumstances” for secular ways of life and “unsupportive or undermining circumstances” for religious ways of life.

Thus, Hamid Hadji Haider, in contrast to Maffettone, asserts that Rawls' model of reason is secular. One would not support Haider's conclusion, due to the fact that Rawls' public reason is distinct from both secular and religious conceptions. He considers both of them as opposing doctrines and allocates for both of the doctrines an equal room in the political discussion. In the case of Iraq, this debate over secularism has occupied huge space in public sphere. This debate was mostly centers against secularism. What extend political failure in Iraq is the facts that the successive governments have failed to tackle two principles found in PL are:

1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

Daniel Dombrowski argues that the freedom of religion and liberty of conscience included in the first principle (the equality principle) should not be trivialized or taken for granted, especially because the denial of freedom of religion can be devastating for sincere religious believers. For

⁵⁸ What characterizes Rawls’s theory of liberalism lies in his commitment to four ideas about liberty as follows (Haider, 2008, 135): (1) the idea of basic liberties; (2) the idea of the superiority of liberty not only over all human ends, but also over all other rights and primary goods; (3) equal liberty for each person; and finally the relationship among different rights and liberties.

Dombrowski it is essential to reach a rational agreement regarding the distribution of economic advantages as a common asset. Thus, equality, for Rawls, is to which the political liberties can be protected. In actuality, Dombrowski contends that reasonable people should take into account the burdens of judgment. The reasonable is a part of the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation (Dombrowski, 2001, 36). Thus, to reduce the disadvantage of inequality, the fair system of cooperation and trust must be strong to guarantee to all equality of liberties despite the fact that not all have the same opportunities to access full rights or advantages of these rights. This difference in opportunities is a natural result of the socio-economic differences that shape the person's life. Also the restriction on the liberties must be equal and fair to all without exceptions be it at an individual or a group level. Rationality and reasonableness are the moral powers that constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for being counted as a full and equal political member of a society. Equality and justice are very important notions to avoid particularity of majority role. These notions are enough to let people, who hold diverge comprehensive doctrines, to think that official conduct is designed for the collective good. But what happened in Iraq official conduct is mostly described as sectarian or violent towards specific social groups. This means that wealth is not distributed justly and equally towards the groups. Rawls is aware of the consequences of the lack of collective agreement on the priority of the right. In this case one perception of good and right prevails and the room of inequality will enlarge due to two reasons: the domination of the majority conception of justice; this perception of justice is not necessary to be related to fairness and equality. Therefore, the unity of the reasonable person must be built on his attachment to the right and his conception of the good. Rawls encourages a restraint on the use of religious reasons while debating political issues. Dombrowski refers to this argument to assert that Rawls' intention is to ensure for the followers of diverse doctrines that no doctrine is proper such that it can dominate the public debate on political issues.

To this extent, pluralism and equality of rights must be restricted to the limits of reasonable pluralism and worthy equality of rights. First by emphasizing and recognizing that:

- Who is in charge of these rights?
- These rights are not for those who oppose the public good in a sense of imposing their comprehensive system of values.

Take into consideration, the traditional religious groups who intend to impose theocratic legislature process. One assumes that this would be supported in case of a society of monolithic religious majority. Still it is the will of people to implement their own system of values in the legislation process in case that this process or system does not represent threat to other people or excludes the minorities from participating in this process. I think that the weakness of Rawls' model rests in its strength, when he emphasizes the priority of the legal constitutional tools over the necessity, still he does not ignore it, of public culture. Reasonable public culture, for Rawls, will be a result of the sufficient implementation of the liberal constitutional system. Here a question is raised: how to create reasonable institutions in the first place? Audard offers two elements to answer such a question, which are (Audard, 2007, 184):

- Political autonomy.
- Constitutional consensus.

Because an agreement on justice means an agreement on the use of coercive political power, it cannot be derived from a shared conception of the good that would destroy people's autonomy and may require the use of oppressive state power. Thus confusion between *personal moral agreements* and *public political consensus* must be cleared. In Iraq both elements are not properly endorsed. Political autonomy requires full sense of political liberty in public conduct. The individual in Iraq could not see himself out of political or religious authority. Restrictions on political autonomy can be recognized on two kinds:

- Voluntarily restrictions; whereby the individual finds himself obliged to endorse such conduct for specific political and doctrinal reasons.
- A cohesive restriction since the individual has no power to challenge either social or political peculiarities.

In this regard, the overlapping consensus suffers from the same restrictions which mentioned above. Since overlapping consensus is based on two powers: individual's moral commitment and social reliability towards cooperation. Rawls, in describing the overlapping consensus, highlights this problem even when he did not make a clear distinction between the role of the individual and the authority. In my point of view, that is because:

- The authority is run by individuals who have the opportunity to be in particular position.

- The general principles of overlapping consensus provide the moral ground to both the individuals as citizens and the officials.
- The principles of Morality and cooperation flourish in the context of a democratic constitutional system where the priority is for the individual rights and liberties.

Audard puts his hand on an important problem in Iraq's political sphere, whereby she states that:

The main feature of democracies and free societies is that obligations and duties, the use of coercive political power, cannot be based on conceptions of the good characteristic of some sectors of society, for instance on religious doctrines, that we are not free to question and decide upon (Audard, 2007, 185).

In Iraq, officials could not distinguish their commitments between private and public spheres. Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds politicians have dealt with the official apparatus as instruments to achieve their private commitments. They prefer to endorse narrow sectarian conduct rather than encourage the national belonging. I can't generalize this finding but at least this what political reality in Iraq suggests along 13 years. Political liberalism makes the person as an end in himself. To this end, Rawls himself suggesting only that a constitutional consensus could constitute a proper path (PL: 158–68). While in the case of Iraq the constitution itself is a subject of conflict. Each group tends to deploy the constitution for their partisan interests without taking into consideration that the constitution should create consensus over legitimacy. Legitimacy is what derives officials to deploy public reason which is acceptable and compatible with the political conception of justice. Public reason is restricted to the reason of citizens and not groups. Citizens should be treated equally and fairly in receiving rights. To this end the citizen's needs should be the core elements of any government's policies. Despite Cathrine Audard critique⁵⁹ public reason should be public at its core and comprehensive religious, moral and philosophical doctrines must be private. Thus, public reason is not only citizens' reason; it is also the reason of political institutions, regulated through the political principles of justice.

⁵⁹ She finds that public reason itself weakens the political autonomy. She asserts that public reason itself is a private reason because it reflects the need and values of the person, the reason became public, for Audard, when the person expresses it in public language that is understood logically by all (Audard, 2007, 208).

3.2. The Second Section: Prospect of Democracy in the Arab-Muslim world:

This section discusses two trends on the prospect of democracy in the Middle East: the first which support Lewis's argument about the deficit of democracy in the Muslim world; the second is in contrast with the first, Esposito and others support the argument that Islam like any other religion is not immune to the social-political circumstances that shape the type of government in any society. Thus, Islam is not an obstacle to the implementation of democracy in the Middle East, but they assert that there is no a monolithic type of democracy that fits all societies.

3.2.1. Bernard Lewis's argument about the deficit of democracy in the Arab-Muslim world:

Lewis presents Islam, from political point of view, as the worst prospects for liberal democracy. To support this argument Lewis defends twelve claims. Still he honors only the Turkish political experience as democratic in Western terms (Lewis, 2010, 55). His claims usually tend to glorify the secular reason or the idea of secularism over Islamic reason. For Muslims, the state is God's state; there could be no other law than that of the God (Lewis, 1993, 181). Secularism for Lewis is essential for Muslims to assimilate in the western symbol of democracy. Proponents of radical change fall into two main groups—the so-called Islamic fundamentalists and the democrats. Each group includes a wide range of sometimes contending ideologies. He states that "all the foreign ideologies—liberalism, socialism, even nationalism—that set Muslim against Muslim are evil, and the Muslim world is now suffering the inevitable consequences of forsaking the God-given law and way of life that were vouchsafed to it" (Lewis, 2010, 59).

Thus, Lewis concludes his first argument that Islam's peculiarities are incompatible to democracy.⁶⁰ In this regard, he avoided the need of making distinction between Islam as religion and the political manipulation of this religion.

⁶⁰ While Amin Maalouf asserts that the deficit of democracy in the Muslim world is related to the political experience of the religion itself. This means that Muslims has deployed the religion for specific political ends. And this deployment was affected by authority interpretation of Islam's political role. He also indicates five reasons for deterioration of democracy in the Arab and Muslim world (Maalouf, 2011, 171-85):

(a) Islam and politics are inseparable.

The second claim is that Muslim's attitude toward democratic elections has been summed up as one collective voice in accordance with the idea of Ummah. Thus, individualism as the search for reason and autonomy is frail. In this kind of reality, he asks, weather liberal democracy is at all compatible with Islam? Is it possible for the Islamic people to evolve a form of government that will be compatible with their own historical, cultural, and religious traditions and yet will bring individual freedom and human rights to the governed as these terms are understood in the free societies of the West? His answer is no. Because Muslims can't depart their historical and religious peculiarities, Lewis claimed.

Third claim is that Islamic history since the earliest phases lacks political institutions⁶¹, until the first introduction of Western institutions in the Islamic world. One obstacle to the emergence of such bodies was the absence of any legal recognition of corporate persons. Thus almost all aspects

(b) Any social or political challenge can make free use of religion to attack the established order.

(c) Lack of separation between religion and politics belongs to the lack of political institution that directs the movement of modernity in the right path.

(d) Without a supreme authority no advance is definitely validated. The prevailing mistrust in the Muslim tradition of centralized religious authority is perfectly legitimate but it has a disastrous side-effect. Without a religious centralizing authority, the sectarian struggle will prevail.

(f) Amin Maalouf's profound conviction is that too much weight is placed on the influence of religion on people. People's interpretation of religion is considered as an important factor that plays a significant role on the religion's political discourse.

⁶¹ Albert Hourani (2013), Buchanan James and Congleton Roger (2006) support this argument of Lewis especially about the institutional crisis in the Arab world. Hourani asks "how was it that the 'Islamic city' was able to maintain its personality, its power of collective action, throughout Islamic history, when it never possessed municipal institutions in which that personality could be formally embodied, or a municipal law which would at once express and legitimize it?" (Hourani, 2013, 24). In the Islamic view of the world there was the individual believer and there was the whole community of believers. The whole spirit of Islamic social thought is based on a common obedience to God's commands. The city in the Islamic world lacks formal institutions because in the Arab-Muslim culture the power is personalized in the name of the headship "Caliph" and limited number of elites "ulema" who depend on the divine reason to justify the governing system. He states that without an active civil society, comprised of a liberal middle class and constitutional set of laws the political participation and popular sovereignty are weak and ambiguous. Thus without the political institutions the sense of political pluralism will be blurred within the religious conception of good because Islam excludes unbelievers from the social integrity and consolidation. Buchanan states that a consensus is based on the collective social agreement derived from the person's moral legitimacy. In this alternative model, politics becomes an arena of conflict and despotism in which the minority rights are denied. There is, indeed, no constitutionally protected sphere of activity into which politics cannot potentially enter. Majority rule may be accepted as the sine qua non of democratic politics, but majority rule, standing alone, cannot offer guarantees of permanence of the rule itself. Thus the majority rule rests on the collective system of values or consensus that gives the priority to the collective interest and public good through a liberal reasonable individual.

of Muslim governance have an intensely personal character. According to Muslim doctrine, Lewis argues, there was no legislative function in the Islamic state and therefore no need for legislative institutions. For believing Muslims, legitimate authority comes from the sovereignty of God alone. Fourth claim, concerns the perception of private property in the Islamic history in which property has never been safe from it being taken away by the state. In this regard, there is no way out of the authority intervention.

Fifth claim insists that there are also older elements in the Islamic tradition that are not hostile to democracy such as the concept of supreme sovereignty. The Islamic caliphate is in no sense despotism. The electorate was never defined, nor was any procedure of election ever devised or operated, but the elective principle remains central to Sunni religious jurisprudence, and that is not unimportant. Again according to Sunni doctrine, the relationship between the caliph and his subjects is contractual through 'Bay'ah'. An Islamic ruler is not above the law. He is subjected to it. Though this principle has never been institutionalized, nor even formulated in the treatises of the holy law.

The sixth says that traditional Islam has no doctrine of human rights. "Only God has rights—human beings have duties". But in practice the duty owed by one human being to another, by a ruler to his subjects particularly when the discharge of this duty is a requirement of holy law (Lewis, 2010, 71). Without the doctrine of elective and contractual sovereignty the human rights are not secured. He states that the supremacy of the law has been flouted. Tolerance of pluralism and diversity has dwindled or disappeared in an age of heightened religious, ethnic, and social tensions. Consultation, as far as it ever existed, is restricted to the ruler and his inner circles. All in all, the prospects for Middle Eastern democracy are not good, Lewis argues. If they fail to cope with these problems, then the existing regimes, both dictatorial and authoritarian, are likely to be overthrown and replaced, probably by one variety or another of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, any social or political change in the region will fail to the degree that public political culture empowers revolutionary language to restore traditions in violent way.

Seventh claim concerns the public reason and the constitutional building of the state's politics. He asserts that Islam figures either as the religion of the state or as the "principal source of legislation." Unfortunately, secularism is misunderstood. He states that Islamists control the social hierarchy if not the political as well. To this reason the elections that took place in many countries

in the region were ceremonial ratification of the realities of power for the sake of respect in the international arena.

Claim eight is that Islamic history is a record of deficit of democracy (Lewis, 2010, 121). Since the same reasons worked out in the past, have found resonance in the present such as Islam, masculinity and the institutions will inevitably be shaped to a significant degree by their cultural and historical traditions. Then, the future will have no prospect for liberalism and democracy. He stretches this claim by stressing the fact that Freedom as a political ideal was new and alien, in political theory in particular. Politically speaking Lewis contends that three essential features of democratic regimes are dismissed in the Middle East political culture:

- Limitation which means that government is limited in subject to certain laws.
- The second is accountability; the government, being limited, and may be called to account when it crosses the line, where it violates the basic laws under which it operates.
- The third is representation, government should be chosen by the people.

Lewis explains that *limitation* is ensured by the constitutional legitimacy; *accountability* is a legal procedure for testing the constitutionality of government's acts and policies; and *representation* should be ensured through some form of election. According to these features, the executive authority or the headship of the state has three remarkable rules: it is contractual, consensual, and limited. In Western democratic systems, the head of state is accountable to the people. In the Islamic Middle East, he is accountable to God. Here, he refers to the problem of legitimacy; which he defines as "a system in which the majority of the people accept the right of the ruler to rule" (Lewis, 2010, 147).

Thus, without constitutional democratic legitimacy, how do states in the Middle East determine succession? For him it is by violence, coup d'état, insurrection and civil war.

The ninth claim stresses that political opposition is missing in the Middle East. He raises an example of the Iraqi election of January 2005 that was a major occasion, even in the long history of the Middle East. But the problem is due to the fact that no party would like to abandon the privileges of political power. The task of such an opposition is to monitor governmental policies through democratic processes.

Claim number ten, political reform and modernity are weak⁶² and limited to military modernization and administrative centralization (Lewis, 1995, 309). Hence, and political or constitutional reforms in the Middle East, according to Lewis, were obviously the result of European influence and of a desire to face Europe on equal terms.

The eleventh claim is about social justice and equality in Muslim law and tradition. Three groups were at a disadvantage according to general Muslim principle of legal and religious equality: unbelievers, slaves, and women. "The woman was obviously in one significant respect the worst-placed of the three" (Lewis, 2002, 67). The emancipation of women, he states, is the touchstone of difference between modernization and Westernization. The emancipation of women is Westernization, therefore, it is perceived as a betrayal of true Islamic values. He tends to say that the Muslim rejection of modernization is due to the ideas of Westernization. So not merely all notions of modernity are refused but at least it must not be linked with westernization otherwise it will be refuted by Muslims. Thus, even when Muslims adopt some notions of modernity, they still work out to shift it in a way that fits their cultural privacy.

The claim number twelve, is about the basis of identity and loyalty in the Islamic world.⁶³ In this regard, Islam is the cultural monolithic code for all Muslims, even moderates and mainstream

⁶² Von Grunebaum views Islam as incompatible to modernity because it lacks the critical filter of a reflexive subjectivity (Quoted in Masud & Salvatore, 2009, 41). He denies to Islam any autonomous capacity for social change and intellectual renewal, seen as the preconditions for a successful encounter with modernity. Thus, since *ijtihad* is not an independent process of free thinking, as it is designed for and with respect to the Islamic law, then Muslims have no intellectual power to interlock with the global progress (Ibid, 45-6). Masud Muhammad and Armando Salvatore (2009, 237-8) affirm that Islamic modernism is quite problematic; it overlaps with two other discourses on reform. The first discourse, often described as revivalism. It calls for the revival (*ihya*) of the practice of the Ancestors (*salaf*). The second discourse regards adherence to tradition and religion as the main cause of backwardness of Muslims.

⁶³ Oliver Roy asserts that there can be no democracy without political legitimacy (Roy, 2008, 40). He asks how is democracy to be introduced into societies where tribal and clan identity is central? For Roy the problem of democracy in the Middle East is due to the deficit in the public political culture. This culture is a victim of the high propensity of conflict in the socio-political context in Middle East. This context of conflict is due to the interaction of various variables between what is domestic and what is external to the regional political situations. These variable are: 1) the conflict between seculars and Islamists; 2) theological and sectarian conflict between Shi'ism and Sunnism that tend to be strategically of which cross national borders "the case of Arab-Iran conflict and its regional implications"; and third the Arab-Israeli conflict. He affirms that this state of conflict that frames the political culture, of the Arab-Muslim world, paves the way to the Islamists and fundamentalists to control the socio-political interaction. Neo-Fundamentalism aims to: first, oppose Western notions such as modernity and democracy; second, embraces the *salafism* and implement a political system that depends solely on tradition and *Shari'a* (Roy, 2008, 58-59). This characterization of elite political culture shaped through despotism and fundamentalism in the Arab world can be extended further (Macqueen, 2009, 3). Most of the authors such as Lewis, Hourani, Benjamin Macqueen focus on the

Muslims. The Masjid is a place of worship and study. And in that sense, separation of church and state was conceived as a Christian remedy for a Christian disease. In respect to this argument a question was raised before Lewis in the conference that took place in Washington in 2006, by PEW research center of religion and public life. The question was “How realistic a policy of spreading democracy in the Islamic world is it at this point? These Muslim people are incapable of decent, civilized, open government. Whatever we do, they will be ruled by corrupt tyrants, therefore, the only aim of foreign policy should be to ensure that they are friendly tyrants rather than hostile tyrants.”

Lewis answered that the whole Islamic political tradition is strongly against despotism. He believes that despite the fact that the traditional Islamic government is authoritarian, but it is not despotic and dictatorship is not the part of the historic Arab or Islamic tradition. Therefore, any attempt towards democracy to see light in the Middle East should be local and accommodated with Muslims' political and social particularities. One can conclude that, according to Lewis political modernity is the most important element to enhance the prospect of democracy in the Arab-Muslim world due to the fact that Arabs and Muslims are not ready or willing to abandon their Islamic identity in favor of any another principles or identity.

historical ambition to revive the tradition as well the glory, through unity, in the Arab-Muslim world. They also find that individualism is ignored within the socio-political context. In a more ‘traditional elite’ society such as Lebanon, political values focus on an equilibrium between the communities and bases itself on the leadership or elites' values. There is an increased attachment to kinship and patronage networks that also serve as relatively autonomous units from the state. Thus, the individual's will be subordinated to the sub-identity based on religion and detached from the collective national activities that must be carried out by civil society. Here, socialization, or ‘induction into the political culture’, works where the values and assumptions of a political community and a political system are ‘inculcated and reinforced’ through education, popular culture, state influence and family structure. Political culture if ‘socially accepted’, has two phases: first, as a popular property; the second as indistinguishable from individual consciousness, knowledge or psychology. Here, Benjamin Macqueen states that “violent contestations over state power are seen, in this perspective, as the norm. Instead, Arab communities are trapped in a permanent state of conflict management in which various groups within this “mosaic” seek to dominate and repress other groups in a volatile and perpetual struggle for power” (Macqueen, 2009, 26). Moreover, according to Macqueen, Arabs and Muslims are regressive in respect to modernization. One can conclude that “civic culture” in the Arab world is weak in contrast to the traditional comprehensive identities. Therefore, he concludes that political culture is not sufficient to implement democracy or political modernity in the Muslim world. What Macqueen tries to say is that since the essential framework or vessel of democracy, the nation state, is in conceptual and political crisis then, democracy is in a great danger.

But still the main guarantee to the state cohesion is constitutional democracy. This approach needs sufficient political institutions that can protect the sovereignty of people and the idea of individual rights (Quoted in El-Affendi in Albadawy& Makdisi, 2011, 14).

El'effendi states that stable distributions of political values, beliefs and understandings among population can reasonably orient the political conduct. In the Muslim world, fundamentalism is a phenomenon that has emerged in most religious traditions, 'only in Islam do fundamentalist tendencies appear to play a central role' (Barber, 1984: 206–7). Oliver Roy and Abdelwahab El-Affendi share the argument that Islamism or political Islam and not Islam has become a hindrance to democratization. In view of all this, I can argue that the reason why the Middle East remains inhospitable to democracy is due to the lack of civic commitments towards the society. In this regard, Barber adds that, *strong democracy* requires unmediated self-government by an engaged citizenry. He states that his model of democracy is derived from United States experience that honors the popular participation at different levels (local and national) to the extent of Athena model of direct assembly to deliberate the essential political questions. His model requires institutions that will involve the citizen in common decision-making and political judgment. To this end, strong democracy ought to meet the following criteria (Barber, 2003, 262):

1. They should be realistic and workable.
2. They should complement and be compatible with the primary representative institutions of large-scale modern societies.
3. They should directly address liberal anxieties over such unitary propensities of participatory communities as irrationalism, prejudice, uniformity, and intolerance. This means they must offer safeguards for individuals, for minorities, and for the rights that majorities governing in the name of community may often abuse.
4. They should deal concretely with the obstacles that modernity poses in the way of participation whereby participation is exercised in local institutions that sap national identity and power is exercised in centralized institutions that bar meaningful participation.
5. They should give expression to the special claims of strong democracy as a theory of talk, judgment, and public seeing by offering alternatives to representation, simple voting, and the rule of bureaucrats and experts.

Thus public consensus and agreement, burden of judgment toward each other and legal frameworks are all essential elements of this model of strong democracy which operates through an active civil society. This collective activity needs a consensus from well-informed individual who can have the knowledge to develop burdens. The individual, citizen or official, needs to know properly his political space of rights and duties. He responds to this criticism by asserting that strong democracy can have no special-interest partisans, but makes potential supporters of every citizen. In order to give some system to the institutional reforms, he sets out three categories precipitated by the theory of strong democracy: strong democratic talk (deliberation, agenda-setting, listening, empathy); strong democratic decision-making (public decision, political judgment, common policy-making); and strong democratic action (common work, community action, citizen service). Thus, Benjamin Barber (1984) and Mark Tessler (2010) (believe that survival of democracy depends on institutional changes and the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens (Tessler, 2002, 39). Some Western observers assert that democracy and Islam are incompatible because Islam, Lewis (2010) Barber (1984) and Tassler (2002) argue, encourages intellectual conformity and an uncritical acceptance of authority.

One can sum up the debate, Lewis's argument as discussed in this part of the section, with three essential factors that have led to the deficit of democracy in the Middle East:

- First, the lack of constitutional political institutions.
- The second is that political culture is in crisis and is characterized by despotism and authoritarianism.
- The third is the lack of essentials for an active civil society.

Though, Maalouf (2011) asks whether it was the fault of the Arabs, the Muslims the way they live Islam. According to him, yes. He also blames US and Israel for the political situation in the Middle East and how that has affected negatively the political culture in the Arab world. Gilbert Achcar (2004) supports the last claim of Maalouf, whereby he asserts that "Arab exception (authoritarian regimes without reform) does not result from "cultural specificity", rather it is in part the product of western policies, the rise of fundamentalist opposition groups when people take globalization as going hand in hand with democratization (Achcar, 2004, 69). He contends that what has happened in the Middle East concerning democracy is a responsibility of the global order. Thus, for him, the West could not promote democratic values in the Arab world without running the risk of radicalism as a component of political resistance to Western involvement in the region. It is the balance of

power in the region that mostly affects the US policy towards democracy in the region; this balance has three angles, within the US perspective:

- First, the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- The Islamic movements.
- The Arab-Iran struggle and the sectarian balance of power.

One can conclude as Maffettone and Francesca Corrao in *Multiculturalism* that Islam and Arabism at its core do not pose any obstacles to democracy. Thus, democracy will flourish in the Middle East when essential socio-political conditions are available.

3.2.2. Second trend, Esposito's argument of the compatibility between Islam-Democracy:

John Esposito argues that Sharia has many meanings, and functions as a moral compass for individuals and society. Inclusion of Sharia in the legislation process is not a hindrance to democracy. He asserts that even in most liberal democratic societies, such as United States, the majority want the Bible as a source of legislation (Esposito, 2010, 41). Esposito contends that the Muslim world is steadily advancing toward democratic reform, toward an “Islamic democracy that might create an effective system of popular participation unlike the American system” (quoted in Horowitz, 2013, 210). Esposito thinks that the democracy is hindered fundamentally due to the misperception of secularism. He questions why don't Muslims practice a separation of church and state? The Muslim vision of religion and politics is based upon a reading or interpretation of the Quran as well as the example of Muhammad and the early Muslim community (Esposito, 2011, 180). Hence, Muslims believe that their primary act of faith is to strive to implement God's willingness in both their private and public life. "Muslims see themselves as God's representatives with a divine mandate to establish God's rule on earth in order to create a just society. While a minority of Muslims today believe that modernity requires the separation of religion and the state, many Muslims continue to maintain that religion should be integral to state and society. Esposito argues that any political model to success in the Middle East should create a ground in which religious principles and democratic values coexist. He asserts that "Islamic democracy" is possible. In the Muslim world, there has been an important and highly visible resurgence of Islam, while governments are also being committed to programs of modernization using Western-secular models (Esposito, 1996, 16). Democratization and the Islamic resurgence processes involve popular

empowerment and communal identity affirmation. Esposito cites Giovanni Sartori's statement that there is no universal model of democracy of which diverge societies should apply. "Islamic democracy" in a way is appropriate both to the demands of increasing popular political participation and to the desire to establish a clear and authentic Islamic polity.

Esposito defends his argument by asserting that in Islamic history, there are numerous foundations for the Islamic democracy. These foundations are: tawhid (Unity of God), Ressalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Caliphate). In Tawhid equality and justice are the two core elements of Islamic polity. In the second foundation "caliph" the first phase of the "fulfillment of social-political Khilafah" is "the creation of the community of believers," while the second phase "is to reach the level of self-governance." In particular, these foundations are not sufficient to have an Islamic democracy without three essential concepts which are consultation (shurah), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive judgment (ijtihad). Buklay assumes that Esposito's arguments ignore the approach of Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino.⁶⁴ This approach is important, since it emphasizes civil liberties, human rights and freedoms, instead of over-reliance on elections and the formal institutions of the state (Bukay, 2007, 73). Esposito instead of this approach endorses Khatami's view that democracies need not follow a formula and can function not only in a liberal system but also in religious ones. In this view, Islam and democracy are not only compatible but their association is seen as being inevitable. Esposito argues that the will of the majority shapes the ideal Islamic state. Bromely supports this opinion by quoting Ernest Gellner that Islam remains rooted in broader sets of social and material practices. In this perspective there is one way to democracy in the Muslim world which is Islamic democracy. For Mohammed al-jabri the transition to democracy is the main problem facing the Arab-Muslim countries. Moreover, this transition needs to be achieved by the rulers themselves, or the alternative is the emergence of democratic powers in the society, capable of enforcing democracy. In other words, transition to democracy may be achieved in one of the two ways (Al-Jabri, 2009, 145):

- The first one is slow and 'gradual' to democratize the state by establishing representative institutions.

⁶⁴ Ascribe seven features to any democracy: individual freedoms and civil liberties; rule of the law; sovereignty resting upon the people; equality of all citizens before the law; vertical and horizontal accountability for government officials; transparency of the ruling systems to the demands of the citizens; and equality of opportunity for citizens (Buklay, 2007).

- The second is for the democratic powers either to pressure the ruler into stepping down or to remove him by force.

How can we guarantee the continuity of the democratic process itself? Democracy is a political-social-economic system needs the desire for democracy to be installed. Al-jabri asserts that consensus is what needed to empower the collective desire towards democracy; while al-shura transports the collective desire to the public sphere, guarantees the absence of 'absolute despotism' and strengthens democratic proponent in the public culture. The basis of consultancy is: The Islamic legitimacy of any sultan radiates from his respect for working according to its rulings; the second is that the ummah is the source of authority, and reserved to it is the right to appoint and remove him upon adjudication because authority is a civil right (Belkeziz, 2009, 35-36). For Tibi the problem of applying Shura in the Muslim societies lies in the crisis of political legitimacy (Tibi in Weinberg, 2008, 46). Thus, democracy needs to be rooted domestically through a collective consensus 'ijma'a', which is the second important political conception in Islamic thought. This consensus, to work out should take into consideration these findings:

- First, must rest on Islam to reach a majority consensus. However, the reference to Islam must be restricted to an Islamic ethics of democracy. This Islamic ethics of democracy must be installed within the political culture and protected by the political institutions.
- Second, it requires cultural change that honors freedom of critics and encourages the collective activity through civil society. This consensus has to work out to emphasize the popular participation through institutional culture.

Bassam Tibi insists that, critiquing Lewis, cultural borrowing is not alien to the history of Arab-Islamic heritage. He states that "democracy has Greek origins, but Hellenism was also a part of the Islamic legacy." Thus, borrowing from others to install a new system of institutions is compatible with Islam i.e. it is possible to implement a new system of Shura, since Shari'a is not in favor of specific system of government, through a collective consensus 'ijma'a' that is based on rationalism and reason. In this regard, Tibi asks whether shari'a law can provide the basis for a democratic order. He suggests that what Muslims need instead is Islamic rationalism and Civic pluralism⁶⁵ (Tibi, 2012, 116-17). Asef Bayat (2007) finds out that the ijma'a is a necessary element for Islamic conception of democracy but indeed, the diversity of national or cultural specificity and interpretations of Islamic law, makes it so difficult to have a common Islamic model of political

⁶⁵ Read also Haifa Jawad in Marranci, 2010.

consensus. And each “Muslim” country is comprised of people with various degrees of religious affiliations. In this sense, three factors have played equal role in hindering democracy in Muslim states (Bayat, 2007, 7):

- The first is the continuing prevalence of Orientalist essentializing thought in the West.
- Second, persistent authoritarian rule by the local regimes.
- Third, emergence and expansion of Islamist movements that have often displayed socially conservative and undemocratic dispositions.

In short, Asef Bayat (2010) concludes that the compatibility or incompatibility of a religion, including Islam, with democracy is a matter of political struggle between opposing conceptions of good. Sadiki finds out four assumptions of the ‘democratization paradigm’ seem to guide much of the enquiry of Arab political reforms (Sadiki, 2009, 14):

- Transition away from authoritarianism.
- The second assumption regards the sequential trajectory of democratization through elections.
- The third is that it is difficult to engender democratic citizenship in the Arab world.
- The fourth assumption holds that democratization is more or less an outcome enabled top-down by the choice of rulers and elites. This top-down reform, according to Thana Fuad Abdullah, is that of institutionalism.

Thus, two phases of political conceptions are necessary for social reform in the Arab states: institutionalism and bottom-up process by the civil society. Thus, to install democracy in the Iraqi society, for instance, there is a must to create new democratic proponents in the political culture.⁶⁶

The best approach, to accommodate democracy in public culture, should deploy two elements: active social force and constitutional legitimacy to which the political institutions should be endorsed. Political culture is somehow a result or affected by the result of the contrasted relationship between diverge social and political forces. This state of conflict is exceeded to the

⁶⁶ To accelerate the process of democratic transition some elements are required such as active new approach of media which pushes towards democratization; the democratic practices such as elections and International public diplomacy efforts (Seib, 2007, 2). Philip Seib argues that since 2005 when the first free election was held in Iraq the media played a critical role in transiting images of this democratic practice to the rest of Middle East’s peoples. This process has educated people and encouraged them for asking back their political and social rights. Therefore, the availability of communication and information systems will affect how individuals live and how nations operate. Seib believes that breadth of movement toward democracy will be particularly significant in the Middle East. Another variable can be added to secure transition to democracy which is by the degree of society’s autonomy from the state (Kamrava in Amineh, 2007, 177). To this extent, economic development is a pre-condition to enhance the role of civil society in the Middle East as a fundamental proponent to democratic transition.

epistemological and practical perceptions of political conceptions such as nationalism and unity of Ummah; Pan-Arabism and Islam; sectarianism and nationalism. This state of conflict among these Islamic political orientations is due to ijthad; the third conception of Islamic democracy according to Esposito. Due to these epistemological differences and the diversity of Islamic interpretations, the process of democratic transition can indeed regress and even break down (Korany in Ehteshami & Wright, 2008, 62). In other words, giving priority to sectarianism over nationalism causes a huge rift in the political process in post-2003 Iraq. On political issues three basic ideas are essential to ijthad: burden of judgment, reformation and pluralism. Furthermore, it is the function of ijthad (independent scholarship) and reason accommodate political modernization in the Islamic democracy. One can conclude that most of scholars, who support Esposito's argument of compatibility between Islam and democracy, emphasize that democracy deficit in the Middle East is a product of two intertwined variables: the patterns of political and economic development in the region and the particularity of local political culture. Here, they ask the approach that Muslims should adopt to establish a solid ground for an Islamic model of democracy. Mohammed Hashas quotes Tibi and Ramadan in response to this question. He suggests "Cultural modernity" is the best approach to apply democracy (Hashas, 2013, 99). Cultural modernity is based on three pillars: primacy of reason, individual's freedom and pluralism. Cultural modernity, in political sense, makes the separation between religion and state, not politics easier. Ramadan honors the cultural privacy of Muslims. Therefore, he proposes an "Islamic modernity" that differs from westernization.⁶⁷ Muslims and Arabs have the historical moment to represent their model of modernity, the model that can reveal the society from within. This process will avoid repetition of the errors committed by the West in its interpretation and practice of modernity. This is a model that can preserve Islam's identity as well as paves the way for Muslims to restore their positive role in the global design. Here, I conclude that three factors push forward the political modernity in Islamic societies:

- First, according to Ramadan the distinction is necessary between Islamic culture and Muslims' behavior.
- Second, ijthad is not a static interpretation process in regard to political issues.

⁶⁷ See also: Yevgeniya, B (2010). Islamic Modernism: Responses to Western Modernization in the Middle East, {Online}. Inquiries Journal, Volume 2, number 5, 1. Available at: <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/248/islamic-modernism-responses-to-western-modernization-in-the-middle-east>. (Accessed on July 20, 2016).

- Third, Islamic principles are not against the core of democracy.

In this regard, one can refer to Oliver Roy (1994) questioning the prospect of political future in the Middle East if Islamism has profoundly marked the political landscape and contemporary Muslim society since the end of the 1970s (Roy, 1994, 25). He asks how modernity can be installed if the ulamas and mullahs are potentially fundamentalist. The claim that all the resources modern Muslims need to restore Islamic ascendancy is in her past means that any idea (however novel) has to be located in that legacy (Turath) if it is to enjoy authenticity (Bennet, 2005, 18; Rahman in Holt, 2007, 650). Islamists tend to invest political innovation such as election procedure and modern technologies only in favor of their propaganda. Hence, Esposito locates the deficit of democracy in the particularity of social forces and political conditions in the Muslim countries such as Iraq. Then, the question, in which direction political modernity has to work out to transform the society towards democracy? Here, political modernity works due to four factors:

- New alternative which does not assimilate westernization.⁶⁸
- Second, balances between Islamic authenticity and political innovation.⁶⁹
- Third, intellectualism and Modernism should be encouraged
- Fourth, distinction between modernity and modernism should be made.⁷⁰

Ibn Khaldoun claimed that faith and reason are both necessary for a balanced human life. In this regard, Mohammed Khatami asks the Muslim world to emulate two essential elements of modernity from the West: freedom and reason.⁷¹

⁶⁸ In this regard, Fred Dallmayr notices that modernity is not immune to criticism. Modernity as a concept and function is linked with westernization in Islamic societies. Then, one can notice that the propensity to criticize modernity is clearly high. This criticism flourishes in the perception of the sides of political order: the people and authority; elites and institutions. Dallmayr also notices that criticism is not dismissed in the West. Here, criticism aims to salvage modernity at a deeper level, namely, "as a stage in the progressive unfolding of rational reflection and moral autonomy" (Dallmayr, 1996, 158). He quotes Jurgen Habermas that in modern society the motor of development was located in the process of "rationalization" seen as the advancement of rational reflection or "reflective learning."

⁶⁹ Reza Aslan supports Al-Jabri's claim that a reinterpretation of traditional Islamic ideals is necessary to present modern democratic principles in terms that the average Muslim could easily recognize. "Thus, Abdu redefined shurah, or tribal consultation, as representative democracy; ijma, or consensus, as popular sovereignty; and bay'ah, or the oath of allegiance, as universal suffrage" (Aslan, 2005, 232-3).

⁷⁰ Modernity generally refers to socio-political transformation while Modernism refers to a philosophical approach to certainty that relies primarily on reason rather than revelation. Islamic discussion of modernity focuses on the fundamental issues of rationalism and secularism (Sonn in Hunter, 2005, 65).

⁷¹ In this regard, one may discuss Raja Bahlul's perception of reason. Bahlul quotes Rawls's distinction between public reason and 'nonpublic' religious reasons (Bahlul, 2003, 45). He distinguishes a number of meanings of 'reason,' as the term is used in contemporary Islamic discourses, such as that of Mohammad al-Jabiri's use of 'reason' as a 'philosophy of rationalism.' Although, 'religious rationality' (al-'aqlaniyah al-diniyyah) is based on Islam, and it should be thought

Aslan (2005) raises the question: can a modern Islamic state reconcile reason and revelation to create a democratic society based on the ethical ideals established by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina nearly fifteen centuries ago? His answer: not only can it do so, it must. Indeed, it is already doing so in Iran and in other parts of the Muslim world. But it is a process that can be based only on Islamic traditions and values. He states that "the fact is that the vast majority of the more than one billion Muslims in the world readily accept the fundamental principles of democracy into Islamic terms. Democratic ideals such as constitutionalism, government accountability, pluralism, and human rights are widely accepted throughout the Muslim world. What is not necessarily accepted, however, is the distinctly Western notion that religion and the state should be entirely separate. It is pluralism, not secularism, which defines democracy. Aslan asserts that a democratic state can be established upon any normative moral framework as long as pluralism remains the source of its legitimacy. Islam has had a long commitment to religious pluralism (Aslan, 2005, 262).

Hanafi asserts that such a political project that can emulate modernity and pluralism is possible. The project is divided into theoretical and operational parts. Hasan Hanafi explains (in Hunter, 2009, 101-2) this project as follows: the theoretical section is religious; the Muslim state is neither religious nor theocratic, rather, it is civil; the state is featured as contractual, representative, pluralist, institutional, and legal based on the principles of peaceful transfer of power and equal citizenship; finally, *hakimiyat* is defined not as direct rule by God, but as the exercise of his rule through people's representatives. The main responsibility of the state is to implement the constitution and establish the rule of law. The most political part of this innovation is that this project justifies the establishment of the nation-state as the political embodiment of the nation and the homeland (*al-watan*).

Hunter asserts that the failure of modernizing projects and of establishing public reason, in the sense of political liberalism, is due to two reasons: the failure of the secular modernizing projects led to a revival of interest in Islam as a social and political frame of reference and the lack of space for political debate concerning social reform and modernity (Hunter, 2009, 295). One can conclude

of in general terms by analogy to 'reason that is based on a liberal political conception of justice. In light to this conception, public reason, the language of communication among citizens, may be applied with religious reason in case that the collective consensus is built on this belief. Bahlul insists on the differentiation between the two types of reason. To that each person has two communicative reasons: first is public as political; second, person's private sphere generates the religious reason (Bahlul, 2003, 53). Thus, in Islamic thought there is one reason and that must be public. The idea is that free and equal individuals may have different views about the good (life). Therefore, public reason must be public in its political sense and private in its moral justification.

that, within postmodernism religious reason inevitably intervenes in public debate as long as it is not deployed to capture the state identity. Therefore, individualism and reasonableness must be considered in the process of public justification and within the person's moral justificatory process which is based on the burden of judgment. This individualism means that the individual is the corner stone of the collective work. Without reasonable person that holds his conception of right and good, there is no space for public debate over cooperation and mutual trust. In this regard, political liberalism is a proper approach. Fevzi Bilgin indirectly supports this claim. He asserts that "according to political liberalism the two doctrines, the individual autonomy and submission to God, can be involved in an overlapping consensus so long as they fall into the category of the reasonable" (Bilgin, 2011, 35). Protection of comprehensive doctrines as such is an essential aspect of political liberalism, since the realization of the political liberal ideal depends on a consensus of those doctrines. What political liberalism proposes is that people continue to value their religious views, but they also engage in social cooperation defined by fair terms of cooperation acceptable to all. Bilgin asserts that People might have different reasons to endorse those terms, but as long as they can do so in accordance with their religious views, this will only extend the stability of the public order. One can argue that Rawls's reason is neither religious nor secular. Thus to apply publicly the religious reason means that secular reason must have the same space in the political activity. But the answer is that state institutions must be neutral. It is not the duty of political institutions to spread or favor any comprehensive doctrine in the public sphere. For Bilgin, political liberalism is a positive injunction to political culture that leads to political modernity. Still it might not necessarily lead to social modernity but by time through state intervention at least it will accommodate the individual's right to freely express their views and enjoy rights. It must also be noted that those who favor an important political role for Islam are not necessarily expressing opposition to democracy. Mark Tessler (2010, 227) identifies four categories of religion's participation in constructing democracy: (1) secular democracy; (2) democracy with a political role for Islam; (3) secular non-democracy; and (4) a non-democratic system with a political role for Islam. Thus, given the division on political Islam, it is important to investigate and compare the political culture orientations both of citizens who favor secular democracy and of those who favor a political formula that is not only democratic but also Islamic in some meaningful way. Tessler quotes Almond and Verba's concept of *Civic Culture* as an attempt to understand the relationship between citizen orientations and governance, including democratic governance. Among the

particular orientations they explore: obligation to participate, sense of efficacy, and level of interpersonal trust. Civic culture honor six values and behavior patterns in Arab-Muslim society: (1) support for equality; (2) tolerance; (3) interpersonal trust; (4) civic participation; (5) political interest; and (6) political knowledge. One can agree with Tessler regarding *Civic participation* as an important component of a democratic political culture. He states that "the most important point, however, is that the political culture orientations of individuals who support democracy and favor political role of Islam do not differ very much from the political culture orientations of individuals who support democracy and do not favor political role of Islam" (Tessler, 2010, 235). In other words, democratic political culture is tolerant and plural. Democratic core ideas are same no matter which measures or practices are adopted. Thus, Tessler joins those who claim that democracy can be implemented in Arab and Muslim societies. Still the question of compatibility of Islam and democracy is difficult. But both agree that the public maslaha must prevail and prosper. Some experiences of democracy have already been initiated in the Arab world. Tessler agrees with this claim by asserting that some evidences of democratic political culture are shown in the Arab-Muslim world. Tessler affirms that The main assumption informing these propositions is that persons who are more disadvantaged or vulnerable will be more inclined to support political Islam, presumably because Islam emphasizes justice and protection of the weak and, more generally, because political Islam, as much as democracy, represents a distinct and consequential alternative to the status quo. Therefore, democracy should go hand in hand with economic and sustainable developments, political stability and security.

3.3. Third Section: Huntington's theory of "Clash of Civilization"

Islam Encountering Globalization, edited by Ali Mohammadi, acknowledges that one of the greatest dilemmas facing Muslims today is the fact that Muslim culture is often seemingly incompatible with the culture of the modern western world (Meehan, 2013, 30). Marranci in his book, *Understanding Muslim Identity*, finds that fundamentalist Islam may be byproduct of secularism (Marranci, 2009, 44). Marranci argues that fundamentalism is not so much a religious view, but something broader. An inclination to avoid engaging opposing ideas may be core to fundamentalism, and in that sense, a secularist can be a fundamentalist as well. Such an approach to tradition is in vivid contrast to modernism. Though, tradition preceded modernism, in its rush toward secularized and systematized knowledge, modernity was forced by its own method to eliminate the role of traditional truth. Mehan argues in this regard Traditional Islam's epistemology "Naqli", transcended, is distinct from modernist approaches "Aqli", which based on reason.

This section aims to demonstrate the main arguments that are presented in Huntington's theory: the kind of perception it tries to create on Islam in the public conscious of the West. Also, this section will discuss intellectual responses to his theory.

3.3.1. Huntington's theory "Clash of Civilizations":

The dominant source of conflict is the clash between nations and groups of different civilizations⁷² after the end of Cold War (Huntington 1993, 48).⁷³ How did this affect popular and elite conscious in United States towards Iraq? To answer this question, one needs to understand Islamophobia as the necessary myth that installshis argument in the public memory. This myth will be the essential inquiry of the fourth chapter of this thesis, while here, I intent to argue the main claims of Huntington.

⁷² What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity (Huntington, 2016, 4).

⁷³ The anthropological understanding of culture supplants the Enlightenment notion of Kultur, which describes a process of intellectual-spiritual formation specific to the symbolization of a people, usually considered as a homogeneous unity. Tylor uses the word 'culture' interchangeably with 'civilization', a term that in its Enlightenment sense explicitly contrasts culture as the opposition between material and spiritual practices and values (Neilson, 1999, 81).

Huntington's first claim is that religion⁷⁴ will play a role in the emergence of new patterns of alliance and conflict among states (Huntington, 1996, 32). This process of polarizing the alliances depends on the otherness justification. In other words, people are always tempted to divide people into us and them, our civilization and those barbarians. Muslims have traditionally divided the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the abode of peace and the abode of war. This "otherness" escalates the status of war due to the claim that each parties of the conflict tend to see the other in their own terms. In this case, both refuse any kind of differences, while they seek to universalize their culture.

The second claim is that nation states remain the primary actors in world affairs.⁷⁵ They are also subject of legitimate international interference which causes a loss in sovereignty. This claim has two phases:

- First, the continuity of nation state as a primary actor is due to the Western understanding of politics, since Islam does not recognize the nation state.
- Second, the West is the winner in this conflict even if it is eternal.

The third claim is that the expansion of the West has promoted modernization and the Westernization of non-Western societies. The political and intellectual leaders of these societies have responded to Western impact in one of the three ways: rejecting both modernization and Westernization; embracing both; embracing the first and rejecting the second. "Only the very most extreme fundamentalists," Daniel Pipes writes concerning Islam, reject modernization as well as Westernization.⁷⁶ The argument is that "the religious values, moral assumptions, and social

⁷⁴ Caputo argues that these two religions, Islam and Christianity, believe that their truths are not only universal but also exclusive. They believe that they are the fortunate recipients of God's final message to humanity, which it is their duty not to keep selfishly to themselves like the Jews or the Hindus, but to bring to the rest of mankind, removing whatever barriers there may be in the way (Caputo, 2001, 104-5).

⁷⁵ Arshin Adib Moghaddam asks How can history end, when the nation-state continues to be the most potent carrier of national memories, and How can the clash mentality be overcome, if the nation-state, by definition, needs to be filled with meaning, a mission, a will, authority or a *raison d'état* or *raison d'être*? (Adib-Moghaddam, 2011, 173). Moghaddam adds that successive US administrations have acted upon this understanding of the international system as a place to maximise the country's (inter) national interest and to extend its sovereignty (Adib-Moghaddam, 2011, 208). In this regard, the notion of Nation-state can be either the source of conflict or of cooperation. What keeps the international system safe and stable is the collective consensus of cooperation by which all nations should reach agreement upon the accepted norms.

⁷⁶ The second argument focuses on the psychological features of Muslims and Arabs that gears them propensity towards violence. One of the most important works in this regard is Patai's book, *The Arab Mind*, conceived as "the bible of the neoconservatives on Arab behavior" (see Atkine, 2004). Novell B. Atkine quotes Patai saying that two themes emerge "one, that Arabs only understand force and, second, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation." To

structures of these [non-Western] societies are at best alien, and sometime hostile, to the values and practices of industrialism" (Huntington, 1996, 73-4). Thus, the borders of clash are blurred since civilizations are global at its core.

The fourth claim is that modernization promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways:

- At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer.
- The resurgence of Islam and "re-Islamization" are the central themes in Muslim societies. It embodies an acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world.

Thus, as far as Muslims are strict in their religious identity, there is no chance to modernize them in a western manner⁷⁷. In this perception, Muslims can adopt modernity but only in their own terms, and this experience will be evolutionary and dangerous.

begin a process of understanding the seemingly irrational hatred that motivated the World Trade Center attackers, one must understand the social and cultural environment in which they lived and the modal personality traits that make them susceptible to engaging in terrorist actions (Patai, 2000, 14). Raphael Patai refers to some features in the Arab mind that effect negatively their behavior:

- The first feature is narcissism: they see themselves as the center of the world affair as well as the perfect. Patai insists that Muslims consider the outer part of the world as Dar al-Harb.
- Second feature is savagery which causes damage everywhere. They enjoy savagery because it means freedom from any moral commitment.
- Third feature is *izdiwajiah*, this claim is discussed earlier in the second chapter by offering a reading of Ali Al-wardi's analysis of the Iraqi personality.
- Fourth feature is that Arabs and Muslims are strongly related to the territory.
- Fifth feature is rhetoricism. In Arabic, the greater measure of rhetoricism is accompanied by a corresponding greater proclivity to exaggeration (Mubalagha). Arabs are led by their language into exaggeration and overemphasis. Arabs react in a manner that causes grave damage to their opponents. This behavior has another side effect on the Arab personality formation: Arabs do not trust other's intention while the scope of false self-confidence has risen. Thus psychological factors play an important role in shaping Arab exceptionalism as well as in the rejection of western notions of modernity. Arabs tend to be honored by their history and traditions. Patai concludes that, one of the most important reasons of Arab inclination is the intellectual stagnation in the face of western influences since 1798.

⁷⁷ For Huntington, modern man, in contrast, accepts the possibility of change and believes in its desirability. In this regard, Huntington quotes Lerner's phrase, a "mobile personality" that adjusts to changes in the environment (Huntington, 1973, 32). Huntington argues that the aspects of modernization most relevant to politics. Modernization depends on the social mobilization by which traditions and customs are broken. This process liberates people from the old system of beliefs and pushing them towards new patterns of socialization and behavior. Huntington argues that Muslims cannot adopt this process of modernizations since their literacy, and educational system rely on Islam. Contrary to that Kishore Mahbubani and Lawrence H. Summers, in joint paper on Foreign Affairs, assert that Islam is fully compatible with modernization. They give physical structures such as the Petronas Towers in Malaysia and Burj Khalifa Dubai through which Muslims manifest themselves as part of the modern world in all dimensions.

The fifth claim asserts that the democratization wave had only a limited impact on Muslim societies. While democratic movements were gaining strength and coming to power in southern Europe, Latin America, the East Asian periphery, and central Europe. Islamist movements were simultaneously gaining strength in Muslim countries. The source of failure of liberal democracy in Muslim countries is in the inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberal concepts (Huntington, 1996, 115). Huntington identifies Islam and Arab as a challenge for both democracy and human rights, in fact each notion has its own space in Islam, and what is valid to one of them does not necessarily applies to the other. Equality and justice serve the task of democracy as well are goals to be achieved. The rules of democracy and social justice in the west may not meet its counterpart in Islam, where the main goal is to maximize the public sphere "Ummah" at the expense of individual space.⁷⁸

The sixth claim is that natural and cultural differences are crucial reasons for spreading conflicts. Two features are emphasized here: greed or selfishness and hate. All groups of different ethnic and civilizations seek control of territory, wealth, and resources. Thus, for Huntington, since Muslims lack democratic culture due to Islam' peculiarities, then, prospectively they will be violent towards the other.

The seventh claim stresses that two elements have affected negatively the political loyalty in Muslim world:

- The structure of political loyalty has been the family, and the tribe.
- Islam is divided among competing power centers each attempting to promote Islamic cohesion under its leadership. The concept of ummah presupposes the illegitimacy of the nation state and yet the ummah can be unified only through the actions of one or more strong core states which are currently lacking.

⁷⁸ Many intellectuals support Huntington's argument and core of their argument is that Muslim world is alien to western values especially democracy and modernity (Haynes in Parker, 2013, 11). This argument has already been discussed in the second section of this chapter. So, this section is going to discuss it briefly. Simon Murden argues that Arab and Muslims reject democracy and liberal human rights (Murden, 2002, 155). Such rejection is due to clash of civilization. To Simon Murden, Islamic law was never liberal or democratic, and liberal ideas were provided with limited accommodation. But the voice of democratic reform has gradually been raised. In Murden's perspective that Islamic history had been ever met democracy and liberalism, thus the neo-Islamism is in no different situation (Murden, 2002, 160).

The concept of Islam as a unified religious-political community has meant that all Islamic lands have been combined in a single ruling institution, Caliphate or Sultan (Huntington, 1996, 177). For Huntington, the same reasons are sources of threat to other civilizations. Since The absence of an Islamic core state is a major contributor to the pervasive internal and external conflicts which characterize Islam. And consciousness without cohesion is a source of weakness to Islam due to the fact that there are different schools of interpretations to Islamic teachings.

Claim eight tackles the historical discourse of interaction between Islam and Christianity, which contends that the violent nature of power shifts causes a severe grievance between these opposing poles. Huntington asserts that 50 percent of wars involving pairs of states of different religions between 1820 and 1929 were wars between Muslims and Christians. Conflict was a product of difference, as well as similarities between them. He emphasizes that twentieth and twenty first centuries are no exception to this discourse. Various factors have increased the conflict between Islam and the West (Huntington, 1996, 211):

- First, socio-economic circumstances have increased recruitment of young people within Islamic movements.
- Second, the Islamic Resurgence has given Muslims renewed confidence to encounter the West.
- Third, the West's simultaneous military and economic superiority, and intervention in conflicts in the Muslim world generate intense resentment among Muslims.
- Fourth, the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each with a perceived threat of the other.

The ninth claim discusses conflict as fault lines.⁷⁹ Conflicts between the West and Islam focus less on territory than on broader inter-civilizations issues such as weapons proliferation, human rights

⁷⁹On social issues, H.A. Gibb, stated in 1940: "all those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire, and who cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession." (quoted in Findlay, 1994, 11). The vision of re-creating one great Arab nation has certainly been a powerful influence in temporarily uniting some Arab states at times of conflict with the West. Both modernity and political progress are fundamentally important to the task of contemporary modern state as well as to the integration in the world civilization discourse. The Arab Muslims were an ummah, unified body, a jama'a, community, and by modern criteria of linguistic and racial identity, they were clearly a nation (Lewis, Holt & Lambton, 1970, 473). Thus the defeated civilization must find a way to regain its reign. But still this reign suffers from ethnic and textual differences that threaten its unity. P. M. Holt et al. (1998) emphasizes that Arabic language and Islamic culture are stronger than universal values within the Arab-Muslim conscious. Holt asserts that Islamists aim is to implement the will of God through sharia. But in order to implement the sharia, the Muslim society must set up certain institutions, the most important of which is the state (Lewis, Holt & Lambton, 1970, 637). The state in Islam takes another shape than the modern nation state. It is borderless since its power reaches to all Muslims anywhere in the world. But still this fact does not remove the fact that because of current global order Islamists don't have sufficient power to establish this state,

and democracy, control of oil, migration, Islamist terrorism, and Western intervention. Thus, fault line conflict is enlarged rather than decreasing. Huntington asserts that Islam and Arabic countries have no core state that leads them, but at the same time he generalizes the aggressive actions of some Arabic countries towards the USA as the collective behavior. He also finds out that the Islamic threat is two-fold: by Islamic terrorist organizations, on one side, and by some dictatorial regimes in the Arab-Muslim world, on the other. Another contradiction exists locally between those who favor western values and traditionalists who oppose it; in another text, he generalizes the collective behavior as aggressive towards the West. In this context, he requires on the reasons for the late-twentieth-century upsurge in fault line wars and the central role of Muslims in such conflicts? To this extent, he contends that (Huntington, 199, 264-5):

- First, it is argued that Islam from the start has been a religion of the sword and glorifies military virtues.
- Second, from its origin in Arabia.
- Third, "indigestibility" of Muslims. Indigestibility, however, works both ways: Muslim countries have problems with non-Muslim minorities and vice-versa.
- Finally, the demographic explosion in Muslim societies and the decline of economic situation that raises the propensity of rage towards violence both within Islam and against non-Muslims.

In fault line conflict identity is always defined by religion. Psychologically, blind faith provides the power of moral justification for struggle against those characterizes as God's enemy. Thus, fault line argument uses civilization in the process of otherness to mobilize the public consensus in favor of war. Huntington argues that fault line wars spread as domino theory. It is not limited to one area of conflict which is local or external. In this regard, to avoid a defeat in local conflict officials tend to

they are obliged to follow the modern territorial concept of state. Daniel Pipes extends this argument by asserting that the unity of the Ummah and the rule of the caliph both point to a third characteristic Islamic ideal, the fatih, and military action intended either to defend or expand the boundaries of lands ruled by Muslims. This ideal has two important implications; first, it encourages, under proper circumstances, aggression against non-Muslims as fulfillment of a religious precept. Second, it prohibits warfare among Muslims, for violence must only be employed to spread the rule of Islam (Pipes, 1981, 65). Thus, when non-Muslims threaten Shari' Muslim subjects often become active to defend their religion (Ibid, 72). Since Dar al-Islam has no territorial borders then Islam is anti-nationalistic. Muslim nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, furthermore, are in competition as Bruce Lawrence (1990: 200) has suggested (see also Marranci, 2009, 53). This argument assumes that Islam is conducive towards fundamentalism with respect to some historical elements. First, Islam is a scriptural faith that claims to be the perfect and final one. Secondly, there is no room for new prophets. Thirdly, Islam has no clergy, and, therefore, no religious differentiation is possible. Finally, Islam does not need to differentiate between church and the state. Mcalister argues that the problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, different civilizations whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power (Mcalister, 2001, 266-267).

trigger a sequence of external enemies. Thus a global war either between states or against terrorism could come about from the escalation of a fault line war between groups from different civilizations, most likely involving Muslims on one side and non-Muslims on the other. Escalation is made more likely if aspiring Muslim core states compete to provide assistance to their embattled coreligionists (Huntington, 1996, 315). In this perspective, the lack of core state in the Islamic civilization paves the way to the fundamentalist organizations to establish the Caliphate state, as the unique substance to encounter the West. Thus the absence of a core state in the Islamic bloc will be a cause of weakness in the Middle East in fighting the terrorist movements and will hinder the negotiation with the west. The question is raised here, does Huntington insist on the need of core state which can create a peaceful relationship between Islam and the West. One can claim that the cultural renaissance is what required in the Middle East to create a collective consensus to refute any notions of clash. A core state may be both useful and bad. Core state is required to build democracy and enhance cooperation in the international arena. Huntington does not refer to this problem because if the collective consensus is built on Islam, as Huntington assumes, there is no requirement for this state to be in accordance with western values. The main aim, rather, of this core state is to reestablish the united Islamic state or Arabic state. This will enlarge the fault line conflict.

Fault line is about the militant wing of fundamentalism which has different aims from opposing the western presence in Muslim lands to create the Islamic state. But all kinds of militant wings are against the nation state and world order.⁸⁰ Several threats were perceived in the Middle East against the US interest. These threats were related to terrorism. Iran and Syria were similarly singled out for arming and encouraging militants in Iraq, and for supporting groups fighting against Israel. But the big issue for Washington became Muslims nuclear power. This threat has been escalated, according to Loretta Napoleoni, due to the negative feelings towards the West, such as fear and hatred in the Middle East, enhances the terrorist organizations' economic and public situation and helps in recruiting people. Today, Islamist leaders address their followers using a religious rhetoric since this language is easily understood by the Muslim masses. Loretta Napoleoni (2003) argues that for millions of Muslims, mosques across the world are socio-economic anchors in deeply troubled waters. And hence, even for good Muslims, fighting the West is a duty (Napoleoni, 2003, 101). Barber Benjamin in his work, *Mcworld* (2003), says that in Islam, fundamentalism has played a leading political role since the eighteenth century and Jihad has been a metaphor for anti-Western

⁸⁰ Read also: Milton-Edwards, 2007, 121.

and anti-universalist struggle. Jihad, according to Barber, "in its most elemental negative form is a kind of energy, a kind of animal fear propelled by anxiety in the face of uncertainty" (Barber, 2003). Benjamin Barber understands Jihad as the struggle of local people to sustain solidarity and tradition against the nation-state's legalistic and pluralistic abstractions as well as against the new commercial imperialism of Mcworld. Gabrielle Marranci has another idea about jihad based on his reading of Quran: "forbidding useless violence, preserving civilians, and expressly dictating strict codes of conduct and engagement" (Marranci, 2006, 18). However, Muslims have not shaped their contemporary idea of jihad only through the Qur'an and the Prophet's Sunna. Marranci asks why the Islamic scholars selected the term *harb* (war) to geopolitically identify non-Muslim lands. Marranci adds that Ulama "Islamic scholars" argue that since the non-Muslim lands, lived in a *jahiliyya* state (did not recognize Islam), it was the duty of Muslims to invite citizens living under *jahiliyya* to follow Islam. If they refused the invitation, Muslim states were religiously required to impose what was good (Islam) and forbid what was wrong (*jahiliyya* lifestyles). Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plumber question on the goals of terror leaders. Their answer is that all terror leaders want to achieve some fundamental change in policies, or even a change in the political regime of, their home country or the wider region (Neumayer & Plumber, 2009, 8-9). Political grievances again raise the ideological appeal of terror groups. Such grievances spur hatred and anger and the wish to revenge oneself on those who are perceived as being the cause of grievance. Their theoretical concern is to know why terrorists attack foreign targets. Fault lines theory suggests that terror groups are no more local actors with limited ambitions. Some claim to establish Islamic State that across borders such as Da'esh. It has two folds: first, attracting media and public attention by attacking Western targets to gain strategic benefits; second, enforcing the western states to reassess their level of involvement in the Middle East's politics. So, to assume that terrorism is a global actor, does not neglect the fact that they tend to invest the unstable domestic circumstances of some nation-states in the Middle East as the ground for their abroad activities. Terrorists attack foreign targets because they have political ends within the militant agenda. Neumayer and Plumber conclude that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are regarded as conventional military Huntington-type clashes between the West and Islam, to which the Islamic civilization responds with increasingly lethal terrorism (Neumayer & Plumber, 2009, 25). They assure that in fighting Islamic terrorism, Western countries are in a no-win situation. One can suggest that for the West it is better to stay and fight terrorism rather than to leave the Middle East to sink in the dark water of terrorism;

because if terrorists control the Middle East and its resources, then, it is the right moment for them to restore the Islamic state according to their terms.

