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The Determinants of Intrafamily Ideological Differentiation: Western European Social Democracy Between 1990 and 2019

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Abstract

Congruence of ideological positions is one of the main criteria used by scholars to classify political parties into the analytical tool of party families, meaning that formations defined as belonging to the same group should adopt similar ideological positions. However, existing literature shows that, in some cases, this criterion is violated in empirical reality. Further, the examination of Manifesto Project (MARPOR) data on party positions estimated by using electoral manifestos highlights how one of the core components of Western European party systems, the mainstream-left party family of social democracy, displays varying and often considerable levels of what I label 'intrafamily ideological differentiation' along the economic left-right axis. Yet, investigations of the ideological differentiation internal to single party families have never moved beyond the descriptive level and towards an explanation of this phenomenon. In this doctoral thesis, I intend to do so, by asking: why do formations from the same party family adopt different ideological positions, intended along the economic left-right dimension? What determines these differences in party positions, as well as their variation at different points in time? To this end, I analyse social democratic parties in 20 Western European countries over the three decades spanning between 1990 and 2019, which also allows me to answer substantive questions concerning what this party family is in contemporary times, the degree of its ideological homogeneity (or heterogeneity), and what determines social democratic formations in different countries within the region being at times either very similar to or very different from one another. My research objectives are achieved through an original, regression-based nested analysis approach to the scientific investigation of intrafamily ideological differentiation, with this specific multimethod research (MMR) design making it possible to explain both *what* factors determine this phenomenon and its variation over time, and *how* they do so. More specifically, by relying on an explanatory framework about the longer- and shorter-term determinants of parties' economic positions informed by several strands of literature, the thesis leverages an extensive empirical analysis both at the descriptive and the explanatory level, with the latter being structured in two steps. First, in a large-N analysis (LNA), I estimate the determinants of social democratic parties' more left-wing or more right-wing positions by means of OLS regression models with panel-corrected standard errors, and exploit the predictive function of these models in a subsequent reassessment of descriptive evidence that links their results to the broader phenomenon of intrafamily ideological differentiation. Second, in a latter small-N analysis (SNA), I enhance the explanation emerging from the LNA by tracing, through the thematic analysis of party manifestos and executive speeches, the way in which the different configurations of specific determinants of social democratic parties' left-right positions are linked to the differences in such positions and, hence, the different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation within this group of parties. The results highlight that, descriptively, this party family is mostly between just left-of-centre and more markedly leftist in economic terms, moves leftwards over the analysed three decades, and displays very different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation over time, appearing alternatively as rather homogeneous or heterogeneous ideologically. In explanatory terms, the combination of the LNA and SNA within my regression-based nested analysis demonstrates that both the more left- or right-wing economic positions of single social democratic parties at the individual level, and the variation in the levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate level of the social democratic party family, are above all determined by the different configurations of three 'external constraints': levels of sovereign debt, Eurozone membership, and degree of economic globalisation of the respective countries. Indeed, the first two of such macro-structural variables related to transnational dynamics and processes constrain the positions of parties with realistic aspirations of accessing governments, such as social democratic formations, further to the economic right; whereas social democrats will 'compensate' for higher levels of international economic interdependence by rallying around their traditional economic left stances and their flagship achievements at the national level, in particular the construction of the welfare state. Through its extensive comparative and longitudinal analysis, this thesis provides numerous original and relevant contributions to several strands of research in

political science, including on the systematic investigation of party families, left and social democratic politics, external constraints, and their impact on domestic party competition and the quality of representative democracy.

Sommario

Uno dei criteri principali utilizzati in ambito accademico per la classificazione dei partiti politici all'interno dello strumento analitico costituito dalle famiglie partitiche è la congruenza ideologica, ovverosia il fatto che partiti definiti come appartenenti alla stessa famiglia dovrebbero stessa famiglia dovrebbero avere posizioni ideologiche simili tra di loro. Tuttavia, la letteratura mostra come, in alcuni casi, questo criterio sia violato nella realtà empirica. Inoltre, un esame dei dati del Manifesto Project (MARPOR) sulle posizioni dei partiti stimate attraverso i loro manifesti elettorali mostra come una delle famiglie che è diventata perno dei sistemi elettorali in Europa occidentale, la socialdemocrazia, è interessata da livelli variabili e spesso considerevoli di "differenziazione ideologica intrafamiliare" lungo l'asse economico sinistra-destra. Nonostante ciò, le investigazioni scientifiche della differenziazione ideologica interna a singole famiglie partitiche non si sono mai spinte oltre il piano descrittivo, ossia verso una spiegazione di questo fenomeno. In questa tesi di dottorato, mi pongo esattamente questo obiettivo, cercando di rispondere alle seguenti domande di ricerca: perché le formazioni appartenenti alla stessa famiglia partitica adottano diverse posizioni ideologiche, intese lungo l'asse economico sinistra-destra? Cosa determina queste differenze nelle posizioni dei partiti, nonché la loro variazione nel tempo? Per perseguire questo fine, mi concentro sui partiti socialdemocratici in 20 paesi dell'Europa occidentale nel corso dei trent'anni tra il 1990 e il 2019. In tal modo, sono anche in grado di rispondere a domande di interesse sostanziale sul cosa sia stata questa famiglia partitica negli ultimi decenni, il grado della sua omogeneità (o eterogeneità) ideologica, e cosa determini il fatto che le formazioni socialdemocratiche di diversi paesi in quest'area siano a volte molto simili e altre volte molto diverse fra di loro. I miei obiettivi di ricerca sono realizzati attraverso un approccio originale allo studio della differenziazione ideologica intrafamiliare, incentrato su una *regression-based nested analysis*: uno specifico disegno di ricerca multimetodo (MMR) che rende possibile spiegare sia quali fattori determinano questo fenomeno e sia la sua variazione nel tempo, sia il modo in cui lo fanno. Più specificamente, basandosi su un impianto esplicativo che unisce vari filoni di letteratura nel raggruppare le determinanti delle posizioni economiche dei partiti in fattori di più lungo e di più breve corso, la mia tesi sfrutta un'estesa analisi empirica sia sul piano descrittivo, che su quello esplicativo, con quest'ultimo che si sviluppa in due stadi. In primo luogo, in una *large-N analysis* (LNA), stimo le determinanti delle posizioni economiche sinistra-destra dei partiti socialdemocratici in generale, attraverso dei modelli di regressione OLS con *panel-corrected standard errors*, sfruttando inoltre la funzione predittiva di questi modelli nel collegare i loro risultati al più ampio fenomeno della differenziazione ideologica intrafamiliare attraverso una successiva rilettura di evidenza descrittiva. Successivamente, in una *small-N analysis* (SNA), rinforzo questo quadro esplicativo tracciando, attraverso l'analisi tematica di manifesti elettorali e discorsi governativi, come le diverse configurazioni di specifiche determinanti delle posizioni economiche sinistra-destra dei partiti socialdemocratici siano legate alle differenze tra queste stesse posizioni e, di conseguenza, ai diversi livelli di differenziazione ideologica intrafamiliare all'interno di questo gruppo. I risultati mostrano come, descrittivamente, questa famiglia partitica si collochi tra posizioni economiche appena a sinistra del centro e più marcatamente a sinistra, muovendosi verso sinistra nel tempo e mostrando livelli variabili di differenziazione ideologica intrafamiliare, che la fanno apparire a volte relativamente omogenea, altre volte relativamente eterogenea da un punto di vista ideologico. In termini esplicativi, la combinazione della LNA e della SNA nel mio disegno di ricerca dimostra che le posizioni economiche relativamente più a sinistra o più a destra dei singoli partiti socialdemocratici a livello individuale, e di conseguenza la variazione nei livelli di differenziazione ideologica intrafamiliare sul piano aggregato della famiglia partitica, sono soprattutto determinate dalle differenti configurazioni di tre vincoli esterni: i livelli di debito sovrano, l'eventuale appartenenza all'Eurozona e il grado di globalizzazione economica del paese di riferimento. Infatti, le prime due di queste variabili macrostrutturali legate a dinamiche e processi transnazionali vincolano i partiti con legittime aspettative di governo, come i socialdemocratici, a posizioni più economicamente di destra; mentre la socialdemocrazia reagisce a

più alti livelli di interdipendenza economica enfatizzando maggiormente le proprie tradizionali posizioni di sinistra economica e difendendo i propri risultati storici a livello nazionale, specialmente a riguardo della costruzione dello stato sociale. Attraverso la sua estesa analisi comparata e longitudinale, questa tesi fornisce numerosi contributi originali e rilevanti a molti filoni di letteratura nella scienza politica, inclusi quelli sull'investigazione sistematica delle famiglie partitiche, sulla politica di sinistra e socialdemocratica, sui vincoli esterni e il loro impatto sia sulla competizione partitica a livello nazionale, sia sulla qualità della democrazia rappresentativa.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

'In the 1990s, under the pretext of globalisation and the recession, the centre-right parties began to question basic state tasks and redistribution functions with growing aggressiveness. They are increasingly audacious in defending the tax privileges of the rich and even demanding new ones. The SP, on the other hand, values a functioning state that continues to fully guarantee social security and public services and which finances itself as fairly as possible.'

- 1999 Swiss Socialist Party Manifesto, p. 7

'In Europe we agree on how to stimulate economic growth without falling into protectionism. We share one currency, the euro, with sixteen other countries. That is why we benefit from every country having its household book in order. Laziness of one should not be at the expense of prosperity of the other. The Netherlands must therefore also adhere to the European agreements to bring the financing deficit down again.'

- 2010 Dutch Labour Party Manifesto, p. 7

If one were to remove any reference to the source of the two presented quotes, these would seem as if originating from entirely different parties taken at face value, especially in terms of economic views.

Indeed, the former openly challenges the encompassing phenomenon of globalisation and its use on the part of centre-right formations to reduce the relevance of the state in the economic and social domains and foster non-progressive tax policies; instead, promoting the function of the state as an active guarantor of material security and social justice. By doing so, it furthers a political vision of economics and society fundamentally shaped by the influential macroeconomic views of John

Maynard Keynes, traditionally associated with electoral socialism and in particular social democratic parties ever since their early days (see, e.g., Notermans 2000). Bringing in more information, it is evident how this quote was written perhaps when it would have been the least expected: in 1999, meaning during the heyday of globalisation and neoliberal economic prescriptions, which at this time also permeated left-wing politics through the 'Third Way' version of social democracy (see, e.g., Giddens 1998) and its early electoral success.

Conversely, the latter is critical of economic protectionism whilst supporting the single currency area of the world's largest single market and free trade area, the European Union's 'euro area' or Eurozone, and the consequences entailed by membership in this monetary framework in terms of economic policy. More specifically, the necessity of having balanced budgets in countries' public finances and cutting down on deficits – i.e., principles usually associated with right-of-centre economic positions – is reiterated as prominent. Not only that: the 'laziness' of other countries within the Eurozone with regard to achieving such goals is also openly called out, lamenting that this comes at the expense of the prosperity of those who comply with the related fiscal requirements. Once more, the timing of this assertion is noteworthy: 2010, at the beginning of Europe's worst financial crisis to date (e.g., Lane 2012) in the context of the global downturn first initiated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In this light, this political message is also rather surprising: instead of proposing an alternative to the hegemonic and now extremely vulnerable neoliberal paradigm (e.g., Cerny 2010), this formation rather doubled down on the commitment to its principles (e.g., Birnbaum 2010; Meyer 2010). Yet, the crisis of the late-2000s affected different countries differently based on their specific circumstances, meaning it was also met differently from a political viewpoint.

Despite their radical difference in economic positions, both reported quotes are from contemporary Western European social democratic parties: respectively, the Swiss Socialist Party and the Dutch Labour Party. This is just one example out of many other similar cases, which however – despite emerging from the exploration of data sources such as, first and foremost, party manifestos – have not been systematically explored and explained yet. In this doctoral thesis, I set out to pursue this

research objective: understanding what determines the ideological differences internal to an individual party family, as well as the variation in this phenomenon, which I will define and label 'intrafamily ideological differentiation'. Further, from a substantive viewpoint, by virtue of the party family I specifically analyse, I will also be able to assess what is contemporary Western European social democracy, and what determines social democrats to be varyingly – and, at times, very – different from one another.

I will do so in an extensive piece of research that, through an innovative design that will be replicable in other future applications, relies on a data-rich analysis, which is leveraged in multiple steps. Hence, in the next few pages of this opening chapter, I will introduce the key questions tackled by this thesis and why this work is relevant, to me as a political scientist and research in the social sciences as well as to the readership in the discipline. Further, I will briefly outline the main picture emerging from this work as a whole, before concluding by presenting synopses that will shortly summarise which each chapter within the thesis, as well as the function each of them serves.

1.2 A recap of research questions

First and foremost, this thesis moves from an interest in party families as the object of study, and especially what may determine their nature as, indeed, 'party families' to be stretched, if not violated. Indeed, as illustrated at greater length in the final section (2.4) of Chapter 2 and the second section (3.2) of Chapter 3, whilst a systematisation of the very concept of party family has often been complicated by the many usages attached to this analytical tool, scholars eventually seemed to converge on a more empirically sound and widely accepted criterion to classify formations into such groups: a common ideology (e.g., Seiler 1980; von Beyme 1985; Ware 1996; Mair and Mudde 1998).[1] Yet, it is well-known in the specialised literature that this very criterion is often challenged, if not

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[1] Notice that, as further elaborated upon in the third section (2.3) of Chapter 2, 'political ideology' is analysed here through its fundamental constitutive component of positions along the economic left-right dimension.

violated altogether: this has been already ascertained empirically vis-à-vis party families such as, for instance, liberal and radical right parties (e.g., Ensser 2012, Carroll and Kubo 2019). Further, data based on Manifesto Project (MARPOR) (Volkens et al. 2021) estimates of economic left-right positions disseminated throughout the thesis shows how the same considerations apply to contemporary Western European social democratic parties in the three decades between the 1990s and 2010s, albeit to varying extents across this timeframe. More specifically, the preliminary descriptive exploration of MARPOR data brings to light a striking puzzle: in the span of these thirty years, social democrats in the region at times adopted very different economic left-right positions, with the levels of this differentiation varying and making them much more similar in other instances. Hence, given how relevant this characteristic of 'party families' in general is, the following questions ensue: why do parties routinely classified as belonging to the same party family adopt different ideological positions, intended along the economic left-right dimension? Namely, what determines these differences in party positions between formations belonging to the same party family, in this specific case contemporary Western European social democracy, as well as the variation in the levels of this differentiation?

In general terms, these are the main research questions to which I will pursue an answer in this thesis. However, by taking an interest specifically in contemporary Western European social democracy, I also have the chance of answering relevant substantive questions related to this party family. Indeed, we know about the changes over time of social democratic parties in the Western European region, especially from an ideological viewpoint: with the various phases of this historical evolution reconstructed in detail in Chapter 2. The transformations of this party family during the course of its history gave rise to ongoing prominent debates in the dedicated literature.

On the one hand, some looked at the general trend of social democrats' ideological evolution over time, especially in more recent decades. In this regard, the most widespread and mainstream 'convergence to the centre' argument, which posits that social democratic parties have engaged in a very consequential moderation of their stances especially concerning their support for traditional

economic left issues (e.g., Adams et al. 2004; Mair et al. 2004; Dalton 2013; Mudge 2018; Loxbo et al. 2019), has recently been challenged by a number of empirical works based on MARPOR data. Indeed, these (e.g., Emanuele 2021; Polacko 2022) seem to empirically testify the opposite picture, whereby over time and especially ever since the Great Recession that started in the late-2000s social democrats increased the emphasis they put on traditional economic left issues: although, even by using the same data source, the debate is far from settled (see Trastulli 2022).

On the other, a more specific debate is specifically concerned with the ideological homogeneity internal to Western European social democracy. On this matter, some argue that this party family is amongst the relatively most homogeneous ones across the region (e.g., Camia and Caramani 2012; Ennser 2012; Freire and Tsatsanis 2015), whilst instead others point to the presence of relevant levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation even within Western European social democracy (e.g., Volkens 2004; Elff 2013).

Hence, given the possibility of contributing to these debates and particularly the latter one, in this thesis I will be well-placed, by analysing the economic left-right positions of social democrats and the determinants of intrafamily ideological differentiation within this party family, to also answer these additional research questions, which are more substantive in nature: what is contemporary Western European social democracy? Is it the same across the region, as well as over time along the analysed timeframe? And what determines Western European social democratic parties to be different – and varyingly so, depending on the specific spatial-temporal context under scrutiny – from one another?

1.3 Thesis background and relevance

Before illustrating the picture emerging from this large research project and the different steps in which the thesis unfolds, I believe it is necessary to first spend some words on two fundamental and

interconnected questions: why did pursuing this thesis matter to me? And why should this research be relevant to the readers?

I will start with the first question, which allows me to elaborate on more personal aspects that motivated me, as a political scientist, to undertake this research project. During my time as a Master of Science student at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), which has been tremendously influential in shaping both my doctoral research agenda and my outlook as a perspective junior academic, I remember one of my many mentors saying something extremely interesting about anthropologists and one specific way they go about their research. They said, anthropologists would often open longer research projects (such as books) with a cover page, briefly and publicly outlining who they are, their background and formative experiences, and their inclinations and beliefs: in sum, what led them to develop an interest in what they are researching on. I have always found this practice very fascinating. As empirical political scientists, we are taught – and, in turn, teach our students – about one of the guiding principles that ought to shape the research efforts of social scientists at large: the fundamental Weberian tenet of '*wertfreiheit*' – 'to be free of value'. In other words, Max Weber famously warned against the perils of approaching scientific enquiry through a normative lens and hence 'value judgements', as these may interfere with the very production of knowledge in social science. Given that such value judgements are, evidently, informed by the kind of personal background that was described above, this should be kept out of the picture in our enterprise as social scientists insofar as it may lead to adopting normative postures. And yet, whilst we can of course strive to be as *wertfrei* as possible in our capacity as researchers, there is only so much we can do to avoid our personal background shaping our research to at least an extent, namely wherein our scientific interest lies.

In this light, I reckon the above practice to be very beneficial to doing social *science*, which at the same time is characterised by shared conventions amongst inherently limited human beings, similarly to all other forms of science (e.g., Kuhn 1970; Lakatos 1970); and, differently from all other forms of science, is even more human as, ultimately, it deals from different angles with what is most human

by definition, society. Therefore, the benefit is in terms of transparency concerning what shaped the researcher's interest in a given work, which I believe can be extremely informative for the readership of such research. This is why I will now briefly proceed with illustrating some of the reasons that led both me and my doctoral thesis to where we are at the time of writing.

As already mentioned, although I have always had a keen interest both in politics at large – in which I had already obtained a bachelor's degree – and more specifically left politics – coming from a traditionally centre-left leaning family –, the years spent in London prior and building up to my doctoral studies were decisive in drawing me towards the scientific investigation of social democratic formations. They were so in two ways, or better in two places: the university, and the party.

The first place, the LSE, was an enormously influential place because of the history that had been made by key figures linked to this institution with regard to social democratic politics. In particular, two directors of the School emerged most of all, because of how important they had been in the development of social democratic politics over key moments of its 20th century history: William Beveridge and Anthony Giddens.

On the one hand, in the midst of World War II (WWII), by launching his report on the 'Five Giants' to be faced by politics in modern societies – that is, socio-economic issues such as poverty, healthcare, education, housing, and work –, Beveridge (1942) famously systematised ideas for a comprehensive welfare state, the political pursuit of which would become the defining characteristic and flagship achievement of social democrats in countries across the continent.

On the other, instead, when the 'social democratic consensus' of the post-WWII years started to wane decisively in the last quarter of the century, coinciding with the heyday of globalisation in a perceived non-zero-sum game in which everyone could win, Giddens (e.g., 1998) contributed decisively to changing the course of social democratic politics – perhaps, for good –. He did so with his ideas on a 'Third Way' and a 'renewal of social democracy', which would go beyond old and now less relevant left-right divisions.

Much beyond this necessarily brief and unsatisfactory summary, the possibility of closely investigating the works of these two 'giants' – to cite Beveridge himself – by being immersed in the environment where much of such works was either shaped or came into the world was incredibly stimulating and impactful. In social democracy's adaptation to changing times, Beveridge and Giddens epitomised in my eyes the two fundamental strands of social democratic politics and thought in the 20th century, their different *ethos* and the fundamental tension between them: the universalistic and welfare-oriented traditional version versus the 'modernised', globalised, and more agile one. This evolution and division were both largely made, at the very least in the British tradition, were I had the privilege of conducting my graduate studies.

The second place, the party, was also fundamental in shaping both my academic interest and doctoral research agenda on contemporary social democratic politics. Indeed, in parallel with my experience at the LSE, I started being active in the London branch of the largest Italian centre-left formation, the Democratic Party (*Partito Democratico*), which has a history of being one of the most relevant epicentres of Italian party politics abroad.

Amongst many other things, the branch became for me a bridge between interests: academia, real-life politics, and the social dimension in which both are embedded. By doing so, it gave me the possibility of seeing and experiencing, first-hand, the very tension between the two different 'souls' of Western European social democratic politics in a contemporary and real-life application. This experience went well beyond the linear evolution and transition between the two distinct phases that I had read about in academic works and materialised before my eyes their (not so) latent contradictions; at a time – the late 2010s – when neither of the two alternative models of social democracy seemed capable to succeed on its own.

Simplifying, the party was essentially divided internally between two camps, which I will take the freedom of labelling as follows: the 'democratic-socialists', more left-leaning on both the economy and relationships to other parties; and the 'liberals', more free-market oriented and closer to other centrist formations. Most of the times, I found the political differences between the two sides – on

big questions, such as how society and the economy are viewed – absolutely remarkable, to the point where I wondered how these could be reconcilable into a unitary synthesis under the same roof (and at times, as they could not, splits ensued).

Upon reflection, this experience gave rise to important questions, linking together historic theoretical developments in social democratic thought with a current, real-life issue. That is: if there were such stark differences between the different components of the practical instance of large, contemporary social democratic parties I got to know, this might have been the case elsewhere too. Clearly, each case is different, and the level of analysis (e.g., national versus local party) also makes a difference. However, this signalled to me that, according to the interplay between a potentially enormous number of different factors, the positions and overall ideological outlook of social democratic parties could be ranging within a set of very different options: meaning that, depending on this, such formations could be either very similar or very different from one another. This hunch, then, became the very basis of this research project.

All of this informative background from my perspective links into the dreaded '*so what?*' question, or in other words why this thesis should matter to you: the readers of this research. Before going into the reasons why this work is theoretically and substantively relevant, some of its features are also worth highlighting. Indeed, as shown, this work aims to answer big, complex, and difficult questions, which hence needed to be tackled in a large and comprehensive research project. To do so, this thesis brings together several different strands of relevant literature to build an elaborate explanatory framework, which serve as the basis to be employed in an innovative, multimethod (MMR) (e.g., Lieberman 2005; Rohlfing and Zuber 2021) research design for the analysis of intrafamily ideological differentiation. With these features, a thorough analysis of a large amount of data will be conducted in several steps, both at the descriptive level and in separate stages (large-N and small-N) at the explanatory level: with each of these steps contributing to answer the research questions of this thesis. This will result in an important and novel addition to the relevant literature and in particular to the body of works on social democratic politics, party families, 'external constraints', and elections and

party competition, with the specific contributions and implications of this thesis fully outlined in the 'Conclusions' in Chapter 9.

Theoretically, as mentioned, the thesis looks into the criterion most often employed by scholars to classify formations into party families: the commonality in terms of ideology. By analysing the determinants of the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation in the specific case under analysis, contemporary Western European social democracy, it is possible to understand what leads to this criterion being violated (or not) by formations usually classified as belonging to the same party family. Hence, this is a very relevant addition to the systematic investigation of party families intended as ideologically coherent sets of parties, as it specifically seeks to provide an explanation for the situations in which this intellectual construct is challenged – albeit one bounded to the specific party family under investigation in terms of its generalisability.

Substantively, this thesis is very relevant to the investigation of contemporary Western European social democracy. First, it addresses the specific debate surrounding the ideological homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of this particular party family. Whilst, as already mentioned and detailed out in the following chapters, this debate is usually divided in two well-defined sides arguing for either relative homogeneity or relative heterogeneity, in this thesis I am able to provide a more nuanced and interesting picture. Indeed, the analysed data shows that whilst it is true that, at times, there is very considerable ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy along the economic left-right dimension, on other occasions this is not really the case, and such formations appear as rather homogeneous. It is therefore this variation in intrafamily ideological differentiation that emerges and becomes especially interesting to investigate: with this thesis, to the best of my knowledge, being the first attempt at doing so.

Second, and perhaps even more importantly from a substantive viewpoint, interlinked to such considerations are even more explicit questions on the nature of this party family itself. What is contemporary Western European social democracy? And is it the same across the analysed spatial and temporal contexts? As to the former dilemma, social democratic parties across the region are

centrist to relatively leftist formations from an economic viewpoint, and the employed data shows how they become relatively more leftist between the 1990s and 2010s (again, also see Emanuele 2021; Polacko 2022; Trastulli 2022). Yet, concerning the latter question, it is clear from the many analyses of the data in the thesis how social democratic parties are not always the same either over time or across space. What determines these internal differences, as well as the variations in them, is the key part of the story that emerges from this work.

1.4 A story of 'external constraints'

Formations from the same party family should display ideological homogeneity amongst one another. However, data on contemporary social democracy shows that this is not always the case: at time, parties from this group show considerable differences in economic left-right positions, whilst being much more similar on other occasions. What determines intrafamily ideological differentiation within this party family, as well as the variation in this phenomenon?

As per Chapter 3, I seek an answer to this question by building a comprehensive explanatory framework that brings together several strands of literature, grouping the potential determinants of the phenomenon under investigation into temporally and causally more distal and proximal factors, which in both groups can be either political or economic in nature. Further, as I will fully illustrate throughout the thesis and particularly in Chapters 4 and 8, I employ a specific MMR design called regression-based nested analysis (e.g., Rohlfing 2008), in which a prior statistical analysis in the form of regression models is integrated by process tracing based on the qualitative investigation of evidence on individual cases. This multistep approach allows for an extensive analysis of the data in terms of both the several alternative specifications and robustness checks that replicated the regression analyses, and the wealth of textual data subsequently scrutinised in detail, of which only a selection was presented. In turn, this in-depth investigation makes it possible to confidently reach conclusions not only as to the individual determinants of intrafamily ideological differentiation within

contemporary Western European social democracy, but also and especially regarding the overall story emerging from the data. Because of these features, the quantitative cross-case and qualitative within-case evidence complement each other in serving the function of understanding and *explaining* such a complex phenomenon, both in terms of *what* determines it and *how* it does so: a goal that, according to some, is only made feasible in the social sciences by this combination of different methods and levels of analysis (e.g., Morlino 2018).

Predictably, in light of the complex nature of the phenomenon that I analyse in this thesis, the different economic left-right positions at the individual level (i.e., by only looking at parties), which in their different configurations result in the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate level (i.e., by looking at the party family as a whole), are shaped by a mixture of longer- and shorter-term determinants, both political and economic in nature. Indeed, statistical effects such as the leftwards ones exerted by higher levels of economic globalisation and the presence of competitive radical right opponents, as well as the rightwards ones of being a member of the Eurozone, the centrist ideological character of the dominant internal faction within social democratic parties, and higher levels of national sovereign debt all emerge from the main regression models. Conversely, no statistically significant impact is found for other factors deemed relevant by the literature such as the nature of electoral systems, levels of political globalisation, the sole membership in the European Union, the presence of competitive opponents from the radical left, and government or opposition status, whilst instead some of the additional factors added as control variables seem to matter.

However, this complex picture is simplified and subsequently reinforced by the numerous alternative specifications and robustness checks of the large-N statistical analysis. These narrow down the key determinants of social democratic parties' different left-right economic positions to a specific set of macro-structural variables that, as confirmed by extensive evidence analysed in the subsequent small-N analysis, lead to varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation according to their case-specific configurations and usage by social democratic parties.

More specifically, to present an introductory narrative take on what ultimately emerges from this thesis, overall this extensive data analysis highlights a story of 'external constraints' (e.g., Mair 2011; Lefkofridi and Nezi 2014; Plescia, Kritzinger, and De Sio 2019). This expression, which has now become widespread in the political science literature, refers to the increasing pressure and limitations put on national governments' policy-making by the increasing international economic and political interconnectedness and embedment in various supranational institutions and frameworks, which are especially impactful in the economic domain. In turn, the constraints put by such transnational processes to the possibilities of governing parties in terms of actual policy outputs also limit the policy proposals that formations with realistic expectations of either accessing or competing for executive power can credibly and realistically adopt when campaigning, thus impacting domestic party competition. Hence, one of the key contributions of this thesis will be providing a wide and comparative empirical assessment of the dynamics related to external constraints, which have so far been analysed mostly in single cases (e.g., Tsoukalis 2000; Damgaard 2004; Raunio 2004).

More specifically, the case-specific configurations of such external constraints in each national context give different leeway to social democratic parties in the adoption of specific economic left-right positions. In particular, the role of how high country's national sovereign debt is appears as absolutely decisive in shaping the economic positions of social democrats – who, over the decades, have established themselves as a 'core' component (e.g., Smith 1989) of Western European party systems (e.g., Keman 2017), hence also being often involved in government. More specifically, I demonstrate how higher levels of debt are tackled through an increase in the emphasis on traditionally economic right positions, chiefly aimed at rebalancing budgets through fiscal retrenchment. Overall, this is the most constant and robust determinant analysed within this thesis, both statistically and in terms of textual evidence, and hence the strongest and most impactful constraint on social democratic parties' economic positions.

Yet, another interesting aspect of external constraints is constituted by the directionally opposite statistical effects and case-specific impact traced in textual evidence of the respective country being

a member of the Eurozone and experiencing higher levels of economic globalisation. The former, has the expected rightwards effect on social democratic parties' economic positions, deriving from the fiscal commitments taken on by countries when signing joining the area and signing the related treaties (e.g., Laffan 2014). Conversely, higher levels of the specific external constraint of economic globalisation actually have the opposite effect, given that they elicit more leftist economic positions on the part of social democrats. Within the debate between the 'efficiency' and 'compensation' theses on the impact of economic globalisation on parties' economic positions (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016), this goes in the direction of the latter and perhaps less mainstream viewpoint. That is, higher levels of economic globalisation will be met by social democratic parties with a desire not to backtrack on fundamental socio-economic questions and particularly the flagship historical achievement of social democracy at the national level: the construction of the welfare state. The opposite impact of these two different forms of the same macro-process – globalisation – adds to the complexity and nuance highlighted by this thesis, which could be fully explored and analytically leveraged because the adopted research design.

It is, hence, clear from the analysis how the different configurations of these external constraints lead to different economic left-right positions of social democratic parties at different times. Where and when the levels of national sovereign debt are higher, social democrats will adopt relatively more right-wing economic positions than where and when such levels are lower – and vice versa with levels of economic globalisation. Further, when a country is not a member of the Eurozone, the respective social democratic party will be freer to adopt relatively more left-wing economic positions than in the opposite case, where it would actually be more externally constrained. By verifying these relationships emerging from the statistical analyses, the subsequent case-oriented small-N analysis demonstrates how the different configuration of these external constraints and their usages on the part of social democratic parties lead to different economic left-right positions and, hence, the source of variation in intrafamily ideological differentiation. In the cases in which these external constraints are configured more similarly, the economic left-right positions of social democratic parties will be more

similar, and hence the levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation will be lower, signalling greater ideological homogeneity. Instead, a different configuration of such factors will constrain (or, in the case of economic globalisation, 'exacerbate') some parties more than others in crafting their programmatic outlook from an economic viewpoint, ultimately leading to higher levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation.

So, linking these findings to the actual history of the party family under analysis, what happens to Western European social democracy in the past 30 years? Data shows how in some portions of the analysed timeframe, and especially between the mid-to-late-1990s when globalisation as a process was on the up in the Western world, all seemed well and good for these formations: they were relatively left-of-centre, consistent with each other, and under the influx of Third-Way ideas that were also translating into early electoral success. Then, as both the processes of economic globalisation and, especially, Europeanisation unevenly deepened across the region, these 'sibling' parties started becoming progressively different from one another. The decisive moment, in this regard, can be identified with the European sovereign debt crisis in the late-2000s, after which social democrats in different countries, according to the different conditions in their national contexts, go their separate ways: some stay the course, some decisively steer left, and some even go further to the economic right. Those who were in a condition to do so, could try and do what was possible to 'shape globalisation politically' from the economic left (e.g., Meyer and Spiegel 2010), whereas others were just too constrained to be in such a position. In the end, this is the story behind the variation in intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy emerging from this thesis.

1.5 Synapses of chapters

I now conclude the introduction to this thesis by presenting brief synopses of the chapters making it up. After this introductory part, the thesis will develop over eight additional other chapters, for a total

of nine. These will be structured as I will now outline, with a recap of both their content and the purpose they serve within the scope of the broader research project.

In Chapter 2, the following one, I will present an analytical reading of the existing literature on Western European social democracy. In particular, I will do so by focussing on three distinct aspects. First is a detailed reconstruction of the history of Western European social democracy and its development over the decades, from the origins of electoral socialism in the late 1800s to contemporary days. Here, I will divide such history into four substantive phases: the 'parliamentary socialism/early social democracy' phase between the final decades of the 19th century and the two world wars; the 'mature Keynesian social democracy' phase between the post-WWII years and the final years of the 1980s; the 'Third Way' phase of the 1990s and 2000s; and, finally, a potentially ongoing fourth moment with newer social democratic developments after the Great Recession that originated in the late 2000s. Second, I will discuss the empirical literature dealing with the ideological profile and evolution of Western European social democracy over time, particularly by looking at two opposing viewpoints: on the one hand, the more mainstream 'convergence to the centre' perspective, positing that over time social democracy has moderated its traditional stances; and, on the other hand, an emerging strand of works positing that social democracy has not moderated, but actually exacerbated, its economic positions over time, and especially so in the past few years. Third and final, I will introduce the works dealing specifically with the ideological homogeneity of Western European social democracy as a party family, hence providing an assessment of the related debate. By doing so, in this chapter I will introduce the reader to the object of this research, setting the substantive background against which the entire thesis develops.