Respectively, Bernard Lewis suggests the imperialism of a defensive kind such as the American invasion to Iraq in 2003 (Lewis, 2011, 7). Bernard Lewis refers to eight challenges to which the Middle East is headed towards chaos:

1. Muslims in the Middle East suffer fundamentalism as a ruthless political ideology.
2. Democrats suffer from a very serious disadvantage.
3. Lacking democratic political culture to which peaceful transfer of power can be guaranteed.
4. The regional struggle over the leadership between Turkey and Iran. The sectarian tension is an inevitable result of the historical discourse of the region.
5. Israel is the unique democratic state in the Middle East except Turkey.
6. The danger of territorial claims such as the case of Iraq and Kuwait, Iran and Bahrain.
7. The most dangerous threat to Middle Eastern states is civil war. Thus, the trend towards fragmentation will be encouraged by the growth of ethnicity and sectarianism.
8. Socio-economic developments that would decline with the crisis of superseded natural resources in the region.

Democracy, for Lewis, is the best path to accelerate the peace process in the region. Through democracy the negotiation process will go softly due to the perception that democratic people are more amenable to peace. Still the general perception is that Arabs and Muslims are incompatible with democracy, and this fact will make peace process in the region more difficult. The best prospect for the region would of course be a regional program of cooperation and development. Lewis sets three fundamental factors to modernize the region (Lewis, 2011, 54)⁸¹:

- First, liberate the women.
- Second, peace and cooperation between Israel and Arabic states. Eliminate Terrorism from the region through spreading cultural democracy and collective regional militant cooperation.
- Third, Prosperity of the region requires the need to strengthen the sense of nationalism because democracy needs the Westphalia nation-state.

To conclude Huntington's theory one can say that the clash is the sole path to stabilize the world order. Huntington asks why this will be the case (Huntington, 2016, 6-8):

⁸¹ See also: Lewis B., 2002, AIH, p.190.

- First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Mostly important, the people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man.
- Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations; what makes this interaction as a conflict is the game of power between nations of diverge civilizations.
- Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled “fundamentalist.”
- Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power; the west dominates international political and security institutions. At the same time, west’s power will invoke the jealousy of other civilizations. Thus, they will seek a return to the peak of world order.
- Fifth, economic regionalism is increasing. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization.
- Sixth, Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.
- Finally, groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization.

3.3.2. Critiques of Huntington's theory:

Before presenting the arguments, which criticize Huntington’s theory, I would like to refer here to Larry Diamond’s in *Search of Democracy* in which he explained why are there no Arab democracies? First of all, his methodology distinguishes among the Arab countries. Diamond does not deal with the Arab world as a monolithic political entity. While he prefers to study the prospect

of democracy in each state or group of state that share the same socio-political conditions. Diamond comes up with his critique against the assumption that relies the deficit of democracy in the Arab countries on culture or religion. For Diamond, four essential variables lead to the deficit of democracy (Diamond, 2016, 161-170):

- 1- Oil and its negative effects on the socio-economic situation in the region. Arab countries have severe problems in economy. They lack the proper ground in which investments can flourish.
- 2- Authoritarian state craft. This problem is not unique to the Arab world but Arabs have found sophisticated skills in escalating this problem.
- 3- The coils of geopolitics. Diamond argues that the conflict among super powers over the Arab world's resources has participated in the deficit of democracy.
- 4- The lack of democratic model in the Arab world.

Furthermore, four main arguments are highlighted to criticize Huntington theory:

The first is about the confused perception of Islam in the West in general and United States in particular. Bassam Tibi assumes that most of the journalists in the United States do not distinguish between Islamists and fundamentalists. Some of them conclude that "America should open a dialogue with the Islamists" (Tibi in Weinberg, 2007, 46). Their assumption is simply that societies in the Muslim countries have no power to abandon Islamists rule. Tibi (2007) locates the challenge of modernity in Islamic societies in the socio-political circumstances that have prevailed in the Middle East since the independence days in twentieth century. These circumstances have produced unstable security and political situation. These circumstances such as coup d'état, the defeat of the Arab secular-populist regimes in the Six Days War and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 have interacted with the misperception of Islam in the West and strengthened the ideology of political Islam in the region. Both of its current directions, institutional Islamism on the one hand and jihadism on the other, share the aim of restoring Islamic sovereignty even though institutional Islamists accept to play the game of voting under "democratic" procedures. Contrary to Huntington, for Bassam Tibi the problem is not in Islam, it is in political Islam; the political movements that tend to invest religious teachings in their justification process. But the political ideology of Islamism does operate neither on Islamic ethics nor with the democratic values of pluralism and power sharing (Tibi, 2012, 105). No democracy, of course, can exist without voting, but equally no

democracy can prevail if the necessary political culture and public institutions are not in place. Tibi (2012) accuses some voices in the West of lacking efficacy. He quotes opinions expressed in Financial Times that accommodate Islamists' participation within the political process to moderate Islamic countries. Tibi in these words oppose Huntington. He asserts that it is possible to establish democratic regimes in the Middle East, but this process must be bottom-up. Because for Tibi it is not true to consider Islamist jihadism merely as a passing phenomenon or a reaction to current events. For example, Da'esh project is a state affair and not a global resistance like what Al-Qaeda has shown during last two decades.

While Asef Bayat thinks that two simultaneous but contradictory processes pushed Islamism into its hegemonic position: opportunity and suppression. Its primary concern is building an “ideological community” establishing an Islamic state (Bayat, 2007, 15). However, by the mid-1990s, it became clear that Islamists could not establish an Islamic polity and economy and conduct international relations compatible with the modern national and global citizenry. Consequently, Islamist rule faced profound crisis wherever it was put into practice (as in Iran, Sudan, or Pakistan); and the violent strategies, and armed struggles, that the radical Islamists had adopted failed to make major inroads (as in Egypt and Algeria). Bayat asserts, in contrast to Huntington, that Islamism is struggling with local as well as global resistance. To him Islamism has not been able to implement its political project. To this point, Dinesh D'souza opposed Huntington's claim that Islam at its core is against Christianity. Dinesh D'Souza asserts that Islamic radicals make their case against America and the West on the grounds that these cultures have abandoned Christianity. In his May 2006 letter to President Bush, Ahmadinejad faulted America not for being Christian, but for not being Christian enough" (D'Souza, 2007, 179-80).

He continues that the Muslims are right—there is a war against Islam—but it is the secular liberals who are waging it. This war on Islam is based on three claims: "One America" strategy; "One West" strategy; and finally, "Don Quixote" strategy, which tries to locate liberalism in the Muslim world. This strategy wages the inner clash within the Muslim world. One understands that D'Souza is in agreement with Tibi (2012) and Bayat (2007) that Islam is not the cause of the clash. In order to build alliances with traditional Muslims, three critical steps are needed (D'Souza, 2007, 278-80):

- First, conservatives should cease blaming Islam for the behavior of the radical Muslims.
- Second, Islamic democracy; Muslims must choose their own way.

- Third, United States should moderate its policy towards Middle East. Alliance with Muslims is possible.

In this regard, Lisa Weeden (2003) stresses that many Muslim authors claim that the ideal Islamic state is a *dawla madaniyya* (a civil state) rather than a theocracy ruled by the `ulama or an authoritarian state ruled by the military. One of these authors is Al-Azm who affirms that Islamists call insistently for an immediate return to Islamic fundamentalists, and only these fundamentals are capable of (a) organizing people for radical socio-political action (Al-Azm, 2014, 42). Al-Azm quotes Hasan Hanafi in his book the "*Islamic movements in Egypt*," to show that how young men in touch with the Islamist organizations are influenced by the fundamentalists. Al-azm finds out that Islamists do not capture the process of reviving the fundamentalists of Islam. But they have captured the process of "Nahda" renaissance and "Yakazah" awakening, and put it in their terms and implement it to serve their interests. Thus, the shadow of the Islamist's failure will cover all Arabs and Muslims within the process of self-other assessment in the global debate. Respectively, Hamid Dabashi alters the terms of public conversation about Islam in both its immediate regional and global contexts. To Dabashi the proposition of an active agency of Muslims-being-in-the-world highlights two elements (Dabashi, 2012, 14):

- First, the idea and practice of an Islamic cosmopolitanism.
- Second, hermeneutics of alterity rather than a politics of identity.

He suggests that there is no need for a "dialogue of civilization" instead there is a need to the dissolution of civilizational thinking along the inherited East-West binaries altogether. What Muslims really need, Dabashi proposes, for the full realization of their global citizenship, is a "vibrant restoration of their own enduring historical cosmopolitanism." One crucial result of this act of hermeneutic confrontation should ideally be the final suspension of the hegemonic rule of the myth of "the West" as the final arbiter of historical realities that perpetually paint "other-societies" into a "non-Western" corner (Dabashi, 2012, 31).

The second argument is about terrorism being an anonymous concept. Dabashi blames the western governments, United States in particular, of deviating terrorism from its proper track. The problem rests at terrorism terminology which suffers from the imperial cartography that polarizes the world on a West–East axis. This conceptual ambiguity and imperial ambition have pushed the world into

an ill-considered adventure in to the Middle East (Dabashi, 2008, 237). American biased policies in favor of Israel can be recognized, By Muslims and Arabs, as a fundamental element to which Western interpretation of terrorism is conducted in favor of Israel. According to this fact in Middle East politics, western biased policies, concepts such as dar al-harb (abode of war) has been deployed by terrorists to face the western intervention in the Middle East. Still abode of war, as Ramadan argues, is not in favor of aggression instead it is a defensive term (Ramadan, 2004, 65). Tariq Ramadan insists that two things must be taken into consideration about the universalism of Islam:

- First, for a Muslim, the teaching of Islam is valid in every time and place, and this is the meaning of the idea of the alamiyyat al-Islam (the universal dimension).
- Second, the concepts of dar al-Islam, dar al-harb, and dar al-ahd were constituted as a human attempt, at a moment in history, to describe the world politics.

Thus, all Western countries are included within Shafii concept of dar al-ahd (“abode of treaty”) or dar al-amn (“abode of safety”) in which Muslims in the West and non-Muslims in the Muslim world are safe. By this explanations Ramadan and Dabashi assert that the terrorism ideology is not rooted in the Islamic peculiarities rather it’s a by-product of political circumstances. In this regard, Roy asserts that Sharia is not the expression of an Islamic totalitarianism. For him, Sharia is a legal system independent from state law (Roy, 2008, 63). He asks whether sharia is a nightmare or a utopian myth. To resolve this question three different ways have been raised:

- 1) By confining Sharia to the personal sphere, family law and anything to do with morality.
- 2) By completely separating Sharia from the rules governing accession to power, while declaring it state law.
- 3) By asserting that political principles, in the Islamic state too, supersede Sharia.

But the answer rests in the process whereby Sharia is implemented by radicals to interpret political events in their favor. Roy gives an example: Salafists exploiting Arab nationalism in the wake of the American military intervention in Iraq in 2003, or thousands of Arab volunteers trying to make their way to Fallujah. In this context, one can witness the Islamization of Arabism. Within this process Islamist neo-fundamentalists are detached from any state's territory (Roy, 2007, 75). So, they act wherever they have the opportunity to seize power and have a social justification to recruit

new members. Roy's *intégralisme* means that the neo-fundamentalism depends on voluntary joining when the individual abandon his liberty and reason in all fields of life with respect to religion.

In this context, Bayat raises a question: what is Post-Islamism? His answer was that:

In the first instance, post-Islamism refers to a political and social condition, in which after a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, and sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted even among its ardent supporters (Bayat, 2007, 18).

Post-Islamism as a project aims to build a collective conscious which attempts to conceptualize a rational method to override Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains. Post-Islamism may have two-fold process: 1- exhausted the source of legitimacy; 2- Since Muslims are so attached to their religion, then Islamism will never be exhausted unless it is their failure that costs them their social position. Rached Ghannouchi suggests that the problem of legitimacy emanates from the lack of understanding of the nature of Islam as well as of the historical development of the Muslims' approach to the question of governance (quoted in Tamimi, 2001, 188). Thus, Ghannouchi observes that Islamists model of governing will fail shortly due to some factors: the lack of political institutions, the lack of proper knowledge and interpretation of Islamic teachings and the diversity of interpretation schools 'madhahib' in Islam. This diversity in Islamic schools, in all sects of Islam and the equilibrium of Muslims quantity that follow each school, limits the scope of societal power of Islamists. Furthermore, it is so unaffordable to the West to accept such a governing system that keen to create an Islamic state with universal ambition which would threaten West's position in the global balance of power. According to all these factors mentioned above Bayat and Ghannouchi predict the failure of radical Islamist in the Muslim world. They do not share Huntington's argument; instead they see this failure as a normal result of the Muslim resistance to the intrusive thoughts advocated by the fundamentalists.

The third argument accuses Huntington's theory of seeking cultural domination in the global sphere. Huntington's idea of conflict as cultural binaries is based on a biased classification. According to Huntington's argument, Islamic civilization, is not equal to the West, and is counted as inferior and 'barbarian' (Beck in Held, Moore & Young, 2007, 62). In this sense, what is involved is a

hegemonic project, where the Other's voice is permitted to enter only as the voice of sameness. Glenn Beck argues that the imposition of monolithic type of culture over all others will cause the birth of global resistance. Cultural domination is seen as a part of a strategy to generate demand for Western goods and to compound subordination and inequality between producer and recipient cultures (Mackay in Held, 2004, 61). The reaction for this cultural imperialism might be globalized as well, as much of the recipients see this identity in a broader context than the national borders especially when this identity is contested. Here, one can refer to a religion as a global identity for the community of believers. Hugh Mackay affirms that it is very difficult to convince people to abandon their cultural particularities. Since, their identity is a product of a long-term process of mixing of culture with religion and has transcended generations to create blind faith and love. When someone recognizes himself in a specific context of identity, and his existence depends on this identity, as he believes, then, no power can enforce him to abandon it. In this regard, Anthony McGrew adds that globalization should not be deployed by super powers for centering politics on its interests and coloring the world with one monolithic cultural paradigm. Globalization, as cultural interaction, should go hand in hand with the global order, political design, to secure cooperation among nations (McGrew in Held, 2004, 132). Thus, legitimacy in global order comes from the consensus among various nations, which belong to different civilizations, on various global issues. This consensus must be built within the corridors of international institutions.

The majority of Muslims, Ehteshami assumes, understand globalization as a rival of Islamic ways which ignored Muslim realities (Ehteshami, 2007, 130). Why? Because Muslims tend to believe that globalization serves Americanization. In this perspective globalization is challenging Muslims' personal values and practices. That means most of the Muslims accused globalization as imperialism. No doubt the youth in the Arab-Muslim worlds have been in parallel affected and confused by the contested relationship between globalization and Islamism. The problem is that Muslims and Arabs have not yet found their way to globalization, Ehteshami argued. They enter the global sphere of culture through other's gates. They have not fixed till now the crisis of misperception of globalization. What escalated the problem is that terrorists have deployed the misconception of globalization as well as the advantages of globalization to challenge the global order.

Terrorist have successes in shaking the global security. To enhance the stability of the global order Esposito submits six-step solution (Esposito, 2002, 120-147):

- First, the west shall judge Islam by the teachings of the faith, not just by the beliefs and actions of a radical few.
- Second, to ask whether Islam is compatible with Western civilization is to ignore past and present exchanges. In fact, civilizations and cultures overlap; they have similarities and differences.
- Third, ignoring the old stereotypes such as Huntington's theory, by characterizing Islam and the West as age-old enemies.
- Fourth, pluralism and tolerance based upon mutual respect and understanding is cornerstones of a dialogue among civilizations.
- Fifth, supporting the civil society in the Middle East which is a critical ingredient for building democratic institutions.
- Sixth, enhancing the neutrality in US foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern issues, especially, the Arab-Israel conflict.

John Esposito asks why Muslims hate us. Anti-Americanism is driven not only by the blind hatred of the terrorists but also by a broader based anger and frustration with American foreign policy. In this regard, Antonio Negri presents an explanation of the possibilities of militant in the '*multitude*' as reaction to imperial policies in local or global orders. He states that "in the postmodern era, as the figure of the people dissolves, the militant is the one who best expresses the life of the multitude: the agent of resistance against Empire" (Negri, 2001, 411-2).

According to the statement above, any resistant movement against western policies in the Middle East should include two essential elements: collective construction and exercise of a counter power and an alternative program of government. This reaction may take various shapes, military, cultural and political. Gilbert Achcar, in his book, *Clash of Barbarism*, blames both parties of escalating the scope of struggle and violence. Achcar explains that anti-Americanism sentiment is partially due the mistaken of United States' foreign policy towards the Arab-Muslim world (Achcar, 2006, 24). One can oppose Achcar as he justifies any act of terrorism as belonging to a specific part of the game. Some find in it a remedy to their pain and humiliation. Most Arabs truly hate or at least blame the United States for injustices done to them and especially for the condition in Iraq and Palestine. But

majority still want a peaceful settlement and reject any recourse to violence. Achcar asserts that Bush in his first union speech, after 11 September events, used the term "evil" five times in relation with rogue states. This kind of rhetoric of demonizing the other is shared by both Bush and Bin Laden. For Achcar the world is polarized between those who support the American way of life, and traditionalists who oppose it; such a formulation only enhances the clash. Here, one can ask whether traditionalists can indeed be described as barbaric if they do not recourse to violence, and what kind of traditionalists should be condemned? To answer this question Achcar takes recourse to the modern history of the Middle East in general and the Arabic peninsula in particular. He finds out that the Saudi Kingdom regime is the most important reason or engine of Islamic fundamentalism and political despotism. He expresses it as the most totalitarian in political and cultural terms. Thus, he claims that US policy is hypocritical since it enjoys a lucrative friendship with the Saudis. All terrorists share hatred against United States and they believe that they will achieve victory someday. But for them enemy is anyone who opposes them (be it local or an outsider). They use the most barbaric methods against their local enemy since they are involved in a bitter struggle for power, and till the outsider does not harbor political ambitions they are left alone. Achcar suggests that "each civilization produces its own specific modalities of barbarism...some people cut throats, others launch cruise missiles" (Achcar, 2006, 85). And one face of barbarism is the repression and collective paranoia. Arabs and Muslims, whether in the United States or somewhere under the control of terrorists, are victims of repression, anxiety and paranoia. Thus the clash of civilizations at its core is a clash of barbarism, the brutal face of each civilization is expressed through violence without legitimacy even under self-defense or pre-emptive. Given that the battle is waged on the Arab-Muslim land and some want to take it to the American territory. But who are really they? Who keeps the battle over the other's territory? According to Achcar the wealthier and powerful are the deadliest in the clash. In other words, to justify one's cruelty or barbarism, he tends totally to accuse and blame the others for his action. Thus, *Islamophobia* as an approach is to be blamed.⁸² The

⁸² Negri presents his concern about the difficulty of constructing on stable and coherent definition of terrorism is intimately linked to the problem of establishing an adequate notion of legitimate violence (Negri, 2004, 27). US government asks for legitimation of its military violence on the basis of its values such as freedom, democracy. The aware of how often international law served in the 20th century merely to legitimate and support the violence of the strong over the weak. Huntington seeks a similar ordinary function for civilization of polarizing the nation states into stable groups of friend and enemy to organize global violence within the war on terror that orchestrated through islamophobia.

causes of anti-American sentiment in the Arab-Muslim world are, according to Achcar (2002, 92-6):

- First, the United States military presence in the Middle East.
- Second, the United States policy toward Iraq before and after the invasion in 2003.
- Third, the US's biased policy in favor of Israel.
- Fourth, unilateralism, imperial arrogance and lack of legitimacy through a disrespect of the international law.

The fourth argument⁸³ is about the “Arab street” which reified the cultural and collective conduct of an entire people in a violent abstraction. Bayat prefers to replace the “Arab street” by the “political street”. The Arab political street, according to Bayat, has undoubtedly reinforced a feeling that Islam is under a global attack. This sentiment has flourished as a reactionary movement towards Anti-Islamic sentiments in the West following the September 11 events, and the subsequent “war on terrorism” (Bayat, 2010, 215). Bayat asks what kind of Muslims rebel in the age of modernity? Two types of interpretations have been attempted in this regard:

- The “modernist” interpretations portray Islamism as a reactionary movement carried out by “traditional people”.

⁸³ See also: 1. Abd Alqadir Mohammed Fahmi (2006). {alrayah algharbiyah lil islam} The Western Vision for Islam Between the: Probability of Conflict And the Prospected Dialogue, Journal of International Studies, Baghdad University, Issue 30, 1-12.

2. Adel Sabir Radhi (2014). {altahawul aldemocracy} Democratic Transition (Reasons, Conditions, Levels): Case Study of Iraq, Journal of Political Issues, Issue 37-38, 151-168.

3. Ala'saf, M. (2013). {al-Democratia fi alfikr al'raby} Democracy in Contemporary Arab Thought}, Beirut: Arabic Institution for Studies.

4. Ghalyon, B. and others (1994). {alkhayar aldimocracy} *About The Democratic Choice*, Beirut: The Center of Arab Unity Studies.

5. Al-jabri, M. (2011). {tashkeel alakl albasher} *The Formation of Arab Mind*. Eleventh edition, The Center of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut.

6. Abd Allah, T. (1997). {a'lyat altaghiir aldemokrati fi aloutn ala'rabi} *Mechanisms of Democratic Change in The Arab World*, Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies.

7. Abdesalam, R. (2008). {ilmaniya, aldeen waldemocratayah} *Secular, Religion and Democracy*, Aljazeera Center for Studies.

- The second type of interpretation views Islamism as a manifestation of, and a reaction to, post-modernity.

In this framework, one can say that the movement is dedicated against the universalizing secular modernity. Why political Islam? For Bayat Islam is an essential factor in the political and socialization processes. He suggests that the focus must not be on Islam but rather on the historical Muslims, who come to define and redefine their religion. Thus, he supports the claim that honors political change in the Middle East. One can add that any change in the Muslim world will not succeed if does not take into consideration Islam as a reasonable engine in the socio-political context. Thus, order can only be restored globally if one can honor John Rawls' thesis of Law of Peoples which encourages cultural and political pluralism through the conception of multiculturalism, as Sebastiano Maffettone and Francesca Corrao suggest, in achieving global stability.

Conclusion

I can conclude the chapter with Binder Leonardo's statements that the Arabs are poorly integrated communities into global design (Binder, 1988, 104). In this regard, Huntington, in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* (2016) in the occasion of twentieth anniversary of the Clash of Civilization, continues his argument that the Islamic world is incompatible to western cultural codes. Thus, Muslims, in his perspective, might join the third alternative in confronting the western hegemony. These alternatives are: isolation such as the case of North Korea, accepting and joining the west and the third is facing the western hegemony. Still, the fundamental question was how to civilize (facing) the Muslims without making them lose their identity. The mission of "civilizing them" requires a coherent strategy. But what is the essential path of this strategy. In this regard, two trends in the west have been contesting each other towards how properly deal with the Arab world:

The first is Strauss's ethics of intervention in the global order. Concerning intervention for the sake of change in the Muslim world, Strauss honors the Western intervention, in particular that of USA, in global affairs: America is the best model according to classical political philosophy. In this regard Zuckert Catherine asserts that Strauss made three affirmations central to his understanding and judgment of America: America is modern, modernity is bad and America is good. One can understand from this that Strauss honors United States model of modernity and encourages it to

have a crucial role in global affairs to invoke modernity. When Strauss says that America is modern, he means that it is a nation shaped to a large degree by the ideas that emerged within modern political philosophy (Zuckert, 2006, 60). Even though Strauss agrees that rights come to play a central role in modern political philosophy, Catherine Zuckert finds out, that according to Strauss, the founder of modernity is Machiavelli, and Machiavelli has no doctrine of human rights, but he honors Machiavelli's doctrine of natural rights which means there is no equal standing of rights for all peoples since peoples are naturally different before others. Thus, each people have their own characteristics that distinguish them in various fields such as skills, culture and nature. Hence, the stronger or the most skilled should impose his model on others. To this end, some honored the notion of *noble lies* to justify American foreign interventions and wars. Are the ideas of the conservative political philosopher Leo Strauss a shaping influence on the Bush administration's world outlook? To answer this question Danny Postel interviews Shadia Drury – a leading scholar and critic of Strauss. Shadia Drury asserts that Leo Strauss was a great believer in the efficacy and usefulness of lies in politics. Public support for the Iraq war rested on lies about Iraq posing an imminent threat to the United States. Thus, Drury is against the idea that noble lies support liberal democracy. In contrast to modern political thinkers, the ancients denied that there is any natural right to liberty. Human beings are born neither free nor equal. Drury asserts that Strauss shares the insights of the wise Plato that justice is merely the interest of the stronger. In his book *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, Strauss outlines why secrecy is necessary. She quotes his arguments that the wise must conceal their views for two reasons – to spare the people's feelings and to protect the elite from possible reprisals. So, they come to the conclusion that they have a moral justification to lie in order to avoid persecution. For Strauss, the rule of the wise is not about classic conservative values like order, stability, justice, or respect for authority. The rule of the wise is intended as an antidote to modernity. Peter Minowitz agrees that the neo-conservatives are for the most part genuine in wanting to spread the American commercial model of liberal democracy around the globe (Minowitz, 2009, 105). But he goes deeply to assess Drury's conclusion that neo-conservatives in George Bush's administration were affected by Strauss's ideas. He characterized some of them as Straussians such as Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Minister of Defense and assistant to Vice President Dick Cheney. Wolfowitz was one of the key architects of the war on Iraq and a self-proclaimed follower of Strauss. Drury continues by stating that the wise are those who fabricate the noble lies while the vulgar are those who consume them (Drury, 2005, 194-5). Thus, morality is

considered as a hindrance to the city's quest for greatness. Drury states that like Machiavelli, Strauss believed that political greatness is a function of power whereby moral ideals have no place in politics. Justice and happiness are the products of the strong. So, the stronger is the one who sets the concepts and conditions of justice in global affair. Therefore, America must be strong and cohesive that is necessary for military success. In response to this argument Drury argues that civilization fights others with brutality and ideals (Drury, 2004, 133). Once an ideal is widely accepted by society, it can begin to pressurize on the state to use its coercive power to support the ideal in question. Drury insists that Strauss's idea of good and right is not liberal at its core, because to use force in favor of a monolithic model and not for the idea of the right itself is against liberty. Thus for her the conflict between Islam and the West has at its source *sameness* and not difference between the two worlds. Both parties share the same process of constructing ideals which refuse the other. For Drury it is the clash of ideals that prevails in the global arena.

The second trend is about John Rawls' model of global order. By the law of peoples Rawls means a political conception for right and justice in the international arena (Rawls, 1993, 36). His aim is to set out the bearing of political liberalism for the tolerance of non-liberal societies? Tyrannical regimes cannot be accepted in a reasonable society of people even if they are able to provide stability. Rawls in the *Law of Peoples* tends to emphasize that there is no unique symbol or system can be applied by all societies despite their particularity. Thus, western liberalism cannot be endorsed by the western world as an absolute fact. Therefore, Rawls uses the notion *well-ordered societies* to describe liberal and non-liberal societies. The requirements for hierarchical societies to be well-ordered are:

- 1) Must be peaceful and gain its legitimate aims through diplomacy.
- 2) Its system of law be guided by common good conception of justice.
- 3) The political institutions constitute a reasonable consultation hierarchy. Its conception of common good of justice secures for all persons at least certain basic human rights.

It is important to understand that the Law of Peoples is developed within political liberalism. Law of Peoples is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples of free and equal liberal peoples debating their mutual relations as peoples (Rawls, LOP, 55). The ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever

government officials follow the principles of the Law of Peoples. The representatives of liberal constitutional democracies reflect on the advantages of the principles of equality and reciprocity among peoples. For Rawls three basic features characterize liberal peoples: reasonably just constitutional democratic government⁸⁴; Mill's concept of "common sympathies"; third, a firm attachment to a political (moral) conception of right and justice. He states that "Liberal peoples are both *reasonable* and *rational*. Rawls' project is promising since he calls for common sympathies as the main framework that orients and manages the relations between different peoples. To bring this sympathy to the fore of international relations, as Rawls suggests, some norms must be implemented (Rawls, LOP, 59-66):

- First, is toleration that extends the Law of Peoples to non-liberal peoples as equal participating members in good standing of the Society of Peoples? Rawls affirms this reasonable toleration in the international arena to secure stability. Since, he accepts these hierarchical societies, of which religious doctrines plays a significant role in polity, one can believe that as long as a hierarchical decent society staying in the society of law of peoples, it will attract other societies to join them towards stability and cooperation. But at the same time, their existence in the society of well-ordered societies does not mean they are going to be equally liberal to liberal societies.
- Second norm is pluralism whereby citizens in a liberal society affirm a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice towards the non-liberal. Pluralism honors mutual respect to decent non-liberal societies. But this pluralism is limited with respect to two criteria for decent hierarchical societies: the society does not have aggressive aims, and its law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice. It is crucial that the Law of Peoples does not require decent societies to abandon or modify their religious institutions and adopt liberal ones; this is what the project of multiculturalism is for. According to Rawls, liberal peoples should assist these states to satisfy the conditions necessary for joining the society of peoples (Maffettone, 2010, 307).
- Third norm is reasonableness. All societies have to honor the civil and moral commitments in their conduct towards others to preserve peace and cooperation.

⁸⁴ Sørensen G. quotes Michael Doyle's interpretation of Immanuel Kant identifies three elements behind the claim that democracy leads to peace with other democracies (Sorensen in Dallmayr, 2014, 173): 1) the existence of domestic political cultures based on peaceful conflict resolution; 2) democracies hold common moral values; 3) peace between democracies is strengthened through economic cooperation and interdependence. On the global scale, liberal order is founded on interdependence, institutions, and common values. In this regard, Sorenson honors the Liberalism of Restraint which aims to replace unilateral power exhibition by institutional networks. He also opposes the Liberalism of Imposition whereby power is used unilaterally to impose a specific set of values on others such as democracy and open market (Ibid, 182). A further barrier to Liberalism of Imposition is the loss of legitimacy.

- Fourth norm is legitimacy. The idea of political *legitimacy* is based on the criterion of reciprocity. Thus, all societies as part of Law of peoples must accept and respect the *obligations of legitimate law*. Three ways are required to protect these obligations of international legitimacy: 1) endorsing a reasonable constitutional democracy; 2) international institutions must be honored and respected, these institutions must be able to involve all liberal and decent societies in the process of international decisions; 3) spread a democratic *public political culture*.

The non-ideal part of law of peoples, according to Maffettone, is constituted by the relations between this society of peoples and the other three kinds referred to as states rather than as peoples. These kinds include outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutism that lack popular participation (Maffettone, 2010, 296). The society of peoples is conceived as pluralist. But still there is a limitation on pluralism. Maffettone explains the resistance to such a limitation by embracing two main reasons: global interdependence both in socio-economic terms and in terms of international institutions; second, many ethical and legal ideas are now implicit in the shared bases of global politics. Thus, non-liberal societies can be included in the club of law of peoples without having to renounce their own traditions. Maffettone contends that there is for peace to flourish in the global politics only when four basic points are endorsed: reasonable pluralism, unity within diversity, public reason and democratic peace. One can say that all these four points of Maffettone's project of reconciliation can be found in multiculturalism⁸⁵ as a global discourse to embrace pluralism and sustain peace and stability through a liberal democratic culture. Therefore, multiculturalism is a reasonable conduct towards other's privacy which differs from western approaches and ideas. Islamic civilization, Corrao and Maffettone assume, has been multicultural since its very beginning (Maffettone & Corrao, 2014, 4). My point of view is that, multiculturalism also depends on public reason to establish a liberal public culture that raises reasonable citizens in a wider organized context in which different groups and sub-identities give priority to public reason which accommodates common conception of good and justice to maintain co-existence.

This global consensus must be based on the three elements:

⁸⁵ This model of global multiculturalism, Chris Brown suggests, denies the state of clash between civilizations since they are systems of ideas not physical entities and have no specific borders (Brown in Dallmayr, 2014, 55). Brown quotes Eisuke Sakakiba, the Japanese official, *The End of Progressivism*. Progressivism, for Sakakiba, is the belief that there is only one ideal end, a unique path for all human beings. Brown honors Sakakibacriticism against the tendency of the West to impose itself as a universal civilization. Multiculturalism is a real discourse of dialogue, according to Brown, that can take place between individuals will lead to mutual understanding only if all parties equally accept the norms of this dialogue and share the common consensus of cooperation commitment.

- First, *liberalism of choice* which implement three notions “Freedom, responsibility and tolerance.”
- Second, *political moral learning*, Eugene defines it as "a positive sense of political reciprocity, is a potentially plausible basis for stability both within liberal democracies and between reasonable states, at least on the Rawlsian view" (Eugene, 2002, 2).
- Third, the culture of multilateralism in decision making process and international institutions management. Tony Smith honors Woodrow Wilson's favored proposals of disarmament and collective security that dictated multilateral decision-making and a limited surrender of sovereignty to international institutions (Smith in Ikenberry, 2009, 56).

In this regard, what it needed by any country to be a core state of multiculturalism is to follow this trend of consensus which depends on cooperation and trust. Smith continues his argument by linking between two notions: from international legitimacy comes the idea of the “*right to intervene*.” This idea is a collective choice based upon common consensus whereby multilateral decision is in favor for international public interest. To this end, Slaughter A. proposes some basic principles designed to ensure an inclusive, tolerant, respectful, and decentralized world order: first principle is global deliberative equality to maximize the possibilities of participation; second is legitimate difference which means pluralism; third, is affirmative cooperation; fourth is the vertical norms of checks and balances towards the use of force (Slaughter, 2004, 29-30).

In this chapter I shed light on the most important findings in western political philosophy. The aim of this chapter was to find out the western prospect towards the inclusion of Arabs and Muslims in the global order. One of the most important questions was whether Arabs or Muslims are compatible with democracy. But the most important is that how this prospect can affect United States strategy towards the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular especially in the aftermath of IS crisis. Thereafter, the forthcoming chapters will be designed to tackle two important questions:

- The political experience in Iraq post-2003, and how this experience is related to the emergence of IS in Iraq.
- The United States’ official and popular reaction to IS crisis.

The fourth chapter

Islamophobia the concept and its implications on Politics in the U.S

This chapter tackles some serious questions concerning orientalism's spheres of interaction and effectiveness on United States' politics, domestic or abroad, towards Muslims in the aftermath of the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The focus of the Chapter rests on the following theme:

1. The concept of Islamophobia as an instance of Orientalism's deep involvement in constructing the public perception towards Muslims issues whether in the United States or in the Middle East.
2. Islamophobia as a point of reference in the U.S' politics whether on the private or official levels such as the race of the US Presidential elections 2016.

The thematic selection stated above aims to answer specific questions such as:

- How Islamophobia works or interacts in the social and political spheres?
- Does islamophobia affect the political tendencies of the American individual especially in the presidential election?
- Is Islamophobia a by-product of institutional interaction in the public sphere?
- Is Islamophobia measurable in the U.S?

To answer the questions above, the structure of this chapter will be distributed in three sections. The distribution has been done according to Chris Allen's methodology. Allen identifies three components of Islamophobia:

- The first is the Symbolic forms, which discusses the concept.
- The second component includes the '*modes of operation*' through which the Islamophobic message is sustained.

- The third component of Islamophobia is exclusionary practices against Muslims and Islam in social, economic and political spheres. “Exclusionary practices must also include the subjection to violence as a tool of exclusion.”

In this regard, the sections will be designed as follows:

- The first section explores the concept of Islamophobia and how it works in the socio-political context. To this end, my methodology will revisit the works of Chris Allen regarding the concept of Islamophobia.
- In the second section, I will focus on Foucault's works concerning Islamophobia's mechanisms of interaction in the social sphere. Thus, Michel Foucault’s model of ideological hegemony will be studied in the light of Islamophobic practices that seek domination over the public perception of Muslims and the kind of relationship this process aims to sustain between Knowledge and Power.
- In the third section, the discussion will shift to question Islamophobia’s implications on politics and social interaction. In this regard, the kind of attitude endorsed by both private and official levels towards Muslims will be studied.

4.1 Islamophobia: the concept and the spheres of interactions

This section tries to shine a spotlight on Islamophobia as a process which may create cultural hegemony over a specific object. The section will be distributed in sub-parts where each one seeks to highlight a specific fact of Islamophobia. It starts from the conceptual stance that tries to underpin its literal and political meanings. From the conceptual ground this section tries to explore what kind of model Islamophobia rhetoric uses to deliver messages to the subject of study. To this end, the section visits Foucault’s works concerning power-knowledge relationship. Foucault’s model of processing information around the ‘game of truth’ is essential to understand the practical instances of the discourse of signs and statements. This section addresses the practical tools of creating a discourse model which depends on linguistic thrift through texts and audio. The most important part of this section is the questioned relationship between Islamophobia and politics whether locally and abroad. To understand this relationship this section needs to cover few other

questions such as: what is the scope within which Islamophobia functions; what are the social and global challenges and threats beyond Islamophobia; is Islamophobia a by-product of the private sphere, the public sphere or both; finally, is Islamophobia a necessary process to expose threats to the western societies or it poses threats to the social fabric and global tolerance alike. The second part of this section discusses Islamophobia's modes of operation. To this end, Foucault's model of cultural hegemony will be discussed to explain the relationship between power and knowledge; and how this relationship provides the fertile ground to the modes of operation to affect the social consensus. The third component of Allen's concept of Islamophobia will be tackled in the third section of this chapter.

In this regard, one can refer to Edward Said's notion of representation of Islam in *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (1981). Mehdi Semati asserts that today's discourse of Islam and Muslims is inextricably bound with the issue of terrorism, which tends to frame all other issues concerning the Middle East. Semati goes on by stating that "This era has been characterized as the era of aggressive militarism and a ruthless foreign policy as a response to the perceived erosion of American power and standing in the international political arena" (2010, 256).

Thus, the color-coded terrorism threat is where the formal structure and the individual psychic meet. This process manifestly interacts with the relentless cultural representations of the Muslim Other. Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that imperial racism is no longer explained in an inferior/superior framework. Instead, the 'Other' is believed to be 'different' (p. 192). Due to this explanation, Semati pays attention to the shift from 'diversity' and 'multiculturalism' policies to 'assimilation' as essential requirement for 'integration'; might take specific forms which should accommodate the dominant cultural values (Semati, 2010, 267). Accordingly, Muslims became the figure of the 'Other,' whether in the global order or any domestic social order, which determine the positive or negative coexistence. Thus, according to Lorraine Sheridan the line between racism and religious discrimination, however, is often blurred and caused a severe damage on the self-assertion whether in the social or global order (Sheridan, 2006, 318). As a result, policies such as for fighting terrorism have shifted away from its essential goals. Foucault's influence on Said's thinking in his formulation of Orientalism lies in the idea of discourse as a materialization of power/knowledge.

Islamophobia: the concept:

For Chris Allen⁸⁶ Islamophobia is:

An ideology, similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other similar phenomena, that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways to that which it has historically, although not necessarily as a continuum, subsequently pertaining, influencing and impacting upon social action, interaction, response and so on, shaping and determining understanding, perceptions and attitudes in the social consensus – the shared languages and conceptual maps – that inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other neither restricted to explicit nor direct relationships of power and domination but instead, and possibly even more importantly, in the less explicit and everyday relationships of power that we temporarily encounter, identified both in that which is real and that which is clearly not, both of which can be extremely difficult to differentiate between. As a consequence of this, exclusionary practices – practices that disadvantage, prejudice or discriminate against Muslims and Islam in social, economic and political spheres ensue, including the subjection to violence – are in evidence (Allen, 2010, 190).

By this definition Allen explicitly explains Islamophobia as a priori ideology founded long before 9/11 events.⁸⁷ He tries to interpret the mechanism of social influencing played by this ideology to create social consensus towards specific groups within the local society and the global world alike. This mechanism does not properly work without a sufficient mobilizing power. The relationship between power and knowledge deploys ‘the game of truth’ to justify any exclusionary practice towards the object “Muslims” of this game. But the question is: who deploys the exclusionary

⁸⁶ Chris Allen, a research fellow at the Institute of Applied Social Studies at the University of Birmingham, writes that the term seems to appear in print first in 1925 when Alphonse Etienne Dinet and Sliman ben Ibrahim drafted *L'Orient vu de l'Occident*, a biography of the prophet Muhammad. In this work, Dinet and Ibrahim use the phrase "accès de délire islamophobe" which roughly translates to an "Islamophobic delirium" (Miller, 2012, 6).

⁸⁷ According to Mastnak the beginning of anti-Muslim antipathy in the Christian world dates back to the mid-ninth century, and the Christian fear of cultural assimilation for those living under Muslim rule (Mastnak in Shryock, 2010, 33). While Stephanie Wright finds out that Islamophobia exists in the U.S since the beginning of the Seventeenth century. In this regard, Wright quotes John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon's *Cato's Letters* (1720–1723), which accused Islam's peculiarities as evidences of despotism resulting from the fusion of secular and religious authority (Wright in Pratt & Woodlock, 2016, 51).

practices? It is obviously the people, whether individually or collectively, who hold this responsibility of excluding bad group (as framed) from the social fabric. Thus, the institutional power creates socially the capability and credibility of the game of truth.

“Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks Islamophobia was defined as having a fear of Muslims and an ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’ (Runnymede Trust 1997)⁸⁸. By these words Arun Kundnani supports the claim that Islamophobia is a by-product of social interaction, and thus, its consequences are profoundly dangerous for multiculturalism. Kundnani adds that both institutional power and the media play a key role in creating a climate of racism and hostility as a natural reaction to the excessive mixing of different cultures (Kundnani, 2007, 132). To add salt to injury, local and international events have been deployed to prove the failure of integration and the failure of multiculturalism (Massey & Tatla in Morgan, 2012, 167-71).

While the report (Runnymede Trust 1997) defined Islamophobia as “the dread, hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetrated by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims.” The term continued to be used in various ways. Titled Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001, the report documented acts of discrimination and racism against Muslims in fifteen EU member countries. These acts of discrimination may be summarized as cultural humiliation and detraction; political attacks and blame over the failure of integration and violent actions; and religious exclusion and cultural racism (Kalin in Esposito: 2011, 8). By presenting these examples Chris Allen asks Does ‘Islamophobia’ exist? He answers, yes. Allen argues that there are evidences to suggest that manifestations of an anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic phenomenon are apparent, albeit at times as a causal influence underpinning a myriad of expressions and forms. Allen looked at the conclusions of some organization such as IHrC⁸⁹ which claimed that 674 attacks on Muslims were recorded following 9/11. Allen also did not differentiate between these acts of discrimination, based on religion and identity, to what same communities such as Muslims were experiencing based upon their nationality or cultural heritage. For a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, Allen suggests this definition⁹⁰:

⁸⁸ See also: Ingrid Ramberg, 2004, Islamophobia and its consequences on Young People, European Youth Centre Budapest 1–6 June, the Directorate of Youth and Sport of the Council of Europe.

⁸⁹ Islamic Human Rights Commission. Available at: <http://www.ihrc.org.uk/>

⁹⁰See also: Carr, J. (2016). *Experiences of ISLAMOPHOBIA: Living with Racism in the Neo-Liberal Era*, Routledge. [Google Books]. Available at: <https://books.google.it/books> (accessed on 27July, 2016).

Any ideology or pattern of thought and/or behavior in which [Muslims] are excluded from positions, rights, possibilities in (parts of) society because of their believed or actual Islamic background. [Muslims] are positioned and treated as (imagined/real) representatives of Islam in general or (imagined/ real) Islamic groups instead of their capacities as individuals (Allen, 2010, 133-4).

Here one can refer to Allen's conclusion about the meaning of Islamophobia. He emphasizes five points concerning the phenomenon:

- Firstly, it is neither consistent nor uniform, neither in its products nor in the method of defining the other.
- Secondly, the process of framing specific group of people suggests some overlaps with other notions and not only Islam or Muslims but rather refers to nationality.
- Thirdly, Islamophobia appears to have a historical legacy from which it draws information, relevance, understanding and meaning.
- Fourthly, there is no much attention paid to distinguish between 'Muslim' or 'Islamic'. Tibi supports this position by affirming that a distinction must be made between Islam as religion and the political ambition of the Islamists.
- And finally, Islamophobia has significantly failed to permeate all settings and contexts, and even where it has achieved greater social and public permeability, understanding and meaning remains confused and lacking in clarity.

Allen suggested that the escalation of discriminatory behavior towards Muslims in the West represented an intensification of preexisting attitudes toward Islam and Muslims rather than signifying a new problem. For Sheridan, mass media represent the key player in elevating the instances of discrimination from a community level to the national level (Sheridan, 2006, 331). In addition, the interplay between media representations, political rhetoric, and legal responses to these cases displays social reaction defined as 'moral panic', as Seldo Dagistanli and Kiran Grewal quote Stan Cohen (1972/2002). For them Moral panic is "a social outbreak around a specific event that

triggers significant attention by the media which impulses specific notions in the private and public spheres, whereby a certain group are stereotyped and condemned as threat” (Dagistanli & Grewal, 2012, 125).

The message effectively delivered by the media saturation around specific events was that Arab or Muslim people are more likely to act violently since they see westerners as non-Muslims moral panic, then, is a collective discourse and perception around cultural difference which provides a fertile ground to anti-multicultural and xenophobic agenda. This panic framed by Dagistanali and Grewal as ‘problem’, has been globally tackled as a collective concern. They contend that the messages resonate with long-standing orientalist thoughts of cultural determinism which posits Islam as a religion of violent practices, supporting a ‘common sense’ agenda that Muslims should not be considered as subject of multiculturalism (Dagistanli and Grewal, 2012, 134-5). Thus, the boundaries between local moral panics and the global one are blurred. This sense of panic upon Islam’s place in the world order constructs and justifies Islamophobic attitudes and anti-immigration, anti-multicultural rhetoric, as well as providing legitimacy to ever more security discourses and policies.

In this regard, Erik Bleich quotes Zúquete (2008, p. 323) who describes Islamophobia as “a widespread mindset and fear-laden discourse in which people make blanket judgments of Islam as the enemy, as the ‘other’, as a dangerous and unchanged, monolithic bloc that is the natural subject of well-deserved hostility from Westerners” (Bleich, 2011, 1583). Thus, the fear within Islamophobia discourse does not distinguish between Islam as faith/doctrine and Muslims as a group since ‘Muslim’ means the individual’s conscious as alleged spiritually and practically related to Islam. Bleich asserts that, this totality of Islamophobic ideas gives it the ability to transplant panic in the collective conscious. To this end, Islamophobia has taken root in public, political, and academic discourse. Respectively, Bleich asks: is it possible to measure Islamophobia? To this end, one would refer to Jorg Stolz’s (2005: 548) definition of islamophobia “Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes. It may have emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements (e.g. discrimination, violence)” (quoted in Helbling, 2010, 4-5).

By this definition one can assure that the answer for Bleich question is Islamophobia is measurable. For instance, Helbling (2010, table 1) notices that in the two years under investigation (1996, 2007)

many more people do not like to have Muslims as neighbors than foreigners in general. The ratio of people who do not like to have Muslims in their neighborhood increased to 21.3 percent. Helbling (2010, Table 5) have carried out a factor analysis in order to find out different national self-understandings, and how this understanding frames the self-acceptance towards the others. To this end Helbling sets out three factors:

- The first can be labeled 'basic criteria' which asks whether foreigners have to abide by the laws.
- The second factor consists of classical 'ethnic criteria' often required by people who have a rather restrictive national self-understanding. This factor requests the foreigners a full-scale of assimilation before they can become members of the community.
- The third factor combines criteria that have rather recently sparked violent political debates upon religious affiliation and practices.

These criteria according to Helbling are arranged along two dimensions: The first emphasizes the conflict between the 'acceptance of the other' and the tendency to mainly focus on one's own success (self-enhancement); the second dimension underlines the tension between 'openness to change' and conservatism. The interaction between these criteria is managed by emotions and feelings of fear 'Phobia'. The American Psychiatric Association notes that "[A phobia] is an abnormally fearful response to a danger that is imagined or is irrationally exaggerated ..., Reactions are automatic and uncontrollable, practically taking over the person's thoughts" (quoted in Miller, 2012, 8). Thus, Islamophobia is measurable through two things:

- 1- The first is through the manifestation of reactions (attitudes against Muslims) whether at an official or private level.
- 2- The second through the manifestation of public ideas concerning Muslims or Islam.

In this regard, Henk Dekker and Jolanda Van der Noll (Helbling, 2012) tried to measure Islamophobia by conducting a survey in Netherlands. Through this survey Dekker and Noll focus on three things to measure Islamophobia: asking about general attitude towards Muslims; the level of trust in Muslims; and any negative feelings towards Muslims. In other words, feelings and attitudes are based on perception towards others. Mathew Bryce Miller asserts that perceptions and ideas orient public or individual acts towards them. These ideas create transnational perceptions

concerning Muslims' understanding of the West. To explain his argument Miller quotes Cora Alexa Doving, a senior researcher at the Norwegian Center for Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities, who offers ten characteristics of Islamophobia (Miller, 2012, 12-3):

1. The Takeover of the West due to Muslims high birthrates; 2. Institutions at Risk - Muslims pose a legitimate threat to the institutions that uphold west's modern democracy; 3. The Naive Left - Liberals are too quick to propose integration and acceptance; 4. Hate Commanded by God - Islam is an authoritarian and political ideology that promotes exclusiveness and injustice; 5. The Sexualized Man - Muslim men are overly masculine, which gives rise to a "sexuality that goes unchecked; 6. Treatment of Women; 7. Using History - The modern oppressive nature of Islam and its adherents can be linked to the history of certain regions; 8. Lack of Will to Integrate; 9. Absence of Humanism - Muslims lack a true sense of morality; 10. Something Must Be Done - The West must take action against this threat so as to regain control.

Thus, Margaret Nydell asserts that despite the rare number of Militant Muslim groups who espouse violence, which cannot represent even 1 percent of Muslims in the world, no one can deny the existence of Islamophobia in the West. It is simply common sense to realize that these groups cannot possibly represent Arab or Muslim societies and people as a whole (Nydell, 2012, 100).⁹¹ In this sense, Moustafa Bayoumi gives a different angle in understanding Islamophobia. He asserts that Islamophobia is a mission. In his words, the mission is to convert Muslims from the current teachings of Islam into a benign compatible force for the Western world (Bayoumi in Shryock, 2010, 81). It seems that Bayoumi's explanation depends on conspiracy theory. According to him, the imperial policies aim to assimilate the whole people on the planet without taking into consideration cultural differences. Whilst, Nydell has A different point of view, it is the number of Islamists, whether in the United States or in the Middle East, is not important. Rather what important is why their number is rapidly increasing. Nydell explains this by asserting that:

⁹¹ "American Muslims," it serves to correct the common conflation *that all Arabs are Muslim* and all Muslims Arab. (al-Sultany, 2012, 142). The problem with some Islamophobia research notes is that Muslim identity is at times conflated with either Arab or some other ethnic, racial or national identity, blending anti-Muslim attitudes with anti-Arab, anti-Pakistani, anti-Turkish etc. racism (Pratt & Woodlock, 2016, 4).

1. Their numbers will continue to grow rapidly because they act on perceived grievances that are constantly being reinforced.
2. There are many Muslims, especially the young, who feel lost, hopeless, alienated, and uncertain of their future. Thus, Islamism for them is a sense of moral outrage that resonates with their experiences.

Some argue that Islamism is growing because of the mistakes done by the US towards the Arabs and Muslims in general. These mistakes have escalated the grievances towards West's manipulation of power over the will of the Middle Eastern people. To support his argument, Nnydell quotes a Pew poll conducted between March 21 and April 26, 2011, that surveyed four Arab nations (along with Turkey and Pakistan) on whether people are favorable toward the United States and whether they have confidence in it. The result shows the decline of confidence in the U.S. as expressed by the majority of individuals surveyed. The highest mistrust was noticed in the Palestine; the confidence indicator declined from 23% in 2009 to 14% in 2011. Nydell asserts that “on both sides, anti-American and anti-Arab/Muslim sentiments are as much about perceptions as they are about reality—who and what people listen to and the conclusions they reach” (Nydell, 2012, 114).

Bernard Lewis figures out that perception creates hatred towards the ‘other’. Thus, hatred is what affects attitudes in the Muslim world toward the Western world.⁹²Dabashi responds to Lewis by asserting the hatred is not from nowhere. Hatred fundamentally arose in the Arab world with the rise of European and the American imperial adventures; Muslims have continued to be conscious of them as a defeated consciousness, resulting in them being unable to recognize themselves in the mirror of those other empires and their project of modernity and secularity (Dabashi, 2013, 9). Bassam Tibi adds another reason of this binary misconception between the West and the East. He asks why should an attempt to take issue with the Sharia's state be an expression of Islamophobia? The answer is simple since (Tibi, 2013, 185):

- 1- Western scholar misunderstands Sharia as Islamism.

⁹² Bernard Lewis (2002). “Targeted by a History of Hatred.” Washington Post, 10 September.

- 2- Second, any attempt to insert Sharia within the legal code or the court system will be interpreted in the eye of Islamophobia as an attempt to impose an Islamic political ambition.
- 3- Third, Tibi quotes John Breukman argument that the Islamic claim to Shari'a based world order, in which non-Muslims submit to Islamic rule, is a political reality that generates geo-civil conflict.
- 4- Fourth, Islamophobic knowledge argues that there is only "one Islam" ignoring the national and sectarian particularities.

Islamophobic trends indirectly serves Fundamentalism which fights modern Muslims by creating a unique cluster of terrorism in which all Muslims belong as one. In this regard, Tibi asserts that in US Middle Eastern studies the clear distinction between Islam and Islamism is not welcome, as a distinction between faith and political ideology. Tibi continues his challenge to Western knowledge whereby the hostility must be directed against Islamism, not Islam, as a challenge to the existing Westphalian world order of sovereign nation state (Tibi, 2013, 200).

The last point of the section sheds the light on how Islamophobia operates in the social context. Allen states that "Language, terminology, and ideas circulated in the public domain relating to Muslims did not emerge only from the political elites" (Allen in Abdulhamid, 2004, 17). And that:

Islamophobic exclusionary practices (institutional' Islamophobia) neither necessarily nor specifically refer to the exclusionary practice itself but to the fact that a once present discourse has either justified or initiated an exclusionary practice to the detriment, discrimination or exclusion of Muslims, either individually or collectively (Allen, 2010, 162).

Here, he asserts that neutral conceptions are therefore designed entirely for the contemporary and refer to newer relationships of interaction, power and meaning, most importantly those that relate to 'the thought of the other, the thought of someone other than oneself. From here, a number of important dimensions emerge (Allen, 2010, 172):

- 1- Symbolic forms create images of the other through texts and cultural signs which might be relayed, produced or constructed by individuals, groups or institutions. Symbolic forms might

therefore be linguistic, either spoken or inscribed. Thus, for Allen, fear of Muslims following 9/11, might therefore be logical, rational and justifiable by those who feel increasingly fearful and at risk.

2- Islamophobia as ideology-whether institutional or popular- is therefore implants through symbolic forms specific notions and ideas in the social consensus.

How Islamophobia does operate? For Allen Islamophobia is an ideological factory that uses symbolic forms; these forms operate through some strategies such as (Allen, 2010, 174-184):

1. Legitimizing the ideological content of images towards ‘others’;
2. ‘Dissimulation’ through ‘displacement’, where symbolic forms are employed to identify and disseminate meaning to a subject;
3. Unification: is where meaning is sustained and circulated as a collective identity;
4. Fragmentation: which asserts that the out-group is divided between those who represent definite and immediate threat and those who represent a potential threat;
5. ‘Reification’ and ‘naturalization’, defined as a social or historical creation, act or event that is either understood or perceived to be natural or the inevitable outcome of the natural characteristics of the out-group. As regards Muslims and Islam, terrorism is therefore seen to be quite natural for Muslims.

One can conclude that Islam and Muslims are conceived through thought and symbols⁹³ which impact upon social action, interaction, in the process shaping and determining understanding, and meaning that shapes the social consensus. If Islamophobia is therefore ideological, then it must operate and function as such, where ideological content must be disseminated to the public and private spaces through a vast range of different actions. In this context, the second section discusses Islamophobia’s modes of operation. To this end, Foucault’s model of cultural hegemony will be discussed to explain the relationship between power and knowledge, and how this relationship provides the fertile ground to the modes of operation that affect the social consensus. The third component of Allen's concept of Islamophobia will be tackled in the third section of this chapter.

⁹³ Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg contend that every symbol relies on the agreement among a group of people that when they see the object or image, it will represent something else to them; something different. Political messages rely on symbols to which the reader can understand to whom the message refers to (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008, 45). Douglas Pratt (2016, 31) adds that it is the combination of ignorance and imagination that lies at the heart of any generalised fear of Muslims and Islam. Thus symbols’ core function is to spread fear towards Muslims that based on imagined perceptions.

4.2 Foucault's model of ideological hegemony

Islamophobic acts manifest themselves in numerous ways. Some are explicit and obvious, some subtle and implicit. They take various forms and display varying degrees of aggression. Sometimes they come in the form of verbal and physical attacks on Muslim individuals. In some cases, mosques, Islamic centers, and Muslim properties are attacked and desecrated. The societal level, the political loyalty of Muslims living in Europe and the United States is questioned, and they are accused of dual or multiple loyalties. They are presented as less committed to democracy, constitutional rights, and human rights than others because of their religious affiliation (Kalin in esposito: 2011, 9).

Such binary oppositions introduce a deep dichotomy between religious identity and national loyalty. But the most important thing, in Foucault's words, is that what has determined Muslims' existence as an object of discourse?

Foucault's answer contains three rules essential in the formation of other's existence in the self-image. These are (Foucault, 2002, 45-7):

- (a) First is differentiation: this mode of operation accorded the differences as status of disease, alienation, or psychosis. Thus, 'psychiatric discourse' defines an object of default differences.
- (b) Second rule describes the authorities of delimitation "As a body of knowledge and practice, as an authority recognized by public opinion, the law, and government became the major authority in society that delimited, designated, named, and established madness as an object."
- (c) Third rule is the system where the grids of specification are settled to carry a comparison among different 'kinds of madness' as objects of psychiatric discourse.

Here, another question tackles the relationship between the authorities of delimitation and the discourse of psychopathology. What 'system of formation' organizes this relationship? In this regard, Foucault states that:

If criminal behavior could give rise to a whole series of objects of knowledge, this was because a group of particular relations was adopted for use in psychiatric

discourse...The relation between the authority of medical decision and the authority of judicial decision (Foucault, 2002a, 48).

The formation of object due to the psychiatric discourse is made possible by a group of relations established between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification. Hence, according to Foucault (2002) three conditions are required to accomplish the formation's process: the historical conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discourse; these relations are established between institutions and social process according to the systems of norms, types of classification, and modes of characterization; discursive relations are not internal to discourse. It is a preparatory condition to the law of differences which guide the discourse itself.

Foucault makes a distinction between the *unity* and the *totality* of the discourse:

4.2.1 The Unity of the discourse:

Foucault thinks that the unity of discourse is characterized by the objects themselves. by analyzing this statement, one can find out that the discourse itself suffers of being strongly linked to the objects themselves. On one hand, the discourse is static and coherent at the same time since the object is still the same in the formation process. On the other hand, it is changeable and fragmented since the object is a matter of change. Though, the modes of operation of any discourse remain the same towards various objects. To support this claim, Foucault argues that:

It is not the objects that remain constant, nor the domain that they form; it is not even their point of emergence or their mode of characterization; but the relation between the surfaces on which they appear, on which they can be delimited, on which they can be analyzed and specified (Foucault, AK, 2002a, 51-52).

Since the discursive discourse is the core element of the process of ideological hegemony, one needs to discover how it works in the social and political fields. The discourse itself is about a cluster of statements that discover, analyze and classify the ‘Other’. Here, one would have to describe the organization of the statements' field where they appeared and circulated. According to Foucault (AK) the organization of statements contains three elements:

- (a) This organization involves forms of succession.
- (b) It involves forms of coexistence between those that are criticized, discussed, and judged, as well as those that are rejected or excluded.
- (c) It defines the procedures of intervention that may be legitimately applied to statements.

These elements or procedures apply for most types of discursive formations whereby some constitute rules of formal construction, others rhetorical practices; some define the internal configurations of a text; others the modes of relation and interference between different texts. Foucault asserts that the rules of formation operate not only in the mind or consciousness of individuals, but in discourse itself (Foucault, 2002, 69-70). Such discourses give rise to certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, certain types of enunciation that regroup objects and form themes. In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault concentrates on the “conceptual systems” which participate in the formation of the objects, and locate it in the psychiatric discourse. This process of object formation within the psychiatric discourse can be summarized, according to Foucault, to: 1. Determine the possible points of incompatibility between two objects; 2. the psychiatric discourse ignores the possible alternatives to the themes posed by the process itself towards specific objects. Foucault blames the authorities that guide the discourse on this ignorance which affects the individual’s choice; 3. This authority operates in a field of non-discursive practices.

Therefore, the unity of the discursive discourse itself depends on these factors:

- The validity of the authority as unified source of individual and collective choice; Foucault (AK, 2002a, 25-6) describes the authority as power towards the receiver (individual or group).

- Second factor is the object itself. As much as the object is disabled to challenge the themes posed by the discourse, as long the discourse will be valid and accepted among specific social group.
- The third factor is that the varieties in statements do not pose a different image, while the variety plays a fundamental role in creating a homogenous theme about the object.

Here, one might ask how the authority invests in the unities of the discourse. A strategy of language deployment is essential to create a collection of texts that can be designated by the sign of a proper name as a public figure. Here, Foucault considers the authority as power of interpretation of reality; as an author who has a sufficient credibility among the audiences. Within this formula two components are deployed by the authority: the first is, the eruption of a real event; another is based on an 'already-said' (Foucault, 2002a, 27). By the relationship between the reality and the eruption of this reality, the psychiatric discourse in the collective imagination immerges. The psychiatric discourse affects the consciousness through a deliberation of forces between what is true and what is accepted as legitimate based on the socially constructed truth. Here, Foucault compares between a text and the collective consciousness.

4.2.2 The totality of the discourse:

The totality means that the discourse of certain images and statements is not a subject of social challenge since the author is collectively accepted as a credible source of knowledge and due to the fact that there is no one willing, whether individually or collectively, to challenge well-constructed themes. In addition, the theme itself is constituted steadily in the public mind in which challenging the theme means putting the collective identity at risk.

Foucault in the *Order of Things* asserts the consequence of strategic deployment of language in the relationship the mind and the forms of illusion that construct the individual thought and guide his choices whether socially or politically. According to Foucault:

It is Classical thought excluding resemblance as the fundamental experience and primary form of knowledge, denouncing it as a confused mixture that must be analyzed in terms of identity, difference, measurement, and order (Foucault, OT, 2002b, 58).

In Foucault's terms, there exist two forms of knowledge: the comparison of measurement and that of order. Here, one can conclude that the totality of discourse is closely related to power while the unity of the discourse is related to knowledge. Thus, comparison becomes a function of order. Knowledge provided by the discursive discourse is politicized and methods of comparison are shifted to suit this goal. To this end, the discourse deploys the 'sign' as a matter of framing and classifying the object. According to Foucault (OT, 2002b: 61) the sign needs some modifications to deploy knowledge:

- First, knowledge classifies the object's position in an order by asserting the object differences by means of measurement with a common unit.
- Second, the sign permits an absolutely certain knowledge of identities and differences.
- Third, discrimination imposes upon comparison the primary and fundamental investigation of difference.

In this regard, the sign becomes the core element of knowledge and replaced resemblance as the unifier of the discourse. To Foucault, in *The Order of Things*, the 'sign' has three functions:

- 1- Emphasizing that differentiation is a natural fact.
- 2- An arbitrary system of signs on the differences between the self and the 'other' as the object of the discourse.
- 3- Representation, the relation of the sign to the signified resides in knowledge whereby the continuity of the image's content is confirmed.

To fulfill these functions three variables are essential in the relationship between the sign and knowledge (Foucault, OT, 2002b, 65-8):

1. The sign should find its area of being within knowledge.
2. The form of its relation with the object.
3. Signs' ability of arbitrariness.

But, the sign through 'Representation' causes the reduction of knowledge from epistemological base to the representational variable. Here, Foucault states that:

If the sign is the pure and simple connection between what signifies and what is signified (a connection that may be arbitrary or not, voluntary or imposed, individual or collective), then the relation can be established only within the general element of representation of the other... (Foucault, OT, 74).

In *The Order of Things* Foucault argues that arbitrary system needs the sign and this to classification through the process of representation. Classification is a process through which each social group occupies specific position in a hierarchical table. The position of each group not only depends on the group's characterizations but also on biased comparison before another social group. Foucault notes that there are four elements essential to classification (Foucault, 2002b, 246-9):

- First, in the form of a hierarchy of characters.
- Second, Characters are linked, therefore, to functions.
- Third, to classify, therefore, representing the others through comparison proving that the emergence of differentiation is natural between oneself and the other.
- Fourth, classification aims to determine the other's position in the hierarchical order.

In this sense, Language is an important variable for the credibility of signs. Texts, audio recordings and other linguistic tools are deployed to deliver signs through representation. For instance, if the text talks about terrorism, then, reader's conscious without hesitation start thinking about Muslims. Foucault understands words as power within the discursive discourse. Words' power is able to construct psychic and physical reactions towards the object of the discourse. It is this mechanism, as Foucault describes it, in which identity is deployed for political ends through the manifestation of differences.

Here, the totality of the discursive discourse resumes its power through ideas. To proclaim this power, the idea should meet two requirements: the idea should be able to impose itself within the order of conscious; and the idea should be able to transfer through generations. Thus, Historicity of the ideas constructs the totality of any discourse, even if the discourse modifies itself through the ages. Thus, the analysis of man's being is importantly linked to the mechanism of representation. This mechanism is constant even if the discourse changed its way of perceiving an object. This mechanism deploys signs to create perceptions in which man's being defined and posited, through linguistic strategies, as a threat (Foucault, 2002b, 369-70). Therefore, perception is not a matter of

modification concerning the same object of discourse. Since perception is socially constructed upon specific hegemonic ideas regarding a man's being who is seen as naturally static and incompatible to change. The threat is always articulated even through various forms of representation.

4.2.3 The power/authority and Knowledge:

Since signs are constructed by knowledge, then, one can refer to the strategic maneuvers of powers. Although, Foucault maintains that knowledge requires its own analysis irreducible to these maneuvers. He distinguishes between the sociology of knowledge and epistemology (Alcoff in Falzon, 2013, 207). The most important and influential of these ideas was Foucault's claim that power and knowledge are co-constituting: "that power and knowledge directly imply one another" (DP, 27). Given that Foucault argues that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between power formations and accepted knowledge as "truth". Linda Martin Alcoff asserts that Foucault applied this idea when he characterized his approach to discourses of knowledge as an "archaeology," which tries to define discourses as practices obeying certain rules. In this regard, Foucault uses the term *problematization* which means "the set of discursive or non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and the false, and constitutes it as an object for thought" (Alcoff, 2013, 211).

The 'play of the true and the false' continue to be what Foucault builds in *The Order of Things*. Foucault stresses that the authority enforces a system of knowledge in which less intention has been paid to epistemological construction of the truth (AK, 2002a, 182). In Foucault's work, neither truth nor knowledge is assumed to operate free from power relations, and he includes here not just the applications of knowledge but also its content. Alcoff quotes Peter Dews suggesting that power is an institutional precondition for the elaboration of a form of knowledge, such as reliable epistemic authorities and experts (Alcoff, 2013, 215). For Foucault, power is domination over the social and political fields of human lives. Knowledge cannot be understood independently from the sphere of power's hegemony. In this context, Alcoff asserts that the operations of power affect what is seen as truth. In Foucault's account *truth can be socially constructed* (DP, 28). The criterion of truth is likewise affected by the ontology of truth. Here, one would focus on the apparatus of power that guides the psychiatric discourse in creating the ontology of truth.

In this context, Amy Allen states that "in Foucault's account the apparatus of power produces discourses, structures of thought, and forms of perception, representation, and experience" (in Falzon et al., 2013, 341).

Amy Allen by quoting some of Foucault earlier works concludes that power could take various shapes such as:

- In the History of Madness; Foucault maintains that effective control of the madman is not only the condition of possibility of cure but also of the medical knowledge of madness. In Foucault's explanation, 'medical authority' functions as power well before it functions as knowledge. Foucault suggests that there is a "strategic model" of power. This model prepares the ground to the question of how to confront madness without asking whether it is cureless or not.
- In his 1975 – 76 lecture course Society Must Be Defended, Foucault calls for the juridical model of power. This model understands power in terms of law and sovereignty and focuses on questions of legitimacy.

But despite the varieties of power apparatus, power functions in one way in the socio-political context. This function aims to construct one hegemonic interpretation of truth. To this end, Allen A. (2013, 345) argues that Foucault suggests three essential conditions: First, power is spread throughout the social body rather than confined to its central institutions; second, power comes from below; third, power relations are "intentional and non-subjective". Hence, if power is productive for Foucault, then the individual as a subject is one of its primary products. Since power and knowledge are socially constructed, they are not immune to the social disease such as racism which goes beyond color and race. Power and knowledge are naturally by product of this unstable dichotomy between power and the repressed group. Thus, the individual in both cases, whether the object or the subject of discourse, is affected by the artificial reality created by the psychiatric power. But, Brad Elliot Stone concludes that even if power could take different shapes, even if one dominates the other (Stone in Falzon et al., 2013, 356). Stone further asserts that the hegemonic position of specific power has severe consequences on the order such as:

- Racism and repression emerge from power as a war of forces.
- Feelings of ignorance in one part and injustice in the other create a sphere of power struggles.
- Since power relations are unstable, there is always an opportunity for resistance.

- The powerful part imposes its rules and destiny over the other.

Foucault in his lecture on 7 November, 1973, asserts that power draws different types of position in an order; each position has a specific function. In Foucault's words, the doctor is the source of power that heads a number of supervisors whose task is to inform on the patients. The supervisor of the insane must have the strictest integrity, pure moral standards, and must be absolutely obedient to the doctor's orders (Lagrange et al., 2006, 4). Jacques Lagrange et al. understands madness by its system of belief. Madness associates and affects ideas in a way that might bring them into conflict with each other. Thus, the struggle among differentiated powers based on the incompatibility between the ideas of various groups in one order. Struggle along incompatibility causes mania.

In this sphere of struggle the dominated power holds the position of the doctor as the main source of cure. What drives the doctor to failure is his ignoring of the recognition of the causes of the illness. The doctor does not require the real truth while he constructs his type of truth. This process, in which ignorance and selfishness play vital role, leads to the confrontation of two wills that of the doctor and of the patient. What is established, therefore, is a battle, a relationship of force. Lagrange believes that the doctor abandons morals in favors of his desire of victory over the patient's will. This victory signifies that the patient abandons his interpretation of truth and accepts the truth of the doctor (Lagrange et al., 2006, 10-11). In short the cure for madness is only through the patient's abandonment of his interpretation of truth. The patient must subordinate the doctor's truth. In this respect, how can this deployment of power, these tactics and strategies of power, give rise to a 'game of truth'? The answer, according to Lagrange, appeals to three notions:

- First, the notion of violence; it allows one to think that good power can deploy justified violence as rational and controlled.
- The second notion is that of the institution; psychiatric knowledge took the forms and dimensions in close connection with what could be called the "institutionalization of psychiatry".
- The third notion is the family i.e. "the norm".

These notions produce statements that are given as valid and justified. The essential function of psychiatric power is to be an effective agent of reality, a sort of intensifier of reality to madness (Lagrange et al., 2006, 143-4). Here, within this formula, the patient and the supervisor suffer from the same psychiatric illness; what signifies difference between them is that the supervisor's destiny

is strongly related to the doctor's truth. The treatment of madness requires an asylum where the doctor's therapy can be implemented without challenge from the patient. The patient should recognize his unsatisfied state outside the asylum space. Despite the creation of the asylum the doctor still needs to ensure his dominance over order, thus, the patient must always have 'the pleasure of being ill'. This pleasure according to Lagrange is the underlying basis of the omnipotence of madness.

The game of truth needs a credible source of knowledge to produce justified statements; for Foucault the proper one would be located in institutions. Colin Gordon in the light of interview with Foucault states that "This reduction of power to law underwrites a schema of power which is homogeneous for every level and domain -family or State, relations of education or production" (Gordon, 1980, 139-140). Thus, power is represented as the obeyed master; the credible source of knowledge, and the teacher who sets the rules for the asylum as the benign truth. Since power, according to Foucault, is socially constructed and enjoys the totality of truth then followers, who create it in the first place, tend to believe in it and follow it without questioning reality itself. From this ground, institutional psychiatric power has the right to take what is necessary to keep the asylum safe.

4.2.4 The relationship between political project and the discourse itself

Here, Ferda Keskin⁹⁴ refers to the third component of Foucault's methodology which is 'ethics', which elaborate it within the context of the political objective. Keskin asserts that Foucault's work is deeply informed by a complex political objective. This objective consists in analyzing a certain type of individuality or identity imposed on the Western 'man' and the ways in which it is imposed by certain technologies of power in what Keskin calls "political modernity." Within the context of political objective Foucault found that individuality, identity, and subjectivity are the very means by which such strategies proceed to achieve institutional interest; and the asylum is the system where the process of individualization flourishes.

Under this broad description, the transcendental functions of the subject provide the *a priori* conditions without which subjective experience would not have been possible. What is significant here is that

⁹⁴ Ferda Keskin is an associate professor at *university of Bilgi*/ Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Comparative Literature. He gave a lecture at LUISS Guido Carli/ Rome in May, 2015, concerning Foucault's collection of works.

ethics need to be installed in the subjective experiences to be elevated to the public sphere whereby the relationship between power and knowledge is profoundly clear, stable and agreed upon whether individually or collectively?

Keskin quotes Foucault as the four-stage process in which Phenomenology and anthropology, seem to have in common through which they conceptualize subjective experience:

- The first stage is an objectification of the various aspects of a human being by such means as empirical observation: the physical *versus* the spiritual, the rational *versus* the irrational;
- At the second stage, phenomenology objectifies a subject and characterizes it in terms of the transcendental;
- In the third stage Anthropology objectifies a human nature and characterizes it in terms of the empirical;
- The fourth stage is a conceptualization of subjective experience on the basis of this theoretical account.

Keskin finds out that:

the actualization of the self and the acquisition of self-knowledge are in fact actualization of a human nature as a historical product, upon the play of true and false, and consequently constitutes the human being as knowing subject; in other words, it is what establishes the relation with oneself and with others, and constitutes the human being as ethical subject.

This last passage indicates that the games of truth through which “being is historically constituted as experience; that is, as something that can and must be thought” are to be understood as ‘problematizations’; problematizations are based on certain ‘practices’ that constitute social ethics and thoughts. Hence problematization is the end product of the process in which a form of being is articulated with a discourse or with a number of discourses and thus made an object for ‘discursive thought.’ Thought, as the by-product of the game of truth, confirms Foucault’s claim that human beings are made subjects. Keskin quotes Foucault argument that the constitution of an experience involves:

- (a) the development of diverse fields of knowledge that refer to it;
- (b) the establishment of a certain system of power that regulates its practice, that is, “the establishment of a set of rules and norms;

(c) and finally, changes in the way individuals “are obliged to recognize themselves as subjects” of this experience and “led to assign meaning and value” to their forms of being.

Here, one might shed light on another important component which is the relationship between the political project and the discourse itself. Maria Ryan quotes Gramscian theory about the special role of intellectuals in the creation of political “hegemony.” his theory analyzes the relationship between an ideological elite and the masses based on the importance of an alliance between the leadership elite and the grassroots in order for an ideological perspective to become widely accepted and entrenched (or “hegemonic”) across society as a whole (Ryan in Johnstone & Laville, 2010, 157). The key organizers in the achievement and maintenance of hegemony are the society’s intellectuals. Through the ideological production of the intellectual elites there is a space for appealing to a political project in which public involvement is vital to its success.

Ryan gives an example to of the kind of project Islamophobia might be highlighted as. Such a project is America’s exceptionalism as destiny. To this end, the alliance of intellectuals-political elites deploys a “top down” strategy to attract support of the masses. To target the audience, elites deploy various maneuvers and strategies such as the think tanks and magazines. Within this context, one would understand Islamophobic rhetoric as a necessity to maintain and achieve strategic interests imposed by power through various public channels. To this end, the hegemony of specific political ideas is vitally required to be installed within the public mind. Ole Holsti challenges this claim by quoting William Caspary’s argument that public opinion on foreign affairs is best characterized by volatile moods (Holsti, 2006, 64). Here, one might question the attempt to make connection between orientalism/islamophobia and foreign policy attitudes; one would refer to public opinion theories. For instance, how public opinion reflects or responds to foreign policy positions on vital issues; and how international events can shift public opinion. The same rhetoric would explain how Islamophobia through specific collective perceptions could guide masses’ choices on important issues whether locally or internationally. However, one would support the claim that the authority manipulates events; the events, now part of the information available to the public, result in opinion change, followed by policy changes that are congruent with opinions. Holsti adds that:

A full analysis of the opinion–policy links would often require explorations into many aspects of the domestic political process, including the role of parties and candidates in raising issues,

the impact of interest groups, the role of the media, the level of elite competition on specific issues, and the like (Holsti, 2006, 73).

The international events have been deployed to reduce and contain the volatility of public opinion towards foreign role and the intensive American intervention in world politics. One can share some examples of political deployment to local/international events within the top-down process of knowledge transfer. Examples of which include:

- First, the official statements warning about the high possibility of terrorist attacks on the American soil; Anne Norton asserts that the successive statements of Department of Homeland Security warning the public off the possible terrorist attacks in the United States as an attempt to justify the notion of the just war within the American public mind (Norton, 2004, 142-3). Edward Curtis argues that these official messages about the trustworthiness of Muslim Americans have dangerous consequences on the social fabric by promoting some subjective and collective practices of racism (Curtis, 2009, 100). He contends that the U.S. administration contributed to Muslim Americans' negative attitudes about the war on terrorism through its mistaken prosecutions of Muslim Americans as terrorists.
- Second example is the political deployment to the Iran crisis in the beginning of the 1980s. For Melani Mcalister "Islam" became highlighted as the dominant signifier of the region, rather than oil wealth, Arabs which itself became conflated with "terrorism" (Mcalister, 2001, 200). Anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States drew heavily on the stereotyped representations of the Arab Middle East that had become so prevalent in the 1970s, particularly the image of "Arab terrorism"; the expert panel played a vital role and posited an essential opposition between "Islam" and the "West." Mcalister asserts that since the Iran hostage crisis, an impressive array of cultural and political campaign was waged through various tactics such as texts, media reports and books described American bodies as vulnerable to a terrorist threat posed by the Muslims. Through this campaign the United States' interventionism abroad was justified.
- The third example shown through data from several surveys, including Pew, Gallup, conclude that most Americans are not in favor with American international roles as "the world's policeman." Thus, Holsti finds out that the language of *Burden sharing* has been deployed regularly by the competent authorities trying to reconcile with the masses preferences concerning international

issues (Holsti, 2006: 291-292). This notion of burden sharing as deployed the common threat of global terrorism.

- The fourth example posed by Halil I. Yenigun (in Abdulhamed, 2004, 43) which shows that the media's coverage of Islam reached an unprecedented intensity. Yenigun asserts that the most remarkable shift in the representation of Muslims was the media's departure from the monolithic representation of Muslims, one of Said's main criticisms, towards a fragmented perception. Instead, a differentiation strategy between two types of Muslims was pursued: Fundamentalists (i.e., Muslim extremists, Islamists, Islamic radicals) vs. moderate Muslims. Even when Anti-terrorism sentiment shifted its attention from Shiite threat, posed by the Iranian revolution, to the Sunni terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida, Islamophobic rhetoric focused on Islam as a monolithic source of threat. The question is who determines the characters of a moderate Muslim? How to point out a moderate Muslim? How to draw the lines between moderate Islam and Radical Islam, since the lines are blurred in the Islamophobia's eyes. The most important part of this story is that Islamophobic discourse believes that moderate Muslims are subjects to shifting towards radicalism in case of necessity to protect religion. Through this perception, it becomes unclear just where fundamentalism begins and moderate Islam ends. Yenigun is aware that this blurred line implicates every Muslim as a potential fundamentalist and puts the burden of proof on Muslims to show that they are not fundamentalists (Yenigun, 2004, 54-55).

Therefore, political elites especially the neo-conservatives tend to believe that intensive interventionism is required to help expanding the scope of moderate Islam in the Middle East. It is not clear whether this claim is true since most of the political and intellectual elite, in the United States, believe that Islam is radical in its teachings and foundations.⁹⁵ Thus, one would think that this interventionism is somehow connected with a political project to the whole Middle East in which religion has no credible position in the solution. To this end, a popular support is fundamentally required to let this strategy of interventionism see the light. Therefore, Tim Jon Semmerling believes that two perceptions have grown within this representation: first that the "evil" Arabs are incompatible with Western values. Thus, the policy of interventionism is derived mostly from the will to fight the threat of radical Islam and not to bring changes to the political reality of Muslims life; the second perception concludes that the dangerous Arabs and Muslims

⁹⁵ Semmerling quotes Patricia Ann Rainey, which believes that many of the portrayals of Arabs give the impression of cultural and ethnic traits that are inherently inimical to Western civilization (Semmerling, 2006, 1).

affect the self-picture in the west as the insecure-self. Semmerling supports the anthropologic assumption that the exercise of power over foreign peoples and objects, have been seen as part of the Orientalists methods of control to assign 'Others' into classification schemes that protect the Orientalist self. One would ask as to why islamophobia does affect U.S foreign policy? The answer to this has to be discussed at various levels that include several variables such as:

1. The object themselves are not only locally endorsed; Muslims everywhere have been portrayed as part of a broader global community.
2. The threat is coming from abroad, posing challenges on the internal security.
3. It is in the interest of the U.S to keep the issue as a globally shared responsibility.
4. According to Foucault, the struggle between forces produce resistance against the dominant power. Some (such as Huntington, Loretta Napoleoni and Antonio Negri) understand terrorist organization as a global resistance against the U.S' position as a super power in the world order.
- 5- The phenomenon is tackled globally since no one has sufficient power to stop the flow of information and risks, moreover, no territory or country is out of the global interaction and what might be brought to the fore through transnational deliberation and exchange such as terrorism.
6. The binary relationship of dominance between the West and the East.

4.3 How the Image was created (Media as a case study; framing a group) and the challenge to multiculturalism and tolerance:

This section tackles the third component of Chris Allen's concept of islamophobia. In this component, the representation of Muslims questions identity. For Gabriele Marranci emotions and consciousness are central to the understanding of identity. Thus, the construction of self-image depends on the differentiation with the other's self and vice versa. Indeed, the mass media are crucial to the stereotyping process. Stereotyping depends on the process of global information, which forces the mass media to rely on tautological, catching, imaginary depictions of the other 'Muslim'. Marranci asserts that this process of stereotyping has two essential elements: the first is rhetorical; the second is political ideology. Thus, due to political interest in emphasizing on 'differences', and 'cultural peculiarity', the perception of the other becomes the real other in social interaction. Marranci quotes Frederik Barth's model which analyzes the formation of ethnic groups within the public sphere. Marranci asks "But if personal identity is not defined by a person's social actions, how is identity formed?" his answer is a conscious brain. Therefore, memory plays a core

role in processing what Antonio Damasio defines as ‘the feeling of knowing’ in the formation of the sense of ‘self’ (Marranci, 2008, 96). For this process to be successful, another element beyond emotions and brain is required which is the external world and its inputs. Marranci concludes that the environment produces stimuli; which produce the individual’s emotions; which in turn affects his autobiographical self. Fred Halliday identified three key ‘components’ of racial and cultural assumptions about the other (‘Islam’ and the Arabs) in the western public sphere (quoted in Vaughan 2005: 50):

- The first is the belief that the region and its inhabitants must be understood through the absurdity of ‘etymological reductionism’.
- The second characteristic is the emphasis upon the ‘supposed difficulty or even impossibility of change.’
- The third of the key Orientalist characteristics, the identification of ‘Islam’ as an all-consuming ideological system which has served to thwart the development of modern methods of thought.

‘Islam’ was frequently invoked as the root cause of Arab ‘backwardness’. Greg Noakes contends that in order to understand why, it is important to answer several questions (Noakes in Heddad, 2000, 285): how do the media cover Islam? What factors shape this coverage? And what are the consequences of this perception? Noakes' answer concentrates on specific factors that participate in shaping the Muslim's image in the western mind:

- 1- The few number of mass media resources which cover Muslim's issues characterized by Islamophobic rhetoric. The limited number of resources bears a conclusion that whatever messages they want to deliver to the masses, the efforts of scrutiny are very rare. The three major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and Fox news), in addition to the Cable News Network (CNN), maintain their own Middle East correspondents and special-assignment foreign correspondents. The American “newspapers of record,” the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Christian Science Monitor, also have Middle Eastern correspondents.
- 2- Media coverage can be characterized as sensationalist not just in the topics it addresses, but also in the imagery and language utilized in reporting those topics. When individual Muslims are shown, they are typically shown as being radical. The media’s terminology relies on certain ill-defined words both to convey certain concepts to an audience and to avoid closer scrutiny. The average

news consumer is presented with an image of Muslims as irrational and confused, and vaguely threatening in their unpredictability.

- 3- Financial promoters orient the fields of interest and the topics of the financed mass media.
- 4- The problem is compounded by the exclusive club of “experts” who have closed relationships with the political elites. Noakes asserts that most so-called experts on the Middle East have no real contact with the region; most journalists are a by-product of the stereotyping process; and have no credible knowledge concerning the Middle East.
- 5- The fifth factor concerns the American education system which neglects the Middle East. Thus, Americans have little or no professional or personal contact with the region and little exposure to the religious and ethical teachings of Islam.
- 6- Media coverage deploys the immediate action and current events, which is reported in terms of American interests.

Michael Schudson’s *The Sociology of News*, asserts that public scrutiny over news have little chance than that of political scrutiny, since political institutions and media corps are so deeply intertwined (Schudson, 2003, 157). He asserts that media’s strength in the political life comes from different ways: one of the most important is that officials, politicians, and candidates tend to be keen about “going public” and to garner public support. In this regard, the section moves on to cover two more questions which are: *how the perceived image is created?* And, *what are the consequences of this image on the social interaction?*

4.3.1 How the perceived image is created?

Mustafa Bayoumi⁹⁶ tries to answer the first question by emphasizing the notion of ‘racial profiling.’ “In brief, Arabs and Muslims have entered the American imagination with full force, but their entry has been racialized and seen as a social problem to be dealt with” (Bayoumi, 2010b).

Lina Khatib sheds light on the role of American cinema in creating the social profile towards Muslims. She takes into consideration two movies in this regard: *The Siege* (1998), and *The Kingdom* (2007). The films articulate some ideas about Islam (Khatib, 2006, 165):

⁹⁶ Mustafa Bayoumi, Middle East Project [Online].

1. The logic of “good Muslim, bad Muslim” that Mahmood Mamdani has identified as central to the cultural logic of the “war on terror.”
2. The notion “Arab” has often become a synonym for Islamic fundamentalism in contemporary Western culture; fundamentalism has been looked at as a symptom of the Otherness of the Arab world, rather than as a problem within it.

“Islamic fundamentalism,” the term was earlier appropriated by the media to describe certain Muslim political groups such as Hamas. But later the term is circulated to represent a monolithic image of Arabs and Muslims. However, this image has been associated with the Islamic challenge to America’s position as a global power. Thus, “Islamic fundamentalism” is used, in the political sense, to refer to groups that use Islam as a basis to achieve political power. If the Fundamentalists are conceived as Muslims who base their political and social actions on Islamic code Shari'a, then, the critique that those fundamentalists are against modernity and democracy, uses this perception to accuse Islam. Stereotyping the 'Other' serves the National interests within and outside the country. On the first hand, it emphasizes National identity. On the other, it encourages American Exceptionalism. In Said's argument American exceptionalism tends to impose a singular identity on all of the orient; Binder asserts that this false identity reflects the need of the West to serve its political interests including the justification of imperialism (Binder, 1988, 110).

Habermas concentrates on another notion in answering the first question. He explains how public opinion is built over time in the public sphere through a network of communication, whereby Media is seen as important in forming public opinion (Saeed in Zweiri & Murphy, 2011, 50). The power of the media rests in determining which events are delivered to the public, as well as, how these events are encoded and conveyed. One can call this process as *'ideological hegemony'*, sort of power according to Foucault: this refers to the processes by which the dominant ruling classes influence and shape popular consent. In this respect, Saima Saeed quotes Peter Dahlgren by asserting that the powerful American media lend support to American foreign policy by creating particular images of its opponents. More accurately, Khalid Hajji argues that the ideological hegemony through the images pave the way for *'cultural hegemony'* with convincing examples of the correlation between the travelling images and the coercive forces of its content (Hajji in Zweiri, 2011, 69). The more this image is able to travel through minds and hearts of the consumers the more it lends credence to a global coercion in favor of American or western exceptionalism. One can refer to Robert

Entman's precaution concerning the audience independence from the media influence. The audience autonomy assumption provides the basis for the minimal consequences position that audiences develop their political opinions in relative independence from the media. There are two somewhat distinct variants of this view (Entman, 1989a, 75-6):

- The first emphasizes that audiences think about communications selectively, screening out information they do not like.
- The second holds that audiences pay so little attention and understand so little that the news cannot influence them.

In Entman's words "In practice, media messages tend only to reinforce existing preferences rather than help to form new attitudes or change old ones. In this view, the news can affect what people think about, i.e. can affect their attitudes" (Entman, 1989b, 361).

The autonomy model stresses selectivity and inattention, but that leaves us to explain why many individuals do think about a great deal of the new information they encounter. Entman contends that 'Schemas'⁹⁷ as 'Information processing' recognizes and helps explain how attitudes emerge from a dynamic interaction of new information with people's existing beliefs. The interdependence model predicts that media influence varies according to the way each person processes specific news messages depending on his schemas. The interaction between the attributes of the message and the schemas of the audience shapes the impact of the news. This interdependence model is based on the message. Entman concludes that media messages can indeed move audiences in directions counter to their predominant dispositions (Entman, 1989a, 81). Because the information that comes from the media includes not only concrete data for cognitive processing but symbols that may engage with emotional needs. One reason may be that scholars define media influence as changing the average individual's actual opinions which may cause shifts in behavior.

Here, one would refer to the notion 'framing'⁹⁸ which is an, according to Brak Bahador, "the attempt to simplify, prioritize, and structure events into interpretive frameworks; by prioritizing

⁹⁷ Information processing research shows that people have cognitive structures, called "schemas," which organize their thinking (Entman, 1989a, 77).

⁹⁸ Broadly defined, framing refers to the ways in which mass media organize and present issues and events. According to Entman's popular definition of media framing, to frame means 'to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (quoted in Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005, 404).

certain facts and images over others, journalists promote particular interpretations of events over others” (Bahador, 2007, 18).

‘Framing’ is also influenced by culture; framing needs a metaphor to ‘Manufacture Consent’, in which the authors claim that media news is selected and presented in ways that promote the interests of powerful elite in government and business. Peter Morey and Amina Yaqin quote Maxwell McCombs phrase that framing is processed through repeated clichés and suggests a particular problem definition and moral evaluation for item under investigation (Morey& Yaqin, 2011, 19). Morey and Yaqin contend that framing and stereotyping are twin concepts and follows a juxtaposition of narrative whose parameters are defined by questions of otherness and threat. Framing process involves judgments about others; this judgment depends on the arbiter’s set of categories. According to Morey and Yaqin, stereotype has three overlapping functions:

- 1- Social causal: the stereotyped group has been perceived as the cause of an event.
- 2- Social justificatory: stereotypes are created to justify behavior towards the stereotyped group;
- 3- Social differentiation or classification: classification functions to give advantage to specific group over the stereotyped one.

Thus, Morey and Yaqin pose some questions concerning this process of framing: how are stereotypes constructed and circulated? Four variables are essential to the process of framing:

- 1- The first is the metaphor:

The metaphor for Dabashi needs the construction of the sign, thus, Islamophobia to manufacture consent deploys certain images of which Islam has been turned into a sign and signifier of vicious violence (Dabashi, 2013, 17). Still, the sign to be accepted must confirm the self-image in comparison with the inferior other. The power of the metaphor depends on the ability of media messages in creating consumed signs by the public mind or conscious. Dabashi contends that “Islamic societies” had to be “Islamic” so that “Europe” could better define itself as “Enlightened.” Dabashi, to confirm the deployment of metaphor in the western public sphere, gives an example of how strong the metaphor of ‘terrorist Muslim’ is in the public conscious in both Europe and the United States; he asks why do the news outlets immediately suspect Muslims regarding the

Multiple factors contribute to the selection of media frames, including journalistic norms and routines, individual schemas of reporters, and political ideology, as Daniela Dimitrova and Jesper Stromback argue.

massacre in Oslo? His answer simply manifests that "Muslim as a metaphor" of illegitimate violence (Dabashi, 2013, 97). Furthermore, Dabashi asks why Europeans use the term Caliph as a metaphor of despotism rather than to use another term from their historical political discourse. He concludes that the Muslim is a metaphor of menace, banality and terror everywhere. He tries to submit a solution for being a Muslim in the world, by placing ourselves outside the metaphoric matrix onto which we have been placed over the last two hundred years.

2- The narratives⁹⁹:

The second variable of the framing process is manifested through the 'narratives.' According to Marc Howard Ross, narratives may be defined as "frameworks for action" through which members of particular identity groups "understand the social and political worlds in which they live, and explain the conflicts in which they are involved" (quoted in Funk & Said, 2004, 3).

For Nathan Funk and Abdul Aziz Said narratives, then, are the stories that members of social and political groups tell about themselves and their relations with selected "others," to create or reinforce a sense of collective identity and shared purpose. The narratives are characterized by:

- Dynamic narratives bind individuals together within an active and adaptive community.
- Narratives provide invaluable information about the signified group.
- They manifest the emotional fears and visceral threats experienced by conflict protagonists.

Therefore, concerning Islamophobia one needs to manifest the narratives towards Muslims, which are:

A- Islam and Muslims are in conflict with the Western world (Ernst, 2003, 207). Here, one would argue that Islamophobia is an inevitable result to the terrorists' global propaganda that deployed Islam to deepen the clash among civilizations and to attract the biggest possible number of Muslims to join them.

B- The construction of differences as the foundations of incompatibility to the Western values.

⁹⁹ Deepa Kumar sets out five myths of Orientalism/ Islamophobia towards Muslims and Islam (Kumar, 2012, 41-62):

- 1- Islam is a monolithic religion.
- 2- Islam is a uniquely sexist religion.
- 3- The Muslim mind is incapable of reason.
- 4- Islam is a violent religion.
- 5- Muslims are incompatible to democracy.

C- *Why do they hate us?* The answer of this question has been frequently articulated by the U.S' mass media by asserting that the Muslim hates the America's way of life, as both jealousy and inferiority to modernism. This answer lacks profound knowledge and relies on false truth represented in the repeated image about Islam. Peter Ford, in an article published in 2001 on Christian Science Monitor, finds out that the vast majority of Muslims in the Middle East were as shocked and horrified as any American by what they saw happening on their TV screens during the 9/11 events. He contends that a mood of resentment toward America and its behavior has become so commonplace in the Arab world countries that it was converted to hostility, and even hatred. This mood of resentment has grown in the Arab world due to the injustice done to the Palestinians, the cruelty of sanctions against Iraq, the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia (Ford, 2001)¹⁰⁰.

D- Muslim's rejection of the Westphalia world order. Donald E. Schmidt finds out that today's problem between Muslims and Americans is political. For him the problem goes back to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement when European powers remapped the Arab region (Schmidt, 2005, 332).

E- The narrative of being a terrorist. This narrative asserts that the lines between "good" and "bad" Arabs or Muslims are blurred. Arabs and Muslims are terrorists, or potential terrorists.

3- The cultural memory:

The third variable involved in framing process is the ability to penetrate the cultural memory. To create consent in the public memory, for instance 'framing' process should meet some requirements: reaching out to the public through active communication; transmission of information; and communicating American values. For Astrid Erll *Cultural memory* is:

Constituted by a host of different media, operating within various symbolic systems: religious texts, historical painting, historiography, TV documentaries, monuments, and commemorative rituals, for example. Each of these media has its specific way of remembering and will leave its trace on the memory it creates (Erll, 2008, 389).

¹⁰⁰ Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0927/p1s1-wogi.html>

Negative stereotyping is the most obvious technique of establishing an antagonistic mode. Only the memories of a certain group are presented as true, while the versions articulated by members of conflicting memory cultures are deconstructed as false (Rajagopal in Curran: 2006, 76).

4- The imagined reality

The imagined reality is closely related to cultural memory. Carola Richter quotes Werner Früh's statement that: "Media does not depict reality; media can only construct an image of reality." (Richter in Kaim, 2008: 113). The strategy of 'Imagined reality' deploys some tactics (Lean, 2012, 66):

- The first is 'foe images.' A special feature of a very negative stereotype is the foe image whereby the self-image is associated with two other images which are: one's image of the world; and one's image of the other (the foe).
- The second is the meta-image. Meta-image refers to the assumption of an image "the other" has of "us." So, media needs to shed light on the perception in the Arab world towards the United States.
- The third tactic spreads public fear of Muslims. This is a relationship of mutual benefit, where ideologies and political proclivities converge to advance the same agenda.

The framing process has successfully installed a metaphoric, reductive and biased image towards Muslims in the U. S or abroad. To this end, Media corps have associated with the society of intellectuals and experts to provide a constant image which is able to penetrate people's cultural memory. Nathan Lean argues that Fox News' viewers may develop their negative views of Islam as a result of the already existing, deeply anti-Muslim bias. Although, no one can deny Fox news role in spreading fears towards Muslims in the US, for instance, Fox hosts brought up the phrases "radical Islam" or "extremist Islam" 107 times in three months, while CNN used the term 78 times and MSNBC only 24 times in 2011. Lean contends that experts and politicians have played a crucial role in spreading Islamophobic messages in the public sphere. He quotes some experts' statements who encourage fear of Muslims such as Steven Emerson's documentary, *Jihad in America*, Daniel Pipes and Tom Barfield, a private investigator, who states that "the Muslim

community is the most radical and terrorist of any immigrant group that's ever come to this country," (Lean, 2012, 146). One can conclude that the imagined reality is based on perceptions towards others. Pratt contends that perceptions rely on ignorance and imagination towards other's facts. In case of Islamophobia, perceptions rely on the process which ignores the circumstances that surround Muslims' lives. Douglas Pratt adds that ignorance may be manifest in at least three modalities or kinds (Pratt, 2016, 32):

- Innocent ignorance or ignorance simpliciter; namely the situation of a naïve 'not-knowing'.
- Blind ignorance born of an intellectual incapability, or cognitive barrier, that effectively prevents any 'seeing' or 'knowing' other than what has been dictated by the worldview perspectives held.
- Culpable ignorance, that is, an active ignoring; the deliberate refusal to know; the avoidance of the challenge to cognitive change.

This argument does not assume that all experts are involved in this biased process, while argues that media is the core element in constructing images and perceptions towards Muslims and Islam. Furthermore, Pratt contends the kind of perceptions Muslims suffer of (Pratt, 2016, 33-36):

- First, the picture of Islam portrayed is very often an imaginative construct shaped by media images;
- Perceptions of Islam are shaped by dominant political forces at play;
- the image of Islam projected via the media arguably often lacks an authentically critical framework for interpretation;
- Islam is often not portrayed or perceived as religion;
- Islam is portrayed as the necessary de facto opposition religion to Christianity;
- Islam gets presented in terms of a sociologically misrepresented image. Islam is deemed to be, in a variety of ways, sociologically 'out of control.'

To test such an argument, the forthcoming chapters, the sixth in particular, will exhibit and analyze the most prominent works presented by American experts regarding the issue of ISIS in the Middle East. Despite this observation concerning experts' involvement in spreading biased images and fear towards Muslims, light has been shed on the consequences of such biased images on two areas:

- 1- The Muslims' coexistence in the west.

- 2- The effect of this negative public perception on American foreign policy towards Middle Eastern issues.

4.3.2 What are the consequences of this image on social interaction?

In this part of the section, the discussion moves towards the third component of Islamophobia which is about the exclusionary practices and its consequences that challenge multiculturalism nationally or globally.¹⁰¹ The most important narrative of Islamophobia regarding multiculturalism is that Muslims and Islam are anti-change and anti-modernity. In contrast Tzvedan Todorov refuses this metaphor. He assures that all cultures change, if the necessary conditions are met (Todorov, 2010, 52). Todorov meanwhile questions the necessity of multiculturalism, if the individual struggles with collective traditions. However, despite the argument that bias and alienation towards Muslims existed in the West before the 9/11 terrorist attacks although shortly afterwards cultural diversity has been attacked and questioned.¹⁰² Here, the debate focuses on a specific point which asserts that Muslims take advantage of tolerance and liberalism, which have been augmented in the multicultural societies, to alienate them from the original local traditions and values. Arun Kundnani called this behavior as segregation whereby the Muslim individual prefers to stay in closed community in which non-Muslims are excluded (Kundnani, 2007, 122-3). He explains this segregation as normal by-product of Salafist notion of ‘self-rectification’ which aims to model Muslim’s life authentically to the Prophet’s example totally at odd with the Western way of life (Kundnani, 2014, 25). The voices which defend the ‘integration debate’, argue that Muslims should subsume their cultural heritage within ‘national spirit’ or ‘Britishness’ as referred to by Kundnani (2007, 123). One of the consequences of this debate is the submission of new doctrines such as ‘community cohesion’ or ‘state cohesion’ focusing on the need to integrate Muslims whose are perceived as a problem. This debate pays little attention to the individual and institutional racisms. Kundnani, though, assures that the motives behind Muslim lives in the western societies who join terrorist movements are political and economic rather than the sense of self-segregation. In other

¹⁰¹ Pratt explains that the fact of diversity is responded to in a range of degrees towards Muslims live in the Western countries, although most would fall within the purview of one of the following: exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism (Pratt, 2015, 210).

¹⁰² Pratt (2015) distinguishes between three variants of exclusivism: open, closed and extreme or “hardline rejectionist.” An open exclusivism, while maintaining cognitive and salvific superiority, may at least be amenably disposed towards the other. By contrast, closed exclusivism simply dismisses the other out of hand. Relationship to the other, especially the religious other, is effectively ruled out. On the other hand, extreme exclusivism gives expression to hardline rejectionist exclusivity, the viewpoint that asserts an exclusive identity to the extent that the fact and presence of an “other” is actively resisted, even to the point of taking steps to eliminate the other (Pratt, 2015, 210).

words, second generation Muslim immigrants joined ISIS and al-Qaida due to the sense of injustice and in order to break up with their parent's version of Islam. To explain this sense of injustice Kundnani blames the notion of cultural similarity. This sense of alienation, according to Kundnani, implied that multicultural tolerance of these new forms of identity such as Islamism is in itself a national security risk. Thus, assertive defense of the Western identity has been gradually and increasingly flourishing against Islam as an 'extremist ideology' (Kundnani, 2014, 33). He adds that American multiculturalism selectively opened towards different groups of identity. This openness requires the given group to enter the mainstream and that they abandon any desire to resist the basic contour of American political life. The role of the state's own policies and pronouncements under the banner of the 'war on terror' is crucial in legitimizing this anti-Muslim racism (Kundnani, 2007, 127). Anti-Muslim racism is endorsed by the integrationists as the promotion of national values, and the civic public sphere, to which Muslims ought to be assimilated. The moral consequence is the conflict by divergent political thoughts in which the core values, such as freedom, are endorsed or understood differently. This cannot be done unless shared values are found through an equal dialogue across the cultural horizons of different groups. Kundnani adds that State coercion or community cohesion, if one takes into consideration the global sphere, is then justified as a possible means for bringing about this 'emancipation'. In contrast, any resistance to this emancipation leads to collective moral panic. This panic justifies the majoritarian fear towards minority rights. In the global sphere majoritarian may be replaced by another description which is the strongest bank of the civilizational interaction which may hold fear from the next bank. Arjun Appadurai, in his essay *Fear of Small Numbers*, describes what he calls "majoritarianism,":

Fear of Small Numbers, establishes debates on majorities and minorities circle around the perception of the self and serve to reaffirm (national) belonging; and civilizational or cultural belonging. They focus on the majority's fears and premonitions that minority power could disrupt the status quo no matter how small the minority might actually be (quoted in Shooman & Spielhaus in Cesari: 2009, 199).

Yasemin Shooman and Riem Spielhaus also quote Werner Schiffauer's concept of 'moral panic'¹⁰³ which is characterized by a strong concern over a certain group which increases hostility due to the

¹⁰³ Sheridan also mentions the moral panic as by-product of social interaction.

exaggeration of threats to society. Correspondingly the concerned group disproportionately reacts to minority. Shooman and Spielhaus state that examples of the exclusionary practices have been manifested through Anti-Islamic slogans which appear mainly in the aftermath:

- a) After violent events that are being related to Islam.
- b) In the course of political agendas especially during election campaigns.
- c) When Muslims become visible in public space and active in socio-political life.
- d) Due to the precautions voices and literature works that posed specific images and ideas about the fear from Muslims who are perceived as coming to destroy the Western civilization.

For instance, Shooman and Spielhaus quote Gisèle Littman, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* appeared in 2005, and The Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci, thesis of a “demographic fight” among others, who warn European countries from the dramatic consequence of letting the numbers of Arabs and Muslims grew in Europe and how that will lead to an invasion from within the European continental (Shooman in Cesari: 2009, 210). In this regard, Andrew McCarthy assures that Islamophobic rhetoric could not install itself in the public conscious as a moral panic without real evidences of the perceived threat. He refers to the 12-points strategy which aims to establish an ‘Islamic government on Earth’ as part of Muslim Brotherhood’s political project in the global sphere (McCarthy, 2010, 42). He justifies such moral panic by asserting that the threat posed to all Americans and not exclusively against the government. To support his claim, he quotes Bin Laden’s statement in which he considered the American people responsible for the atrocities committed against Muslims. Thus, as Clinton Bennett concludes that this moral panic, created along the Islamophobic rhetoric, has a two-fold consequence (Bennet, 2005, 11-2):

- The first challenge is posed before the multicultural notions of social interactions which may lead to self and collective segregation of certain groups.
- Second challenge is posed on the global sphere of cooperation which may complicate the locus of cultural interaction paving the way to the clash of civilization.¹⁰⁴ A 2004 nationwide survey conducted by Cornell University found that 44 percent of people in the United States favored some kind of restriction on the civil liberties of Arab and Muslim Americans—which included registering

¹⁰⁴ Read also: Charles Taylor, “The Collapse of Tolerance,” *Guardian* (Sept. 17, 2007), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/sep/17/thecollapseoftolerance>.

one's place of residence with the government and racial profiling (al-Sultany, 2012, 133). Here, one might ask why US' through foreign policy approaches to Muslims convincing them that it shares values with them. This leads to another question which is: does Islamophobia tackle globalization or it paves the way to it by enforcing others to join the American way of life. This kind of attitude has a very dangerous consequence for global interaction. Ibrahim Kalin supports this claim by asserting that the consequence might affect negatively the cooperative prospect of the relationship between Islam and the West. Islamophobia, just like any other form of intolerance and discrimination, finds the asylum in the turmoil events (Kalin in Esposito: 2011, 4). Kalin contends that due to the narrow scope of political liberalism, Arab and the Islamic world turned into a distant and marginal member of the multicultural world of Western modernity which defines secularization as the only emancipator power in the modern world.¹⁰⁵ Mohammed Khan quotes Charles Taylor's "politics of recognition," which should allow a middle ground for cultural specificity on the one hand and a set of universal normative principles on the other.¹⁰⁶ Here, there is a long history of debate over moral particularity versus moral universalism. Khan adds another notion to moral panic which is the crystallization of identity as a barrier to social involvement (Khan in Heddad& Esposito, 2000, 87). The process of inclusion and exclusion is integral to the process of drawing boundaries to define communities. This attitude that Islam is a major threat to the West, in the post-communist era alienates, many American Muslims, putting them on the defensive and creating barriers that discourage their assimilation. Khan asserts that many American experts and scholars often fail to avoid two things:

- Scholars should distinguish between accepting Muslims and accepting Islam.
- American should avoid alienating its Muslim population each time it faces resistance to foreign objectives in Muslim states or from Muslim political movements.

Khan suggests that any meaning of inclusion or exclusion, whether nationally or globally, should not invoke a religious background of differentiation. In other words, a global space of integration should be neutral towards religious affiliation. This affiliation should not be a subject of boundaries meaning, otherwise the common good will fail in adopting a unique interpretation of the value itself. This affiliation should be avoided in the formation of any kind of metaphor. In this regard, I find it worth quoting some suggestions:

¹⁰⁵ Read: Anne Philips (2007). *Multiculturalism without Culture*, Princeton University Press, 9 .

¹⁰⁶ Read: Charles Taylor (2009). *The Politics of Recognition*. In: Amy Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- James Der Derian asserts that the global sphere requires an approach in the sense of a critical inquiry into an area of thought where there is no final or exclusive arbiter of truth. Thus, the knowledge acquired by the arbitrary system should be neutralized from events manipulation (Der Derian, 1989, 6).
- William Connolly assures that knowledge should be separated from the arbitrary system of otherness. The discourses of knowledge should acquire a unique interpretation of truth through the universality of values such as reason freedom and other common values. He states that “it supposes that if we cannot fashion a pure universalism we must be able to fashion a pure contextualism that draws us into the perspective of the 'Other' as it was prior to its discovery” (Connolly in Der Derian: 1989, 326).

Connolly and Der Derian refuse conquest and conversion as political manipulation to otherness. This manipulation accommodates the strategic interests of the dominant group to maintain its self-assurance and its position in the word order. For Connolly (1989, 329) universalism should give a potential space for the other to express his difference. In this regard, the global danger, such as terrorism, should be prevented to provide the locus where identity and difference play key role in shaping the negative perception of otherness. The solution in one hand, according to Connolly, should deploy truth that depends on an epistemological methodology as a necessity to create knowledge susceptible to the interference of rhetorical means to protect coherence in public sphere. On the other hand, globalization, as Reza Aslan understands the notion, is about one’s sense of self in a single collective space (Aslan, 2009, 18). Aslan finds out that globalization to be collectively endorsed should meet some conditions:

- 1- Reduce its secular particularism. Thus, efforts should concentrate on the political deployment of religion and not on religion as identity. He means that collective efforts on the global arena should refute Islamism as a unique representation of the totality of Islam.
- 2- Global exceptionalism should not be reduced to Westernism, instead, modernity should take the core interest of global sphere.
- 3- A distinction between secularism and modernity should be done in advance to convince the others including Muslims for accepting the single global sphere of belonging.

If these conditions are met, then, the terrorist movements will lose essential components of its power in resisting globalization; the scope of endorsement to their reductionist understanding of globalization, as a Western assault on Islamic identity, will be manifestly damaged.

Conclusion:

The question is "Is Islamophobia a threat to Islam? How to distinguish between moderate Muslims in the nation state and Islamists as the subject of Islamism (politicizing the religion and state order)? Is it possible for nation states of Muslim majorities or to the international community of moderate Muslims to orient the Islamophobia process and subject it to its interests? I think the main hypothetical point is that whether moderate individuals can convince the rest of the world to distinguish Islam as faith and the political project of Islamism as a global project that aims to establish its political entity. That would lead us again to a fundamental question as to how those minorities of Islamists, hypothetically assumed, in the Muslim and Arab world could establish this wave of strategic implication on the surface of regional and local politics in some countries. Here, Pratt explores the idea that Islamophobia is itself a manifestation of religious extremism and is construable as "reactive co-radicalization." Pratt quotes McCauley and Moskalenko who view radicalization as an aspect of "increasing extremity of beliefs" as well as behaviors supportive of conflict and violence (Pratt, 2015, 206). Thus, as much Muslims and Arabs have the ability to redirect Islamophobia against ISIS, or under any other titles that share the ambition of Islamism, both sides of the civilizations interlocutor, East and West, will get equal benefits of this process. From my point of view, ISIS crisis might hide more for cooperation than conflict in both sides; between the notions of the I, as national or religious partners, or between I and the 'Other' to reach a stable regional and global order. But, first of all we need to shed light on the peripheral conditions that help ISIS to emerge in general in the Middle East and in Iraq in particular. To this end, the fifth chapter will discuss the failure of secularism and political liberalism alike in Iraq.

The Fifth Chapter

The Rise of ISIS in Iraq: Causes and Effects

The vital aim of this chapter is to answer to Orientalism/Islamophobic view concerning the rise of ISIS in Iraq. This discussion cannot be tackled without paying a close attention to the questions that have been raised in the third chapter of this thesis. In general, this chapter will try to answer the following questions:

1. The Iraqi case especially since American invasion, and June 2014 in particular when ISIS occupied Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq after Baghdad.
2. What are the essential causes of the failure of secularism in post-2003 Iraq?
3. Is secularism's failure related to the raising of IS crisis in Iraq?
4. What was the role of United States in the political turmoil in Iraq?
5. Is it true that Iraqis are incompatible to democracy (Lewis' argument), or the current socio-political circumstances have led to the political turmoil and the rise of ISIS in Iraq?

To answer the question above, the chapter will be divided into two sections:

- The First Section centers on the intellectual response to the debate concerning the three questions of the third chapter. One would argue that it is necessary to highlight the intellectual debate in Iraq around these questions since Iraq is the key object of this thesis. Furthermore, it is necessary for the upcoming chapters to understand the collective perception in Iraq about democracy, secularism and modernity. Furthermore, what the key Iraqi intellectuals feel about these questions and how to deal with such an important issue such as constitutional democracy. My intention is to answer to Huntington's theory of clash of civilizations to which the reader can conclude that the inevitable result of democratic experience in any Islamic country is failure. This failure, according to Huntington, is due to Islamic peculiarities and Arabic particularity.
- The Second Section tackles the experience of secularism in Iraq post 2003. To this end, I am going to analyze and study the experience of political process in Iraq in the aftermath of American invasion. Therefore, my intention is to discover what kind of challenges and checks have faced the political liberalism along with democracy in Iraq. I do believe that the failure of secularism especially in the state's institutional level (political secularism) have been one of the most important factors which led to the rise of ISIS. Although, this factor has been interacted with another serious

one which is the failure of American project in Iraq. In other words, U.S' administrations have failed to understand the social and political particularities in Iraq. And thus, this failure has led to a catastrophic result which is the domination of Islamic political parties on the political life in Iraq. Through the arguments above I will try to find out the relationship between secularism's failure and the decline of political liberalism which been manifested through IS's crisis.

5.1 The prospect of democracy in Iraq: the answer to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations:

In this section I would like to address the three fundamental questions of the third chapter¹⁰⁷ by exhibiting most important contemporary academic works in Iraq. My methodology centers on two aspects:

- The first concentrates on the intellectual debate in Iraq concerning the relationship between Islam and democracy in one hand and the prospect of democracy in Iraq in the other.
- The second aspect of methodology will concentrate on democratic experience in Iraq post-2003.

Here, I would like to start with one of the most important cleric and intellectuals in Iraq, Sayyid Mohamed Baqir Al-Sader (1982). In his book "Falsafatouna" {Our Philosophy}, he has a firm position on "liberalism". He tries to explain Western conceptions of "liberalism and Democracy".

From his perspective, there are four types of liberalism:

- First, Democracy is bases on unlimited individualism, therefore, political liberalism gives the right to individuals to participate freely in the public life and politics. Since there is no supremacy of any one or any group in the public discourse, thus, this liberalism must depend on the equality of political rights among all citizens (Al-Sader, 14-16):
- Second, political liberalism associates with economic liberalism, which depends on free economy and productive property. In this regard, the personal interest drives the individual, it also guarantees public social interest. For Al-Sader the most important notion is equality as fairness in the economic and political fields.
- The third type is intellectual liberalism that gives the individual the right of free thought and doctrine without any authoritarian barriers.
- The fourth is individual's privacy.

¹⁰⁷ The third chapter centers on three important themes: John Rawls' political liberalism, Bernard Lewis's argument concerning the prospect of democracy in the Muslim's world, and Huntington's theory of Clash of Civilizations.

Thus, in the liberal perspective, religious liberalism is considered part of the intellectual liberty in its doctrinal sphere, and part of the individual privacy in its practical sphere. He concludes that Individualism is the corner stone of the social system, and the virtuous state is the apparatus that dedicates its abilities to serve the citizens. Al-Sader affirms that the liberal social system is material; it separates the individual from his principles or doctrines. And this system lacks the sufficient philosophical context that explains this process of separation "privatization." He assures the need of both the material and doctrinal values in the public sphere due to the fact that religion is inseparable from the material life of both the society and the individual. Thus, religion must be included in the legislation process. In al-Sader's perspective political liberalism is established on a material philosophy that takes only into consideration the human reason and the private interest. This approach excludes religious doctrine and ethics by explaining that the private interest in itself is enough to achieve the public interest. So, when the individual acts in the society he does so for his private interest but at the same time he serves the community. Hence, the private interest is the main engine that drives public good in liberal societies. Al-Sader asks how the relationship between public interest and the individual is sufficient to rationalize the individuals' conduct towards virtues. For him political liberalism is the majority rule over the minorities' interests, assuming that, the majority are materialists who lack ethical context. Thus, he affirms that as much as the private interest is considered vital for the individuals, and the majority does not take into consideration the religious doctrine, exploitation will be manifested within the society interactions. He concludes that capital democracy is a system that is doomed to fail. Thus, there is a severe necessity to raise and adopt religious doctrine such as Islam that puts a moral code for directing human role in the service of Allah {God} (Alsader, 1982, 44-45). This scale means that the individual has to follow the transcendental rules to overcome his ego or selfishness and cooperate with others. Al-Sader's approach, to balance between private and public sphere, consists of two processes:

- First, through the *realistic interpretation of life* which aims to achieve Allah's satisfaction and to reach paradise after mortal life. To get Allah's satisfaction, the individual must follow the virtue scale to ensure justice in his relationship towards others, and through this reciprocity of justice both private and public interest will be achieved.
- Second, through moral context that needs an educational system. This educational process must depend on the religious doctrine to enhance the ground for ethics and instill spiritual values in the individual conduct.

One can say that in Iraq, there is a huge problem in debating political liberalism. The problem is that there are very rare efforts to distinguish between public reason and secular reason. In this regard, for instance Mohamed Al-Hashimy asserts that secularism in Iraq has been manifested due to Orientalism in the late of nineteenth century. He accuses the West of launching a wave of secularist movement in the region to destroy Islamic culture (Al-Hashimy, 2013, 72). Hence, the popular conduct towards secularism could not avoid the conspiracy theory. Al-Hashimy asserts that Islamic revolution of Khomeini in Iran represents the only historical deterrent to secular movements, thus, Shi'ites community is more immune to secularism than the Sunni community due to the role of Maarji'yah {Shi'ite cleric}. He sees that in Iraq the secular thought had been strengthened during the monarchy through a direct orientation by the West, British mandate, when some Iraqi scholars, British graduates, called for secularism. Since the beginning of this movement a conflict with Islamic culture began. This secular movement was supported by intellectuals, students, employees and military institutions. Those who support this movement call for a distinction between private and public sphere in a way that was opposed by some scholars who think that it degrades Islamic values. Al-Hashimy mentions two manifestations of secularism after 2003, as follows:

- 1) political and governmental field. He concludes that most Islamic political parties tend towards secular language in the political process, this type called "the Islamic secularism", means its Islamic by its elites and secular in the political practices.
- 2) Cultural secularism. Al-Hashimy concludes that liberal thought in Iraq presents a number of conceptions such as: secularism, rationality "human reason", individualism, utilitarianism, and freedom of thought. According to liberal Iranian scholar Mohammed Shibestri all these conceptions tend to exclude religious doctrine from public politics as well as put all religious teachings under scrutiny within a liberal context.

Although, Alhashimy finds out that there is a possibility of convergence between religious doctrine and liberalism, due to the fact that religion also calls for respecting human rights, and to enhance the human life conditions. Thus, the cornerstone for both, religion and liberalism, is the individual. In this perspective, Islam does not support coercive measures over the individual rights but aims to establish a process of mutual respect between the individual freedom and law (Al-Hashimy, 2013, 382). Hence, the author supports the idea of involving religion in public politics and legislation, and calls for a strong educational system. I can conclude both Al-sader (1982) and Al-Hashimy (2013):

- The state becomes an apparatus to spread and protect the religious doctrine. Because it is believed that the religious doctrine is the best approach to achieve justice through a unique system of values which citizens must follow in his relationship with other individuals from diverse groups.
- Political parties must be Islamic and not liberal in any sense of the word, their task is to protect the religious teachings and not the individual rights, Al-Hashimy assumes that the public good that results from religious doctrine will protect the individual interest, due to the limitedness of human abilities to control and legislate for his own life, thus there is always a need of the religious doctrine to organize the relations among individuals and between the individual and the society.

Here, let's move on the debate towards another trend in Iraq concerning political liberalism and secular reason. Amer Fayadh, the dean of political science faculty in Al-Nahrain University in Baghdad, asserts that the core of polity consists of three elements: Individual, groups, authority. To build a civic state we need these three elements. Through civil society organizations modernity will be achieved, while acceptance to which the authority can gain the sufficient legitimacy to implement its duties. Still to control the authority we need a sufficient institution that builds upon the constitutional legitimacy. He emphasizes that there are four pillars to have a civic state: democracy, economic stability and development, active civic groups or organizations, and cultural and epistemological development. He contends that the individual's conduct is vital to get a civil society. Hence, reasonableness to be flourished three elements should be available in political culture which are: individualism, reasoning and secularism. Amer Hassan Fayadh does not ignore the role of traditional associations such as the Masjid and the comprehensive doctrines in the public sphere but emphasizes that there must be a functional separation between the political and religious institution. Thus, the lack of liberal political culture and the lack of political skills in political elites will lead to critical problems in the constitution. And that is what happened in Iraq post 2003. The weakness of political culture of the political elites led to deficit in legislation process. Regarding political liberalism, Fayadh asserts that the constitution gives to everyone equal right of political participation, without any barriers on his/her sub-comprehensive affiliations. But still, since this individual is in charge of an official position he should separate between his affiliation and function. He must be secular in his duties. He does not call for complete separation between religion and politics, because he believes since the doctrines are related very closely to the individual identity, it is very difficult to convince him to abandon it, but the individual must express his doctrines in

constitutional ways. Al-Fayadh respects all sub-affiliations such as tribal, religious, ethnic within the socio-political context of the state, and for him the only way to make this diversity homogenous is through the civil society organizations. Thus, civil society can achieve social and political stability while peaceful transition will be reached later (Fayadh, 2014, 41).

This debate over political liberalism in Iraq cannot be separated from another question: is Iraqi society compatible with democracy? Before answering this question, Fayadh rests the successful political liberalism in liberal democratic system on three fundamental pillars (Fayadh, 2009, 9-27):

- First, the intellectual or cultural underpinning which are: Individualism, Naturalism, Reasoning and Liberty. The corner stone for the social system is the individual and not the group, since the individuals who are going to vote in the electoral process must vote on reasonable grounds. Thus, the system must consider the individual as its first priority and works to develop his skills, since the individual is the guarantee of the social and political systems. To focus on individualism as the corner stone of political liberalism does not mean dissolution of the comprehensive doctrines of different groups or replacing it with political values. Liberty must be limited by reason and the limits of others' liberty. Fayadh distinguishes between two types of liberty: the inner liberty which expresses the individual will as a free social actor; and the external liberty which guides the individual conduct towards others. Thus, the inner liberty is the ethical ground for individual cooperation in the social context. And while he has this inner liberty the individual is socially liberal and corporately active. So, with this inner liberty happiness will be reached if it does not exclude the public interest.
- The second pillar is the social underpinning which is the civil society organizations and the middle class "bourgeois", he asserts that this class will lead the civil society organizations and the elites towards political change.
- The third pillar is the constitutional underpinning: which is liberal democracy. Fayadh asserts that to build a constitutional liberal democracy in Iraq we need a liberal political culture. He concludes that Iraqi society needs a long-term strategy to achieve the transition to the liberal political culture. The first step in this strategy must be to reshape new liberal political institutions, and that requires the amendment of the current constitution (2005) in Iraq.