In Chapter 3, I will introduce the theory-based explanatory framework of parties' economic left-right positions and intrafamily ideological differentiation that serves as the basis for the empirical analysis of this thesis. I do so by, first, introducing the concept and definition of 'intrafamily ideological differentiation' and how it ties into the traditional criterion of ideological homogeneity usually employed to classify formations into 'party families'. I then develop an explanatory framework that

divides the analysed determinants into two blocs of longer- and shorter-term factors in terms of their causal and temporal distance or proximity from the outcome, each in turn divided into political or economic ones. By doing so, I select the determinant that will constitute my focal variables in the empirical analysis, present them through the related works in the relevant strands of literature, discuss the academic debates surrounding them, and introduce hypotheses to be tested empirically. I also, finally, introduce some additional determinants deemed as potentially relevant to the ends of the thesis by the literature: this discussion will also include the presentation of control variables. Whereas Chapter 2 constitutes the substantive background to the thesis, Chapter 3 represents instead its analytical background by purposely bringing together several different strands of literature with the goal of answering the big research questions introduced beforehand, by setting theoretically informed expectations to be tested in the empirics.

In Chapter 4, I will introduce the research design that characterises the investigation of intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy in this thesis. This will be done in the following steps. First, I will outline and discuss the research questions underpinning this thesis, both in terms of intrafamily ideological differentiation of itself and social democracy in the region from a broader substantive viewpoint. Second, I will discuss how to operationalise and study intrafamily ideological differentiation by elaborating on electoral manifestos as a source of data on party positions; reviewing how left-right semantics are measured by using MARPOR data on party manifestos, which will also include the introduction of deductive left-right indexes based on this data source; and illustrating the measurement of the specific dependent variable devised for and employed in the statistical analyses alongside the broader strategy adopted to analyse the phenomenon of interest, also outlining how this overcomes the issues with existing approaches in the literature. Third, I will focus on the spatial-temporal framework and units of analysis of this thesis, with detailed justifications for all these essential research design choices. Fourth and final, I will discuss the data, analytical strategy, and methods employed in the research design of this thesis. With both the substantive and analytical framework now set, Chapter 4 will provide a detailed answer to

the fundamental question concerning *how* intrafamily ideological differentiation will be analysed in this thesis.

In Chapter 5, I will introduce descriptive analyses concerning the object of study of this thesis, intrafamily ideological differentiation in contemporary Western European social democracy, based on MARPOR data. This will be done in the following steps: first, I will present detailed pooled evidence concerning the 'simple' economic left-right position of Western European social democrats during the analysed timeframe. Second, I will integrate the former step by presenting the same kind of evidence specifically for the dependent variable employed in the statistical analyses of this thesis. Third and fourth, more fine-grained evidence on both indicators will be presented by breaking them down into, respectively, across space and over time within the wide and long spatial-temporal framework that will be adopted in this thesis. Fifth and final, I will conclude by presenting an informative classification of national instances of contemporary Western European social democracy vis-à-vis how deviant they are compared to the rest of the party family, with evidence again presented at different levels of disaggregation, in order to provide even more nuance to the assessment of intrafamily ideological differentiation within this party family. Chapter 5 is fundamental for the thesis as, already at the level of descriptive analyses, it provides an answer to and a different take on the debate surrounding the ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity of contemporary Western European social democracy, illustrating the nuanced scenario whereby both viewpoints are right at different points in time and, hence, redirecting the focus on explaining the interesting variation that emerges.

In Chapter 6, I will present both how the determinants of parties' economic left-right positions and intrafamily ideological differentiation are measured and the related descriptive evidence. I will do so by, first, operationalising and describing longer-term determinants, that is the long-standing nature of electoral systems in the analysed national contexts, political forms of globalisation including the specific variant of European integration (or 'Europeanisation', see e.g. Laffan 2014) that applies to this region, and economic forms of globalisation. Second, the same will apply to shorter-term determinants: specifically, competitive electoral competition from parties of the radical left and right,

the government or opposition status of social democratic parties, the ideological leaning of the dominant internal faction within such formations, and the levels of sovereign debt in a given national context. Third, I will also introduce the operationalisation of the control variables employed in the statistical analysis. Fourth and final, all of these determinants are analysed specifically from a diachronic perspective, especially in terms of whether different national context within the analysed region grow more similar or more different with regard to each of them over time. Again, this descriptive information already provides initial hunches as to what, at the explanatory level, may be important in determining the different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation observed within contemporary Western European social democracy. This greatly contributes to the overall utility of Chapter 6, which precedes the explanatory part of the thesis by describing and especially making operational the determinants of parties' economic left-right positions and intrafamily ideological differentiation.

In Chapter 7, I present the first of the two steps of the explanatory analysis: the large-N, statistical analyses of *what* determines social democrats' different economic left-right positions and, hence, the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation, which occur by means of multivariate regression models. The chapter is structured as follows: first, I recap the introduced hypotheses and independent variables. Second, I also recall the methodological approach of the statistical analysis and illustrate the results of the diagnostic tests performed on my data, demonstrating the adequacy of the selected method. Third, I proceed to illustrate the results of the two main models of the regression analysis, which analyse the impact of longer-term and both longer- and shorter-term determinants on the dependent variable by employing both unstandardised and standardised versions (or *z-scores*) of the predictors. Fourth, the explanatory power of the regression models will be tested and verified against numerous spatial, temporal, and substantive clusters, to have a more comprehensive assessment of the statistical analysis, enhance its robustness, and explore interesting variation. I conclude by recapping what emerged from the statistical analyses and, especially, leveraging the predictive function of the regression models in a subsequent reassessment of descriptive analysis that

shows the connection between the different configurations of the three external constraints of *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation* and the different economic left-right positions of social democratic parties that, hence, determine the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation, leading into the subsequent small-N analysis.

In Chapter 8, I present the small-N analysis of this thesis: the second and final step of its explanatory part. This, indeed, moves from what makes social democratic parties more economically left- or right-wing in general and the explanation based on such results – as established in the previous stage of this regression-based nested analysis –, whereby different configurations of external constraints will lead to different economic left-right positions and, subsequently, varying levels of intrafamily ideological configuration of social democratic parties. More specifically, with the twofold goal of testing the associations established comparatively in the previous statistical analyses and showing exactly *how* the external constraints are linked to social democrats' economic left-right positions, it assesses the impact of *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation* in its Eurozone membership level through a theory-testing, confirmatory process tracing. This is executed by means of the thematic analysis (e.g., Boyatzis 1998; Lapadat 2012) of textual data from both party manifestos themselves and executive speeches to national legislative bodies on the part of social democratic politicians in power, provided by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) (Grossman and Guinaudeau 2021). The chapter is structured as follows. First, I introduce the rationale, methodological framework, and case selection of this small-N analysis. I then proceed with illustrating selected within-case textual analysis from party manifestos concerning the three independent variables of interest. Third and final, this will be integrated with similar evidence concerning the three selected predictors from executive speeches. Chapter 8 caps off the innovative research design of this thesis and, with its small-N analysis as the conclusive empirical step, allows for completing the pursued comprehensive explanation by showing *how* the three external constraints emerging from the LNA lead to the different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy.

In Chapter 9, I move to the conclusions of this thesis. Here, I will first briefly recap what has been done in this extensive piece of research, especially recalling its research questions and design. Second, I will also review and summarise the results of the empirical analysis of this thesis. Third, I will once again outline the story of external constraints that emerges from this work, which links together both its many parts and the provided explanation of the different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy. Fourth and final, I will highlight key aspects in my thesis, namely its contributions to and implications for the relevant strands of literature, as well as the potential avenues for future research opened up by this work.

I conclude here by also mentioning that analysis of this thesis is also complemented by a detailed Appendix, which reports additional empirics and especially focusses on several alternative specifications and robustness checks of the main regression models presented in Chapter 7, by also commenting those that were not discussed in the main text.

2. From the Origins to the Post-Great Recession Days:
An Overview of Western European Social Democracy

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will critically assess and analyse the scholarly contributions on this work's object of study: Western European social democracy. In particular, I will do so by focusing on three aspects. First, I will provide an overview of the historical evolution of this party family, detailing the different phases that have characterised this process. Second, I will specifically focus on the debate surrounding the evolution of social democratic ideology in Western Europe over time, and in particular in recent decades. Third, I will provide an internal assessment of Western European social democracy as a party family, especially by looking at the ideological consistency of social democratic parties, also in comparison with other formations. By doing so, I will here first introduce the matter of interest for this work, that is the ideological differentiation internal to individual party families, from a theoretical perspective.

2.2 A history of social democratic development in Western Europe

Social democracy is one of the most established party families in Western European politics, long representing the main electoral force of the political left and a key structural component of numerous political systems (Keman 2017). With a history now spanning over a hundred years, several authors have looked at the development of Western European social democracy over time (e.g., Przeworski 2001; Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco 2020; Manwaring and Holloway 2022). Most of these contributions identified a number of phases in which social democratic parties presented distinct characteristics throughout their development, although often disagreeing on the exact number of such periods. On the basis of this debate, I will now give an analytical reading of the historical evolution of Western European social democracy. In particular, I will identify three phases of social democratic

development, as well as a potential ongoing fourth moment: (1) the 'parliamentary socialism/early social democracy' phase (late 19th century-World War 2); (2) the 'mature Keynesian social democracy' phase (post-WWII-late 1980s); (3) the 'Third Way' phase (1990s-late 2000s); and, finally, (4) a possible contemporary development following the global financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. These stages will now be described, focussing on the distinctive traits and electoral results of social democracy.

2.2.1 The 'parliamentary socialism/early social democracy' phase

A first wave of social democratic thought and organisational structuring can be identified between the late 1800s and the first half of the 1900s. On the one hand, the earlier portion of this period sees the development of socialist formations and the forging of early, often region-specific traditions. On the other, social democratic parties proper first emerge during the interwar period and specifically after the Russian Revolution (Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco 2020), seeking a non-revolutionary, i.e. parliamentary, road to a revolutionary goal: the realisation of a socialist society.

Being the traditional representatives of workers vis-à-vis capital within the class cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), socialist parties significantly gained traction as Western European societies became more and more politically enfranchised with the extension of national suffrages since the 1880s (e.g., Kim 2007; Przeworski 2009), which led towards mass politics (McKay et al. 1995; Palmer, Colton and Kramer 1995, Merriman 2004). During this time, Bartolini (2000, 70) identifies a 'triangle of genealogy' of early European socialism, made up of the British, German and French traditions. First, in the UK, where Marxism did not find a cultural and societal breeding ground, strong trade unions develop with the explicit goals of redistribution and regulating competition within capitalism. With most radical variants of socialist thought rejected, the dominant strand of British labour movement became Fabianism, which sought the democratisation of industrial societies and did not incorporate Marxist or anarchist elements.

Second, Germany is traditionally seen as 'the homeland of orthodox Marxism' (Bartolini 2000, 72). In this regard, a key component in this phase was the continued struggle, before and during the foundation of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD), to preserve ideological purity vis-à-vis exogenous influences: for instance, the focus of Ferdinand Lassalle on the welfare state and the acceptance of the state in order to democratise it. Traditional Marxism, which developed in imperial Germany, puts its main focus on international solidarity between workers and the liberation from oppressive domestic structures. Yet, in practice, traditional Marxism was challenged exactly in Germany, with the emergence of Eduard Bernstein's reformism. This movement contributed to the dilution of theoretical purity as a result of the increasing tension with political practice, so as to render realistic compromises with existing capitalist structures more acceptable, insofar as they contributed to improving the conditions of the working class (see, for instance, Berman 2003).

Third and final, the French context contributed to the development of an eclectic and paradoxical form of socialism. This is because it combined the influential French revolutionary tradition with the republican and anti-authoritarian impulses deriving from both the Enlightenment and the Parisian workers' governments in the mid-1800s. These conditions resulted in a culturally rich but organisationally weak class movement, fully integrated within democracy and unused to organised collective action. Marxism, in its Guesdesist form, never made inroads into France due to the fragmentation of the socialist movement, political differences with the German context, and the independence and non-Marxist character of French trade unions, which were weaker than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. To the extent that Marx's doctrine penetrated French socialism, this tradition was defined by a 'unique mixture of elements of Jacobinism, utopianism, anarcho-syndicalism, republicanism, state-technocratic socialism, and Marxism' (Bartolini 2000, 78). Other Western European early traditions of socialism were largely informed by these three types and especially the Marxist SPD model (Sassoon 1996, 11).

During the first decades of this period, socialist parties started taking part in elections in those European countries with a democratic framework, achieving mediocre results and with slow gains

(Bartolini 2000, 79; Delwit 2021, 6). These results meant than left parties were relegated to being in opposition across the continent. Indeed, as Figure 2.1 shows, in the last 30 years of the 19th century socialist parties achieved on average between under 5% and 10% of national vote shares, competing in few elections. Moreover, the bulk of these results was driven by the electoral performance of two well-established socialist formations, that is the German and the Austro-Hungarian ones. Yet, with the turn of the century the electoral fortunes of socialist formations improved, as more European countries democratised and started introducing proportional representation (PR) as their electoral systems to both satisfy the need for representation of previously excluded groups and preserve the dominant position of established groups, according to the 'Rokkan hypothesis' (e.g., Rokkan 1970; Lijphart 1992; Benoit 2004). Indeed, in the first decade of the new century socialist parties' share of

Figure 2.1. European social democratic electoral performance between the 1870s and 2010s.

Source: own re-elaboration of Delwit (2021) data.[2]

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[2] The presented aggregations of countries in which social democratic parties are considered are constructed as follows by Delwit (2021, 3). 'Europe 15' includes Western European states that have been democratic at least since the end of WWII.

national votes across the continent rose to 15.2%. Importantly, this increased even further to more than 20% during the 1910s, albeit this decade was affected by the events of World War 1. In these years, prominent gains were made by socialist parties across the continent, in countries such as the UK (where Labour became the main alternative to the Conservative Party in 1922, overshadowing the Liberals), Italy (where in 1919 the *Partito Socialista Italiano* won the most votes and seats) and across Scandinavia. This also translated into socialist formations entering government for the first time, the very first case being the French *Parti Socialiste* (PS) in 1906.

The outbreak of the Great War had a profound impact on Western European left-wing politics, not least because it pushed the various states into different directions regarding the conflict itself (Sassoon 1996, Bartolini 2000). In combination with the Russian Revolution, it contributed decisively to the split between revolutionism and reformism, which had been mounting for decades and resulted in the birth of communist parties (Sassoon 1996, 31). This historical juncture, where the tensions deriving from increasing internationalisation started clashing with the national labour and welfare objectives traditionally pursued by left-wing parties, resulted in a decisive and encompassing transformation of electoral socialism, with lasting effects on various fronts. It is, indeed, during this phase that the earliest stages of social democratic politics proper can be identified in Western Europe.

Differently from revolutionary movements that sought the transformation of society and the 'withering away of the state' (Engels 1877), socialists believed that, by achieving political power through elections, they could introduce redistribution of power and means with reforms, in seeking to achieve a model of society characterised by greater equality (Sassoon 1996, 41). In this way, they could introduce socialism peacefully from within the democratic state, through electoral victories. Hence, after the communist breakaway, socialist parties could further pursue their stated intent without being in a contradictory unified camp with the communists. Furthermore, in this historical

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This list includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 'Europe 20' adds Cyprus, Malta, and the three most recently democratised Western European nations, that is Greece, Portugal, and Spain, to these countries. The latter list precisely includes all the countries analysed in this thesis.

scenario and with such a goal in mind, during the years following WWI socialist parties were already faced with the need to enlarge their voting bases beyond national working classes. This entailed the dilution and moderation of traditional left-wing ideology, to broaden the socialist appeal (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 51): so much so that, in contexts such as Sweden, an electoral coalition with bourgeois parties was now seen as acceptable (Sassoon 1996, 43). The programmatic moderation and inclusion within existing political and institutional structures of socialist parties meant that traditional left-wing objectives, for instance nationalisations, were purposedly not sought where politically unfeasible (e.g., Sassoon 1996, 44, 56). Thus, the socialist elaboration of this period could be summarised with the following key concepts: gradual reformism, acceptance of liberal democracy and capitalism, peaceful electoral pursuit of socialism from within the state, ideological moderation, and political realism. These elements constitute the earliest version, programmatic basis, and electoral strategy of Western European social democracy. Electorally, the strategic decision of broadening the socialist appeal rewarded such formations. Votes-wise, indeed, the war favoured such parties throughout Western Europe, as they found political legitimacy where the communists did not. Generally, these mainstream left parties became one of the two key actors in national politics by gaining between a quarter and a third of the vote and often formed governments, although at times in ways that constrained their scope for political action (Sassoon, 1996).

In sum, the breakaway from revolutionary politics that characterised this period translated in relevant changes for former socialist parties in terms of electoral results. Indeed, the data reported in Figure 2.1 shows how immediately after WWI social democratic formations significantly increased their vote shares, faring well above 20% in the 1920s across the continent (Moschonas 2018; Delwit 2021). This trend was also driven by the electoral performance of prominent parties in the first post-war elections, with instances such as the Swedish *Socialdemokraterna* and the Austrian *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs* (SPÖ) winning over 40% of the vote midway through the decade (Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco 2020). Moreover, during this decade the socialists started entering government more frequently, for example in the UK, Germany and most Scandinavian

countries. At the aggregate level, the 1930s set the benchmark for decades to come in terms of these parties' electoral performance, as they gravitated towards 30% of the vote in most of Europe (Delwit 2021). This signified the consolidation of the left as a major electoral force in representative democracies across the continent.

2.2.2 The 'mature Keynesian social democracy' phase

The 'modern West European conception of social democracy' fully emerged in the wake of WWII (Sassoon 1996, 42), by building on the illustrated foundations of the interwar period. The programmatic consistency of social democratic parties across Western Europe up until the mid-to-late-1980s, a time that includes the electoral 'golden age' of social democracy, allows identifying a second stage in the development of this party family.

'Mature' social democracy sought a compromise between labour and capital in capitalist societies, to be achieved mainly through public intervention by the state in the economy (Sassoon 1996; Habermeier 2006). Central to its development was the macroeconomic thought of John Maynard Keynes, which was extremely influential in social democratic circles even in its early and unstructured forms (Notermans 2000).[3] Once perfected, the doctrine of Keynes would shape decisively the economic approach and policies through which social democracy aimed to achieve its political objectives. As a general principle, the economy needed to adapt to the social needs within national societies. It was thus fundamental to attain economic growth, so as to afford achieving full employment whilst tackling material inequalities, for instance of income, housing, and education, through redistribution (Mackintosh 1972; Gustaffson 1974; Crosland 1975; Eichner 1982; Duncan 1985; Esping-Andersen and van Kersbergen 1992). This vision was to be achieved within a mixed economic framework built around a strong social welfare system that, coupled with the key role of

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[3] Highly illustrative of this point is the affirmation of one of the key theorists of socialist and social democratic doctrine, Rudolf Hildefring, during the SPD congress of 1927. Here, Hildefring illustrated how one of the central concepts of what would become Keynesianism, planned production, was ultimately a 'socialist principle' and the essence of planned capitalism itself (Harrington 2011).

education, had the purpose of fostering equality, both material and of opportunities (Macfarlane 1996; Sassoon 1996). In this economic framework, the state was seen as central for macroeconomic planning, investment in large infrastructural projects, ownership of key public assets and natural resources, market regulation and allocation of key resources (Gustaffson 1974; Thomas 1974; Castles 1975; Morgan 1982; Marquand 1987; Sassoon 1996). Otherwise, the mixed economic framework envisaged by social democracy favoured private ownership (see, e.g., Lansbury 1972; Thomas 1974; Marquand 1987; Macfarlane 1996). The larger role of the state in the economy was also substantiated in a more far-reaching fiscal policy approach, which coupled greater public spending to achieve welfare and egalitarian goals with increased and progressive taxation (Crosland 1975; Berman 2003; Thompson 2008). Practically, the expansion of public spending funded policies such as universal health coverage and developing health infrastructures, pensions, and social welfare provisions (Rosenblum 1980). Such measures were needed not only to provide everybody with material security, but especially to meet the claims of the most disadvantaged in a collectivist conception of the state (Duncan 1985; Winter 1988). Overall, the social democratic vision entailed a 'humanly managed' capitalism that focussed on all citizens within national societies (Lansbury 1972; Tilton 1979).

The crucial role of Keynesian social democracy in building essential public structures in Western European states following WWII resulted in a long period of political and cultural hegemony: a 'social democratic consensus', which reached its peak in the 1970s (Marquand 1987). In electoral terms, following from socialist formations, social democratic parties maintained their main constituency in the working class, which they claimed to represent whilst explicitly committing to representative liberal democracy (Hewitt 1977, 457; Morgan 1982, 25-26). Indeed, over the decades social democracy became the prevalent modality of workers' political organisation within capitalism and the key referent for pro-working-class reforms (Przeworski 1980). Yet, it also managed to draw votes from across different professional sectors and socio-demographics, often attaining the largest membership in Western European party systems (e.g., Lansbury 1972). This is coherent with the strategic decisions of the transitioning socialist formations in the interwar period, as social democratic

parties also sought to win in the bourgeois electoral game to pragmatically legislate into socialism (Przeworski 1980; Rosenblum 1980). It is also important to stress this vote-seeking aspect of social democratic electoral strategy in light of its policy-seeking objectives. Again, a pivotal programmatic feature of social democratic parties was the need to acquire political power in order to be in the position to direct economic forces towards collectivist goals (Sassoon 1996; Berman 2003; Newman 2005; Harrington 2011).

As a whole, during this period social democratic formations solidified their status as 'mainstream electoral machines' (Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco 2020, 3). Indeed, this is the time when social democratic mass parties' role as the political representatives of the working class within the class cleavage was the strongest, due to the relative stability of social groups and electoral preferences (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Schumacher 2017). This entailed the stabilisation of social democratic vote shares at around or above the threshold reached in most European countries before the outbreak of WWII, that is 30%. As reported in Figure 2.1, the electoral performance of European social democracy peaked during the 'golden age' 1950s and 1960s, with average vote shares at around or above 31% depending on the considered countries (Delwit 2021). Instead, the 1970s saw a partial decrease in votes obtained across the Continent, now on average below the 30% benchmark. During the 1980s, this slump continued in those countries with 'older' democracies, where social democracy fell below 29% of the share of the vote. However, such a consideration is partially reversed by also considering more European democracies and, especially, the formerly authoritarian 'Third-Wave' democracies of Southern Europe (Huntington 1991), as their inclusion leads average social democratic vote shares above 30% again. Yet, these fluctuations pointed to a general decline in the consensus surrounding social democracy during its 'golden age' that, if not yet electorally, already started to show at least in both political and broader public discourse. Indeed, across most Western European countries, social democratic parties managed to pursue national policies in line with their political vision only until the economic growth brought about by the mid-century boom ended. Yet, a number of factors including rising inflation and economic downturns following the first oil crisis in

1973 and the intellectual readiness of neoliberal advocates would soon bring Keynesian social democracy to an overall crisis, both in the electoral arena and beyond (Duncan 1985; Share 1988; Stretton 1995; Birnbaum 2010; Keating and McCrone 2015; Diamond 2016).

2.2.3 The 'Third Way' phase

The crisis of the social democratic consensus over the late 1970s and the 1980s sparked an intellectual elaboration that resulted in a comprehensive alternative model proposed by centre-right camps across the Western world with Thatcherism and Reaganism, but also had lasting effects on the mainstream left itself. Indeed, the resurgence and affirmation of the neoliberal paradigm deeply affected social democracy, leading to a decisive change in programmatic connotations and policy objectives. During the 1980s and leading into the 1990s, the classical Keynesian social democratic model seemed too inefficient, unsustainable in its large bureaucratic ramifications, and in desperate need of renewal. Hence, the 1990s and 2000s saw the emergence of the social democratic 'Third Way' model. This was a period that would shape contemporary Western politics and the identity of the mainstream left across Western societies, epitomised by prominent examples such as Tony Blair's 'New Labour' in the UK, Gerhard Schröder's 'Neue Mitte' within the German SPD, and Bill Clinton's presidencies in the US.

Third Way politics found its most prominent elaboration in the work of Anthony Giddens. With the intention of adapting social democracy to a fast-changing world, the Third Way asserted there would not be any room for left-right political divisions in the modern age (Giddens 1998, 26-28, 42-43). This was because of the globalisation and individualisation processes, which the Third Way supported against both protectionisms, economic or cultural in nature, and the collectivist conception of the state previously endorsed by Keynesian social democracy (Giddens 1998, 64-65). The endorsement of globalised and individualised societies entailed, as a consequence, a profound re-evaluation of fundamental Keynesian social democratic views on key concepts such as the economy, the role of the state and equality. The Third Way proposed a 'radical centre' programme of modernisation, centred

around a 'new mixed economy' with greater public-private synergies, able to exploit the dynamic potential of free markets to pursue the public interest (Giddens 1998, 70, 100-101). Within this framework, the state had to be a 'risk manager' characterised by administrative efficiency, to be achieved through structural reforms (Giddens 1998, 72-74, 76). Therefore, it needed to be 'without enemies', aiding market processes through reforms leading to greater openness, efficiency and transparency; properly balancing market regulation with deregulation where needed; and providing tax breaks for corporations that committed to long-term social goals (Giddens 1998, 70, 72-74, 88, 100). Equality was now seen as chiefly 'of inclusion' rather than material and this also changed the role of citizens, by focussing on the inextricable bond that linked rights to individual responsibilities (Giddens 1998, 65, 70; 2003, 25). Furthermore, a certain degree of 'controlled inequality' between the affluent and underprivileged was seen as beneficial to social bargaining within national societies (Giddens 2003, 25).

Such a conception profoundly impacted one of the flagship policies of Keynesian social democracy, universal welfare states. Indeed, welfare provisions were reduced in an effort of 'economic rationalisation', and individuals were no longer entitled to unconditional claims to the government but would rather be obliged to meet some criteria in order to receive support (Birnbaum 2010). That is, the Third Way advocated a smaller, more efficient and sustainable welfare state whilst criticising the Keynesian version, deemed too large and bureaucratic to tackle inequality or even just survive (Giddens 2000, 166; Driver and Martell 2001; Latham 2001, 27; Merkel 2001, 52).[4] A key example of the Third Way ethos applied to welfare provisions is represented by active labour market policies, in which people would receive unemployment benefits only under the obligation of actively looking for work. Indeed, unconditional unemployment benefits were seen negatively, as a shelter from the labour market that itself produced further unemployment. Rather, individuals were encouraged to follow saving practices, exploit educational resources and make the most of personal investment

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[4] This form of welfare state is sometimes referred to as 'proactive' (Driver and Martell 2001, 39).

opportunities to improve their situations (Giddens 1998, 115-125; Latham 2001, 28). The Third Way vision of societies and individuals, therefore, combined limited forms of equality and meritocracy with a positive conception of the welfare state (Giddens 1998, 105). Intentionally, it marked a clear separation from Keynesian social democracy, which was also lexical: for instance, in the 'positive' instead of 'negative' conception of the welfare state (Giddens 1998, 128).[5]

The Third Way marks a significant watershed with past expressions of social democracy and electoral socialism. To understand the rationale behind the illustrated programmatic shift, it is necessary to put this social democratic phase into context. Not only had previous crises significantly weakened the Keynesian model, but the Third Way also blossomed during the 1990s, that is the heyday of globalisation. In this changing world, this variety of social democracy was seen as the only viable option to promote left-of-centre values (Giddens 2000, 163). Moreover, in times of perceived generalised progress, Third Way proponents argued that there was no need for emphasising existing societal conflicts, but rather for an ideologically light movement free from left-right contrapositions (Driver and Martell 2001, 42). Neoliberalism was seen as the paradigm of progress and liberalised markets matched it by being considered with no exception the best functioning economic systems (Latham 2001; Kay 2004), as 'market competition generates gains that no other system can match' (Giddens 2000, 164).

Likewise, the guiding principles of this social democratic wave changed and adapted to the neoliberal hegemony, by praising freedom over other priorities (Grayson 2007). At the same time, the socialist and classic social democratic gradualism was refuted by Third Way modernizers, who were critical of the inefficient relics of previous eras and intended to promptly roll them back. A key example of this is Tony Blair, who both amended the old Clause 4 of the UK Labour constitution by rejecting the key goal of nationalising production means and deeply reformed the Keynesian aspects of the British welfare state, of which he was critical (Legget 2007, Bogdanor 2009). Yet, other contextual elements

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[5] This is epitomised by how the Third Way replaces Beveridge's five societal negatives, i.e., the foundation of the welfare state, with five positives: 'want' becomes 'autonomy', 'disease' becomes 'active health', 'ignorance' becomes 'education', 'squalor' becomes 'wellbeing', and 'idleness' becomes 'initiative'.

that potentially contributed to these developments ought to be considered. Having already failed at introducing socialism electorally, as famously affirmed by Przeworski and Sprague (1986), the mainstream left then sought catch-all electoral strategies. Such tactics changed the social democratic voting base, by both enlarging it and diluting its defining traits even further (Berman 2003). However, the even greater and now definitive compromise with capital struck by Third Way social democracy meant that the centre-left found itself incapable of forcefully proposing alternative political and economic models (Birnbaum 2010; Meyer 2010).

Electorally, the more marked transformation of European social democratic parties into catch-all formations (Kirchheimer 1966) allowed them to cling on to competitiveness. Indeed, Figure 2.1 shows how, despite not halting the declining trend that started already in the 1970s and 1980s, Third Way social democracy managed to maintain an average share of the vote between the mid-20%s and 30% during the 1990s, depending on the considered countries (Delwit 2021). In this decade, this relative success is epitomised by the election of prominent Third Way proponents to the top executive post in several countries across the continent, including but not limited to Italian *L'Ulivo*'s Romano Prodi in 1996, British Labour's Tony Blair in 1997, and German SPD's Gerhard Schröder in 1998. More generally, Third Way social democracy appeared reinvigorated in the short term: so much so that, by the end of the millennium, it was in power 'in every Western European country except Spain, Norway, and Ireland; governing alone in the UK, Portugal, Sweden, and Greece, [and] leading coalitions in Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France' (Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco 2020, 4).

However, data shows how European social democratic parties' performance at the ballot box started declining more markedly since the 2000s. Indeed, in the first decade of the new millennium already, social democracy would no longer reach 30% of the vote share across the Continent, accentuating the now long-lasting electoral decline. This is not surprising when considering the well-known decline of cleavage politics, that is of both the size of social groups traditionally supporting social democracy (e.g., Best 2011; Goldberg 2020) and their capacity to explain social democratic vote shares (e.g.,

Franklin 1992; Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco 2020). Yet, the worst was yet to come, as the electoral collapse of European social democracy would only materialise in the 2010s, in the aftermath of a large-scale financial, social, and political crisis.

2.2.4 A potential contemporary development of Western European social democracy

The global financial crisis of the late 2000s marked a historical watershed across the world in economic, societal, and political terms. This unprecedented downturn was triggered by the bankruptcy of American services firm Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which soon became the symbol of this phase. The ensuing crisis is generally acknowledged as a large-scale collapse of the existing international system based on neoliberal economics. Yet, as already shown, rather than being prepared with an immediately viable alternative to propose politically, Western European social democracy found itself falling with the system in which it was embedded: programmatically and electorally. On the first front, with the Third Way transition social democratic parties had fully accepted the logics of free-market economics, failing to distinguish itself from neoliberalism altogether (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 2). Social democracy compromised on its traditional goals to put greater focus on neoliberal economics and globalisation, individualism, structural reforms, welfare rollback, cosmopolitanism, and meritocracy (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 2-3). This resulted in a paradoxical situation: what should have been a momentous historical juncture in favour of social democracy, given the highlighted deficiencies of the neoliberal economic paradigm, was characterised by a response of social democratic politicians made of 'deafening silence' (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 3). Again, this is because of the fundamental philosophical adjustment the heirs of socialism made not only with capital, but with a specific and rather orthodox doctrine, which left an intellectual vacuum as well as existential dilemmas for the centre-left (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 3-5).

Yet, the fact that prominent alternatives were not brought up by politicians and struggled to emerge in the broader public debate in the aftermath of the crash does not mean that there was a lack of

programmatic elaboration in intellectual circles. In this regard, especially relevant is the 'Good Society Debate': a conversation amongst progressives in academia and various industries during the years of the crisis that first proposed alternative ideas around which to rebuild Western European social democracy (for a summary, see Meyer and Spiegel 2010). Indeed, several of the concepts highlighted within this framework would become important for the programmatic positions of several social democratic parties years later, towards the second half of the 2010s. These include, but are not limited to, Antonio Costa's *Partido Socialista* in Portugal, as well as the British Labour Party and Italian *Partito Democratico* during the tenures as party leaders of, respectively, Jeremy Corbyn and Nicola Zingaretti (e.g., Lisi 2016; Whiteley et al. 2018; Diamond and Guidi 2019).

If one were to summarise the traits of the illustrated intellectual elaboration that also transpired in the positions of contemporary parties, the sketch for a potential preliminary vision of a renewed, post-financial crisis social democratic idea emerges. This sees a general recalibration to the economic left if compared to the Third Way. In fact, full employment, fairness of pay, strong workers' rights and regulation of markets returned to the forefront, with flagship policies such as the living wage, larger welfare provisions and progressive income taxation. Importantly, Western European social democracy doubles down on the commitment towards European integration while more being critical of the policy paradigms adopted so far by the European Union (EU). Indeed, intellectuals called for a clarification of the relationship between the EU and its Member States, most importantly through comprehensive European-wide reforms in financial and economic governance (e.g., Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 9). This is an indispensable passage for the realisation of the main political project of post-crisis social democracy: 'Social Europe', that is the Keynesian social democratic model at the European level (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 3, 8-9). In doing so, a European social democracy could both respond adequately to the challenges of globalisation and put the key goal of equality back to the forefront. Through social democracy at the European level, more equal societies could be attained by reducing poverty and expanding the material rights of all, e.g., in accessing public services, chiefly through the redistribution of wealth, power and risks (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 3, 6, 9). Social justice,

therefore, was seen as the guiding principle of economic policy, restoring the primacy of politics over economics (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 9). In general, this European form of supranational social democracy was seen as a steppingstone towards a global social democratic model with democratic, internationalist, humanitarian, political and welfare roots (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 6-7). Post-crisis, social democracy had to revert its economic focus back to growth, whilst at the same time seeking to protect the environment. To reach these objectives, a Keynesian-inspired 'reform' of capitalism was necessary. Such a revision entailed more market regulation and fairer tax systems as well as increased state intervention in the economy for progressive political goals (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 8). Finally, social democracy needed to revive its relationships with traditional left-wing constituents, especially trade unions and NGOs, with a much stronger demand-side focus (Meyer and Spiegel 2010, 10).

In terms of empirical reality, recent works show how the more recent evolution of Western European social democracy neither corresponds to fully-fledged a return to the past, nor is free from contradictions. For instance, as will be illustrated further, Bremer (2018) shows how after the economic crisis of the late 2000s social democratic parties did shift to the left with regard to welfare policy and economic liberalism, whilst at the same time accepting the principles of austerity and budgetary rigour in a seemingly incoherent configuration. Such interesting empirical developments, coupled with the illustrated programmatic evolution of social democracy after the global financial crisis, delineate a potential fourth moment in the evolution of this party family. More time is needed to assess whether this latest stage of transformation is consistent and persistent enough to be able to define it as a separate and proper 'wave' of social democracy. Still, this review already points to an important, yet so-far underexplored conclusion: that this phase is characterised by elements that are different from the preceding Third Way period.

The potential pursuit of a change in direction from the Third Way period is made plausible by looking at the electoral results of European social democracy during the 2010s. Indeed, the social democratic collapse finally materialises in this decade: after being established for several decades at around 30% of the vote, these formations across the continent fall sharply to just above 20% on average (Delwit

2021) (see Figure 2.1). This is epitomised by several historically strong social democratic parties recording historical electoral lows in the 2010s. One of the most remarkable instances is the French PS that, albeit managing to obtain 29.4% of the overall preferences in the 2012 legislative elections, plummeted dramatically to its worst ever result of 7.4% of the vote share in 2017. Similar considerations can be made for other formations. In Italy, the *Partito Democratico* (PD) only collected respectively 25.42% and 18.76% of preferences in the elections of 2013 and 2018, after the Italian centre-left fared consistently at least above 30% in previous decades (e.g., Emanuele 2018[a]). The Swedish social democrats, traditionally considered as the founders and first establishers of the Scandinavian social democratic model (e.g., Misgeld, Molin and Åmark 1993), also fell to below 30% (28.3%) in 2018 for the first time since 1911. Furthermore, despite being traditionally slightly less dominant due to the effects of the purely proportional Dutch electoral system on party competition (e.g., Lijphart 1978), the vote share of the *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) too plummeted during the 2010s, going from 24.84% in 2012 to the by far historical lows of 5.7% and 5.73% in 2017 and 2021 respectively. Lastly, even in a less competitive setting such as Switzerland (e.g., Lehmbruch 1993; Klinger and Russmann 2017), in 2019 the *Sozialdemokratische Partei* (SP) reported its worst electoral result since 1905, only managing to obtain 16.8% of the vote share. These prominent examples illustrate how the declining trend in social democratic electoral fortunes that began already in the 1970s reached its tipping point during the 2010s, when the prominent status of this party family within European party systems was jeopardised.

2.3 Empirical assessments of Western European social democracy's ideological evolution

The previous section illustrated the political transformation of Western European social democracy since the days of electoral socialism in the late 19th century, as well as the electoral fortunes of this party family. An additional and interconnected aspect of social democratic change over time is the evolution of its ideological profile. This is intended in terms of economic left-right positions,

considered by many as a fundamental constitutive component of political ideology especially in post-WWII Western Europe (e.g., Castles and Mair 1984; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990),[6] which has been analysed in several empirical investigations. In general, although there is no shortage of studies with inconclusive or mixed evidence, these scholarly accounts can be divided into two broad categories. On the one hand, many found that Western European social democracy drifted away from traditional economic left goals over time, hence undergoing a process of moderation and ideological convergence with centre-right parties. On the other, recent studies come to a different conclusion: indeed, they highlight an increase in Western European social democratic parties' emphasis on traditional economic left themes over time, and especially in recent decades. This study now proceeds to illustrate both the viewpoints that emerge from empirical investigations.

2.3.1 The causes and consequences of the alleged convergence to the centre

The first argument in the literature concerns a shift to the ideological centre of Western European social democratic parties over time with regard to their economic positions in left-right terms (e.g., Mudge 2018; Loxbo et al. 2019), especially in recent decades (e.g., Kraft 2017). Indeed, some empirical investigations show how social democracy in this region moved away from traditional economic left goals over time (e.g., Mair et al. 2004; Dalton 2013). For most of these formations, this rightwards move occurs since and during the heyday of the Third Way in the 1990s (Keman 2011). A well-known instance is the sizeable shift towards the ideological centre of the UK Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair, which is well captured empirically by data sources such as the Manifesto Project (MARPOR) (Adams et al. 2004). Indeed, 'New Labour' is a prime example of a broader tendency: that is, social democratic parties' convergence to the centre by means of a strategic

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[6] However, it must be noted that left-right is not the only form of defining political ideologies. For instance, Rokeach's (1979) two-value equality-freedom model defines four political ideologies (socialism, communism, fascism and capitalism) as the different combinations of high or low equality and freedom. Moreover, political ideology is context-dependent, as for instance Middendorp (1978) applies a different ideological contraposition to the US context, that is progressiveness versus conservativism.

decision, which eroded differences with traditional mainstream right competitors (Keman and Pennings 2006; Evans and Tilley 2013).

There are different reasons behind social democratic parties' move towards the ideological centre. Amongst such key factors are the institutional constraints deriving from government participation, which have been defined in the literature as part of the 'responsibility versus responsiveness' dilemma (e.g., Mair 2009, 2011, 2013; Lefkofridi and Nezi 2014). In essence, in the current times of global governance through multilevel institutional settings, parties with legitimate aspirations of entering government will be limited, both in their programmatic proposals whilst campaigning and policy output once in power, by responsibility considerations dictated by the various relationships with external actors in which states are embedded (e.g., Karremans and Damhuis 2020; Romeijn 2020), for instance through international treaties and various other broad transnational processes. This will entail conforming to the policy ideas and prescriptions deriving from the hegemonic neoliberal paradigm (e.g., Cerny 2010), especially from an economic viewpoint. The other side of the coin is responsiveness towards voters' demands, which are partisan in nature and often diverge from mainstream policy-making dictated by institutional constraints (Mair 2008[a]). In this regard, perhaps the most glaring in contemporary Western Europe is the EU and the obligations in terms of adhering to the *acquis communautaire* deriving from the Treaties (e.g., Rose 2014), which are even more demanding if a country is a member of the Eurozone (e.g., Laffan 2014). Europeanisation can also be seen as part of a broader and important driving force behind the responsibility versus responsiveness dilemma and its impact on social democratic position taking in recent decades: globalisation. Indeed, regardless of whether they are part of the largest trading bloc in the world in the EU, Western European countries are members of international economic organisations which regulate and manage worldwide trading and economic dynamics, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD), and the World Bank (WB). As mentioned, these institutions promote and enforce a specific set of neo-liberal, free-market economic policies that members, i.e. countries and their governments, need to comply with. Hence, the need of

parties with legitimate government aspirations to be accountable in their policy outputs and have good fiscal reputation once in power influences their position-taking, determining their rightwards shift if they are left-of-centre (Hellwig 2012, 2016; Ezrow and Hellwig 2014; Kraft 2017).

Another set of reasons motivating the strategic rightwards shift of social democratic parties is constituted by electoral considerations, both in office- and vote-seeking terms (Strøm 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999). On the first front, more centrist positions favour social democracy's chances of coalition building at the governmental level in contexts of reduced ideological differences between left- and right-wing parties (Keman 2011). Instead, considerations regarding the second set of behaviours concerns the enlargement of the electoral basis of social democratic formations. Indeed, social democracy's move to the centre follows a 'catch-all' reasoning (Kirchheimer 1966; Evans and Tilley 2012; Arndt 2014; Thau 2018). Indeed, with the increase in material security and well-being recorded in post-WWII Western societies, the divisions between social groups became more and more blurred, whilst the size of the working class progressively shrunk (e.g., Best 2011). Conversely, due to these processes other segments of society were expanding. This meant that it was necessary to go beyond traditional voting bases for parties to win electoral contests in such changed environments. However, an adverse effect of this strategy is the progressive alienation of social democratic parties' original electorate. Social democratic moderation decisively contributed to removing partisan cues for voters, especially in traditional and shrinking constituencies such as the working class; which, in turn, entailed a decline of class voting in favour of such formations (Keman and Pennings 2006; Evans and Tilley 2012, 2017). In other words, also due to their changed and now not clearly distinguishable ideological profile, Western European social democratic parties struggled to mobilise its historical constituency. This has profound impacts in terms of political dealignment and relevance of the class cleavage, with empirical evidence highlighting how social democratic strategies alienate its traditional supporters (Karreth, Polk and Allen 2013; Schwander and Manow 2017); hence, pointing to a decline of cleavage politics (Franklin 1992; Goldberg 2020). Conversely, this also meant that the political referent of some social democratic parties changed in response to the transformed

programmatic profile of such formations, which now cater to the 'new middle classes' made up by highly educated urban professionals and white-collar voters (Kitschelt 1994; Arndt 2014; Rennwald and Evans 2014; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Damhuis and Karremans 2017; Gingrich 2017; Rennwald 2020).

2.3.2 Beyond convergence: the persistence of economic left positions in social democracy

Despite the existing evidence on the alleged convergence of Western European social democracy towards the ideological centre in terms of left-right economic positions, the literature is far from unanimous on this matter. To begin with, other empirical investigations present mixed results concerning the ideological evolution of social democracy over time, pointing to the absence of universal trends in the left-right movement of such formations in Europe during the last decades (e.g., Jansen, Evans and De Graaf 2012). Yet, other empirical evidence goes even further by showing that, over time, Western European social democracy has not moved away from traditionally leftist economic goals. Indeed, based on MARPOR data on electoral manifestos, some argue that left-wing parties in Western Europe have not significantly altered their positions since the 1970s (Adam and Ftergioti 2019). By employing the same data source and extending the timeframe to the immediate aftermath of WWII, others instead show how the salience put by social democratic parties on matters such as market regulation, state involvement in the economy, equality and redistribution, welfare state expansion, and support for their traditional working-class electoral basis significantly has significantly increased over time (e.g., Emanuele 2021; Trastulli 2022). This is especially true in recent decades and especially since the turn of the millennium, with Western European social democracy repositioning itself further to the economic left after a period of shifting to the right during the 1990s, a period characterised by the prominence of Third Way politics (e.g., Polacko 2022; Trastulli 2022).

There are a number of potential causes for this continuing relevance of left-wing economic positions within the programmatic offer and ideological profile of Western European social democracy. First,

it was noted that the long-term policy orientations and the usually large organisational structures of social democratic parties constitute important obstacles to radical rightwards economic shifts, effectively impacting their capabilities in terms of policy adjustment (Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009). Another important factor to mention is the other side of the 'responsibility versus responsiveness' dilemma: the responsiveness to voters' demand. Indeed, in recent years and especially after the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, social democracy finds itself in the difficult position in which to strike a delicate balance between 'responsible' neoliberal policies with regards to budged deficits and the need for more 'responsive' left-wing positions on welfare provisions and market regulation (Bremer 2018).

Furthermore, these dynamics are closely tied to an additional factor that might have fundamentally contributed to the persistence of social democratic economic left positions: the reaction of such parties to globalisation. Whilst, as shown, globalisation pushes political formations with government aspirations to adhere to the dominant neoliberal paradigm with regard to their economic policies, another strand of literature argues that this phenomenon pushes social democratic parties more to the economic left (e.g., Swank 2002; Hellwig 2016). That is, in the face of the greater deregulation and international competition entailed by economic globalisation, left-wing parties have several stimuli to defend their distinctive policy proposals. Firstly, they are embedded in path-dependent national trajectories as key social actors within labour-capital bargaining, and such pressures to maintain a distinctive policy profile are stronger where trade unions are more powerful (Garrett 1998; Hellwig 2016). Secondly, Western European social democratic parties have an impulse to defend the historical achievement that they themselves have decisively contributed to build through policy, national welfare states, vis-à-vis globalisation; hence contributing to the persistence of economic left positions (Kriesi et al. 2008). This entails a greater emphasis on such formations on maintaining and expanding national welfare provisions in the face of globalisation, contributing to their economic left profile (e.g., Boix 1998). Third, globalisation is posited to exacerbate class conflicts, hence leading social democratic parties to persist in emphasising traditionally left-wing economic issues and, according to

some, to even shift to the left (Garrett 1998; Swank 2002; Milner and Judkins 2004). Overall, therefore, globalisation might also lead social democratic parties to become more economically left-wing by opposing this very phenomenon, for instance with policies such as increasing taxes on capital (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004).

2.4 Western European social democracy: a homogeneous party family?

So far, the presented review of the literature traced the history and evolution of Western European social democracy since the early days of electoral socialism. Moreover, it illustrated the ongoing debate regarding the ideological evolution of this party family, intended in terms of left-right economic positions, since the end of WWII. In this regard, it was shown how the disagreement on the programmatic nature of these parties' platforms is substantial not only from an overall longitudinal viewpoint, but also specifically concerning the last few decades and especially the period starting with the emergence of the Third Way in the 1990s. Indeed, whilst some scholars argue that social democracy substantially converged to the ideological centre, others suggest that in these years some important drivers pushed these formations further to the economic left. What is in common between these diverging perspectives, however, is a shared view of social democratic parties as if belonging to a unified group, i.e. social democracy as a party family, and hence all behaving in the same way over time.[7] However, the social democratic party family in Western Europe is very differentiated, with mainstream-left formations operating in different national contexts and party systems, whilst – as seen – also deriving from different socialist traditions. Hence, in this thesis my focus now turns to perspectives that analyse party families not as monolithic blocks, but rather as differentiated ensembles made up of different individual party actors.

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[7] There are some exceptions to this, for instance the works by Volkens (2004), Jansen, Evans and de Graaf (2013), and Polacko (2022).

But first, as a starting point, it is important to specify why political scientists have deemed party families as important to study over the decades. Party family as a systematised concept (Adcock and Collier 2001) is often overshadowed by the frequent and almost 'conventional wisdom' use of this expression (e.g., Mair and Mudde 1998, 214). A contributing factor is the varied adoption of 'party family', which can refer to four fundamental and at times overlapping aspects concerning political parties: the sociological dimension of party origins; parties' transnational links; party ideology; and party name and labels (Mair and Mudde 1998). Despite the potential conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970) that these many broad applications may point to, it clearly emerges how – in any case – all the different understandings of what a party family is refer to fundamental dimensions of political parties. Indeed, the party origins approach refers to the cleavage structure from which party families in Western Europe originate (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and, therefore, the societal groups the interests of which specific political formations seeks to represent (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 1995). Instead, perspectives focussing on transnational links analyse either the membership in either international groups, such as for instance the Socialist International (e.g., Schleiter et al. 2021), or the formal connenctions between parties from different countries in international representative fora, particularly in the EU Parliament (e.g., Jacobs 1989, Hix and Lord 1997). Others look at the ideological connotations of parties to group together formations that share similar traits, especially by employing empirical sources such as data on electoral manifestos (Volkens et al. 2021) or expert surveys (e.g., Bakker et al. 2020). Finally, one last viewpoint on party families is to leave parties to be the judge of their own collocation through the labels adopted in their party names (e.g., von Beyme 1985). In sum, despite some of such perspectives clearly being more adequate than others,[8] party family has risen to the status of an important concept in political science, as it refers to fundamental characteristics of political parties.

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[8] In particular, solely looking at a party's name seems the most questionable approach, as the same words or labels may come to mean different things altogether in different languages and political cultures (see, for instance, the Portuguese *Partido Social Democrata*, which is actually not a social democratic party but rather Portugal's main centre-right formation).

Hence, there is no doubt concerning the importance of investigating party families in political science. Yet, despite the idea of party family may lead to understanding its individual components as one unit, their consistency should not be overstated or taken for granted. Indeed within party families there are individual party actors: therefore, it follows that there can be differences internal to a specific group. An overall indication that emerges from the literature is that, in terms of such internal ideological differentiation, some party families in Western Europe are generally more differentiated than others. In particular, liberal and radical right parties are usually reported amongst the most internally heterogeneous formations (e.g., Ennser 2012; Carroll and Kubo 2019). Conversely, there are diverging opinions concerning left-wing party families such as communist, socialist and especially social democratic parties. On the one hand, some scholars see left-wing formations especially social democrats as the most internally homogeneous groups of parties (e.g., Camia and Caramani 2012; Ennser 2012), at least in relative terms (Freire and Tsatsanis 2015). On the other, there is also empirical evidence pointing instead towards a relevant internal differentiation of left-right economic positions of European social democratic parties since the end of WWII (e.g., Elff 2013). In particular, not only it was shown how most – but not all – social democratic parties tended to follow almost general leftwards or rightwards moments at the party level during specific periods since the 1950s; but also how, during all these phases, there were formations that diverged from these patterns by moving in the opposite direction, hence generating ideological differentiation internal to this party family (Volkens 2004). The proposed explanation behind the difference in left-right economic positions between political formations belonging to a same party family ought to be found in the fundamental role of national contexts (e.g., Volkens and Klingemann 2002), which hence ought to be further investigated in order to understand more fully what determines the phenomenon I will analyse in this thesis: intrafamily ideological differentiation. Therefore, both from a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint, the internal ideological homogeneity of Western European party families in general, and of social democracy in particular, seems to be far from adjudicated in the literature. This should call for both caution in seeing party families as something different than an analytical tool that

precedes parties themselves and an interest in exploring the determinants of different degrees of ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity internal to a party family.

3. The Determinants of Party Positions and Intrafamily Ideological Differentiation: An Explanatory Framework

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter (Chapter 2), I introduced the theoretical basis of the investigation of intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy, by reviewing what this party family is, its historical and ideological developments, and the early assessments of its internal homogeneity or heterogeneity. Such a basis allows us to now move towards the construction of an explanatory framework to be employed in this thesis. More specifically, I will present the scholarly contributions and debates surrounding the selected independent variables and, in particular, their impact on parties' economic left-right positions, introducing the related hypotheses that will subsequently inform the empirical analysis of this thesis.

In this chapter, I will proceed as follows. To start with, I will outline the employed definition of intrafamily ideological differentiation, which derives from individual parties' economic left-right positions. I will then introduce the potential determinants of this phenomenon that are of interest to this thesis, by dividing them into longer-term, or more causally distal, and shorter-term, or more causally proximal, factors. Amongst each of these groups, I will further differentiate between political and economic determinants. Finally, I will conclude by focussing on some additional factors that should also be controlled for in terms of their potential impact on parties' economic left-right positions posited by theoretical sources.

3.2 Intrafamily ideological differentiation

The final section of the previous chapter introduced the question of the ideological differences internal to individual party families. It was shown how 'party family' is now a very commonly used term in the specialised literature, and yet there are several ways of defining such groups by focussing

on different traits such as origins, transnational links, ideology, and name. Still, whilst several criteria have been used to assess what a party family is, it is also true that ideology has been 'traditionally cited as the basis for distinguishing between party families (see for example Seiler 1980, von Beyme 1985, Ware 1996)' (Mair and Mudde 1998, 219). Therefore, the academic classification of political formations into the useful analytical tool of party families most often occurs by means of evaluating the congruence of their ideological positions as the main criterion, which is instead challenged when parties usually defined as belonging to the same group are not ideologically homogeneous. Hence, gauging the levels of ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity internal to a party family – and how, how much, and why they vary over time – is a question with important conceptual and empirical implications, as it touches upon the most routinely employed criterion for the academic classifications of parties into party families. Or, in other words: why do parties routinely classified as belonging to the same party family adopt different ideological positions?

Further preliminary reflections are needed before moving on to the explanatory framework of this thesis. To start with, for reasons already outlined, from a substantive viewpoint the presented research question is asked concerning contemporary Western European social democracy. Moreover, it was also specified that ideological positions are intended here in terms of economic left-right.[9] At this point, it is now necessary to spend some words on both what constitutes intrafamily ideological differentiation and, hence, levels of analysis.

In light of the above, I define intrafamily ideological differentiation as the level of differentiation in ideological positions adopted by formations from the same party families. Hence, intrafamily ideological differentiation will be high if parties from the same party family adopt considerably different ideological positions from one another, and low when instead they are relatively homogeneous from an ideological viewpoint.[10]

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[9] As will be fully outlined in Chapter 4, this approach is also made necessary by data-related considerations.
[10] The assessment of the intrafamily ideological differentiation concerning a party family can occur both synchronically, that is at a single point in time, and diachronically, meaning over a specific period of time.

Important considerations as to the level of analysis follow from this, with relevant implications for the research design and explanatory framework of this thesis. Indeed, on the one hand, if we take individual parties as the unit of analysis, intrafamily ideological differentiation is an aggregate-level concept: that is, it only makes sense and can solely be assessed with reference to a party family and, more specifically, the individual ideological positions of the parties constituting it. On the other, this means that, given high or low levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation are the result of the different individual ideological positions of parties, the determinants of this phenomenon at the aggregate level coincide with those that determine the different individual-level ideological positions of the formations constituting a party family. Hence, with specific regard to this thesis, the explanatory framework presented here will introduce the different determinants of Western European parties' economic left-right positions, under the assumption that variations in these determinants will lead to variations in parties' economic left-right placement at the individual level and, thus, intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate level.[11]

3.3 The explanatory framework

As already said, the research question of this thesis revolves around what determines the ideological differentiation internal to a given party family from an economic left-right viewpoint. To this end, intrafamily ideological differentiation was defined as the situation in which parties belonging to the same party family in a specific spatial-temporal context adopt different economic left-right positions. These internal distances might have different sizes in different moments, and they are especially puzzling when relatively large, as the fundamental component of party families' very definition is their ideological homogeneity (e.g., Mair and Mudde 1998). Understanding the determinants of the variation in this phenomenon, then, requires in turn understanding which factors lead parties to move

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[11] In other words, we would assume that all else equal, there should be no theoretical reason why social democratic parties, or parties from any party family more generally, should adopt different ideological positions if there are no case-specific differences in the determinants of such positions.

further to the economic left and right, hence contributing to the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation once the positions of individual formations are considered from an aggregate viewpoint.

Based on theoretical sources, I hence develop an explanatory framework built upon several features of the different national contexts in which parties are embedded, which – as mentioned in Chapter 2 – may determine different economic left-right party positions. The explanatory framework discerns the causal order between the different determinants of parties' economic left-right positions by dividing them into two blocs: longer-term, or more causally distal, factors; and shorter-term, or more causally proximal, factors. In turn, for both blocs, two further subdivisions will be presented with regard to the nature of each determinant: political and economic. These determinants will now be discussed in detail and hypotheses will be generated for each of them.

3.3.1 Longer-term political determinants

The first bloc of potential determinants of parties economic left-right positions and, consequently, the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation is constituted by longer-term and more causally distal political factors. I start with the systemic electoral characteristics that serve as the institutional backdrop of party competition. Usually long-standing and rather stable over time, these factors can be subsumed under the broad definition of electoral systems. As per Rae's (1967) classical definition, an electoral system is the 'set of rules governing the process through which preferences are translated into votes and votes are translated into seats'. Electoral systems are often identified through one of their key components, that is electoral formulas, of which two broad categories can be identified: majoritarian and proportional. It follows that usually electoral systems vary between the majoritarian and proportional representation (henceforth, PR) ideal-types, with mixed electoral systems combining various features of the two also being possible (for an overview, see Norris 1997; Massicotte and Blaise 1999). Without going into the specific characteristics and workings of the different types of electoral systems, which are beyond the scope of this review, in general the tradeoff

between the majoritarian and PR types is between the two key principles of governability and representation (e.g., Norris 1997). That is, majoritarian electoral systems favour governability over representation, most often by employing single-member districts in which only one representative is elected over one (plurality) or two rounds (majority). By doing so, majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce rather stable single-party majorities that can, therefore, lead to a relatively strong executive. Conversely, this is likely to lead to a sizeable dispersion of votes both at the constituency and aggregate level, with smaller and minority parties penalised unless they are rather concentrated from a territorial viewpoint (e.g., Calvo 2009). On the other hand, PR systems favour representation over governability insofar as they allocate the multiple seats of multi-member districts in a way that is proportional to the votes received by the parties, or at least approximates such proportionality.[12] This mostly results in a higher degree of proportionality in terms of elected representatives, which may however lead to coalitional and less stable governments (e.g., Quade 1991).[13]

For the purposes of this thesis, what matters is how the institutional backdrop of party competition influences the positioning of formations partaking in electoral contests. In this regard, the effects of electoral systems on party left-right positions have been amply investigated in the literature. Generally speaking, there is a generalised consensus in the literature, with existing contributions coming to two complementary conclusions. First, majoritarian electoral systems tend to favour more moderate (e.g., centrist, meaning relatively right-wing for mainstream left parties) left-right economic positions. Second, PR systems are instead conducive to exacerbating left-right economic positions, meaning that left-wing parties such as social democratic formations will generally be more on the left in economic terms. Moreover, it must be pointed out that whilst most empirical evidence goes in the direction of electoral systems having an impact on party left-right economic positions, a smaller

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[12] The degree of proportionality achieved in reality by PR systems mostly depends on two components: district magnitude and the presence or absence of electoral thresholds for accessing parliament (e.g., Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Cox 1997; Lijphart 1999; Merrill and Adams 2007).
[13] Yet, there is no definitive agreement on this point. For instance, Lijphart (1991, 45) describes Quade's (1991) account of coalition governments as less responsible and accountable than one-party governments as only applying to perhaps 'few exceptional cases like Israel' and overall a 'grossly overgrown caricature' (sic) that is not supported by empirical evidence.

number of works however argues that there is no meaningful relationship between these two factors. The following paragraphs will illustrate all such viewpoints in greater detail, focussing on the specific arguments and mechanisms highlighted by the existing contributions, to then derive the related hypothesis to be subsequently employed in the empirical analysis.

To start with, most existing contributions concur that majoritarian electoral systems generally lead to more moderate party positions (e.g., Sartori 1976; Dow 2001). This, for left-wing formations such as social democratic parties, should translate into centrist, i.e. relatively right-wing, economic positions. Indeed, majoritarian electoral systems foster more compact ideological spaces in party competition across democratic states worldwide, with formations clustering closer to the centre of issue dimensions within the electoral space (Dow 2011). Such a proposition has been relatively common knowledge in political science ever since Downs (1957) first posited convergence towards the median voter in two-party plurality systems (e.g., Calvo and Hellwig 2011, 27). This is because of the 'winner takes all' nature of such systems, which push vote-seeking parties to compete over a smaller portion of voters, generally through a 'Downsian' convergence towards the centrist median voter in relatively normal distributions (Ezrow 2011). Specifically, evidence shows how convergence is favoured by key characteristics of majoritarian electoral systems such as smaller district magnitude (Cox 1990). The relationship linking higher electoral rules' disproportionality to ideological moderation has also been confirmed in formal models, which also show how a lower number of parties, i.e. a typical feature of majoritarian systems (e.g., Duverger 1954), favour convergence to the centre (Matakos, Troumpounis, and Xefteris 2016). Yet, other elements, more specifically related to the characteristics of the competing parties themselves, can be brought into the picture. Indeed, for instance, Calvo and Hellwig (2011) argue that only larger parties, such as social democratic formations, move towards the ideological centre as a consequence of majoritarian electoral rules, which tend to favour them vis-à-vis smaller competitors. Moreover, left-wing parties specifically will have an incentive to move to the economic right in the face of economic hardships, and specifically rising income inequality, in majoritarian systems, as they are bound to endogenous commitments towards the policy outcomes

preferred by the electorally decisive middle class (Becher 2016). Finally, by focussing on intraparty dynamics, Ceron (2013) shows how majoritarian electoral systems lower the payoffs for internal factions to break away from the party and hence deter them to do so. Consequently, this favours the existence of larger, more ideologically incoherent and diversified big-tent parties, which will tend to have a less defined programmatic profile and will thus have to strike a balance between different components, resulting in more blurred party positions.

The other side of the coin is represented by PR systems favouring more clearly defined ideological positions, which means being more left-wing economically for social democratic parties. Such electoral systems have been shown to be conducive to the dispersion of party positions (Dow 2011), i.e. to parties and candidates locating themselves further away from the centre of the voter distribution than in majoritarian contexts (Dow 2001). It follows, in terms of constituency size, that divergence is usually recorded in multi-member districts (e.g., Cox 1990; Catalinac 2018). Budge (1994) also underlines that, in times of evolving ideological configurations, PR systems are conducive to divergence because parties will be in the position of having and maintaining their niches, hence encouraging them to keep well-defined programmatic profiles. This is because in most proportional contexts even smaller parties will be able to partake in coalition or even policy formation once they have elected representatives: therefore, such formations too can make an impact on policy, and this in turn further incentivises policy-seeking behaviour. Another important consideration relates to 'Duverger's law' (1954), which posits that PR systems will lead to multipartyism: in other words, a greater number of parties than in majoritarian contexts. In turn, this has been shown to generally lead to a higher degree of policy dispersion (Andrews and Money 2009), also in line with what has been posited by classical spatial theory in contexts of multimodal voter distributions (Downs 1957). All these elements point to PR systems being conducive to more left-wing economic positions of social democratic parties compared to majoritarian alternatives.

It must be highlighted that a smaller number of contributions take a different view on this matter, arguing that electoral systems have little to no effect on party positions. In this regard, central is the

work by Ezrow (2008), which performs an empirical test of the illustrated propositions and finds that there is no association between positional divergence from the centre and neither electoral system proportionality, nor the number of parties. Budge and McDonald (2006), instead, have a more moderate take. Indeed, they argue that whilst PR and majoritarian systems do, in general, have the illustrated effects on party positions, they do so to varying extents, with notable exceptions, and they are not amongst the decisive factors that shape the parties' programmatic platforms, especially if compared to strategic considerations and the path-dependency deriving from previous policy choices. Overall, however, these contributions are far outnumbered from the analogous works and related empirical evidence showing how electoral systems do impact the positions taken by parties when competing electorally.

To sum up, in light of the presented review of the literature on the effects of electoral systems on party positions, it is possible to derive the hypothesis related to the first bloc of factors within the explanatory framework behind parties' economic positioning and intrafamily ideological differentiation. Specifically, it was shown how, generally speaking, majoritarian electoral systems favour ideological moderation and convergence to the centre, whilst the opposite applies to PR systems, which are conducive to greater ideological differentiation and positional dispersion within party systems. Consequently, when these prescriptions are applied specifically to social democratic parties, it should be possible to expect that majoritarian electoral systems will lead to more right-wing economic positions, whereas PR systems will lead to more left-wing economic positions. Hence, the following hypothesis can be derived:

Hp. 1: If the electoral system is majoritarian (proportional), the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more right-wing (left-wing).

Additional longer-term political determinants are related to a key force impacting the policy proposals of political formations across the world and, in particular, the West in recent decades: globalisation.

This phenomenon, which has shaped the contemporary world as we know it, is broadly defined as the increase in international interconnectedness and interdependence. Most often associated with economic aspects, globalisation is however a multidimensional concept (van der Bly 2005, Zajda and Rust 2021), of which chiefly three aspects can be measured: economic, political and socio-cultural (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019). Given the relevance and pervasiveness of this phenomenon, scholars have amply investigated the impact of globalisation on party positions, albeit almost exclusively focussing on its economic variant. A partial exception can be found in the analysed Western European context, where attention was also devoted to a particular and especially important form of political globalisation in Europeanisation: that is, the different levels of integration within the institutional framework of the European Union (EU) and its impact on Member States and especially their domestic politics (e.g., Laffan 2014).

More specifically, political globalisation means the embedment of states in international organisations (IOs) and other supranational institutions through signing international treaties and agreements, which have the goal of providing regulatory frameworks for interactions that are mostly economic in nature. Hence, it is possible to say political globalisation sets the rules for economic globalisation: key examples of this are IOs such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organisation (WTO), but also economic frameworks such as the Eurozone set by broader supranational institutions such as the EU.

The specific impact of political globalisation on party positions has been rather underexplored by the literature, which as mentioned focussed on the economic variant of this phenomenon; with systematic investigations hard to come by. Yet, this matter is of fundamental importance, as the loss of national control over specific policy areas deriving from political forms of globalisation, including the economy, may have fundamental consequences on the programmatic platforms of parties and, thus, the functioning of the 'party government' model (Katz 1986, 1987; Mair 2008[a]). The case for this is eloquently made by Ward and colleagues, both for what concerns political globalisation and the

particular form of Europeanisation (2015, 1231): 'Such "loss of control" is particularly explicit in the context of European integration (often referred to as an "intense case of globalization"; Haupt, 2010; McNamara, 2003; Notermans, 2001; Scharpf, 2002). […] Both the "neoliberal pressures of open economy" (Haupt, 2010, p. 7) and the constraints set by supranational bodies such as the EU (but also the International Monetary Fund [IMF], Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], the World Bank, etc.) are further argued to lead to the convergence of party positions on the economic dimension (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Steiner & Martin, 2012)'. Hence, the explicit separation between economic and political globalisation will be one of the key contributions of this thesis and its investigation, both from a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint.