Here, before moving to the question of democracy in Iraq, I would like to exhibit some Iraqi works on political culture and how it affects the democratic transition in Iraq. In this regard, Mohammed Adnan Al-Khafajy defines political culture as “set of values, doctrines and political ideas which

been cultivated through the roots of cultural particularity of the specific society. It is such a process of transcending values through generations in a way that guide the political behavior of individuals” (Al-Khafajy, 2005, 12, my translation).

One of the most important intellectuals of political sociology in Iraq Sadiq Al-Aswad, indicates that in each generation there are two types of political culture: the elite culture and the mass political culture. In both cases the political culture is psychological to its core. In this regard, it directs the interests and perceptions of the individual towards the political process (al-Aswad, 1991, 326). Thus, political culture is what controls the inner liberty of the individual. It also controls the individual's enthusiasm towards political participation. Thus, the political culture is what keeps the coercion of political process whether through peaceful measures or mutual violence between the authority and the masses. What guarantee the peaceful relationship between authority and the masses is liberal democratic institutions (al-Hadithy, 1998, 187).

One can conclude that to tackle the prospect of democracy in Iraq the inherited political culture should be analyzed and explored. The inherited political culture has been discussed in Iraq in two ways: the doctrinal analysis which studies the Islamic conception of polity, and the practical way which analyzes the effects of politics on political conduct. In the first stance, Fayadh asks, like Mohamed Al-jabri, is Al-shurah "consultancy" compatible with democracy? Fayadh asserts that Al-Shurah is an Islamic political principle that works in case of absence of texts. He argues that there have been no institutions that have represented Al-shura in Islamic history. Thus, it paves way for the individuals to participate in authority (Fayadh, 2009, 106). For Fayadh the obstacles to democracy in Iraq are not the inherited culture but it is the subordinate culture. Since the majority is Muslims in Iraqi society then there is no doctrinal barrier to install constitutional democracy.

At the second stance, even though after 2003, Iraqi society has witnessed small shift towards the culture of political participation¹⁰⁸ since a seed of democratic system has spread in Iraq by the new democratic constitution, but, with the existence of the constitution of 2005, there are still some features of exclusivity in decision making. This exclusivity is not constitutional, because even in liberal democratic societies there is admission of differentiation in individual skills, but it is due to the fact that exclusivity is part of the inherited political culture in Iraq for centuries. For Abd

¹⁰⁸ For Sabbah Aln'as, political participation depends on: 1- the political forma of the individual; 2- the dynamic of political regime. Since the political self of the individual is gained of the society, then the political participation can be measured through: essential perception that consist the political identity of the individual; knowing and evaluating the political institutions; the political aims of the individuals. (Al-na'as, 2012, 91-2).

Al'adheem Hafidh democracy is the system of liberty whereby all individuals are treated equally before the law, and has the intellectual and physical liberty that preserves his dignity and develop his skills to enter the contemporary world of innovation and reforms (Hafidh, 2011, 63). In this regard, the individual should be liberal in both inner and external spheres, he has the liberal will to participate and involve in organized movements under the umbrella of civil society. This willingness comes from his wish to change the social conditions in public spheres, and from the public space that provides the opportunity to such movements to grow. In this regard, Hafidh asserts that three elements determine the position of inherited political culture in the legislation process:

- The popular tendency in public sphere towards the position of inherited culture such as Islamic culture is the core element of public legitimacy process.
- The political failure of the Islamists in Iraq will give the opportunity to the liberals to lead the process of social transformation.
- As far as the individual starts to use reason over religious doctrines political liberalism will grow.

Thus, to bypass the effects of inherited political culture in Iraq two types of political conduct should be eliminated: shrinking of political authority in public sphere, and officials must have in their epistemological ground sufficient consciousness on the limits of both their political position and institutions. Otherwise, without this political consciousness no separation between authorities will be preserved and political chaos will prevail. Accordingly, we witness today a huge political movement of the masses in different provinces in Iraq against political institutions and politicians. Still that does not mean the masses have reached an advanced level in political culture, but at the same time, it gives us an impression that civil society in Iraq is developed to a certain level that allows it to be organized without a common political leadership. Thus, Hafidh assigns great importance to masses to change political culture through social tools such as family, school, and civil society organizations (Hafidh, 2011, 244). But, in reality, very rare evidences have been seen concerning the autonomy of civil society in Iraq. What the evidences tell us is that the civil society in Iraq suffers of the problem of militarizing the society. That means non-state actors “Militias” share power with the state institutions. But still people can do much to achieve political change. Because when the officials fear the seriousness of popular demands and movements they have no choice other than bringing about political reform. Before explaining the chances of political reform

in Iraq, it is important to exhibit the obstacles of democratic transition. Mun'em Al-amar, has another opinion about the conditions of democracy (Ala'mar, 2011, 1):

- 1- The existence of an independent political framework (the state).
- 2- General will to achieve the democratic transition.
- 3- National strategy to strengthen democracy through liberal institutions.

Hence, Ala'mar criteria of obstacles¹⁰⁹ to democracy in Iraq as follows:

- first, political and institutional deficits such as the lack of conscious political elites; misusing democracy as a pragmatic tool to achieve political goals; seeking stability more than liberty; the gaps in the constitution; the weakness of political opposition, the need of essential codes to organize vital sectors such as the law of political parties and administrative corruption.
- Second, social and cultural obstacles: security threats and instability, the weakness of national identity, sectarianism, economic problems such as poverty and unemployment, social justice, the underdevelopment of civil society, mistrust and the weakness of dialogue.
- The Third set of obstacles are the foreign and regional interventions in the Iraqi domestic issues: United States strategy in the Middle East, the policies of Iraq's neighboring countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, transforming the regional problems into Iraqi borders such as Daesh (ISIS) and other terrorist organizations.

Still the debate considers political culture the corner stone of democracy and political reform. In this regard the political behavior of the individual is driven by four fundamental environments (Alkhafajy, 2005, 87):

- First, the intellectual one which suffers from diversity as well as the struggle between secularism and comprehensive doctrines.
- Second, cultural environment which refers to the education system and the education culture. Since the educational institutions are under authority's control, it is an easy task for the authority to develop certain values in. These values are: unilateral value and the rejection of pluralism; memory culture.
- Third is economic environment.

¹⁰⁹ See also: - Albayati Faris (2013). *Democratic Transformation In Iraq post 9 April 2003*, Beirut: Al-a'aref publications, Lebanon, pp208-304.

- Al-bidhani Ibraheem (2014). The fragile Iraqi State: domestic products or American necessity, Hammurabi journal for studies, Hammurabi center for research and strategic studies, March, n9 special edition, Baghdad, pp28-39.

- Fourth is political which consists of political ideology, political parties and the scope of political participation.

These four environments have affected the behavior of both the ordinary citizen and the official. Thus, one might ask do people, disappointed with the parliament and the government, have the right to demonstrate and demand political reform. In this regard, what should prevail is people's sovereignty. Fayadh emphasizes that "democracy is the guarantee against the just tyrants, its value is to transform the popular wisdom to the elites and to enforce them to meet its demands" (Fayadh, 2012, 392).

How and under what conditions can we translate popular sovereignty into reality? The answer is through election. But popular demonstrations are also constitutional if are not violent. Although, there is a procedural problem which is how to be sure that those people who demonstrate are the majority. In this regard, according to Fayadh, in democracy there is no sovereignty for majority over minority. Democracy aims to bring happiness equally to all, and democracy's core-aim is individual rights. Thus, there is no justice in favoring the majority over the minority, and this consideration must be taken by the winners of the election. Also, Fayadh asserts an important point which is how to protect the executive power from the fluctuation of public opinion? The answer is the constitution. Any political reform and change must be constitutional. In the case of Iraq, the crisis is complicated and takes a prismatic form:

- First, according to liberal democratic regime there is no room for the exclusiveness in the decision-making process. In the Iraqi parliament, there is no political majority and the prime minister has no real support for his policies without "Al'tawafuqiyah" political consensus or harmony with other political parties.
- Second, there is lack of political proficiency and political consciousness for the majority of the parliament representatives, in a way they cannot understand the limits of their duties and the limits of the legislative institution, also they misunderstand the principal of the separation of powers. The absence of proficiency makes political institutions fragile in the face of crisis.
- Third, since there is no political majority in the parliament then the task of reform will be difficult and would need a special authorization.
- Fourth, there is no political opposition since all parties have participated in the government.

In political philosophy, political reform needs some elements: legislations, political institutions, political support for reform, constitutional methods and finally the individuals who hold a sufficient political culture of change and have the will to lead and achieve the reform. But the question is who is going to be authorized to lead the political reform?¹¹⁰ Who will authorize him? The political reforms need pillars:

- First, the democratic institutions capable of applying the change in a peaceful way that preserves social and political stability.
- Second, political liberalism as an ideology. This ideology to be effective must penetrate the political culture of both the people and the elites.

Thus, two things must be taken seriously by the demonstrating people: first, rejecting the individuality¹¹¹ and exclusivity of the political reform; second, the reform must be constitutional. People have no choice but to keep up the pressure on the political elites to meet their demands. Otherwise, chaos will prevail. Mohamed Maliki has another opinion. He emphasizes in 'Legitimacy of election and the legitimacy of performance', that election alone as a constitutional procedure is not enough to produce democratic legitimacy; it requires legitimacy associated with the political performance of both the parliament and the government. Thus, he supports popular right of political participation through demonstrations and civil society activities (Maliki, 2013, 67-8). In contrast, Khuder Atwan asks whether popular political culture can achieve reform. And what kind of procedures they seek? Is it peaceful, constitutional or revolutionary?¹¹² To answer this question one

¹¹⁰ For Hussein Dukheil the reform is a soft change partial/totally in some devices of the political regime. The reform is necessary to ensure the ability of the regime to meet the current conditions in socio-political context of its society, and to enhance its performance to meet the popular demand in the face of crisis.

¹¹¹ Said Dahdoh, asserts the conclusion of Rasheed Khayoun, that all political parties in Iraq after 2003, suffer of two points in their political culture: first, they are psychologically victims of Saddam tyrannical policies, thus they are potential tyrants. Second, most of the political elites in the political parties have never changed since more than 20 years ago. Thus, the political parties in Iraq lack of democratic procedures in selecting its leaders, and that was obvious in some parties when the leadership was inherited for the relatives of the leader.

¹¹² In this regard, one might refer to constitutional tolerance, which enables citizens to pursue political ideas and programs and thereby enriches democracy (Searing, Crewe & Conover, 2006, 291). constitutional tolerance is said to protect all citizens. I do believe that positive tolerance means to respect either the other citizens' rights and the constitutional measures. Searing et al., asks is there a trade-off between tolerance and other forms of good citizenship, such as patriotism, participation and law-abidingness? The answer is yes. Their answer has established that constitutionally tolerant citizens tend to place a low value on national solidarity. Thus, citizens should respect and obey minor as well as major laws; even in the case of popular demonstrations against the government's performance. People should take into consideration there is no other way to achieve political reform than the constitutional one. While Frank Michelman (2015) assures that people's support to political regime should be conditioned by legitimation. People should have a sense of collective deservingness towards its political regime through government's adherence to the constitutional obligations. For Michelman, constitution is a platform of legitimacy; Michelman prefers to call this relationship as "legitimation by constitution." But, the question is to what extent the constitution could be the platform

needs to exhibit constitutional articles related to political reform. In this regard, one might find that there are four important articles concerning reform (constitution of Iraq, 2005):

- Article 5 affirms that "the people is the source of authority, and express this right through election".
- Article 20: "Men and women equally have the right of political participation." Article 38/third: "People have the right, individually or collectively, to demonstrate."
- Article 64: "the parliament is dissolved through absolute majority of the parliament representatives according to the demand that presented from the prime minister or two thirds of the parliament members."

One might conclude that the constitution restricts the task of reform in the hand of the parliament. This task is hindered by the absence of political majority in the parliament, and second of the lack of political will to handle this reform. Thus, protesting people have no other choice to reform rather than supporting the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to force the political parties to meet the popular demands. Popular support to the prime minister comes to the fore due to two facts:

- They do not trust the parliament representatives to reach reform.
- Second, the popular political culture in Iraq looks towards charismatic leader.

Thus they tend to trust and authorize one person to lead and achieve their demands. Algharbawy Husam explains this phenomenon by asserting that people tend to surrender some of their rights to authority, without surrendering their original right (Algharbawy, 2005, 28). Thus, the political process remains under the threat of fluctuation in public opinion due to the fact that Iraqis are emotional; extremer and hasty in expression of their emotions. This fluctuation will arise rapidly when the prime minister shows hesitation in supporting their demands. The obstacles that hinder his way are various; it is constitutional in one hand, and political on the other. The case in Iraq is different of Egypt; President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt has a strong institution behind him that supports his plan of reform. This is the military institution, in Iraq this institution has no political

of legitimacy. There must pre-conditions to Michelman's proposition: constitutional consciousness, so as to consider possible resultant effects on constitutional practice and debate; government should adhere to the constitutional obligations; fairness in the basic terms of social cooperation among citizens conceived as "free and equal." Thus, the constitution should guarantee justice and fairness in the socioeconomic terms to which citizens should be equally treated. Thus, from my point of view, political efforts should focus on the constitution itself; to which process it was drafted, under which terms and narratives it was debated on and according to whom it was written. In the case of Iraq, the constitution is one of the important sources of the political turmoil. This fact has been accumulated with the deficit of constitutional consciousness among politicians. Thus, the steps towards political reform and stability should start from re-viewing the constitution of Iraq.

role and suffers from many technical, operational and political problems. Since, it is susceptible to the problems of the political process, including quotas and inefficiency in the distribution of positions. Thus, when the people ask for more operational procedures within the reform process, and the prime minister has no chance to meet it, we will witness the escalation in demonstrations. In this scenario one could conclude three outcomes: early elections, revolutionary revenge or the state quo with gradual steps of reform. Khuder Atwan asserts that the solution must be in the political majority. Thus, the demonstration will have several results: the amendment of the constitution; shift in popular political culture to the level that changes the individual norms in election; strengthen the national identity (Atwan, 2012, 115).

This discussion has led to a fundamental question which is, according to Khuder A'twan, is American sample of liberalism and democracy compatible to the Iraqi society? In this part of the section, the discussion will focus on the Iraqi intellectual response to Huntington's thesis of "Clash of Civilizations" in three fields: the compatibility of liberal democracy to Iraqi society; the political socialization and its effects on political culture in Iraq; and third the theoretical readings to Huntington thesis.

First is regarding the response to liberal democracy in Iraq. Here, Algharbawy (2005, 44) asserts that there are two trends towards liberalism in Iraq: first trend sees liberalism as a negative ideology which cannot survive in traditional societies; second trend, in contrast, affirms that liberalism is the proper ideology of the whole world. Algharbawy discusses the critiques against political liberalism in Iraq:

- 1- Rights do not exist without community, because it is a social phenomenon due to relations among individuals.
- 2- The necessity of authority's role in the socio-political context to restrain selfish tendencies within the individual.
- 3- The priority is for the public sphere because the society is the assessor with respect to individual needs.
- 4- Political liberalism does not recognize a criterion to distinguish virtues of the individual.
- 5- Liberal democracy leads to the rule of political majority and not the rule of popular sovereignty.
- 6- The weakness of political liberalism lies in its core idea of maximizing the private interests of the individual, and this idea is in contrast with social justice and equality of opportunity.

7- For Islamists democracy leads to infidelity since it is not based on the God's law. They also insist that the rule must be to the caliphate and the ulema "scholars." Islamists criticize democracy because in election all individuals are equal, and there is no difference between the believers and the unbelievers.

8- For Islamists the sovereignty of God 'Hakimiyat Allah' must prevail and not the sovereignty of people.

While Ihsan Abdul-Hadi, locates the hindrance to democratic transition in the misunderstanding of political modernity in Iraq. He points out the misconception of absolute liberty that spread in Iraq after 2003. This misconception has led to several damages to the socio-political fabric of the Iraqi society such as the weakness of national identity, the detachment of the individual from traditions and the invitation to the secular thought in private sphere (Abdul-Hadi, 369-70). One would oppose this point by asserting that political secularism does not deny a role to comprehensive doctrines in the public sphere, because these doctrines are essential parts of the individual identity. The point is, political secularism asks the individual to be reasonable and cooperative towards the others no matter what their doctrines demand, also asks the official to be neutral in policy making process. The question here, is whether the majority can abandon their comprehensive doctrine in public sphere in favor of national or public interest? The answer lies in democracy as a constitutional system and in political modernity that paves the way for democracy to be implemented. Without modernity, there is no room for democratic transition, because modernity provides a space for shift in political culture. Then, the inner liberty, Fayadh's notion, will flow to the fore of the individual's political behavior. Thus, the space of cooperation and trust will enlarge among the individuals and the groups under the conditions of social justice and equality before the law.

Ali Abbas Murad asserts that to accelerate the process of political change and modernity in Iraq we need an active civil society.¹¹³ According to Huntington and Fukuyama, the success of liberal democratic regimes depends on three elements: the proficiency of political institutions, the independence of civil society institutions and liberalism and modernity must be the ground for organizing the relationship between civil society and political authority (Quoted in Murad, 2008, 243). But Ali Abbas Murad criticizes the political regimes in the Middle East with respect to their ambition to control the civil society through: terminating any possibility for political opposition to

¹¹³ For Murad civil society consists of the social apparatus and institutions that exist and function independently from the political authority, its essential aim is to protect the private space and right of the individuals from authority interference (Murad & Fathi, 2005,250).

grow in the socio-political context, controlling the social apparatus and institutions, and drying the financial resources of the civil society organizations. Thus, for Murad the existence of civil society is not enough to lead to political modernity in the society. It must work within a liberal democratic regime that does not give the chance to the political authority to interfere in social movements. So for Murad the priority must be towards constitutional democracy. This system will create new type of political institutions that respect human rights and private sphere as well as the public mobilization to participate within the decision-making process. The constitutional democracy over time will create fertile ground for political change and modernity starting from the bottom of the society. In his book titled 'dawlat al sharia' *the sharia State*, Murad tries to answer the question about the compatibility between sharia and democracy. In this work, he studies Ibn Sina's treatises about the role of political authority in shaping the virtues in public sphere. He asserts that it is the repetition and habitual of civil arrangements are what make the virtue the basic of social work (Murad, 1999, 150). And political authority must be involved in this repetition through its institutions to consolidate the ethics in public and private spheres. Furthermore, the sharia must be the source of social ethics and virtues, especially in political activities. Thus, morals should be divine with respect to the duties but without any divine justification. In this regard, no one has the right to pretend the divine right in his favor to legislate his social or political position in public sphere. Thus, religion must be excluded from the justification process of the authority. In other words, the legitimacy must not depend on religious privileges. In this regard Amer Fayadh asserts that sectarianism is one of the serious hindrances to democratic translation in Iraq. For him sectarianism means usage of religion for political purposes. Ali Murad concludes that Ibn Sina supported the democratic principles of political rule and participation on one hand, and democracy as the ideological ground on which virtue can flourish. For him Islamic codes in Quran or Shari'a do not present a specific type of political regime, also there are no texts that identify the political system for an Islamic society (Murad, 1999, 155). The absence of such texts in Islamic codes gives to the Islamic community the opportunity to shape the political system with respect to the socio-political conditions. And this absence of the Islamic system does not deny the need for political institutions to run up the community of believers. In fact, Murad affirms, the Arab-Muslim community was based, in politics, on sincere secular system. Thus, Islamic codes tend to establish a political authority has the right to apply Shari'a and the ability to manage the affairs of society according to the principles of justice and fairness. But this right of applying Shari'a does not confer

a sacred religious character to political power as a divine legitimacy. That is the reason political authority is always under popular monitory, and people have the right to participate in decision-making process whenever they notice that the political power is not doing their job. For Ibn Sina, according to Murad, political activity is a human task that any one has the right skills can handle. While the religious duty is only handled by prophets Thus for him Arab-Muslim community is compatible with democracy. But here, one would ask what type of democracy can be implemented in a Muslim society? Is it the Western liberal democracy? In this regard, Ali Murad and Amer Fayadh have tried to answer this question from two different perspectives. Their paradigm is based on the premise that the rejection within Muslim society to this kind of democracy is due to the state of clash between tradition and the imperial policies of the United States of America which tries to impose its model on the rest of the world. Murad names it *the policy of democratic coercion*. This policy aims to demolish the privacy of traditional Muslim culture and replace it with western culture. Hence the Islamists reaction to liberal democracy takes several critiques (Murad, 2008, 320-7):

- Islamic religion does not separate between politics and religion in society's affairs. Shari'a provides the best system for social justice both private and collective good are reserved.
- Islamists refuse democracy as a governing system; they claim that there are no texts in Shari'a concerning democracy.
- Islamic rhetoric affirms the need for Shurah {consultancy} system as implemented in the Islamic history. This position is based on the sovereignty of God; whereby divine legislation is the sole source of authority.
- Since Islamic rhetoric calls for god's sovereignty there is no room for civil society.

Murad has a contrary opinion, he supports the compatibility between Islam and democracy, he challenges Islamists rhetoric by emphasizing that:

- First, Muslims have different interpretations of the Shurah system, each one represents the socio-political conditions of different society and era. But all interpretations share that Shurah is for the sake of collective good. Thus, democracy and 'shurah' share the same goal.
- Second, Figh of ijtihaad {Provisions of jurisprudence} are the products of human interpretations of the sacred texts which belong to different eras. Thus, reason is included in the interpretation process of these texts.

- Third, the invitation to sovereignty of God must be a collective responsibility and is not confined in the hands of some elites. So, people should protect the virtues of the sovereignty of god and participate in political authority. Thus, civil society should bear the responsibility of protecting the collective rights and guarantee the balance between the rights of political power and people's rights. Islamists' rhetoric usually tends to ignore the social contract in describing the relationship between the people and authority.
- Fourth, the sample of political authority of the Islamists is utopian since there is no single human who can represent the prophet's role.

Thus, Murad presents the model for democracy in Arab-Muslim societies. This model is "a mix between the sovereignty of god and the people right to rule itself." The divine sharia is the constant variable, while the pattern of human rule in his socio-political context is the changeable variable. Thus, all patterns, democracy or shurah, are human products that emulate changing needs in space and time. Fayadh is in same vein as Ali Murad, but he tries to answer the question above by studying the Iraqi democratic experience post 2003 as a product of the policy of democratic coercion. Fayadh asserts that failure is a result of canned democracy exported to traditional societies through the hegemonic will of the super power. Thus, he opposed Strauss's notion of legitimate interference in international society for promoting democracy or human rights. Rather Fayadh believes that these practices should arise from within the society itself as an expression of its civilization (Fayadh, 2014, 34). Fayadh finds out that Iraq is in the middle of a long-term process to achieve democratic transformation. He affirms that the problem in Iraqi case came from US invasion of 2003 which led to the detachment of the political system from the original socio-political situation which enlarged the gap between popular political culture and the new political order. This was a result of two correlated causes:

- First, Jeremy Jones (2007) argues that the relationship between occupation and democracy is far from straightforward. In other words, the resistance was for and against democracy, though democracy will not flourish when the occupation ends.
- Second, the absence of strong national identity which had been damaged due to the political behavior and rhetoric of the political elites.

This behavior depends on the sectarian/ethnic mobilizing of that harms the process of building a civic state; some expected this kind of political failure since Iraq has never practiced democratic

system in its modern history (Fayadh, 2014; Jones, 2007). Thus, despite US ambitiously political project to organize democratic practices in Iraq and modernize political culture; people started voting for the long people, Islamists (Danahar, 2013). This problem has interacted with the ethnic/sectarian diversity in Iraq which creates conflict as all segments of the society ignore diversity.¹¹⁴ Individuals tend to endorse sectarian affiliates during elections. Thus, pluralism, as a crucial principal is missing in elites' political project. For Fayadh, the solution for this detachment, between the social reality and political performance, requires active civil institutions that are able to heal the political and social rift. This can come through democratic process that respects human rights and citizenship.

Second finding in response to Huntington's theory is about extremism and political socialization in Iraq. In this regard, Ali A. Murad asserts that extremism is a human product (Murad, 2014, 279). No one is born an extremist. Murad refutes Patai's idea in "the Arab mind", that the Arab and Muslim are extremists at their nature. Murad does not deny the existence of extremism in the Arab world. But the reasons of this phenomenon are due to the socio-political situation that the Arab world has witnessed under the rule of dictators. So, repression, dictatorship, the decline of educational and cultural consciousness and economic crisis are the reasons for political extremism. He asserts that it is not an absolute socio-psychological phenomenon but it is a result of the interaction among three variables: biological features, social environment and the educational system. Thus, any human being, Arab or European, can be liberal or extremist depending on the type of social environment that has shaped his political character. In this part of the section, three Iraqi scholars will be presented: Thamir Abbas (2012), Baqir Yaseen (2010) and Ibraheem Alhaidary (2015). Both Abbas in his book, *Ambiguous identity* published in Baghdad in Arabic, and Yaseen in his book, *"The Iraqi Character: three negative features Contradiction, bloody and Authoritarianism"* published in Erbil, explain the aggressive behavior of the Iraqi individual. Yaseen analyzes the Iraqi character towards the other local or foreign. Abbas refers to the intolerance in the Iraqi character in an inclusive social context where individual's identity is local. Abbas refers to several elements that shape the Iraqi character and the state of ambiguity and delusion that has been passed on for centuries. These elements are:

¹¹⁴ Mushriq Abbas (2013). Lecture titled [Mihnath al ta'aesh alselmy fi Al-Ira] The plight of peaceful coexistence in Iraq, the Humanitarian Dialogue Foundation, London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-nd5p_7-n [Accessed on 4 march, 2015].

- 1- Religious resources, the more religious control the more individual is authoritarian.
- 2- Natural disasters such as floods.
- 3- Invasions and political events.
- 4- Socio-political conditions.¹¹⁵
- 5- Cultural resources such as: expanding the scope of "I" in relation to "other." So, the other is something different, and as much it is different than I, it is wrong. The weakness of national identity and lack of reasonableness in political behavior have led private interests to prevail.
- 6- Restoring political memory in the social life. Memory which includes experiences of grievances among diverge social groups.
- 7- The absence of liberal democratic political culture that enables the creation of reasonable citizens.

In contrast, Yaseen focuses on three psychological features that shape the Iraqi character: contradiction, authoritarianism and bloodiness. In his method, these features are constant due to two reasons:

- First, because these are natural biological features.
- Second, these features are the result of long-term process of socialization.

Although, these negative features do not override the existence of positive features in the Iraqi character such as generosity, courage and honesty (Yaseen, 2010, 27). For him the hegemony of these negative features is due to the socio-political conditions in Iraq. These conditions are:

- Frustration and deprivation with respect to the bloodiest historical moments in the Iraqi history. Yaseen exhibits sixteen bloody scenarios in the period 1621-1895: floods, diseases and invasions. Thus, frustration causes authoritarianism and vice versa.
- Violence in Iraq is characterized by continuity. Thus, the continuity that creates new ways and types of violence. Fekrat Ala'ani recognizes extremism as a human behavior that becomes a daily life feature through repetition and imitation. Those who usually practice violence over others tend to justify their extremism with some noble motives like religion (Al-ani, 2011, 36).
- Violence in Iraq is performed by both the authority and the individual.

¹¹⁵Abd al-Ridha Alt'an adds that the socio-political conditions have associated with the political history of Iraq in a way that gives to power's rhetoric the most important perception in the construction of social relation in the Iraqi society (quoted in Abbas, 2012, 24). Abbas affirms that Saddam's regime is a by-product of the historical interaction among social conditions of the Iraqi society

- The syndrome of obtained power which means the lack of peaceful trade of political power. Individuals tend to inherit power from their relatives according to the tribal customs. Thus, even after the constitutional regime in Iraq post 2003, one could notice that power is limited among few politicians.

- The decline of norms and ethics in social behavior.

While Ibraheem Alhaidary who affirms in his book, *The Iraqi Character: quest for identity*¹¹⁶, that the Iraqi identity is not lost but shattered. This identity crisis has torn the Iraqi character into authoritarianism and impotency. Alhaidary asks why the Iraqi character is distorted. For him the reasons are cultural such as the decline of collective ethics and the spread of violence. These reasons are what led to political sectarianism and the escalation of administrative corruption in Iraq post 2003. In this regard, one would argue that Ali al-wardy and Al-haidary have studied the Iraqi character by two different methods. Alwardy analyzes the character as inner system of values and psychological features that affects and is affected by the society to have a specific type of political or social behavior, individually or collectively. While Alhaidary focuses on identity as the common feature of both the individual and the society. Thus, identity crisis is the result of the decline of the process of socialization; the decline explains individual's partisan behavior.

One can conclude that the core problem in Iraq is the political culture. To make the change smoother and peaceful society needs a new plan of socialization.¹¹⁷ In this regard, Mohamed Adnan asserts that there are various variables that affect this process of political socialization in Iraq. These variables, in response to Huntington's theory, are (Alkhafajy, 2005, 206):

- First, globalization as a process of cultural hegemony that tends to penetrate the traditional societies. In politics, globalization aims to spread liberal democracy without respect of cultural differences. Sayar al-Jameel finds that to encounter globalization Arabs must be democrats and cooperative. He believes that globalization can create a common pot whereby all cultures, with respect to privacy, can find mutual respect for common values (Al-Jameel, 2000, 80).

¹¹⁶ Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NNzg1iCGI4g>

¹¹⁷ Socialization process aims to orient the political behavior of the individual through an active educational system that able to teach the individual the socio-political values of which the domestic coercion can be reached. This coercion is not due to the authority interference but as a result of collective conscious to enhance the democratic culture and protect it through cooperation and trust. Alzubaidy Qasim, 2009, Democratic transformation in the Arab society, doctorate thesis, political science faculty: Alnahrain university, Baghdad, Iraq, p136.

- Second, terrorism¹¹⁸ is an excuse to enact specific policies in the international arena.¹¹⁹ But terrorism has no geographical limits. It can be spread wherever its conditions are provided. It is a local-global phenomenon and socio-political crises. Thus, when the notions of justice and right disappear then one can notice a resistance against the current order. Under such conditions terrorist organizations justify its recruitment of followers. One can say that terrorism is a global phenomenon but the cure must be local. Abd al-Hussein Sha'ban asserts that terrorism is a global phenomenon due to the facts that: terrorist events have a global effect and reaction, like the wave that happened in response to September 11th 2001; terrorist events occurred in many important cities in the world such as London, New York, Tokyo...etc. (Sha'ban, 2013, 6a). Sha'ban finds that the strategy of countering terrorism must take into consideration reasons and motives of this phenomena, especially the socio-economic causes. Thus, his strategy to fight terrorism focuses on the spread of justice in local or international arenas; any kind of bias between West and East must be eliminated; and restrict the use of force in international affairs under United Nations Organization.

Third variable is the clash of civilization theory. Nadhim Aljasoor is one of the best scholars in Iraq who responded to Huntington's theory. Aljasoor asserts that Huntington's theory is a theoretical attempt to justify the bias and aggression against Islam in the West; this clash will not end but the balance of power will shift in favor of the West. West will win this but the Arab-Muslim world is never compatible with western ideas. In this formula, an increase in Islamophobia will only enhance Islamic reaction to it. In addition, Huntington's theory is not the paradigm that fits with civilizations, but it is a method to explain the chaos in the global order post-cold war (Aljasoor, 2006, 2). Thus, to locate Islam as the hardest enemy to the West was so easy to Huntington due to the tension between United States and some Muslim countries, Iran and Iraq in particular. In general, Huntington describes all Muslims and Arabs as a threat. Here, he made an epistemological mistake, because not all Muslims or Arabs are extremists or Islamists, there are many mainstream Muslims who support the western style of government and are actively involved in the globalization process. One can emphasize three theoretical challenges to Huntington's theory:

¹¹⁸ Terrorism is an extreme human behavior through using force to subordinate others for political purposes (Ala'ani, 2009, 32).

¹¹⁹ See also, Zainab Hadi Almaksosy, Clash of Civilization and United States Policies Towards the Islamic States, doctorate thesis, Political science faculty: Alnahrain University, Baghdad, p103.

- The West has to understand that their liberal democracy does not apply to all societies.
- Huntington's theory describes the clash of identities not civilizations.
- Islam is not part of the cultural clash, since Islam believes in tolerance, pluralism and religious diversity. What is part of the clash being political Islam of the radical Islamists who refuse any human civilization?

My argument is based on the fact that most of the struggles and clashes in the world today are local within the cradle of one culture or religion no matter where this struggle is waged. This is due, according to Zaid Adnan Muhsin¹²⁰, to the Western domination over every field of life globally. But, one can notice that what makes Huntington afraid of Islamic civilization is that when Muslims apply democracy, with respect to their cultural privacy, then they will be able to restore their historical role as a global power. This raises a pertinent question: what will be the political philosophy of Islamic civilization? What type of political regime will be implemented? Will it be the caliphate system or the nation state or will the Muslim states have a unity project like the European Union? Many scholars in Iraq (Naji Abd aljabar, Zaid Adnan, Thamir Abbas and others) blame the Orientalists¹²¹ for the gap between the East and the West. Overcoming it can only be through an equal and fair dialogue. Abdulsamad Sadoun Abdullah supports this claim. He asserts that both East and West must end the state of misperception that causes strategic grievances between the two civilizations. Abdulsamad asserts that events such as the Gulf war 1991, and September 11, 2001, are used as justificatory tools for the imperial policies of the United States of America (Abdullah, 2014, 150). These policies, according to Abdul-Samad, are centered to protect the interests of USA and Israel, under the pretexts of spreading liberalism and democracy. To this end, the US government needs to justify its foreign policies to the American people. The most effective way, according to Jabar I'naad and Satar Aljabri in joint study, is to penetrate into the individual conscious. This process needs epistemological and emotional mobilization. Thus, the American individual must be in a circle of threat at home. From this point of view, Huntington's theory has succeeded in convincing the collective conscious in the United States that Islam is the upcoming threat to their ideology and prosperity (I'naad & Aljabiri, 2014, 72). They also have an epistemic vision that the clash is an inevitable end due to the idea that Americans confuse between the mainstream Islam and radical Islam. According to American there is no mainstream Islam as much

¹²⁰ Vice dean of political science faculty in Al-nahrain University, Baghdad.

¹²¹ Some of the Orientalists are: Daniel Pipes, Marshal Frank, Steven Emerson and Dellas Olleri.

Muslims refuse to abandon their religion. Thus, this misperception of Islam is a collective conscious that supports a bias and hegemonic policy towards the Arab-Muslim world. In addition, Munim Al-Amar accused globalization of translating this misperception to the global arena. These biased policies resulted in two challenges for the Muslim world:

- First, deprives Muslims of expressing their cultural particularism.
- Second, creates chaos through social agitation in a way that leads to ethnic and sectarian wars.

Due to these challenges terrorist organizations, have found a fertile ground to grow as providing cultural resistance to the invaders (the Americans) (Al-Amar, 2009, 10). Here, it is necessary to summarize the response of the Iraqi scholars to Huntington:

- First, imperial policies are the main cause of the state of clash in the international arena.
- Second, the consensus over the need to follow Islamic teachings in the process of civilization building. That means Muslims have the right to preserve and practice their doctrinal particularity.
- Third, support the dialogue instead of clash among diverge cultures.
- Fourth, blame USA and the West in general of terrorism and injustice in the global order.
- Fifth, support the argument that Muslim-Arab world is compatible with democracy, they explain the deficit in democratic culture to the decline in socio-political conditions in the Muslim societies.
- Sixth, reject the western liberalism as an absolute framework of individual behavior, at the same time support political liberalism as the ideological ground of political participation.
- Seventh, most of the writings tend to describe Huntington's theory as unjust due to the fact that Islam as a religion is a revelation of God, while democracy is a political ideology produced by humans. Thus, this is not a balanced equation between what is divine and what is mundane. Because, to put political ideology in clash with what is divine means an inevitable end is predicted (clash) because people tend to be attached emotionally to their religion.

Finally, one can quote Fukuyama's argument that liberal democracy is a global dream that all societies look forward to. Fukuyama continues that the main challenge to liberalism in the Middle East is Jihadism as an opposite ideology (quoted in Hany, 2015, 13). For Fukuyama, this ideology will never win over liberalism. Therefore, to defeat this ideology, democratic institutions must be installed in the Muslim societies in a peaceful manner. In contrast, Huntington believes that without surgical intervention of hard power there is no room for political change in the Arab-Muslim world. To this end, military intervention is necessary to fight fundamentalism. This helped the US

administration of G.W. Bush to frame their policies towards the Middle East post 11/9 events. They believed that the intervention (Strauss' notion of noble lies) is necessary for two reasons: first, to protect United States national security; second, to spread liberalism and democracy in the rest of the world. Thus, US justify its invasion to Iraq based on the work of Strauss, Fukuyama and Huntington.

Here, I would like to emphasis the weakness of the political process in Iraq after 2003. Starting from the "Muhasasa" the official sectarianism that this process is based on; this sectarianism has enlarged the rift among the diverge groups and shrunk the area of toleration and pluralism. This division as mentioned earlier was exploited by terrorists and Ba'ath comrades to challenge democracy in Iraq. Thus, terrorist organizations take advantage of political circumstances in the domestic and regional arenas. In addition, Iraqi people did not welcome American intervention even though many of them were against Saddam's regime. In conclusion, the socio-political circumstances in post-2003 Iraq have caused a severe damage to the democratic experience. The problem from my point of view is not due to Islam as Huntington argues¹²²; is it the political mistakes that caused rifts either on social or political sphere. Therefore, the second section will precisely discuss the political problem in Iraq and the role of both the external factor represented by the U.S' policies towards Iraq, and the domestic Iraqi particularities.

5.2 The failure of secularism and the rise of ISIS in Iraq:

This section will tackle the debate concerning the return of religion as essential engine to the Middle East politics. Since the main topic of the thesis discuss the prospect of Iraq in the perception of American orientalism, thus, this section is going to concentrate on the return of religion in the Iraqi politics post 2003. To this end, there is a need to discuss the experience of secularism in Iraq in this period of time. The discussion will be directed to answer the hypothesis that secularism has failed in Iraq since 2003. I think that, the rise of ISIS in Iraq is somehow related to two factors:

¹²² Condoleezza Rice believes that democracy has no geographic or ethnical barriers; democracy could be promoted in every society such as Chile and Colombia, Senegal and Ghana, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia which have given an answer to those who thought that democracy could take root only where Europe's Enlightenment had prepared the ground (Diamond & Plattner, 2015, ix). Fukuyama concludes that those who wish to strengthen democracy need to pay greater attention to state- building, including such prosaic matters as public administration and policy implementation (Plattner in Diamond, 2015, 6).

- First, the failure of political secularism as necessary variable to achieve tolerance at least on the official level.
- Second, the failure of American project in Iraq.

Concerning the first factor one would challenge this idea by asserting that IS flourished in Syria and Iraq while in Syria the political regime is secular. To answer such argument, I can say that in both cases secularism has failed since it could not match the idea of political liberalism. The secularity of the leader is not enough alone to spread peace and prosperity. Secularism of the political elites should endorse liberal values such as freedom of thought and protect human rights. Even, if the section will focus on the Iraqi case, but it is necessary to shed light on the regional circumstances which negatively affected the political experience in post-2003 Iraq, especially in the aftermath of what so-called the Arab spring.

5.2.1 The experience of Secularism in the Iraq post 2003 period:

To discuss the prospect of secularism, one needs first to understand the concept: George Jacob Holyoake (1817–1906), defines it as follows: "Secularism is the study of promoting human welfare by material means; measuring human welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making the service of others a duty of life. Secularism relates to the present existence of man, and to action, the issues of which can be tested by the experience of this life" (quoted in Hashemi, 2009, 104). Nader Hashemi asserts that one simple way of thinking about secularism is in relation to three core disciplines in the social sciences: philosophy, sociology, and political science. He asserted that philosophically, "secularism refers to a rejection of the transcendental and the metaphysical with a focus on the existential and the empirical."

Sociologically, secularism correlates with modernization. And, politically, secularism is about a separation of the public and private spheres and the separation of religion and state. Without this separation, the result, per Filali Ansary, was a "large and enduring misunderstanding" of the topic of secularism in general in Muslim politics that lasts until today.¹²³ While Abbas Kadhim, professor at John Hopkins, asserts that secularism should be implemented in the societies like Iraq to protect religions from the political intervention of the state.¹²⁴ In other words, secularism prevented the

¹²³ See also: Abdou Filali-Ansary (2001). Muslims and Democracy, pp37-51. In: Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *"The Global Divergence of Democracies,"* The John Hopkins University Press.

¹²⁴ Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/abbas.kadhim.9?fref=ts>

state's institutions of violating the individual's religious rights. Hashemi (2009, 137-47) demonstrates four problems that face secularism in the Arab-Muslim world:

- Secularism was imposed from the outside through a Western hegemony in the form of colonialism and imperialism.
- Despotism, dictatorship, and human rights abuses, such practices came to be associated with secularism.
- The concept of secularism has become highly politicized in Muslim societies due to the modern encounter between Europe and the Middle East in the form of neo-imperialism such as the 2003 American invasion and occupation of Iraq which have further alienated Muslim societies from the West.
- Finally, there is the topic of Muslim identity and secularism.

Hashemi concludes that for secularism to flourish, it needs to be a bottom-up process that should emerge via an organic connection with the civil society. In other words, due to the absence of a religious reformation of the normative relationship between religion and government, political secularism has had weak intellectual roots in the Muslim world.

Here, I am trying to endorse Hashemi's paradigm to discuss secularism in post-2003 Iraq. In this regard, one needs to explore two variables:

- 1- The growing role of Militias (Society Militarizing).
- 2- The results of general elections (the prospect of secularism in political life).

5.2.1.1 The growing role of Militias:

An important question might be raised concerning the first variable, which is: why the growing role of militias damages secularism in Iraq?¹²⁵ To answer this question, there is a need to discover the most important militias in Iraq. But, before that anyone can observe that any kind of militant group is against political liberalism ideas, even if they believe in secular ideas. Concerning the case of Iraq Ranj Alaaldin, asserts that the collapse of Iraq's armed forces and security institutions in the face of terrorists led to a situation where militia playing a pivotal role in both government security operations and in the public sphere. Thus, one can defend the existing of Shia militias in Iraq as a necessity to cover the institutional deficit. While Jared Malsin, contends that the

¹²⁵For more explanation, read:

- Brian Goldstone (2011). *Secularism, Religious Violence, and the Liberal Imaginary*, pp 104-124. In: Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, ed., *Secularism and Religion-Making*. Oxford University Press.

power vacuum that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq post 2003, gives the opportunity to non-state actors – especially militia groups- to become a lethal feature. He classified three main Shia militias in Iraq by power:

- 1- The Badr Organization: today the group is reported to command 10,000 fighters and enjoys tight relations with elements of the Iraqi state. Iraq's Interior Ministry is currently headed by a member of the Badr Organization.
- 2- Kataib Hezbollah: The U.S. State Department declared this secretive group a terrorist organization in 2009, blaming the group for attacks on U.S. forces.
- 3- Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Created following the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Asaib Ahl al-Haq was formed because of a split in forces loyal to the influential Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr.

Furthermore, there are other militant groups which are very active on the Iraqi political and social arenas such as Al-Mahdi brigade which might be considered the most influential group in the Iraqi society.

Fannar Haddad asserts that what is crucial is that since 2003, there has been a tendency to perceive these militias as being driven by sectarian identity. This sectarianism has been rapidly growing in the Iraqi society due to some reasons:

- 1- Mistrust among the various segments of the Iraqi society. This mistrust led to Sunni rejection toward the post-2003 order.
- 2- Shia-centric state building¹²⁶. Haddad contends that Iraqi government went all the way to attempting to endow the state with a Shia identity.
- 3- The growing Iranian role in Iraq. Joost Hiltermann, assert that Iran has become increasingly bold about asserting its influence in Iraq.
- 4- The institutional deficit and governmental corruption. Charles Lister, a Middle East expert and author of “Profiling the Islamic State,” a paper written for the Brookings Doha Center, said the Shiite militias could provide much-needed muscle in confronting the extremist group.¹²⁷

While, Ali Khedery¹²⁸ revisited old arguments concerning *The Republic of Fear* in Iraq. He contends that fear is being reborn in Iraq due to mistrust among the various segments of the society

¹²⁶ From my point of view, the problem rests with Muhasasa the process of ‘political quotas.’

¹²⁷ Read also: Huge Naylor and Mustafa Salim (2015). Iran-aligned Shiite militias gather to join fight against Islamic State gains, The Washington Post: Middle East. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-aligned-shiite-militias-head-towards-the-is-captured-city-of-ramadi/2015/05/18/46d26210-fce1-11e4-8c77-bf274685e1df_story.html (accessed on 15 June, 2016).

and the growing manifestation of violent means in social and political life. Tehseen Nisar and Elaaf R. Hadi, in joint paper¹²⁹, assert that the growing role of militancy in Iraq is due to the failure of the political process in Iraq. They argued that the political process suffered under the following:

- 1- Sectarianism has enlarged the gap of mistrust among the individuals from different groups and shrinking the area of toleration and pluralism.
- 2- The complex nature of the political instability in Iraq: “the major problems existing at the internal front was that of the political tugging among the various political parties that deepened the course of the sectarian strife; together with the issue of the ethno-political dispute between Baghdad and Kurdistan.”
- 3- America has failed to install a secular regime in Iraq in the aftermath of invasion. The removal of the most powerful secular nationalist regimes in the Middle East resulted in the onslaught of the Islamist movements that began to find the institutional space in a bid to power.

Nisar and Hadi contend that this internal conflict was exploited by fundamentalists and Ba'ath comrades to challenge the democratic experience.¹³⁰ To quote their argument “this position towards Saddam did not prevent the Iraqis of expressing their rejection to the U.S intervention; at the same time, each trend of rejection represents a specific sector in the society as well as a regional player or players” (Tahseen & Hadi, 2016, 2).

The American invasion to Iraq escalated the hatred feelings within the Arab and Muslim world, particularly in Iraq. This hatred gave to the terrorist organizations a public justification that based on the notions of Islamism and violence as the approach to counter the imperialism policies in the Middle East in Iraq, in particular. This justification provides a fertile ground to fundamentalists in some parts of Iraq, Tehseen and Hadi further maintains that radicals deploy religion in the process of justification in two directions: first, against the West in general and the US in particular; second, towards the political process which has been associated with Shi'ism.

In this regard, Paul Rogers (2006, 69-75) contends that the wave of anti-new order in Iraq had been shaped as Sunni resistance guerilla movement since Sunnis felt themselves alienated from

¹²⁸ Ali Khedery was a political consultant to the US ambassadorS in Iraq post 2003.

¹²⁹ Available at: <http://www.archumankind.com/the-unresolved-question-of-iraq-and-syria-global-interventionism-in-the-new-phase-of-action/>

¹³⁰ Fukuyama argues that in post-conflict reconstruction operations, adequate security is the absolute sine qua non of success. Fukuyama quotes Larry Diamond who points out that the single biggest U.S. mistake after the invasion of that country was the failure to anticipate the widespread looting and disorder (Fukuyama, 2006, 234). U.S army had failed to deter the terrorist organizations and militias alike. It failed neither to deploy the sufficient number and types of troops nor to create a broader international-regional coalition to secure Iraq's stability (Diamond in Fukuyama, 2006, 175).

power. Thus, terrorists exploited the political turmoil and expressed themselves as the savior of Sunnis rights in Iraq. Terrorists accommodated themselves with the Baathists to create a pleasant situation in the areas where the majority is Sunnis. Therefore, the conflict in post 2003 Iraq is twofold: sectarian and political.

Charles Trip summarizes the political turmoil in Iraq to the nature of the ‘dual state’ in Iraq (Trip, 2007, 25). Dual state stems from the existence of the shadow organizations. The term refers to the fact that in Iraq an important distinction needs to be made between the formal, public apparatus of the state and the less visible ‘shadow state’ organized along rather different lines and subject to different dynamics. James Dobbins adds that recognition of the ethnic, sectarian and tribal entities as effective social actors in Iraq run the risk of perpetuating forms of power and networks of influence. Thus, for Dobbins, National identity in Iraq suffers from the communitarian identities. And political failure puts the national identity before a higher risk (Dobbins et al., 2003, 168-9).

This risk, according to Tehseen and Hadi, was escalated in Iraq post 2003 due to the lack of common political ground. One would argue that amid political instability, the aggressive campaign of terrorists, and the institutional deficit; social groups enforced to rely on self-defensive measures. These measures might be shaped through militant groups ‘militias’ which later have played a significant role in the political and social life in Iraq. But to explore the relationship between the growing role of militias and secularism in Iraq; one should refer to the narratives of these militias:

- First, the narrative of shia-centric state, which is at odd with secularism. Secularism tends to create a national institution which takes its capacity from the constitutional legitimacy.
- Second, the narrative of anti-institutional capacity. This means that militias always work to weaken the state's institutions to control power and strength its societal footage.
- Third, militias deploy a theological background in the seeking of actions.
- Fourth, militias are anti-democracy, even if they deploy elections to political ends, but, in practice it is totally at odds with democracy. Evidence is given by Hafidh who assert that militias in Iraq belong to the Islamic wing in Iraq. For instance, the Shiite militias believe in vilayat al’fagih {Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist} which means: political power should be located in the hand of the supreme religious leader; and God is the sole source of ruling and legislation.

5.2.1.2 The results of general elections in Iraq after 2003:

The second evidence concerning the experience of secularism in post-2003 Iraq is the results of general elections. Through this evidence one can observe which political powers or parties

controlled the political process in Iraq. Since the first election in 2005 the results approve the dominance of the Islamic political parties on the political life in Iraq. Elected prime ministers all belong to one Islamic Party which is the Dawaa party. The political process in Iraq witnessed two essential secular parties: Al-Iraqiya and Civil democratic Alliance. “Iraqiya,” is unique in the country’s political landscape. Although it enjoyed the support of more than 80 percent of the Sunni community in the 2010 elections, it is headed by Iyad Allawi, a secular Shiite, former prime minister (2004-2005) appointed by the U.S led Coalition Provisional Authority. Middle East report contend that the Iraqiya’s diversity of political trends, allowed for an impressive result in the March 2010 parliamentary elections, in which it obtained 91 out of 325 seats in the Council of Representatives.¹³¹ Al Iraqiya in 2010 election depended on the Sunnis support since it combined candidates from different sects and ethnicity. What is significantly important is that the majority of Sunnis elected the secular political alternative in 2010¹³², while in the slogans in 2012 demonstrations were Islamic. To explain this contradiction in political choices towards secularists I think it is up to the followed reasons:

- First, most Sunnis remain effected by the secular political trend of Saddam Hussein, while most of Shia believe in anti-Saddam narrative. This narrative played a vital role in the first general elections post 2003. Secularism is strongly believed in relation with Baathification in Iraq. Shiites in Iraq was acknowledged that any secular political party is fundamentally believes in Saddamism; there is no exception before this rhetoric.
- Second, Maliki policies against al-Iraqiya leaderships – especially the Sunnis – combined with deteriorating security and growing sectarian tensions had left secular nationalists with virtually no political space. Thus, they started to believe that there is no solution to confront the shia-centric state except the Islamic one.
- Third, and very important, is that the secular political parties could not develop its propaganda before the Islamic political parties. They failed to provide the Iraqis with a credible alternative. In this sense, the notion of leadership is important since no secular leader could escape from religion particularities. Some of them start assimilating religious slogans and insert Islamic notions in their

¹³¹ Middle East Report N°127 31 July 2012, Iraq's Secular Opposition: the Rise and Decline of AL-Iraqiya, International Crises Group.

¹³² For more information concerning the general election in Iraq in 2010 please read:

- Hashim N. J. (2010). The Geographic analyzing to the General Election in Iraq in 2010, AL-Mostansiriyah journal for arab and international studies, Issue: 31, 1-20. ISSN: 2070898X.

political speech. In the aftermath of general election in 2010, even when leading politicians began forming new alliances that shunned sectarian discourse (Maliki established the State of Law Coalition, led by his own Islamic Daawa Party) the sectarian and Islamic notions remain powerful in their political agenda. Those leaders cannot understand politics without religion. Politicians deploy religion every time they seek power or solution to specific problems. Their political resilience depends on the religious doctrines to achieve cohesion within specific social group. Regardless of how Iraqiya perceived itself originally, it cannot compete the Islamic political parties unless uses religious notions in its political project. Thus, Secularism in Iraq does not signify full separation between state and religion. The Iraqi state has always officially sought inspiration and support from religion including Saddam Hussein. Saddam played very negative role and caused severe damage to secularism. Despite Saddam's regime secular outlet -which no one can deny- it deployed religious peculiarities in approaching the masses especially in the aftermath of 1991 defeat. Also, Saddam's brutal violence against people raised popular sentiment which blamed secularism for Saddam's political failure.

- Fourth, 'marginalization' which usually describes the political behavior of Islamists against secularists. For instance, Moqtada al-Sadr – the popular leader of Sadrists- expressed his political vision as anti-secular and secularists. He refuses to collaborate with them even when the recent political events in Iraq show a sphere of cooperation between secularists and al-sadr has been established. But, this sphere is created in the demonstrations squares and not on the elites' level. By this, I mean that people from different political trends united before the institutional failure. Still secular slogans are not permitted or not endorsed by the Islamist. Ali al-Mamouri asserts that despite the Islamist parties' failure in managing the country, some Islamist parties, such as the Islamic Dawa Party, have accused the secularists of intending to destroy religion in the Iraqi society. In his speech April 9 in Babil province, head of the Dawa Party Nouri al-Maliki said that "the goal of the ongoing protests is not reform, but "targeting the Islamist project and Islam itself." It seems that Maliki was imposing anti-secularists trend in the public sphere. Here, one might ask why the political situation in Iraq is dangerous on secularism. The answer might include several factors:

- The First is the intervention of supreme religious leaders in political life. Zaid Al-Ali, asserts that the religious class in Najaf decided to take two initiatives: to advance an Islamic political doctrine

to challenge and eventually supersede all leftist ideologies in Iraq, and to create a modern political organization that would serve to implement this ideology in practice.

- Second, the lack of ‘civic reason’ in the public sphere. In contrast, the civic reason has been replaced by religious reason; and later by the narrower which the sectarian or ethnic reason. Thus, there is no institutional separation between Islam and the State. Since Iraqi society consists of various and different ethnic and religious groups, thus, the religious reason itself is a source of conflict. Therefore, Individuals within specific group construct meaning and values through their own interpretation of religious reason. According to Abdullahi An-Na’im, people tend to accept political reforms with respect to constitutional legitimacy; which in turn depends on the religious reason (an-Na’im, 2008, 28). An-Na’im adds that religion to be included in the public sphere it should not be granted divine power over the constitutional legitimacy and the civic reason. The political change in post-2003 Iraq did not insure an-Na’im suggestion while in contrast, groups start granting divine power to social and political players, since the masses believe that it replaces the national institutions. For instance, the masses in Iraq -especially the Shiites- calling the ‘popular mobilization,’ which established in the aftermath of IS crisis in June 2014, the ‘sacred popular mobilization’. I do believe in and honor this ‘popular mobilization’ for their noble sacrifices in defending Iraq before the barbarian wave of terrorists. But still what I do not encourage is that people should not apply sanctity to social or political entity. This religious rhetoric in describing our social needs and actions has a severe dangerous consequence on the public sphere. As a result, secularism in Iraq lost its social footage before the sectarian/religion reason. For instance, the Civil Democratic Alliance got only three seats in the last general election in 2014.

- Third, Hafidh Hamady's¹³³ methodology concentrates on the socio-political conditions that shaped the psychology of the Iraqi individual which affected his choices in the general elections. First of all, voting behavior in Iraq reflects the eclipsing of secular choices within the individual decision making process. The Iraqi individual was a victim of the collective cohesion even if he voted freely without any direct interruption. He called this type of cohesion as ‘collective obsession.’ He also asserts that the Iraqi individual has been captured by the political events which created anti-alternative sentiment. The individual psychologically has been constructed through the historical developments of Iraqi politics. Furthermore, the individual lacks the proper societal conditions for

¹³³ Full professor at al-Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad.

liberal life. Politically speaking, the Iraqi politics in the post 2003 era lacks active civil society organizations and well-presented secular political parties. The religious parties controlled and dominated the political life in Iraq. To this end they deploy some narratives mostly religious to ensure the social group's cohesion. Thus, the individual is standing in front of a huge social machine in one hand, and on the other, he has been confused due to tremendous political developments in the societal periphery. Thus, the Iraqi individual lacks the method of psychoanalysis. According to Benslama, psychoanalysis is required to challenge a progressive ideology (quoted in Massad, 2015, 285). The tendency of challenging "the tradition of Islamism", within which people grow up, is low and refused by the masses since it at odds with the social and religious cohesion. Benslama's conclusion is that there is no sufficient socialization process that generates real modernity in the socio-political context. Since Islamists control the key of social work then, it is so difficult to liberal activists to endorse such a cultural shift.

- Fourth, the lack of strong state-institutions to protect secularism in the public sphere. Institutions in post-2003 Iraq became tools in the hand of religious political parties to reach their political ends. Muhasasa along with sectarianism play vital role in destroying the state institutions.¹³⁴ According to Carl Ernst "liberalism and secularism require a strong state, capable of upholding the rule of law" (Ernst, 2003, 140-41).

Thus, if the institutions are unable to protect individual rights and create common consensus in public sphere, then, social groups tend to protect their particularity to protect their rights. Here, one can refer to two ideas: Rawls idea of the importance of the constitution to guarantee the independent nature of the institutions; and Sebastiano Maffettone idea of legitimacy through constitutional democratic means. But, the case of Iraq affirms that the political liberalism has problem in its nature, because the change in political structure that occurred after 2003 was in favor of the Islamists. The problem was not that the Islamists won the election, but occurred in the aftermath of

¹³⁴ In Fukuyama's view, the decline of democracy in any society, despite its particularities, is due to the failure of institutionalization—the fact that state capacity in many new and existing democracies has not kept pace with popular demands for democratic accountability to which government should act in the interests of the whole community. This is one of the most critical political problems in post-2003 Iraq. For Fukuyama modern liberal democracies combine three basic institutions: the state, the rule of law, and democratic accountability (Fukuyama in Diamond & Plattner, 2015, 12-3). Despite the fact that in Iraq that many democratic practices have taken place, but still there was a need to the development of a modern state that could defend the country's territory from internal and external enemies, deliver public services in a fair and impartial manner, and insures integrity by fighting financial corruption. Thus, for Fukuyama the development of a modern state requires a high-quality governance.

their winning, whereby they deployed a very strict window of identity in state politics. This behavior caused damage to the narrative of national identity and enlarges the disputes between the political partners. Hence, political liberalism needs a liberal political culture that respects secularism in a diverse society to guarantee the independence of the state's institutions.

- Fifth, the complexity of Iraqi politics. Laura Keynes¹³⁵, assert that it is difficult to think that secular left-liberal values would readily fill the vacuum left by Arab dictator. She is convinced that the national narrative in Iraq was not strong enough to accommodate the values of secular liberalism. In this regard, the political situation neither before nor after 2003 inaugurates secularism. The political instability post 2003 along with security crisis has damaged the national narrative and led to the mistrust among the social groups. Furthermore, the political crisis in Iraq has weaken the individual' resistance to the sectarian choices in the political life. Derick Brinkerhoff and Donald Johnson find out that the state institutions in Iraq have failed to fulfill three core governance functions: security, effective and efficient delivery of basic public goods and services, and managing political participation and accountability. Thus, the public frustration towards the state incompetence of delivering social needs has alienated the individual to alienate itself from the state (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009, 586). The net result of this political failure makes the state fragile before the non-state actors which manipulate sub-forms of identity such as ethnic or religious. In fragile states the polarization process, according to Brinkerhoff and Johnson, depends on ethnic, religious, or class-based groups, with histories of distrust, grievance, and/or violent conflict.

5.2.2 United States Foreign Policy and its implications on Secularism in Iraq:

To summarize the American experience in the post 2003 period, I would prefer to use the word 'failure'. The failure to understand the Iraqi particularities led to the so far political turmoil. In this regard, one would revisit the American invasion to Iraq which occurred for some reasons¹³⁶:

¹³⁵ Dr. Laura Keynes is an academic, writer and critic based in Cambridge.

¹³⁶ Roland Paris presumes that there are various motives behind foreign-imposed regime change policies; accordingly, interveners make such decisions for instrumental reasons, such as to increase their own security, to ensure continued access to critical resources, or to achieve other desired ends. Thus, if we assume that US intervened for installing democracy in Iraq, then, Paris assumes that interveners rely on 'rational' means-ends calculations in order to decide which types of political arrangements (schemas of governance) to promote (Paris, 2015, 140). Paris, however, focuses on interveners' fundamental assumptions about which kinds of practices and institutional forms count as 'governance'. Furthermore, Paris quotes John Owen who postulates that one of the most important interveners' choices reflect calculations of how best to transform the target state (Iraq as example) into an ally. One would ask how political

some related to Iraq and others to the National Security of United States concerning Iraq; the invasion was declared by American officials to be about installing democratic regime. But, democracy alone was not enough to secure peace and political progress in Iraq. Democratic practices alone are not sufficient to enhance the sphere of secularism. The debate over democracy cannot be separated from secularism and the role of religion in public sphere, then, The United States through different administrations should have paid attention to secularism in Iraq since the Iraqi society is rich with diversity. What happened was that neither Bush nor Obama administrations supported the secular trend in Iraq. In contrast they delivered Iraq to Islamists.¹³⁷ In this regard, Ali Khedery, asserts that:

The Obama administration also undermined the country's central democratic institutions. After preaching the virtues of democracy around the world, Obama chose to bypass the secular, Western-leaning winner of Iraq's 2010 parliamentary elections, Ayad Allawi, in favor of the runner-up, Nouri al-Maliki. Ignoring Maliki's sectarian and autocratic tendencies ...¹³⁸ (Khedery, 2015).