There seems to be a generalised consensus about the impact of political globalisation on party positions amongst the few accounts that focus on it. That is, political globalisation is generally expected to move parties' economic proposals further to the right (e.g., Fairclough 2000; Plevnik 2003). The mechanism operating in this context relates to the 'responsibility versus responsiveness' (RR) dilemma (e.g., Mair 2008[a], 2009, 2013; Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel 2014[a], 2014[b]). That is, once increasing their degree of political globalisation, i.e. of membership in IOs or other supranational institutions or transnational networks through signing the related treaties, national governments will have obligations towards international partners that will constrain their policy-making capacities, in turn impacting the economic positions of parties with legitimate government aspirations (e.g., Karremans and Damhuis 2020; Romeijn 2020). In particular, political globalisation will entail conforming to the prescriptions of the hegemonic neoliberal policy paradigm (e.g., Cerny 2010), which are promoted by several important international actors. Indeed, research shows how this applies to membership in and obligations towards the IMF (e.g., Lami 2014) and in the OECD (e.g., Davis 2016), which curtail the scope for policy alternatives by partisan governments (Huber and Stephens 2001; Steiner and Martin 2012). Hence, despite the relative lack of resources concerning the impact on party positions of specifically political forms of globalisation, to guide a more systematic analysis that can contribute to this strand of literature, it seems possible to derive the

following hypothesis: the more a country is politically globalised, the more right-wing the economic positions of parties, hence including social democratic formations.

Hp. 2: The more politically globalised the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.

A more specific form of political globalisation that applies to the analysed Western European context is Europeanisation. As per above, this is intended as the progressive integration of states within the institutional framework of the EU and its consequences on domestic politics in particular (e.g., Laffan 2014). Seen in this light, Europeanisation can vary in its extent: for instance, even just the prospect of EU membership and the accession process has been shown to have a significant impact on domestic politics, especially in Eastern and South-Eastern European countries (e.g., Vachudova 2001, 2008; Spendzharova 2003; Renner and Trauner 2009). Moreover, some countries are for instance Member States of the EU whilst not belonging to the European Monetary Union (of which the final stage is adopting the single currency in the Euro and, hence, being a member of the Eurozone), whereas others are members of both. Finally, there are countries across the continent and even its Western parts that are not members of either the EU or Eurozone. It follows that these different levels of Europeanisation have different obligations on national governments and, consequently, on domestic politics, as accessing the EU means complying with the *acquis communautaire* established by the Treaties (e.g., Rose 2014), with additional and often rather demanding commitments deriving from membership in the Eurozone (e.g., Laffan 2014), which should push parties' economic positions further to the right. The impact of Europeanisation on party positions has attracted great scholarly interest. In this regard, there seems to be once more a situation of generalised consensus, whereby greater Europeanisation leads to more right-wing economic positions (e.g., Bernhard 2004; Nanou and Dorussen 2004; Mair 2008[b]; Kriesi et al. 2008). For a start, Vachudova (2008) demonstrates how party systems in candidate states follow a typical pattern of transformation during the accession process. This sees all

parties shifting their platforms in ways that are more compatible with the EU agenda and mainstream formations in particular, including social democrats, moving more to the economic right. Evidence also points to Europeanisation leading parties to tone down their ideological connotations (e.g., Bomberg 2002), which means more right-wing economic positions and convergence towards the centre of this issue dimension for left-wing parties such as social democrats (Johansson and Raunio 2001). In this regard, scholars argue that Europeanisation concurs to convergence towards the economic centre alongside economic globalisation in particular, by constraining the ability of parties to credibly differentiate themselves on economic matters: specifically, both factors lead all parties to blur their positions along this issue dimension by putting greater salience (Budge and Farlie 1983) on other issues (Ward et al. 2015).

In sum, party competition on issues such as the economy results restricted by EU membership (Hix 2003), with mainstream parties converging and hence becoming more promiscuous from an ideological viewpoint (Mair 2000). Moreover, not only has this constraining effect been shown to be stronger in policy areas that fall under the EU's remit such as monetary policy, but it also exerts the strongest influence on larger mainstream pro-EU formations (Dorussen and Nanou 2006; Nanou and Dorussen 2013). This means that EU membership should especially affect the economic positions of social democratic parties, with an expectation for formations in Member States to be considerably more to the economic right than those in non-Member States. Such considerations are reinforced even further when considering an additional step in the EU integration process, which goes beyond simple membership. This is being part of the Eurozone (e.g., Bernhard 2004; Laffan 2014), which of itself is devised according to neoliberal policy principles and requires adherence to these through additional economic regulations (Maatsch 2014). Indeed, over time the EU integration process has been tied so closely with economic integration that even social democratic parties, traditionally sceptical about such measures, have progressively become supportive of the Eurozone, signifying their right-wing shift to the economic centre in the name of the EU (e.g., Johansson and Raunio 2001). Overall, the relevant literature seems to point to a clear conclusion: the further embedded a country is within the

process of EU integration, which ranges from not being an EU Member State, to being an EU Member State, to also being a member of the Eurozone, the more to the right the economic positions of parties and especially social democratic formations. This allows formulating the following hypothesis:

Hp. 3: The more Europeanised the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.

3.3.2 Longer-term economic determinants

The longer-term economic determinant of parties' economic left-right positions analysed here is economic globalisation. It follows from the previous definition that, from a theoretical viewpoint, economic globalisation consists of the increasing interdependence and interconnectedness of countries worldwide in trade and financial terms. Differently from political forms of globalisation, the economic aspects of this phenomenon have been investigated by a vast literature, which also focussed at length on the consequences for party positions. Specifically on this point, matters are far from adjudicated by the many existing contributions. That is, whilst numerous works contend that economic globalisation pushed the economic positions of parties further to the right, several others make the opposite argument and posit that parties move further to the economic left in the face of increasing economic globalisation – especially social democratic formations. Therefore, a key contribution of this thesis will be seeking an empirical contribution to this argument, to test which between the 'efficiency' and 'compensation' theses prevails (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016).

To start with, several works argue that as a consequence of rising economic globalisation, political parties have been forced to move their positions further to the economic right: i.e., towards neoliberal and free-market economic policies (e.g., Rodrik 1997; Iversen 1999; Milner and Judkins 2004; Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny 2005; Hellwig 2016). This corresponds to the 'efficiency' thesis (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016). Some argue that this is especially true for mainstream

centre-left parties, which have moved rightwards from their original positions towards the economic centre because of these processes (Lachat and Kriesi 2007).[14] Hence, similarly to the illustrated political forms of globalisation, economic globalisation also result in a restriction of party competition over fundamental issues such as, indeed, the economy, lowering polarisation and dispersion along such dimensions of contestation (e.g., Steiner and Martin 2012). As parties are forced to gravitate towards neoliberal economic positions, this entails diminished responsiveness (see Mair 2009) to median voter shifts (e.g., Ezrow and Hellwig 2014). Once more, this applies in particular to social democracy, which will either adopt economic right positions in the face of a median voter positioned to the economic right or move away from an economically left-wing electorate if faced with economic globalisation (Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen 2011).

More generally, a number of mechanisms lie behind this generalised movement of party positions towards neoliberal policies as a result of economic globalisation. Firstly, as already illustrated, economic globalisation is at least in part a by-product of political globalisation. Indeed, it was shown that membership in IOs such as for instance the IMF, WB and comparable entities is conducive to a greater degree of economic globalisation by means of greater trade openness, hence influencing parties' economic positions in this direction (e.g., Chang and Lee 2012). This has several implications for specific policy domains (for a review, see Ward et al. 2015), such as for instance less taxation and greater freedom for corporations (e.g., Ganghof 2006; Plümper, Troeger and Winner 2009) by means of lower regulation levels (e.g., Wilson and Wildasin 2004). Furthermore, economic globalisation has an especially important impact on the flagship policy domain traditionally owned (Petrocik 1996) by social democracy: that is, the welfare state. Indeed, it was demonstrated that, in the so-called 'race to the bottom', greater globalisation corresponds to a general lowering of welfare standards by means of greater opposition to traditional, large and resource-intensive welfare state models, seen as incompatible with globalised economic dynamics (e.g. Kurzer 1993; Strange 1996; Ross 2000; Piazza

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[14] A comparable argument is made by Lacewell (2017), who argues that social democratic parties will obscure the contents of their manifestos because of rising economic globalisation, hence moving rightwards from their traditional economic positions, but only in the case of radical right competitors being present.

2001; Sinn 2002; Hellwig and Samuels 2007). In sum, several works highlight how the impact of economic globalisation on parties' economic positions is very pervasive, forcing a generalised rightwards movement in several ways.

However, numerous other contributions come to the opposite conclusion, arguing that greater economic globalisation will lead parties to move further to the economic left: this corresponds to the so-called 'compensation' thesis (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016). That is, political formations will compensate for such processes by adopting more left-wing economic positions to protect the welfare state through reinforcing it (e.g., Boix 1998; Garrett 1998; Swank 2002). Whilst this seems to apply to all parties, it does so even more for social democracy. Indeed, as Western European social democrats understand the threat posed by economic globalisation to the national welfare systems that they built over the decades, they will particularly focus on this matter, also in light of their traditional constituency and programmatic outlook (Burgoon 2012). Some go even further, by claiming that economic globalisation does indeed produce a convergence of parties' economic positions, but to the left rather than to the right (Adam and Ftergioti 2019; Sen and Barry 2020).[15] Specifically, this is because these processes also produce issues such as greater income volatility (e.g., Rodrik 1998), making economic left positions more popular amongst voters (Walter 2010): hence, this will incentivise all parties to compensate for such economic and social repercussions. Moreover, left-wing parties in particular are further constrained by national structures that pressure them into resisting globalising pressures, such as for instance welfare states and trade unions (e.g., Pierson P. 1994; Pierson C. 2001): hence, further complicating and increasing the costs of economic rightwards movements. Therefore, works within the 'compensation' thesis point towards an opposite effect of economic globalisation on parties' economic position compared to the 'efficiency' strand, indicating that political formations and especially social democracy may have reasons to move further to the economic left in response to an increase in such processes.

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[15] Yet, Sen and Barry (2020) specify that the degree to which left-wing parties will move further to the economic left in the face of greater economic globalisation will vary across different national contexts and their specificities.

Lastly, it must be reported that other empirical investigations have come to mixed or inconclusive results. Indeed, Adam and Kammas (2007) demonstrate how economic globalisation has both 'efficiency' and 'compensation' effects on OECD countries' fiscal policies, that is taxation and public spending. More specifically, greater economic globalisation equates to higher taxes on labour and lower taxes on capital, hence an 'efficiency' effect, jointly with a typical 'compensation' effect such as the consequent increase in social spending. Moreover, Rohlfing and Schäffoner (2019) find that, over time, economic globalisation has varying effects on party positions, which are generally stronger between the mid-1980s and late-1990s compared to the 2000s and, especially, the 1970s-to-mid-1980s period, when no effect at all was found.

However, overall, the above review illustrates how the vast majority of contributions and empirical evidence can be subsumed under two coherent but opposite scenarios. The former follows the 'efficiency' thesis and argues that greater economic globalisation corresponds to parties' economic positions being further to the right, whilst the opposite leftwards movement in the face of greater economic globalisation is posited within the 'compensation' strand. Whilst both are hence plausible, I will adopt as a working hypothesis the more 'mainstream' and widely accepted viewpoint of economic globalisation and increasing economic interconnectedness pushing parties' economic positions further to the right, constraining their economic policy options through the stimuli towards greater economic openness and more free-market oriented stances.

Hp. 4: The more economically globalised the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.

3.3.3 Shorter-term political determinants

I now move to shorter-term and more causally proximal determinants of parties' economic left-right positions, starting with election-specific factors. Indeed, a large number of immediate considerations that are political in nature shape the strategic considerations of parties when determining how to

contest an election in programmatic terms. Accordingly, scholars have covered, to varying extents, the impact of several such factors on the economic left-right stances of political formations. Before presenting the contributions on the determinants that will be included in the empirical analysis and deriving the related expectations, a preliminary step makes itself necessary. Indeed, shorter-term political factors other than the ones considered that have also been deemed as having an impact on parties' economic positions must be acknowledged. These are voters' competence evaluation of social democratic parties (e.g., Adams and Ezrow 2009, Adams and Merrill 2009) within valence politics frameworks (Stokes 1963); median voter positioning (e.g., Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen 2011); the issue yields of different economic left-right positions (e.g., De Sio and Weber 2014); the balance of power within a party (e.g., Ceron 2012), i.e. whether it is more leader- or activist-dominated (e.g., May 1973; Marx and Schumacher 2013; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013; van Heck 2016); the composition of a party's electoral constituency (e.g., Roemer 1999) and the socio-economic backgrounds of its elected representatives (e.g., O'Grady 2019); the perceptual disagreement amongst voters concerning a party's left-right positioning (Somer-Topcu 2015); the organisational feature of party size (e.g., Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2016); and whether a party contests elections by entering a coalition (e.g., Coffé and Da Roit 2011; Adams, Ezrow, and Leiter 2012; Greene and Haber 2017). However, these are not included in the present analysis due to data-related issues, such as information missing entirely (e.g., for social democratic parties' competence evaluation, median voter location specifically on economic left-right issues and the related issue yields), not covering large parts of this thesis' spatial-temporal framework (e.g., for the composition of social democratic parties' electoral constituency, socio-economic background of elected representatives and perceptual disagreement amongst voters), or not varying enough (e.g., for social democratic parties' coalitional strategies and party size).

Conversely, it was possible to select and consider some crucial shorter-term political factors that have an important impact on parties' economic left-right positioning when contesting an election. These are the electoral performance of radical left and right competitors; the governmental or opposition

status of social democratic parties; and, finally, the internal party dynamics related to its coherence from an ideological, economic left-right viewpoint, and in particular the role played by its dominant faction. As a key contribution, in this thesis I will provide a thorough, comparative and longitudinal empirical investigation concerning the impact of these several political factors on parties' economic left-right position, adding to the existing and at times numerically scarce evidence in the literature. Moreover, it will not only limit itself to inter-party competition, but it will also focus on the fundamental, albeit often neglected, aspect of intraparty competition, by looking at party factions. This seems especially important when dealing with contemporary Western European social democratic parties, being these large, composite and quite diversified political formations (e.g., Bale et al. 2010), at the very least since the Third Way (e.g., Giddens 1998), in which internal dynamics hence become central.

Starting with inter-party competition dynamics within a party system, an important related consideration is constituted by the performance of radical left and right competitors. Indeed, the literature shows how the presence of electorally competitive such formations has an impact on the positions of mainstream counterparts, especially social democratic parties (e.g., Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010). Radical left parties (henceforth, RLPs) are competitors to the left of social democracy that originate from the decisive rejection of contemporary capitalism whilst more strongly advocating traditional economic left stances (e.g., March 2011; Lourenço 2021), and moved over time towards a more post-communist and at times postmaterialist profile (e.g., March and Mudde 2005; March 2011). Instead, radical right parties (henceforth, RRPs) can vary in their programmatic profiles, specifically along the economic dimension. Indeed, whilst they consistently promote authoritarian (e.g., Flanagan and Lee 2003) cultural stances, RRPs can couple such positions with either right-wing or relatively left-of-centre economic stances (e.g., de Lange 2007; Ivaldi 2015; Hillen and Steiner 2020; Wahl 2020).

Existing scholarly contributions provide mixed evidence as to the effect of the electoral presence and performance of such formations on the economic positions of mainstream competitors and

particularly social democratic parties. Yet, most argue that, if competitive, both types of radical parties push parties' economic positions further to the left, through different mechanisms. As to radical competitors and mainstream parties in general, it has been shown that the latter will adjust their policy positions based on those of the former if they constitute an electoral threat (e.g., Meguid 2005; Dilling 2018). In this regard, it has been empirically shown how more leftist competitors such as RLPs are especially impactful on social democratic economic positions, because parties tend to respond to other members of their (in this case, leftist) 'ideological family' (e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). Similar outcomes occur when competitive RRPs are successfully contending elections. Indeed, the presence and electoral relevance of such radical right competitors is especially influential for social democratic parties, pushing them towards a general recalibration of their economic platform through a greater emphasis on the welfare state and diminished support for free-market economics (e.g., Salo and Rydgren 2018; Krause 2020; Krause and Giebler 2020). In doing so, social democratic formations might be reacting to the channelling of economic discontent on the part of some RRPs (Angelucci and De Sio 2021) that have catered to the so-called 'losers of globalisation' (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2008) also along this issue dimension, as the mainstream left progressively moved to the economic centre during and after the Third Way.

The remaining contributions come to more differentiated conclusions on these matters. Some argue that the presence of competitive RLPs is conducive to a rightwards movement towards the economic centre by social democratic parties (e.g., Schumacher and Vis 2012). Others make the same argument with regard to RRPs, which lead social democrats to obscure their positions along this issue dimension and specifically so in contexts of high economic globalisation (Lacewell 2017). However, other evidence would seem to suggest that the moderating effect of radical competitors, specifically RRPs, on parties' economic positions might be indirect at best, that is due to a recalibration of emphasis within and towards the cultural dimension (e.g., Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020), hence leading to the diminished salience and polarisation of the economic conflict if a saliency theory perspective (Budge and Farlie 1983) is adopted. Moreover, according to some RLPs have

differentiated effects on social democratic economic positions, depending on the specific national and party system context, especially in post-crisis Western Europe (e.g., Balampanidis et al. 2021). Therefore, despite some accounts that report mixed or inconclusive evidence, the bulk of the literature seems to point to the electoral competitiveness of radical competitors, both left and right, being conducive to a leftwards recalibration of social democratic economic positions, hence allowing to formulate the following hypotheses:

Hp. 5a: If at least one competitive RLP is contesting an election, the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more left-wing.

Hp. 5b: If at least one competitive RRP is contesting an election, the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more left-wing.

It is subsequently necessary to consider a key aspect related to the executive sphere, the governmental status of a party: that is, whether that formation is in government or in the opposition during a given election campaign. Once again, as the 'responsibility' side of the RR dilemma particularly involves those parties that lead or partake in national executives, it looks as the more embedded a party is within the governmental arena, the more its economic positions will be constrained and moderate, hence converging towards centre-right stances. Conversely, the opposite argument also seems to emerge. That is, opposition parties will be incentivised to further clarify (e.g., Rovny 2012) their economic position, meaning that left-wing formations will adopt even more left-wing stances. Indeed, van Heck (2016) demonstrates that, in general, mainstream parties with government participation experience will seek to cover as many issues as possible in their party manifestos to broaden their electoral appeal, whilst opposition parties will only focus on a selected few issues.[16] This means that,

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[16] Additionally, van Heck (2016) shows how this office-seeking versus policy-seeking contraposition in the formulation of party policy platforms is also reproduced at the intraparty level: that is, if a party is more dominated by its leaders, it will follow the former type of incentive, whilst the opposite applies to situations where activists are more relevant.

for instance within a saliency theory framework (Budge and Farlie 1983) such as the one adopted by the main source of data on parties' programmatic positions, i.e. the Manifesto Project (MARPOR) (Volkens et al. 2021), greater emphasis on a large number of matters will generally moderate party positions along the several issue dimension covered, whilst focussing on fewer matters allows for greater positional clarity. Other contributions show how government parties within the European Union are usually supportive of EU policy, meaning a general alignment towards centre-right economic positions (e.g., Wendler 2013; Closa and Maatsch 2014). The key contraposition between government and opposition status is essential also in times of crisis that demand fiscal retrenchment, with government parties shown to be more supportive of austerity policies and opposition formations more opposed to them (e.g., Maatsch 2014; Karyotis, Rüdig, and Judge 2014). Indeed, opposition parties are shown to be against such measures even in creditor countries such as Germany (e.g., Wonka 2016). Finally, some accounts about the effects of government status on parties' economic positions are rather mixed and argue that this impact depends on the state of national economies, with formations in government further moderating or exacerbating their traditional economic stances when robust economic growth is, respectively, missing or present (Hellwig 2012; Greene 2016). By doing so, government parties can dilute their responsibility when the economy is not performing at its best, whilst in the opposite situation they can claim their credit vis-à-vis the voters by further accentuating their usual economic positions. Yet, a clear picture seems to be emerging from this review: generally speaking, in light of the above mechanisms, the effect of government participation should lead social democratic parties to moderate their economic positions, hence leading them to move rightwards along the economic issue dimension; conversely, the opposition status should lead them to exacerbate their traditional economic stances, equating to a leftwards movement. Hence, the related hypothesis is as follows:

Hp. 6: If it is in government (in opposition), the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more right-wing (left-wing).

Lastly, after looking at factors related to interparty competition, i.e. between parties, in the electoral and executive arenas, I will also analyse intraparty dynamics, i.e. competition *within* parties and hence internal to social democratic formations. I will do so by focussing on factions and how these shape the programmatic profile put forward in electoral campaigns. The empirical investigation of this fundamental, albeit often overlooked aspect will constitute a key contribution of this thesis. Indeed, party factions have been analysed extensively (e.g., Boucek 2009; Ceron 2015, 2016) and are considered fundamental for several aspects of party politics, such as for instance government portfolios' allocation (Kam et al. 2010, Ceron 2014). In this regard, relevant contributions point to a potentially important role of dominant factions in shaping programmatic outlooks (e.g., Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003; Medzihorsky, Littvay, and Jenne 2014). Yet, empirical evidence corroborating this expectation is currently very scarce. As a consequence, given the assumption that internal conflict between factions might alter party left-right positions is to be coupled with the necessity to move away from conceiving parties and social democrats in particular as unitary actors, original research on this matter becomes particularly important (Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald 2010; Fagerholm 2016; Steiner and Mader 2019).

Substantively, this aspect seems especially relevant for contemporary Western European social democratic parties. Indeed, in this region, these mainstream left formations aggregate a diverse set of interests and political traditions, the most relevant contraposition being between traditional leftist working-class stances and the more contemporary, middle-class 'new politics' agenda (e.g., Poguntke 1987; Müller-Rommel 1989). This often resulted in generally large and internally differentiated parties (e.g., Koelble 1987; Bale et al. 2010; Jahn and Oberst 2012; Rathgeb and Wolkenstein 2022), perhaps most prominently epitomised by the genesis of the Italian *Partito Democratico* in the 2000s as a merger of the post-communist, democratic socialist *Democratici di Sinistra* and the Christian-left, social liberal *La Margherita* (e.g., Bordandini, Di Virgilio, and Raniolo 2008).

Generally speaking, existing works that assess the impact of factions on parties' programmatic outlook only do so indirectly. For instance, some look at the numerical criterion, arguing that a greater number of groups internal to a party will lead to greater ideological blurring and, by extension, to more centrist economic positions (Köllner and Basedau 2005). A comparable substantive conclusion can be inferred by Ceron's (2013) work on electoral systems and factions, in which it is demonstrated how majoritarian systems imply a greater number of groups internal to the party because of the disincentives to break away; hence, implying more catch-all and blurred positions. Similarly, Dewan and Squintani (2016) model that factionalism is conducive to both substantially influencing party manifestos and favouring ideological moderation. Others focus on intraparty ideological heterogeneity and demonstrate how greater ideological differences between factions along an issue dimension, for instance the economic left-right conflict, will lead to a decrease of party emphasis on that issue dimension (Steiner and Mader 2019), equating to more centrist positions within a saliency theory framework (Budge and Farlie 1983).

However, these differentiated theoretical contributions are usually very limited in their spatial (e.g., Debus and Bräuninger 2009; Giannetti and Laver 2009; Spirling and Quinn 2010; Ceron 2012; Schumacher et al. 2019) and temporal coverage, due to the difficulties in finding extensive data on the numerical and ideological nature of factions across Western European party systems (e.g., Dewan and Squintani 2016; Steiner and Mader 2019). Moreover, by focussing on the illustrated aspects, most empirical evidence neglects the power struggle between the different actors internal to a single party, and – as shown – evidence regarding the direct impact of dominant factions and their ideological profile on parties' programmatic platforms is currently missing. Therefore, on the basis of the reported indications emerging from the relevant literature, I will specifically try and assess this relationship, moving from the following hypothesis. That is, it will be expected that social democratic parties' economic positions will mirror those of their dominant faction: meaning that the more to the left the economic stances of this actor, the more left-wing those of the party as a whole; and vice-versa.

Hp. 7: If the dominant faction is economically leftist (centrist), the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more left-wing (right-wing).

3.3.4 Shorter-term economic determinants

The review of the shorter-term determinants of parties' economic left-right positions that are of interest to this thesis concludes with a fundamental factor that is economic in nature: the sovereign debt of a country. This is an especially important aspect for the timeframe under consideration (1990-2019), given that from 2009 onwards the large-scale European sovereign debt crisis unfolded, involving many countries within the Eurozone (e.g., Lane 2012). Yet, despite the relevance of this economic aspect, the impact of different national debt levels on party positions has been largely neglected by the literature, with very few studies providing empirical analyses on this matter. Further, such investigations provide mixed results and can be divided into two groups.

On the one hand, some works argue that higher levels of national sovereign debt have pushed parties' economic positions further to the right. Indeed, research showed how the austerity measures imposed on debtor countries during the Eurozone crisis have generally forced mainstream parties in power, including social democratic formations, to further adhere to and promote fiscal retrenchment; albeit with greater difficulties where 'clientelistic linkages' funded through state resources constitute the core means through which to mobilise the electoral constituencies of such parties (e.g., Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2015). Moreover, Müller's (2009) empirical analysis found that higher levels of state debt in Germany led to more right-wing economic positions adopted by parties at the regional (e.g., Länder) level. To add to this, Bremer (2018) provides a differentiated picture, whereby whilst during the crisis years social democratic parties in particular have indeed moved to the economic right with regard to budgetary rigour and acceptance of austerity measures, at the same time they however shifted leftwards on economic liberalism and the socio-economic issue of welfare.

On the other hand, others made the opposite argument: that is, higher levels of sovereign debt are conducive to more economically left-wing party positions. For instance, Clift (2013) illustrates how during the 2012 French presidential election, François Hollande's Socialist Party (PS) stood for more left-wing economic policies especially in light of the rising debt levels in France. In their view, economic growth should have been prioritised precisely to reduce debt, hence rejecting strict budget rules and promoting redistribution through more progressive taxation. Salo and Rydgren (2018) showed how, in the name of the national interest as opposed to solidarity towards European states in greater financial difficulties, the Finnish social democrats (SPD) demanded more market regulation and higher taxes for the corporate sector in light of the debt crisis, hence moving further to the economic left. Moreover, the empirical investigation of Maatsch (2014) demonstrates how parties move to the left in support of Keynesian anti-crisis policies where the debt crisis is worse, as in these particular national contexts voters will be especially opposed to austerity measures. All these accounts are also compatible with other sources (e.g., Maatsch 2014; Wonka 2016) positing that, conversely, parties in creditor states will tend to move further to the economic right, to pursue the national economic interest over international solidarity and mirror the preferences of the respective national electorates.

Yet, the scarcity of empirical evidence specifically on the impact of different debt levels on parties' economic positions is evident, and even more so in terms of comparative and longitudinal investigations. Therefore, one of the key contributions of this thesis will be providing an original empirical analysis on this matter, covering several European countries over three decades. To guide this investigation, based on the presented literature and on the perspective positing high levels of debt as an 'external constraint' on parties' economic policy proposals and a situation to be amended through government policy that seeks to pursue the typically economic-right goal of debt reduction, I will test the following hypothesis:

Hp. 8: The higher the debt level of the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.

3.4 Additional potential determinants

I will now proceed to illustrate a number of additional and potential determinants of parties' economic left-right positions that also emerged, although to a lesser extent, from the literature and could be operationalised through available data. These are all shorter-term and, hence, more causally proximal factors, both political and economic in nature.

Starting from the former kind, parties in general, and hence social democratic formations, may first be influenced in their economic left-right positioning by the systemic movement of the entire party system along this issue dimension. That is, if the overall configuration of contestation on these matters changes between elections, and therefore on average all formations within a national party system move either leftwards or rightwards along the economic dimension, social democratic parties are also expected to mirror their movements and shift their economic positions further to the left or right. Although numerically scarce, existing empirical evidence seems to support this expectation, especially by employing the key concept of party systems' ideological 'centre of gravity' (e.g., Keman 1994; Rohlfing and Schäffoner 2019). Indeed, this rather underexplored (e.g., Gross and Sigelman 1984) aspect is defined as the mean party position of parties within a specific party system along a specific issue dimension, often the economic left-right. This ideological centre of gravity may determine the related positions towards which political parties are attracted. The ideological movement of competitors within a party system also influences the positioning of left-wing parties, which move rightwards when other formations move rightwards and vice-versa (e.g., Pontusson and Rueda 2010). Furthermore, particularly with regard to Western European social democratic parties since the 1990s, it was shown how such formations have moved towards the centre of gravity of the respective national party systems as a reaction to the emergence of new challengers (Keman and

Pennings 2006; Keman 2011). Hence, this determinant should be controlled for in the empirical analyses.

Similar considerations are related to government aspiration: that is, the realistic expectation that a party will be well-positioned to access the executive power when competing in elections. Indeed, the realistic prospect of accessing government should be amongst the considerations factored in by parties when shaping their programmatic platforms. In particular, the illustrated 'responsibility' dynamics (e.g., Mair 2008[a], 2009, 2013) regarding Western European executives put pressure on parties that will realistically control or partake in cabinets and shape their policies, effectively constraining their options. In this regard, existing contributions in the literature are virtually unanimous in asserting that parties with greater government aspiration should generally converge towards the centre of the economic dimension, hence meaning a rightwards movement for left-wing formations such as social democrats. For instance, Laffan (2014) illustrates how, ever since the great recession of the late 2000s, the external constraints imposed on domestic policy and politics across the Eurozone have been considerably increasing, with the introduction of even stricter economic regulatory frameworks such as the 'six pack', 'two pack' and Fiscal Compact. As a result, the set of economic policies amongst which national governments and parties can choose within the framework of domestic politics is increasingly constrained towards a centre-right, neoliberal profile, due to the increasing relevance of responsibility considerations. This is applicable even beyond the EU and Eurozone contexts, as King (1997) argues that international commitments and responsibility towards various actors are amongst the key factors pushing the programmatic platforms of American Democrats and Republicans further towards the centre. More generally, Schumacher et al. (2015) show that government aspiration leads parties to adopt a more overall centrist profile, even when levels of government aspiration are low to medium; with this effect increasing after a spell in office. Finally, by specifically focussing on Third Way social democracy, Keman (2011) argues that parties that are chiefly office-seeking and aim at government participation will scale down their ideological connotations. This means that to increase their attractiveness towards coalition partners and hence increase their coalitional potential, social

democrats will move rightwards and converge towards the centre on economic and welfare matters. In sum, this is another shorter-term political determinant of parties' economic left-right positions that should be controlled for.

It is also necessary to include, in these considerations, additional shorter-term factors that are economic in nature. One of these, very important in the later years of the analysed timeframe, is constituted by bailouts. These are financial assistance and recovery plans that, in the wake of the great recession, some countries needed to undertake. Essentially, to access financial resources and borrow enough to keep afloat their economies on the verge of bankruptcy, national governments had to commit with European institutions such as the European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), as well as with the IMF, to rebalance their budgets through austerity-inspired policies and carry out structural reforms. This situation of almost *force majeure* put immense pressure on party systems and political contestation over fundamental and mostly economic issues, with left- and right-wing mainstream parties all but bound to a very restricted set of neoliberal policies. Accordingly, most of the works analysing the impact of bailouts on parties' economic positions find, with few exceptions, a convergence towards such policy prescriptions, equating to a rightwards movement for left-of-centre formations along this issue dimensions. The existing empirical evidence particularly highlights the key role of conditionality in reducing the scope for alternative economic policies proposed by parties in countries undergoing bailouts. Indeed, as shown by Clements, Nanou, and Real-Dato's (2016) analysis, political formations turn to more economically right-wing positions in bailed-out countries, all else equal. This, in line with Ezrow and Hellwig (2014), is also especially true for parties in government: a consideration particularly pertinent to social democratic formations, which often access executives in Western Europe. Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos (2014) further confirm how bailouts constitute very strong external constraints that force parties to commit to severe austerity measures, hence impacting their economic positions. As noted by Karyotis, Rüdig, and Judge (2014), such pressures blurred the ideological lines of division between parties in bailed-out countries, leading left-of-centre formations such as for instance the Greek Panhellenic Socialist

Movement (PASOK) and Democratic Left (DIMAR) to defy expectations based on economic traditional left-right positioning and support retrenchment. Other works make the opposite argument, arguing instead that bailout programmes lead the economic positions of the related national parties to be more left-wing. For instance, Maatsch (2014) explains that formations in countries with weak economies will move further to the economic left as voters in such context strongly oppose austerity measures.[17] Furthermore, Kinski (2016) illustrated how, in the Irish case, members of parliament increasingly resorted to openly anti-austerity claims after the bailout, to protect citizens from such measures. However, the most convincing case as to the hypothesised mechanism linking bailouts to parties' economic positions, i.e. that of hard external constraints, conditionality and responsibility considerations, seems to be made by the former strand of works, which are also relatively more numerous despite the general scarcity of contributions.

Finally, a limited number of works specifically investigates the impact of traditional economic issues owned by the left on parties' economic positioning. More precisely, Müller (2009) shows how higher unemployment, taken as a proxy of an unfavourable socio-economic condition, is associated with more left-wing parties' economic positions. Other works, instead, look into the key aspect of economic inequality by looking at income distributions. Indeed, this is the key concern of the political left, as the transformation of societies in a more egalitarian direction has been defined as its historical mission (Bobbio 1997). The empirical evidence is more mixed on this front. In consonance with the above findings on unemployment, Pontusson and Rueda (2010) find that higher income inequality is associated with more left-wing economic positions of left parties, but only when electoral turnout is comparatively high. Moreover, this also seems to be the case in the US context, where higher income inequality leads to higher positional polarisation in economic terms (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Conversely, others make the opposite argument, finding that greater income inequality leads to more right-wing parties' economic positions. For instance, Fenzl (2018) points to a similar turnout-

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[17] Although, as noted by Salo and Rydgren (2018, 244), 'we know indeed that public opinion across European countries was firmly against the bailouts, but we also know governments executed the bailouts nevertheless'.

related mechanism: that is, it seems as in contexts of high income inequality the electoral participation of low-income voters, who would usually support more left-wing economic positions, decreases, leading left parties to strategically move further to the economic right. Moreover, Becher (2016) shows how left parties will have a strategic incentive to be responsive vis-à-vis the policy options preferred by the middle class and hence move to the right in the face of rising income inequality. However, this only occurs in contexts where there is a majoritarian electoral system, whilst it does not where PR is present. In sum, these shorter-term economic factors, too, will be controlled for.