From my point of view, one of the most identifiable mistake was done by the Bush's administration, and damaged political secularism in Iraq, was the establishment of the Interim Governing Council

secularism can affect Iraq's foreign policy especially towards US? The answer is very simple, if political secularism has been sustained in Iraq since the first day of US invasion, then, no religious group or non-state actors can challenge state's institutions and impose on it some specific preferences in foreign policy. These preferences might go in favor of Iran rather than US, as Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan argue in their joint work *ISIS: Inside The Army of Terror*. Weiss asserts that Iran's hegemony in Iraq began well before the regime change, since Weiss believes that Iran either have created some Iraqi political parties such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and supported some political figures such as Abu Mahdi al-Mudaris, Hadi al-Amiri and others; for this reason, US should be more cautious towards the relationship between political secularism and the schema of governance in post-2003 Iraq (see also: Wehrey at el, 2010, 21). Weiss and Hassan presume that three factors have interacted respectively and led to the creation of state of fear to the Sunnis in Iraq. The factors are: Iran's policy in Iraq which included a sphere of cooperation with a-Qaeda to abort the American project in Iraq; al-Qaida oppressive control over Sunni-majority provinces in Iraq in the period 2005-2007; and US' failure to establish neutral and competent central government in Baghdad. This 'state of fear' along with al-Maliki exclusionary policies led to the rise of IS in Iraq in 2014.

¹³⁷ Theodore J. Piccone asserts that "Democracy Must Always be a Home-Grown Affair" (Piccone in Weinberg, 2008, 15). But this finding does not mean political secularism will not success in Iraq because the majority of people are Muslims. What should be done is that people should be able to sustain the representative democracy which must be neutral in its nature. What happened was that the U.S' authority in Iraq delivered the political process to the Islamists without soliciting people's position. Piccone suggests that the U.S should support the advocates of non-violent change in country like Iraq. In other words, the democracy promoters, the U.S in the Iraqi case, should support the civil society and the civic trend in the political arena post-2003. Those who deploy violent means and have militias should be excluded unless they manifest their self-esteem as part of the civic trend.

¹³⁸ Emma Sky (2014) endorses some senior officials' opinion who argued that the United States should uphold the constitutionally mandated right of the winning bloc, Iraqiya, headed by Ayad Allawi, to have the first go at trying form a government.

(IGC).¹³⁹ According to Fukuyama (2006, 237) the second most important mission in nation-building is the reconstruction of some form of legitimate political authority. I think that the best way to establish national authority would have been to hold elections for a transitional government. What we can notice that the efforts by which IGC was created did not pay attention to Fukuyama's condition. In contrast, CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) gave the priority to six key political parties emerged as the major political organizations in Iraq. They included two main exile groups, the INC and the INA (Iraqi National Accord); two main Kurdish groups, the PUK and KDP; and two Shi'ite groups, SCIRI and the Da'wa Party. On July 13, after several rounds of negotiations between CPA – (The Coalition Political Authority)- and key Iraqi leaders, Bremer announced the selection of an Iraqi interim authority, to be called the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). The IGC consisted of six major political parties—the INC, the INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the Da'wa Party—in addition to minor parties and independent leaders. Report issued by Rand Corporation asserts that the IGC faced challenges to its legitimacy on both domestic and international levels.¹⁴⁰ Here, I quote the Rand's Report statements:

Many criticized the selection of IGC members by CPA and called for a process that would allow Iraqis to choose their own leaders. The growing insurgency also challenged the IGC's legitimacy. Insurgents accused members of collaborating with the United States, and IGC members became targets of violence. The IGC also faced challenges to its legitimacy in international circles.... The UN did not grant the recognition immediately, citing the fact that the

¹³⁹ One of Paris' hypothesis maintains that the interveners should be predisposed to promote political structures that fit their own schemas of governance (Paris, 2015, 144). Then, one would ask, does IGC compatible to state building practices in the US. In other words, is IGC compatible with democracy? If so, then, why there is a need to organize elections in the first place. Larry Diamond (2005) argues that the Pentagon's expectation was that it would be possible to hand over power fairly quickly to an Iraqi interim government led by Ahmed Chalabi and other pro-democratic Iraqi exiles. In reality however, the Bush administration was forced to abandon this strategy in favor of: bold new initiatives such as to dissolve the Iraqi army, and the establishment of Iraqi Interim Governing Council. Diamond contends that the IGC was expected to fail due to (Diamond, 2005, 10-11): it had no real political power like that of Bremer; The IGC was never able to agree on a formula for political transition, partly because of its own deep internal divisions along philosophical, ethnic, and sectarian lines. Therefore, the Iraqi constitution (2005) still suffers of these divisions since the members of IGC were keen to represent sub-identities over the national. Although, Diamond assures that Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, worked hard and innovatively to try to craft a political process for transition to a legitimate, viable, and democratic system of government in Iraq, as well as to rebuild the Iraqi state, economy, and society (Diamond in Fukuyama, 2006, 174). One can understand that Diamond blames the Iraqi politicians concerning the political failure either by IGC or later on.

¹⁴⁰ In this regard, read also:

- Phillips, D. (2005). *Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco*, Westview Press.

IGC was appointed and not elected as grounds for withholding full recognition (Bensahel et al., 2008, 168).

So, one might ask if the United States suspended the policy of regime change in the second half of Nineties of last century, because of the lacking of secular alternatives to Saddam¹⁴¹; why, then, in the aftermath of invasion established the IGC which mostly consisted of Islamic political parties. By contrast, the religious parties were allowed to function almost unhindered and remained unblemished by association with the occupation. Al-ali asserts that the United States failed to ally itself with a powerful secular leader in Iraq.

Bruce Jentlson has defended the American position in Iraq. He explains that: "despite the State Department's extensive process to plan postwar strategy, but Iraq "would not provide fertile ground for democracy... That a foreign occupying force would itself be the target of resentment and attacks—including guerrilla warfare" (Jentlson, 2010a, 469).

Although, this argument cannot deny American's mistakes such as Bremer disbanded the entire Iraqi army on the grounds that they might still be loyal to Saddam.¹⁴² In this regard, one needs to call on Diamond's four conditions to rebuild any state in post-conflict (Diamond in Fukuyama, 2006, 175):

- Political reconstruction of a legitimate and capable state;
- Economic reconstruction of the country's physical infrastructure;
- Social reconstruction by means of the renewal of a civil society and political culture that foster voluntary cooperation for development and the limitation of state power;
- And security, in the provision of a relatively safe and orderly environment.

However, instead of creating a new potent security apparatus which is fundamental to any political project; security vacuum was escalated and non-state actors challenged the state legitimate

¹⁴¹ Doran C. (2012) assures that the removal of Saddam Hussein from power was the corner stone of U.S policy towards Iraq from 1991 to 2003. To this end, US' successive administrations had deployed several tactics, for instance, in 1991, Bush ordered the CIA to 'create the conditions for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power'. The CIA organized and funded the Iraqi National Congress which led by the late Ahmed I-Chalabi. Furthermore, during Clinton's second term of presidency the Congress approved in October, 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) by which the US allocated \$97 million to support the Iraqi political opposition.

¹⁴² "If one event can be said to symbolise the birth of ISIS, it must be the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA)14 decisions to disband the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Army on 16 May and 23 May 2003 respectively in the first two formal orders that it issued" (Joffe, 2016, 12). In other words, George Joffe (2016) and Robert Kaplan (2013) believes that one of the consequences of US policy in Iraq is the situation in which Sunni community found itself impoverished by these decisions (Joffe, 2016; Kaplan, 2013).

power.¹⁴³ In this regard, Jentlson (2010a) asks could the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds reach enough of a compromise for political stability. How could they share power? In other words, the lack of national consolidation and solidarity in Iraq caused the political failure and not the impotent American strategy, Jentlson argues.

For instance, Jentlson (2010a) affirms that the militias that each group maintains as its own private army hindered the construction efforts of the Iraqi national army. Consequently, power struggle in Iraq is twofold: between the formal state's institutions and the shadow non-state actors; and among the social groups.

Hamid Dabashi has another point of view, he assures that United States to justify its expansive designs on the world it has manufactured a global Islamic threat. He states that: “the globalized terrorism that US imperialism at once generates, sustains, and needs in order to justify itself is squarely based on the illusion that ‘Islam and the west’ are two quintessential realities and that they are at odds with each other” (Dabashi, 2008, 36).

In other words, Dabashi blames the United States of neglecting the political reality in Iraq in a way that exacerbated the threat of terrorism. Hence, by exploiting political turmoil terrorist organizations such as IS has successfully challenged the political project in Iraq. In this perspective, Loretta Napoleoni describes IS a shell-state which often emerged out of proxy war and usually looks for sponsors to build state infrastructure of their own. The proxy war among Iran and Arab Gulf states in Syria generally shaped by the sectarian dress (Napoleoni, 2014, 28). Thus, in Dabashi words, United States' world order design requires the terrorist organizations to justify its manipulation of power over the whole world; and it requires the sectarian war among Muslims for weakening their position within this world order.

¹⁴³ Toby Dodge (2012) contends that the post-war strategy was concentrated in few hands in Bush's administration. And Iraq-planning was dominated by the department of defense. It was Rumsfeld's strategy which implemented in Iraq till 2006. Dodge argues that this fact had resulted ill-considered policy towards political reform in IRAQ. While James Dobbins argues that the failure of imagination was reflected in planning that anticipated American troop levels in Iraq (Dobbins in Fukuyama, 2006, 223; Dobbins, 2007). To some extent, senior Bush administration officials miscalculated the challenges they would face in post-2003 Iraq. The miscalculation effects U.S policy in Iraq in various fields mostly important in security and political transition. Dobbins highlights another mistakes which is American strategy for nation-building in Iraq was fundamentally shaped by the decision to conduct this mission under the laws of armed conflict, rather than as a “peace enforcement” action under the U.N. Charter. And this policy affects the U.S in Iraq in many ways: first, it caused a legitimate shortage to U.S' position in Iraq; second, it hindered the efforts towards creating an international and regional coalition to support the political process in Iraq.

To answer to Dabashi and understand how these mistakes have affected secularism in Iraq, then, one needs to revisit United States policies toward Iraq since 1979. Why 1979? Simply because this year witnessed three important events that effected Iraq and the whole region:

- The first event is the Islamic revolution in Iran led by Ruhollah Khomeini.
- The second is the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan which led later to the establishment of Al-Qaida in 1988.
- The third was that Saddam Hussein captured power in Iraq and became the President.

In the aftermath of these events two regional wars had been waged: the 8-year war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988); and the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

During these wars the United States supported Saddam's regime and the Radical Islamists. It supported both of them with weapons, financial aid and training to secure America's interests in the Middle East against Soviet Union and Iran. Just after the collapsing of Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990, both Saddam and the al-Qaida became most dangerous enemies to the United States.

Garikai Chengu, is a research scholar at Harvard University, asserts that during the 1970's the CIA used the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a barrier, both to thwart Soviet expansion and prevent the spread of Marxist ideology among the Arab masses. The U.S also supported the army intervention succeeded by a military coup against the elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Chengu quoted Former British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, told the House of Commons that Al Qaeda was unquestionably a product of Western intelligence agencies. Mr. Cook explained that Al Qaeda consisted of the thousands of Islamist extremists, who were trained by the CIA and funded by the Saudis, in order to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan.

To understand why United States policy has led to the failure of Secularism; one needs to highlight some ideas:

- The United States' war against Iraq in 1991 led to the collapse of the institutions in Iraq while the economic embargo caused a huge damage in the economic and social conditions in the Iraqi society including the decline of the educational system in Iraq. These American policies led to the failure of the national institutions in Iraq, while America did not support an alternative to Saddam's regime to avoid such failure, whether before or after the invasion.
- The 2003 American invasion and occupation of Iraq created the pre-conditions for radical Sunni groups, like ISIS, to take root. America, rather unwisely, destroyed Saddam Hussein's secular state

machinery and replaced it with a predominantly sectarian system of power distribution among political parties. In this regard, McCants quoted Sayf al-Adl's, former special forces colonel in Egyptian military, statements to assert that the Islamic State would develop from Taliban's Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. But the American invasion in 2001 had ended that dream. Iraq was a second chance (McCants, 2015a, 11). One would argue, if they aim to establish the caliphate state, why they attacked US by 9/11. In other words, why should they invoke the US hostility if they can initiate their model of IS in Afghanistan. Here, one reason is that Afghanistan has no enough resources to such a project to be installed on. Second, the Islamic sympathy was not in high level to support the IS. Thus, they were looking for a new territory where all essential requirements can be met. Iraq provided this place.¹⁴⁴ Iraq was controlled by a strong secular regime which was difficult to be penetrated by the jihadists. Thus, one could say that 9/11 events were a trap settled by the terrorists to drive down the US army in Iraq. By America's war on Iraq, terrorists were able to open new resources of recruitment; enhance the public sympathy towards them; collect more financial resources.

- United States' policy in Iraq has deepened the sectarian clash. Hagan et al. explain that in Iraq, the 'legal cynicism' frame involved reports of unnecessary violence¹⁴⁵ by U.S. forces and Iraqi security apparatus against Arab Sunni civilians (Hagan, Kaiser, & Hanson, 2016, 3-4). Here, what interact with legal cynicism the idea that Shiites have been seen as traitors collaborate with the occupied forces. This perception was transported across the whole region. However, Hagan et al. raised some hypotheses: one of it contends that Legal cynicism in Arab Sunni community predicts the areas where insurgent attacks on U.S. forces persisted or increased, even as these attacks declined elsewhere after the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq. Hagan adds that legal cynicism led to the decline in confidence in the national government of Iraq and the security apparatus. He conducted a survey asking whether it is acceptable for attacks to target U.S./Coalition or Iraqi forces. The results show

¹⁴⁴ The loss of Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training ground appears to have had relatively little effect on al-Qa'ida's ability to stage significant terrorist operations, as demonstrated by subsequent attacks in Indonesia, Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Kenya, Turkey, Spain, and elsewhere. Indeed, in some respects, al-Qaida has been transformed into something potentially more threatening. Operating independently of Osama bin Laden but still inspired by his iconic status, "franchises" of affiliated groups wage the global jihad for the same broad set of objectives (Chubin, Hoffman & Rosenau, 2004, 4).

¹⁴⁵ Arshin Adib-Moghaddam argues that unnecessary violence such as that practices at Abu Ghraib humiliated the victims in a way that the power of the punisher (U.S' personnel) had to be engrained in the very memory of the victim and, by extension, in the consciousness of the occupied nation (Adib-Moghaddam, 2011, 213).

that nearly two thirds (62 percent) of Iraqis (Sunni), who been surveyed, regarded attacks on these state actors as acceptable (Hagan et al., 2016, 10). Hagan concludes that the implication is that “defeated” Sunni communities were denied infrastructure improvement, and the resulting frustration was a significant source of attacks on U.S./Coalition and Iraqi forces. Thus, Legal cynicism creates possibilities for violence against state actors.

According to Pollard et al., United States intervention in Iraq led to State failure. State failure can be defined as:

The failure of governments to deliver political goods to citizens on a scale likely to undermine the legitimacy and the existence of the state itself. State failure occurs in respect to a wide range of political goods, of which the most crucial are the provision of security, a legal system to adjudicate disputes, provision of economic and communication infrastructures, the supply of some form of welfare policies, and opportunities for participation in the political process (Pollard, Poplack, & Casey, 2015, 4-5).

One of the most important implication of State failure is Nation failure, occurs because nation-states’ cultural projections of their nationhood are no longer convincing too many. The decline of nation sentiment arises in Iraq since people lost confidence in State’s apparatus, especially when these apparatuses been perceived as tools to deliver goods for specific social group. Thereby, grievances of the state’s national groupings intensify; and people start questioning the legitimate of institutions; especially when militant groups representing exclusive nationalisms in the name of the nation’s self-defense.

Pollard et al. and Hagan et al. apparently analyzed what happened in Iraq post 2003. The state lost sovereignty on part its territory and then the government lost the identity as the sole legitimate executer of people’s needs. The government lost its power to deploy legitimate use of force. Now, anyone can notice the ability of non-state actors – such as the militias – to impose political choices on the government. The role of militias has been expanded not only on the domestic arena but also in the regional level whereby some militias have transnational role in accordance with other militant groups in the region. Terrorists organization such al-Qaida deployed successfully the political crisis in Iraq to spread its capacity of recruitment. It franchised itself as Sunni organization that wanted to save dignity and pride of the Sunnis in Iraq. Some segments in the Iraqi society found accommodate

in deploying this franchising process to resist and challenge the political process. Some of those belong to the Baath regime and some who felt marginalized by the Iraqi government (as they proclaimed).

5.2.2.1 The Arab spring and secularism in Iraq:

Upon state failure's ashes Islam is revived in the Iraqi and regional politics. For instance, the political developments which called the 'Arab spring' often been discussed in relation with Islamism.¹⁴⁶ Tariq Ramadan asserts that the uprisings were broad-based non-violent movements with no specific political affiliation (Ramadan, 2012, 79). The debate and discussion that followed the uprisings opened the path to political reform. Ramadan finds out that polarization became a result to this development whereby "secularists" and "Islamists" found themselves at odds.¹⁴⁷ Ramadan poses a question: do the secular intellectuals of the Global South have an alternative to propose for their own countries? He contends that they have neither a credible solution nor the power to propose one. This is the case of Iraq. If we take into consideration the orientalist assumption, discussed in the 3rd chapter, which affirms that failure of this political movement in the Arab world is the inevitable result due to the incompatibility to democracy, as Bernard Lewis claims. In contrast, the real reasons of failure are up to the immature socio-political conditions. The transition process, from totalitarian to democracy, requires tolerance, reasonableness, and efficient social contract. The lack of these notions leads to unwelcomed results such as Islamists can take over the moment to achieve their ends. This is the case in Iraq or Syria with difference. In Iraq, Islamic political parties have dominated the political scene since Saddam's regime was franchised as Sunni; they deployed both notions to win the election: the anti-Saddamism sentiment and Shia-centric state. While in Syria, the game also characterized by two notions: anti-Assad sentiment and anti Shiism. In Syria, Islamists have had the upper hand in the civil war since people are convinced that the problem rested in the secular regime. Although people do not support radicals, they are looking for Islamic solution to their political and social problems.

¹⁴⁶ See also: Wisal Al-Azawi (2012). Althawrat al'arabiah wa altagheer {Arab revolutions and benefits of change Analytical study on the reasons for the collapse of political systems}, Baghdad: Al-nahrain University, Political Issue, Volume 26, issue 1, pp155-191. ISSN: 20709250.

¹⁴⁷ This finding might explain Fukuyama's argument that the Arab Spring of 2011, has degenerated into renewed dictatorship in the case of Egypt, and into anarchy in Libya, Yemen, and also Syria, which along with Iraq has seen the emergence of a new radical Islamist movement, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Fukuyama in Diamond & Plattner, 2016, 12). See also: Cole Juan, 2014a, *The New Arabs: How The Millennial Generation is Changing the Middle East*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 166-188.

One can ask why the Arab Spring ended in the hand of Islamists in Iraq and Syria. Al-Azm's answer highlights two methods of answering (al-Azm, 2011, 223-4):

- 1- Conspiracy theorizing which accused the West, the United States in particular, of creating the ISIS organization to bring political change in the region. Al-Azm does not support this methodology in analyzing the recent political developments, while he supports the second one which is:
- 2- The tyrannical nature of the regimes gives no choice to people unless the revolt against it seeking liberation.

To this extent, al-Azm asserts that the outbreak of the revolutions is a normal consequence due to the political and societal pre-conditions. The Arab Spring intifadas have been called "youth revolutions" and "high-tech revolutions" on account of their reliance on such instant communication and electronic information technologies.

But to answer the question, al-Azm asserts that, despite the features of the youth uprising (independence from any political affiliation, the lack a common leadership whether in the national or regional level, the lack of collective political project imposed by the protestors, since there was no political power behind the wheel of the popular movement, and the strong existence of national particularities) which was seeking towards democracy and freedom; but they have no sufficient social and political power to orient the political actions in the aftermath of the uprising. Who have the sufficient power? The Islamists have captured the moment most apparently in Egypt and Syria, then, the wave reached Iraq in 2012. Nevine Mossaad asserts that the entry of Islamist parties into the political arena has brought about one significant change: politics has become more focused on ethnic and religious clearage.¹⁴⁸ Whilst Amel Grami, professor of Islamic and Gender Studies, during her participation in Berlin Forum in 2013 noted that the polarization of political parties and the retreat of civil society organizations from political arena posed a particular danger for the debate concerning the role of religion. From my point of view, sectarian clash is the most important sentiment which been deployed by the Islamists from each sect in the region to achieve political ends. Within this sectarian framework, based on feelings of insecurity across all the region in general and Iraq in particular, some members of each side participate in the extremist organizations and to support their violent policies, especially the Sunni one (Karakoç, 2014, 598). One can refer to IS as example which promotes itself as representative and a defender of Sunni Islam. In this sense, IS intends to manifest itself for being beyond a terrorist group.

¹⁴⁸ Berlin Forum, 2013...

In this context, one can refer to Bernard Lewis argument that Muslims mostly invest Islam in their social and political discourse. Thus, whatever the cause—political, social, or economic— the solution is Islamic. Here, three factors are essentials to the role of Islam: the universality of religion; centrality of religion as cause and result; third is the totality of Islam whereby there is no space to detach Islam from political and social lives of Muslims.

Lewis concludes that Islam was thus associated with the exercise of power from the very beginning, from the first formative years of the Prophet and his immediate successors (Lewis, 1993, 135). Lewis contends that this association between religion and power based on the Islamic texts and dominated the political debate in the public sphere. For the traditional Muslim, religion was not only universal but also central in the sense that it constituted the ultimate basis and focus of identity and loyalty. Thus, Pan-Islamism was the first and natural response of Muslims to the political developments and events.

To answer such a quotation in the orientalist's mind, one needs to understand the political conditions that surrounded the political events in the region. In this context, one can refer to some important arguments which challenge Bernard Lewis' claim:

- First, Irfan Ahmad contends that “the idea of an Islamic state flows from the theological character of Islam itself.” Ahmad proposes of two interlocking arguments (Ahmad in Osella, 2010, 140):
 - 1- The proposition by Lewis helps us understand neither the modern nature of the state nor the complexity of sharia; the concept of ‘the state’ is quite modern.
 - 2- He affirms that the reason why the state became central to Islamism because of the configuration of the early twentieth-century socio-political formations. Ahmad tries to explain how Muslims despite their political trends create their political projects, even the Islamic one, based on the western political thought. He adds that, the political crisis in the Middle East is a consequence of western interference in the Muslim world post colonialist discourse.
- Second, while al-Azm quoted Bernard Lewis's essay titled ‘*The return of Islam*’. Al-Azm tackles the question which Lewis fails to address in his essay is where did Islam go? According to al-Azm “the answer of this question, goes beyond the struggle going on over the definition of Islam and over the control of the meaning of Islam” (Al-azm, 2011, 9). In other words, the political powers which manifest itself as Islamic has deployed religion for political ends. Thus, al-azm does not locate the problem in the Islamic teachings itself, rather, he accuses the way in which Muslims interpret their religion politically.

According to al-Azm two forces have had direct impact on the reviving of religion in the regional politics:

- 1- The petro-Islam of countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran.
- 2- Militant Islam, with a plethora of fractions, factions and groupings that resort to spectacular terroristic violence both locally and on a world scale.

For al-Azm Islamists with petro-dollar control the political life since their Islam becomes the Islam of civil society in general.

- Third, Paul Marshal contends that due to the weakness of secular forces in the Arab world, Islamists captured the moment and launch a campaign in which the only solution to the Arabs' problems is that they revive the purity of the faith (Marshal in Chaplin & Joustra, 2010, 83). In this context, Thomas Farr finds out that people in Iraq rely on their selves to guarantee security. To this end, political and social actors, mostly with religious trend, called on the exacerbated need of militant organization such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda alike (Thomas in Chaplin et al., 2010, 187-8). In all cases, despite the nature of each organization (one cannot put Hezbollah at the same category of al-Qaeda), the activity of these organizations damaged the prestige of the nation-state including the concept of sovereignty. In this regard, Peter Galbraith contends in his book, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End*, and Crowley in his article, *The End of Iraq*, contends that the failure of political project in post-2003 Iraq has been perceived in two ways:
 - 1- The failure of political project in Iraq has led to the emergence of militant groups from different sects.
 - 2- United States has failed in supporting secular political alternative, thus, the emergence of the militant groups is an inevitable result to this political failure.
- Fourth, Laura King suggests that the failure in Iraq and the Syria's 3-year-old civil war had long since devolved into a battle between a mainly Sunni armed and the Shiite-militant coalition. The problem with this conflict is severe, since it developed to be shaped by the dynamics of regional politics. The role of these militant groups has exceeded its capacity as non-state actors: first, they start playing a trans-border role across the states; second, these militants groups are backed by specific regional state. With the spillover of the conflict into the Iraqi heartland, that proxy battle

expands onto the doorsteps of patrons on opposite sides of the Sunni-Shiite divide: Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively.

The political events in Iraq, has enlarged the scope of sectarian conflict not only in the Iraqi domestic but also across the region. King adds that “secular and moderate Sunnis in Iraq and Syria have little wish to embrace the militants' austere brand of Islam, but the impulse toward separatism based on tribalism, sectarian loyalties or ethnicity has demonstrated enduring appeal in countries across the region” (King, 2014).

In general, King asserts that the situation in Iraq is very dangerous since militias from each sect will flourish and the failure of state is vulnerable. This chaos will encourage other groups of Islamists to challenge the power of state. Thus, the risk of losing secular trend in the region is at high stake. In this regard, Marc Lynch agrees with King (Lynch, 2003, 56). He asserts that the Arab public sphere, despite the national particularities, suffers from the historical trauma of power relation between the East and the West. In this context, Iraq served as the focal point for the emergence of the collective trauma due to the invasion in 2003. Eric Bonds adds that what interacts with the collective trauma in the Arab world is the United States hegemony over the world system that exert global influence through both coercion and consent (Bonds, 2014, 369). This collective trauma has created a sphere of division whether in the Iraqi society or in the regional politics. Bonds used the term ‘terrorizing violence’ to describe methods of violence in which civilians are intentionally targeted with the goal of creating fear be practiced by both non-state and state actors with political messaging. Here, one can assume that the majority in the Arab world think that U.S. invasion to Iraq was not to install democracy rather to achieve its hegemonic ambition on the Muslims land. Thus, this sentiment across the Arab region granted to the radical Islamists a sentiment of sympathy. One can imagine, depending on what written above, that the regional perception is totally negative towards the Iraqi experience post Saddam Hussein whereby the sectarian passionate is on fire. Arabs are convinced that the government and Shia militias are responsible to what have happened in Iraq (despite it's not the total truth). Also they accuse them of collaborating with the invaders to topple up the national regime in Iraq. Furthermore, Iran is well-connected to this conspiracy theory all over the Arab world. For example, the first question any Iraqi faces in the Arab world is “Are you Sunni or Shiite” which annoys the Iraqis abroad. Thus, the anti-American sentiment has been broadened in the Arab perception to include anti-Shia feelings. Thus, under these conditions terrorism is the contingent outcome (Harrow, 2010, 285). Studies of radicalization have shown that it takes years for an

individual to become an Islamist militant. But, what this process was accelerated in Iraq because of the two sentiments mentioned above. Therefore, some people isolate themselves from society, and became a militant. They accommodated themselves with the terrorist organizations since these organizations have the sufficient resources to lunch resistance to the state quo in Iraq. The project of radicals in Iraq started with narrow ends such as fighting the American army. Then, this project has been gradually enhanced to include anti-government in Baghdad and finally to the establishment of IS in Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, “nation-building” in Iraq faces a huge challenge from the political reality (Blum in Shaffer, 2006, 66). Still, IS has its own way to create ‘nation-building’ that depends totally on historical application to identity which is twofold process: the first is Islamic; the second is political entity which is the Caliphate.

- Fifth argument submitted by Juan Cole when he quoted John McCain warning in the 2008 presidential campaign: “my friends, if we left, [al-Qaeda] wouldn’t be establishing a base. They’d be taking a country ...” (quoted in Cole, 2009, 115).

Cole wonders how a small group of fanatically anti-Shiite terrorists had the ability to establish its own political entity. His answer explores two essential reasons:

- 1- The socio-political conditions that have led Iraq to lose Mosul in June 2014. Socially, people lack the sense of justice and equality before the law. Furthermore, they felt insecure in their own land.
- 2- The strategic and political mistakes done by the United States in Iraq post Saddam Hussein. The consequence of these mistakes was disparate and determined guerrilla movement launched by the minority Sunni Arab.

The core idea of Cole argument supposes that: despite the enormous ground of western data base concerning the Muslim world, but, the west lacks a clear and sufficient vision to what have to be done in order to face the political turmoil and radicalization in the Middle East.¹⁴⁹ Elias Groll, in an article published in Foreign Policy, Criticizes the western intellectual and expert communities in the west, United States in particular, since “none of our analysts, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence officers, politicians, or journalists has yet produced an explanation rich enough — even in hindsight — to have predicted the movement’s rise (IS)” (Groll, 2015).

¹⁴⁹ For instance, Cole (2014a) argues that Obama administration could not find a better way to deal with the progressive youth in the Middle East in the aftermath of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. Obama’ administration show’s a great tendency to work and cooperate with movements of political Islam.

In this context, Ian Almond finds out that the West has failed to understand the Muslims. He adds that, in contrast to what some western intellectuals think about Muslims but they inaugurate religious notions in the process of self-affirmation (Almond, 2007, 161). Thus, the decline of the West's political and cultural role in the Middle East was an inevitable result of this false western perception towards the Muslim world. This decline accompanied the failure of the global war on terror which, according to Saikal, reinforced rather than marginalized the position of many exponents of radical Islamism.¹⁵⁰ Amin Saikal contends that “Washington played its part in opening the space more for Jihadi than Ijtihadi Islam” (Saikal in Akbarzadeh & Mansouri, 2007, 18).

One might ask why:

- 1- For Saikal, the war on terror has disgraced and disrespected Muslims all over the world. Thus, Muslims feel that they lost their position in the civilization dialogue. Islamists deployed this sentiment by cherishing an ideal of some form of political and social organization in which self-realization may become possible for them (Piscatori in Akbarzadeh et al., 2007, 30). The symbol of ‘unity’ was concretized in the idea of Pan-Islam. Therefore, the unity of Ummah has been deployed to create an Islamic state which able to restore the glory of Islamic heritage (as proclaimed by the radical Islamists). Therefore, the politicization of religion, in Tibi's words, underpins the justification of the call for a new Islamic order to be achieved by the irregular war of jihadism (Tibi in Akbarzadeh et al., 2007, 49).
- 2- According to Tibi's, the global war on terror has failed due to the lack of a universal values on which both the West and the Muslim world can stand together in their common war against radicalization.
- 3- Farah Pandith¹⁵¹ spoke about millennial Muslims dealing with a “crisis of identity,” which made them easy prey for extremist ideology. In other words, Muslims has been alienated whether in their original societies or in the western societies. In the Iraqi case, the political turmoil and the failure in the aftermath of the American invasion damaged the identity of either the individual or the Iraqi society. As a result, the national belonging has been carved away from the socialization process and has been replaced by other sub-identities. However, the religious identity has been also shattered by

¹⁵⁰ See also: Kumar, D. (2012). pp 81-92.

¹⁵¹ Farah Pandith is an Indian-American academician and the first ever Special Representative to Muslim Communities for the United States Department of State.

the deployment of extreme interpretations to the political reality. In this regard, the political reality, mostly the failure, in post-2003 Iraq has damaged the identity whether the national or the religious.

- 4- Secularism has failed in the Middle East. There are many reason which combined together led to this failure, but, for D'Souza America's foreign policy during Obama's presidency has participated in this failure. In one hand, he accuses Obama's administration of supporting the Islamists for collapsing the secular regimes in Egypt and Tunisia while ignoring the Islamic regime in Iran. On the other hand, he contends that it is for the interest of the United States to keep secular regimes in power, no matter if it is democratic or not, since they are allies to America; because he believes that the Arab world is incompatible with the Western values of liberation and modernity as well as inconvertible according to the western model. The problem, for D'Souza, lies in the religious sentiment that keep the public sphere vulnerable to the Islamic teaching (D'Souza, 2012, 175-7). Furthermore, the Islamic radicals find a better way, and in democracy it has found one, to reach the power. But, this reliance on democratic ways does not mean that they started to believe in political philosophy and abandoned the religious one. Patrick Cockburn (2015, 17) states that:

The importance of Saudi Arabia in the rise of al-qaeda due to two reasons: its economical wealth; the theological and ideological influence through wahabism trend which characterizes by religious intolerance and political authoritarianism. A striking development in the Islamic world in recent decades is the way in which Wahabism is taking over mainstream Sunni Islam (Cockburn, 2015, 17).

Actually, Patrick Cockburn blames U.S. policy of selecting the partners in the war on terror. There was always something fantastical about the US and its western allies teaming up with the theocratic Sunni absolute monarchies in the Gulf to spread democracy and enhance human rights. As a result, to this failed policy, the Jihadi and Sunni sectarian militarized wing of rebel movements that received massive injections of money from the Gulf States.

5.2.2.2 The United States' policy towards political turmoil in Iraq:

Joby Warrick, in *Black Flag*, asserts that U.S. has played a vital role since 1990 in escalating the hatred towards it. The point is that, the U.S. has participated in creating the proper atmosphere

for terrorists to operate in Iraq. Any mistake done by U.S. in Iraq post 2003 was located in favor of the Islamists. United States' policy in Iraq was affected and affected the region's politics between those who support militias to fight American troops in Iraq and those who support terrorism under the name of revolution.

But, one can inquire if the United States has adopted specific actions or policies to tackle the growing role of radical Islamists in the regional politics post the Arab Spring, especially in Iraq and Syria. What happened shows us that the United States blinked its eyes in front of the growing role of terrorists in Iraq and Syria in the aftermath of Arab spring. The Administration's policy of strategic neglect toward Iraq has created a situation where IS controls territory stretching for hundreds of miles through al-Anbar Province in Iraq and into Syria. Juan Cole asserts that:

It is an indictment of the George W. Bush administration, which falsely said it was going into Iraq because of a connection between al-Qaeda and Baghdad. Ironically, by invading, occupying, weakening and looting Iraq, Bush and Cheney brought al-Qaeda into the country and so weakened it as to allow it actually to take and hold territory in our own time (2014b)¹⁵².

Cole also blames America for its support to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Shiite political elite that took over Iraq from 2005, and which has never been interested in reconciliation with the Sunni Arabs. He adds that America's administration has supported the religious right among Shiites and neglect the secular Shiites. Furthermore, Cole argues that American indictment has continued its legacy in Iraq when the United States did not take in advance steps to tackle the fall of Mosul in June 2014 under the control of IS. Jamie Dettmer (2014) affirms that Washington and London were getting detailed warnings about jihadist plans to exploit Sunni resentment toward Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and launch an ambitious takeover of northern and western Iraq. But what they have done to prevent it: nothing.

To explain why United States did not intervene in both cases, Iraq and Syria, to prevent the expanding of IS; one can notice three reasons:

¹⁵²Available at: <http://www.juancole.com/2014/06/promises-modern-history.html>

- 1- Obama's administration understands the situation in Iraq and Syria as a civil war, thus, president Obama refused to intervene in such conflicts. For instance, Obama in press release published in 2013 said that¹⁵³:

My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about Syria -- why it matters, and where we go from here. Over the past two years, what began as a series of peaceful protests against the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad has turned into a brutal civil war.

Robin Simox in a Foreign Affairs' essay contends that "Obama understands of the situation in Iraq (as well as in West Africa and Syria) as "local power struggles," looks naive at best and dangerously misguided at worst" (Simox, 2014b).

- 2- Steven Heydemann contends that what has been most evident in the administration's approach to Syria and Iraq is a deep cognitive bias against risk. Heydemann states that "for the president and his advisers, the possibility that U.S. actions might have negative consequences has consistently loomed larger than the actual and visibly negative effects of inaction" (Heydemann, 2016).

Senior officials, including Obama, regularly justify their approach on the grounds that engagement would inevitably lead to devastated consequences, drawing the United States into an Afghan-style quagmire. He adds that the administration's reliance on "lessons learned" from past interventions, moreover, is not simply an ad hoc justification for avoiding engagement in Syria's messy conflict. In this regard Ambassador Dennis Rose¹⁵⁴ sheds light on a corollary question: Tell me what happens if we don't act? Rose assures that not acting would produce a severe vacuum in which a humanitarian catastrophe, a deepening proxy war and the strengthening of ISIL in Iraq and Syria would occur.

- 3- Kim Sengupta provides the third reason which is the American's reliance on regional players such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. These regional states, according to Sengupta, have actively supported a hardline coalition of Islamist rebels against Bashar al-Assad's regime that includes al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria. The two countries are focusing their backing for the Syrian rebels on the combined Jaish al-Fatah, or the Army of Conquest, a command structure for jihadist groups in Syria

¹⁵³ Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria, The White House Office of the Press Secretary: Immediate Release, September 10, 2013. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria>

¹⁵⁴ Ambassador Dennis Ross is the William Davidson Distinguished Fellow and counselor at The Washington Institute.

that includes Jabhat al-Nusra, an extremist rival to ISIS which shares many of its aspirations for a fundamentalist caliphate. He adds that those regional actors start searching for self-reliance approach against their regional rivals such as Iran or Shiism in general. Thus, according to this policy, radical Islamists got benefit from financial and military assistance which been supplied from United States or the regional players mentioned above.

I prefer here to shed light on Hilary Clinton, former Secretary of State in the first Obama's administration, explanation concerning the American position towards the political developments in the Middle East in general, Iraq and Syria in particular, post the Arab uprising in 2011. Excellency Clinton in her book, *Hard Choices*, states that "trying to drive change in the Middle East could feel like banging your head against a brick wall" (Clinton, 2014, Kindle edition Part 5, N. 15).

But to some extent her Excellency felt that the Arab Spring is the right moment to deploy change policies even if that will cost the United States its most reliable allies and friends, she refers to Mubarak the former Egyptian president. Clinton urged that "if Arab leaders, many of whom were America's partners, failed to embrace the need for change, they risked losing control of their increasingly young and alienated populations and opening the door to unrest, conflict, and terrorists" (Clinton, 2014).

In this perspective, Clinton believes that the American administration was in critical situation. The debate was about how it should balance strategic interests against core values? The answer obviously was that: "Championing democracy and human rights had been at the heart of our global leadership for more than half a century" (Clinton, 2014).

Clinton contends that the Obama' position before the political development was ideally based to support democratic values in the Middle East. But, she believes that the history of the region shows that transitions from dictatorship to democracy are fraught with challenges and can easily go terribly wrong. For instance, as she continues: "In Iran in 1979, for example, extremists hijacked the broad based popular revolution against the Shah and established a brutal theocracy. If something similar happened in Egypt, it would be a catastrophe, for the people of Egypt as well as for Israeli and U.S. interests."

The question is why this American awareness should not manifest itself towards the Syrian crisis. Here, I found it relevant to refer to Liz Sly interview with General David Petraeus, which published

in *The Washington Post* under the title *The Islamic State isn't our biggest problem in Iraq*. Petraeus contends that:

That said, it is impossible to return to Iraq without a keen sense of opportunities lost. These include the mistakes we, the U.S., made here, and likewise the mistakes the Iraqis themselves have made. This includes the squandering of so much of what we and our coalition and Iraqi partners paid such a heavy cost to achieve, the continuing failure of Iraq's political leaders to solve longstanding political disputes, and the exploitation of these failures by extremists on both sides of the sectarian and ethnic divides (Liz Sly, 2015).

Petraeus adds that the proximate cause of Iraq's unraveling was the increasing authoritarian, sectarian and corrupt conduct of the Iraqi political elite after the departure of the last U.S. combat forces in 2011. The actions of the former prime minister in Iraq Nouri al-Maliki alienated the Iraqi Sunnis and once again created in the Sunni areas fertile fields for the planting of the seeds of extremism, essentially opening the door to the takeover of the Islamic State. Some may contend that all of this was inevitable. Iraq was bound to fail, they will argue, because of the inherently sectarian character of the Iraqi politics. Thomas E. Ricks, *Iraq: No Way Out*, adds that any tactical/operational victory in Iraq (neutralize ISIS) translates into strategic defeat since Iraq firmly under the influence of the Iranians. In other words, America did not intervene at the beginning of IS crisis since it did not want to engage in any condition of action with Iran.

Petraeus criticizes the decision of withdrawing from Iraq since he believes that America has delivered Iraq to: Iran in on hand, and to the Iraqi Islamic political parties which backed by Iran. Thus, he affirms that all of this could have been averted if America had kept 10,000 troops in Iraq. Juan Cole responds to such a question. He agreed with Obama administration's decision to withdraw from Iraq since the Iraqi elected parliament decided so. Hence, America has no moral justification to keep its forces on the Iraqi ground. This step would extend the political dispute among the Iraqi political partners and launch a wave of guerilla against the American troops and Iraqi security apparatus. Again, what happened in Iraq is worse than what anyone could imagine before or after the adoption of the decision of American troops withdrawing. The result was the conquer of Mosul in the North of Iraq by IS fighters. Even in the aftermath of this serious event, American government kept neglecting the decline of security situation in Iraq as red line alarm that requires direct intervention, since they read this event as civil war or political dispute between the

Iraqi shia-government and the Sunni rebellions. At the beginning of the crisis American government failed to understand the particularity of this situation and its dangerous not only on the Iraqi nation state but also on the whole region, and the danger might be extended to reach the world order. In this regard, Yasser Abdul Hussein quoted the statement of Ibrahim al-Jaafari (the Iraqi Secretary of State since September 2014), when his Excellency described the crisis of ISIS as the third world war and its effect on the world order will be more dangerous than that of the second world war.

Conclusion:

one can assert that the secularism has failed in post-2003 Iraq. The evidences are so manifested in the Iraqi political life. Secularists could not compete with the Islamists without endorsing the Islamic peculiarities. For example, Al-Iraqiya coalition which consisted of different political and social trends in 2010, could not win the election without collaborating with some Islamic political trends, because the narratives of political process in Iraq after 2003 did not accommodate the secular trend; since secularism is strongly perceived in the Iraqi mind as associated with Saddamism. The evidence is manifested in the Iraqi political process whereby secularists and liberalists has had very limited space in political life such as the Civic Democratic Alliance which got only 3 seats in the general election in 2014.

One can also notice evidences on state official sectarianism such as the sectarian flags which have been noticed hanging over the vehicles of some security apparatus. Also, one can refer to the governmental instruction to police officers to arrest those who eat in public during Ramadhan. The first example shattered the collective image of security apparatus whereby people from different sects tend to believe that this institution does not represent the whole society; while the second evidence violates the individual right to practice his freedom of choice. The institutions should understand that it has no granted power to interfere in the individual's religious choices. No one has the right to question or enforce any individual to fast during Ramadhan, since; no one has the divine right to ask others to obey God's will.

Nader Hashemi was right when he attributes the failure of secularism in the Arab world on the political factors. What happened in Iraq confirmed this assumption, since many political events have had a negative role on shaping the meaning of secularism such as the Saddam's totalitarian practices over the people and the American invasion in 2003. Thus, people were convinced that the

solution to the political crises should be Islamic, while it takes them 13 years of bloodshed and insecurity to recognize the failure of current Islamic political parties. But, this recognition does not mean people will shift to support a secular alternative. Some would argue that secularists have very limited chance due to the intervention of supreme religious institution in political life. Islamization redefined state-society relations, and changed the balance of power between the two. In today's reality, Islamization has reached the role of formatting and reinventing the codes of State in some Muslims political consciousness. According to Seyyed Nasr:

Islamization is a strategy of state formation. Its ultimate success or failure was determined in the political arena, and then as a measure of the extent to which it served the interests of the state. Religion and, more broadly, culture are directly relevant to state reach and power, and hence, to the aforementioned imperatives (Nasr, 2001, 159).

In such contexts dimensions of Islamism becomes a dominant factor in state politics whereby other political competitor has no enough resources to approach the masses (Milton, 2007, 59). Thus, any solution to split religion from politics in the Iraqi society should rely on Rawls' model of political liberalism which been discussed in the third chapter. Democracy alone is not enough to guarantee peace and security. Democracy as Charles Kuzman puts it, should be engaged with key ideas of the western liberal tradition, such as human rights, social equality and tolerance (Kuzman, 2011, 95). Kuzman adds that liberal Islam could be revived with the demand for democratic constitutions. To this end, the constitutional legitimacy should enable the official institutions to sustain (Kuzman, 2011, 102-6):

- 1- Politics should be left for human beings to decide for themselves in accordance with the needs and values of the age.
- 2- The authority should be political and there should be distance between politics and religion.
- 3- No one or any group that has the exclusive right to understand Islamic texts. An interpretation of Islamic text is pluralistic.
- 4- Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government politics.

In Iraq the failure of secularism is apparently related to the failure of political elite to adopt Rawls' model of political liberalism. Therefore, people were alienated from state institutions since

it could not meet their needs in one hand. In the other, the state institutions through narratives and actions could not hold a collective national identity. Injustice and inequality towards specific social groups create anti-government sentiment in the public sphere. However, the political problem in Iraq suggests that political secularism still has sphere of hope. To this end, the political factors that led to the failure should be removed through:

- 1- Constitutional reform should guarantee 'neutrality' as essential character in state politics; also, it should provide and protect some notions such as justice and equality towards the citizens' rights.
- 2- The second element is the education institutionalization. This educational institutionalization must consolidate reason 'aql' and self-critic in the philosophical base of the socialization process (Cox & Marks, 2003, 75).
- 3- Third element is that of secular reason. Secular reason should be conducted by institutions (Tibi, 2012, 239; Cesari, 2004, 46; Ramadan, 2012, 80).

The idea, is not to encourage a trend who departs from Islam entirely. It is how to appeal to Islam in political life without it being misused by some groups for their political goals. Secularization, so-called, can also consist in choosing an integralist approach to tradition. This human conduct, according to individualism, must rely on the power of reason. Individualism is a path to liberalism (Kelly in Held, Moore & Young, 2007, 126). Paul Kelly discusses two approaches to the problem of accommodating religious, cultural and ethical difference that have a bearing on how we should conceive of secularism in the public domain:

- First is the one that belongs to John Rawls, who sought neutral principles to regulate social cooperation between different conceptions of the good.
- Second is the concept of equality in Ronald Dworkin's theory of resource-egalitarianism.

Oliver Roy warns that secularization will lead to the appearance of so-called fundamentalist forms of religiosity, "that is, when the believer refuses to keep his faith private and is determined to have it recognized as an integral part of his public existence, deeming that religion should govern all his personal conduct" (Roy, 2007, 69). Thus, individualism must be so careful to abandon any intention to push the believer to detach from his religious identity. But it must aim to teach him how to be reasonable and socially active. So to speak the secularists negative behavior is one of the important causes of conflict in the public sphere, illiberal secularists are equally dangerous as fundamentalists.

Hence, liberal political secularism should protect religion by not trying to shape it into a political agenda (Kadhim, 2016; Roy, 2007, 131). In other words, how to create a reasonable culture that rejects any kind of fundamentalist ideas even if these are related to religious doctrine? The idea is to make the social change easier and less expensive to the Iraqi people in a way that all groups converge to achieve this change, especially in the political culture. This change makes the individual, belongs to different groups, more flexible to accept the differences with others with respect to comprehensive doctrines or to the interpretation of this doctrines. Respect and cooperation between the individuals and the groups will create a space for trust.¹⁵⁵ Trust is what the Iraqis need nowadays to counter terrorism. Everyone must think and believe that the political process is dedicated to their benefit, so to speak the public good represents all, and not exclusively for the interests of some groups.

Does political change need secularism in Iraq? In this respect, I do prefer a specific type of secularism which is "*Liberal political secularism*." This type, from my perspective, will help the individual to vanish the misperception of secularism in the Iraqi society. Most of the Iraqis think that Secularism is a synonym of Atheism, which excludes religion from their public and private sphere. This political secularism is a vital tool to achieve trust among individuals and groups, it does not tend to shrink the role of the religion to the limited private sphere, but also to involve religion in the public politics, especially in the legislation process, and that what pluralism aims to do, especially when the majority respect the religion role in their private and public spheres. One would call for In/Out¹⁵⁶ paradigm to accept the individual or the groups within the political public sphere. The construction process of integrity conditions should be based on a specific idea which is liberal reasonableness in the political sense. Since the individual or the groups are liberal and reasonable they can express their rights in the public sphere. Within this context we need a liberal secular institution which aims to protect both the private and the public good. With the existence of these institutions no one can impose their doctrine over others. Within this paradigm, two groups

¹⁵⁵ Brian Barry argues that want-satisfaction could be associated with political liberalism. Since, anyone has the right to achieve his want-satisfaction. Still Barry asks does utilitarianism entail that it would be an improvement to kill somebody as long as he could be replaced by somebody else with a higher level of want-satisfaction? (Barry in Fleurbaey, Salles & Weymark, 2008 283). In other words, anyone needs to achieve his self-satisfaction but without violating other's rights. Thus, all social actors should reach a collective agreement upon narratives such as trust, cooperation and justice to reach general good.

¹⁵⁶ **In** means: integrated within the political public sphere under conditions.

Out means: Indispensable rejection to the approach of specific groups or individuals who want to impose their comprehensive doctrine over the collective identity.

are excluded of the public political sphere, conservatives or fundamentalists (religious and secular) and extremists who use violence to impose their doctrines. Inclusion and exclusion of a group depends on their own behavior towards the society. Two ideas are required to maintain stability in the socio-political domain: first, political secularism is what controls the dialogue among religions. The second is political liberalism¹⁵⁷ that promotes reasonableness in the public debate between all doctrines religious or secular. In accordance with this argument Fred Dallmayr asserts that the institutional secularism, that Ramadan proposes, must be restricted to constitutional legitimacy (Dallmayr, 2010, 67). Here, secularism has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state to diversity. Indeed, the point of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favoring or disfavoring not just religious positions but any basic position, religious or nonreligious (Taylor in Butler et al., 2011, 37). Democracy obliges citizens to commit to the civil duty through solidarity and commitment to the joint political project. Nonetheless, to be a good citizen is not the same as being a good Muslim. The first requires a reasonable person who adopts the political conception of justice. The good citizen at the same time is a believer keen to honor the civic religion as the moral ground for his reasonableness. Being a good Muslim, on the other hand, requires piety to his religious practices and ethics. But, in both cases the person has a common virtue i.e. the priority of right. For al-Sader Mohammed Baqir piety is what orients the believer to be a reasonable or rational person.

Still it is not easy to justify the notion of secularism to the individual as well as to the society in Iraq. Some would argue that secularism will not find a ground in a country with Muslim majority such as Iraq (Lewis, 2002, 101; Eisenstadt in Stauth, 1998, 16). Samuel Eisenstadt asserts that Islam honors the divine contract revealed from God, thus, there is no way for Muslims to develop a concept of self-critic revolution by which they can challenge the role of Islam in political life. In contrast, Sadek al-Azm (2015) finds that Islam is a dynamic faith and has responded to widely differing environments and rapidly shifting historical circumstances, proving itself highly compatible with all the major types of polities and varied forms of social and economic organization that human history has produced. He refers to the political experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The republic had popular elections, a constituent assembly, and a parliament. Al-Azm argues that the role of Iran's ruling mullas dealing

¹⁵⁷ This process depends on 'political secularization' (can be understood to refer to the historical separation of church and state) rather than social secularization which simply refers to questions about practice and belief in everyday life religious 'habitus' (Turner in Marranci, 2010, 12).

not so much with theology, but with economic planning, social reform, re-distribution of wealth without forgetting such issues as identity and modernization. In this way, political secularism can be practiced in any society without dogmatic barriers unless basic pre-conditions such as constitutional legitimacy, justice and efficient state' institutions are not sufficiently satisfied. I leave the task of political secularism to be honored to the recent political and security circumstances in Iraq, when people have witnessed the failure of political Islam and the Islamic political parties. To achieve this task an efficient educational system that paves the way to political secularism to express itself within the public conscious. After 2003 most of the people believed that the Islamic political parties are the savior, and each group corners to the parties and politicians who share with them the sectarian interpretation of Islam. This behavior is not Islamic and not reasonable as well. From this perspective, I called for liberal secularism, it is so important to understand that reasonableness, as John Rawls explains in *Political Liberalism*, is so important to the democratic process, especially in voting. To this end, the liberal individual, in the democratic-political conception, tend to vote for the political programs of the candidates and not for the politicians' sectarian programs.

The sixth chapter:

Politics in the US in the aftermath of the Rise of ISIS

In this chapter three sections will be designed to tackle specific topic and to answer a specific question:

- 1- The first section concerning IS' strategy to which it tries to endure the political entity it creates in Iraq and Syria. To this end, two essential works will be discussed: Abu Bakr Naji's 'management of Barbarism' and As-Suri's Global Islamic Resistance. The idea is to answer whether IS threat is limited to the Middle East or globally that might reach United States at home.
- 2- The second section will try to explore the public perception in the United States concerning IS. To this end, a cluster of important American intellectuals and scholars' works will be analyzed. In this part, I would like to understand the sphere of intellectuals' role in creating the collective perception towards the crisis.
- 3- The third section will highlight the consequences of the collective perception concerning IS on either the domestic politics or foreign policy of U.S towards Iraq.

In this chapter, I will try to figure out the American response to the rise of IS in the Middle East in various levels. The first and the most important is the academic or intellectual level whereby experts play a significant role for providing knowledge concerning such foreign and unfamiliar political crisis to the American people. Thus, it is very important to cover out:

- What kind of information the ordinary American receives everyday concerning this problem.
- By whom, to whom and in what mechanism this phenomenon has been analyzed and circulated in the public sphere.
- What are the consequences of this process and knowledge on the political perception and preferences towards Islam and Muslims in the public sphere.

During each section out of three a few sub-questions will be raised to fulfill the methodological requirements of this chapter. Some of the questions are deliberately related to Islamophobia rhetoric and its effects on American politics. The questions are: is Islamophobia institutionally endorsed in the aftermath of IS crisis? Is islamophobia manifested in the presidential election in 2016? And what are the consequences of Islamophobia on United States strategy towards the Middle East?

6.1 ISIS strategy and capabilities

The first section explores the strategic doctrine of IS, through visiting the most important works of al-Qaeda's leaders who prepare the ground to IS to become as reality. Two important strategic works of al-Qaeda will be presented here.

- First one is Abu Bakr Naji's book '*The Management of Savagery*'.
- The second work of Abu Mus'ab As-Suri titled '*The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance*'.

Some scholars such as William McCants and Berger Stern assert that these works represent the master key to the strategic doctrine of the organization. They are complementary to each other. The first represents the operational guideline of the guerilla. The second represents the mobilization framework to the required man power. As-Suri's model essentially works on the individual level preparing the proper follower to the Global resistance call.

6.1.1 Strategic doctrine of IS

Naji in the first pages of his book refers to specific ideas that directed him to present his work:

- a- The caliphate state is the only legitimate political solution to the Islamic world.
- b- The West caused the defeat of the last Caliphate state and imposed their nation-state system on the Islamic world.
- c- Any government in the Middle East is seen as traitors and taghuts which works for the interests of the West.
- d- The problem rests in the current global order which resulted after the end of the Second World War.
- e- The regimes in the Middle East are a set of apostates who alienate with the Muslims society.

Naji finds out that to resist this order two kinds of power should be conducted: the power of the masses (quwwat al-shu`b) and the power of armies. Thus, violence and appealing to masses are essential tactics to any political project. 'Society cohesion' and the meaning of 'centralized power' extended to another notion which is 'Submission.' "When a state submits This overwhelming power is also assisted by the cohesion [tamasuk] of the society in the central country and the cohesion of that society's institutions and sectors" (Naji, 2006, 7).

Society cohesion needs the reviving of dogma and jihad in the hearts of the Muslim masses. To this end, the global Islamic call should be launched to unite the hearts and minds of Muslims all over the world, Naji argued. 'Global resistance call' is not an Ijtihadi approach, rather, it wages war

not only against the military power of the United States but also against the whole western civilization since they belong to a different culture of Satan (infidels). Thus, the society cohesion or civilization cohesion would bring back the military superpower. This argument includes the whole Western blog.

In Naji's words the war is not the final aim itself, rather, it is a prologue to a political project which includes the implementation of a specific system [nizam mu`ayyan] for the achievement of the following goals:

- A- Destroy a large part of the respect for America and spread confidence in the souls of Muslims.
- B- Replace the human casualties sustained by the renewal movement during the past thirty years by means of the human aid that will probably come for escalating anger over the obvious, direct American interference in the Islamic world.
- C- Work to expose the weakness of America's centralized power by pushing it to intervene directly on the Middle East.

To this end, Naji poses his notion of '*the management of savagery*' is defined very succinctly as the management of savage chaos to bring change to current order. He explains why he calls it this way by asserting that: "Submitting to the law of the jungle in its primitive forms whose good people and even the wise among the evildoers yearn for someone to manage this savagery" (Naji, 2006, 11).

He adds that this strategy to be successfully achieved some requirements are needed such as: spreading internal security; providing food and services to local inhabitants; establishing Sharia justice; imposing a fundamental Islamic system of belief; establishing a fighting society at all levels; uniting the hearts of the world's people by means of money and Sharia governance and violence; and most importantly progressing until it is possible to expand and attack the enemies through establishing coalitions.

To the end of uniting the Muslim edge Naji quoted the book al-*Ṭ̣ībar* by Prince Usama Munqidh whereby the role of the major leaders, like the Zanki family and the Ayyubids, was to unite these factions (al takattulat) and organizations into a single band and a single organization. Zanki controlled the whole area from Mosul to Levant to fight Constantinople and Persian Empire, as Naji argued. Thus, the management of savagery is keen to spread chaos for fighting post Sykes-Picot nation-state in the Middle East and any super power opposes the organization such as the United

States. On the other hand, to secure the region any theological difference should be eliminated; to this end, Shiism is severely targeted.

One would ask an organization like ISIS, how it manages to deal with a dynamic environment such as the Middle East? To this end, the terrorist organization deploys several tactics such as:

- 1- The celebration and exhibition of maximum violence to dominate, and to attract media attention.
- 2- The second tactics deploys a theological base for their takfiri thought. Qatada and Maqdisi played an important role in spreading Takfirist thought in their youth, by providing the religious justification for violence, including against innocent civilians.
- 3- The third tactic gets advantage of the political turmoil to install specific understanding to the political developments in the region. They usually use conspiracy theory to tackle notions such as democracy and modernity.
- 4- Vicken Cheterian (2015) and John Horgan (2005) argue that deploying ‘events’ is the fourth tactic, events such as American invasion to Iraq and the Arab Spring created yet another space for jihadism to thrive, this time at the heart of the Arab world (Cheterian, 2015, 109). Cheterian contends that the withdrawal of US forces and the policies of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki – marginalizing the *sahwa* (reawakening) Sunni tribal forces, and using the jihadi pretext to weaken his rivals – had provided *raison d’être* for ISIS in Iraq. Thus, for him this event is equally important to the war on Iraq in 2003.
- 5- The fifth tactic deploys either the sectarian conflict or the clash of civilization to justify the group’s brutal violence. To this extent, they got advantage of Islamophobic rhetoric in the West and anti-shia sentiment in the East to attract supporters. While Yasser Abdul Hussein, in his book *The Third World War*, asserts that IS’s most influential rhetoric that challenge the world order. To this end, IS should challenge the prestige of the nation state in the Middle East.
- 6- Ideology must be a cynical cover for the group’s ultimately political objectives. To this end, IS deploys the apocalyptic propaganda. Fromson in a joint paper concludes that ISIS has found fertile ground for its apocalyptic doctrines in some portions of the Muslim world. He quoted 2012 Pew poll which found out that 51% of Muslims of those have been surveyed in the Middle East expected imminent arrival of the apocalypse (Fromson & Simon, 2015, 30).
- 7- IS manifesting itself as state with modern institutions and infrastructure projecting the image of a functioning state is as the key to its foreign-recruitment efforts. This political project of IS deploys the notion of Ummah. Gautam poses two vital questions (Gautam in Meuleman, 2005, 259):

- First, to what extent does the concept of Ummah still play a role among the Muslims?
- How do the Muslims define their identity when they live abroad?

For Mohan Gautam despite the evidences of differentiation among Muslim groups but the notion of Ummah still play significant role in their political and social life. He believes that the role of this notion grows when Muslims feel the threat of losing identity. Sami Zubaida to answer Gautam question has quoted Ernest Gellner, that the Islamic idea of the religious community as the political unit is incompatible with the territorial nation- state. Nationalists, on the other side, have exalted the nation as a cultural and territorial unit as the ultimate basis for unity and solidarity (Zubaida, 2011, 176).

From Naji's strategy one can notice two essential controversial ideas concerning terrorism in general and Daesh (ISIS) in particular: first, this current wave of extremism, with its different shapes, is a reflection of the socio-political context in the local environment. In other words, it is a local phenomenon that hits specific societal conditions; second, although it is a global issue with respect to the burden of common responsibility and the common threat that target any group of people as well as local political regimes and the world order. Due to the legacies of tyranny, dictatorship, political repression in the region; terrorism has emerged. What distinguish Daesh from other terrorist group that it has a political project. This project is twofold: the first is the political entity the Caliphate; the second is the public sphere of the caliphate. To this end, it deploys a mixed strategy includes brutal violence which should be followed by victory and theological justification. Islam as belonging, then, does not pertain to territory or state. Its logic is at odds with pan-Arabism. To the end of the unity of the Muslim Umma, Zubaida asserts that there are two paths of implementing Caliphate:

- The first keen on uniting the will and solidarity of Muslims; and would assume the functions of a supreme mujtahid who would hold authority over spiritual matters for Muslims living under various political authorities and national arrangements.
- The second path which posed by Sayyid Qutb and the radicals who followed him rejected nationalism in favour of Islam.

Zubaida asserts that the debate over the global Ummah has dismissed another fundamental debate concerning the relationship between Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. Pan-Arabism and Pan-

Islamism have dreams and aspirations, while the territorial nation-state is the only concrete political reality (Zubaida, 2011, 188).

Naji did take into consideration the struggle between Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. Thus, according to Naji's strategy, the path for establishing an Islamic State consists of three stages:

- first, the stage of “the power of vexation and exhaustion.”
- Second, the stage of “the administration of savagery.”
- Third, the stage of “the power of establishment – establishing the state.”

The stage of the “power of vexation and exhaustion” deploys groups and separate cells in every region of the Islamic world as well as the western world. These cells should continue its mission until the anticipated chaos and savagery breaks out in several regions. Then the regions of chaos and savagery will advance to the stage of the administration of savagery, while the remaining regions and states of the Islamic world will continue two flanks: the flank of logistical support for regions of savagery and the flank of the “power of vexation and exhaustion” in other regions to enter the game of savagery.

The primary goals for the stage of the “power of vexation and exhaustion”, are:

- 1- Exhausting the forces of the enemy and the regimes collaborating with them.
- 2- Attracting new youth to the jihadi work by undertaking qualitative operations.
- 3- Drilling and operational practice so that they will be prepared psychologically and practically for the stage of the management of savagery.

In this stage small cells of terrorists undertake “vexation” (operations) in order to weaken a state, and enforcing it to enter the stage of the administration of savagery. Within the second stage the plan is keen to organize “Sequential strikes” against in order to cause the fall of the prestige of America among the masses. Naji states that: “As a consequence, America will either seek revenge and the conflict will intensify or it will launch a limited war” (Naji, 2006, 19).

Resistance to America's campaign will increase the chances of cohesion in the transnational Muslim society across the region of the Middle East. Through breaking the tutelage that America is not invincible, Naji contends, the masses will aggressively join the organization. To this end, the United States military interference is indispensable for Naji's strategy. America's army should be trapped in the guerilla warfare whereby violence seeing as necessity to fight the new crusaders and who collaborate with them. Here, casualties lead to justify terrorist's acts. As for the second trap,

Naji calls for the diversification and the widening of the vexation strikes in the heart of the western world. Naji advances his strategy by pointing out the vital targets: economic targets, particularly petroleum. While As-Suri asserts that:

The goal of the operations of the Resistance and the Individual Terrorism Jihad is to inflict as many human and material losses as possible upon the interests of America and her allies, and to make them feel that the Resistance has transformed into a phenomenon of popular uprising against them (as-Suri, 32).

In short for as-Suri the expansion of the targeting is essential to the Islamic Resistance Call to be flourished. The organization should Target all kinds of material and human presence of the Americans and their allies in both sides the Muslim and Western. For as-Suri the most important enemy targets are:

- First, the oil and mineral sources of energy.
- Second, the straits and the main sea passages; one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal.
- Third, most important military targets.
- Fourth, political figures and Media centers.
- Fifth, striking civilians in general.

To this end, the organization should be able to deploy ordinary Resistance fighters among the Muslims residing in America and the allied Western countries to organize qualitative operations. For as-Suri, This can be done as part of popular resistance action such as destroying economic targets and burning forests during hot periods in the summer. The ‘administration of the savagery’ needs some principles such as:

- 1- "If regular armies concentrate in one place they lose control. Conversely, if they spread out, they lose effectiveness." This means that the battle must be stretched out to specific limit that suitable to the organization capabilities and shattered the efforts of the enemy
- 2- "Strike with your striking force multiple times and with the maximum power you possess in the most locations [niqat, also “military bases” of the enemy."

- 3- "The most likely way to defeat the strongest enemy militarily is to drain it militarily and economically." Thus, the war of attrition is necessarily needed to the strategic position of the organization.
- 4- "The policy of paying the price." It's one of the most important principle to IS's strategy since its strongly related to the organizations propaganda message. The principle of 'Paying the Price' has two goals: to spread fear within the enemy masses; and strengthening the organization image to encourage recruiting among young people. According to Naji if the organization apply it properly, then, the consequence will be deterrence; since IS's enemy knows that the organization can reach it anytime anywhere. *"If the enemy undertakes a hostile action against a region in the Arabian Peninsula or in Iraq, then the response will occur in Morocco or Nigeria or Indonesia"* (Naji, 2006, 33). Such wave of attacks includes the West itself like Paris attacks in November 2015. This principle associated with another which is, according to As-Suri, open fronts: "The meaning of Open Fronts is that there are mujahidin forces whose presence is overt and linked to permanent bases. They fight the enemy forces on open battle lines, or they fight a guerilla war from these fixed positions" (*as-Suri, 13*). As-Suri adds that without the 'individual jihad' the principle of 'open fronts' will never success.
- 5- "Power" (al-shawka) is achieved through ties of religious loyalty. For Naji as long the US increases its power in responding to IS's threat as much the power of the group will be escalated. 'Group power' depends on the coherence of the group and the awareness among the members of the Ummah to the importance of uniting goals and methods and exchanging loyalty.
- 6- The sixth principle depends on retreat and bargain. To this end, Naji suggests to IS's leaders to have into consideration the map of interests of each IS and its enemies. Bargaining here not necessarily means negotiation, rather, means the shifts in the region of 'vexation and exhaustion'.
- 7- Polarization is an important principle to enhance cohesion in the Ummah and encourage recruitment. "Polarization means dragging the masses into the battle. We must make this battle very violent; such that death is a heartbeat away so that the two groups will realize that entering this battle will frequently lead to death." (Naji, 2006, 46). The best way to do that is through justifying the operations through the sharia efficient propaganda system that enables the organization to communicate with the Ummah. Furthermore, polarization requires the unity of the groups and regions under a single banner so that the "power of the establishment of an Islamic state" [shawkat al-tamkin] may be formed through them. To this end, methods of education are required such as:

education by momentous events and education by example. One crucial point is that the commitment of belonging to the Ummah has two consequences: first, defending the universal commitment to both the Ummah and the political project (Caliphate). This universal commitment has military dimension which conducts jihad at the Open Fronts.

Here, the discussion pays attention to As-Suri methodology. He sets a cluster of preconditions to the success of the global resistance:

- The individual commitment all over the world.
- Second, the organizational networks.
- Third, the strategy of global resistance that based on the establishment of the caliphate state.

After securing these pre-conditions as-Suri urges towards fourth methods to secure the Caliphate:

- 1- The 'civilian terror' and secret methods, especially on the level of individual operations and small Resistance Brigades completely and totally separated from each other, as-Suri teaches his followers. The solution then is military revolt taken from the Sunna and may lead to the establishment of a state. The state should be secured through violent means. The battle should be prolonged as long as possible to strengthen the corner stone of the state (As-Suri, 83).
- 2- The second method to secure the state is through causing damage at enemy's home by creating a power capable of directing strong strikes inclines the enemy toward reconciliation.
- 3- The third method comes through Da'wah success whereby educational policies are required.
- 4- The fourth method to secure the Caliphate state is the strict selection to the region where the state will be established. The region should meet specific pre-conditions such as: geographical preconditions: It has to be Spacious in terms of area with long borders; It is also a requirement of the territory that its food and water sources are efficient in case of a siege. Population factors: They include the presence of a large number of inhabitants. As-Suri contends that most suitably region is the Levant and Iraq: "they comprise a whole, continuous region with a total area of more than 700,000 km². It has all the preconditions for the Open Fronts, especially the mountainous regions in Northern and Western Iraq, the total number of people in the region also exceeds 60 million. In most cases, they are arenas suitable for Individual Terrorism Jihad, small brigades, and secret guerilla warfare, as a result of the dense presence of different American and allied interests, and of Western and Zionist hegemonic projects" (Naji, 2006, 25).

- 5- For As-Suri, the most important method to secure the political project is the ‘individual Jihad.’ It opens the possibility to participate for most possible number of people and extends the space for secret action. Furthermore, As-Suri assures that the individual Jihad should be characterized by a general sense of unity around a jihadi Resistance current and creates a form of centralism on the level of commitment.
- 6- The sixth method based on the institutional distribution of the brigades of the Global Islamic Resistance Call. He set out three circles: the first circle is the Centralized Brigade: Its basic mission is guidance. The secondly circle is ‘the Decentralized Brigades’; they are responsible of coordination and communication. The third circle is ‘the Da’wah circle’ and the administration circle; there mission is to guarantee that the resistance call should be applied by the masses and to provide services to the community of the Calipha state.

6.1.2 IS' capabilities in front of global rejection:

Gwynne Dyer (2015, 79-81) contends that IS has done some procedures to secure the self-proclaimed caliphate since June, 2014:

- First of all, Abu Muhammed Adnani delivers a message to the masses that the Caliphate state was established on the Islamic way and should meet Sharia categories.
- Second, the words Iraq and Al-sham have been removed from the name of the Islamic State. The aim is to apply the universal character of the Ummah.
- Third, Baghdadi declared himself Caliph over the territory stretching 500 miles, and has demanding the immediate and questioning allegiance of all Muslims.
- Fourth, after capturing Mosul in June, 2014, IS has approached to tribal leaders to enhance its man-power. To this end, IS demonstrates itself as the only hope for Sunni Arabs by escalating the sectarian sentiment against government in Baghdad.
- Dyer explains that IS operates in the Sunni region in Iraq. For Dyer, now it is IS volunteers versus Shia volunteers.

But, by the end of August, 2014, ISIS’s phase of expansion was over, and it now needed to stabilize its control over most of the Sunni majority regions in Iraq. Thus, the question is IS able to maintain its existence in the regional political reality? Here, one would ask does IS pose a real threat to the world? To answer we need to manifest the organization’s capabilities in various fields: militarily,

economically, human resources and ideologically. I think the threat rests whereby IS is able to maintain its existence as long as it could. One can say that ISIS was able to maintain the control over territory it controlled till today. To explain why and how, some experts highlighted some of the organization's capabilities such as:

1- **The military and man power capacity.** In September, 2014, CIA estimates that IS had between 20,000 and 31,000 fighters, two times as many as it had at the start of the year (Dyer, 2015, 88; Fromson & Simon, 2015, 9). Dyer locates part of IS problem on the sectarian aura that shape the regional politics. In Iraq he refers to sectarian tension between the Sunni people and the Shia government that relied on the Shia militias for most of its military manpower, moreover, Baghdad was approaching closely to Iran in the time of crisis. While James Fromson and Steven Simon found out that six aspects of ISIS's fighting machine explain the group's military progress to date. These factors are:

- a- Its number and quality of troops.
- b- Sophisticated military equipments.
- c- Sheer aggressiveness.
- d- The group's military strategy is dictated by a coterie of second- and third-tier leaders, many of whom were Ba'athists and officers in the military or intelligence services under Saddam Hussein.
- e- The organization's ability to maintain the battlefield initiative by opening new fronts.
- f- The growing networking by allying with other militant groups.

While Horgan adds two other factors that support IS's military actions: the global scale of terrorist acts of violence which hit everywhere anytime; and the process of target selection is properly scrutinized (Horgan, 2005, 97). Many of IS's operational acts of violence, out of the savagery territory, deployed small number and did not cost much. Rather, its political affect was very highly amounted. ISIS demonstrates critical capabilities in the arenas of military campaign design of which the enemy's 'center of gravity' has been brutally attacked.

2- **The economic wealth.** Ana Swanson (2015) in her article on *The Washington Post* quoted David Cohen, the Treasury Department's Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, that:

"The Islamic State is probably the best-funded terrorist organization we have confronted"

In the autumn of 2014, ISIS's total daily revenue stream was estimated to be between \$3 and 5 million, of which up to \$3m; came from the production and smuggling of oil products (Fromson &

Simon, 2015, 41-3). Based on conservative estimates, the IS currently control assets in excess of US \$2 trillion, with a current annual income amounting to US\$2 .9 billion (Brisard & Martinez, 2014, 3). Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, in joint paper, provide clear explanation about IS's financial capabilities:

- The amount of foreign donations received by IS amounts to an average of US\$50M a year.
- According to estimates, the IS raises as much as US\$10 million per month through ransom payments. In Mosul alone, IS is believed to raise US\$8 million in taxes each month. In total, the extortion/tax system imposed in areas under its control in Iraq and Syria could generate as much as US\$30 million per month for IS, or US\$360 million a year.
- The Islamic State has secured control over several oilfields in Syria and Iraq. They include Al-Omar, — the largest Syrian oilfield — Tanak and Jafra. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), IS controls 13 oilfields in Iraq. In total, IS controls more than 60% of Syria's oil production capacity and less than 10% of Iraq's oil production capacity. With an overall production capacity of between 80,000 and 120,000 bpd, this represents a profit of between US\$2 million and US\$4 million per day. Based on those figures the oil trade could generate an annual profit for IS of between US\$730 million and US\$1,460 million.
- According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Iraqi provinces under IS control, especially Mosul, are the most fertile in the country, accounting for 30% of the national wheat production (or 1 million ton) and 40% of the national barley production. In total, areas under control of IS, including the Nineveh, Salaheddine and Al-Anbar provinces, these account for 40% of the annual wheat production and 53.3% of the barley production.
- Natural Gas production consist 17% of IS's funding sources, which comes second after oil productions with 38%.

While Swanson quotes Matthew Levitt, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, In November, 2014, told a House committee that the sale of antiquities was the group's second-large source of revenue after illicit oil sales since the group had at least 4,500 cultural sites under its control. These funds have supported the construction of a governmental apparatus that is worthy of the best management consultants.

3. **‘Resistance and endurance.’** The ISIS religious-political vision is therefore not a recent development, although its recent messaging carefully explains the need for physical control to precede religious authority (Lewis J., 2014, 10). Jessica Lewis explains what kind of methodology (minhaj) IS deploys to secure its existence. This Minhaj is based on four pillars:

- Firstly, hard power. This minhaj aims to create a maximum sphere of chaos through violence in order to reach the complete collapse of the current regime in entire areas. As a consequence, to this chaos a new political entity should replace the collapsed one. To this end, some objectives should be fulfilled: Permanently break down political boundaries in the region; bring like-minded people to fight alongside and settle within the Islamic caliphate; expand the territory of the caliphate and connect to the wider Muslim community.
- Secondly, social control in the wake of military victory is a must to prolong the existence of the new state.
- Thirdly, developing institutions for providing services to local inhabitants.
- Fourth, through education a process of polarization or normalization is settled out to reconstitute several generations of leadership and followers to the Caliphate state.

To this end, ISIS has the interest in controlling territory, through the rudiments of a genuine state in the territory it controls. It has established clear lines of authority, tax and educational systems, and a sophisticated propaganda operation (Walt, 2015, 42). Stephen Walt describes IS as Revolutionary movements while Loretta Napoleoni (2014) names it as shell-state. For both, this new political entity typically uses a combination of strategies such as indoctrination to enforce obedience and encourage sacrifices.

In this regard, Horgan question the relationship between the peripheral or environment and how being a terrorist. The group plays a significant role in shaping the behavioral processes inherent in becoming a terrorist, and promoting engagement in violence (Horgan, 2005, 93). The process of creating terrorists consists of two phases:

- the first, concerns the outer environment whereby the individual is located outside the organization’s sphere of direct effect. In this phase, Horgan asserts that deploying ‘events’ is the best way for escalating collective sympathy in the public sphere. Events such as the war of aggression waged by the United States against Iraq in 2003 played a significant role in recruiting.

- The second phase of keeping the fertile environment to terrorism concerns the internal arena whereby the individual enter the organization. Horgan quoted Milgram's experiment in explaining the psychological factors that drive the individual to follow strictly the terrorists group. One can identify two distinct ways in which obedience to authority functions within institutions: some individuals ignore any possibility of personal responsibility for the consequences of their actions because they locate the responsibility on the authority; the others believe that they have no choice but to obey. Furthermore, one can add the process of justification that convince and enforce the group's volunteerism to moralize the idea of dehumanizing the "other." In this process a reduction for conscious to the limits of actions without scrutinizing the meaning of these actions.

Thus, self-assurance has deliberately interacted with AL-baghdadi willingness to foster allies with local Sunni. Thus, Al-baghdadi seeks consensus inside the IS. To this end, the IS shifts its strategy from severe violence with local habitants to a mixed strategy which includes repression and involvement of the civilians who run out the social works (Napoleoni, 2014, 34). With the help of modern technology and through social media channels, the IS attempts to present a contemporary political image of itself; this image is combined with theological background (Cockburn, 2015, 15). Cockburn quotes Aymenn Al-tamimi, an expert on Jihadis, said: "the rest of the Sunni military opposition will be able to turn against ISIS successfully. If they do, they will leave to act as quickly as possible before ISIS gets too strong" (Cockburn, 2014, 5). I do not agree with this argument for three reasons: if we accept the fact that many f IS leaders were Baathists then they have the efficient experience to deal with such a situation to suppress unwilling people; people under IS control have no sufficient capacity to resist the organization's severe violence; and IS have already take into consideration the potential wave of resistance, hence, it takes several measures to prevent such a movement such as establishing the apparatus of informants which called 'caliphate's eyes' (uyon al kilafha). Thus, I can assume that no local uprising will be subject of success to get rid of IS.

4. IS's global scale message. The message's strategy treats the entire planet as a battle field, rejecting national borders while advocating operations throughout the globe. Furthermore, it promotes franchises, aimed at instill its ideology and agenda (Kfir, 2015, 233). Isaac Kfir asserts that IS' message exploits grievance, insecurity, and religion to become arguably the most dangerous brand of Al Qaedaism. It relies on three interconnected pillars: an insecure environment; religion to

bond the targeted audience with the group; and self-interest. To this end, the notion of “true Muslims” has been associated with two factors:

- IS definition of legitimacy concerning violence to achieve its political ends.
- IS franchised itself as the defender of Sunnis rights across the world.

ISIS’s military success to date would not have been possible without its parallel role as a political vehicle for Sunni grievance. Despite the franchised identity of IS as Sunni organization, but the Islamic State’s leaders believe that their fundamentalist message applies to the entire Muslim world (Walt, 2015, 44). Thus, anti-Shiism and the global nature of IS give no possibility to scholarly debate on the interpretation of the faith (Gaub, 2016, 114). Two factors have increased the number of recruited persons who joined IS:

- The first is the manifestation of power through brutal violence that followed by victories.
- The second is establishment of the caliphate in summer 2014. In this sense, ISIS has managed to more than double its foreign-fighter contingent from 12,000 to at least 27,000 in December 2015.

Florence Gaub asserts that IS not only was able to double its recruitment, rather, it is also able to keep people within its system of governance. In this context, he contends that once individuals have joined a cult, the real transformative work begins through establishing boundaries of psychological control. To install psychological boundaries, they should believe that a life outside the cult is impossible. Thus, the message not only should secure the individual allegiance but also franchising itself as global Islamic resistance to the world order. Thus, for IS the establishment of the Caliphate is a prelude to a “global clash of civilizations” (Marsili, 2016, 86). Sarah Zabel (2007, 5) concludes that IS' strategy is formed on the perception that: if IS will be able to wage a clash of civilization then the Islamic order will be welcomed by the region’s inhabitants. The question: How does ISIS leverage Islamic Law to support its strategic objectives? The answer is three-fold (Pelletier et al., 2016, 15-32):

- To appear legitimate to a broader audience, ISIS must carefully craft its message to emphasize areas that are complementary with mainstream Islamic Law.
- IS’s message should fulfill the historical destiny and reinforcing that Muslims have an obligation to further this destiny.
- IS’s through franchising itself as Sunni brand, it calls for solidarity and cohesion in Muslim community in the global scale. To this end, anti-Shiism sentiment has been deployed for enhancing

the collective support to IS interpretation of legitimacy. To give evidences, one can refer here to the survey that organized on twitter by Aljazeera anchorman Faisal Alkasim, asking “who you support Iraqi popular mobilization or Daesh. 15,026 participated in the survey, 72% supported Daesh.

To understand this kind of sectarian behavior, Jessica Stern and Berger, in *the State of Terror*, argue that IS' message has got advantage of al-Qaeda propaganda strategy. This propaganda started in 2001 when al Qaeda released *The State of the Ummah*. What distinguishes al-Baghdadi propaganda is that he took his anonymite to extraordinary heights (Stern & Berger, 2015, 106). Thus, IS launched a series of tubes and reports such as Salil as-Sawarim (the clanging) which launched in June 2012. Stern and Berger summarize The Clanging of the Swords propaganda by:

- Video proof that the near enemy was vulnerable.
- The part 4 shows that the enemy's most feared weapon was now part of IS's arsenal.
- Foreign fighters were shown burning their passports and renouncing the citizenship of their native lands.

Therefore, this propaganda resonates with political project and force manifestation. It racked up millions of views on video-sharing platforms, although the numbers were almost certainly inflated by ISIS's deceptive social media techniques. Berger and Stern conclude that in IS publication and videos, the anti-Shiites sentiment was exacerbated and have been imaged as narrative. IS has deployed this sentiment to claim legitimacy from the rising number of followers which confirms the global appeal of its message (Napoleoni, 2014, 40).

To conclude this section, one needs to shed light on Napoleoni's argument. She poses an important question: is it possible that IS will ever achieve the necessary legitimacy at transition into a modern state? One can answer that If ISIS can prolong its existence on the territory that carved from Iraq and Syria, and continues its attacks in the western territory, then; international community would rethink about deploying political solution to this threat. Some voices would say that the best way to refute IS's project through shaking hands with it. Having cooperation with IS means that IS is not the promised state of Muslims but it is only another product of the discourse of western power in the Middle East. By that the west strips the divine claim of ISIS. Why this scenario is dangerous on Iraq? If the world accepts IS, then, Iraq will no more be the same as it was before IS crisis. Second, if IS rejects the west's recognition to its right of existence, then, IS will have much moral power to

recruit people. But to answer the first question, there is a need to tackle a second one: how did an armed organization come to challenge the world's greatest powers? For Napoleoni the answer lies in the progressive breakdown of the nation state in Iraq and Syria. These nation governments regressed to the conditions of pre-modern enclaves. Sectarian fronts opened almost and protests morphed into a civil war, which in turn degenerated into a modern proxy war¹⁵⁸. To answer Napoleoni question, Fromson and Simon find out that ISIS's four principal manifestations (guerrilla army, Sunni revanchist political movement, millenarian Islamist cult and ruthless administrator of territory) do suggest that in the near to medium term the gradual decline of IS from within nearly inevitable (Fromson & Simon, 2015, 9). Hansen-Lewis and Jacop Shapiro (2015) support the finding of Fromson and Simon which believes that IS' military spending suggests that it will not be able to sustain large defense expenditures which already reach some numbers in the range of \$900M to \$3B per year. While Henry Johnson, in the article published on Foreign Policy on March 16, 2016, titled *Mapped: The Islamic State Is Losing Territory-and Fast*, gives evidence to support this argument that the defeat of IS is a matter of time. He quoted HIS Jane's map which manifests the group's territorial losses in 2015. The self-proclaimed caliphate has lost 22 percent of the territory it controlled in 2015. It controlled in the end of 2014 one-third of Iraq and one-third of Syria. He causes IS's territorial lost to the political developments in Iraq and Syria. Barak Mendelsohn (2014), *ISIS' Gruesome Gamble*, in *ForeignAffairs* contends that from a military perspective, ISIS' boldness was made possible by the weakness of many of its rivals. But, if the United States decided to step in on behalf of its allies then ISIS must have believed that it would be able to strengthen its position within the jihadi camp. ISIS could use the bombings as evidence that the United States is waging a war on Islam, and to portray itself as the defender of Muslims from "Crusader" aggression.

Although, many scholars in the United States present various views and understanding to the threat of IS which go along with Napoleoni worries and enquires concerning the existence of this threat in the global politics. Therefore, the forthcoming part of this section tackles the question: how intellectuals have participated in spreading specific perception regarding IS's threat? And what are the consequences of this perception on the politics in the United States.

¹⁵⁸ Kim Cragin (2015) argues that the term "proxy war" refers to a conflict in which countries oppose each other indirectly, through the use of surrogates, typically in a third country.

6.2 American Experts: The worries and public perception concerning IS' threat.

The second section will tackle the question: what is the public understanding in the United States concerning IS threat. The field of study is the American intellectual and public periphery and how it delivers the images concerning IS, especially, in the aftermath of Mosul fall in June 2014. To this end, my methodology is two-folds:

- First, explores the intellectual works presented to Americans in different ways such as books, articles and mostly online journals. Thus, this part represents a reading to the most influential and recent works concerning IS by American experts and columnists in most prestigious journals such as: Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, USA Today, Time Magazine, The Washington Post, New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and Chicago Tribune. I was keen to cover the whole series of articles and papers concerning IS in these Journals in the period from June, 2014, to April, 2016. I have collected a number of articles reached around (200). The *American Press Institute* conducted a survey in 2014 which titled 'How Americans Get Their News'. The results state that:

For many Americans, keeping up with the news is an activity that occurs throughout the day and across different formats, devices, and technologies. When asked when they prefer to watch, read, or hear news, a plurality (33 percent) report following the news all throughout the day. Americans follow the news on a wide variety of devices, including through television, radio, print versions of newspapers and magazines, computers, cell phones, tablets, e-readers. The most frequently utilized devices include television (87 percent), laptops/computers (69 percent), radio (65 percent), and print newspapers or magazines (61 percent). The most popular way that Americans report finding their news is directly from a news organization, such as a newspaper, TV newscast, website, or newswire (88 percent). Sizeable majorities also cite the three-national network broadcast news operations (73 percent) in their various forms and 24-hour cable news channels (62 percent) — such as Fox News, CNN, or MSNBC — as sources of news, either on television or digitally.¹⁵⁹

- Secondly, I was so keen in selecting the experts and intellectuals on topics relevant to the field of study. In this part, I have visited the works of the most important intellectuals concerning IS. To be more specific the most important works are: Jessica Stern and Peter Bergen's *The State of Terror*,

¹⁵⁹ Available at: <https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-americans-get-news/>

which published in 2015; Loretta Napoleoni's *The Islamic Phoenix*; Joby Warrick's *The Black Flags*; William McCants' *The ISIS Apocalypse*; Patrick Cockburn's book *The Rise of The Islamic State*; Glenn Beck's *It Is About Islam: Exposing The Truth About ISIS*; and another works.

Through reading, analyzing and exploring the intellectual works, essays and articles concerning IS' threat, I found out that five essential arguments have been discussed frequently by American experts. **The arguments are:**

6.2.1 The first argument: "ISIS going global."

In this argument, American experts discuss two important factors:

- IS's ability of creative a global web of allegiance from Asia to America.
- The global resistance to the western block in which IS has organized several attacks in the heart of European capitals such as Paris, Brussel and beyond. Thus, most of American experts warning the public of potential terrorist attacks in the heart of America.

Initiate a global war of attrition. The Islamic State will operate tactical missions to hit important strategic and economic targets. These targets will be distributed geographically in the West and East alike to shatter the western alliance's strategy. Thus, 'the management of barbarism' is the terrorists' method to transfer the battle from the local stage to globalism whereby all near enemies (Shiites as theology target and Westphalia' state as political target) in the region and distant enemies (western targets) will be approached by the Islamic State's fighters. Liam Stack concludes in NYT that the Islamic State has demonstrated a worldwide reach. It has drawn pledges of support or allegiance from about three dozen jihadist groups in at least 18 different countries.

Let's go further concerning the first argument. Johnnie Moore warning Americans that: "What is also true is that ISIS cells and ISIS-inspired people are right on your doorstep. ISIS doesn't need a geographical region to have a base of operations. A person you recognize as a former coworker approaches you with a knife" (Moore, 2015, 82).

Researchers determined that 21.4 percent of all Arabic tweets in the United States related to ISIS were in support of the Islamic State. The danger according to Moore that individuals can now do what only nation states could do a generation ago. ISIS has not only fielded armies and established government it has also inspired and equipped individuals to commit acts of terror. Terrorism experts describe ISIS' global jihad as a 'leaderless resistance' in which self-proclaimed combatants are

linked by common beliefs and goals and wage a common terrorist war, but operate autonomously. So when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself the Caliph of all Muslims, he was calling himself the successor to Muhammad, demanding allegiance from Muslims, and calling them to conquest.

Within this debate a question is raised which is: why America is targeted by ISIS? However, Napoleoni contends that politicians and anti-terrorism bureaucracies alike had no idea of the magnitude of the danger? She believes that U.S successive administrations treats or perceives political violence as a crime against individuals and property rather than a threat to the state (Napoleoni, 2003, 6-7). Thomas Friedman finds out that nine-eleven, changed all that. It shows the world the power of a group of hateful men who spent several years imagining how to kill as many innocent people as they could (Friedman, 2007, 608). But today, the small number of men can act very big today and pose a danger to world order—without the instruments of a state, Friedman argued.

Manuel Castells continues this argument by asserting that the terrorist organizations despite their small number; they represent a revolutionary or resistant movement against the state quo to vanish the nation state and establishing their Islamic entity (Castells, 2010, 111-2). Castells continues that the real threat for this movement is the worldwide conspiracy against Islam, led by the United States.

Joby Warrick, in *The Black Flag: The Rise of ISIS*, asserts that the most dreadful thing in the story of Daesh, is not their severe savage tool of barbarism, rather is the goal of establishing an Islamic State on the Middle East's ground. Second dreadful thing is how much the threat of IS that located within the western territory. Third, is how IS posed a threat to the world order?

Glenn Beck amid his discussion of IS in his work *'It Is About Islam: Exposing the Truth about ISIS'* quoted Fouad Hussein¹⁶⁰. Hussein revealed the terrorist group's twenty-year plan which has seven different phases. Today we are at the sixth phase which includes total confrontation (2016-2019) in which, in terrorists' view, will be the west's doom. In the light of victory, the caliphate will triumph over the west. The caliphate will be the world's lone superpower.

In this sense of danger Stern and Berger asking why the west should fight ISIS? Their answer was that "ISIS evokes disproportionate dread. As we have shown, the availability of ISIS's crimes, together with its evil, makes us prone to exaggerate the risk, and prone to react rather than strategize" (Stern & Berger, 2015, 237).

¹⁶⁰ Hussein, F. (2005). Al-Zarqawi: the second generation of al-Qaeda, in Arabic.

To be precise David Rothkopf, is CEO and editor of the FP Group, strategically analyzes IS' threat. He sheds light on ISIS ambitious strategy to spread all over the region. And that alone represents red line danger to the United States. In his words: "this is the type of red line that triggers historic change and is worth considering as we mark the epoch-making events in Sarajevo that spawned World War I 100 years ago" (Rothkopf, 2014).

He wonders if ISIS' assertion that it wishes to incorporate Jordan into its caliphate, how would their involvement inflame other extremists?

Robin Simcox in an article, *ISIS' Western Ambitions*, published on *Foreign Affairs*, warning that ISIS "understands no borders." One can notice that this threat should be tackled seriously since the organization has managed to expand its activity and gains since 2003. Simcox argues:

These are not the actions of a locally focused group. Rather, they are the actions of a group is looking to establish a base in the Levant from which to expand its influence throughout the whole region -- and beyond. The real question, then, is where ISIS will go next (Simcox, 2014a).

This question had been central to many articles that published in prestigious Journals and Newspapers in America. For instances, Joseph Chinyong Liow (2014; 2016) and Seth G. Jones (2015), in separated articles, shed light on IS strategy to spread in Asia. They argue that some militant groups in the Southeast Asia have pledged allegiance to IS such as Katibah Nusantara. In October, 2015, Igor Lyakin-Frolov, Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan estimates the number of IS fighters in Afghanistan at 3,500, while in March, 2016, Zamir Kabulov, the Russian special presidential envoy for Afghanistan, estimated that ISIS had 10,000 loyalists in Afghanistan (Azami, 2016, 146-7). Seth G. Jones argues that IS strategy towards Asia is part of broader one which involves a series of discussions with groups in Egypt (including Ansar Beit al-Maqdis), Libya (including factions of Ansar al-Sharia), and later in Nigeria (including Boko Haram), they also began to contact militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They argue that ISIS' reach world-wide is based on several factors:

- 1- Certain devout Muslims feel a theological affinity for the militant group.
- 2- Another reason for ISIS' appeal is its sectarianism.
- 3- The universal sympathy for the Syrian people.

Whilst Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher (2016) along with Geoffrey Howard (2015) pay attention to IS strategy of spreading in North Africa. They argue that since the summer of 2014, ISIS has exploited a governance vacuum and a factional civil war in Libya to expand towards the central coastal city of Sirte. The total number ISIS fighters in Libya are estimated between 3,000 and 6,500. Correspondingly, Jared Malsin (2016b) finds out that IS appears to have two robust prongs: a proto-state in lands that it has captured in Iraq and Syria; and also an emergent global network. And as the group loses ground in Iraq and Syria, it appears ever more bent on launching deadly attacks outside its areas of control. Malsin refers to the attacks in Paris in November 2015 which demonstrated a new level of sophistication. In this regard, William McCants in *The Times* article warning that: 'As long as Western nations are involved in wars fought by jihadists, jihadists will be warring in Western nations' (McCants, 2016).

McCants (2015a) analytical suggestion in this article was not clear in terms of American policy towards this threat. It seems that neither he suggests an American involvement in fighting IS nor leaving aside in such critical situation. Whilst, Michelle Boorstein contends that in both cases the United States will find itself before IS' aggressive strategy. Bernard Haykel, McCants and Daniel Byman assert that Attacks like Paris style are "important to IS for three reasons:

- First to deter U.S. and its western allies of attacking IS.
- Second, going global also offers a host of recruiting advantages.

6.2.2 The second argument the threat of terrorist attacks in the United States

Here, I would like to quote John Moore's statement: "It's bad enough that Westerners are going to fight for ISIS, but the scariest part is that some are coming back—trained, radicalized, and with the ability to blend in—and some of them arriving via their United States passport" (Moore, 2015, 97).

The threat of IS in the United States is not excluded to those who came back from Iraq or Syria as one can notice through the forthcoming paragraphs. But also includes lone-wolves who operate separately and independently. This argument, then, sheds light on two kinds of potential threats:

- The first is about the threat of dirty bomb or the nuclear attack.
- The second concerns lone-wolves' threat.

Both kinds of threat should not be separated since some American scholars or experts contend that any act of violence is potentially includes the threat of dirty bomb. Although, James Der Derian asserts that very little attention has been paid to the relationship between the nuclear balance of terror and modern terrorism (Der Derian, 2009, 86). His analysis is obviously had been conducted prior to IS self-proclaimed declaration in Iraq in 2014. Hence, Anna Bella Korbatov et al. observe that ISIS' seizure of nuclear materials in Iraq and Syria poses that "non-state actors, especially terrorist and insurgent organizations, may now pose greater security threats than traditional states" (Korbatov, Suzuki, & Goldblum, 2015, 68).

The risk of nuclear terrorism exists as long as nuclear materials remain poorly secured. Non-state actors and extremist organizations such as ISIS are acquiring increasingly deadly capabilities and fomenting unrest and political instability in global hot spots. Thomas Ricks (2015a; 2015b) and Neil Joeck (2016), in two separated articles on Foreign Policy, assert that the terrorist attacks in Brussels indicate that planning had been underway for some time, and that dirty bomb is highly potential risk. Arabinda Acharya¹⁶¹ organized in February 2016 interview with John Brennan, director of the CIA, who mentioned that the Islamic State has, in a number of instances, "used chemical munitions on the battlefield." Specifically, ISIS used such munitions in an August 2015 attack on the Kurds in Kobani, and Iraq according to several statements by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. Acharya continues that with financial capacity ISIS could purchase a nuclear weapon from Pakistan, take it to Nigeria, and then smuggle it into the United States through Mexico.

Here, one might question IS' ability of deploying weapons of mass destruction since it involves a high level of technological and scientific skill, equipment, materials, and organization. Despite this skepticism of IS capabilities of deploying such weapons, Jim Michaels (2016) and Karl Vick (2016) quote James Clapper, director of National Intelligence, and other American officials who contends that radiological terrorism is an immediate danger; and suggesting that dirty bombs attacks might be widespread. They explain that this threat is highly profiled due to the fact that there are many places in Iraq and Syria where radioactive material is stored, often carelessly: hospitals, food-irradiation centers, industrial sites. Even though, "They don't have to go to Iraq or Syria to get the material," says Andrew Bienenawski, an expert at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), because of (Vick, 2016):

¹⁶¹Author of *Ten Years after 9/11: Rethinking the Jihadist Threat*, Routledge security in Asia and Pacific Series, 2013.

- 1- Only 23 countries out of 130 have committed to securing radiological materials.
- 2- IS start seeking radiological and nuclear knowledge. In this regard, Debra Decker (2016) refers to Ilyass Boughalab¹⁶² who worked in Belgium's nuclear industry and later joined the IS.

- **The threat of terrorist attacks in the United States:**

Now the discussion moves on the second part of this argument which concerns the growing threat of domestic terrorism in the United States. Stephen Fiddler interprets the attacks of Brussels and Paris as message. The message contends that the Islamic State has the capability to commit deadly terrorist attacks in the heart of Europe and beyond. Fiddler argues that the IS organization has three strategic advantages: a home territory in Iraq and Syria which promotes and finances terrorist acts; the refugee flows into the West; and its returning fighters to their homeland in the west.

Peter Bergen¹⁶³ in an article published in The Wall Street Journal stresses that it's likely that the United States will witness a several terrorist attacks like the San Bernardino attack. He contends that despite the 2015, the FBI investigation efforts the Islamic State could plan and execute such events. For him the problem is up to the difficulty of pointing out the potential lone-wolves. It's very difficult to figure out who is going to join the terrorist organization. The lines between mainstream Muslim and the radical have been blurred, by focusing on religious beliefs. Thus, there is no sufficient way for prosecuting radicals without violating civil rights to some Muslims. According to FBI conservative estimation (Berger, 2016; Mead 2016):

- Only 300 homegrown jihadists in the United States.
- Every lethal jihadist terrorist attack in the U.S. since 9/11 has been carried out by individuals with no formal connection to foreign terrorist groups.
- At the other end of the spectrum, a handful of American jihadists have emerged as serious actors at the global level such as Anwar al-Awlaki.

In this perspective, Adam Goldman (2015) asks: is the United States safe from a Paris-style Islamic State attack? The answer is twofold:

¹⁶² From 2009 to 2012, Boughalab worked for contractor AIB-Vincotte and had security clearances to inspect welds in sensitive areas of the Doel 4 nuclear reactor. Then he left for Syria, was convicted in absentia for being part of a group called Sharia4Belgium and died fighting in Syria in 2014 (Mufson March, 2016).

¹⁶³ Mr. Bergen is CNN's national security analyst, vice president of New America and a professor at Arizona State University.

-First, “*Safer here than there? Yes*. Since American security apparatus have taken the necessary measures to prevent terrorist acts. He argues that in 2015, the FBI has charged more than 60 people in connection with the Islamic State; also, the number of Americans who have traveled to Iraq and Syria is about 250, dramatically less than the estimated 4,500 who have left Europe, or the 400 fighters who trained by IS to target Europe in deadly waves of attacks (Goldman, 2016; Hinnant & Dodds, 2016).

- Second, America is not immune before the IS aggressive war of attrition. In this regard, Kelly Moore and Steve Lopez suggest that due to shortage in current policies concerning border security and immigration a new attack is a potential result. Matthew Levitt quoted testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2016:

The Brussels bombings have made it plain that the scale of the threat posed by the Islamic State to the West is far larger than most Westerners had previously thought. That threat is no longer limited to the radicalization of the 5,000-6,000 European citizens who left the comfort and safety of their homes to fight alongside the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq and, more recently, Libya. Nor has it only expanded to include so-called "lonewolf" plots—self-organized attacks carried out by homegrown radicals. The Brussels bombings have made it painfully clear that the Islamic State is determined to plan and direct attacks in the West that are far more sophisticated and lethal than such small-scale mayhem (Levitt, 2016).

Following of the statement above there is a need to shed light on the doctrinal background of IS organization; because one needs to understand to what extent IS is going global. In other words, why they are going global? Is it for securing their political project as shell-state (Napoleoni, 2014) or for a bigger ambition? The third argument will try to answer this question.

6.2.3 The third argument: what ISIS really is?

One can summarize the discussion around this question into two trends:

- First, IS is a group of criminals who find reliance with the baathists in opposing the new political regime in Iraq.
- Second, IS is a group of terrorists who join the revolutionary movement of Qaedism. Thus, they belong to a global revolutionary Islamic movement.

Here, Yasser Abdul Hussein¹⁶⁴ asserts that Al-Baghdadi organization is a product of Baath cadres who joined terrorist organizations such as IS in Iraq. Thus, IS became the son of Baath-Qaida marriage in Iraq. One can assume if that true then IS in Iraq does not represent a threat to the world order since Baathism believe in nationalism which in contrast to the theological aspiration of IS leaders; second, as well as this assumption can create a link between al Assad and ISIS since both belong to the same political background. In this perspective it is a threat to the international peace but not to the Westphalian order. But the reality on the ground in the ME shows us that ISIS' aims and actions posed a real threat to the world order. Joby Warrick supports this argument; he asserts that among the dominant leaders are a number of former officers of Saddam's vanquished army-Sunni colonels who had allied themselves with Zarqawi but were never fully trusted by him.

The movement's toxic but potent mix of extreme religious beliefs and military skill is the outcome of the war in Iraq since the invasion of 2003 and the war in Syria since 2011 (Cockburn, 2015, 18). Jihadists having shifted today the political terrain in Iraq and Syria, is already having far reaching effects on global politics with dire consequences for the whole world, since the growing dominance of intolerant Wahhabism' belief within the world wide Sunni community, means 1,6 billion Muslims will be increasingly affected, Cockburn argued.

The newly declared caliphate covered an area larger than Great Britain and inhabited by some six million people, a population larger than that of Denmark or Finland. The birth of the new state was the most radical change to the political geography of the ME since the Sykes-Picot agreement was implemented in the aftermath of the First World War.

As Hassan Hassan, an analyst with the Delma Institute in Abu Dhabi, notes, the success of the strategy lies in how ISIS 'allows local forces to govern their own state of affairs, which increases rivalry and reduces the visibility of ISIS.' Nevertheless, in Iraq particularly, ISIS has had to take

¹⁶⁴ The author of "The Third World War," the Head of Beladi Center of Strategic Studies in Baghdad, vice-dean of Iraqi Diplomatic Institute (MOFA).

into account the guiding hand of the Ba'athist elites who found themselves excluded from post-2003 Iraq (Edwards, 2015, 13).

ISIS exploited sites of localized administrative weakness in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Libya to establish its territorial foothold. Ariel Ahram and Ellen Lust argue that these groups found themselves in the position of would-be state-builders, mimicking, recreating and appropriating the infrastructure of state power. Still ISIS has shown nothing but contempt for international borders and the underlying norms of sovereignty. Its vision of a caliphate would seem to preclude any territorial boundaries at all. Yet ISIS does much to look and act the state (Ahram & Lust, 2016, 19). It seems that there is huge political dispute within IS leadership between those who manipulate state borders and those who believe in anti-border system. In this regard, there is a need to shed light on the relationship between the Baathists and Qaedists. In this regard, Stern and Berger quote Major General Douglas Stone who became in 2007 the deputy commanding general of Multi-National forces in Iraq; he states that "the majority of the detainees were former regime Baathists, former criminals or serious takfiri ideologues" (Stern & Berger, 2015, 36).

Baghdadi gets advantage of his close relationship with Baathists to create a web of trust with the tribes' leaders in the Sunni areas. The baathification of ISIS may have been the brainchild of a former colonel in Saddam Hussein's army whose who spent time with Baghdadi at Camp Bucca. To accomplish this feat, ISIS crafted a series of complex alliances with Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq, even with tribes that did not necessarily share ISIS's extreme ideology. Stern argues that Baghdadi manipulate the political dispute between Sunni Arabs and the central government during Maliki era. Samuel Helfont and Michael Brill, *Saddam's ISIS? On Foreign Affairs*, quote Kyle W. Orton who wrote in The New York Times: "Those who assumed leadership roles in the Islamic State's military council had been radicalized earlier, under Mr. Hussein's regime" (Helfont & Brill, 2016).

Hence, Orton and Liz Sly have portrayed Saddam as an Islamist, based on the revitalization of Islamic practices during his 1993 Faith Campaign, and even argued that he promoted Salafism, the rigid brand of Islam practiced by ISIS. In contrast Helfont and Brill criticize these depictions as inaccurate and dangerously misleading. They visited the Iraqi archives at Hoover Institution's Ba'ath Party records. They contend that the study of those records has found no evidence that Saddam or his Baathist regime in Iraq displayed any sympathy for Islamism, Salafism, or Wahhabism. Saddam was particularly critical of religious arguments that denied the need for Arab unity and instead called for Islamic unity.

They oppose the argument that Saddam at some point merged his Baathist policies with either Islamist or Salafist ones is also incorrect; for some reasons: Saddam regime's support for foreign Islamist groups such as Hamas was strategically motivated; also The Baathists were ruthlessly consistent in their attempts to track down and "neutralize" anyone with the slightest hint of Salafist or Islamist sympathies; when the Baathists did promote Islam as part of a national Faith Campaign, they mostly referred to a watered-down version of Islam that had always been a part of Baathist ideology and was compatible with their pan-Arab agenda.

Ofra Bengio's chapter *The Manipulation of Islam* shows that the deployment of Islamic themes in Baathi discourse had been exacerbated during the regime's later years. Despite this deployment there was no basic change in the content of Baathi thinking, as Bengio argued. The 1947 party statutes, for instance, made no mention whatsoever of Islam or of its place in the projected polity. More than that, clause 15 of the statutes declared: "The national bond [al-rabita al-qawmiyya] is the only bond existing in the Arab state and it is this bond that promises harmony among the citizens and their fusion in a single melting pot while struggling against all other loyalties: religious [madhhabiyya], communal, tribal, racist, and regional [iqlimiyya]" (Quoted in Bengio, 1998, 94). However, Bathism, being a "positive spiritual movement," according to Saddam, could not dissociate itself from religion or clash with it. This approach—implying the secular character of the state and the separation of state and religion—remained official policy along with Saddam's religious rhetoric as believer. Bengio finds out that the use of Islamic terminology as no more than a propaganda gimmick; the inclusion of Islamic terms in Husayn's personal idiom and the perfection of their use as an instrument of war reached their peak during the Gulf War. Saddam's political rhetoric in the aftermath of the second gulf war was characterized by both pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam (Bengio, 1998, 176-191). However, no evidences can be found concerning radicalization in the Iraqi society prior to 2003. Yasser Abdul Hussein through a well-organized chapter asks whether the Iraqi society was familiar to radicalism and Salafiyyah before 11/9 events? He provides answers with respect to long and worth organizing methodology by asserting extremist ideologies were alien to the Iraqi society.

Juan Cole questions: how Iraqis went from being coded as potentially dangerous, left leaning Arab nationalists, to being grouped with al-Qaeda as a radical Islamic menace (Cole, 2009, 129). He blames Islamophobia discourse of these incorrect and misleading conclusions. Cole quoted

sociologist Mansoor Moaddel who conduct several nationwide polls in Iraq from spring 2004 through summer 2007. Over 7,000 respondents were polled. The polling revealed that summer of 2007, averaging about 15 percent in Iraq support implementing sharia, or Islamic canon law.

However, the discussion about IS political doctrine shows us that it implements state's codes in securing the political project of Caliphate. It seems that they cannot escape the modern nation state even in recruiting. In this regard, Audrey Kurth Cronin (2016) argues that the ISIS threat is more akin to the state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Iran, Libya, the Soviet Union, and Syria during the 1970s and 1980s. In this sense, Cronin analysis is close to Napoleoni's shell-state of which she described IS in Iraq and Syria. Hence, territory and manifestations of state are necessary tools in IS political strategy. Shell-state is an inevitable result to proxy wars. In other words, Napoleoni contends that IS is emerged from the ashes of conflict among regional and super powers (Napoleoni, 2014; Rabinovich, 2014, 4). This political conflict provided a fertile ground to the religious and sectarian sentiments to be politically manipulated. Therefore, a core element of any anti-ISIS strategy should be diminishing its state-like safe haven.

The Second part of this argument reflects the trend that perceives IS as Islamic revolutionary movement. In this regard, Bruce B. Lawrence (2015) and Kathleen Parker (2016) argue that ISIS is like al-Qaida. Both claim the mantle of Islam in opposing the West in general. In Lawrence words: "The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse" (Lawrence, 2015). IS myth is Islamic in the sense that it attracts psychopaths and adventure seekers, Lawrence said. For them ISIS offers a version of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad that few Muslims would recognize or honor. Hence, Katie Zavadski (2014) argues that without Islam as religious identity Is could not appeal Muslims worldwide. Zavadski evidence is that the demonstrations of popular sympathy appear in Muslim countries or by Muslims in the West. About a dozen militant organizations in nine countries (in addition to Iraq and Syria) have made formal pledges of support to the group. These countries are: Pakistan, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Philippines, Lebanon, Indonesia and Jordan.

In contrast, Jessica Stern (2015b), and Alastair Crooke (2014) argue that the goals of IS organization are Islamic such as establishing the Islamic Caliphate.¹⁶⁵ To this end, IS manipulates religion to polarize Muslims around its goal. Mohammed al-Adnani, official spokesperson of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has repeatedly urged Muslims to carry out a jihad at home. In Stern words: "IS is a criminal organization which deploys Islam for appealing to Muslims. To be clear, ISIS is a populist organization. It is seeking to seduce anyone and everyone who might be willing to join" (2015b).

But, according to Stern, IS flourished because of:

- Arab countries show a lower level of human development over the last quarter century.
- Arab youth are not being adequately prepared to compete in a globalized society.
- Poor governance creates the conditions under which extremist groups to thrive and able to spread their message.

6.2.4 The fourth argument concerning the common threat by IS and Iranian Backed-Shia militias which operate in the Middle East.

Patrick Cockburn (2015) argues that the threat of IS cannot be thwarted down without taking into consideration the Iranian role in the region which is fighting back on behalf of the region's shia population. This binary opposition has escalated the civil war within Islam to bloody proportions. Glenn Beck (2015) asserts that the West needs to understand the war that is engulfing Islam and threatens to expand into a global war posing a dire threat to America and the west. In the light of this argument both sides (Shiism backed by Iran and reductive Sunnism to Wahabism backed by Saudi Arabia) represent a threat to the West. Beck continues his argument by asserting that both of them manipulate shariah for political ends; which is in direct conflict with the western values such as freedom of thought and liberalism (Beck, 2015, 197). Beck urges that those Muslims are willing to establish Islamic Emirates weather in the Middle East or on the American territory. Beck quotes Murk and Daniel Pipes that Muslims dream of dominating the world through establishing the no-boundaries caliphate; and militant path is their way to restore this Caliphate. Beck asserts that Sunni and Shia Islamists are two faces of the same coin. They deploy the same slogans which sometimes

¹⁶⁵ See also: Zachary, L., and Masters, L. (2016). The Islamic State. CFR Backgrounds. {Online}. Council on Foreign Relations. available at: <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811>. {Accessed on 7 September, 2016}.

include of democratic one to achieve their ends. They share the same end of establishing IS based on their own interpretation of Islam.

McCants also support such an argument. He gives evidences through highlighting apocalyptic messages resonate among many Muslims today because of the political turmoil in the Middle East. McCants (2015) urges that despite differentiation in apocalyptic messages both sects believe that the establishing of the Caliphate is a must to spread Islamic justice. Shiites believe in the prophecy of imminent appearance of the Mahdi, meanwhile, Sunnis deploy the prophecy of black flag. Today, self-proclaimed IS in Iraq and Syria carved territory to impart credibility to these prophecies. Hence, one can notice Al-Baghdadi when he called on Muslims to head to the blessed land (as he proclaimed). McCants adds that "Baghdadi chooses Dabiq as a capital for the same apocalyptic reason, they believe that the great battle between infidels and Muslims would take place there... Meanwhile, Shia believes that the Mahdi and the prophet will kill the Sufyani in the Sham" (McCants, 2015a, 75).

Thus, IS's strategy depends somehow on what Craig Whitlock and Ellen Nakashima (2015) call as the apocalyptic narrative. This narrative extracts legitimacy among Muslims from the aggressiveness of the American bombarding in Syria as well as the escalating sectarian conflict.¹⁶⁶

In this regard, Stern and Berger have no different opinion. They cite a 2012 PEW poll, which had been conducted in the Middle East countries; the results contend that half of those been surveyed believe that they will personally witness the appearance of the Mahdi. This expectation is most common in Afghanistan (83 percent), followed by Iraq (72), Tunisia (67), and Malaysia (62) (Stern & Berger, 2015, 219). For Stern and Berger, the participation of Shiite militias in the Syrian conflict is up to the sectarian apocalyptic motive. In this sense, they quote Rohollah Hoseinian, an Iranian cleric and member of Parliament, who explained that the participation of Shiiate in the Levant is a must to defeat the infidels as Imam Sadeq has stated. McCants explains, both Shi'a and Sunni groups hope to achieve the privilege of destroying the infidels.

Gen. David H. Petraeus argued, in an interview organized by Liz Sly, that:

¹⁶⁶ Concerning the historical discourse of sectarian conflict in the Arab world, please read:

- Thomas Asbridge, 2010, *The Crusaders: the Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land*, Harper Collins e-books.
- J. Wellhausen (translated by Maragret Graham Weir), 1927, *The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall*, Calcutta University Press.

The foremost threat to Iraq's long-term stability and the broader regional equilibrium is not the Islamic State; rather, it is Shiite militias, many backed by — and some guided by — Iran. Thus, they have, to a degree, been both part of Iraq's salvation but also the most serious threat to the all-important effort of once again getting the Sunni Arab population in Iraq to feel that it has a stake in the success of Iraq rather than a stake in its failure (Liz Sly, 2015, TWP).

In other words, Petraeus warns that in a long term, Iranian-backed Shia militia could emerge as the preeminent power in Iraq. The more the Iranians are seen to be dominating the region, the more it is going to inflame Sunni radicalism and fuel the rise of groups like the Islamic State, Petraeus said. It seems that many officials in the United States share Petraeus' understanding to the turmoil in the Middle East. Chris Christie, the New Jersey governor, added: “We are in the midst of the next world war.” Christie's war seems adopting Naftali Bennett's classification of enemies. Naftali¹⁶⁷ states that:

For the free world to win, we need to start by realizing one simple thing — no matter what the name of the organization, the enemy is the same. It might be called Hezbollah in Lebanon, ISIS in Iraq, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Al-Nusra in Syria. All have the same goal — to attack the Western democratic way of life wherever it might be (Naftali, 2014).

But Christie adds some salt to this argument whereby he believes that Iran is a greater threat than IS (Smith 2015; Goldberg, 2015).

6.3. Third Section: The Implications of the Rise of ISIS on American Politics:

Jocelyne Cesari in her work *Why the West Fears Islam* tries to answer such a question endorsed in the title itself. She concludes that the public perception in the United States deals with Islam and Muslims as internal and external threat. But why this perception has been installed in the American mind? To answer the question her methodology asserts two important points:

- The first that Muslims always has played the role of ‘other’ in the western psyche.

¹⁶⁷ Naftali has served as Israel's Minister of Education since 2015.

- Second, the emphasis on liberal values and national identity to defend the self from the incompatible other.

This psycho-ideological approach justifies coercive state power to protect the values of liberal societies. Thus, this binary vision of Islam versus the West has long standing effects beyond the formation of modern politics. Furthermore, she contends that the threat of Islam cannot be separated from the political developments such as the Iranian hostage crises and its aftermath on the Middle East' politics. She also adds that public discourse focuses on two perceptions: Islam as incompatible with Western values; and Islam as either enemy or threat (Cesari, 2013, 6). According to this perception Muslims cannot assimilate with liberal values even if they get used with some aspects of Western life such as dress codes. Thus, western and Muslim cultures are two separate identities and at odds. Here, the fear is shifted towards any possible change to the status quo if Muslims are able to bring Islamic values to western law codes. But the main threat of Muslims is that related to national security and terrorism. Cesari gave evidence which is the establishment of a special committee in 2011 to investigate radicalization of American Muslims; because Islam was reported by many polls to be linked with terrorism violence (Cesari in Esposito & Kalin, 2011, 34). To answer the question why the west fears Islam, Cesari concludes that the public perception in the West understands Islam and Muslims by these notions:

- Muslims have not and will not integrate.
- Muslims are threat to the national identity now and in the future.

Idrees Hani, is a Moroccan author and Islamic researcher, in the long introduction of the *Third World War* (96 pages), analyses the methodological relationship between Orientalism and western strategy towards the Muslims and Arabs. His conclusion in the introduction is simple to demonstrate the reality of the dichotomy that tells us that the (Muslims) are the victims and the Executioners at the same time. He asserts that extremism and terrorism is the product of the stereotyping process that creates negative images to the East in the Western public conscious. However, extremism is a local product of Eastern sanctuary to restore their pride and self-assertion in front of the other. Thus, terrorism is a chapter in "*the game of Nations*" that adopts the stereotype of irrational and barbarian Middle East which deployed by the West itself to certain political ends. Hani adds that Daesh is "a monster that created by the playing with genes in the Western laboratory." This new creature has become uncontrollable due to surplus power that gave it the

opportunity to claim the supremacy over the other terrorist organizations in the world. Hani's point is expressed plainly in this subtitle (*Terrorism in the Orientalism's perception: the paradigm of Huntington's theory*, page 26). He means that Orientalism submits both the cure and the disease. But let us go further in discovering Muslim's perception in American politics.

Many scholars have discussed and analyzed this perception especially since 9/11. Kathleen Blee (2016) and Andrew McCarthy (2010) argue that Muslims in the United States today are widely considered as actual or potential terrorists, with predictably negative consequences. Thus, Muslim Americans are routinely surveilled and screened as threats to the public order. The devastating attacks on U.S. targets in the name of global Islam did create a negative understanding against Muslims. Bail argues that anti-Muslim civic organizations could change broad public discourse in a relatively short time (Blee, 2016, 7). By 2012, for example, legislation meant to stop “creeping Shari-ah,” the imposition of Islamic law on U.S. citizens, was proposed in almost two thirds of all U.S. states despite the legal and political implausibility of this scenario. McCarthy makes some statements such as: "It is sharia, not terrorism, that must be our line of demarcation, dividing radical Islam from moderate Islam." He Continuous with: "We must no longer allow those who mean to destroy our society to camouflage themselves as “moderates” (McCarthy, 2010).

In this sense, no clear distinction has been made between radical or mainstream Muslim. The challenge then is what role the government plays to build both public security and public trust without alienating Muslims (Saeed & Johnson, 2016, 38). How official institutions can keep neutral policies under the increased aggressiveness of IS threat. For instance, since December 2015 two terrorist acts have been reported in relation with IS. The first on 2 December, 2015, 14 were killed and 21 injured in a shooting in San Bernardino, California; the second occurred in June 2016. For every physical casualty of a terror attack, there are serious consequences on different levels:

- 1- On popular level a psychiatric condition to arise as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), with consistent findings of a 30–40% prevalence rate among those directly affected (Bartholomew, 2016, 4). Several instances of mass panic involving chaotic flight from a perceived threat have been reported in America since the December attack.
- 2- On official level *Terror Management Theory* (TMT) explains why perceived threat from out-groups may induce prejudice and hostility towards them (Lopes & Jaspal, 2015, 381).

On both levels (popular and official), Barbara Lopes and Rusi Jaspal argue that paranoia can be suggested as a mediator of the relationship between death anxiety and anti-Muslim prejudice. Their findings clearly suggest that paranoid thinking shapes attitudes towards “Others” which are perceived to threaten, in one way or another, the integrity, of the in-group in. As a result, Hellen Fenwick concludes that *Temporary exclusion orders* (TEC) are potentially can be seen in the societal and official level. But, these ‘orders’ (TEO) should accommodate legalism. In other words, government should acquire scrutiny in implementing TEO on individuals involved in terrorism (Fenwick, 2016, 2). In contrast, the so-called “War on Terror,” launched by President George W. Bush in the immediate wake of September 11, 2001, incited Islamophobia to a large degree and posited in the minds of the American political right and the general population alike the idea that Muslim-majority countries, such as Iraq, were suspicious and dangerous even (Lean, 2012, 142). In this regard, Cole argues that official Islamophobia such as that of Rumsfeld could not be analyzed separately from the societal context. And this sense of paranoia and phobia is exclusively imaged and correlated as Islamic; whereby no distinguish made between Muslims as anthropological by-products and Islam as belief. As a consequence, Rumsfeld and any regular individual alike see the United States as “surrounded” by violent Muslim movements; and perceives Muslims as intrinsically extremist. Cole quotes Indonesian intellectual Muhamad Ali who advised Washington:

If they want to refer to a group of terrorists, they may name them, such as al-Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyah, Islamic Jihad, etc., instead of using the word Islamic for any ideology emerging from the Muslim tradition and history without a clear definition and full understanding of the characteristics and diversity of Muslim movements (Cole in Esposito& Kalin: 2011, 129-30).

Cole concludes that the imagining of an implacable Islamic enemy that licenses U.S. aggression is clear in a number of speeches by former U.S. vice president Dick Cheney and by Bush or other republican politicians such as Former New York mayor Rudolf Giuliani almost seemed to be running against al-Qaeda in the primaries. Hence, political campaigns have been seen as indisputable field of Islamophobia (Miller, 2012, 15). Thus, in the following pages, I provide evidences of Islamophobic rhetoric being utilized by presidential candidates in the United States of

America. But, I have to test whether their rhetoric is really Islamophobic in accordance to what have been discussed in the first section concerning Islamophobia.

To this extent, I quote Chris Allen's explanation of Islamophobia as:

An ideological phenomenon, one that includes systems of thought and meaning, manifested in signifiers and symbols that influence, impact on and inform the social consensus about the 'Other'. From this perspective, Islamophobia is not necessarily restricted to any specific action, practice, discrimination or prejudice but instead shapes that which is widely accepted as natural and normative with regard to Muslims, Islam or both. Consequently, being opposed or resistant to the 'Other' comes to be seen as common sense: rational, justified, natural and, most importantly, not in any way racist (Allen, 2011, 290).

In this regard, Jentelson concludes that Islamophobia helping build consensus and national solidarity when the nation faces a serious threat. Islamophobic consensus cannot be limited to the domestic politics whereby foreign policy should not be detached from national solidarity which been built within public perception (Jentelson, 2010, 65-7). So, Islamophobic currents affect the practices of the political mainstream, transforming legislations, political decision making and policies on security and immigration specifically towards Muslims (Ekman, 2015, 1987).