To conclude, in this chapter I introduced the explanatory framework regarding the determinants of parties' economic positions at the individual (e.g., party) level and, hence, the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate (e.g., party-family) level. It did so by grouping the different blocs of determinants from social democratic parties' different national contexts in a conceptually meaningful fashion and ordering them in terms of causal distance from the analysed outcome; discussing the existing scholarly contributions on these factors; and generating the related hypotheses. It also introduced additional potential determinants derived from the relevant scholarships, which should be controlled for in the empirical analysis. Table 3.1 summarises the expectations that will guide the empirical analysis of this thesis.

Table 3.1. Explanatory framework and hypotheses.

	Longer-term political determinants
Hp. 1	If the electoral system is majoritarian (proportional), the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more right-wing (left-wing).
Hp. 2	The more politically globalised the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.
Hp. 3	The more Europeanised the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.
	Longer-term economic determinants
Hp. 4	The more economically globalised the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.
	Shorter-term political determinants
Hp. 5a	If at least one competitive RLP is contesting an election, the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more left-wing.
Hp. 5b	If at least one competitive RRP is contesting an election, the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more left-wing.
Hp. 6	If it is in government (in opposition), the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more right-wing (left-wing).
Hp. 7	If the dominant faction is economically leftist (centrist), the economic positions of the social democratic party will be more left-wing (right-wing).
	Shorter-term economic determinants
Hp. 8	The higher the debt level of the country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.

4. Research Design: How to Analyse Intrafamily Ideological Differentiation

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will introduce the research design of the thesis. By doing so, I will touch upon several points of substantive and methodological interest. Indeed, on the one hand, I will focus on relevant questions concerning the investigated phenomenon, that is intrafamily ideological differentiation, and the fundamental heuristics it rests upon: left-right semantics. On the other, I will introduce technical considerations surrounding essential research design choices, that ought to be properly contextualised and justified. On this basis, in this chapter I will proceed as follows: the following section will be dedicated to the research question addressed by this thesis: i.e., why do parties routinely classified as belonging to the same party family – hence supposedly sharing similar ideological positions (e.g., Mair and Mudde 1998) – and specifically social democratic formations differ, at times vastly, in their economic left-right positioning? Subsequently, I will reflect on the conceptualisation of what constitutes the foundation of the analysed *explanandum*: the semantics of left and right. These conceptual reflections will lead to the operationalisation of the dependent variable, which I will illustrate in detail. In the following section, I will elaborate upon key research design decisions concerning the space, time, and units of analysis of this thesis. Lastly, I will conclude by outlining the selected analytical strategy and methods, presenting and formalising the specification of the regression models as well as introducing the subsequent within-case analyses.

4.2 Research questions: intrafamily ideological differentiation and social democracy

According to the relevant literature, ideological consistency is one of the defining characteristics of party families as an analytical tool (Mair and Mudde 1998). As such, there is an expectation that formations classified as belonging to the same party family should share similar ideological positions despite the different national contexts and party systems in which they are embedded. Whilst,

actually, this is not always the case, with party families such as liberal and radical right formations showing considerable levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation (e.g., Ennser 2012; Carroll and Kubo 2019), there are contributions showing how this criterion seems to hold within Western European social democracy. Indeed, turning to this group, it is usually considered as being amongst the most internally homogeneous party families in terms of general left-right positioning (Camia and Caramani 2012) and numerous other policy issues (Ennser 2012). However, others disagree with this conclusion, indicating how heterogeneity in ideological positions can be observed specifically for Western European social democratic parties as well ever since the end of WW2 (e.g., Volkens and Klingemann 2002; Elff 2013); with parties in different national contexts moving in different directions along the left-right economic dimension in the same period, hence resulting in intrafamily ideological differentiation (Volkens 2004).

Indeed, there seem to be numerous reasons why the former viewpoint should be further challenged. To begin with, at times the ideological homogeneity of Western European social democracy is assessed in relative terms, that is in a comparative fashion vis-à-vis other party families, meaning that this does not rule out the absence of at least some internal ideological differentiation. Moreover, when such claims are made in absolute terms (e.g., Camia and Caramani 2012) the focus tends to be on general measures of ideological positioning that do not distinguish between economic and non-economic components of left-right semantics. This seems a shortcoming especially vis-à-vis the programmatic evolution of social democracy in this region during the last decades, as in many cases such parties recalibrated their economic positions from typically left-of-centre stances concerning redistribution and state involvement in the economy to centrist economic positions during the Third Way phase (e.g., Giddens 1998, 2000, 2003). However, this recalibration to the economic centre was more pronounced in some countries (e.g., the notable examples of the UK with Tony Blair's 'New Labour' and Germany with Gerhard Schröder's '*Neue Mitte*') than in others, hence already indicating a potential path towards internal ideological differentiation between formations that have renewed their ideological profile and others that may, to varying extents, have stayed the course.

Hence, in this thesis I will already add two relevant contributions to the dilemma surrounding the ideological heterogeneity or homogeneity of Western European social democracy in recent decades. First, empirically, a dedicated chapter (Chapter 5) will show detailed evidence on the levels of internal ideological differentiation of this party family in the analysed spatial-temporal framework, conceiving political ideology as pertaining to the traditional 'horizontal' axis of the left-right economic conflict (e.g., Castles and Mair 1984; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). By doing so, it will contribute to the theoretical debate as to the levels of ideological differentiation internal to contemporary Western European social democracy, especially by illustrating how this phenomenon varies over time. Second, the thesis has the broader overarching objective of providing a much needed and so-far missing (e.g., Volkens and Klingemann 2002, 166; Camia and Caramani 2012, 50) multivariate explanatory analysis of what determines intrafamily ideological differentiation: one that includes, alongside party competition variables, other political, economic and societal factors, so as to 'constitute an appropriate acknowledgement of the intermediary character of parties and party systems' (Volkens and Klingemann 2002, 166). That is, it seeks to provide a comprehensive answer to the following research questions: why do parties routinely classified as belonging to the same party family adopt different ideological positions, intended along the economic left-right dimension? Meaning, what determines the (varying) differences in party positions between formations belonging to the same party family? Thus, the specific interest in social democracy rather than other party families that are generally recognised as being more internally heterogeneous from an ideological viewpoint seems justified not just because of the resurgence in the academic attention (e.g., Elff 2007; Jansen, Evans, and de Graaf 2013; Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019; Benedetto, Hix, and Mastrorocco 2020; Emanuele 2021) towards this core component (Smith 1989) of Western European party systems (Keman 2017), but also because of the possibility of adding to the illustrated debate concerning this party family. This will also allow to answer more substantive research questions regarding specifically this group of parties. That is: what is contemporary Western European social democracy?

Is it the same across the region and over the analysed timeframe? And what determines Western European social democratic parties being (varyingly) different from one another?

Intrafamily ideological differentiation is a complex phenomenon to explain. Indeed, as illustrated in the chapter dedicated to the explanatory framework of this thesis (Chapter 3), there are several factors that could play into why formations from the same party family diverge from one another along the left-right economic dimension. Parties can exhibit a more left- or right-leaning programmatic profile due to different long-standing, systemic features of electoral systems (e.g., Dow 2001); forms of political globalisation, such as levels of Europeanisation (e.g., Laffan 2014); degrees of economic globalisation (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016). Parties' economic left-right positions also depend on more contingent economic and electoral factors, of which I will be able to analyse the impact of competitive competition from the radical left and right, the government or opposition status of social democrats, as well as underexplored – yet extremely relevant – determinants that may exacerbate political differences between instances of social democracy in different national contexts, such as the preferences of the dominant faction within such large and diverse parties and the debtor versus creditor status of the respective countries (e.g., Maatsch 2014). Furthermore, whilst its comprehensiveness seems adequate to tackle the complexity of the analysed phenomenon, as mentioned there are variables that this explanatory framework will not be able to account for, given that they cannot be measured for the space and time of this thesis due to operational limitations. Hence, this points to even more potential determinants of the variation in intrafamily ideological differentiation, reinforcing the intricacy of this picture.

With this in mind, what ultimately motivates this thesis is seeking an organic understanding of which of these several factors matters, and how, for determining party positions along the economic left-right dimension at the individual level and intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate level. This is an important question within the scholarly investigation of party families, with potentially important implications for the concept of 'party family' itself given that ideological homogeneity is one of its founding – and most agreed-upon – features (e.g., Mair and Mudde 1998).

Such an answer will be pursued both at the pooled level and by looking at geographical, macroeconomic and temporal differences within the analysed spatial-temporal framework, to provide a comprehensive investigation. This systematic explanatory analysis of intrafamily ideological differentiation, which is very much needed (e.g., Volkens and Klingemann 2002, 166) but admittedly so far missing in a strand of literature that 'is descriptive and makes no attempt to explain converging or diverging patterns' (Camia and Caramani 2012, 50), will be performed according to the research design illustrated in the following sections.

4.3 Operationalising and studying intrafamily ideological differentiation

In order to analyse intrafamily ideological differentiation, it is first necessary to measure what underpins it: party positions. To do so, three steps are necessary. First is the selection of the employed source of data, the Manifesto Project (MARPOR), which ought to be adequately introduced and justified. Second is a discussion surrounding the fundamental component of political ideology as intended in this study, that is the conceptualisation and measurement of left and right through Manifesto Project (MARPOR) data on electoral manifestos. Third, and building on the previous part, is the operationalisation of intrafamily ideological differentiation of itself, which will be outlined vis-à-vis the existing alternatives adopted so far in the literature. I will now move to the detailed illustration of these passages.

4.3.1 Electoral manifestos as a source of data on party positions

Analysing intrafamily ideological differentiation requires measuring party positions. Here, I do so by relying on the Manifesto Project (MARPOR) dataset (Volkens et al. 2021), which – through the lens of its defining saliency theory framework (Budge and Farlie 1983) – measures party positions through the content analysis of electoral manifestos performed by human coders, who apply a predefined codebook to text units called 'quasi-sentences' (see Werner et al. 2021). Yet, the MARPOR

framework on electoral manifestos is only one of the many sources of data and approaches employed in the specialised literature to measure party positions, which include mass, elite, and expert surveys (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2006; Bakker et al. 2020; Lindberg et al. 2022), roll call data (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Hix 2002), social media output (e.g., Emanuele, Maggini, and Paparo 2020; Capati, Improta, and Trastulli 2022), and political texts more generally, analysed through techniques such as Wordscores and Wordfish (e.g., Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Slapin and Proksch 2008).

This plurality of sources should be kept in mind, as MARPOR data has notoriously come under thorough scrutiny and criticism from multiple viewpoints over the years. In particular, in the related debate issues have been raised about some of the key features of this project. These include: its theoretical and methodological foundation, especially the overlap between salience and position posited by its saliency theory framework (see, for instance, Bakker and Hobolt 2013; Zulianello 2014) and the absence of any uncertainty estimate deriving from the coding procedures of the MARPOR (e.g., Bakker and Hobolt 2013);[18] the codebook, criticised for formulating some items so that they possess little discriminating power between different issues and dimensions of political contestation (e.g., Zulianello 2014; Trastulli 2022),[19] and being prone to 'coding seepage' (e.g., Klingemann et al. 2006, 112; Mikhaylov 2009);[20] and, especially, the MARPOR's left-right measure, the 'RILE'. In particular, this index has been criticised for relying on a methodologically problematic use of factor analysis that incurs issues such as sampling adequacy, interpretation of the many dimensions extracted, and violations of the linearity assumption (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Jahn 2010; Gemenis 2013); choosing MARPOR items for scaling that are too outdated vis-à-vis the concepts of left and right (e.g., Pennings and Keman 2002) and do not adequately rely on theoretical justification

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[18] This particular issue is due to manifestos only being coded once by one human coder, who is allowed to perform this essential step of the MARPOR's data collection after receiving specific training. This also leads to other methodological issues such as, for instance, the 'structural zero problem', which has important implications for applying scaling techniques to MARPOR data (Bakker et al. 2006).

[19] Examples of this from the cited works are the items on equality (per503) and the welfare state (per504 and per506). Due to their excessively broad formulation, which also collates multiple dimensions that are substantively meaningful, these items are notoriously problematic, with some suggesting they should have been broken down into multiple subcategories (e.g., Merz, Regel, and Lewandowski 2016; Horn et al. 2017, 413).

[20] Coding seepage is the systematic misclassification of pairs of MARPOR items due to issues in their formulation.

in their deductive selection (e.g., Jahn 2014); and obtaining systematically biased measurements of parties' left-right positions, both positionally (e.g., see its systematic centrist bias in Mikhaylov, Laver, & Benoit, 2012) and, especially, geographically, with notoriously invalid estimates in Southern European countries such as Greece (Dinas & Gemenis, 2010), Italy (Pelizzo, 2003), and Portugal (Budge & Klingemann, 2001).

Although a transparent acknowledgement of the limitations of MARPOR data should be at the centre of any related methodological discussion, the other side of the coin is constituted by the undeniable advantages in measuring party positions provided by this source. Indeed, party manifestos best suit the main theoretical tenets concerning the dominant functional model of representative democracy in the Western world, i.e. 'party government' (e.g., Katz 1986, 1987; Mair 2008[a]). In this model, it is fundamental that parties compete against each other for political power on the basis of clearly distinct and identifiable programmatic platforms, hence allowing citizens to allocate responsibility for government action and act accordingly when called upon to vote in elections. Hence, party manifestos fulfil essential electoral and democratic functions: not only streamlining the efforts of parties and providing them with material during campaigns, but also – and, as mentioned, most importantly – publicly setting the programmatic agenda and policy commitments of political formations during electoral campaigns (e.g., Eder, Jenny and Müller 2017). On this last key point, empirical evidence does indeed show how the official stances provided by parties in their manifestos when campaigning are often reflected in actual policy output if and when they get into a government position in which they can enact such commitments (e.g., Brouard et al. 2018), leading some to talk about a 'mandate effect' (e.g., Carammia, Borghetto, and Bevan 2018). Hence, whilst a common criticism of party manifestos is that these documents are just 'lip service', meaning that parties are not actually obliged to keep their campaign promises once in power, existing empirical evidence does not seem to clearly point to the direction of this argument, which in principle could also be made of other data sources of party positions (e.g., communication on social media and in public events). Conversely – and, most often, the actual or main reason why data on party manifestos is used, beyond their intrinsic relevance

–, MARPOR data does present an unparalleled longitudinal and cross-sectional coverage, with a century's worth of data starting from the 1920s to contemporary days for a total of over 5000 party-election observations in more than 50 countries from five continents; which undeniably contributed to make this project the most widely employed source of data in empirical works analysing party positions (e.g., Laver and Garry 2000). Hence, whilst recognising the limitations of this data, these are the reasons why I will rely on the MARPOR dataset for measuring party positions and, hence, intrafamily ideological differentiation in this thesis.

4.3.2 Left-right: semantics and measurement through MARPOR data

I now move to the speicific measurement of parties' left-right positions through MARPOR data. A first fundamental component of measuring party positions in contemporary Western European supply-side politics is an accurate conceptualisation and operationalisation (Adcock and Collier 2001) of left and right. Left-right semantics is a heuristic device that contributes to simplifying the cognitive complexities of politics (e.g., Laponce 1981; Dalton 2002) and is able to absorb new meanings over time (e.g. Fuchs and Klingemann 1990), hence contributing to their widespread use. Following White (2011, 2013), left and right usually refer to conflict over three fundamental questions from a conceptual viewpoint: (in)equality, social change and human nature. On inequality, the left aims at rectifying economic and non-economic forms of social disparity (e.g., Bartolini and Mair 1990; Anderson 1998; Lukes 2003; Noel and Therien 2008), whilst the right tolerates them. It follows that the left seeks to change societies in an egalitarian direction (e.g., Inglehart 1984; Bobbio 1997), whilst the right instead intends to defend the existing accepted social order (e.g., Thorisdottir et al. 2007). Finally, encompassing both previous points are left and rights views on the nature of human beings, according to which the former sees more things making people similar rather than setting them apart, and the latter holding the opposite stance (see the seminal contribution by Bobbio 1997).

In the face of this conceptualisation, another prior step is necessary before moving to operationalising left and right: that is, a reflection on Western European patterns of party competition within political spaces widely seen as two-dimensional (e.g., Kitschelt 1992; Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug and van Spanje 2009). These are made up of a horizontal axis embodying the traditional left-right divide over state intervention in the economy and the allocation of material resources (e.g., Downs 1957; Knutsen 1989) and a vertical dimension juxtaposing non-economic matters defined alternatively as 'authoritarian' versus 'libertarian' (Flanagan and Lee 2003), 'green-alternative-libertarian (GAL)' versus 'traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN)' (e.g., Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson 2002), 'demarcation' versus 'integration' (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), or even constituting a full-fledged 'transnational cleavage' (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2018).[21]

Whilst there seems to be widespread consensus as to the two-dimensional structure of Western European political spaces, there is greater debate as to the main patterns of party competition within them. Traditionally, left-right semantics has usually been employed by most contribution to describe a dominant, unidimensional pattern of political contestation whereby traditional left and right economic positions were coupled respectively with libertarian and authoritarian second-dimension stances (e.g., van der Brug and van Spanje 2009; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Rovny 2013; Rosset, Lutz, and Kissau 2016). This is most widely known in the literature as Kitschelt's (1992) classical 'axis of competition' argument and corresponds to what has been recently defined as 'ideological consistency' in 20th-century terms (e.g., De Sio and Lachat 2020).

Yet, the empirical fit of this account has been increasingly challenged by political developments in recent decades. Indeed, empirical evidence illustrates how the patterns of party competition in Western Europe have evolved over time (e.g., Rovny and Whitefield 2019), with greater scholarly recognition of non-unidimensional configurations (Bakker and Hobolt 2013, 37). In this regard, central are the implications of the theoretical strand of 'issue yield' (De Sio and Weber 2014). This

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[21] Alternative definitions provided in the literature for this second dimension are 'materialist/old politics' versus 'postmaterialist/new politics' (e.g., Inglehart 1984), and 'Green- Alternative-Libertarian (GAL)' versus 'Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN)' (e.g., Hooghe et al. 2002).

posits that in an increasingly volatile political environment dominated by single issues rather than coherent and comprehensive packages of positions, rational vote-seeking parties should seek an electoral strategy based on so-called 'bridge issues', i.e. those issues that can simultaneously unite their traditional constituents and be popular enough in the general electorate to cater to new voters, if they are to maximise their electoral success. Indeed, recent empirical works informed by this theoretical perspective (e.g. De Sio and Lachat 2020) show how contemporary Western European parties, presented with new electoral opportunities in terms of voters' distribution within two-dimensional political spaces, can be found combining economic and non-economic stances innovatively, in ways that move away from the traditional 'left-libertarian/right-authoritarian' diagonal. Notable examples have been identified by recent contributions both in the right-libertarian quadrant, for instance 'free-market cosmopolitans' (De Sio and Lachat 2020), and in the left-authoritarian quadrant, indeed with 'left-authoritarian' formations (e.g., Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willman 2014). Moreover, another key Western European party family that has risen to prominence in recent years and adds to the complexity of this picture can be found in the radical right, which can combine authoritarian positions with either right-wing or relatively left-of-centre economic positions (e.g., Hillen and Steiner 2020; Wahl 2020). In sum, these developments in the contemporary patterns of Western European party competition seem to suggest that, in order to make sense of innovative party placements in two-dimensional political spaces that are incoherent with 20th-century ideological consistency, economic and non-economic components should be separated in the measurement of left and right.

However, so far this has not happened with left-right indexes based on the MARPOR dataset, which is one of the most employed sources of data on party positions given its long time series and wide cross-section (e.g., Laver and Garry 2000). Indeed, most of these measures place economic and non-economic matters along a single continuum, *de facto* assuming left-right unidimensionality. This consideration applies regardless of the inductive (i.e., data-driven) (e.g., Budge 1987; Laver and Budge 1992; Gabel and Huber 2000; Elff 2013) or partially deductive (i.e., theory-driven) (e.g.,

Klingemann 1995; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Jahn 2010; Bakker and Hobolt 2013) nature of such instruments, and it also concerns the MARPOR's own 'RILE' index (Budge and Klingemann 2001).[22]

For the abovementioned reasons, this unidimensional collapse is likely to be problematic for measuring the left-right positions of parties in contemporary Western European party competition and might result in problems such as the apparent positional blurring (e.g., Rovny 2012) of parties adopting innovative strategies, derived by the artificial collapsing of economic and non-economic matters not in line with the 20th century unidimensional view of the left-right continuum. Furthermore, the majority of existing MARPOR-based left-right indexes are purely or mostly inductive in nature, hence incurring specific potential issues. These include questions of content validity (Drost 2011) stemming from the lack of theoretical references linking the MARPOR categories aggregated in either pole by statistical techniques such as factor analysis to the concepts of left and right, and the data-specific nature of the scale components to be employed in constructing left-right indexes identified by these methods, which means that different datasets are likely to generate different scores altogether (Prosser 2016).

To take both the illustrated necessities and problematic aspects of existing measures into account, I opt for an alternative approach and presents a deductive and two-dimensional measure of left-right party positions, explicitly distinguishing 'economic' and 'cultural' components. The foundation of this process is a rigorous process of conceptualisation (Adcock and Collier 2001), which results in widely applicable instruments that leverage a clear operationalisation of the theory and hence are not affected in their measurement validity by potential idiosyncrasies in the data.

On this basis, the MARPOR items aggregated in the deductive economic left-right index are, for the left pole, those on regulating markets and social market economy (per403), Keynesian demand-side

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[22] There are partial exceptions to this, albeit still unsatisfactory. Bakker and Hobolt (2013) develop several positional indexes based on the MARPOR, among which a 'general left-right' and an 'economic left-right' index can be found. However, the former corresponds to the RILE itself, whilst the latter is very similar to it and a separate non-economic left-right index is not developed. Prosser (2014) inductively develops an 'economic left-right' and a 'social liberal conservative' scale, without relating the latter in any way to the concepts of left and right from a theoretical viewpoint. Finally, whilst Dolezal et al. (2016) do distinguish 'economic' and 'cultural' left-right components in two separate measures, they do so without explicit reference to theoretical sources and develop an index with very limited spatial applicability, as it was specifically devised for the contemporary Austrian context.

economics and public social expenditure (per409), minimum wages (per412), nationalisation of essential services to enlarge access to them (per413), expansion of welfare state (per504) and educational provisions (per506), and support for labour groups (per702); for the right pole, those on free-market economics and promoting unhampered personal enterprise (per401), supply-side economics and preference for assisting businesses rather than consumers (per402), economic orthodoxy, austerity policies and reduction of public expenditure in the face of crises (per414), limitation of welfare state (per505) and educational provisions (per507), and opposition to labour groups (per702).

These categories were selected as they all specifically concern overcoming economic inequalities on the left and trying to replicate the natural order amongst men in the economic sphere on the right. More specifically, regulating is identified within the 'social Keynesianism' strand of economic left-wing thought (e.g., Heine 2010), whilst demand-side economic policies to help those who are most in need in society, enlarging access to fundamental services, are typical characteristics of the left. These concepts are operationalised in the MARPOR items on the expansion of social expenditure and economic intervention, introducing minimum wages and nationalising key services, expanding the access to the welfare state in its Beveridgean (1942) conception and thus also including the aspect of education, and guaranteeing better conditions for workers. On the other hand, the right typically takes the opposite positions on such matters, by privileging unhampered individual freedoms and consequently being less enthusiastic of state support for people in disadvantaged economic situations, with such differences usually translated into the desire for 'pure' market economies (e.g., Böhm 1979). Hence, with its views linking societal structure to inequality, the political right is not concerned with distributional outcomes in its pursuit of economic growth (e.g., Boix 1997). Particularly, this is done both through free-market supply-side economics aimed at incentivising private investments, and balancing budgets by reducing social expenditures at large, as reflected in the chosen MARPOR items.

Non-economic MARPOR items that are also theoretically pertinent to the presented conceptualisation of left and right were aggregated in a separate, deductive cultural left-right index. These are, on the left, opposing war and conflicts (per105), supporting human, civil and refugee rights (per201.2), negative attitudes towards nationalism and discrimination associated with positive views on immigration (per602), secularism and opposition to traditional morality (per604), rejection of stronger policing and penal measures, coupled with liberal stances on issues such as drugs and prostitution (per605.2), promoting multiculturalism (per607), and defending non-economic underprivileged minorities (per705); on the right, supporting greater military capacity (per104), positively viewing nationalism and opposing immigration (per601), traditional religious and moral stances (per603), a tough 'law and order' view of society (per605.1), and cultural assimilation in opposition to multiculturalism (per608).

Similarly to economic left-right, these MARPOR items explicitly deal with expanding rights and treating all men equally on the left and the support for and preservation of clear socio-cultural distinctions amongst different people on the right. Accordingly, the left focusses on opposing militarism and the promotion and extension of human rights (e.g., Rathbun 2004; Fonck, Haesebrouck, and Reykers 2018), as well as more general rights reducing non-economic forms of inequality between people coming from different nations, cultures, and underprivileged situations, in a universalistic fashion. Instead, scholarly contributions also demonstrate how the opposite approach is taken up by the right, as it has a much narrower conception of the national interest and, hence, different people in terms of their societal status, position, and rights. In this regard, the national interest, as well as the existing external and internal orders, are to be preserved through force if necessary. These elements are coupled with traditional and conservative stances on moral and religious issues, preserving clear differences between people *à-la* Tocqueville (e.g., Lakoff 1998, 444). Hence, the deductive cultural left-right index operationalises all these illustrated aspects through the selected MARPOR items.

The deductive economic and cultural indexes are summarised in Figure 4.1. However, it must be noted that, of these two deductive MARPOR-based left-right indexes, only the economic instrument will form the building block of intrafamily ideological differentiation in this thesis. At a time in which socio-cultural issues have often formed the decisive dimension of political contestation both for parties and voters in contemporary Western Europe, reshaping political spaces (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier 2010; Dalton 2018; Jackson and Jolly 2021), this is surely an important limitation of this research project on social democratic intrafamily ideological differentiation. Yet, as illustrated in Tables A1 and A2, this decision was forced by the lack of variation along this issue dimension deriving from the very little and positionally moderate emphasis put by contemporary social democrats on socio-cultural issues, and its consequences for measuring party positions through MARPOR data. Table A1 shows that, in line with empirical investigations analysing the salience of Western European parties on economic and non-economic issues over time (e.g., Stoll 2011; Trastulli 2021), over the analysed three decades social democratic formations in this region put very little emphasis on second-dimension issues; with this trend only partially reversed around the mid-2010s and the pooled average emphasis on economic left-right MARPOR items being around fivefold the salience put on cultural left-right issues (30.9% versus 6.4%). This means that, through the specific saliency theory framework of the MARPOR (Budge and Farlie 1983), the limited emphasis put on cultural issues by these parties translates into very little positional variance, hence making it impossible to observe meaningful internal differentiation along this dimension. This issue, reported in detail in Table A1, is testified by the very centrist pooled mean position of Western European social democracy along this issue dimension in the analysed 30 years (-0.05), and especially by the consistently smaller mean standard deviation values, both on a yearly basis and at the pooled level (4.2, vis-à-vis 10.95 for economic left-right MARPOR items). Further, this issue seems to specifically derive from the choices made by social democrats themselves in terms of which themes they emphasise in their manifestos, and more specifically how much salience they put on second-dimension socio-cultural issues and which positions they adopt along this dimension of political

contestation. Indeed, not only there is generally little emphasis put by social democratic parties on socio-cultural issues, but – as evident in Table A2 – these formations do not adopt very clear or marked positional stances along this issue dimension, as testified by both their pooled mean position corresponding to the dimensional centre and degree of dispersion testified by the standard deviation being amongst the absolute smallest ones. Hence, as from a practical viewpoint users adopt the saliency theory framework (Budge and Farlie 1983) when employing MARPOR data, the scarce and positionally moderate emphasis put – strategically, one may presume – by social democratic parties on socio-cultural issues makes it unfeasible to extract meaningful information on their intrafamily ideological differentiation along this issue dimension from the MARPOR dataset. Yet, as shown, these data-related concerns do not apply to traditional economic left-right matters, to which contemporary Western European social democratic parties devote the majority of their attention: therefore, the adopted dependent variable, as well as the presented analysis of intrafamily ideological differentiation at large, will be based on the introduced deductive economic left-right index.

Economic Left
per403 - Market Regulation
per409 - Keynesian Demand Management
per412 - Controlled Economy
per413 - Nationalisation
per504 - Welfare State Expansion
per506 - Education Expansion
per701 - Labour Groups: Positive

Economic Right
per401 - Free Market Economy
per402 - Incentives: Positive
per414 - Economic Orthodoxy
per505 - Welfare State Limitation
per507 - Education Limitation
per702 - Labour Groups: Negative

Cultural Left
per105 - Military: Negative
per201.2 - Human Rights
per602 - National Way of Life: Negative
per604 - Traditional Morality: Negative
per605.2 - Law and Order Negative
per607 - Multiculturalism: Positive
per705 - Underprivileged Minority Group

Cultural Right
per104 - Military: Positive
per601 - National Way of Life: Positive
per603 - Traditional Morality: Positive
per605.1 - Law and Order: Positive
per608 - Multiculturalism: Negative

Figure 4.1. MARPOR items aggregated in the deductive economic and cultural left-right indexes.

4.3.3 Measuring the dependent variable and analysing intrafamily ideological differentiation

In terms of describing the levels of ideological differentiation internal to a single party family, existing contributions have taken two different routes, at times integrating different measures and presentational forms. First, some opted for numerical or graphical illustrations of social democratic parties' positions, often based on the key statistical measure of central tendency represented the mean. For instance, Volkens (2004) assessed the average left-right positions of national social democratic parties in different time periods, e.g. decades or longer, as emerging from MARPOR data, also comparing it to the party family average in each of such periods.[23] Likewise, by employing the same source of data, Elff (2013) graphically plotted the economic left-right trajectories of individual social democratic parties, estimated via posterior distributions that update specific point estimates of economic left-right positions by taking into account previous ones by the same party and the mean of those of all parties from the same party family and across party families, against the party family smoothed mean between the 1940s and the 2010s.

Second, most works adopt approaches centred around various statistical measures of dispersion, to directly operationalise how much ideological differentiation exists within single party families. Many rely on standard deviations, employed to calculate how concentrated or dispersed the positions of formations belonging to the same party family are along a specific issue dimension. Hence, the larger the standard deviation values, the greater the intrafamily ideological differentiation, and vice versa. This is done with several different sources of data, such as electoral manifestos (Volkens and Klingemann 2002; Camia and Caramani 2012), elite surveys (Freire and Tsatsanis 2015; Carroll and Kubo 2019), and expert surveys (Ennser 2012). Moreover, standard deviations as an indicator of intrafamily ideological differentiation can be calculated both for the overall temporal framework of a given analysis and for specific periods of time (e.g., Volkens and Klingemann 2002; Camia and Caramani 2012). Other measures of statistical dispersion are also used in the literature to

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[23] Volkens and Klingemann (2002) also adopt the same approach, albeit integrating it with measures of statistical dispersion similarly to the contributions below, specifically by also reporting standard deviations per decade.

operationalise the ideological heterogeneity internal to single party families, often to integrate other evidence. For instance, Ennser (2012) also presents the average distance between pairs of parties by party family, whereby the larger such values, the greater the intrafamily ideological differentiation. Moreover, Elff (2013) also graphically presents ranges between different quantiles that, similarly to interquartile ranges (e.g., Pollock III 2016, 88), can also be taken as measures of statistical dispersion. Both such paths to measuring intrafamily ideological differentiation present aspects that are problematic for the analysis that I intend to perform in this thesis. On the one hand, whilst they provide intuitive descriptive evidence concerning the overall left-right cross-sectional dispersion and movement over time of social democratic parties individually and aggregated as a party family, illustrations of individual formations' left-right position do not quantify this internal heterogeneity in any way. On the other, the use of measures of statistical dispersion and chiefly standard deviations surely constitute an improvement in terms of both measuring and operationalising intrafamily ideological differentiation. However, adopting aggregate measures of statistical dispersion for specific periods comes with the limitation that, unless they are applied to very short spans of time in extremely long temporal frameworks that are unlikely to be compatible with the typical average length of electoral cycles and legislatures in Western Europe, observations will be numerically too few to be adequate for statistical analyses. Indeed, whilst for instance standard deviations applied to either entire timeframes or to parts of them have been used to present useful descriptive evidence on the level of intrafamily ideological differentiation at a given time point, admittedly they have never been used in multivariate explanatory analyses (e.g., Volkens and Klingemann 2002, 166; Camia and Caramani 2012, 50), which is what I set out to do instead.

Therefore, keeping these necessities in mind, a different approach is adopted here. Recall what has been said about intrafamily ideological differentiation in Chapter 3: it is an aggregate-level (i.e., party-family) concept that results directly from an individual-level (i.e., party) phenomenon in the individual social democratic formations' economic left-right positions. Hence, the empirical strategy of this thesis will consist of two steps. Firstly, the determinants of social democratic parties' different

economic left-right positions will be analysed, by employing a measure of such economic left-right positions. This step will constitute the large-N analysis of the presented design, as further elaborated below. Secondly, once what moves these formations further to the economic left or right in general terms has been established through statistical estimation, the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation in given years of substantive interest – assessed both through visual evidence and measures of statistical dispersion in standard deviations, as per the literature –, will be explored in a subsequent small-N analysis. This will test a number of statistically significant relationships between the employed independent variables and the dependent variable in specific cases.