6.3.1 Islamophobia as public sentiment:

Despite the fact that Islamophobia exists in the U.S since the sixteenth century¹⁶⁸, but, not so much light has been shed on Islamophobic practices till 9/11 events. While, in the aftermath of 9/11 events and its subsequent terror events which took place in the west one can notice the growing anti-Islam sentiment in the U.S. in this regard, Carl Ernst highlights two evidences that occurred in 2011 (Ernst, 2013, 1): one was the theatrical announcement of Pastor Terry Jones, leader of a small religious group in Florida, that he had put the Qur'an on trial for "crimes against humanity" and was planning to burn copies of it on the anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against American targets. The second was that whereby anti-Muslim bloggers created an enormous dispute by arguing

¹⁶⁸ For more details, please read: Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, 2013, *Common Heritage, Uncommon Fear: Islamophobia in the United States and British India, 1687–1947*. In: Carl W. Ernst, ed., *Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance*. Palgrave Macmillan. pp21-52

that this so-called Ground Zero mosque was really intended to be a celebration of the 9/11 attacks as a victory of Islam over America.

Carl Ernst concludes the anti-Islam sentiment in the U.S by emphasizing three points (Ernst, 2003; Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Curtis, 2009):

- 1- Treat it as a largely unwarranted social anxiety about Islam and Muslims.
- 2- Considers it to be a prejudice against Islam that is particularly associated with violence in media representations.
- 3- The element of racism in Islamophobia, which might be linked to state policies.

From my point of view, Media and political deployment to the rise of radical groups such as IS have led to the acerbation of Islamophobia as public sentiment in the U.S. For instance, Donald Trump's call for a ban on Muslims might sound outrageous, but it could appeal to the 55% of Americans who voice an unfavorable opinion of Islam.¹⁶⁹ Islamophobic sentiments are more common among Americans who are 45 and older, those who are Republican and those who are white. So far, much of Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric has focused on security. Hostility towards Muslims in America exists alongside a lack of familiarity with Muslims. The YouGov poll that looked at unfavorable attitudes also asked respondents: "Do you personally happen to work with anyone who is Muslim?" – 74% said no.¹⁷⁰ Sarah Berger argues that Americans' perceptions of Islam have turned increasingly negative in recent years, a survey released on November from the Public Religion Research Institute revealed. Fifty-six percent of people surveyed agreed that the values of Islam are at odds with America's values and way of life, which is a significant increase from 47 percent in 2011. What is significant that Islamophobia has reached very high peak even more than that in the aftermath of 9/11. In this sense, Eric Ward argues that discrimination and bigotry are worse for American Muslims in 2016 than they were in the months following 9/11. Erik Ward contends that "official forms of discrimination prevade law enforcement, schools, and immigration policy, institutionalizing a system of bias that makes bigotry against Muslims acceptable in this country" (Ward, 2016).

¹⁶⁹ For more details, see also: table 8.1 in Henk Dekker and Jolanda Van der Noll (2012). *Islamophobia and its Explanation*. In Marc Helbling, ed., *Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes*. Routledge (google books).

¹⁷⁰ How anti-Muslim are Americans? Data points to extent of Islamophobia. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/08/muslims-us-islam-islamophobia-data-polls>

Iyad Mamdani in the aftermath of Mosul fall in June 2014 noticed that (Madani, 2015, p12):

- a. Hatred against Muslims has been growing in the United States;
- b. Hate Crimes against Muslims in the United States rises even higher due to violent acts on the falsely name of Islam in different countries;
- c. Americans have now been starting to question the peaceful nature of Islam due to the spreading violence claiming this religion as the background;
- d. Most of Americans disagreed with the existence of Mosques in their city;
- e. according to the NYPD: Anti-Muslim hate crimes are up 143 percent.

Furthermore, Madani conducted the survey which revealed that 48 percent of those been surveyed disagreed with the statement “ISIS is not Islamic.” Hence, 2015 has been the deadliest year on record for American Muslims, with 63 recorded attacks on mosques. The previous high was 2010, with 53 attacks targeting Islamic worship centers (Cartwright, 2015). On June 24, 2015, the Center for Security Policy (CSP), a Washington, D.C. think tank run by former Reagan official Frank Gaffney released a survey of 600 Muslims living in the United States. Bridge Initiative Team accuses CSP of spreading fear towards Muslims. They questioned the credibility of this survey. They believe that Gaffney selected carefully the symbols of survey from one group of Muslims; the argue that the title reflects Gaffney's dubious claims: “Poll of US Muslims Reveals Ominous Levels of Support For Islamic Supremacists’ Doctrine of Shariah, Jihad.” Among the poll's findings that: "nearly one-fifth of Muslim respondents said that the use of violence in the United States is justified in order to make shariah the law of the land in this country.”¹⁷¹

I can summarize three main consequences of Islamophobia in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the United States:

¹⁷¹ Bridge Initiative Team, Trump Calls for Ban on Muslims, Cites Deeply Flawed Poll, Posted on December 7, 2015 at 6:48 am. Available at: <http://bridge.georgetown.edu/new-poll-on-american-muslims-is-grounded-in-bias-riddled-with-flaws/>

- 1- The increasing incidents of hate crimes.¹⁷² Since the December 2 shooting at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, there have been dozens of reports of anti-Muslim incidents across the country.¹⁷³
- 2- Growing anti-Muslims sentiment in American political life. This sentiment manifests itself in the National scale polls which revealed pro-Trump trend. Rasmussen's report¹⁷⁴ which issued on 30 June contends that Donald Trump has taken four-point lead when reached 43% in the aftermath of Orlando attack. Michael Tasler (2015) from a November 19-23 YouGov/Economist survey quoted that Trump's supporters are particularly suspicious of Muslims.
- 3- Basic challenge confronting Muslims in America has to do with the enterprise of self-definition. Sherman Jackson argues that both foreign-born and American-born Muslims are equally confronted with the question of how they should seek to influence American social and political institutions to the end of gaining public recognition and respect for themselves as Muslims and contribute to the creation of a social reality that is free of double consciousness (Jackson in Nizamuddin, 1999).

6.3.2 Islamophobia as Institutional by-product:

Nathan Lean argues that:

Anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States has not only manifested itself through mosque arsons, assaults, murders and invariably hostile rhetoric from society's extreme fringes. It has also become a permanent fixture of the very institutions that should provide safeguards against those things (Lean, 2013).

¹⁷² Irene Zempi and Neil Chakraborti (2014) contend that Being a victim of hate crime can have devastating and long term impacts upon individuals including emotional, psychological, behavioral, physical and financial effects (Zempi & Chakraborti, 2014, 66). In this regard, Islamophobic practices will have a very dangerous implication on individual's behavior not only those who being victims of these crimes; also anyone from Muslims community can be a subject of this impact. In other words, Islamophobic victimization would escalate terrorism danger in the West. Zempi and Chakraborti argue that experiences of Islamophobic victimization increased feelings of insecurity. Thus, in both cases whether as subject or object to Islamophobia fear is what arise to the fore. Fear has a very devastated effect on social fabric and individual self-esteem. Marc Helbling (2012) urges that it is important to tackle Islamophobia because increasing negative behavior against Muslims among non-Muslims may result in increased social exclusion, which then may result in radicalization among Muslims (Helbling, 2012).

¹⁷³ Board of editors (2015). Hate crimes against Muslims play into ISIS' hands, Los Angeles Times: editorial (27 March 5: 08). <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-1215-mosque-burning-20151214-story.html>

¹⁷⁴ Available at: http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/elections/election_2016/white_house_watch

Arshin Adib Moghaddam (2011) argues that racism, reveals itself as a latent instrument that continues to contribute to the functionality of power. Here, one might ask to what extent or by which group either Islamophobia or Anti-Muslim racism have found roots in the U.S' state craft. In this regard, Sarah Berger (2015) and Michael Lipka (2015) contend that this institutional Islamophobia is strongly promoted by republican officials. For instance, Former Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Texas Senator Ted Cruz said that the U.S. should only accept Christian refugees since there is "no meaningful risk of Christians committing acts of terror." A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2014 shows that people who identify as Republicans or say they lean toward the Republican Party have more negative views of Muslims than do their Democratic counterparts. In September, 2014 Pew Research Center survey found that 82% of Republicans are "very concerned" about the rise of Islamic extremism in the world, compared with 60% of political independents and 51% of Democrats. Similarly, two-thirds of Republicans (67%) say that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its believers, compared with 47% of independents and 42% of Democrats (Lipka, 2015). The very recent instances of republican Islamophobia are witnessed in Trump presidential campaign. Trump's call 'for total shutdown of Muslims entering the United States' has offended and inflame Muslims whether in the United States or worldwide, as Gabriel Schoenfeld argued. But, what is really upsets Muslims is the official surveillance by security apparatus. Homeland Security Committee released a report in September 2015 which reveals expanding terror threat numbers since June 2014. This escalated threat pours heavy responsibility on homeland security to prevent Paris-style attacks.¹⁷⁵ In this sense, some Americans especially republicans support FBI efforts scrutinizing Muslims in the United States. FBI has opened over 10,000 cases concerning terrorism threat whether in the United States or abroad to prevent potential attacks.

One can refer to anti-Sharia sentiment as second evidence of institutional Islamophobia. Jason Dewitt (2015) argues that American start fighting back the Muslims' threat whereby 16 U.S. states have introduced legislation to ban or restrict Sharia law since 2013. In this regard, Stephanie Wright quotes a February 2011 Poll (Public Religion Research Institute) which found that one-third of self-identified Republicans believed that Muslims want to establish shari'a as the law of the land (Wright in Pratt & Woodlock, 2016, 47).

¹⁷⁵ Available at: <http://inlandsecurity.com/is-the-united-states-safe-from-a-paris-style-islamic-state-attack/>

From my point of view, the most important experience of Islamophobia can be seen during the presidential election 2016. Damian Paletta (2016) and Cathleen Decker (2016) demonstrate that the deadly terror attacks abruptly refocused the agenda of the presidential race into a renewed debate over protecting America from Islamic terrorism. Republican front-runner in the presidential race Donald Trump called for new laws that would allow torture when interrogating terror suspects. While Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton urged the need to do more to control borders. Others such as Senator Ted Cruz offered “We need to empower law enforcement to patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become radicalized.” Paletta quotes December 2015, WSJ survey. The survey asked “What Should be the top priority for the federal government?” The survey found out that 55 % of the surveyed republicans answer with National Security and terrorism. While only 28 of democrats support this priority. To this respect, Decker believes that Donald Trump won the Republican candidacy due to his anti-immigration positions; and anti-political correctness¹⁷⁶. Trump has benefited politically from terrorist attacks. Elizabeth Warren, senior Senator from Massachusetts, accuses Trump of building his campaign on racism and xenophobia. Anti-Muslim rhetoric in American presidential campaigns is not a relatively new phenomenon. In fact, republicans' campaigns since 9/11 accommodate Islamophobia especially during Bush's campaign. 15 presidential candidates since 2015 have deployed Islamophobia or anti-Islamophobia rhetoric.¹⁷⁷ The candidates are: Governor Jeb Bush, Senator Ted Cruz, Senator Lindsey Graham, Governor Mike Huckabee, Governor Bobby Jindal, Governor George Pataki, Senator Rand Paul, Senator Marco Rubio, Senator Rick Santorum, Donald Trump, Governor Scott Walker, Ben Carson, Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Martin O’Malley.

The republican candidates, Trump in particular, raise some Islamophobic slogans such as: Ban-Muslims immigration; Muslims regular surveillance; United States is at war with Islam; the

¹⁷⁶ Political correctness: the avoidance of forms of expression or action that are perceived to exclude, marginalize, or insult groups of people who are socially disadvantaged or discriminated against. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_correctness.

- See also: Ben Kamisar (2016). Trump pans ‘political correctness’ in post-Orlando address. Available at: <http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/283298-trump-decries-political-correctness-in-post-orlando> (Accessed on June 2016).

¹⁷⁷ Islamophobia in the 2016 Elections, available at: <http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections/>

problem in the world is Islamic; closing some Masjids in the United States; registry to track Muslims; finally, Islam hates us.

Daniel Byman and Michael Shapiro blame American politicians of exaggerating terrorism threat for political ends (Byman & Shapiro, 2015, 38). Furthermore, Max Fisher finds out that the political deployment of anti-Islam sentiment is in parallel goes along with the popular sentiment. Fisher says this did not come out of nowhere; it's been building for some time in American politics. In Fisher's words:

Trump is just the tip of an iceberg that runs much deeper than many Americans would like to believe. The day after Trump's registry comments, a makeshift militia, wearing military-style camo, some of them masked, showed up outside an Islamic center in Texas carrying assault rifles and announcing they had come to stop the Islamization of America (Fisher, 2015).

Fisher argues that hatred crimes against Muslims in America increase in the aftermath of each terrorist attack in the west. Because many in the media continue to indulge Islamophobia as a valid position, they implicitly tell their audiences that it is acceptable to hate Muslims. This perception has been rooted in the popular perception. Movies, novels and documentary reports portray Iraqis as an undifferentiated mass of terrorists and terrorist sympathizers who can only be confronted with violence. CNN and Fox news have played a vital role in making a point about the 'history of violent Islam'. Bill O'Reilly has declared several times in his show that 'Islam is a destructive force' and that the US is in a holy war with radical Muslims.

Final point concerning the institutional islamophobia is related to the reflections in foreign policy towards the threat of terrorism. Shibley Telhami argues that 70 percent of Americans identified ISIS as the biggest threat facing the United States in January 2015. In fact, this sentiment goes along with unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims. These attitudes have been escalated from 39 % in 2001 to 61% in 2015. Politically speaking, republicans have the major part contributing to indulge this sentiment into foreign policy. Telhami finds out that a large majority of Democrats, 67 percent, have favorable views of Muslims, compared to 41 percent and 43percent for Republicans and Independents respectively. These numbers can be confirmed by Obama's foreign policy since he refused to name IS threat as Islamic. Still this point of view is not the only dispute between

Republicans and Democrats. Republicans such as Trump and Marco Rubio challenge the prospect of democracy in the Middle East. Thus, they believe that America should support secular dictators for insuring its interests. In contrast, Democrats such as President Obama and Hilary Clinton believe that democracy can be flourished in the Middle East. What distinguishes Hilary position from that of Obama she named IS threat as radical Islam. Her position has been shifted due to the dynamics of presidential elections. Since American people are very sensitive towards naming properly the threat of IS as Islamic, Hillary Clinton's statement was that "today's attacks will only strengthen our resolve to stand together as allies and defeat terrorism and radical jihadism around the world (quoted in Taranto, 2016).

Peggy Noonan argues that in the aftermath of Paris attacks some Democrats like Hillary Clinton tend to believe that the threat is immense, and increasingly seeing radical jihadist Islam versus the world. While most of republicans like Trump seeing the battle as radical Islam versus the west and the US in particular. Noonan as republican herself assumes that if only 10% of the 1.6 billion harbor feelings of grievance toward "the West," or desire to expunge the infidel, or hope to re-establish the caliphate. And 10% of those would be inclined toward jihad. Thus, she concludes that it will be a long, hard fight; and there is no alternative to American involvement in this fight. What distinguishes Hilary's understanding to the threat is that she called on Muslims to be involved as equal partner in this fight. Trump does not trust Muslims; and called on self-relied policy whereby he called for 'boots on the ground' to seize Iraqi oil for American interest. Trump campaign deploys anti-Obama policies especially concerning terrorism. According to a CNN/ORC poll, 57 percent of the public is already unhappy with the way the president is handling the Islamic State and thinks the approach is failing.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, republicans wage political and media war against Obama administration. Charles M. Blow (2014) argues that Fox News delivers to the public either false or notorious images which depict Obama is responsible for the creation of ISIS; because of his sympathy towards Muslims' issues worldwide, as republicans argue. But, According to a Pew Research Center report issued in July, 2014, two-thirds of the public (67 percent) cite ISIS as a major threat to the United States (Katulis & Adhikari, 2016). This perception of IS threat has a core element which is "make America great again." The question is how this slogan will be tackled. And according to which candidate (Hilary or Trump) American foreign policy will be designed. Two potential methods towards Muslims' issues are in tied competition in the presidential election:

¹⁷⁸ Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/16/politics/cnn-poll-isis-obama-approval/>

- The first believes that United States foreign policy should accommodate tolerance towards Muslims (Hillary's method).
- The second is combined with intolerance for specific groups, it becomes exclusionary and more volatile (Trump's method).

But despite the differentiation in methods both republicans and democrats are looking for new spheres to American involvement in the world issues. A poll conducted by WSJ in December 2015 signs out a shift in public mindset towards the threat of IS. The survey finds out that each Republicans and Democrats became keener to have greater role to America in world affairs. Brian Katulis (2016) finds out that “Be Stronger Abroad” the phrase used in the survey has been endorsed by 40 % of those been surveyed in December 2015 while the percentage was only 19% in April 2014. Speaking of differentiation, Trump and Ted Cruz have both expressed support for authoritarian leaders such as Egypt’s Abdel Fattah Al Sisi. In contrast, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke about supporting democratic values.

Conclusion

Some of the questions are deliberately related to Islamophobia rhetoric and its effects on American politics. The questions are: is Islamophobia institutionally endorsed in the aftermath of IS crisis? Is islamophobia manifested in the presidential election in 2016? And what are the consequences of Islamophobia on United States strategy towards the Middle East?

To answer these questions evidences of Islamophobia have been noticed, discussed and analyzed. I can conclude the concept as public opinion phenomenon. The debate upon Islamophobia cannot be separated from the public perception; it is about how information can be gathered, analyzed and systematized within specific paradigms to create images towards the 'other'. These images translated from words into biased actions. Actions or behaviors can be traced on two levels:

- 1- Individual's preferences towards specific religious group in socio-political context.
- 2- The state's level whether on domestic or foreign policy.

The promotion of Islamophobia creates both prejudice and discrimination among the general population. Prejudice plays a key role in the existence and proliferation of Islamophobia. In the U.S., about one-half of nationally representative samples agree that in general, most Americans are

prejudiced toward Muslim Americans.¹⁷⁹ Although, one can criticize this finding by referring to Khan winning more than %1.3 million votes in the mayoral election in May 2016. Here, distinguish can be made between the dynamics of American and British politics. British people are more familiar to Muslims than the American people. But to understand what kind of reaction enacted by whether American people or the institutions; I need to shed light on the intellectual perception towards IS. In this regard, I was keen to cover the most important works concerning IS of which I conclude that: most American experts avoided describing IS as a militant gang which deploys religion for political ends, except Napoleoni (2014); while most of them like McCants, Stern¹⁸⁰ and Berger believe that IS is a reflection of the radical Islamic peculiarities. Also I found out that experts have perceived the threat of IS on three main levels:

- 1- Operational risks which include the potential threat of terrorist attacks.
- 2- Dynamic risks which include IS threat to the world order.
- 3- Epistemological shortage in the American community concerning IS and political turmoil in the Middle East.

Furthermore, the debate over IS in the United States can be summarized as follows:

- Terrorism is a revolutionary movement which will not be terminated soon; and the world will witness new forms of extremism in the Middle East. In this regard Emma Sky¹⁸¹, warned that ISIS is not so much the problem as the symptom of larger problems. The evolution occurs on several levels: the tools such as advanced technology; man-power and the combat skills (Levin, 2015, 1610). While Peter Chambers finds out that IS's project having been attached to the person (Chambers, 2012, 32). To divert the individual into a monster a process of collective trauma is required. This trauma should be valid either psychologically and theologically. And to this end, the meaning of enemy is essential. Two enemies are ready to be deployed by IS: Shia and Crusaders.
- Nonetheless, there are few of ISIS sympathizers in the United States, Islamophobic rhetoric has been flourished, as Michelle Boorstein (2015) argues in *Washington Post*.

¹⁷⁹ Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West. Available at: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx>

¹⁸⁰ Although Stern (2015c) highlights that ISIS's most numerous victims are Muslims. However, she believes that ISIS justifies its brutality by referring to religious texts. She asks what can those of us in the West do to help ISIS achieve its goal? She means that conflating ISIS with Islam has a severe damage on the west.

¹⁸¹ Best Defense contributor who advised the U.S. military in Iraq and now teaches at Yale.

- Khilafah and Imamah are eponymous of the two main branches of Islam (Mihaylov, 2015, 50). Dimitar Mihaylov adds that IS will certainly not last example of such violent religious fanaticism. What distinguishes the current moment the ever-deepening rift between Sunna and Shi'a at certain hot spots is now evident. At the extreme edge of the Sunni camp now stands IS, on the other edge is Shi'a coalition cobbled together to support the regime in Damascus, as Mihaylov explains. He concludes that the unprecedented Sunni–Shi'a confrontation will have a lasting and devastating effect on the public sphere and will affect the world as well.
- The problem is totally Islamic. Fishman in his paper quoted Joby Warrick's and William McCants's explains that "the ISIS Apocalypse is a crash course in early Islamic history and extremist Islamic thought, coupled with a sociological portrait of a certain Arab desire to restore the glory of a once great civilization in the form of a renewed caliphate" (Fishman, 2016, 186).

But most importantly, Rex W. Huppke (2015), in *ChicagoTribune*, questions how much American understand IS threat? He blames two resources of false depicted knowledge: media and political elite. He states that "*we are often a nation of hot air.*" This public sentiment is all the fuel politicians need to wage wars, Huppke said. However, over time, Islamophobia has advanced into an accepted concept that implies hatred or animosity aimed at Islam and Muslims. Furthermore, Islamophobia is not dependent on the 'sociological reality or the theological framework of Islam,' but relies on specific (and historical contingent) signifiers, such as the 'terrorist' or the 'suicide bomber' (Ekman, 2015, 1989). Concerning Iraq, Islamophobic rhetoric in the U.S has linked Iraq with the threat of terrorism on US. Respectively, the public in the U.S has received so much information about the threat of ISIS or al-Qaida alike, but, without apparent explanation concerning the source of such threat. I can say that Iraq is a victim of distorted propaganda concerning terrorism in the global politics. For instance, Donald Trump in one of his biased speeches calls Iraq as the prestigious college for terrorism (Harvard for terrorists, as synonymous) without explaining why is become so.

Finally, the sphere of interaction between popular and institutional Islamophobia would produce two potential trends towards IS:

- The first is the direct military involvement in the Middle East (Jeffrey, 2016). A Pew Research Center poll released in February, 2015, showed that sending ground troops to fight these terrorists

in Iraq and Syria is supported by 47 percent of the country, up from only 39 percent in October 2014.

- The second trend requires American involvement but without deploying troops on the ground.

America's strategy should be based upon deep epistemological knowledge concerning the political conditions in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The political sensitivity in Iraq bears no further strategic mistakes. Hence, the seventh chapter will be designed to explore the prospect of American strategy towards IS crisis in Iraq.

The Seventh Chapter

The US strategy to defeat IS and the Future of Iraq's nation-state

In this chapter, my intention is to inquire into an important question: Does the US support a unified Iraq? The question will be answered in the light of the self-proclaimed IS' rise in Iraq and Syria. In this sense, there is a need to tackle three serious questions to understand the US' position towards a unified Iraq. The questions are:

- 1- What are the Middle East's narratives in the US perspective?
- 2- How does the US strategically perceive the balance of power in the Middle East?
- 3- Does the US really intend to defeat and terminate IS from Iraq's political reality?

7.1. The Prospect of the Middle East in the US' political perspective:

In this part, my intention is to shed light on the most important narratives in the American mind concerning the political dynamics in the Middle East. To this end, this section is divided into two parts:

- The first is about the Middle East metamyths¹⁸² (i.e. narratives) in the US perspective.
- The second is about the US Initiatives to bring political change in the Middle East post-2003.

But, firstly there is a need to define the Middle East geographically. In this regard, Buzan and Waever define the region as stretching from Morocco to Iran, including all of the Arab states, except for Iran and Turkey (quoted in Lu & Thies, 2012, 240). According to this definition, all Middle East' countries consist of Muslims majority. Furthermore, the US definition of Middle East' geography includes Israel as a state and a major political player. On that point, there is a huge dispute among the Middle Eastern countries and the US despite the fact that some states have already established diplomatic relationship with Israel.

¹⁸² Zbigniew Brzezinski talked about 'metamyths' leading to the 'megadeath'. Metamyths are capable of mobilizable masses' and inflaming conflicts (Tanner, 2014, 90).

7.1.1 The Middle East ‘metamyths’:

The American policy-makers endorse James Bill’s research that most of the Middle East countries face the following problems: presence of socio-ethnic and religious divides; domination of illegitimate and undemocratic governments; rampant corruption in many of the state organizations; massive gap between social classes; and strong contradiction between 'Islamic combatants' and the rulers and their supporters (Sajedi, 2006, 195). To explain the root causes of these problems Fred Halliday highlights four main Inter-state or transnational factors in the Middle East (Halliday, 2005, 236-256):

- (i) Nationalist movements: Of all the social and ideological movements that have shaped the modern Middle East the most powerful has been nationalism.
- (ii) Islamism.
- (iii) Political violence: Widely associated with the activities of opposition movements in the Middle East.
- (iv) Diasporas: Communities of people originating in one country and living in another, are the quintessential ‘transnational’ grouping.

In my point of view, four narratives are highlighted in the United States concerning the political turmoil in the Middle East:

First is the lack of democracy (i.e. good governance): This has already been discussed in the third chapter. In this regard, what most scholars describe the Middle East states as “hard,”¹⁸³ are in reality weak, although, there is a belief that the initiation of one or two democracies in the Arab Middle East would lead to democratic rule elsewhere in the region. This logic was pursued before Bush’s administration policy to practice democratic idealism through hard power in Iraq. Meanwhile, there are several explanations to the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, some of it argues that this action was meant to secure US self-interest by dominating this crucial region of the world (Weinberg, 2014, 337).

The second narrative is the flaming conflicts which take various shapes ranging from political to sectarian strife. These developments may be summarized briefly. First, there is the centuries-old

¹⁸³ The hard state deploys hard power to coerce including punishment.

religious conflict between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Leonard Weinberg and others believe that it was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of a radical Shiite religious regime in Tehran that sparked the re-ignition of this interdenominational dispute. Yet, one can argue that without Saddam's brutal policies there could have seen less level of sectarian strife in Iraq and in the region, alike. In this regard, US failed 30 years ago to end this conflict right in its cradle. Furthermore, US added fuel to the fire by helping establish Islamic resistance to the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Today the question might be, according to Weinberg, what role does the United States have in these multiple armed conflicts, reflecting a multi-polar distribution of power? Where is the American national interest in this complicated situation? The Middle East is centered on a fragmented core of collective initiatives especially in security. The regional balance of power, along with the political dynamics, are based, today, on sectarian strife. Struggle in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain are examples of the same. In Iraq, there is a huge dispute about the battle of Mosul to oust IS. Some regional players, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are keen to be involved in this battle. Part of their rhetoric is to secure the interests of Sunni Arabs in Iraq. While the real reasons could be to prevent Iran from expanding its sphere of influence in the region and to prevent the Kurds from seizing the moment by capturing more lands in Iraq and Syria.

The third narrative is the expanding role of the supra-national ideologies and the signs of collapse of nation-state system. To Oliver Roy the failure of Westphalian nation state in the Middle East is a result of three fault lines, or traumas, that mark the contemporary history of the Arab Middle East (Roy, 2008, 74):

- First, in 1918, was the collapse of the project to build a great Arab kingdom out of the ruins of the ottoman Empire, as promised by the British.
- Second is the establishment of the state of Israel and the failure of the four wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973) to destroy, reduce or counter it.
- Third is the destruction of the balance between Shi'ism and Sunnism, which occurred in two stages: The Islamic revolution in Iran, then by Iraq's swing towards Shi'ism following the American intervention of 2003.

Here, we can't just deploy events to justify the failure of nation-state in the Arab world. In that sense, the regimes of the Arab world were unable to construct separate state identities convincing enough to marginalize competing sub- and supra-state identities and legitimize their material

consolidation (Hinnebusch in Buzan & Pelaez, 2009, 222). These supranational ideologies (Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Shi'ism) simultaneously overlap and vie with each other (Roy, 2008, 106). Fredric Wehrey et al. argue that it was in the interest of the regimes to deploy such supra-state identities to challenge each other (Wehrey et al., 2010, 21). As a result, the Middle Eastern peoples are organized into two clusters: the first who oppose Shiism and believe that Iraq and Iran along with Hizbollah in Lebanon and Assad regime in Syria are causing harm to the Muslims-Arabs solidarity. This group are led by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The second cluster believe that Saudi Arabia and Turkey and other Gulf states support radical Sunni organizations. What is happening in much of the Middle East now is the collapse of this system (Sykes-Picot). Fred Kaplan (2013) asks how far does this unraveling go; will civil wars erupt in one artificial state after another? Lord Williams of Baglan (2014a) argues that in practice Syria and Iraq is a real example of the sectarian strife flourishing in the whole region. In this regard, Baglan adds another element which is Kurdistan.¹⁸⁴ But it is not only Iraq that faces the dissolution of the ancient regime of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Libya, Syria and Yemen are somehow considered a similar example. Syria and Iraq are the most diverse countries in the region. Political narratives in the two key Arab countries have never conceded much of democratic substance in their decades of highly centralized authoritarian rule, with the difference that Iraq has been having a democratic experience since 2003. Lee Smith (2014) argues that Arabs perceive the Sykes-Picot agreement as the primary cause of Middle Easterners' woes. This idea is no long vivid in the local national memory, albeit it still works in the collective mind. It works because Arabs believe that Arab nationalism had been neutralized a century ago by the Western conquerors. Yet, the reality is that Arabism was challenged particularly by the rising power of the Islamists (Miller, 2012; Smith, 2014).

The conflict between supranational ideologies has a sophisticated impact on the regional balance of power. Countries are clustered in each sect (Shiism or Sunnism) to create a rivalry strategic poles in the region. David Blair (2013) argues that Across the Middle East, tensions between Sunni and Shia are steadily being inflamed. Why is this happening? Partly, it is explained by the “new regional

¹⁸⁴ Sèvres treaty has been largely forgotten in the West, but it has a potent legacy in Turkey, where it has helped fuel a form of nationalist paranoia some scholars have called the “Sèvres syndrome.” Sèvres certainly plays a role in Turkey's sensitivity over Kurdish separatism (Danforth, 2015). Would different borders have made the Middle East more stable, or perhaps less prone to sectarian violence?

Cold War” dividing the Middle East, Toby Dodge argues. What is more significant that global powers are involved deeply in this dichotomy. Thus, we can notice that while Russia has strict strategic relations with the Shiite side, US still deploy Sunni-based policy. This policy has two main regional pillars Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The fourth narrative is Israel. The existence of Israel has been viewed for decades as a source of tension and conflict in the Middle East. This vision particularly has been expressed by Muslims and Arabs alike irrespective of their sectarian differences. Arabs were keen to pursue the Palestinian issue in most of their common efforts. This situation has gradually changed especially in the light of two events: the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring in 2011. Israelis and westerners in general have started to rethink the role of Israel in the light of these events. Israel after being reluctant initially to view their country as part of the Middle East now involves itself in the regional political turmoil (Podeh, 1997, 282). Why is this happening? Israeli leaders believe that there is common ground, i.e. danger or enemy, a response to which could be a new initiative of collective security. Militant organizations such as Hizbullah, HAMAS along with dictatorial regimes such as Assad regime in Syria have been perceived as common danger to the whole region. Thus, these regional dynamics have brought in two important changes, in the Israeli perspective, with regards to Israel's place in the Middle East:

- First, some Arab states have gradually come to recognize that Israel is a major Middle Eastern political and strategic actor.
- Second, Israel may seek to play a central role in regional affairs deploying its military and industrial superiority.

But to play this role Israel needs to implement some preliminary steps. Jamal Daniel (2016) believes that Israel and US should center their efforts to re-establish the *Mashriq* political and cultural entity. The states of the *Mashriq* must shift from outdated anti-Israel rhetoric, which for so many years served to prop up the failing institutions of Arab nationalism, and instead recognize Israel as a potential partner in the economic redevelopment of the region. Two steps are essential to establish this entity:

- 1- Integration for Peace offers the most promising path towards regional security and prosperity.
- 2- Establishing a single economic zone allowing the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital, based on a European Union–style single market.

7.1.2 US Initiatives to bring political change to the Middle East post-2003:

Some would argue that to create new opportunities of cooperation and peace among Israel and Middle Eastern countries, a fundamental change is required. The change needs initiatives such as the Great Middle East (GME) and the New Middle East (NME) to be realized. Let's start with GME. In late April, 2004, this initiative was presented by the US to the G-8. The initiative was part of President Bush's strategy of promoting democracy. The idea was that democratic Middle Eastern states are immune to Islamist extremism. To this end, the initiative was designed to include several core components such as (Wittes, 2004):

- A "Great Middle East Forum for the Future" through which political reform in the region can be designed and oriented.
- A "Great Middle East Democracy Assistance Group" into which international efforts to promote democracy in the region were proposed to be coordinated.
- A Forum for coordinating the efforts towards economic cooperation.

The Greater Middle East Initiative revolved around three key principles: promoting democracy and good governance; building a knowledge society; and expanding economic opportunities (Shakdam, 2014). The Bush administration tried to develop a new grand strategy at that point, which we can call liberal hegemony, with the objectives of maintaining American primacy and promoting democracy, along with the more specific objectives of containing rogue states transnational terror, strategic and economic advantage in the Arabian Peninsula and support for the consolidation of the Jewish settler state in Palestine (Freeman et al., 2013; Yambert, 2016, 6). In his address to the world Economic Forum in 2004, former Vice President Dick Cheney identifies four fundamental responsibilities to be sustained throughout the ME (Cheney in Yambert, 2016, 14-5):

- First is to defeat violence through the advancement of freedom and democratic reform.
- Second is to cooperate through alliances and international partnerships to confront common dangers through developing rapid-response forces such as NATO.
- Third to remain ready to exert military force when necessary.
- Fourth is a peaceful resolution of the long-standing Arab-Israeli dispute.

But later, the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan were part of a larger military distancing from the greater Middle East. When domestic upheavals rocked the region in the spring of 2011, the Obama administration tried to avoid getting deeply involved. Richard Hass (2013) argued that the era of American domination of the region was coming to an end and that the Middle East's future would be characterized by considerable but reduced U.S. influence. One further consequence of the upheavals, following the US invasion in 2003, was the growing role of terrorist organizations in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Syria. In these two states the turmoil has presented a new challenge, ISIS. The first impression one can get from this situation is that the old order in the Middle East is disappearing. Richard Hass asserts that political Islam is sure to play a large part in the political future of the Middle East. As a consequence, Hass argues, some borders are likely to be redrawn, and some new states may even emerge. In such situations, U.S. officials can encourage political and economic reform, but there is no guarantee that such advice will be accepted or that modest reforms would ensure stability. What is certain is that the United States will retain the role of a major player in the region since it retains important and in some cases vital interests in the Middle East, including a deep commitment to Israel's security, opposition to terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons, and a commitment to safeguarding access to the region's energy resources.¹⁸⁵

In contrast, William Quandt argues that despite the fact that Iraq was the centerpiece of the Bush II strategy of GMEI, Iraq today is hardly a model for anyone; U.S. influence there is less than that of Iran (in Freeman et al., 2013). Here, a question arises concerning the viability of any other initiative before the failure of GME. To be precise, Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya argues that the “New Middle East” project (introduced to the world in June 2006 in Tel Aviv by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) was introduced publicly by Washington and Tel Aviv for realigning the whole Middle East and thereby unleashing the forces of “constructive chaos.” Particularly Iraqi Kurdistan, seems to be the preparatory ground for the balkanization (division) of the Middle East. Nazemroaya quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters’ map of a redrawn and restructured Middle East identified as the “New Middle East.”¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ See also: Rachel, B. (2016). Power shift in the Middle East, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 72, p12.

¹⁸⁶ The map of the “New Middle East” was a key element in the retired Lieutenant-Colonel’s book, *Never Quit the Fight*, which was released to the public on July 10, 2006. This map of a redrawn Middle East was also published, under



Nazemroaya believes that Iraq War in 2003 was just one of many examples of the Anglo-American strategy of “divide and conquer.” It was not Iraq alone that was to be disintegrated, rather Turkey and Iran are potential states for internal conflicts and respectively disintegration (Brzezinski, 1997). However, Zbigniew Brzezinski warns that destabilizing Turkey and Iran, or one of them, will have dangerous outcomes in the region. It seems that a divided and balkanized Iraq would be the best means of accomplishing this, Nazemroaya argues. In this regard, US strategy should be to neutralize Iran from getting advantage of the process of redrawing the Middle East. Thus, the New Middle East should be based on the ashes of the current order. So, why does US still support a unified Iraq despite the belief in the west s it being an artificial entity created by British in the wake of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008, 98-9)? According to this belief, the imposed national identity in Iraq is viable to collapse before supra-national identities (Halliday, 2005, 259). Hence, the new order of entities whether in Iraq or in the whole region will be shaped in the light of two essential factors:

the title of *Blood Borders: How a better Middle East would look*, in the U.S. military’s Armed Forces Journal with commentary from Ralph Peters (quoted in Nazemroaya, 2016).

- Supra national identities.
- The super powers' will.

Thus, there is no guarantee that the US can manage the transitional process in the NME. New larger entities might be created based on ethnical or sectarian ideologies. In an open “memo” to the State Department’s Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Karen P. Hughes, Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, came up with the following policy recommendation:

Banish the terms ‘Arab world’ and ‘Muslim world’ from America’s diplomatic lexicon; be as country-specific as possible, in both word and deed. Radical Islamists want to erase borders and create a supranational world where the lines of demarcation run between the ‘house of Islam’ and the ‘house of war.’ Don’t cede the battlefield to them without a fight” (Scheffler in Jung, 2006, 67).

One can conclude the memo by the fact that Islamism and Pan-Arabism both represent a challenge to US. Islamists have been much more society-oriented than Arab nationalists. Thus, more attention should be paid to prevent them from creating their political entity, albeit with the sectarian differences. Thus, different US administrations continue with the process of GME to promote transnational civil cooperation in the MENA region through cooperation with the G-8 and the existing Arab governments.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ However, this attempt has limits due to:

- First, Islamists created society-oriented associations which able to control major part of civil society in the Arab world.
- Second, US efforts to promote democracy perceived narrow self-interest.
- Third, Fukuyama (2006) identifies American exceptionalism as an obstacle to the attempt of promoting democracy, since there is no a unique platform can fit various cultural and political environments.
- Fourth, due to US ethno-sectarian based policy. US has failed to create a reliable ally in the Middle East except Israel. As John Rawls argues that a reliable state should be politically liberal. In other words, only democratic states are merit to international confidence. Thus, US failed to support real democratic, i.e. secular regimes in the Middle East. Instead, in one hand, it insists on Sunni-based policy which costs it the loss of Iraq. On the other hand, its biased policy in favor of Israel created an aggressive sentiment on the popular level towards US.
- Fifth, the continuing significance of the region energy supply brings to the fore the caution that terrorists may take advantage of this resources (Sorli et al., 2005, 144-5; Lesser et al. In Khalilzad & Lesser, 1998, 215-6). The US has failed to secure a sufficient regional platform to achieve political development. At the same time, it failed to secure natural resources out of terrorists hands especially in Iraq.

One important point is that the NME initiative should be applied in accordance with the Israeli perspective.¹⁸⁸ In this regard, Shimon Peres is considered the architect of Israel's vision for the future of Middle East. Peres outlines the steps toward peace. He calls for lowering arms budget, increasing investment in education, building regional energy and desalination plants, constructing state-of-the-art infrastructure for communication and transportation, and developing industry, agriculture, and tourism (Mel Klenetsky, 1994, 88). Peres believes that for NME to see light Arabs should abandon their collective memory which is the source of conflicts. To this end, four preconditions are required (Peres, 1993, 17-20):

1. Political freedom;
2. Rational approach, not hampered by political or clerical dictatorship.
3. Rational political leadership. In Peres' opinion, the role of leadership is fundamental to achieve peace and progress. Leadership takes two shapes: a country to which the Middle East plan can be designed and administrated (Egypt), and qualified politicians who believe in peace process.
4. Pragmatic economic approach should lead the regional interaction.

In Peres's broader picture, a New Middle East should be built upon a new conception of regional politics and economics. This new regional conceptualization is based upon five pillars (Yadgar, 2006, 301): (1) Political stability; (2) Economics, provided the utmost attention by Peres; (3) collective regional security; (4) Democratization throughout the Middle East; and the regional acceptance of Israel as a major player.

¹⁸⁸ According to the founding father of Zionism Theodore Herzl, "the area of the Jewish State stretches: "From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates." According to Rabbi Fischmann, "The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon." When viewed in the current context, the war on Iraq, the 2006 war on Lebanon, the 2011 war on Libya, the ongoing war on Syria and Iraq, the war in Yemen, the process of regime change in Egypt, must be understood in relation to the Zionist Plan for the Middle East. Greater Israel would create a number of proxy States. It would include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Sinai, as well as parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. *According to* Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya in a 2011 *Global Research article*, The Yinon Plan was a continuation of Britain's colonial design in the Middle East: "Israeli strategists viewed Iraq as their biggest strategic challenge from an Arab state. This is why Iraq was outlined as the centerpiece to the balkanization of the Middle East and the Arab World. In Iraq, on the basis of the concepts of the Yinon Plan, Israeli strategists have called for the division of Iraq into a Kurdish state and two Arab states, one for Shiite Muslims and the other for Sunni Muslims" (Shahak, 2016).

From the Israeli perspective, the realists' major alarm regarding the revolutionary drive of the Arab Spring was the possibility of the emergence of new Arab regional system in economic, social and military terms without making any shift in the political position towards Israel (Amour, 2016, 5-7). Thus, for them, the term 'New Middle East' should become a synonym of peace with Israel and any other regional initiative without honoring this idea should be terminated.

7.2 US strategic perspective and the balance of power in the Middle East:

As I mentioned in the first chapter, US strategy towards the middle East depends on the feedback of an orientalism cognitive process. To determinate US policies towards the Middle East, there is a need to identify some factors which might hinder or energize US role. These factors are: the regional balance of power, the American objectives, the current crisis, the outcomes of strategic alternatives (pullover or deeply involved), and US allies and rivals in the region.

The first factor is US strategic objectives in the Middle East. In this regard, Marwan Bishara quotes the Carter doctrine: "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force" (Bishara, 2016). This is the first and the most important US' objective in this region. But, there is no doubt that there are other numerous objectives and key national interests including (Lesser et al. In Khalilzad & Lesser, 1998, 172):

- the survival of Israel and completion of the Middle Eastern peace process;
- access to oil;
- forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon;
- preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
- promoting political and economic reform;
- and holding terrorism in check.

The second factor is concern with the regional fault-lines. In my study, I focus on the conflict that stretches along Syrian-Iraqi borders. This conflict (i.e. proxy wars) is no more domestic nor regional, rather it becomes global. But, to be precise, am going to pay close attention to the Iraqi case. Henry Kissinger expresses his fear that the conflict in Iraq and Syria has a very catastrophic outcome on statehood in both states. In his words, "the disintegration of statehood into tribal and sectarian units, some of them cutting across existing borders, in violent conflict with each other or

manipulated by competing outside factions, observing no common rules other than the law of superior force” (Kissinger, 2014, 142). For him in fact, state’s weakness in promoting coercive legitimate power over its territory will cause the international and regional order itself to disintegrate. This periphery will create vast territories which suffer of power vacuum and should be found in one way or the other to fulfill it. The cases of Turkish incursion in Iraq and Syria and Saudi interference in Yemen can be considered as instances of power vacuum fulfillment. One dangerous outcome of power vacuum is IS rise in Iraq and Syria in 2014, when terrorist organizations were able to replace the state power in damaged territories that witnessed proxy wars. The conflict now unfolding is both religious and geopolitical. A Sunni bloc consisting of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and to some extent Egypt and Turkey confront a bloc led by Shia Iran, which backs Bashar al-Assad, the government in Baghdad, and the militias of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza (Kissinger, 2014, 144). Each side deploys non-state actors to hinder its political rivals. And participants in the contests search for outside support, particularly from Russia and the United States. Henry Kissinger (2014) and Jonathan Cook (2008) argue that what makes this conflict worse is the potentiality that each side may acquire or obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this regional chaos, the complexity of protecting nuclear arsenals and installations may increase the risk of preemption by tilting incentives toward a surprise attack. A further point highlighted many times in the international discussions is the issue of securing WMD from the terrorists’ access.

In this situation, the Middle East continued to demand US attention (Freedman, 2014, 244). Behind these preconditions lie three considerations: The first and most immediate is the acceptance by the Pentagon that the scale of hostility towards the United States, in the Middle East, requires real restrictions on large-scale deployments on grounds of security of American personnel. A second factor is simply the huge cost of keeping forces overseas. The third consideration is the more general shift by the US military towards the rapid deployment of forces to meet particular security threats (Rogers, 2006, 45).

In this context, Oliver Roy (2008, 42-3) raises another key point: There can be no democracy without political legitimacy. Thus, the US should redesign its strategy towards political reform in the Middle East. In that sense, the real question is how far US will be able to support the NME or the GMEI in this complex situation? One can say the priority should be for security over political progress. In light of this argument, US should support some political trends over others under the

condition of serving US interests as part of anti-terrorist strategy. But this solution is not sufficient to fight terrorism. Shmuel Bar (in Lee Smith et al., 2014) argues that the crisis is ongoing with no sight of solution. Syria and Iraq are irrevocably broken; there will be no more Iraq. The question is about US position towards the independence of Kurdistan. US needs an entity in the heart of this area to protect its interests. Now US should think about the sort of map the region will be redesigned in the light of this situation. Chollet Derek et al. (2016) ask: is there a possibility to stabilize Iraq? He continues with two options that confront US decision makers:

- 1- Military intervention which requires 80000 personnel to be sent to Iraq.
- 2- Reaching a deal with Iran to share responsibility. Or alternately there is the possibility of sponsoring Sunni coalition led by Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, Hillel Fradkin, at the same panel of Hudson Institute, assures the need for a new order in the Middle East. The US should take into consideration two powers before selecting which order it promotes in the region. These powers are Shiite empire led by Iran and IS. Leon Hadar answers Fradkin by explaining that the Washington consensus that America should always be ready to “do something” to resolve the problems of the Middle East has been shuddering due to President Obama’s reluctance to intervene in Syria. But this situation is a matter of shift. For instance, Mike Pence, during the VP debate on October 4, 2016, supports the need for direct intervention to oust Assad regime in Syria. However, continuing U.S. military intervention only helps to radicalize the Arab World and eroded the power of US’ allies in the region. Hadar (2013) believes that the United States could continue to act as the “balancer of last resort” in the Middle East, working together with regional and global powers to help strengthen stability and promote economic prosperity in the region. In this regard, which regional countries merit this partnership?

Ariel Cohen, of the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC, suggested that: Saudi Arabia should be brought to its knees. A weakened Saudi regime would no longer be able to finance radical Islamic groups, including resistance movements like Hamas in the occupied Palestinian territories; and US should prevent Iran control of oil in both Iran and Iraq that would produce an oil titan (Cook, 2008, 120-1). Jonathan Cook advocates direct American control of the Middle East’s oilfields to achieve these goals:

- 1- Remove any threat of China gaining an edge over the US in its relations with the region’s oil producers.

- 2- Breaking up Arab countries into feuding mini-states (Since there is a belief that there is no hope to promote democracy in the Middle East as Noam Chomsky has pointed out several times).
- 3- Independent Iraq would almost certainly have tried to make an alliance with Iran, recover its role as a leader of the Arab world and, as a result, re-arm to confront the regional enemy, Israel.

Hence, the US should be so cautious in choosing its allies in the region. Still, it's a difficult task due to the complexities of the situation in the region whereby there is a triangle of forces contesting each other (Achcar and Matta, 2016, 10).

Thus, to understand US position in the region one needs to visit the current balance of power. This is the **third factor**.

In this regard, the rise of IS has made US' indirect orientalist policies questionable. IS constitutes a challenge to the US's Sunni-based policy. One indication of how much the rise of IS has upset the US' Sunni-based policy is that it has been trying to form an anti-IS coalition that pleases Iran (Karakoç, 2014, 602-3). James Terry (2016) highlights the geostrategic importance of Iraq, as an engine to understand all other geopolitical realities in the region. The IS rise in Iraq, James Traub (2015) argues, demonstrates a war inside a non-Western civilization that has overtaken and consumed the West. However, this fault line is not about to separate the US from Saudi Arabia; despite its Sunni based policy. Anthony Cordesman (2013a) argues that if the US continues with a policy that pays little attention to Iraq's alignment with Iran, then, it might not be able to watch out the shift in the regional strategical map. The question of Arab identity versus Sunni or Shi'ite sectarian identity divides Iraq from the Arab Gulf states and pushes it towards Iran. What Cordesman means is that Sunni-based policy should not neglect the importance of Iraq nor of Iran in the region. What is important here, is how the regional balance of power has been shaped, and how that will affect US' choices of friends and enemies in the near future. A quick glance tells us that, Iraq has been the receiving end of the regional struggle since 2003. At the same time US was not able to keep its military presence in Iraq. For Jeffrey Goldberg (2008) the reason might be its poor imagination about the shifting map of the region. In this regard, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen are subjects of territorial change. In Iraq and Syria, Kurdish nationalism may spill over into the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran. So, Ralph Peter and Goldberg suggest that to stabilize the region Kurdish independence needs to see light (Goldberg, 2014).

One would say that any sudden change in the regional map might bring to the fore a huge reaction from Iran. Thus, Aaron David Miller (2014a) suggests that US should concentrate efforts to degrade the self-proclaimed Islamic State. By listening to the presidential debates, particularly on the Republican side, one would think that it was the absence of U.S. leadership that is responsible for the current travails of a broken, angry, dysfunctional Middle East (Miller, 2016). In reality, trying to get rid of Assad right now will almost certainly make the situation in Syria worse, boosting IS's standing and recruitment capacity while embroiling Washington in further battles with Iran and Russia that it can't possibly win. And who exactly is going to help America in this enterprise? (Miller, 2014b). Zbigniew Brzezinski share the same vision. He believes that the a steady slide, by America, into impotence and irrelevance might have heavy outcomes on the rest of the world. Such a development, he argues, would bring to the political fore insights from the cold war. For that matter, Brzezinski suggests, a weakened America would increase the dangers of (Kakutani, 2012; Brzezinski, 2004):

- Nuclear proliferation around the world.
- The emergence of new powers in the region such as Russian Federation's role which has escalated not only in Ukraine but also in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria.
- Democracy, impatiently imposed, can lead to unintended consequences. If the Muslims anywhere were able to choose a leader in truly free elections, and without US intervention, there is a possibility that they even might opt for a militant Islamic leader.

Brzezinski's suggestion is that US should always take into consideration geopolitical pivots in the Middle East.¹⁸⁹ Turkey, and Iran play the role of critically important geopolitical pivots, though both Turkey and Iran are to some extent also geo-strategically active (Brzezinski, 1997, 41). Both states confront serious domestic problems, and their capacity for effecting major regional shifts in the distribution of power is escalating, albeit limited. To counter Islamic fundamentalism US needs to maintain strategic links with both Turkey and Iran. Otherwise, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, united to confront the US hegemony in the region (Brzezinski, 1997, 55). One more scenario would rock the region: convergence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to create a regional coalition to lead the regional issues without US

¹⁸⁹ Most often, geopolitical pivots are determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in denying access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player.

consultancy. Brzezinski in the *Second Chance* argues that US emergence as the world's most powerful superpower requires three missions to be fulfilled (Brzezinski, 2007, 5):

- 1- To manage and shape central power relationships in a world of shifting geopolitical balances.
- 2- To contain and terminate conflicts, prevent terrorism and proliferation of WMD.
- 3- To address more effectively the increasing intolerable inequalities in the human condition.

Thus, to fulfill these missions US should take these steps: moderate its Sunni-based policy and try to find links with Iran without neglecting the strategic importance of Turkey (Brzezinski, Gates & Maloney, 2004, 10-11); Concerning Iraq, for Iran, any partition of Iraq or outbreak of civil war could pose spillover effects; implement a mutually acceptable two-state solution to resolve the Palestinian issue. Brzezinski (2012) encourages the United States to have strong relationships with the four most important countries in the Middle East: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. To create a link among these four countries Iraq is the key (Freeman, 2016b; Cordesman, 2013). But the question before US' policy makers: is current Iraq could be a reliable ally? Charles Freeman (2016a) poses concrete questions such as: We went into Iraq, why? To secure Iraq for Iranian influence? To divide Iraq between Kurds and Sunni and Sh`ia Arabs? For Marwan Muasher Iraq and US respectively need each other. Iraq needs US economic assistance to build new institutions that support pluralism, foster respect for minority and individual rights and international law, marginalize the voices of extremism and sectarianism, and put their people on a path to greater prosperity (Muasher in Freeman et al., 2013). Thus, US might foster political change in Iraq for putting it on the truck of its interests.

The fourth factor is the US strategic alternatives or choices in the light of the current regional balance of power. In US perspective Israel is militarily the best ally. Participants in Brookings' conference (2015) believe that Saudi Arabia is an important partner to the US, albeit it should moderate its policies towards radical Islamists in specific. From this perspective, three questions can be highlighted: How to act in the Middle East? Which states will be chosen as strategic partners? Which policies should be deployed?

The debate in the United States demonstrates three ways in dealing with Middle Eastern issues:

- 1- 'America's declining' in the Middle East or what some have somewhat called the 'pivot' toward Asia.

- 2- The rebalancing policy between US role in Asia and the Middle East.¹⁹⁰
- 3- Forward presence has also been a central tenet of American global strategy.

Stephen Walt (2016) quotes the Center for a New American Security's new report, *Extending American Power; Princeton Project for a United and Strong America's* more recent *Setting Priorities for American Leadership: A New National Strategy for the United States* (2013).¹⁹¹ The reports extend US's role to maintain the "liberal world order," and declares "to preserve and strengthen this order will require a renewal of American leadership in the international system." Furthermore, to maintain America's "leadership role," the report calls for significant increases in national security spending and recommends the United States expand its military activities in three major areas: Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. These reports continue the US heritage of global dominance.

One can conclude that these neo-conservative institutes contradict with Obama's doctrine. As the US falls back into a more indirect and cautious strategic approach towards the Middle East, increasing attention is actually being paid to the need to re-engage some of its key regional allies and partners (Simon, 2016, 133). For all their importance, the US is well aware of the need not to over-rely on Saudi Arabia and Turkey when it comes to securing its own regional geopolitical objectives. To keep Saudi Arabia and Turkey more close to US orbit, there is a need to deploy some cards such as: first, creating meaningful political and strategic ties with Iran. One can say that US has already re-approached Iran. On the one hand, the common US-Iranian interest in stopping ISIL's advances in Iraq has helped create a more positive political climate between both countries in the last few years. On the other hand, on 14 July 2015 a landmark Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was reached on Iran's nuclear program, under which Tehran has agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by

¹⁹⁰ In a March, 2013, speech to the Asia Society in New York, Tom Donilon, Obama's National Security Advisor, spoke of 'rebalancing' as: "a comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy: strengthening alliances, deepening partnerships with emerging powers, building a stable, productive and constructive relationship with China, empowering regional institutions, and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity" (Hudson, 2013, 462).

¹⁹¹ Along with PNAC, there were a number of other think tanks and institutes that were and are organizationally, ideologically, and politically linked and committed to reshaping U.S. foreign policy. These include the Center for Security Policy (CSP), Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, and the older American Enterprise Institute (Lusane, 2006, 88).

98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its centrifuges for at least fifteen years (Simon, 2016, 137-8). Second, keeping intense military presence in the Gulf countries.¹⁹² Third, supporting Iraq to play more active role in the region.

Through these steps, US can keep its major role in shaping the region's events. In this regard, Dennis Rose (2016) argues that a vacuum was created in Iraq and Syria due to US hesitancy to engage more in Syria. Martin Indyk (2016) believes that Obama's reluctance was due to: his determination to promote a rules-based international order; and his refusal of being dragged into another war in the Middle East. Although, Obama's doctrine does not mean that the US should pull back completely from the region. In this way, Obama deploys the so called "Smart Power." Smart power makes a balance between US commitments and the required means to satisfy US commitments and interests. Diplomacy has been given a huge room along with precise and discreet instruments of American power, such as drone strikes, special operations, and targeted sanctions. However, smart power aims to shrink US financial burden by letting regional partners to be more involved in regional issues. But, one of the important consequences of this policy, Michael Doran argues, is that Iran was able to expand militia network to fight its rivals in the region. Thus, "Rebalancing" requires strong reliable allies, and the next president will need to strengthen US' ties in the region and reverse the idea that Washington cannot productively apply military force (in Chollet et al, 2016). At the same time, some American scholars are concerned with the use of military force. James Jeffrey, Gideon Rose and Michael Eisenstadt wrote that military action does not achieve much without a durable political arrangement. The problem lies in defining what a durable political arrangement is. Gideon Rose argues that Two things have differentiated America's interactions with the Middle East from its overall approach to the post-Cold War era. First, the region was almost entirely a zone of proxy conflict throughout that era. Second, the region's role as an oil supplier drove the United States to be more involved there. America is currently on the cusp of its third significant era of Middle East policy, one that differs markedly from the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Jeffrey, Eisenstadt & Rose, 2016). Consequently, the next U.S. president is going to face a choice in the Middle East: do more to stabilize it, or to disengage further. Disengagement has been most damaging for Iraq (Fettweis, 2007, 92). Kenneth Pollack suggests

¹⁹² Bahrain hosts the US Navy's 5th Fleet. Kuwait hosts almost 15,000 US military personnel and a number of support facilities, training ranges and staging hubs. Qatar houses CENTCOM's regional headquarters and a 3,800 strong heavy battalion combat team. The UAE's Al Dhafra Air Base hosts F-22s, B-1B bombers, a number of surveillance aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. And Oman has recently signed an access agreement that allows the US to use a number of military airfields in the country (Simon, 2016, 136).

five steps to stabilize the region by ending the civil wars such as that of Syria (Pollack, 2016, 66-70):

- First, it must change the military dynamics.
- Second, it must forge a power-sharing agreement among the various groups so that they all have an equitable stake in a new government.
- Third, it must put in place institutions that reassure all the parties that the first two conditions will endure.
- Fourth, shore up the states in the greatest danger of sliding into future civil wars: Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey.
- Fifth, press for reform more broadly across the Middle East—economic, social, and political.

Concerning US options to rebalance the situation in the region, one can highlight two events: the first is the Saudi Arabian-led War in Yemen (Operation *Decisive Storm* `Amaliyyat `Āṣifat al-Ḥazm) began in 2015 as an attempt to influence the outcome of the Yemeni Civil War. The second is Turkish incursion in Iraq in December 2015. Brett McGurk, Washington's special envoy for the US-led anti-IS coalition, said on Twitter, "The U.S. does not support military deployments inside Iraq absent the consent of the Iraqi government." Thus, Turkey might ask in coordination with the United States to obtain the consent of the Iraqi government to involve militarily in the north of Iraq, especially with the synchronization of the Turkish incursion into the formation of the Islamic alliance which consists of 34 countries, including Turkey and Egypt with its headquarters in Riyadh. Therefore, a believe can be promoted on the lines that the Turkish movement in Iraq came in coordination with its regional partners especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, on the one hand, and international allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, especially the United States of America (despite the statements of the US vice president John Biden, who stressed the need for coordination with the Iraqi government before proceeding to take any steps on the ground in Iraq). Thus, the Turkish incursion into Iraq is understood as a strategic necessity in order to be prepared (US and its regional allies) for any strategic sudden shifts whether in the region or in Iraq in particular. The Islamic anti-terrorism coalition, formed by Saudi Arabia, is only an indicator of the state of polarization experienced in the region.

Since the incursion of Turkish forces at the beginning of December 2015 voices of experts differ in explaining the motives of this illegal act which violated Iraqi sovereignty, the principles of good-

neighborliness and also international law. These priorities reflect the US-Turkish geo-strategic aspirations in Iraq which could be summarized on three trends (Hadi & Albdeery, 2016, 14-19)¹⁹³:

1. The first opinion believes that Turkey runs up a proxy war in Iraq and Syria. Charles Glass indicates that the Turkish intervention in Iraq is in the interest of Daesh because Turkey, he adds, has prolonged the crisis of Daesh until the right moment of having the capacity to control the potential outcomes of Mosul liberation act. One can raise a question regarding Turkey's local players in Iraq, and the motives for it to act in Iraq? Two Turkish experts, Cengiz Candar and Metin Gurcan, answer this question referring to the historical competition between Turkey and Iran to control the region and Iraq in particular.¹⁹⁴ Both reaffirm that the Turkish ruling Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan aspires to restore its leading role in Iraq. On the other hand, this state of competition has interacted rapidly with the ambitions of international powers in the Middle East such as Russian Federation under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Putin has the vision to restore his country's role against the Western coalition led by the United States. Russia's role has been reshaped in the aftermath of its intervention in Ukraine (2013) and in Syria (2015). This new turning of Russian presence in the pyramid of international interaction embarrasses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in general and the United States in particular. Therefore, the chronology of events puts Turkey at crossroads that would drive it into taking serious measures to defend its national security. Thus, to encounter Russian role in Syria, Turkey felt a serious need to act urgently. Turkish forces found their quest in the north of Iraq where Daesh controls the territory and where there is an Iraqi power vacuum. For some experts, what this intervention aims to achieve is to limit any possibilities of regional coordination between Russia, Iran and Iraq. The intervention is also an attempt to establish a buffer zone into Syria to stifle the Syrian regime and support the political opposition to topple it. This incursion hits three birds with one stone: the first is to get rid of the Syrian regime, paralyze the Russian role in the circle of strategic balance of power in the Middle East, and preventing Kurdistan Workers Party to seize the moment and establish its territory in Iraq and Syria. Through the facts mentioned above became clear that the proxy war is de facto reality in the regional interaction in Iraq and Syria, especially in the light of the closed strategic relations among United States, Turkey and Arab Gulf - states for making a political change in Iraq and Syria compatible with the U.S alliances' strategic ambitions.

¹⁹³ Read also: Weissbach, M., and Wachim, J. (2014). {Ijtimah al-oa'kol alstratigiyah} *The Gathering of Strategic Minds Between United States of America and Turkey*, first edition, Beirut: The All Print Distributors and Publisher.