Coming now to the operationalisation of the dependent variable employed in the statistical analysis, the thesis adopts an indicator of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions based on the deductive left-right index introduced above. More specifically, the dependent variable is calculated by considering the signed deviation of each social democratic party's value of the deductive economic left-right index at election t from the average such value calculated from the economic left-right score of all social democratic parties at election T-1, meaning in the respective previous electoral cycle. So, for instance, if we were to calculate the score for the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 2017, we would take the SPD's deductive economic left-right value from that election and calculate its signed distance from the mean between the deductive economic-left right values of all analysed social democratic parties in the respective national election immediately preceding the 2017 German contest (e.g., the 2013 Italian election, 2015 British election, 2016 Spanish election, and so on).

By construction, this indicator is well-equipped to also capture the aggregate movement over time along an issue dimension of a given party family as a whole. Indeed, by considering the most recent election in each other country to generate the mean value from which to calculate individual scores, it captures the period effect (e.g., Corbetta 2002; Blais et al. 2002, 2004; Franklin 2004) on the positions of a party family along a given issue dimension.[24] Taking the substantive interest of this

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[24] As with any other measure that calculates mean values, an intrinsic limit of this indicator in general is that its scores depend on the number of countries (here, coinciding with parties) considered, and would hence be different if this were to change.

thesis as an example, indeed, it is well-known that during the analysed timeframe social democratic parties underwent a period of neoliberal positions and convergence to the economic centre during the heyday of the Third Way (e.g., Giddens 1998, 2000, 2003; Adams et al. 2004; Mair, Mūller and Plasser 2004; Keman and Pennings 2006; Dalton 2013; Evans and Tilley 2013); whilst, for instance, more recent contributions show a decisive recalibration towards the economic left after the Great Recession (e.g., Emanuele 2021; Polacko 2022; Trastulli 2022). The design of the employed dependent variable allows controlling for such political phases and explicitly analysing the economic left-right positions of social democratic parries vis-à-vis the expected aggregate movement along a given issue dimension, which is a theoretically fundamental aspect. Moreover, by not computing yearly or period-specific means from which to derive individual scores, this variable avoids problematic compositional effects that would affect the validity of such average values as a valid indicator of the concept of average party family position at the aggregate level. Indeed, such means would be very unlikely to include the same number of observations from all national formations (if not to include them all altogether). This means that each of these average values would be calculated considering different actors, which would also differ in the number of times they are included in the computation.

4.4 Spatial-temporal framework and units of analysis

I focus on social democratic parties in Western Europe during the last decade of the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st century. Hence, this study is both comparative and longitudinal in nature (e.g., Bartolini 1993). All of these elements have been selected in research design choices that demand adequate discussion and justification (e.g., Bartolini 2000). As to the space of this thesis, all countries within the geographical, political and cultural space defined as Western Europe by other studies in the electoral studies literature (e.g., Ersson, Janda and Lane 1985; Caramani 2004; Emanuele 2018[b]) have been taken into consideration. Practically, this equates to 20 national

contexts being considered: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, due to both the socio-cultural and party-political peculiarities of Belgium, this case has been effectively divided into two separate political entities, that is Flemish-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia. Two reasons lie behind this selection of spatial framework, as underlined in comparable works (e.g., Emanuele 2018[b], 29).[25] First, the countries in this region display a high degree of similarity in the origins, trajectories, and current configuration of their political development, with most of them - barring the significant exceptions of the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish 'Third-Wave' democracies of Southern Europe (Huntington 1991) - having experienced democratic rule and high levels of social and political freedom for several decades (e.g., Freedom House 2022; Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research 2022). Secondly, as the substantive interest of this thesis is explaining the intrafamily ideological differentiation of social democratic parties specifically within this region at large, including all the countries and, consequently, party systems of this area allows for the largest possible generalisation of the presented empirical findings, given that the selected sample corresponds to the population of interest.

From the viewpoint of the adopted temporal framework, I on the three decades spanning from 1990 to 2019. Several historical and political reasons justify this selection of time. Firstly, Western European politics is analysed after the watershed moment of the fall of the Berlin Wall, in which history supposedly met its 'end' (Fukuyama 1992) and left-of-centre parties lost an alternative political referent with the collapse of the communist world.

Secondly, and partly as a consequence of the first point, the analysed three decades include the period in which social democracy underwent the most encompassing programmatic transformation with the decisive shift towards neoliberal economic paradigms during the Third Way phase (e.g. Giddens

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[25] Notice that, although still considering the same spatial framework in terms of countries, Emanuele (2018) does not split the Belgian case into its Flemish and Walloon components.

1998, 2000, 2003), that is the 1990s; with enduring consequences during the following decade as well. As mentioned above, the social democratic movement to the economic centre is substantively important not just because of its potential and differentiated effects on individual parties' ideological positioning and, at the aggregate level, on intrafamily ideological differentiation. Indeed, Chapter 2 also illustrated how this rightwards shift is often linked to the alienation of working classes, that is the traditional electoral constituency of social democracy (e.g., Karreth, Polk and Allen 2013; Schwander and Manow 2017), and the consequent decline of cleavage politics (e.g., Franklin 1992; Goldberg 2020); albeit Third Way strategies also seem to have paid off electorally in the short term (e.g., Benedetto, Hix, and Mastrorocco 2020; Delwit 2021). All these reasons make the inclusion of this period in the analysis of social democratic intrafamily ideological differentiation very important from a theoretical viewpoint.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a key contribution of this study is to go beyond in time compared to existing contributions, which were forced to stop much earlier in their analyses of intrafamily ideological differentiation (e.g., Volkens and Klingemann 2002; Volkens 2004; Camia and Caramani 2012; Elff 2013). In this regard, this thesis is innovative as it introduces an analysis of the 2010s: a key decade of social and political turmoil in Western Europe due to era-defining events such as, most of all, the great recession of the late-2000s (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt 2015). In light of this devastating crisis, social democratic parties in individual Western European countries will have been embedded in vastly different national contexts from an economic, social, and political viewpoint, with potentially very relevant impacts on the directions that such formations went in from an economic viewpoint and, therefore, intrafamily ideological differentiation as a whole. Hence, a multivariate explanatory investigation of this recent and important decade is essential for the purposes of this thesis and the specialised literature. Conversely, the ideological outlook and internal homogeneity of social democracy in previous decades, that is after WW2 and until the first fundamental break signified by the Third Way, has already been thoroughly scrutinised and is less contentious in the literature. Moreover, the longer timespan would make data collection for some of

this thesis' key predictors much more problematic, as a number of variables - especially macroeconomic ones - are not available for many earlier decades.

Within the illustrated spatial-temporal framework, the units of analysis have been selected at the national election level, with 153 elections occurring and 159 total observations due to the consideration of the Belgian regions of Flanders and Wallonia as separate cases. The number of electoral contests that could be considered ranges between two for Malta and 11 for Greece, with an average of 7.65 elections per country.[26] The specific number of analysed elections for each national context, reported in Figure 4.2, as well as discrepancies such as the different number of observations

Figure 4.2. Number of elections per analysed Western European country

(Flanders and Wallonia separately considered).

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[26] Notice that this discrepancy in analysed elections across countries depends on data availability within the MARPOR dataset. Indeed, obviously more than two elections were held in Malta during the selected timeframe: however, the MARPOR only has data for the 1996 and 1998 contests. Similar issues of data availability are also incurred in the case of Cyprus, for which the MARPOR only has data since 1996.

for the Flemish (8) and Walloon (6) contexts in Belgium are dependent upon the data availability within the employed MARPOR dataset version (*2020b*).

For each of these observations, the main social democratic party was considered as the unit of analysis, meaning that the national-context level and the party level coincide. From a substantive viewpoint, this decision was taken in order to capture the programmatic connotation and intrafamily ideological differentiation of Western European social democracy through the historical and established main formations of the centre-left in each country, hence truly capturing the 'core' nature (Smith 1989) within such party systems (Keman 2017) that defines this party family. Practically, this was achieved by mainly relying on the 'parfam = 30' ('social democratic parties') category from the codebook of the main source of data employed in this thesis, the MARPOR. This allowed considering most of the enduring and historical social democratic formations across the continent, such as for instance the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the British Labour Party, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), and traditional Scandinavian social democratic parties in countries such as Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. The only exception to this criterion is the case of Italy in the 1992, 1994, and 1996 elections. In these elections, despite being coded as a 'socialist' party ('parfam = 20'), the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) was considered as it was the direct successor of the historical – albeit not social democratic – main centre-left party, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), in line with the literature on Italian politics (e.g., Baccetti 1997; Pamini 1998) and due to the political peculiarities of this case. This criterion of historical continuity applied even in those cases in which parties changed their name (for instance, in Norway with the Norwegian Labour Party between 2009 and 2013) or renewed themselves more structurally (for instance, in Iceland with the merger of the Social Democratic Party into The Alliance, first in 1999) without apparent consequences on the MARPOR 'parfam' classification, reassuring as to the homogeneity and theoretical soundness of the units of analysis. Table 4.1 sums up the spatial-temporal framework, observations and parties analysed by this thesis.

4.5 Analytical strategy and methods

I investigate intrafamily ideological differentiation within social democracy in the contemporary Western European context by employing a time-series cross-section (TSCS) dataset (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995; Beck 2001, 2008) whereby, as illustrated, each social democratic formation (coinciding with the country level) is considered as many times as MARPOR data for national elections is available, meaning that each of such observations constitutes a row within the data matrix. Hence, this is a case of data 'characterised by repeated observations […] on the same fixed (non-sampled) political units (usually states or countries)' (Beck 2001, 271). This dataset is the basis for the empirical analysis of the intrafamily ideological differentiation of contemporary Western European social democracy, which is performed within a multimethod research framework (MMR) (e.g., Lieberman 2005; Rohlfing and Zuber 2021). More specifically, the chosen design will be a regression-based nested analysis (e.g., Rohlfing 2008), a specific variant of MMR whereby an initial large-N analysis (LNA) is followed by a small-N analysis (SNA). The LNA will take the form of a statistical analysis that is aimed at determining, at the type level (i.e., the analysed population), *what* are the determinants of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions and, hence, the conditions under which varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation are produced. Subsequently, the SNA will aim to enhance the explanation emerging from the LNA by answering, at the token level (i.e., of individual cases), the question as to *how* exactly different external constraints lead social democratic parties to adopt varyingly different economic left-right positions, and what mechanism underpins this linkage brought to light at the type level. More precisely, it will provide an empirical test of a hypothesised process of rhetorical justification in which social democratic parties explicitly link the adoption of more left- or right-wing economic positions to a specific external constraint, through the thematic analysis of evidence from party manifestos and executive speeches (for more design details on the SNA, see section 8.2 in Chapter 8). In terms of

Table 4.1. Analysed social democratic parties, covered timespan and number of elections per country.

Country	Social Democratic Party	Timespan	N of Elections
Austria	Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)	1990-2019	10
Cyprus	United Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK)	1996-2016	5
Denmark	Danish Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne)	1990-2019	9
Finland	Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP)	1991-2019	8
Flanders (Belgium)	Flemish Socialist Party (SP) (1991-1999) / Socialist Party Different (SP.A) - Spirit (2003-2007) / Socialist Party Different (SP.A) (2010-2019)	1991-2019	8
France	French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste)	1993-2017	6
Germany	German Social Democratic Party (SPD)	1990-2017	8
Greece	Panhellenik Socialist Movement (PASOK)	1990-2015	11
Iceland	Icelandic Social Democratic Party (Alþýðuflokkurinn) (1991-1995) / The Alliance – Iceland's Social Democratic Party (Samfylkingin jafnaðarmannaflokkur Íslands) (1999-2017)	1991-2017	9
Ireland	Irish Labour Party	1992-2016	6
Italy	Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) (1992-1996) / Olive Tree-Democrats of the Left (Ulivo-DS) (2001-20006) / Democratic Party (PD) (2008-2018)	1992-2018	8
Luxembourg	Socialist Workers' Party of Luxembourg (LSAP)	1994-2013	5
Malta	Labour Party (PL)	1996-1998	2
Netherlands	Labour Party (PvdA)	1994-2017	8
Norway	Norwegian Labour Party (Det norske arbeiderparti) (1993-2009) / Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) (2013-2017)	1993-2017	7
Portugal	Portuguese Socialist Party (Partido Socialista)	1991-2019	9
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	1993-2019	10
Sweden	Social Democratic Labour Party (Socialdemokraterna)	1991-2019	8
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP-PS)	1991-2019	8
United Kingdom	British Labour Party	1992-2019	8
Wallonia (Belgium)	Francophone Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste)	1991-2010	6

methods, the LNA will be based regressions that are able to take into account the peculiarities of TSCS data. This is handled and analysed through specific TSCS methods, which are both devised for dealing with a relatively small number of units over a reasonable length of time (e.g., Emanuele 2018[b], 34) such as in this thesis, and can account for some potential methodological issues. Indeed, because of its nature, TSCS data may incur problems such as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (e.g. Stimson 1985). This means the violation of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression assumptions such as, in the former case, errors being independent and identically distributed, as each panel (in this case, the party level) has its own variance; and, in the latter, errors not being serially correlated, meaning here that errors related to repeated observations of the same party over time are independent of each other. Whilst autocorrelation is an issue related to the longitudinal, time-series component of TSCS data, the cross-sectional nature of its panel component may additionally entail unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. the existence of differences specific to the various panels (here, parties), that are associated with the variables of interest (e.g., Arellano 2003, 7-30). The presence of unobserved heterogeneity would require fixed effects estimation, as the random effects estimator would not be consistent in a situation of correlation between individual-specific effects and predictors (Treiman 2009, 371). However, this possibility is ruled out by performing the diagnostic Hausman test between random and fixed effects (Hausman 1978) on the analyses of this thesis, the results of which allow using random effects estimation. Because of both the cross-sectional dominant pool at hand (Stimson 1985), given that cross-section units (21 parties) are more numerous than temporal units (on average, 7.57 elections per party), and the extreme overconfidence in the estimation of standard error it produces (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995; Emanuele 2018[b], 35), the first TSCS method introduced by Parks (1967), i.e. the feasible generalised least squares (FLGS) method, seems inappropriate. Rather, Beck and Katz's (1995) approach is to be preferred, whereby the appropriate method of statistical estimation in light of the data at hand is OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). In this light, two main OLS regression models with PCSEs are performed: one by only considering the longer-term political and economic determinants of parties' economic left-right positions, and a

full model that also includes shorter-term factors. This will allow correctly identifying the causal effects of focal variables located in different parts of the theoretically determined causal sequence within the explanatory framework of this thesis, by assessing them through controlling only for those other determinants that are either more or equally distal to the *explanandum*, and not more proximal. Accordingly, the two specified regression can be formalised as follows. The first one tests the effects of longer-term political and economic determinants on parties economic left-right positions. This can be written as follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 es_i + \beta_2 polgl_i + \beta_3 eu_i + \beta_4 ecogl_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

where Y_i is the value of the dependent variable for each observation (i); β_0 is the intercept of the regression line, i.e. the value on the vertical y-axis when x = 0; the various β are the population regression coefficients representing, for each observation (i), the amount of change in the dependent variable for a unitary change in the independent variables, in this case the type of electoral system ('es'), the level of political globalisation ('polgl') and degree of Europeanisation ('eu'), and the level of economic globalisation ('ecogl'); and ε_i is the prediction error, or residual, related to each observation (i).

The second and complete regression model adds the shorter-term political and economic determinants of parties' economic left-right positions, which include more synchronic economic conditions and election-specific factors. The related indicators operationalise the political factors concerning the potential presence of competitive radical left ('rlp') or radical right ('rrp') competitors, as well as its government or opposition status ('ingov') and the ideological leaning of its dominant faction ('dfact'); and the economic determinant constituted by the levels of national sovereign debt ('debt'). Further, following from Chapter 3, it controls for a number of other shorter-term potential determinants of parties' economic left-right positions, including the movement of the national party system's centre of gravity along the economic left-right issue dimension from the previous election

('cog'), the government aspiration of the analysed social democratic party ('goasp'), bailout programmes ('bail'), and unemployment ('unemp') and income inequality ('iineq'). Hence, this regression equation follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 es_i + \beta_2 polgl_i + \beta_3 eu_i + \beta_4 ecogl_i + \beta_5 rlp_i + \beta_6 rrp_i + \beta_7 ingov_i + \\ \beta_8 dfact_i + \beta_9 debt_i + \beta_{10} cog_i + \beta_{11} govas_i + \beta_{12} bail_i + \beta_{13} unemp_i + \beta_{14} iineq_i + \varepsilon_i$$

(2)

Moreover, in order to ensure and enhance the robustness of the results, several alternative analyses will be run, by employing either different operationalisations of the dependent variable, alternative operationalisations of some key predictors, additional controls of methodological or substantive interest, and alternative model specifications.

Following the LNA, the SNA will consist in performing a theory-testing, confirmatory process tracing (e.g., Bennett and Checkel 2014; Beach and Pedersen 2019) of the identified relationships between predictors and social democratic parties' economic left-right positions in key instantiations with varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation. In particular, this will be done by performing qualitative text analysis, in the form of thematic analysis (e.g. Boyatzis 1998; Lapadat 2012), not only of specific manifestos from the MARPOR dataset but also of executive speeches performed by social democratic politicians provided by the Comparative Agendas Project (henceforth, CAP) (e.g., Baumgartner, Breunig, and Grossman 2019; Grossman and Guinaudeau 2021), to assess the external validity (e.g., Drost 2011) of the conclusions related to electoral manifestos and political campaigns with evidence from an external and relevant arena such as government vis-à-vis national legislators. Again, greater detail on the SNA of this regression-based nested analysis will be provided in the dedicated chapter (Chapter 8).

5. Intrafamily ideological differentiation
in Western European Social Democracy (1990-2019): Descriptive Analyses

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will analyse the individual-level party positions and the aggregate-level intrafamily ideological differentiation along the economic left-right dimension of Western European social democracy between 1990 and 2019. In doing so, I will provide empirical answers to one of the fundamental research questions of this thesis: is Western European social democracy internally homogeneous or heterogeneous, and what is its level of intrafamily ideological differentiation? By showing that the response to this question ought to be a nuanced and context-specific one across the analysed spatial-temporal framework, this exploration will already constitute an important contribution of this thesis, adding to the relevant scholarly debate between these two different viewpoints.

In this chapter, I will proceed as follows: first, I will illustrate evidence concerning the economic left-right positions of Western European social democratic parties. Second, I will focus on the dependent variable of the LNA of this thesis, that is the signed deviation of individual social democratic parties (at election t) from the party family's mean economic left-right position in the previous electoral cycle (election T-1). Third and fourth, I will look at both such measures across, respectively, the analysed spatial and temporal framework. To conclude, I will complement all the presented evidence on intrafamily ideological differentiation by introducing a classification of party-level economic left-right deviations.

5.2 Economic left-right positions of Western European social democratic parties

For a start, empirical evidence on Western European social democratic parties' simple economic left-right positions provides important information. Table 5.1 reports summary statistics on the deductive

economic left-right index introduced in Chapter 4 for such formations across the analysed spatial-temporal framework. As already mentioned, 153 national elections are considered, amounting to a total of 159 observations due to the consideration of both the Flemish and Walloon social democratic parties in Belgium as two separate cases. The mean (-21.98) and median (-20.58) values are very similar and describe a situation whereby, as expected, Western European social democratic parties present left-of-centre economic positions, as indicated by the negative sign. Moreover, it can be argued that such stances are distinctively left-wing, as they appear on average to be more than 20% worth of the content of an electoral manifesto to the left of the centre of the economic issue dimension. Indeed, whilst this is by no means an extreme distance, as also indicated by the minimum value taken on in the distribution (-69.02 in the Swiss 2011 election, with the maximum value being 16.99 in the Swedish 1994 election), it is still possible to consider it as relevant, given that the increasing multidimensionality of electoral competition in Western Europe (e.g., Steenbergen, Edwards, and De Vries 2007; Thomassen 2012; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018) during the last few decades entails dedicated space for each of such dimensions in electoral manifestos, hence reducing the potential variance of any given positional index based on Manifesto Project (MARPOR) data.[27] Furthermore, estimates of party positions based on the MARPOR usually suffer from issues of centrist bias related to the data itself (e.g., Ecker et al. 2022), meaning Western European social democrats may actually be even further to the economic left than reflected in these scores. By the

Table 5.1. Deductive economic left-right index: summary statistics.

Elections	Observations	Mean	Median	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Kurtosis	Skewness
153	159	-21.98	-20.58	10.95	-69.02	16.99	5.47	-0.47

[27] This is because, according to the saliency theory framework of the MARPOR (Budge and Farlie 1983), if only one dimension of contestation were emphasised in a manifesto, then the party could potentially take on a position ranging between -100 and 100. Hence, on paper, the greater the number of issue dimensions covered in a manifesto, the higher the percentage of the manifesto subtracted from its entirety (100%), which is fully 'available' when only one dimension is salient. This also entails slashing the potential extreme positions that a party can take along any issue dimension, hence *de facto* moderating such potential extreme positions by design. As a practical example, see for instance Lowe et al. (2011, 128) on the halved variance of the RILE index in empirical applications compared to its theoretical -100/100 range. This means that even a measure operationalising a unidimensional, encompassing main left-right axis of competition does not capture all issues and dimensions of contestation, which leaves considerable room to other ones.

same token, a similar scenario would emerge if we were to look at the traditional mean±standard deviation (10.95) range, with a gap larger than 20% between the two extreme values and one of them being much more left-wing (-32.93) than the other, much closer to the economic centre (-11.03). Other statistical characteristics of this distribution are also interesting: the low and negative skewness value (-0.47) indicates an approximately symmetric and slightly left-skewed (e.g., Bulmer 1979) set of economic left-right positions, hence showing that cases can also be found further away from the centre of the distribution and quite evenly on both sides. This seems to reinforce the above picture, whereby there are relevant differences in economic left-right positioning between the analysed Western European social democratic parties. Conversely, at the same time the high kurtosis value (5.47) seems to suggest that several formations seem to cluster around the centre of the distribution (e.g., Balanda and MacGillivray 1988) in their economic left-right position, hence indicating that further investigation of the data is needed to provide a more grounded interpretation. A graphical illustration of the distribution of Western European social democratic parties' economic left-right positions is provided in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1. Histogram of economic left-right positions of Western European social democrats.

Taking the above considerations into account, already this piece of evidence seems to point toward a considerable degree of differentiation between social democratic parties along the economic left-right dimension. However, one may wonder how this internal differentiation of Western European social democracy fares vis-à-vis other party families. The evidence presented in Table 5.2 seems to suggest that, along the economic left-right issue dimension, the internal differentiation of social democratic parties is in line with that of other party families, as identified within the same spatial-temporal scope through MARPOR data.[28] This information is conveyed by the reported standard deviation values, which put the social democratic family (both made up of the parties selected in this thesis and all formations in the 'parfam = 30' MARPOR category, standard deviation values of respectively 10.95 and 11.5) in the same range as other mainstream (e.g., Christian democrats at 11.2) and large (e.g., socialist and communist parties at 10.95, RRPs at 11.91) party families, whilst conservative

Table 5.2. Information on economic left-right positions and internal ideological differentiation per party family (MARPOR categorisation).

| Party family | Economic left-right positions | | | | |
	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean-Standard deviation	Mean+Standard deviation	observations
Agrarian	-11.94	15.73	-27.27	3.79	32
Christian democratic	-11.63	11.2	-22.83	-0.43	142
Conservative	-6.34	12.78	-19.12	6.44	117
Ethnic/regional	-14.61	9.09	-23.7	-5.52	120
Green	-17.36	8.4	-25.76	-8.96	116
Liberal	-7.19	12.31	-19.5	5.12	150
Nationalist/Radical right	-4.81	11.91	-16.72	7.1	116
Social democratic	-21.98	10.95	-32.93	-11.03	159
Social democratic (parfam=30)	-20.86	11.5	-32.36	-9.36	186
Socialist/communist	-27.06	10.95	-38.01	-16.11	166
Special issue	-13.01	14.4	-27.41	1.39	54

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[28] For the sake of completeness, all social democratic parties catalogued as such by the MARPOR within the analysed spatial-temporal framework (i.e., all parties with 'parfam = 30') have also been considered, separately from the selected social democratic parties analysed in this thesis. Also note that here, as explained in section 4.4, the Italian Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) observations for the 1992, 1994, and 1996, originally coded as 'socialist' by the MARPOR, have been considered as social democratic and hence excluded from 'socialist/communist parties'.

parties seem slightly more internally differentiated in terms of economic left-right positions (standard deviation = 12.78). The outliers in this distribution are, on the one hand, green parties, which emerge as the most internally homogeneous party family from an economic viewpoint (standard deviation = 8.4); and, on the other, the most internally differentiated cases of agrarian and special issue parties (standard deviation values of, respectively, 15.73 and 14.4), which however are considerably less numerous in the analysed population. Hence, overall, two broad conclusions can be drawn from this descriptive evidence. First, from a comparative viewpoint, in the analysed spatial-temporal framework social democracy does not seem either particularly internally differentiated or exceptionally homogeneous compared to most other party families (e.g., e.g., Camia and Caramani 2012; Ensser 2012; Freire and Tsatsanis 2015), especially vis-à-vis comparable mainstream and electorally sizeable groups of formations. Second, it follows that, for most party families, exceptional degrees of internal differentiation or homogeneity along the economic left-right issue dimension do not seem to constitute a characteristic that contributes to empirically determining their distinctiveness, as they all present considerable but comparable levels of internal heterogeneity that, in conjunction with the reported mean positions, lead to frequent positional overlaps (as can be seen by the mean±standard deviation ranges).[29]

It is by looking at individual Western European social democratic parties, instead, that it is possible to fully appreciate, specifically, the varying relationship between their different economic left-right positions across the analysed spatial-temporal framework. The scatterplot in Figure 5.2 provides important visual evidence, integrated more systematically by the yearly mean values and standard deviations individual-level party positions displayed in Table 5.3; again, the latter being the main measure employed in the literature to measure intrafamily ideological differentiation, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Indeed, on the one hand, this evidence demonstrates how, indeed, a considerable degree

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[29] For a more detailed descriptive analysis of the positions of Western European party families in the two-dimensional political space, leveraging both the introduced deductive economic and cultural left-right indexes, see Tables A3 and A4 and the related comments and figures in the Appendix.

Figure 5.2. Individual parties' economic left-right positions over time.

of intrafamily ideological differentiation along the economic left-right issue dimension is at times present in contemporary Western European social democracy. This seems to be true both cross-sectionally, that is at some specific points in time such as for instance 1990, 1994, 2007, 2010, 2015, and 2019 in which social democratic parties display even up to around 30% or more worth of a manifesto in economic left-right differentiation; and longitudinally, especially in the temporally subsequent right-hand side of the graph immediately after the 2010s, most likely due to individual parties' different responses to the widespread economic crisis and the electoral decline of social democracy itself. On the other hand, the other side of this coin is evident in years such as, for instance, 1993, 1997, and 2000, in which social democratic parties seem to be much closer to one another in economic left-right terms; as well as in the whole area of the scatterplot just to the left of the graph's centre more generally, indeed roughly coinciding with period between the mid-1990s to early-2000s, when greater homogeneity was perhaps due to a 'contagion effect' during the heyday of the 'Third

Table 5.3. Mean economic left-right positions and standard deviations per year.

Year	Mean economic left-right position	Standard deviation	Observations
1990	-26.13	11.44	4
1991	-11.77	5	7
1992	-19.67	14.72	9
1993	-18.12	3.85	4
1994	-9.18	15.78	7
1995	-17.44	7.25	7
1996	-14.71	6.04	5
1997	-12.21	2.83	4
1998	-17.24	7.41	5
1999	-22.14	4.05	8
2000	-20.86	1.06	2
2001	-20.41	7.2	5
2002	-19.14	4.96	7
2003	-24.34	7.57	6
2004	-20.45	8.49	5
2005	-22.32	13.69	5
2006	-22.19	7.96	5
2007	-25.04	8.74	9
2008	-16.77	4.58	3
2009	-23.84	9.45	6
2010	-25.42	13.28	5
2011	-24.55	21.1	7
2012	-13.94	12.31	4
2013	-25.98	9.38	6
2014	-36.7	22.84	2
2015	-29.32	10.59	8
2016	-30.06	6.24	4
2017	-30.24	4.88	7
2018	-27.47	15.9	2
2019	-30.38	8.9	9

Way' (e.g., Giddens 1998) and in light of the notable electoral success, for instance, in the UK and Germany. By integrating the aforementioned evidence, this then becomes a very important piece of information, which is part of a diachronic perspective that allows for a more nuanced answer to the scholarly debate on whether Western European social democracy is ideologically homogeneous or heterogeneous internally. Indeed, whilst it is possible to affirm that the arguments vying for an overall internal ideological consistency of social democracy (e.g., Camia and Caramani 2012; Ennser 2012;

Freire and Tsatsanis 2015) do not hold *tout court*, as this evidence shows that there is at times a considerable degree of intrafamily ideological differentiation, conversely this differentiation only seems to be present in some, but not all moments. In other words, this means that both sides of the debate are right (or wrong, depending on the viewpoint) at different points in time: there *is* considerable intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy, but this is not always the case throughout the selected timeframe. This means that this degree of intrafamily ideological differentiation varies: whilst, as per above, overall the internal ideological differentiation of social democracy is not abnormal compared to other contemporary Western European party families, this pooled perspective hides significant differences between different periods of significant heterogeneity and homogeneity. Hence, the interesting and so far unexplored research agenda becomes studying this variation, asking what its determinants are. In other words, why are contemporary Western European social democratic parties closer to or further away from one another in economic left-right terms? What determines this distance and its variation?

5.3 Descriptive evidence on the dependent variable

The preliminary evidence on Western European social democratic parties' economic left-right positions already provided important information on the debate surrounding the internal consistency or lack thereof of this party family from an ideological viewpoint. Hence, it is now appropriate to complement this descriptive evidence by looking at the dependent variable, that is the signed deviation of individual social democratic parties (at election t) from the party family's mean economic left-right position in the previous electoral cycle (election T-1).

Table 5.4 provides summary statistics on this indicator. The two measures are very strongly correlated (Pearson's *r* being 0.90 at $p < 0.001$), yet some differences with simple economic left-right scores can be detected by looking at the mean and median. Indeed, such 'centrist' mean (-0.17) and median

Table 5.4. Individual social democratic parties' deviation from party family's economic left-right mean position at election T-1: summary statistics.

Elections	Observations	Mean	Median	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Kurtosis	Skewness
153	159	-0.17	-0.66	9.6	-44.83	31.27	5.88	-0.57

(-0.66) values indicate that, by design, this measure of deviation presents observations both to the economic left and economic right of the party family's mean position at any given electoral cycle, and that these are distributed quite evenly. However, like with simple economic left-right positions, a comparable standard deviation is maintained (9.6), meaning that at the pooled level any given social democratic party could either be around almost 10% worth of a manifesto either to the right or to the left of the party family's mean economic position at election T-1. This overall value also takes into account those cases in which these deviations are not really meaningful. Indeed, as illustrated above, what this descriptive evidence has demonstrated so far is that whilst these deviations are at times significant, they tend to vary over time; perhaps, even more interestingly. As a matter of fact, both such aspects are confirmed by the remaining summary statistics in Table 5.4. On the one hand, it is possible to observe a remarkably large gap between the minimum (-44.83) and maximum (31.27) deviation values in the distribution. Whilst these are obviously outliers and should therefore be interpreted extremely cautiously, the variable's variance remains very considerable even by taking these two values out (that is, between -27.94 and 20.69).[30]

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[30] This also holds when removing further observations that present larger distances to the rest of the distribution: indeed, the values between -15.35 and 13.74 are all distributed very close to each other. These constitute the vast majority of the distribution, as they are 147 out of 159 observations.

Figure 5.3. Histogram of individual social democratic parties' deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1.

Hence, this indicates that considerable individual deviations from the party family's economic mean positions at election T-1 can be found both to its left and its right. On the other hand, similarly to simple economic left-right positions, the skewness (-0.57) and kurtosis (5.88) values indicate an approximately symmetric and slightly left-skewed distribution with several values clustering around its centre. This points to both, again, deviation values being distributed rather evenly away from the middle point of the distribution on either side of it, but also to what at times appears as a rather ideologically consistent picture, with small distances from the party family's mean economic position. All this information can be visualised graphically through the histogram provided in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.4. Individual parties' deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1 over time.

The same considerations are substantially confirmed when looking at a scatterplot of individual parties' deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1 over time, as reported in Figure 5.4. Indeed, observations seem distributed rather evenly both to the left (values with a negative sign) and to the right (values with a positive sign) of the party family's mean. Moreover, similar to the same visualisation for the simple economic left-right positions of contemporary Western European social democratic parties, the variation in these individual deviations seems to become larger on the right-hand side of the graph, that is from the mid-2000s onwards. Here, indeed, it is not uncommon to find years in which the cross-sectional difference in individual deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position between social

democratic formations amounts to up 30% or more worth of a manifesto (for instance in 2010).

Conversely, the period of maximum homogeneity is the one between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s.

Finally, another interesting piece of evidence emerges when considering this measure in absolute

values. Indeed, Figure 5.5 reports the yearly party family mean of this index taken without the sign.

The temporal evolution of this measure shows that in general, regardless of the direction in which

they go, the deviations of social democratic parties in absolute values, despite at at times decreasing

and in particular between the mid-1990s and early-2000s, increase over time: especially so, it seems,

at the turn of the decade between the late-2000s and mid-2010s. This constitutes an intriguing

descriptive finding, the causes of which demand further exploration.

Indeed, overall, all of the illustrated descriptive evidence seems to point to and reinforce two

conclusions: first, there seems to be, at times, considerable intrafamily ideological differentiation

along the economic left-right issue dimension in contemporary Western social democracy. Secondly,

Figure 5.5. Temporal evolution of yearly mean of individual social democratic parties' deviations
from the party family mean economic left-right position in absolute values.

and perhaps more interestingly, this degree of internal heterogeneity seemingly varies over time. Investigating what lies behind this variance, then, becomes the research question of interest for this thesis.

5.4 Economic left-right positions and individual parties' deviations across space

After exploring this preliminary descriptive evidence, it is now necessary to go deeper into the data, in order to appreciate the specificities of both the various geographical subdivisions making up the broad region of Western Europe and the different time periods constituting the analysed timeframe. This more detailed assessment of the intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy will allow for a better understanding of how such phenomenon is configured across time and space.

Again, the starting point of such an investigation is looking at economic left-right positions. Figure 5.6 reports the mean economic left-right position for each of the 21 Western European national contexts of social democracy included in the analysis. Unsurprisingly, all social democratic parties in the analysed countries present overall left-of-centre economic positions, as evident from all mean

Figure 5.6. Mean economic left-right positions of social democratic parties per country.

values being negative. However, there are noticeable cross-country differences, with values ranging between the leftmost value of -35.36 in Switzerland and the rightmost value of -10.23 in Italy. Even after excluding these two outlier values, the differences between countries in mean economic left-right positions of social democratic parties, which already tend to dissipate more extreme values by virtue of being statistical measures of central tendency, remain sizeable. Indeed, the remaining 19 scores are rather evenly distributed between Denmark's -27.3 and the Netherlands' -15.69, indicating that such country means vary within a range of almost 12 points: that is, a potential difference in mean economic positions of up to more than a tenth of a manifesto. The distribution of national cases across this range also provides interesting information. Indeed, we tend to find Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Norway (-26.35) and Sweden (-22.75) amongst the most economically left-wing instances of social democratic parties. This seems to be in line with the literature that has long considered this area of Europe as the birthplace of a distinctive Scandinavian social democratic model, one heavily reliant on welfare structures and political goals such as equality and full employment (e.g., Castles 1978; Iversen 1998; Sejersted 2011; Barth, Moene, and Willumsen 2015). Conversely, the less left-wing parties can be found in Southern European nations such as the young Greek (-18.04) and Portuguese (-16.72) democracies, as well as countries without a consolidated social democratic tradition such as Italy (e.g., Vampa 2009; Pasquino 2013). Moreover, other examples of relatively right-wing social democratic formations from an economic viewpoint are located in countries either characterised by very liberal market economies such as the Netherlands (-15.69) (e.g., Touwen 2005) and Ireland (-20.47) (e.g., Hay and Smith 2013) or in contexts where austerity politics have historically been particularly prominent, such as Germany (-18.76) (e.g., Keller 2014). However, as it is often the case in empirical research, the data does not show a perfectly neat picture, as exceptions to the above 'rules' can be found both across the relatively more left-wing (e.g., the liberal United Kingdom with an economic left-right position of -23.21) and right-wing (e.g., the Nordic case of Iceland, with an economic left-right position of -20.65) national instances of social democracy. Detailed information on social democratic parties' mean economic left-right position by

national context is reported in Table 5.5. By aggregating this information, it is also possible to see how the mean left-right positions of social democratic parties are configured in the macro-areas making up the Western European context across the temporal framework, and whether some of the trends identified at a more micro level are confirmed. Table 5.6 reports such mean scores, by dividing Western Europe into four areas: the British Isles and Continental, Northern, and Southern Europe.[31] As evident, on the one hand, Northern Europe (-24.19) is the area of Western Europe with the economically leftmost social democratic parties, edging Continental Europe (-23.6) and, more to the right, the British Isles (-22.04). On the other, Southern Europe is clearly the region where social

Table 5.5. Mean economic left-right position of social democratic parties by national context.

Country	Mean economic left-right position	Observations
Austria	-22.37	10
Cyprus	-22.29	5
Denmark	-27.30	9
Finland	-24.22	8
Flanders (Belgium)	-21.04	8
France	-25.77	6
Germany	-18.76	8
Greece	-18.04	11
Iceland	-20.65	9
Ireland	-20.47	6
Italy	-10.23	8
Luxembourg	-26.92	5
Malta	-22.84	2
Netherlands	-15.69	8
Norway	-26.35	7
Portugal	-16.72	9
Spain	-21.46	10
Sweden	-22.75	8
Switzerland	-35.36	8
United Kingdom	-23.21	8
Wallonia (Belgium)	-25.48	6

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[31] Western European countries are divided into areas as follows. British Isles: Ireland, United Kingdom. Continental Europe: Austria, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland. Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.

Table 5.6. Mean economic left-right position of social democratic parties by area.

Area	Economic left-right position	Observations
British Isles	-22.04	14
Continental Europe	-23.6	59
Northern Europe	-24.19	41
Southern Europe	-17.83	45

democrats display the most relatively right-wing economic positions, with its mean value (-17.83) being much more to the economic right of those concerning the other three areas. Overall, this means the trends that emerged at the national contexts level seem confirmed when further aggregating them into larger geographical areas.

After looking at the building block of the intrafamily ideological differentiation in the simple economic left-right positions of social democratic parties, this descriptive analysis across space will now be replicated with the dependent variable of this thesis' LNA: individual formations' deviations from the party mean position at election T-1. Figure 5.7 reports the country means of this measure, uncovering very important information. Indeed, what emerges in very general terms is that the various national instances of social democracy are rather evenly split between those that, on average, deviate to the left (10) or to the right (11) of the party family's mean economic left-right at election T-1 across the analysed timeframe. Coherently with the above, the two outliers and by far most deviant instances are represented by Italian and Swiss social democratic formations, respectively to the right (10.64) and to the left (-13.47). Moreover, similar results emerge with regard to the distribution of national cases of social democracy from different areas of Western Europe amongst those that deviate to the left or to the right. Hence, the former group includes Scandinavian countries such as Denmark (-4.97), Norway (-4.86), and Sweden (-1.67), whilst the latter one includes Southern European countries such as Italy, Portugal (5.13), Greece (4.33), and Spain (2.09), as well as very liberal and open market economies such as the Netherlands (5.94) and Ireland (1.03) and more austerity-oriented countries such as Germany (3.34). Here too, as with simple economic left-right positions, exceptions to these

Figure 5.7. Mean deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position

at election T-1 per country.

trends are present, such as Iceland (1.79) amongst right-deviating countries and the United Kingdom (-0.29) amongst left-deviating ones.

Additionally, another interesting facet that can be explored in this data concerns the size of these deviations, which is on average larger when deviating to the left (5.15 in absolute value) rather than to the right (3.19). This makes sense, given that in general social democratic parties have been shown to display left-of-centre economic position across the analysed spatial-temporal framework, therefore making it more likely to observe sizeable deviations to the left rather than to the right. However, the differences in the size of these deviations seem to cut across geographical, macroeconomic and political characteristics both amongst cases that deviate to the left as well as those that deviate to the right, as countries with relatively similar profiles can be found both closer to and further away from 0. Detailed information on the mean deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1 per country is reported in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7. Mean deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position

at election T-1 by national context.

Country	Deviation	Observations
Austria	0.04	10
Cyprus	0.24	5
Denmark	-4.97	9
Finland	-2.33	8
Flanders (Belgium)	0.52	8
France	-4.39	6
Germany	3.34	8
Greece	4.33	11
Iceland	1.79	9
Ireland	1.03	6
Italy	10.64	8
Luxembourg	-6.71	5
Malta	-6.95	2
Netherlands	5.94	8
Norway	-4.86	7
Portugal	5.13	9
Spain	2.09	10
Sweden	-1.67	8
Switzerland	-13.47	8
United Kingdom	-0.29	8
Wallonia (Belgium)	-5.83	6

As with simple economic left-right positions, the measure of individual parties' deviations from the

party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1 can also be analysed at the higher

level of aggregation of geographical areas constituting Western Europe. This leads to results that are

consistent with all the considerations that have been made so far, as can be graphically visualised in

Table 5.8. Indeed, similarly to simple economic left-right positions, here too Northern and

Continental Europe are much more to the economic left, and indeed left-deviating areas, than

Southern Europe, the most right-deviating area, whereas overall British-Isles countries seem to

slightly deviate to the right.

Table 5.8. Mean deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position

at election T-1 per area.

Area	Mean deviation	Observations
British Isles	0.28	14
Continental Europe	-2.1	59
Northern Europe	-2.31	41
Southern Europe	4.16	45

5.5 Economic left-right positions and individual parties' deviations over time

It is now necessary to add the temporal dimension into the present assessment of Western European social democratic parties' configuration along the economic left-right issue dimension. The starting point is looking at the evolution of simple economic left-right positions over time at the aggregate level, that is for the entire party family. Accordingly, Figure 5.8 illustrates the evolution of social

Figure 5.8. Evolution of Western European social democratic parties' economic left-right positions over time.

democratic parties' economic left-right positions over the analysed timeframe, by taking for every year the mean score of all formations that competed in an election. By also graphing the linear relationship between economic left-right positions and time, it is possible to see that overall Western European social democratic parties have become more economically left-wing in the last 30 years.[32] This is a very important descriptive finding, which adds to an important and recently revived debate concerning the temporal evolution of social democracy and its economic stances in Western Europe. Within this discussion, indeed, two distinct positions can be identified. On the one hand, the most mainstream viewpoint contends that, over time, Western European social democracy has progressively moderated its economic stances. Hence, this moderation entailed slowly losing the traditional left-wing ideological distinctiveness of this party family, in a convergence to the centre of the economic left-right issue dimension (e.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Keman and Pennings 2006; Evans and Tilley 2013). This seems especially true in the heyday of the 'Third Way', that is between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s circa (e.g., Giddens 1998; Adams et al. 2004; Mair, Mūller and Plasser 2004; Keman 2011; Dalton 2013). On the other hand, a more recent wave of empirical works comes to different a conclusion, arguing that actually social democratic economic positions have either not changed significantly in the last half-century (e.g., Adam and Ftergioti 2019), or even that they have become more left-wing over time in this region (e.g., Emanuele 2021; Polacko 2022; Trastulli 2022) and especially so in the most recent year, that is after the Great Recession that started in the late-2000s. Similarly to this thesis, these works too are all based on MARPOR data, which measures party positions along the different issue dimensions through electoral manifestos.

In this regard, the presented piece of descriptive evidence seems to be in support of the second argument rather than the first one, with Western European social democracy exacerbating the distinctiveness of its left-wing economic positions during the last three decades. This conclusion

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[32] This is also confirmed by the moderate negative correlation between social democratic parties' economic left right positions and time, with Pearson's r being -0.43 at $p<0.001$.

seems substantively relevant: not only for the academic and political prominence of the topic, but also because of the thematic components (that is, MARPOR codebook categories) that make up the employed economic left-right index, which has been built deductively and with explicit reference to theoretical sources in order to ensure its content validity.[33] By going into greater detail with regard to the temporal evolution of social democratic economic left-right positions, Figure 5.8 shows how these actually record a slight rightwards movement towards the economic centre between the 1990s and mid-2000s, and especially so between 1990 and 2004; with this shift being reversed by the late-2000s. However, after a rightwards spike being recorded in 2012 mainly due to the two Greek elections during the May and June elections in the midst of the tough bailout programme agreed upon by PASOK (e.g., Dinas and Rori 2013; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2013),[34] there is a decisive leftwards shift in the post-Great Recession years, which is key in determining the overall shift to the left of social democratic economic positions during the analysed timeframe.

Yet, for the purposes of this thesis, the more relevant aspect concerns the internal dispersion of these economic left-right positions. Table 5.9 provides summary statistics not just on the over time

Table 5.9. Summary statistics of social democratic economic left-right positions over time.

Economic left-right position	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010-2014	2015-2019
Mean	-15.31	-17.51	-21.09	-22.88	-24.33	-29.83
Standard deviation	11.94	6.39	6.32	9.16	15.54	8.2
observations	25	29	23	28	24	30

[33] At the same time, the aggregation of several different measures into a single index might wash away individual differences and trends, hence depriving the analysis of important information. This is why a more detailed breakdown of the relationship between the individual MARPOR items making up the deductive economic left-right index and time has also been carried out. This highlighted a rather differentiated picture (on this, also see Trastulli 2022). Indeed, whilst issues surrounding welfare state expansion (*per504* and *per506*), support for labour groups (*per701*) and market regulation (*per403*) were increasingly emphasised by social democratic parties over the analysed timeframe, hence going in the direction of the reported finding, other MARPOR categories such as those on economic planning (per404), controlled economy and minimum wages (per412), and nationalisation (per413) went in the opposite direction, as they were significantly de-emphasised over time. The emphasis on the remaining items making up the deductive economic left-right index showed no statistically significant change. These additional analyses are also presented as alternative tests of the main empirical analysis in Chapter 7 on the results of the LNA (statistical analysis) of this thesis.

[34] Indeed, the reported economic left-right scores for the social democratic parties that participated in elections in 2012 are -28.04 for the French Socialist Party, -20.47 for the Dutch Labour Party, and -4.08 and -3.17 for PASOK respectively in the May and June elections.

movement of these economic positions, represented by the mean values, but also on the aggregate measure of intrafamily ideological differentiation represented by the standard deviations. All of these scores are calculated by dividing the analysed timeframe into six five-year periods (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014, and 2015-2019), to better identify the precise moments in which the analysed trends change. By doing so, whilst the constant and linear movement to the the economic left is firmly confirmed by the mean values (going from -15.31 in 1990-1994 to -29.83 in 2015-2019), the standard deviations demonstrate how the period between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, roughly coinciding with the heyday of the Third Way, reports the highest degree of ideological consistency (6.39 in 1994-1999 and 6.32 in 2000-2004). Conversely, these values are higher in the following period (9.16), before skyrocketing in the aftermath of the Great Recession (15.54 in 2010-2014), where the greatest differences in economic left-right positions between different national instances of Western European social democracy can be recorded. The internal ideological differentiation of this party family then returns to less extreme values in the second half of the 2010s (8.2), although by this point a decisive and general recalibration to the economic left occurred.

Along these lines, it is also possible to look at how individual formations' deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1 have evolved over time. In this regard, two conclusions can be drawn by looking at descriptive evidence. First, over the years these deviations have increasingly become more to the left, as testified by the statistically significant (at $p<0.05$), albeit weak, negative correlation between them and time.[35] Second, a more useful piece of information is provided by the assessment of the evolution of these deviations in absolute values over time. Indeed, whilst taking the signed version of this measure may wash away a lot of information due to the presence of both left and right deviations that hence compensate for each other, observing longitudinally it in absolute values is appropriate for a different and important question. That is, did

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[35] The related Pearson's *r* value is -0.17.

Figure 5.9. Temporal evolution of Western European social democratic parties' deviations from the party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1 in absolute values.

such deviations increase over time in general, regardless of their direction? Figure 5.9 provides a clear answer, showing how these deviations in absolute values have indeed increased over time. Moreover, by once again breaking down this longitudinal trend into the different periods making up the analysed timeframe, it is evident from the standard deviations in Table 5.10 how intrafamily ideological differentiation is at its lowest between 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 (respectively, 3.51 and 3.65, also corresponding to very low mean values of 5), whilst it peaks in 2010-2014 (standard deviation of 9.84 and mean of 11.64, both the highest across the timeframe). This is perfectly consistent with the above information on simple economic left-right positions and their evolution over time, as well as with the broader descriptive evidence presented so far.

Table 5.10. Summary statistics of deviations in absolute values over time.

Deviations in absolute values	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010-2014	2015-2019
Mean	8.36	5	5	7.14	11.64	6.22
Standard deviation	6.94	3.51	3.65	5.53	9.84	5.35
observations	25	29	23	28	24	30

Social democratic parties' economic left-right positions and deviations from the party family's mean at election T-1 can also be analysed in their evolution over time across the analysed spatial contexts. On the former front, Figure 5.10 illustrates how in the majority of cases Western European social democratic formations never adopt right-of-centre economic positions between 1990 and 2019. The only exceptions to this rule are the Italian and Swedish cases in 1994, whilst at different points in time countries such as Austria, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Spain adopt centrist positions very close to the zero of the economic issue dimension, albeit never crossing into right-wing territory. In terms of the evolution over time of these economic positions, a certain degree of cross- country variation can be identified, given that social democratic parties in a few national contexts actually move further to the economic right during the three analysed decades. Such formations can be found

Figure 5.10. Temporal evolution of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions by country.

143

in Denmark and in Southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal, and their behaviour seems to go in the direction of the 'convergence to the centre' arguments from the relevant scholarly debate (e.g., e.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Keman and Pennings 2006; Evans and Tilley 2013). On the other hand, these cases constitute the exception rather the rule itself, as the vast majority of social democratic parties in Western Europe either decisively move to the economic left between the 1990s and 2010s (e.g., in Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland), or do so in a much more nuanced way (which seems to be the generalised trend in Continental European contexts such as for instance France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Hence, these instances would seem to provide further corroboration to recent empirical works based on MARPOR data that, counter to the more mainstream viewpoint in the academic and public debate alike, actually underline a leftwards movement of social democracy along the economic issue dimension over time (e.g., Emanuele 2021; Polacko 2022; Trastulli 2022). With regard to the specific timings of these movements in economic positioning, some cross-country similarities can be observed. Such patterns include frequent surges in relatively more right-wing economic positioning in the mid-1990s (around and after 1994, for instance in countries such as Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom); and the movement to the economic left in the years immediately following the outbreak of the Great Recession starting from or around 2009 (in countries such as Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland). The latter is however countered by a contemporary parallel shift to the right of social democratic countries in both several Northern countries (for instance Finland, Iceland, and Norway) and in those national contexts that were most entangled in the economic crisis and often even in bailout programmes (see Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland). This last point is coherent with the climate of strict austerity and economic recovery measures that those countries had to adhere to (e.g., Ladi and Tsarouhas 2014).

These trends are reflected in the information provided in Figure 5.11, which shows the same evolution over time of social democratic economic left-right positions by aggregating national contexts into the British Isles and Continental, Northern, and Southern European areas. Many facets of this evidence

Figure 5.11. Temporal evolution of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions by area.

are, indeed, consistent with the descriptive analyses presented so far. For a start, it is evident how, over time, social democratic parties in Northern and especially Continental Europe move relatively further to the left than in the British Isles and, especially, Southern Europe, where the graphed linear fit is flatter and hence economic positions seem to remain relatively more stable. Additionally, it is also possible to identify a similar development of social democratic economic left-right positions across these four areas up until the seemingly critical juncture of the Great Recession. Indeed, in all three groups relatively centrist economic positions (or even right-of-centre at some point in Southern Europe) are recorded in the initial part of the timeframe, with decisive rightwards movements in the early-to-mid-1990s in Northern and Southern Europe, to then be followed by a situation of virtual stability, despite the general volatility over time of these stances, up until at least the end of the 2000s.

It is then possible to observe that two groups of areas – Continental and Northern Europe on the one hand, and British Isles and especially Southern Europe on the other – depart in the years immediately after the outbreak of the Great Recession, i.e. from 2009 onwards. As evident, whilst the immediate reaction of the former pair of areas is to decisively veer leftwards, the latter instead goes in the opposite direction in the aftermath of the crisis by turning right. Once more, these areas included the countries that were most severely hit by the global financial crisis, with bailout programmes taking place in several of them (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). Hence, it follows that parties with legitimate government aspirations or government status itself such as social democratic formations in this area would recalibrate their economic positions further to the right. Indeed, due to being in such positions, these parties followed responsibility considerations (e.g., Mair 2009; 2013) related to the renewed climate of unprecedented economic crisis and especially the tough economic recovery measures included in these bailout programmes that they very often negotiated and accepted. Instead, it seems that immediately following the collapse of the international economic system, social democrats in other national contexts across Continental and Northern Europe that were not as severely affected by these circumstances were readier to propose a policy alternative (Birnbaum 2010; Meyer 2010) to the neoliberal economic paradigm (e.g., Cerny 2010), decisively recalibrating their positions to the left of this issue dimension. Overall, though, it is worth noting that, in aggregating the data at the level of areas and consequently losing some degree of information, once the first few years after the Great Recession had passed, the general movement of social democrats towards the economic left continued even in the British Isles and Southern Europe when moving further into the 2010s.

Figure 5.12. Temporal evolution of deviations from the party family's
mean economic left-right position at election T-1 by country.

The same assessment across space and time can be made for the temporal evolution of the individual

deviations from the party family's economic mean positions at election T-1, presented by national

context in Figure 5.12. An interesting observation is that almost all social democratic parties deviate

both to the left and to the right over time, hence testifying to the volatility and context-dependence of

these individual deviations also vis-à-vis the general party family evolution along the economic left-

right issue dimension over time. The exceptions to this rule are the Italian instance of social

democracy, the only one to exclusively deviate to the economic right for the entirety of the timeframe,

and the left-deviating only parties in Luxembourg and Malta (although there are only two

observations for the latter). As a consequence of this generalised pattern, these deviations tend to stay

relatively stable in their overall evolution over time, as evident by how flat most of the graphed linear

predictions are. Consistently with this, very few marked trends of evolution emerge over the analysed

timeframe, namely the increasingly right deviations in Denmark and the increasingly left deviations in Sweden and Switzerland.

Lastly, the temporal evolution of individual deviations from the party family's economic mean positions at election T-1 aggregated in the three analysed areas can also be explored. Figure 5.13 reports the related descriptive evidence. As above, in all four geographical regions the deviations are both left and right in nature during the analysed three decades. Here too, this results in relative stability over time, as highlighted by the relatively flat linear trends in the graph. Still, again the British Isles and especially the Southern European region become more right-deviating over time, whilst the opposite applies to the increasingly left-deviating Continental and Northern Europe.

Figure 5.13. Temporal evolution of deviations from the party family's

mean economic left-right position at election T-1 by country.

Moreover, in line with what was shown above, it is evident how over time social democratic parties are mostly left-deviating in Continental and Northern European national contexts, whereas the opposite applies in Southern European countries, where these formations are always right-deviating apart from the second half of the 1990s. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, instead, the direction of the rather small deviations changes from left to right more or less midway through the analysed timeframe. Moreover, perhaps the most substantively interesting piece of evidence emerging from this assessment is the differentiation in deviations that is recorded immediately after the outbreak of the Great Recession, seemingly reinforcing the already highlighted role of this occurrence as a sort of catalyst of the ideological differentiation internal to Western European social democracy in its national instances. Indeed, three different patterns can be identified as a reaction to this large-scale crisis: not just setting social democratic parties in Southern Europe apart from the rest, but also highlighting differences between formations in Continental and Northern Europe. Indeed, starting with Continental European social democrats, these immediately and decisively recalibrated to the economic left in their deviations during the early 2010s. Instead, social democratic parties in Northern European countries first responded by deviating further to the economic right in early-2010s, after subsequently shifting further to the left around the mid-2010s. This trajectory is similar to the one observed in British-Isles countries, although deviations and fluctuations are less marked and mean economic positions generally gravitate towards the dimensional centre, or just right of it. Finally, once more the outlier nature of such formations in Southern Europe emerges by virtue of the adjustment of their deviations further to the economic right following the outbreak of the crisis, as well as more broadly during the 2010s as a whole.

5.6 Regular versus extreme: a classification of party-level economic left-right deviations

So far, much descriptive evidence was presented on both social democratic parties' economic left-right positions and deviations from the party family's mean economic position at election T-1. The

latter can be used to extract further useful information concerning the behaviour of individual social democratic parties in terms of ideological consistency, or lack thereof, vis-à-vis the rest of this party family. Indeed, the size and direction of these deviations can be employed to construct a classification of social democratic parties distinguishing both how and how much they are deviant in their economic left-right positions. Accordingly, as per Figure 5.14, this classification is organised along two dimensions. First, it separates cases based on how large the size of their deviation is. It does so by distinguishing whether a given case is part of the first or fourth quartile versus the second and third ones in the distribution of the individual deviations of all 159 observations within the dataset, hence taking the values of the 25th and 75th percentiles (respectively, -5.45 and 5.87) as the related thresholds. Second, it additionally distinguishes the direction of the deviation, that is whether the

		Size of the deviation	
		In quartile Q2/Q3	**In quartile Q1/Q4**
Direction of deviation	**Left**	Regular left-deviant	Extreme left-deviant
	Right	Regular right-deviant	Extreme right-deviant

Figure 5.14. Classification of regular and extreme left- and right-deviant social democratic parties.

individual observation is more to the left or right of the party family's mean economic position at election T-1. Hence, if a social democratic party displays relatively larger deviations and is therefore located in either the first or the fourth quartile, it will be either an *extreme left-deviant* or an *extreme right-deviant*. Conversely, if it is instead located in the second or third quartile of this distribution, it will be either a *regular left-deviant* or a *regular right-deviant*.

This classification is useful to better understand the data at hand and extract more information from additional analyses. For instance, it can be useful to see how, on average, different national instances of social democracies in Western Europe are distributed across the four introduced categories by taking their mean deviation value during the three analysed decades. Table 5.11 reports exactly this information, whilst Figure 5.15 also provides a graphical representation by order, from top to bottom

of the graph, of on average extreme right-deviant, regular right-deviant, regular left-deviant, and extreme left-deviant national cases. In general, a few commonalities can be identified in the two sides of this picture. As a start, social democracy in the Netherlands (5.94) and especially Italy (10.64) are the extreme right-deviant cases, with the latter being an absolute outlier in terms of the size of its average deviation. Within right-deviants more at large, it is evident how social democratic parties in contexts that underwent a substantial economic crisis in the late-2000s and 2010s, for instance Southern European countries such as Italy and the bailed-out Portugal, Greece, and Spain, or Ireland in this direction, at times substantially even amongst regular right-deviants (e.g., Portugal = 5.13, Greece = 4.33). Otherwise, as per the aforementioned discussion, this side of the division between

Table 5.11. Mean values of social democratic parties' deviations by country and distribution across classification.

Country	Mean Deviation	Observations	Category
Italy	10.64	8	Extreme right-deviant
Netherlands	5.94	8	Extreme right-deviant
Portugal	5.13	9	Regular right-deviant
Greece	4.33	11	Regular right-deviant
Germany	3.34	8	Regular right-deviant
Spain	2.09	10	Regular right-deviant
Iceland	1.79	9	Regular right-deviant
Ireland	1.03	6	Regular right-deviant
Flanders (Belgium)	0.52	8	Regular right-deviant
Cyprus	0.24	5	Regular right-deviant
Austria	0.04	10	Regular right-deviant
United Kingdom	-0.29	8	Regular left-deviant
Sweden	-1.67	8	Regular left-deviant
Finland	-2.33	8	Regular left-deviant
France	-4.39	6	Regular left-deviant
Norway	-4.86	7	Regular left-deviant
Denmark	-4.97	9	Regular left-deviant
Wallonia (Belgium)	-5.83	6	Extreme left-deviant
Luxembourg	-6.71	5	Extreme left-deviant
Malta	-6.95	2	Extreme left-deviant
Switzerland	-13.47	8	Extreme left-deviant

right- and left-deviants tends to include parties in countries with comparatively open market economies (such as the Netherlands and, again, Ireland) or where there is a consolidated tradition of austerity politics (such as Germany). Moreover, it can be noticed how only two national instances of Western European social democracy classify as extreme right-deviant, demonstrating that in general social democratic parties are more likely to deviate strongly to the economic left rather than the economic right, in line with their traditional stances. However, this does not mean that there are no

Figure 5.15. Social democratic parties' mean deviations across the analysed timeframe by country.

differences within the large group of regular right-deviant parties, as some (e.g., Austria = 0.04, Cyprus = 0.24, Flanders = 0.52) are much closer to the mean economic position of the party family than others (e.g., Portugal = 5.13, Greece = 4.33, Germany = 3.34) that deviate much more strongly. On the left side, instead, we find a higher number of extreme left-deviants (Switzerland = -13.47, Malta = -6.95, Luxembourg = 6.71, Wallonia = -5.83), although the Maltese case is based on only two observations and the Swiss case is the only real outlier, and by a large margin, to the left of the distribution. In general, apart from the peculiar situation of Malta and the borderline, *sui generis* British case (-0.29), all other national instances of Western European social democracy within this list of left-deviants are either from Northern European (Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden) or Continental European countries (Switzerland, Luxembourg, Wallonia, and France). Moreover, consistently with what has been said above about both parties from more struggling economic contexts usually deviating to the right and more immediate left-wing responses to the Great Recession originating from better faring ones, this list of left-deviant social democratic parties includes countries that did not suffer relatively as much from the financial crisis. Still, here too sizeable differences between regular left-deviant national instances that can be found closer to either the zero value (e.g., the United Kingdom, Sweden = -1,67) or extreme cases (e.g., Denmark = -4.97, Norway = -4.86, France = -4.39) are present.

The final piece of descriptive evidence that will be presented is the configuration of this classification across the periods that constitute the analysed timeframe. This can shed light on important information concerning Western European social democratic intrafamily ideological differentiation at the individual level across the various phases within the investigated 30 years, which are characterised by different features both in terms of the ideological evolution of this party family and broader socio-economic considerations. Figure 5.16 reports exactly this information, graphing the

Figure 5.16. Social democratic parties' mean deviations across the analysed periods by country.

configuration of the introduced classification in terms of national instances of Western European social democracy across the six analysed periods. Here, the striking piece of evidence emerges from an overall, aggregate-level look at the ideological distances within this party family in the different time periods. Indeed, it is evident how in the second and third of the six observed periods, spanning between 1995 and 2004, Western European social democracy is the most ideologically homogeneous, with the smallest differences between left- and right-deviant parties. This is the period of the emergence of Third Way politics and of relative socio-economic well-being in the region at the heyday of globalisation, resulting in a washing away of both positional and contextual differences between the different national instances of social democracy. Instead, intrafamily ideological differentiation peaks in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis outbreak, that is between 2010 and 2014. During these years, it is possible to observe increased distances between national instances of Western European social democracy, with a higher number of both left and right extreme-deviant

cases and especially much larger sizes of these deviations. This seems to point to greater heterogeneity in the socio-economic and political conditions of national contexts leading to a much greater amount of internal differentiation from an ideological viewpoint, compared for instance to non-crisis years in which different countries and different national politics were much more similar to each other, especially on the mainstream left. More specifically, during this period several Continental European (in Switzerland, Austria, and Wallonia) and Northern European (in Sweden and Denmark) instances of social democracy tend to deviate more strongly to the left, whereas extreme right-deviants are mostly made up of Southern European cases (e.g., Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, and Italy), as well as other national instances of social democracy such as the Finnish, Icelandic, British, and Dutch ones.

Overall, all of this evidence further reinforces the general picture presented so far and enhances the contribution of this thesis to the relevant debate on the degree of intrafamily ideological differentiation in contemporary Western European social democracy. Indeed, this in-depth discussion of extensive and varied descriptive evidence on this phenomenon illustrates how both sides of this debate are only partially correct, and how the response to the question as to whether contemporary Western European social democracy is considerably homogeneous or differentiated from an ideological viewpoint should be a more nuanced one. That is, in the last 30 years, this party family shows considerable levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation only at times, hence rather highlighting how this phenomenon varies across space and time. Hence, what becomes most interesting and can provide an important novel contribution to the literature is the exploration of what determines intrafamily ideological differentiation and, therefore, its variation, which is ultimately the goal of this thesis.

6. Measurement and Descriptive Analyses of the

Determinants of Party Positions and Intrafamily Ideological Differentiation

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss the measurement of the independent variables of this thesis' analyses: that is, the determinants of parties' economic left-right positions and, hence, the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation introduced in the theoretical framework built in Chapter 3. More specifically, I will review and justify the research design choices and potential alternatives concerning the operationalisation of these variables, also presenting relevant information regarding control variables. Further, I will illustrate and comment on descriptive analyses concerning the selected predictors, highlighting the relevant cross-sectional and longitudinal variation that can be observed. By following this structure, in the remainder of this chapter I will introduce the various groups of independent variables as follows. First, I will cover longer-term political and economic determinants in the systemic electoral factor constituted by the nature of electoral systems (Hp. 1); the degree of political globalisation of the various observations (Hp. 2), also including the specific contextual instantiation of Europeanisation (Hp. 3); and their levels of economic globalisation (Hp. 4). Second, I will look at shorter-term political and economic factors related to competitive radical left and right opponents (Hp. 5a and Hp. 5b); the government or opposition status of social democratic parties (Hp. 6); the ideological leaning of the dominant faction within these formations (Hp. 7); the different levels of national debt (Hp. 8). Third, I will also discuss control variables, particularly with regard to shifts in the party system's ideological centre of gravity between elections; the government aspiration of the social democratic party; whether the social democratic party's country underwent a bailout programme; and its levels of income inequality and unemployment. I will finally conclude by presenting important descriptive evidence on the statistical dispersion of the analysed independent variables over time.

6.2 Operationalisation of longer-term determinants and descriptive analyses

6.2.1 The long-standing nature of electoral systems ('Majoritarian')

Starting from longer-term political determinants of the different economic left-right positions of social democratic parties, a first element to consider is the long-standing set-up regulating the electoral process in each country: that is, the electoral system. As will be shown, national electoral systems across Western tend to remain stable over time during the analysed timeframe, hence constituting the institutional backdrop to party competition and the most time-invariant of the determinants under scrutiny. As per the argument outlined in Chapter 3, electoral systems are supposed to impact the economic left-right positions of parties in terms of their majoritarian or proportional nature. In brief, majoritarian electoral systems should have a rightwards, moderating effect on social democratic parties' economic positions (e.g., Dow 2011). This is because of mechanisms such as smaller district magnitude (Cox 1990), the lower number of parties on average associated with majoritarian electoral competition (e.g., Matakos, Troumpounis, and Xefteris 2016), as well as the incentives for large parties to converge towards the ideological centre to gain as many voters as possible (e.g., Calvo and Hellwig 2011) and for internal factions not to break away (e.g., Ceron 2013) under these systems. Conversely, PR systems should favour more clearly defined ideological positions, hence more economic left-wing stances for social democratic parties. These systems favour more ideological dispersion than majoritarian ones (e.g., Dow 2001, 2011) through multi-member districts (e.g., Cox 1990; Catalinac 2018), multipartyism (Duverger 1954), and the consequent maintenance of positional and, hence, voters' niches. On this basis, the expectation outlined in Hp. 1 is rather straightforward: majoritarian systems should be associated with more right-wing economic positions of social democratic parties, whilst PR systems should be linked to more left-wing social democratic economic positions.