2. A second opinion goes to describe the Turkish incursion as a preventive measure to contain direct threats on its national security. US and Turkey fear any sudden variables on the Iraqi field that would create de facto outcomes: A. The capacity of Daesh to expand their auto-controlled territory, and march to the Turkish border that would threaten its interior and Social security. B. The capacity of the Kurdistan Workers Party to establish a state project by exploiting the current circumstances in north of Iraq. C. The fears of an Iranian-Russian military intervention in northern Iraq upon an approval by the Iraqi government.

3. A third opinion concludes that the Turkish government's decision to interfere in Iraq came along due an accord with some Arab Sunni leaders to provide 'National Mobilization Volunteers' with the required military assistance to fight Daesh. Proponents of this view, most of them are Turkish experts including former Consul General of Turkey in Mosul Ozturk Yilmaz, argue that Turkish government, via this incursion into Iraq, intends to influence the political process of Mosul's rehabilitation post liberation from Daesh (in Idiz, 2015).

To conclude this section, I believe that the US is keen to keep its hand on Iraq in particular. Iraq could be a pivot state in regional interaction. Any further unintended consequences in Iraq would have dangerous outcomes on US interests in the region. The partition of Iraq, without direct US hand, would promote Iran's strategic position. If Iran would dominate the south of Iraq, it will gain surplus power to override the regional strategic balance of power. In this scenario, US will have two choices: re-approach Iran or deepen its Sunni-based policy to confront this threat. The catastrophic outcome will that US will not be alone in shaping the new Middle East and that too for a long time. This possibility of US strategic failure in the region will encourage other powers such as China and Russia Federation to challenge the US' major role in the world order. To avoid this scenario, the US should support a unified Iraq or in A worst case scenario find local partners (Kurdistan for example) to secure its interests. From my point of view, US will take these steps in Iraq:

- 1- Degrade IS in Iraq and Syria.
- 2- Support federalism in Iraq to which local governments will have wide-scope of powers over its territory.

7.3 US's Strategy to Counter IS:

This section intends to discuss US' response to IS rise in Iraq. To this end, three questions will be answered: what are the US priorities in countering IS strategy? What are the US' measures on the ground? The situation before the next US' president?

As I have discussed in the fifth and the sixth chapters, IS rose in Iraq and Syria due to two main reasons: the power vacuum in Iraq, and the proxy war in Syria. The problem was not limited geographically to these two countries since this semi-proxy war has the potential to spread beyond Syria and Iraq to other important U.S. allies in the Middle East (Cragin, 2015, 320). Some US scholars argue that the best way to tackle this challenge would be to determine how non-state actors'—in this instance Al Qaeda, ISIL, and Shia militants—logistical networks function. Others suggest that US should focus its efforts on targeting the territorial control of IS (Cafarella, Gambhir, Zimmerman, 2016, 16; Chivvis, 2016, 119-120). Some, such as Stephen Walt, argue that the Islamic State must be contained for the foreseeable future, until it moderates its revolutionary aims or even abandons them entirely (Walt, 2015, 50). That means there is a trend in the US to accept the de facto state of IS if it moderates itself according to an international order. But, this trend has not found any room in the US administration policy towards IS (Hudson & Brannen, 2015). It was apparently clear from the beginning of the crisis that the US, despite its reluctance to deploy military, was determined to degrade IS in Iraq. President Obama received the Authorization for Military Force, or AUMF, from the Congress to exercise military power in Iraq and Syria (Azami, 2016, 146-7). At the same time, US' administration showed no intention to deploy a timetable to its strategy against IS. Here, we can begin one our first question: what are the US' priorities in fighting IS?

On July 21, 2016, the Secretary of State John Kerry and the Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, described the main US' priorities as follows:

- 1- Continue the efforts of anti-terror coalition-building, including fighting “violent extremism.” To this end, Anthony Blinken lays out four steps (Dews, 2016):
 - a) Strengthening local partnerships to address the causes of extremism: politically, economically and socially;
 - b) Amplify locally credible voices that can expose the true nature of extremism;

- c) Strengthen the capabilities of US' partners to prevent radicalization;
- d) Achieving a sustainable political accommodation.
- 2- Emphasizing the need for regional cooperation to create a collective security environment through sharing intelligence and logistical support. US already has information-sharing agreement with 55 countries.
- 3- Anti-terror efforts are not limited to IS, rather it targets any non-state actor that seeks power or territory.
- 4- Targeting IS center of gravity: a) the ideological base, and b) the territorial base.
- 5- Cutting off the way for fighters' transportation into IS carved territory.
- 6- Slowdown IS' recruitment machine.
- 7- Preventing IS from creating a global network.
- 8- Preventing the terrorists from laying their hands on chemical or nuclear weapons.
- 9- Enhancing US homeland security.
- 10- Drying off IS' economic and financial resources.¹⁹⁵
- 11- Tracking down IS' commanders.
- 12- Enhancing diplomatic and financial efforts to support Iraq including raising more than two billion dollars to assist Iraq at the pledging conference that took place in Washington D.C. on July 20, 2016.

The second question intends to find the path through which priorities and objectives see the light of the day. Christopher Chivvis outlines three core strategies before President Obama in 2014 (Chivvis, 2016, 123-124):

- The first strategy seeks to contain the growth of ISIS through a limited air campaign.
- A second option is to conduct air and ground operations against the Islamic State and impose peace on other parts of the country with only limited help from local forces.
- The third strategy is to help build the government and then work with its security forces to degrade the ISIS threat.

¹⁹⁵ Through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2253 (2015) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The 28-page resolution, sponsored by the United States and the Russian Federation, and co-sponsored by a broad array of Governments, covers asset freeze, travel ban, arms embargo and listing criteria for ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertaking and entities. Available at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12168.doc.htm>.

To be precise, these strategic options were thought since president Obama was reluctant to deploy direct military operation in Iraq. On June 15, 2014, Frederick Kagan called for an immediate sending of air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; air transportation; Special Operations forces; training teams; and more military equipment. Four days later, President Obama's response was in accord with Kagan's suggestion. On September 9, the president announced his intention to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy (Bacevich, 2016a, 293). According to the New York Times, by February 4, 2015, the US had 4,500 troops in Iraq. On a visit to Baghdad, two Republican senators, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, on Nov. 29 called for U.S. force levels in Iraq to be increased to 10,000, with another 10,000 in Syria. Such calls have increased suspicions in Iraq of another U.S. occupation of their country in making (Majidi, 2015). Here, Obama blocked the way towards any further military engagement that requires forces on the ground. Andrew Bacevich asks: Would defeating ISIS actually solve anything? Does waging war across a large swath of the Islamic world make sense? Is that war winnable? It seems that Bacevich's questions reflect Obama's thoughts against any further military role in Iraq, even though, John Kerry's strategy deploys U.S. special forces and forward air controllers in Iraq and Syria. The situation in Iraq made it difficult for US to deploy special forces. Thus, Obama agreed to deploy 300 special forces personnel in Syria (Hennessey, 2016). Iraqi government's rejection of US special forces engagement in Iraq pushes the US to work with Peshmerga and Sunni tribes (Boot, 2014).

Another problem US' strategy faced in Iraq and Syria was the lack of any successful strategy of regional cooperation. With partners in the region, the United States can create an ISIS-focused intelligence fusion cell. The de-facto situation was an obstacle to this strategy since proxy war and strategic anxiety controlled the relationship amongst the regional players such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Despite these difficulties, the US administration announced that the urgent priorities were (Katulis, Lang & Singh, 2014):

1. Contain and degrade the threat ISIS poses to the Middle East region and global security;
2. Alleviate the humanitarian crisis affecting millions of Syrians and Iraqis;
3. Restore the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria.

Regarding the third point about the restoration of Iraqi integrity, Petraeus suggests that the Iraqi Forces should tackle IS on the ground, albeit with US logistical support; furthermore, the Iraqi forces that conduct operations should demonstrate much greater care in their conduct; and Iraqi government should recognize that the number one long term threat to Iraq’s equilibrium is the one posed by the Iranian-backed Shiite militias. James Jeffrey (2016), stresses that despite U.S. officials’ repeated argument that the U.S. mission is not to contain ISIS but to “defeat” and “destroy” it, Obama’s ground forces ban was because of the fact that using them would result in a “long and costly ground war,” not only with IS but also with another non-state actor. Thus, one can understand that US still supports the integrity of Iraq, and that one of the reasons why Obama has no intention to send larger number of troops to Iraq is that it does not wish to engage with non-state actors. At the same time, any sophisticated military operation would help IS to justify and expand recruitment efforts. Thus, US’ response to the threat of ISIS since June 2014 can be seen in two stages¹⁹⁶:

- A. In the first stage (June-September 2014), the American response included aerial attacks, sending American advisors, increasing intelligence surveillance and providing humanitarian aid to communities in need.
- B. In the second stage President Obama outlined a comprehensive strategy for a long-term campaign. The strategy was based on intensive aerial attacks, reinforcing local forces by means of an American led international coalition.

Obama outlined a comprehensive strategy for a multi-dimensional campaign against ISIS, carried out by an international coalition led by the United States. The following are the key elements of the American campaign as expressed in President Obama’s speech and other statements (Bruneau, 2016, 122):

- A. A systematic and ongoing air campaign against IS in Iraq and Syria.
- B. Military support for local forces fighting against IS in Iraq and Syria: They include Iraqi security forces, Kurdish forces, and the so-called moderate Syrian opposition. They included 4500 military personnel in advisory roles at joint operations centers.

¹⁹⁶ The American Campaign against ISIS, 2014, [Online]. *Crethi Pleth*. Availabke at: <http://www.crethiplethi.com/the-american-campaign-against-isis/islamic-countries/syria-islamic-countries/2015/> (Accessed on 11 October, 2016).

- C. Financial aid: The White House approved \$25 million in military aid to Baghdad and the Kurdish region. At the same time, urged Congress to approve \$500 million plan recommended by the Pentagon for training and arming the so-called moderate rebels in Syria.
- D. The United States intends to harm IS's sources of funding, fight its radical Islamic ideology, and shut down its recruitment tools and block foreign fighters' ways to join IS.
- E. Further humanitarian aid to civilians and population groups which were harmed by IS: American aid to displaced Iraqis amounted to over \$186 million in 2014.
- F. Strengthening the joint efforts by international community to degrade IS. In this regard, US helped to establish an international coalition that formed mainly in September 2014 during the NATO summit in Wales (September 4-5, 2014) and at an international conference in Paris attended by about 30 countries (September 15, 2014).

Since President Obama ordered U.S. forces to begin operations against the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" on August 7, the coalition has flown over 5,000 strike sorties employing some 4,000 weapons, but airpower has been constrained by U.S. political and military leaders (Vickery, 2015). The constrain is due to the presumption that the US-led international coalition continues its tacit support of the Shia militias in Iraq (Fromson & Simon, 2015, 26-7). This argument, has a great effect on the role of Turkey in the International Coalition (Svendsen, 2016, 267). Turkey waited till the mid of 2015 to get directly involved in the coalition efforts in Iraq and Syria.¹⁹⁷ Since then, Turkey has excessively accelerated its role. It has intervened in Iraq and Syria alike by deploying military forces beyond its borders. One can argue that these efforts reflected the US need of a regional key player to do what America is reluctant to do. But, there are three main dangers to President Obama's excessive caution and incrementalism in Iraq (O'Hanlon, 2015):

- 1- US' strategy puts the political future of Iraq at high risk.
- 2- US' reluctance gives the Iranian-backed militias the opportunity to control the security scene in Iraq.
- 3- By prolonging the battle, IS will have enough time to re-adjust its strategy.

¹⁹⁷ the declaration of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, press release No. 313, on December 19, 2015, its commitment to its role within the international coalition against Daash terrorist

From this perspective, the answer to the third question highlights the most important American scholars' works that intend to provide a total picture to the next president regarding how to confront IS in the best possible way. Here, I would like to summarize the suggested strategy as follows:

- First, on the counter-extremism level (Stern & Berger, 2015, 238-45; 2015b; Curtis et al., 2016; Olidort, 2015; Stern 2015b):

1. Media should be more cautious while presenting news or information about IS to the audience in the US. Scholars suggest that media should not tend to incentivize simple explanations; avoid blaming Muslims or Islam on political grievances. A better understanding will also prevent the more populist politicians from whipping up anti-Islamic sentiment; overreaction only feeds the takfiri cause. The media has an important role in this fight. Prince Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein (2014) encourages the media to empower mainstream, moderate Muslim voices and to give them a larger platform.

2. Tarnishing IS' global image through amplifying the stories of defectors and refugees from the areas that ISIS controls. Muslims and Westerners alike should understand that ISIS has committed war crimes forbidden by Islamic law. The idea is to highlight IS's hypocrisy and to detach it from Islam.

3. Aggressively suspend ISIS social-media accounts. That means the international community should wage cyber war on IS propaganda machine.¹⁹⁸

4. Press Saudi Arabia to stop exporting Salafist ideology. In this regard, one can refer to the recent conference whereby more than 200 Muslim scholars came together in Grozni, Chechnya, for a conference on Islamic issues. This is perhaps the first occasion that mainstream Sunni scholars distanced themselves so clearly from Wahhabis. This effort is very important as it sends a clear

¹⁹⁸ The ISIS propaganda machine has five major goals: to project an image of strength and victory; to excite those with violent tendencies by moral justification in the form of its alleged utopian society; to manipulate the perceptions of ordinary citizens in its enemies' lands to incite demands for military action; to place the blame for any conflict that does result on the aggression of western government; to recast any military action against ISIS as an action against Muslims in general (Stern & Berger, 2015a, 249-50).

message to the whole world that the Muslims from various sects denounce the ideological base of radicalism.¹⁹⁹

5. U.S. counterterrorism has developed to face “the dynamics of radicalization to violence” or the reasons why some individuals associated with violent extremism commit violence and others do not. However, the driving factors of radicalization are not limited to ISIS. US’ programs must cover the waterfront from personal, local grievances to foreign policy issues like the barbarity of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Healthy relationships with Muslim communities are extraordinarily important, for the government and the communities alike (Levitt in al-Hussein, 2014). The defeating of ISIS requires in the words of Bernard Haykel’s, “engaging in cultural and educational efforts to defeat ISIS’s ideology.” In other words, counter-extremism strategy deploys soft power (societal, information technology and media) to terminate violent thought.

6. International community should pay more attention to the socio-political roots of extremism. To create reasonable individuals in a cosmopolitan periphery social justice and good governance should prevail.

- Second: on the political level (Hussein, 2015; Levitt & Youkilis, 2015; Esposito, 2014; Goldenberg et al., 2015):

1. Political change in Iraq and Syria is fundamental to defeat ISIS. Regarding Iraq, most American scholars have apparently blamed the sectarian dynamics of politics in Iraq. They blamed the Iraqi government of being weak and sectarian: it is weak due to its incapability to degrade the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and due to the struggle over power between Baghdad and local governments; while it is sectarian due to the de facto Shia dominance over political discourse. Most scholars believe that Iraq is closer to Iran and Russia than to the US. Some of them believe that this is a normal result of the socio-political realities in Iraq.

Regarding Syria, one can say that, for the Syrian opposition, the Assad regime and IS are two sides of the same coin. Both have opposed democracy in every possible brutal way, and heightened

¹⁹⁹ Available at: <https://eruditeblogger.wordpress.com/2016/09/03/are-wahhabis-sunnis-chechnya-conference-and-saudi-anger/>

sectarian divisions (Esposito, 2014). Hence, Levitt (2014) and Mike Pence²⁰⁰ agree that the United States should target Assad regime's military infrastructure to ensure that Damascus cannot take advantage of the situation. The US must help arm and train moderates.

2. Some scholars expect that the post-WWII boundaries of the middle east will not remain intact in the light of IS rise in the region. The crises is no more limited geographically to Iraq and Syria, rather, it has stretched out to other countries such as Libya and Yemen. And some expect that it will reach Saudi Arabia too. Thus, they suggest that the US administration needs to let the region unleash its new political map. In this regard, Hillary Clinton during the second presidential debate in 2016 stressed that the US should pay attention to the Kurds as the sole reliable ally in Iraq. US support for Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, meant to weaken the Islamic State, alarms Turkey, which fears that its Kurds might renew their separatist push (Byman, 2015, 16). Thus, Daniel Byman (2015) and Jessica Stern (2015c) argue that preventing the next 9/11 requires navigating civil wars, stopping conflicts before they break out, and building state capacity and not working on the Balkanization cart. Here, the question is: which states or groups will merit US' Sponsorship policy (Dombrowski & Reich, 2015, 126-7). In the broad picture the most significant costs of American sponsorship are political. Sponsorship strategies are useful both in times of peace and war. Sponsorship can work to maintain the current regime in Iraq. The US has chosen a strategy of sponsorship with regard to the Iraqi government's struggle against ISIS. Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich find out that the sponsorship strategies are the best way to deal with the Iraq government because: it will conserve American political, diplomatic, and material resources; it will push Iraq to demonstrate resilience towards US strategic demands; and preserve the US position as the engine of regional events.
3. The so-called ISIS is to be terminated as a political project in the regional environment. The strategy to fight terrorism must be based on two columns: global consensus and solid regional security initiatives. Here, one can refer to two obstacles:
 - a) Global consensus takes two levels: the ideological and the political. Concerning the political game of power in the world order, there is a little room for agreement among various international powers.
 - b) Any regional collective initiative to see light requires that the countries should surpass sectarian and political grievances. The question is that: is US ready to create and lead a new paradigm of regional balance of power. In other words, US might need to shift its policy to create a new security

²⁰⁰ During the VP debate of the US in October, 2016.

initiative to which regional powers sit along one table to fight extremism and to preserve the status quo regional order.

- Third, the US measures on the military level (Dodge and Wasser, 2014, 32-3; Ricks, 2015a; Wehrey & Lacher, 2016; Simcox, 2014):

1. Military means should take the priority in fighting IS.
2. Waging a massive air strikes on IS economic resources such as the oil fields they possess.
3. Deploying U.S. and Allied troops on the ground in Iraq and Jordan/Syria.
4. The U.S. must muster Sunni allies to contribute ground forces and to take a major in-country role.
5. Create an International Intelligence Operations Center in Europe with significant U.S. resourcing and quality manning.
6. Greatly augment the manning and resourcing of the U.S. LEA/Intelligence liaison programs with friendly nations.
7. Assisting the Iraqi government to stand up new army units loyal to the government and a counterterrorism effort focused on fighting ISIS and any other non-state actors.
8. The next president will have to make a lengthy military commitment to Iraq and Syria.
9. The US should accelerate efforts to defeat IS as soon as possible, otherwise, the self-proclaimed caliphate will take advantage of long-term battle to recruit more fighters.

After demonstrating the suggested strategy to counter IS, one is definitely led to pose a question: is the US-led coalition able to degrade the so-called Islamic State? IS will no doubt eventually collapse as a result of its false promises, difficulties in state capacity and IS' self-destructive actions, which alienate much of its popular and financial base (Katagiri, 2015, 542; Stern, 2015c). Although, the US needs to make abandon its sectarian-based policy to which Iraq was the field of sectarian balancing between Iran on one hand and Turkey and Arab periphery on the other. This, proxy (i.e. sectarian) conflict has allowed the militias, from various sects and ethnicity, to grow in Iraq and militarize the society. Noriyuki Katagiri (2015) poses a key question here: whether 'boots on the ground' will be necessary and sufficient to destroy IS? Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack (2008) asks: How then should the United States solve this conundrum? They observe that the presence of American troops in Iraq does inspire sizable numbers of Muslims to journey to Iraq to kill Americans after 2003 (Byman & Pollack, 2008, 62). At the same time, if US is still reluctant to

send troops to Iraq the situation could get out of control and that puts the region at a higher risk. In this perspective, James Jeffrey, a former US ambassador and an expert on Middle Eastern issues, believes that the next US' administration will inherit a range of feasible options:

- Choice One would be to continue the current Administration's program against ISIS.
- Choice Two would be "Obama Plus." Under this scenario, the U.S. maintains its ban on American ground troops, but greatly increases its air and advisory support effort to local forces, similar to what Putin has recently done with the Syrian army (minus the high civilian casualties).
- Choice Three would be limited contingents of U.S. combat troops, probably two brigades each of 3-4,000 combat personnel, reinforced with other NATO countries' elite forces, to spearhead drives that would still rely heavily on local forces for subsidiary operations.

Concerning these options, mentioned above, Michael Knights believes no matter of the size of U.S. troops on the ground, any U.S. Administration will have to play a lead political, economic and perhaps security role in stabilizing territories after ISIS is defeated. To this end, the US should take these steps (Knights, 2015; Katulis, Lang & Singh, 2014):

- Tighten the field on the triple alliance which consists of Syria-Russia and Iran.
- The US and its allies should engage more in the region, in Iraq and Syria, in particular, to show its strong commitments to support its allies in these countries.
- Greater Iraqi recognition of the critical role of the coalition could open the way for a more open strategic dialogue. Re-engage the Iraqi government on an enduring U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Framework.
- Support local political actors who are determined to fight Iranian-backed militia in Iraq.

The Special Envoy for global coalition to counter IS Brett McGurk (2014; 2016) made it apparently clear that the key elements of US' plan to IS rise concerns with Iraq' ability to handle this challenge. Most importantly these elements are: assessing the Capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), establishing Joint Operations Centers in Baghdad and Erbil, getting the Political Process on Track, and an agreed plan for post-Daesh governance in occupied territories. McGurk adds that it is up to the Iraqi government to decide what forces are going to tackle the liberation battle against IS' in Mosul. McGurk (2014) emphasizes that five things are important to the US regarding the battle at Mosul: first, local people should be involved in this battle and in the aftermath efforts to control the city; Second, any non-state militias out of government control

should not be allowed to participate in this battle; third, the agreed plan whether on the humanitarian arrangements or on the political level should be done under the cooperation of the Iraqi government with the United Nations and the United States; fourth, Iraqis must be enabled to control their sovereign space and reconstitute their western border with Syria; and fifth, functioning federalism would empower local populations to secure their own areas with the full resources of the state.

Functioning federalism could be the best solution to defeat IS and prevent terrorism from affecting the west of Iraq, and this should be so that Sunnis should enjoy the same autonomy as Kurds do right now (Carroll, 2014; Ricks 2015b). On the other hand, Neil Joeke (2016) and Pollard et al. (2015) argue that before giving the Sunni autonomy US should eliminate the causal roots of Sunni outrage. Specifically, the failure of the Sunni-led Syrian revolution, the exclusionary Shi'a sectarian political structure of Iraq, and the breakdown of the regional security environment while unleashing and allowing for the strengthening of Sunni militias. In other words, it is the national failure in Syria and Iraq and the proxy wars that gave IS the opportunity to grow in the regional political dynamics.

7.4 US perception on Nation-state in Iraq

In this section, I intend to conclude this chapter by answering the question: does the US support a unified Iraq? If we look at the historical discourse of US policy towards Iraq, the answer would be: Yes. However, one can say that recent developments in Iraq and the region might change the strategic trend towards Iraq. To answer properly the question, the section tends to demonstrate why pro-partition sentiment towards Iraq has grown in the US. In this regard, Joel Wing (2014) solicited some scholars' opinion concerning the future of Iraq: Liam Anderson, Amazia Baram, Eric Davis and Judith Yaphe find out that Iraq will survive and pass the IS crisis. They conclude that “the likelihood of Iraq fragmenting along ethno-sectarian lines is remote but not ignorable” (Wing, 2014). This section is divided into two parts: the first sheds light on the pro-partitioning argument, and the second in contrast pays attention to the pro-unified Iraq argument.

7.4.1 Pro-partitioning argument:

This argument goes far in advocating US strategy that provide the required preconditions to facilitate the partition of Iraq into three separate mini-states. Some factors have been raised to support such an argument:

First, the regional order and Iraq, in particular, is an artificial construct²⁰¹. The collapse of Syria, the ongoing fighting in Iraq, and the general instability in the Middle East has led some observers to question whether the very geography of the region will be changed. Robin Wright also warns that competing groups and ideologies are pulling the region apart: “A different map would be a strategic game changer for just about everybody, potentially reconfiguring alliances, security challenges, trade and energy flows for much of the world, too” (Rabinovich, 2014, 4). This discussion touches on a key question: Will the collapse of one or several other Arab states produce a new order in the region? In this context, the future course of the Syrian crisis and its interplay with Iraq’s domestic conflict seems to be the most likely source for such a change. Henry Kissinger in a Hardtalk interview to BBC believes that the failure of reconciliation in Iraq will have devastating consequence as the break up of Yugoslavia did. The argument goes to affirm that Sykes-Picot agreement failed to meet the socio-historical reality of the Middle East. This detachment from reality caused a terrible situation in the countries which have intense diversity of social groups. These groups failed (i.e. refused) to re-approach each other. From this perspective, the second factor affecting partition is the intensification of civil wars. The Iraqi case is complex since the conflict has taken an ethno-sectarian mode. Stephen Biddle (2014) argues that out of 128 civil wars fought between 1945 and 2004, only one-fourth ended within two years. Such wars end in two broad ways. The first, and more common, is for the stronger side to crush the weaker. The other endgame is a negotiated settlement in the meantime. In Iraq, the end game is not near, this situation will have three foreseen outcomes: a growing threat of terrorism, humanitarian disaster, and economic damage. Biddle argues, through statistics, that of 142 civil wars fought between 1950 and 1999, 61

²⁰¹ Iraq is an artificial construct, a British invention formed out of three thoroughly separate provinces of the Ottoman Empire. They had nothing in common apart from a loathing of the British (Danahar, 2013; Visser, 2008, 95). Established as a kingdom under British rule (1921), and detached from Turkey by the peace treaties (1923), Iraq was the first Ottoman dominion to reach independence (1932) and to join the League of Nations (same year) (Parolin, 2009, 82).

saw major military intervention by neighboring states at some point. At this point alone Iraq's integrity is in a dangerous state. In some cases, most dramatically in Yugoslavia, partition emerged as the only feasible alternative to escalating violence and 'ethnic cleansing.' The consequence was a growing number of 'failed states' that presented the major Western powers with a fundamental dilemma: should they abandon their traditional policy of support for the territorial integrity of established states in favor of pressurizing some states to accept partition? Similarly, partition could create as many problems as solutions for the United States, including the creation of numerous weak states which could themselves be breeding grounds for terrorist groups (Armstrong, 2004, 782; Pratt, 2015, 208-9).

The third factor is state's capacity. Toby Dodge refuses to analyze IS rise in Iraq as the fault of the Sykes-Picot old regional system. Prescriptions, for him, should focus on the ways in which Iraq has been weakened since the regime change of 2003, and on methods for reforming the Iraqi state that could sustain the country in the future. A comparative study of modern states suggests that their sustainability rests not on their indigenous or exogenous creation, but on their ability to fulfil three functions (Dodge, 2014, 10-11):

- The first of these concerns the state's capacity to wield coercion and control the activities of its subjects (security).
- The second pillar of a state's sustainability is its infrastructural power (welfare), which is determined by the delivery of government services and rule-making authority through a set of institutions that radiate out from the capital to the population.
- Third is ideological power (representation), or a state's ability to be perceived as legitimate by the population. This legitimacy is closely linked to the state's ability to harness, sustain or create a unitary nationalism.

Dodge (2012, 22) Seeks to judge what the future in Iraq future holds: Can Iraq avoid sliding back into civil war? Comparative examination of the causes of civil wars and the end of such conflicts focuses on three major themes: the socio-cultural factors that give rise to violent conflict; the institutional weakness of the state; and the nature of the constitutional settlement that shapes how politics function, who can have access to power and how that power is shared.²⁰² An assessment of these themes, according to Dodge, suggests that Iraq ay potentially slide into chaos again. In the

²⁰² See also: Yossef Amr, Cerami Joseph R. (2015). *The Arab Spring and the Geopolitics of the Middle East: Emerging Security Threats and Revolutionary Change*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2.

first place, it is this chaos that provides the opportunity for other sentiments of belonging to flourish in Iraq. From my point of view, three sentiments are conflicted in Iraq: ethnocism²⁰³, Islamism and Iraqism. Conflict among these sub-sentiments caused severe harm not only on nationalism in Iraq but also has weakened Iraq's statehood where institutions are weak to deal equally with citizens and to provide sufficient services. Rolf Schwarz and Miguel de Corral argue that a patrimonial failed state (such as those found in Africa, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen) lacks state infrastructure and may be violently contested by various non-state actors (Schwarz & Miguel, 2011, 216; Caplow, 1998, 175). There are a variety of reasons as to why Middle Eastern states are, for the most part, in that middle ground between the two extremes of a strong state and a failed state. A failed state such as Iraq provides the opportunity to non-state actors to emerge as key players in the political dynamics. What makes the scenario worse is that these non-state actors are supra-national in nature. In this regard, the crisis in legitimacy has pushed some portions of Arab societies to give up nationalism and search instead for a different reference of meaning, loyalty and legitimacy in other forms, religious, tribal, sectarian or ethnic. Iraq like any other Arab country manifests hard politics which lacks soft traditions in governing and representation. What, exactly, does a state need to do to survive, is strong, albeit soft 'structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order.' The stability of a state is dependent on its ability to project power over the population through its institutions, functions and actions (Dodge & Wasser, 2014, 14). Furthermore, failed states are unable to prevent the competition for resources which can strengthen secondary identity traits, particularly those that stem from religion and ethnicity. Thus, failed corrupt institutions of the Iraqi state push the populace to seek other security guarantors and social-service providers. In a 2014 poll, 66% of Sunni respondents viewed the decisions of the Iraqi government as illegitimate, in comparison to 31% of Shia respondents; 83% of Sunnis believe that Iraq is headed in the wrong direction (Dodge and Wasser, 2014, 28; Saouli, 2015, 324). Some argue that what as happened in Iraq for the past fifty years is the control by a dominant group that has a monopoly over coercion (i.e. state power). And this power discourse has three severe outcomes: the first is the escalated grievances among social groups which leads to mistrust of each other that often ends in violent confrontation; the second outcome is the corrosion in the common identity; third is the loss of voices of wisdom in local politics. Thus, Adham Saouli argues that the occupation of most of the Sunni areas by the Islamic State provides Masuud Barazani with the opportunity to

²⁰³ I refer here to either Arabism and Kurdish sentiment.

exploit the Iraqi army's weakness to occupy the oil-rich and contested territory of Kirkuk. In that sense, Jaroslav Tir argues that extremists always deploy violent situations to play on people's fears and doctrines, try to spread sentiments of danger and mistrust in the periphery of target audience towards the other groups (Tir, 2005, 547-8).

The fourth factor concerning partition of Iraq is the Kurdish case. Jeffrey Goldberg (2008) argues that in many ways, the Kurds are functionally independent already. The Kurdish regional government has its own army, collects its own taxes, and negotiates its own oil deals. This semi-autonomy is considered as a source of problems. It encourages others to follow such a local governance system on one hand, and stimulates others to refuse it on the other. The division among social groups in Iraq is very deep as demonstrated in the elections. The result of the legislative elections confirms the territorialization of different communities. Of the 102 districts, 87 voted by a majority of at least two thirds for a homogenous ethnic-religious community coalition (Shia, Sunni, or Kurdish) (Roy, 2008, 110-112). The problem rests in the politicians' deployment of this division. This deployment takes three behavioral categories: first, many politicians from both sides (Kurds or Arabs) deploy this friction for political reasons; second, the territorial dispute heightens the political tension through the continuous advance of the Kurds to the west towards Kirkuk, Nineveh and Diyala; the third, is the growing antagonistic popular sentiments regarding the Kurdish case. In effect, the Kurds intend to hold a referendum on independence at some point in the future. George Joffe affirms that the break-up of Iraq into three parts seems now almost certain (Joffe, 2016, 12). But, Joffe asks what kind of agreement among discrete groups will prevail. In other words, will the partition be peaceful? He does not think so. For him the implications of the situation in Iraq and Syria are extremely serious. Even if ISIS is eventually forced out of the cities, Sunni provinces, such as Nineveh and Tikrit, will be radicalized to the extent that the levels of violence in Sunni areas of Iraq will increase. Secondly, majority Sunni regions of Iraq will be even more estranged from the central government than before, due to the intensification of sectarian strife. Thirdly, chaos in Iraq and Syria gives the Kurdish fighters, mostly from Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD), the capability of transportation across borders, and revive the Kurds' dream of grand Kurdistan. This, situation stimulates regional countries to interfere in Iraq and Syria to prevent such a scenario. For instance, one can recall the Turkish incursion in Iraq and Syria in this light. However, Kurdish dreams of independence were either shattered or delayed

when ISIS subsequently attacked Kurdistan. While Kurds have not abandoned their goal of independence, such ensuing events have delayed its realization (Philips, 2014, 355).

The fifth factor is the growing perception that Iraq is falling apart. This perception is linked to two other questions: will the United States continue to help build Iraq's democracy? What will the US do to confront growing Iranian influence in the country? (Dunne in Akbarzadeh, 2011, 23). Some such as Chaim Kaufmann and Thomas Friedman argue that US should destroy the so-called Islamic State and develop a special relationship with an independent or semi-independent Iraqi Kurdistan (Khalilzad, 2016). Zalmay Khalilzad believes that Iraq is not totally lost, but the total withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011 created a vacuum that Iran and its regional rivals tried to fill in the process, pulling the country apart. In this regard, Michael Crowley (2014) and Thomas L. Friedman (2013) ask: Can Iraqi people produce stable, decent, representative governments? Emma Sky and Harith al-Qarawee (2013) latently argue that Politics in Iraq has no sufficient power to produce decent representative system. Hence, a presumption has grown which is weak Iraq lets the regional powers to interfere on its ground. For instance, to encounter Iran's role in Iraq, Turkey is now posing itself as the defender not only of Iraq's Sunnis but also of Kurds, even though Turkey has long feared Kurdish nationalism within its own borders. But to avoid disaster, the United States urgently needs to review its Iraq policy. Sectarian identity was, in many ways, institutionalized in the recreation of Iraqi politics after the fall of the Baathist regime. the sectarian dimension of the crisis has taken on a momentum of its own and occupied center stage (Aaron Reese, 2013, 12; Haddad in Spencer, Kinninmont & Sirri, 2013, 17). Sunni political leaders are claiming their community is sharply excluded from the political process (O'Sullivan, 2013). If the government of Iraq proves unable to get beyond sharing power, it will only fuel the ongoing political crisis and could lead to territorial partition along sectarian and ethnic lines. Does the United States have the appetite to be the external guarantor of peace in a partitioned Iraq? And how is the US going to deal with the regional dynamics in the aftermath of any shift in the regional map? But, at a certain point, the US has shown very careful consideration towards Kurdistan. Three interrelated developments that came together to crystallize the Kurdistan Region's position in the region are (Stansfield, 2013, 266):

- 1- The consolidation of Kurdistan Region's autonomy within Iraq.
- 2- The natural resources of Kurdistan, and its geo-strategic position across the prospected gas and oil pipelines to Europe from the Middle East through Turkey.

- 3- The overlapping of the broader security and national interests of Kurdistan with those of Turkey, the Arab Gulf states.

All these factors and precautions concerning Iraq fed a growing belief that Iraq is falling apart. For instance, in a conference held by the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, on July 22, 2015, titled: *The Middle East in Transition*, the panelists identify two additional barriers to reaching a successful negotiated settlement in Iraq: the lack of consensus among the different groups in Iraq on how the state should be structured, due in part to wildly different interpretations of what “federalism” actually means; and the prolonged absence of any kind of national reconciliation due to the lack of adequate power sharing agreement. The panelists also noted that the idea of separatism/partition has become far more acceptable in Iraq in the last two years. The conference exhorted the United States to support Sunnis and Kurds to balance Iran and the Shia in Iraq. To conclude this part of the section, it can be said that the real factor is that Iraq did not meet the US strategic expectations. US has failed to create a pro-US Iraq which could be a strategic base for its regional policy. Furthermore, Iraq has failed to be a model for promoting democracy in the Middle East. In other words, the Great Middle East was dependent on Iraq’s role to bring it to the regional political reality. Thus, Iraq has failed to lead a collective security initiative in the region that would include Israel as a recognized regional player.

Although, another danger should be expected in the aftermath of disintegration of Iraq. New bigger political entities might see light in the region such as that of new Sunnistan, which would probably include part of Syria and beyond, and a new Shia state could enflame fears of an Iranian hegemony. Thus, a parallel strategic understanding calls for a strategy that keeps the Sykes-Picot regional order alive (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2014; Axworthy & Milton, 2016).

7.4.2 Pro-unified Iraq argument:

It is fundamentally important to demonstrate the other vision on Iraq in the US. Here, many scholars assert that Iraq is not lost, thus, the US should continue its support to unified Iraq to surpass the challenges it faces. In this regard, I prefer to start with an Iraqi-American voice, Abbas Kadhim (2016), who argues that three fundamental tasks should be fulfilled in the post ISIS era in Iraq: reclaiming the lost territories from ISIS, reconstruction of the Iraqi State, and reconciliation among Iraqis. All these tasks require a good measure of winning the population by good governance and a well-defined arrangement of power-sharing according to a faithful implementation of the Iraqi

Constitution on matters related to federalism, Kadhim argues. In US perspective the resignation of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki shows a political accommodation to the US that sets the stage for increasing U.S. role in Iraq. National security advisor Susan Rice said in a statement: “These are encouraging developments that we hope can set Iraq on a new path” (Cloud & Bennett, 2014). This new path should abandon two antithetical forces that are both hostile to US - IS and Iran - that seek to control Iraq and destabilize the region. Robert Ford and James Jeffrey (2015) argue that the most dangerous challenge to the Iraqi government is the Iranian-backed political and militia hardliners. For them US should be involved more seriously in Iraq to abort any effort that seeks to create the "Shiite Crescent" that stretches from Tehran to Damascus across Baghdad. This crescent will be an economic giant, of oil reserves and natural gas, and surpass Saudi Arabia's 268 billion barrels. A power shift in this direction in the Middle East could cost the US not only its leading position in the region but also its position as the core engine of world order's interactions.

Hence, Ambassador Robert S. Ford²⁰⁴ suggests that the US to take the following steps in Iraq (Ford, 2016a; 2016b):

- Support the Forces loyal to the Iraqi government, to recapture territories from the Islamic State and hold nearly all the areas they recapture. This suggestion aims to fight steadily and slowly any threat to state structure by non-state actors.
- Help the Iraqis to implement an efficient federal system.
- Push Baghdad and Erbil to reach an agreement to which Iraq's integrity should be honored.
- Building efficient local governance that can hold captured IS territories, is not as simple as handing the baton to Sunni Arabs.

Andrea Plebani (2014) and Michael Rubin (2013) go further by suggesting that the US should keep its role in Iraq at high peaks. This role tends to guarantee two things: the security of Iraq and ensure constitutional legitimacy. Most of the proponents of this trends (officials or scholars) agree that the sole guarantee of n Iraqi unity is a strong power sharing paradigm. This paradigm should distribute powers between central government in Baghdad and local governments. But this paradigm faces a fundamental challenge at its core. Iraq's administrative and geographical internal boundaries show

²⁰⁴ Senior Fellow- the Middle East Institute.

that there will be some relatively homogenous provinces and localities.²⁰⁵ Thus, most of the regions in Iraq will be established on ethnic or sectarian identities. The propensity of conflict within such power and demographical distribution is still quite high. Kahl Colin et al. provide a recipe to overcome this challenge. This includes: a focus on ‘Legislation’ to make provinces viable; careful management of concerned local citizens’ needs; disarming and demobilizing all militias in Iraq; professionalization of Iraq Security Forces (ISF); a prospect for a peaceful political settlement of the Kirkuk issue (Kahl, Katulis & Lynch, 2008, 87-89). But Kahl et al. proposal deals only with Iraq’s internal efforts. What still lies beneath this debate is that U.S. support should be conditional on the Iraqi central government’s guarantee for certain things: abolition of sectarian and ethnic divisions and restructuring its security service. Anthony Cordesman stresses that US strategy of ‘creeping incrementalism’ should fulfill these requirements: defeat IS, reduce the growing internal divisions in Iraq, and push US’ allies in the region to deploy rapprochement policy towards Iraq. However, Cordesman does not support US’ massive intervention in Iraq (Cordesman, 2015, 24). Cordesman and others believe that the US has lost much of its credibility in Iraq. Thus, it’s a fundamental task is to rebuild confidence with Iraqis. To this end, Zalmay Khalilzad suggests few things that Washington should do:

- Assist in restoring military balance in favor of Iraqi national security forces.
- Carefully assess plans for Mosul.
- The U.S. should help the Iraqis design and implement a program for militia disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
- Facilitate progress toward a new political compact.
- Encourage economic reform.

Iraq is decidedly not lost to Iran—and today U.S. leverage is at a new post-withdrawal high. Washington has an opportunity to rebuild influence if it takes the right steps.

²⁰⁵ Federalism offers the only viable possibility for preventing ethnic conflict and secessionism as well as establishing a stable democracy in Iraq. Rather, a federal system granting regional governments extensive political and financial powers with borders drawn along ethnic and religious lines that utilize institutionalized measures to prevent identity-based and regional parties from dominating the government is required (Brancati, 2004, 7). Although, Dawn Brancati poses additional precautions must be taken to prevent identity based parties from dominating the government, the borders of the regional governments in Iraq should be drawn along ethnic and/or religious lines so that the three major groups in the country have significant control over their own political, social, and economic affairs.

Finally, it can be argued that the US has shown the Iraqi government great tendency and high commitment to defeat the self-proclaimed Islamic State. In this perspective, President Obama ordered on October 14, 2016, to further send 500 troops to Iraq to help the Iraqi ground forces in the operation of liberating Mosul being waged from October 16, 2016. These efforts fall in the category of a pro-unified Iraq commitment. However, any of the future US' administrations could change this policy towards a pro-soft partition policy if Iraq continues as a disappointing case in US' perspective. In other words, US want to realize that Iraq meets its strategic expectations.

Conclusion

This study, along seven chapters, is designed to test two essential arguments:

- 1- Orientalism's findings and themes in the US have sophisticated implications on the future of a state like Iraq.
- 2- The US supports a unified Iraq if it meets its strategic expectations as will be discussed later in the seventh chapter.

Concern the first argument, this study stresses that 'political Orientalism' is one of the fields and impacts of general orientalism which concerns the political atmosphere of the oriental societies. At the same time, the general discourse of Orientalism exercises a political influence over the subject (both the Americans as consumers of Orientalism and the Muslims as the object of orientalism), having played a great role in creating the general popular perception that influences the decision-making process. This study promotes some sub-observations regarding the concept of Orientalism:

- 1- Orientalism as a concept does not focus just on specific geographical or cultural patterns of the orient, but also tries to create the idioms deployed by authors and the institutions behind him. Both are situated in the larger social-political structure of the West.
- 2- The main shift that can be discerned in the transition from classical to contemporary orientalism is that while the former tried to dominate the orient through the exercise of hard power, the latter aims to modernize the orient in the way that engages both sides in the debate, creates a cooperation that paves a way for a common ground that is shaped in the mould of the universal project. This project legitimizes the control over the orient through the exercise of smart and soft power, since the West has the control over the knowledge and this provides it with the advantage and superiority over the orient. So, in this conception all sorts of cultural differences are not discarded but they are also made within new politico-cultural conditions of global rationality.
- 3- Another shift that can be discerned is that the Orientalist is no longer a mere traveler who speaks Arabic. This old definition of 'Orientalist' has been replaced by an intellectual or an expert who is a specialist and who provides observations and intellectual works on the Orient. Their knowledge can be traced and documented as vital resource in the decision-making process concerning the Foreign Policy.

- 4- Another conclusion challenges the conspiracy theory concerning Orientalism. I do believe that the weakness in social and political realities in the Arab world is due to our failure in interpreting our values. This failure creates a fear about facing our heritage as Muslims or Arab in the world civilization.
- 5- But still no one can deny the western perception of which the change in the Arab world is perceived as impossible mission since Muslims cannot be detached from the Islamic peculiarities. Although a contradiction can be noticed in Orientalism findings since the Orientalists believe that the only way to changed social reality in the Arab world is through adopt and assimilating the West. This process resides in the core of the neo-orientalism discourse to dominate the orient by making the Orientals believe that there is no other alternative to westernization in the global designs. Thus, any change in the Middle East should be in favor of the western interests. One of the most serious consequences to this western exclusiveness could be the creation of a new political map to the Middle East based on the ethnic-sectarian belonging. No one can deny that Orientalism was the main cause in shifting the political reality in the Middle East towards national state in the aftermath of WW1. Even the current political map might meet some new changes due to the involvement of the United States in the region.

But the question is: for what motive, Neo-Orientalism is pushing for towards the Middle East? Is it the old classic one of domination or there is new vision in dealing with the Middle East's people? Here, I think it would seek to control rather than completely dominate the orient. It would call for the perpetuation of a general image that has been set within their intellectual tradition and this has been enhanced due to the events of September 11th and the following notion of war on terror which did not make a distinction between Islam as religion or the political deployment of Islam by the terrorists. This image is a consequence of the Orientalism as a discourse of exploring the "*Other*." This "*Other*" does not always called on a foe; the image varies according to the circumstances. The correlation between "*Other*" and "*Enemy*" tries to maintain a historical continuity of the struggle between Islam and the West; this confrontation is not only between the East and the West but also is within the West itself whereby the presence of the Muslims immigration increases in the West. The fact that Huntington's neo-Orientalism can hold such intellectual weight at the turn of the twenty-first century has everything to do with the status of the United States in the New World Order. We see instead a new version of Orientalism, one that

revitalizes, in a subtler form, the insistence that fixed cultural differences must structure the organization of political power.

These inquiries raise the question as to which extent Iraq and United States will meet each other interests despite the tarnished image on Islam and Arabism. So, if we are able to overcome the ideological barriers with United States then it might be possible to undermine and defeat the images created by Orientalism. But first I need to find out what kind of intellectual barriers Muslims in general and Iraqis, in particular, face in their relation with the West in general and America in particular. Thus, in the third chapter I focused on western political philosophy according to which perceptions on Muslims were created. I can conclude the chapter with Binder Leonardo's statements that the Arabs are poorly integrated communities into global design (Binder, 1988, 104). In this perspective, Muslims might join the third alternative in confronting the western hegemony. These alternatives are: isolation such as the case of North Korea, accepting and joining the west and the third is facing the western hegemony. Still, the fundamental question was how to civilize (facing) the Muslims without making them lose their identity. The mission of "civilizing them" requires a coherent strategy. But what is the essential path of this strategy. In this regard, two trends in the west have been contesting each other towards how properly deal with the Arab world:

- The first is Strauss's ethics of intervention in the global order. Concerning intervention for the sake of change in the Muslim world, Strauss honors the Western intervention, in particular that of USA, in global affairs: the US is the best model according to classical political philosophy.
- The second trend is about John Rawls' model of global order. By the law of peoples Rawls means a political conception for right and justice in the international arena. His aim is to set out the bearing of political liberalism for the tolerance of non-liberal societies? Tyrannical regimes cannot be accepted in a reasonable society of people even if they are able to provide stability.

The general perspective in the west on the Middle East (including Iraq) is that they lack four essential pillars that necessary for political development, are: toleration, pluralism, reasonableness, and legitimacy. Thus, as much as Middle Eastern peoples lack of these pillars, then, they are still incompatible not also to democracy but also to the reasonable global order. My point of view, is that, multiculturalism also depends on public reason to establish a global consensus in which different groups and identities give priority to public reason which accommodates common

conception of good and justice to maintain peace. In this regard, what it needed by any country to be a core state of multiculturalism is to follow this trend of consensus which depends on cooperation and trust. In contrast to that sense, the general image in the west asserts the disintegration of Arabs and Muslims in the global order in the light of the increasing impact of islamophobia on politics. In general Orientalism has two very important effects: culturally it creates a general image of Islam and Arab; and strategically it directs United States' Foreign policy concerning the Middle Eastern issues.

Here, the question is "Is Islamophobia a threat to Islam? How to distinguish between moderate Muslims in the nation state and Islamists as the subject of Islamism (politicizing the religion and state order)? Is it possible for nation states of Muslim majorities or to the international community of moderate Muslims to orient the Islamophobia process and subject it to its interests? I think the main hypothetical point is that whether moderate individuals can convince the rest of the world to distinguish Islam as faith and the political project of Islamism as a global project that aims to establish its political entity. That would lead us again to a fundamental question as to how those minorities of Islamists, hypothetically assumed, in the Muslim and Arab world could establish this wave of strategic implication on the surface of regional and local politics in some countries. Thus, as much Muslims and Arabs can redirect Islamophobia against ISIS, or under any other titles that share the ambition of Islamism, both sides of the civilizations interlocutor, East and West, will get equal benefits of this process. From my point of view, ISIS crisis might hide more for cooperation than conflict in both sides; between the notions of the I, as national or religious partners, or between I and the 'Other' to reach a stable regional and global order. But, first of all, we need to shed light on the peripheral conditions that help ISIS to emerge in general in the Middle East and in Iraq in particular. To this end, this study concentrated on Iraq as case study to meet the methodological requirements. Hence, the fifth chapter discussed the failure of secularism and political liberalism alike in Iraq. One can assert that secularism has failed in post-2003 Iraq. The evidences are so manifested in the Iraqi political life. Secularists could not compete with the Islamists without endorsing the Islamic peculiarities. The narratives of political process in Iraq after 2003 did not accommodate the secular trend; since secularism is strongly perceived in the Iraqi mind as associated with Saddamism or atheism. The evidence is manifested in the Iraqi political process whereby secularists and liberalists has had very limited space in political life such as the Civic Democratic Alliance which got only 3 seats in the general election in 2014. The failure of

secularism in Iraq can be attributed on the political factors. What happened in Iraq confirmed this assumption, since many political events have had a negative role on shaping the meaning of secularism such as the Saddam's totalitarian practices over the people and the American invasion in 2003. Thus, people were convinced that the solution to the political crises should be Islamic, while it takes them 13 years of bloodshed and insecurity to recognize the failure of current Islamic political parties. But, this recognition does not mean people will shift to support a secular alternative. In Iraq, the failure of secularism is apparently related to the failure of political elite to adopt Rawls' model of political liberalism. Therefore, people were alienated from state institutions since it could not meet their needs in one hand. In the other, the state institutions through narratives and actions could not hold a collective national identity. Injustice and inequality towards specific social groups create anti-government sentiment in the public sphere. However, the political problem in Iraq suggests that political secularism still has sphere of hope.

The idea, is not to encourage a trend who departs from Islam entirely. It is how to appeal to Islam in political life without it being misused by some groups for their political goals. In other words, how to create a reasonable culture that rejects any kind of fundamentalist ideas even if these are related to religious doctrine? The idea is to make the social change easier and less expensive to the Iraqi people in a way that all groups converge to achieve this change, especially in the political culture. Within this paradigm, two groups are excluded of the public political sphere, conservatives or fundamentalists (religious and secular) and extremists who use violence to impose their doctrines. Inclusion and exclusion of a group depends on their own behavior towards the society. Two ideas are required to maintain stability in the socio-political domain: first, political secularism is what controls the dialogue among religions. Second, is political liberalism that promotes reasonableness in the public debate between all doctrines religious or secular. The idea is simple, since westerns see no semblance of hope to secularism and democracy in a country such as Iraq, then, general negative themes are revived and circulated overall Middle Eastern peoples. These negative themes in one way or another accommodate Islamophobia to which the theory of clash of civilization will always be revisited in the West. Henceforth, as much these themes are empowered as much it could affect local politics and decision-making process in the US or the west in general. In the sixth chapter the answer of the first question was satisfied. Some of the questions are deliberately related to Islamophobia rhetoric and its effects on American politics. This chapter inquiries into some questions are: is Islamophobia institutionally endorsed in the aftermath of IS crisis? Is islamophobia

manifested in the presidential election in 2016? And what are the consequences of Islamophobia on United States strategy towards the Middle East?

To answer these questions evidences of Islamophobia have been noticed, discussed and analyzed. I can conclude the concept as public opinion phenomenon. The debate upon Islamophobia cannot be separated from the public perception; it is about how information can be gathered, analyzed and systematized within specific paradigms to create images towards the 'other'. These images translated from words into biased actions. Actions or behaviors can be traced on two levels:

- A. Individual's preferences towards specific religious group in socio-political context.
- B. The state's level whether on domestic or foreign policy.

The promotion of Islamophobia creates both prejudice and discrimination among the general population. In the U.S., about one-half of nationally representative samples agree that in general, most Americans are prejudiced toward Muslim Americans. But to understand what kind of reaction enacted by whether American people or the institutions; I needed to shed light on the intellectual perception towards IS. In this regard, I was keen to cover the most important works concerning IS of which I conclude that: most experts in the US avoided describing IS as a militant gang which deploys religion for political ends, except Napoleoni (2014); while most of them like William McCants, Jessica Stern and Berger believe that the so-called Islamic State reflects the radical Islamic peculiarities. Also, I found out that experts have perceived the threat of IS on three main levels:

1. Operational risks which include the potential threat of terrorist attacks.
2. Dynamic risks which include IS threat to the world order.
3. Epistemological shortage in the American community concerning IS and political turmoil in the Middle East.

Furthermore, the debate over IS in the United States can be summarized in this way: terrorism is a revolutionary movement that is totally Islamic. To this finding, I quote Rex W. Huppke (2015), who blames two resources of false depicted knowledge: media and political elite. Furthermore, Islamophobia is not dependent on the 'sociological reality or the theological framework of Islam,' but relies on specific circulated information that did not pass through systemic scrutiny process.

Concerning Iraq, Islamophobic rhetoric in the U.S has linked Iraq with the threat of terrorism on US. Respectively, the public in the U.S has received so much information about the threat of ISIS or al-Qaida alike, but, without apparent explanation concerning the source of such threat. I can say that Iraq is a victim of distorted propaganda concerning terrorism in the global politics. For instance, Donald Trump in one of his biased speeches calls Iraq as the prestigious college for terrorism (Harvard for terrorists, as synonymous) without explaining why is become so.

Concerning the second argument, the essential question of this study (does the US support a unified Iraq?) has at its core other question: does the US promotes a new political for the Middle East. The partition of Iraq could be the spark of this map. To answer this question, there is a need to revisit the historical discourse of US policy towards Iraq. Polls suggest that the majority of Americans have held at least one of three mistaken impressions about the Iraq War, 2003, contributing to much of the popular support for the war. I conclude that the public perception on Iraq has been guided by the authority structure. The Media has been subjected to manipulation, oriented to show the audience specific ideas. The function of this defined image was to get public support to the foreign policy.²⁰⁶ But what is most important is that how the image of Iraq post-Saddam has been perceived. This image concludes that the current nation-state in Iraq is in real danger. Four main issues are being raised: (1) National identity, (2) American failure in Iraq, (3) Nation building and security instability, (4) ISIS threat on Iraq and the regional stability. But most experts give the bigger room to *National identity* crisis in Iraq. Facing the challenge of centralism in the form of Arab-oriented Iraqi identity, most groups have protected themselves in tribal forums. Also, the effects of the Iraq war (2003) on expanding terrorism has led to an enhanced threat of Islamic terrorism in the short and long run. The threat is that the political turmoil along with the crisis of national identity may cause a strong wave of change in the region. This change might affect the political map of Iraq and the region alike. It holds within it the seeds of the sectarian war along with the threat of extending the battle into the west. What is significant about US' policy towards Iraq is that it always pays attention to Iraq's integrity. One instance could be highlighted that the US

²⁰⁶ Because the evidence for this threat was not fully manifest, the Bush administration led the public to believe that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and providing substantial support to the al-Qaeda terrorist group.

administration prevented its military to march further towards Baghdad in 1991. The argument was that the oust of Saddam's regime might cause a power vacuum in which Iran can play an important role. The same argument still has resonance in US' strategy towards Iraq. However, there is a growing perception in the US that Iraq is falling apart. This perception is linked to two other questions: will the United States continue to help build Iraq's democracy? What will the US do to confront growing Iranian influence in the country?

In my point of view, the answer to these questions should visit the general perception within the US strategic awareness on Iraq and the Middle East alike. Four narratives are highlighted concerning the political turmoil in the Middle East:

- First is the lack of democracy (i.e. good governance);
- The second narrative is the flaming conflicts which take various shapes ranging from political to sectarian strife;
- The third narrative is the expanding role of the supra-national ideologies and the signs of collapse of nation-state system.
- The fourth narrative is Israel.

The conflict between supranational ideologies has occupied central stage in the US strategic awareness. Considering this threat, the national identity in Iraq is viable to collapse before supra-national identities. Thus, there is no guarantee that the US can manage the transitional process in the New Middle East. New larger entities might be created based on ethnical or sectarian ideologies. Thus, more attention should be payed to prevent them from creating their political entity, albeit with the sectarian differences. Thus, different US administrations continue with the process of GME to promote transnational civil cooperation in the MENA region through cooperation with the G-8 and the existing Arab governments. One important point is that the NME initiative should be applied in accordance with the Israeli perspective. As I mentioned in the first chapter, US strategy towards the middle East depends on the feedback of an orientalism cognitive process. To determine US policies towards the Middle East, there is a need to identify some factors which might hinder or energize US role. These factors are: the regional balance of power, the American objectives, the current crisis, the outcomes of strategic alternatives (pullover or deeply involved), and US allies and rivals in the region.

From this perspective, three questions can be highlighted: How to act in the Middle East? Which states will be chosen as strategic partners? Which policies should be deployed? In this situation, the Middle East continued to demand US attention. Behind these preconditions lies an important consideration: the scale of hostility towards the United States, in the Middle East, requires real restrictions on large-scale deployments on grounds of security of American personnel. Continuing U.S. military intervention only helps to radicalize the Arab World and eroded the power of US' allies in the region. However, the rise of IS has made US' indirect orientalist policies questionable. IS constitutes a challenge to the US's Sunni-based policy. For all their importance, the US is well aware of the need not to over-rely on Saudi Arabia and Turkey when it comes to securing its own regional geopolitical objectives. The US policy should not neglect the importance of Iraq nor of Iran in the region. One would say that any sudden change in the regional map might bring to the fore a huge reaction from Iran. Brzezinski's suggestion is that US should always take into consideration geopolitical pivots (Turkey and Iran) in the Middle East. Two ways are possible to confronts these pivot states: causing harm to their internal integrity through making Iraq falling apart, or making a strong Iraq, under the condition of being a US ally, that able to balance power with these pivot states. In both cases, Iraq is the core of any US strategic option in the Middle East. Thus, to fulfill these missions US should take these steps: moderate its Sunni-based policy and try to find links with Iran without neglecting the strategic importance of Turkey. But the question before US' policy makers: is current Iraq could be a reliable ally?

Two regional events have submitted indirect answer to this question at least in the US perception. The first is the Saudi Arabian-led War (2015) in Yemen (Operation *Decisive Storm* `Amaliyyat `Āṣifat al-Ḥazm). The second is Turkish incursion in Iraq in December 2015. To conclude, I believe that the US is keen to keep its hand on Iraq in particular. Iraq could be a pivot state in regional interaction. Any further unintended consequences in Iraq would have dangerous outcomes on US interests in the region. The partition of Iraq, without direct US hand, would promote Iran's strategic position. If Iran would dominate the south of Iraq, it will gain surplus power to override the regional strategic balance of power. In this scenario, US will have two choices: re-approach Iran or deepen its Sunni-based policy to confront this threat. The catastrophic outcome is that US will not be alone in shaping the new Middle East and that too for a long time. This possibility of US strategic failure in the region will encourage other powers such as China and Russia Federation to challenge the US' major role in the world order. To avoid this scenario, the US should support a unified Iraq or in a

worst case scenario find local partners (Kurdistan for example) to secure its interests. From my point of view, US will support federalism in Iraq to which local governments will have wide-scope of powers over its territory. However, one can say that recent developments in Iraq and the region might change the strategic trend towards Iraq. To answer properly the question, there is a need to demonstrate why pro-partition sentiment towards Iraq has grown in the US. Some factors have been raised to support such an argument:

- First, the regional order and Iraq, in particular, is an artificial construct;
- The second factor affecting partition is the intensification of civil wars;
- The third factor is state's capacity;
- The fourth factor concerning partition of Iraq is the Kurdish case.
- The fifth factor is the growing perception that Iraq is falling apart.

The proponents of this argument exhorted the United States to support Sunnis and Kurds to balance Iran and the Shia in Iraq. Thus, it can be said that the real factor is that Iraq did not meet the US strategic expectations. US have failed to create a pro-US Iraq which could be a strategic base for its regional policy. Furthermore, Iraq has failed to be a model for promoting democracy in the Middle East. In other words, the Great Middle East was dependent on Iraq's role to bring it to the regional political reality. Thus, Iraq has failed to lead a collective security initiative in the region that would include Israel as a recognized regional player. Although, another danger should be expected in the aftermath of Iraq's disintegration; new bigger political entities might see light in the region such as that of new Sunnistan, which would probably include part of Syria and beyond, and a new Shia state could enflame fears of an Iranian hegemony. Thus, parallel strategic understanding calls for a strategy that keeps the Sykes-Picot regional order alive. It is fundamentally important to demonstrate the other vision on Iraq in the US. Here, many scholars assert that Iraq is not lost, thus, the US should continue its support to unified Iraq to surpass the challenges it faces such as the Iranian-backed political and militia hardliners. Hence, US should be involved more seriously in Iraq to abort any effort that seeks to create the "Shiite Crescent" that stretches from Tehran to Damascus across Baghdad.

Finally, it can be argued that the US has shown the Iraqi government great tendency and high commitment to defeat the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Many US political and military efforts fall

in the category of a pro-unified Iraq commitment. However, any of the future US' administrations could change this policy towards a pro-soft partition policy if Iraq continues as a disappointing case in US' perspective. I don't support the argument that deploys conspiracy theory when presumes that IS was created by the US to control the strategic atmosphere in Iraq. This argument goes further by asserting that the US wants to draw a new political map not only in Iraq but also for the whole region; a map that based on mini sub-identities. This argument believes that by IS the US tries to abort any prospect of political unity in the Arab world. Any project of political unity might produce a new giant entity that could have challenged the US' position in the world order.

To answer this argument, I can assume that the US wants to realize that Iraq meets its strategic expectations. Otherwise, Hilary Clinton's advice of supporting the sole ally in Iraq (Kurdistan) can find resonance in the US' strategy towards the Middle East. It is up to the Iraqis first to build their fate whether that of a prosperous Iraq or a failed one; and second, to push the US-Iraq bilateral relationship towards further advanced steps.

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