In general, from an operational viewpoint, two roads are available to researchers interested in measuring the majoritarian or proportional nature of electoral systems. The first one is to follow

widely applicable and broad classifications of Western European party systems that tend to group them, historically, into majoritarian or PR ones. This distinction can be operationalised through a dummy variable capturing either of the two conditions (e.g., Blume et al. 2009; Rickard 2012; Ferland 2020). The second option follows a more election-specific viewpoint and aims at not only distinguishing between different characteristics such as electoral formulas within the majoritarian and PR groupings, but also identifying the degree proportionality of each contest through the specific configuration of party competition. To do so, the most widely employed and election-specific measure of 'disproportionality' is Gallagher's (1991) index, which returns a different value for each contest. Faced with these two alternatives, the question to be answered in order to select a suitable indicator revolved around what best represents the long-standing and stable nature of party systems as one of the most temporally and causally distal determinants analysed here. Based on this consideration, it is clear that a measure such as Gallagher's Index would by design be unsuited for measuring more systemic electoral factors. For this reason, in order to achieve a valid measurement (e.g., Adcock and Collier 2001; Drost 2011) of electoral systems as a long-standing, stable, and institutional variable constituting the 'rules of the game', their nature is operationalised through a *Majoritarian* dummy variable, taking value 1 if the electoral system under consideration is majoritarian and 0 if it is PR.

To operationalise this variable, I rely on data provided by the IPU Parline dataset, which distinguishes between different forms of majoritarian (for instance, first-past-the-post and two-round system) and PR (for instance, party-list PR, single transferable vote, and mixed-member PR). This operationalisation closely mirrors historical long-standing characteristics of and differences between Western European party systems, as testified by historical sources (Bormann and Golder 2013; Renwick and Pilet 2016). This data source separates almost all Western European electoral systems considered in the analysed timeframe in either majoritarian or PR as follows: France and the United Kingdom amongst majoritarian systems; Austria, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,

Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The only exception is Italy, which is instead classified as having a mixed electoral system. As there is no specific hypothesis concerning the impact of mixed electoral systems on parties' economic left-right positions and given that they constituted a small minority both in terms of observations and countries covered in the thesis' dataset, the Italian elections were, based on previous scholarly works (e.g., Pappalardo 1995; D'Alimonte 2001; Baldini 2011, 645), assigned as follows: 1 for the years of the so-called '*Mattarellum*' electoral law (1994-2001), 0 for the rest.

Figure 6.1 illustrates the values taken on by the *Majoritarian* variable in the analysed national contexts. As evident, the values represent the illustrated division between historically PR systems (the vast majority), which are numerically dominant as shown by the pooled mean value (0.11) in the summary statistics for the employed predictors reported in Table 6.1, and the exceptional majoritarian cases of France and the United Kingdom.[36] The time-invariant nature of this variable in all cases but Italy reflects the long-standing nature of systemic electoral factors seen here as the institutional

Figure 6.1. Values of *Majoritarian* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

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[36] Notice that the missing observations reported in Table 6.1, all due to issues of data availability, are distributed as follows across the analysed elections: *Dominant faction*: Flanders (Belgium) 1999; *Debt* (T-1): Netherlands 1994, Cyprus 1996; *Unemployment* (T-1): Austria 1990, Denmark 1990, Germany 1990, Greece 1990; Finland 1991, Flanders (Belgium) 1991, Iceland 1991, Portugal 1991, Sweden 1991, Switzerland 1991, Wallonia (Belgium) 1991; *Centre of gravity*: Cyprus 1996, Malta 1996. This highlights how, in the full regression models, no observation is lost after 1999, and most of the sporadic such cases are in the very first years of the timeframe.

Table 6.1. Summary statistics of independent variables (and controls).

IVs (and controls)	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Majoritarian	159	0.11	0.31	0	1
Political globalisation (T-1)	159	90.57	10.89	44.25	100
Europeanisation (T-1)	159	1.21	0.78	0	2
Economic globalisation (T-1)	159	76.25	9.12	45.95	91.54
Competitive RLPs	159	0.74	0.44	0	1
Competitive RRPs	159	0.55	0.5	0	1
Government status	159	0.58	0.49	0	1
Dominant faction	158	0.66	0.47	0	1
Debt (T-1)	157	62.13	36.07	1.66	181.43
Bailout	159	0.08	0.27	0	1
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	159	32.79	3.28	24.71	45.59
Unemployment (T-1)	148	8.02	4.77	2.12	26.49
Centre of gravity	157	-1.49	6.92	-32.71	25.17
Government aspiration (unlogged)	159	0.42	0.14	0	0.62

background to party competition, reassuring as to the validity of this operationalisation for the intended purposes.[37] Again, the only exception here is Italy, which varies as per above.

6.2.2 Political forms of globalisation ('Political globalisation')

Moving on to political globalisation, this concept entails the involvement of countries in supranational networks made up of international organisations (IOs) and frameworks that regulate interactions between actors, which are chiefly economic in nature. In this regard, relevant examples are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organisation (WTO). The main argument on the impact of political globalisation on parties' economic positions emerging from the literature goes in an 'external constraints' direction (e.g., Karremans and Damhuis 2020; Romeijn 2020). That is, because of the need to abide by the rules set up by supranational institutions, which are often shaped by the neoliberal policy paradigm (Cerny 2014), a higher degree of embedment within such

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[37] The mostly time-invariant nature of this predictor is not problematic from a statistical viewpoint, as diagnostic tests illustrate the appropriateness of using a random effects specification, which can account for such variables.

frameworks will entail a rightwards convergence of party positions along the economic issue dimension (Fairclough 2000; Huber and Stephens 2001; Plevnik 2003; Steiner and Martin 2012). More institution-specific analyses confirm this expectation vis-à-vis, for instance, the IMF (e.g., Lami 2014) and OECD (e.g., Davis 2016). On this basis, Hp. 2 formulates the following expectation: the higher the degree of political globalisation of a country, the more right-wing the economic positions of the social democratic party.

To measure the extent of political globalisation specific to a given national context, the most fine-grained and widely applicable indicator currently available is the 'Political Globalisation, de jure (KOFPolGldj)' included in the KOF Globalisation Index (Gygli et al. 2019),[38] which is included in the analysis as the *Political globalisation* predictor.[39] This is a continuous variable ranging between 1 (least globalised) and 100 (most globalised). It operationalises precisely the aspects of political globalisation that were conceptualised in the explanatory framework of the thesis: namely, the number of IOs that a country is a member of at a given time point and the number of international treaties signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest legislative body of each country since 1945. In order to properly capture when this variable exercises its effect on the process of drafting electoral manifestos – from which the observed economic position of social democratic parties derives –, the national levels of political globalisation are measured in the year preceding the observed electoral year (e.g., 2017 if the election is occurring in 2018).

The summary statistics for this variable in the analysed dataset reported in Table 6.1 indicate that, as expected, the level of political globalisation is very high in contemporary Western Europe, as shown by the pooled mean (90.57) and the degree of statistical dispersion around it (standard deviation = 10.89). Moreover, in terms of observed values, within the dataset the variable ranges between a

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[38] For all related variables, I employ data from the 2020 version of the KOF Globalisation Index.
[39] This was deemed a better indicator to properly operationalise the outlined concept of political globalisation compared to the alternative 'Political Globalisation, de facto (KOFPolGldf)' sub-index, which instead relied on information concerning the absolute number of embassies in a country and the share of national military personnel contributing to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

minimum of 44.25, in a geographically isolated country such as Iceland at the very beginning of the timeframe (1991), and a maximum of 100, (unsurprisingly) in late-2010s Germany.

Figure 6.2 reports the evolution over time of *Political globalisation* in the analysed countries. As evident, during the analysed timeframe the degree of political globalisation linearly increases in every country, indicating that this long-term process is still ongoing with no apparent signs of reversal within the region. Still, the pace at which this increase occurs varies between different national contexts, with quite some variation between the steeper slopes recorded in countries where the initial levels of political globalisation were relatively lower (e.g, Cyprus, Greece, and Iceland) and the flatter slopes where there was already a highly globalised situation at the beginning of the timeframe from a political viewpoint (e.g., France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). Moreover, significant cross-country differences in the level of political globalisation can be identified. Indeed, on the one hand the vast majority of countries report very high values of the *Political globalisation* variable, i.e.

Figure 6.2. Values of *Political globalisation* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

above 80 at least, between the 1990s and 2010s, with Germany reaching the maximum possible value (100) in 2017 and several others (e.g., Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) being very close to it (above 98) by the 2010s at the latest. On the other hand, a few smaller countries such as Iceland, Ireland, and Malta report much lower values of political globalisation, with the first two only reaching roughly the levels from which the other countries started in the early 1990s (i.e., around or above 80) at the end of the timeframe.

6.2.3 The process of European integration ('Europeanisation')

The Western European region is also interested by a specific and peculiar form of political globalisation: Europeanisation (e.g., Laffan 2014). This label describes the progressive embedment within the institutional framework of the EU and the consequences of this process on domestic politics. European integration has been shown to impact parties' economic positions in different stages: from the very prospect of joining (e.g., Vachudova 2008) to membership of the EU (e.g., Rose 2014) and, further, the Eurozone (e.g., Laffan 2014). In general, all these different stages have been shown to move the economic positions of left-wing formations further to the right towards neoliberal stances (e.g., Johansson and Raunio 2001; Bomberg 2002; Bernhard 2004; Nanou and Dorussen 2004; Kriesi et al. 2008; Mair 2008[b]), which are more in line with the *acquis communautaire* taken on by countries that adhere to the EU Treaties and the obligations deriving from partaking in the Eurozone (e.g., Maatsch 2014). The latter, in particular, has imposed increasing external constraints on the scope of economic policies that national governments can adopt, particularly through the progressive introduction of comprehensive regulatory frameworks such as the 'six pack', 'two pack' and Fiscal Compact. Further, these moderating effects are stronger for larger and pro-EU mainstream formations such as social democratic parties (Dorussen and Nanou 2006; Nanou and Dorussen 2013). Hence, Hp. 3 formulates a straightforward hypothesis: the higher the degree of Europeanisation in a country, the more right-wing the economic positions of its social democratic party.

A number of different operationalisations of European integration can be found in the literature. For instance, some rely on different versions of the 'index of European institutional integration' (EURII) (e.g., Dorrucci et al. 2002; Mongelli, Dorrucci and Agur 2005; Krieger-Boden and Soltwedel 2013; Emanuele 2018[b]). This is a continuous measure, capturing the degree of economic integration of EU member states and countries such as Norway and Switzerland that, despite not belonging to the EU formally, share a certain degree of integration with some EU member states. Whilst being able to produce fine-grained scores, this measure is however problematic for the purposes of this thesis as it only captures economic aspects of European integration, hence being unsuited to properly operationalise Europeanisation as the specific form of political globalisation conceptualised here. Others have measured more specific aspects of this phenomenon, such as how European integration impacts domestic policies through the legislative output of national parliaments (e.g., Töller 2010) and even the impact of European integration on the practices of everyday life (e.g., Delhey et al. 2014). However, not even these measures capture the elements of Europeanisation as a form of political globalisation that are of interest here.

Hence, to do so, I develop a trichotomic ordinal measure of *Europeanisation* that operationalises the three fundamental conditions of countries vis-à-vis European integration. That is, the variable ranges between 0 and 2, with value 0 assigned to those countries that are not members of the EU or Eurozone; value 1 assigned to those countries that are members of the EU, but not the Eurozone; and value 2 assigned to those countries that are members of both the EU and Eurozone. The scores of *Europeanisation* are assigned with reference to the condition of a country vis-à-vis this process at the time of the observation (that is, the specific election considered). Further, in order to properly capture the moment in which the constraints imposed by different degrees of European integration exert an impact on party economic positions when drafting electoral manifestos, the variable is measured in the year preceding the observed electoral year.

Summary statistics (as per Table 6.1) illustrate how, on average, Western European countries within the thesis' dataset tend to be members of the EU (the pooled mean value being 1.21). However, there

is considerable variation across both space and, as it will be shown shortly, time, testified by both the relatively large pooled standard deviation (0.78) and the minimum and maximum values of *Europeanisation* (0, no membership in the EU or Eurozone, and 2, membership in both the EU and Eurozone) being present in the dataset.

Figure 6.3 displays the values taken on by *Europeanisation* over time in each analysed country, allowing for some important considerations. In general, most countries show at least some degree of European integration, with 16 out of 20 being at least EU members and roughly two out of three (13) also being Eurozone members. Further, two broad trends can be identified: either the degree of countries' European integration progressively increases over time, or it stays the same over the three investigated decades. Indeed, Iceland, Malta, Norway, and Switzerland remain non-members of EU institutions and frameworks (0) throughout the timeframe, whilst Denmark and the United Kingdom are only members of the EU but not the Eurozone (1). This means that no case of European

Figure 6.3. Values of *Europeanisation* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

disintegration is actually measured.[40] Finally, the data also clearly reflects the different pace of Europeanisation in those national contexts where it constitutes an incremental process, being quicker (hence with a steeper slope) in those countries that became both EU and Eurozone members during the analysed timeframe (Austria, Cyprus, and Finland) compared to founding or longstanding members of the EU (e.g., Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) or countries that only joined the EU, but not the Eurozone (Sweden).

6.2.4 Economic forms of globalisation ('Economic globalisation')

The last longer-term determinant analysed here is economic in nature, as it concerns the economic aspects of globalisation. The literature investigating the impact of economic globalisation on the economic positions of social democrats is divided. Two sides to this theoretical debate can be identified: the 'efficiency and the 'compensation' theses (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016). The former posits that economic globalisation will induce parties, and especially social democratic formations (e.g., Lachat and Kriesi 2007; Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen 2011), to converge towards neoliberal economic positions (e.g., Rodrik 1997; Iversen 1999; Milner and Judkins 2004; Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny 2005; Hellwig 2016). It will do so by means of the external constraint and political pressure put on domestic politics by the increased economic interaction and interdependence at the supranational level (e.g., Steiner and Martin 2012) deriving from, indeed, the political aspect of membership in IOs and relevant frameworks (e.g., Chang and Lee 2012). The political consequence of all this is a movement of parties' economic positions towards less taxation, greater freedom for corporations, lower market regulation (e.g., Wilson and Wildasin 2004; Ganghof 2006; Plümper, Troeger and Winner 2009) and, importantly for social democratic formations, less encompassing welfare state structures (e.g. Kurzer 1993; Strange 1996; Ross 2000; Piazza 2001; Sinn

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[40] This is because the two British elections following the United Kingdom's EU Referendum of 24 June 2016 that determined the country's exit from the EU (8 June 2017 and 12 December 2019) both occurred before this event formally occurred, that is on 31 January 2020. Therefore, during both electoral contests, the United Kingdom was still formally a member of the EU.

2002; Hellwig and Samuels 2007). Conversely, it is exactly moving from this last point that the 'compensation thesis' perspective argues for an exacerbation of the traditionally leftist social democratic parties' economic positions. This is because such formations will be tied by the stances and constituencies they traditionally represent, as well as by actors such as trade unions (e.g., Pierson P. 1994; Pierson C. 2001) to reinforce national welfare states in the face of supranational dynamics endangering it (e.g., Boix 1998; Garrett 1998; Swank 2002; Burgoon 2012). Others even argue for a generalised movement to the economic left of all parties in face of greater economic globalisation (e.g., Adam and Ftergioti 2019), as such economic positions have become increasingly popular with voters over time (e.g., Walter 2010).

Albeit the relevant literature is, as shown, rather divided, I ultimately opt for testing the more mainstream 'efficiency' viewpoint in its empirical analysis, hence formulating the related Hp. 4 positing that the more economically globalised the country, the more to the right the economic positions of the social democratic party.

As with political globalisation, the key data source to measure economic globalisation is the KOF Globalisation Index. Specifically, it employs the general index of 'Economic Globalisation (KOFEcGl)' that captures all aspects of interest concerned with the two subcomponents of trade (imports, exports, tariff regimes, and free trade agreements) and financial globalisation (international transactions and investments, related agreements and restrictions, and capital account openness). As per above, this is also a continuous measure ranging between 1 (least globalised) and 100 (most globalised), included in the analysis as the *Economic globalisation* variable. Further, the national levels of this variable are also measured in the year preceding the electoral year of any given observation.

Summary statistics reported in Table 6.1 show how contemporary Western Europe is rather economically globalised, as indicated by the pooled mean (76.25) and standard deviation (9.12) values, although not quite as much as it is politically. This may be related to further economic globalisation following from further political globalisation, which as said sets the frameworks and

rules for international economic interactions. Further, whilst the minimum reported value of economic globalisation observed in the dataset (45.95 in 1990 Greece) is relatively comparable to the political one, differently from political globalisation no country ever reaches or gets close to the maximum possible score of *Economic globalisation* (the highest observation, Luxembourg in 2004, amounting to 91.54), indicating that there is still quite some room for further international economic integration.

Yet, largely similar trends between the two forms of globalisation emerge when looking at Figure 6.4, which reports the evolution over time of *Economic globalisation* in the analysed countries. That is, the economic levels of globalisation also linearly increase the further we move forward in time in almost all European countries (but the Maltese exception, for which however only two time points are available). Likewise, there are vastly different rates of this increase in economic globalisation, with slopes being steeper for those historically more isolated countries that started from lower levels at the beginning of the analysed timeframe (above all, the 'third-wave' Cypriot, Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish democracies, and Iceland),[41] and vice versa in already highly economically globalised national contexts such as those in the 'Benelux' area and countries with a longstanding free-market approach to the economy and trade (e.g., Ireland) (Hall and Soskice 2001). Further, in this case too, significant differences in the levels of economic globalisation across Western European national contexts persist throughout the analysed timeframe, particularly with some more isolated cases (e.g., Iceland) and especially Southern European countries (most of all Greece and Italy, but also Portugal and Spain) lagging behind.[42] In general, however, even these discrepancies in Western European countries' degree of economic globalisation are recorded to a lower extent than in the political form, reinstating the overall differences between these two aspects of the same phenomenon.

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[41] As per the previous chapters, the definition of 'third-wave democracies' is from the seminal work by Huntington (1991).
[42] For potential socio-economic and cultural explanations behind lower levels of economic globalisation in Southern Europe, see Ferrera (2000).

Figure 6.4. Values of *Economic globalisation* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

6.3 Operationalisation of shorter-term determinants and descriptive analyses

6.3.1 Party competition from the radical left and right ('Competitive RLPs' and 'Competitive RRPs')

Moving on to the second, temporally and causally most proximal group of shorter-term determinants of the parties' economic left-right positions, this too includes both electoral factors and economic aspects. Starting with the former, three aspects are of substantive interest to this thesis: the presence of competitive electoral opponents of the radical left and right; the government or opposition status of the social democratic party, and the ideological leaning of the dominant internal faction. The operationalisation of all three such election-specific factors will now be discussed.

First, the literature illustrates how the presence of electorally competitive formations from both the radical left (RLPs) and radical right (RRPs) exerts an impact on the programmatic profile of mainstream parties (e.g., Meguid 2005; Dilling 2018) and especially social democrats (e.g., Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010). Despite some contrasting opinions in the literature, the most widespread argument emerging from the review of the relevant literature in Chapter 3 with regard to electorally competitive RLPs and RRPs is that both push social democratic parties' economic positions further to the left. Indeed, on the one hand more economically left-wing RLPs will influence the positions of social democrats along this issue dimension as parties tend to respond to the other formations belonging to same broad (in this case, leftist) political area (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). On the other, by catering to the 'losers' of globalisation (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2008) and channelling their economic discontent (Angelucci and De Sio 2021), electorally competitive RRPs will force social democratic parties to react by recalibrating their economic platforms further to the left, particularly through greater emphasis on welfare and reduced support for free-market economics (e.g., Salo and Rydgren 2018; Krause 2020; Krause and Giebler 2020). Therefore, a twofold hypothesis could be derived on this matter, with Hp. 5a positing that the presence of electorally competitive RLPs will lead to more economically left-wing positions of social democratic parties, whilst Hp. 5b expects the presence of competitive RRPs to have the same leftwards effect on social democratic parties' economic positions.

The electoral competitiveness of radical parties has so far been operationalised in either of two ways by relevant works. The first is to look at the electoral support obtained by such formations in national contests (e.g., Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020). However, this measure incurs several issues (e.g., Krause and Giebler 2020). For a start, RLPs and RRPs have different sizes, measured in terms of electoral performance, in different countries, which makes vote shares and their variation between different elections a hardly comparable indicator. Further, improvements in electoral performance do not necessarily signal to mainstream parties that the radical formation now constitutes a force to be reckoned with in terms of electoral competition, as this lower bound of success needs to be integrated

by looking at the legislative arena and the representation threshold (Rokkan 1970). Hence, a second alternative emerged in the literature, whereby the electoral competitiveness of radical parties is operationalised through the dichotomisation of whether the radical party accesses parliamentary representation, as making it into parliament 'signals to other parties that they are a credible challenger that has proven the necessary capacity for a minimum amount of electoral success' (Abou-Chadi and Immergut 2019, 707).

I hence adopt the latter approach, as it is a more harmonised measure of radical parties' electoral competitiveness that better operationalises the conceptualised link between the presence of such competitive formations and the economic positions of social democratic parties. Hence, it constructs two dummy variables, *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs*, operationalising whether the radical left and radical right bloc, respectively, were represented by at least one party that managed to access parliamentary representation in the considered election (1) or not (0). The parties that were considered as belonging to the radical left and radical right blocs were, respectively, those coded as 'far left' and 'far right' in the PopuList's (Rooduijn et al. 2019) classification,[43] whilst data on access to parliamentary seats were provided by the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2020).[44] Further, to properly capture the moment in which RLPs or RRPs constitute a significant electoral force to be reckoned with whilst drafting party manifestos during electoral campaigns, the reported values for both indicators are measured for the election under observation, and not by reporting the lagged value from the previous electoral contest.[45]

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[43] The latest version (2.0) of the PopuList dataset was employed.

[44] Notice that there are two RLP exceptions to this selection criteria: the People's Alliance (*Alþýðubandalagið*) in the 1999 Icelandic election, which was not counted as an RLP because it ran in a unitary electoral coalition with more moderate parties from the social democratic and feminist left; and *Sinn Fein* in the United Kingdom, which was never considered due to its policy of Irish Republican abstentionism from the British parliament.

[45] This is because the ability to enter parliament in the previous election does not automatically translate into the electoral competitiveness of RLPs and RRPs during the current electoral cycle, especially if the legislature ran its full course. This element of present competitiveness is much better captured by a non-lagged indicator, as it will emerge during the current electoral campaign whether such blocs constitute competitive enough opponents in order to access legislative representation in a given election. Still, as will be illustrated in detail in Chapter 7 on the statistical analysis, a replication analysis with the *Competitive RLP* and *Competitive RRP* variables lagged to the previous election substantively confirms the results of this thesis.

The summary statistics on these two indicators reported in Table 6.1 show how, on average, the radical left bloc in Western Europe seems to be more electorally competitive than its radical right counterpart during the analysed three decades, with the former taking value 1 in roughly three-quarters of cases versus around just more than half of all instances for the latter (the pooled mean values being, respectively, 0.74 and 0.55). This may be compatible with the fact that, whilst overall they were on the rise for a longer time, the real spike in electoral support for RRPs is only a relatively recent phenomenon that occurred in the latter years of the analysed timeframe (e.g., Rooduijn 2015). Further, RLPs seem to be consistently more competitive compared to RRPs, as testified by the smaller pooled standard deviation (0.44 versus 0.5).

Figures 6.5 and 6.6, which report the temporal evolution of *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs* in the analysed countries, aid the interpretation of these statistics by highlighting important differences between the two blocs. Indeed, competitive RLPs are a longstanding and constant feature

Figure 6.5. Values of *Competitive RLPs* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

Figure 6.6. Values of *Competitive RRPs* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

of twice as many Western European party systems (60%, 12 out of 20) than RRPs (30%, six out of

12). Conversely, in half of the analysed national contexts, competitive RRPs are a relatively recent

characteristic of domestic party competition in contemporary Western Europe, emerging at some

point during the last 30 years and most of the times, as highlighted by the relevant literature (e.g.,

Stockemer 2015), during the 2010s. In this regard, the radical left is more volatile in its electoral

competitiveness in a few national contexts (e.g., Italy, Luxembourg, and Switzerland), whilst

disappearing altogether in Iceland and the United Kingdom over the analysed timeframe. This results

in the radical right bloc being competitive in roughly the same number of Western European party

systems (the vast majority: 75%, 15 out of 20) compared to its leftist counterpart (16 out of 20),

despite the different starting situations. Finally, it is interesting to note how RLPs are never electorally

competitive in Austria (and, despite the scarcity of available data points, Malta), whilst RRPs are only found in this situation in the small contexts of Iceland, Ireland, and Luxembourg (and, again, Malta).

6.3.2 Government versus opposition ('Government status')

A second election-specific factor that may influence the economic positions adopted by social democratic formations when drafting their party manifestos is their government or opposition status during electoral campaigns. In this regard, the main line of argument emerging from the review of the literature in Chapter 3 concerns the 'responsibility' side of the 'responsiveness versus responsibility' (RR) dilemma (e.g., Mair 2008[a], 2009, 2011 2013; Lefkofridi and Nezi 2014). Indeed, as already outlined, this theoretical framework posits that, in an era of global governance through multilevel institutional settings, government parties in Western Europe will be limited in the scope of policies they can adopt by the external constraints deriving from the embedment in supranational institutions and frameworks and the related transnational processes (also see Plescia, Kritzinger, and De Sio 2019). This equates to a moderation of economic policy in particular, with a (rightwards, in the case of social democratic parties) convergence towards neo-liberal stances. Hence, because they are accountable to both external and internal actors, governing parties are unlikely to greatly depart from such positions, as they could hardly follow through on them in terms of policy output once in government, with the consequent lack of credibility in the eyes of the electorate that this would entail. The opposite reasoning, instead, applies to political formations in the opposition, which are freer to formulate their own policy positions as they are not bound by such 'responsibility' concerns. Hence, Hp. 6 formulates a straightforward expectation: if in government, social democratic parties will adopt more right-wing economic positions; conversely, if in the opposition, social democratic parties will adopt more left-wing economic positions.

Differently from more complex concepts such as, for instance, governmental power (e.g., Bartolini 1998), government status – i.e., the decisive factor in the 'responsibility' dynamics within the mechanism posited by the RR dilemma – can be operationalised through an indicator reflecting the

fundamental dichotomisation of this concept (e.g., Emanuele 2021). Therefore, a *Government status* dummy variable was constructed, taking value 1 if the social democratic party is in government during the cabinet under which the observed election occurs, in order to properly capture the moment in which this factor influences party positions when drafting an electoral manifesto; and taking value 0 otherwise. Data on government participation is taken from the ParlGov database.

Social democratic parties have been in government during the majority of the observed electoral campaigns in contemporary Western Europe, as shown by the summary statistics in Table 6.1 (the pooled mean value being 0.58). Overall, in spite of the ongoing electoral decline of social democratic parties (see, e.g., Benedetto, Hix, and Mastrorocco 2020; Delwit 2021), this is not surprising, given that over the twentieth century this party family has managed to solidify itself as a core component (Smith 1989) of the national party systems across the region (Keman 2017). Still, the relatively sizeable pooled standard deviation (0.49) points to considerable variation across spatial and temporal contexts, which is worth exploring further.

Figure 6.7 allows doing so, by illustrating the temporal evolution of *Government status* in the analysed countries. As evident, excluding the peculiar Swiss collegiate government model (e.g., Fleiner 2006) because of which the social democratic party always partakes in the executive during the analysed timeframe, alternation over time between government and opposition status for the social democrats seems to be the norm in all Western European countries; with a rather balanced division between countries in which *Government status* linearly increases (11) and decreases (8) over time. Still, this also means that during the observed three decades social democracy accesses the executive power in all countries in the region: a testament to the resilience of its relevance within Western European party systems. On average, social democracy is more likely to be in government during the cabinets under which electoral contests occur in Continental (e.g., Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, and the Netherlands) and Northern European (e.g., Norway, Sweden, and Finland) contexts. Conversely, its executive relevance is weaker in particular in the contexts of the British Isles, due to both the UK Labour only being in government with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown 'Third Way'

Figure 6.7. Values of *Government status* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

cabinets during the analysed timeframe and the Irish Labour traditionally being smaller than most of the other instances of mainstream left parties in the region.

6.3.3 Internal factions and their ideological leaning ('Dominant faction')

The final election-specific element to be taken into consideration is the ideological leaning of the dominant internal faction within social democratic parties. Recall from Chapter 3 how such formations in the Western European region can be rather composite, often uniting very different political cultures, traditions, and consequently ideological leanings. It is, hence, fundamentally important to keep this perspective in mind when measuring party positions through electoral manifestos, because of how these documents are drafted. Indeed, one may argue that the position of

the party and that of its dominant internal faction along a given issue dimension should be endogenous, as the former should reflect the latter. However, albeit the importance of accounting for intra-party dynamics has been long recognised in the literature (see, e.g., Duverger 1963; Sartori 1976), as Lo, Proksch, and Slapin (2016, 592-593) effectively put it 'empirical and theoretical work on party competition, coalition formation and policy making has tended to treat parties as unitary actors', and especially 'work on estimating positions from election manifestos has not emphasized the fact that the content of policy programs is the result of meshing different, and often competing, views'. Manifesto drafting is, indeed, a collective effort that needs to cater to diverse constituencies (e.g., Däubler 2012), especially with large left-wing parties such as social democrats which will have multiple inputs and formal veto points (e.g., the approval of lower-level committees and the party congress) along the way (e.g., Dolezal et al. 2012). Therefore, in view of this process, that the ideological leaning of the dominant faction translates into the positions adopted by the party as a whole (and the extent to which it does) is to be confirmed empirically, rather than to be taken for granted. The lack of empirical evidence on this front, especially from a longitudinal and comparative viewpoint, makes such an effort all the more important (e.g., Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald 2010; Fagerholm 2016; Steiner and Mader 2019).

From a theoretical viewpoint, the general expectation is that – of course – the ideological leaning of the dominant faction will play an important role in shaping the programmatic profile of a party (e.g., Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003; Medzihorsky, Littvay, and Jenne 2014). Despite the scarcity of works corroborating this hypothesised general link, the thesis was still in the position of deriving an intuitive working hypothesis to then guide this novel empirical assessment, which will constitute an important contribution to the intraparty politics and party competition literatures. That is, Hp. 7 expects that if the dominant faction of the social democratic party is leftist, its economic positions will be more to the left; conversely, if the dominant faction of the social democratic party is centrist, its economic positions will be more to the right.

An additional complication on the operationalisation front is represented by the well-known lack of extensive data on the numerical and ideological nature of factions across Western European countries (e.g., Dewan and Squintani 2016; Steiner and Mader 2019), with available sources being extremely limited in their spatial or temporal coverage (e.g., Debus and Bräuninger 2009; Giannetti and Laver 2009; Spirling and Quinn 2010; Ceron 2012; Schumacher et al. 2019). Collecting data that covers all countries within the Western European region for three decades is, therefore, not an easy task. To do so, I qualitatively assessed several different sources, such as academic articles and books, governmental and party webpages, historical and secondary sources, and mainstream media outlets to construct a *Dominant faction* predictor.[46] This is a dummy variable taking value 1 if, according to the information gathered through the consulted sources, the dominant faction leading the social democratic party during the campaign of the considered election is centrist, meaning that it has socio-economic stances that are social-liberal or heavily inspired by neoliberal paradigms, as for instance in 'Third Way' social democracy, in terms of free-market economics and welfare policies; and value 0 if the dominant faction is, instead, leftist, meaning more traditional social democratic-, democratic socialist-, or socialist-leaning, and hence displaying more traditionally Keynesian socio-economic stances and approaches to social policy and state intervention in the economy.[47]

The summary statistics for *Dominant faction*, reported in Table 6.1, indicate that in two out of three cases contemporary Western European parties were led by centrist, more moderate internal groups (pooled mean value being 0.66). This is consistent with the reported ideological evolution and moderation of this party family over time (e.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Adams et al. 2004; Mair, Müller and Plasser 2004; Keman and Pennings 2006; Dalton 2013; Evans and Tilley 2013) and

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[46] The full list of sources that were consulted to construct the *Dominant faction* variable is available in Table A5 in the Appendix.

[47] Where no information on such dominant factions was available, the profile and policy orientations of the party leader were considered instead, under the assumption that to stay in power the party leader requires at least to be backed by the majority of party officials. In a few instances, however, even clear information on the stances of party leaders was hard to come by. In such cases, by relying on the sources listed in Table A5, I used the information on the overall economic leaning and policy profile of the party in given years as a proxy for operationalising the economic positions of the dominant faction. Whilst it must be acknowledged that these criteria only allow for a second-best operationalisation, they at least make it possible to gather some informalisation concerning this interesting intra-party dimension, in the aforementioned ascertained lack of any consistent comparative and longitudinal data.

the mid-1990s to early-2000s period corresponding to the heyday of the Third Way (e.g., Giddens 1998), hence contributing to this configuration. However, similarly to other variables, the relatively sizeable pooled standard deviation (0.47) points to significant differences within the dataset, to be further explored from a longitudinal and country-specific perspective.

Figure 6.8 reports the temporal evolution of *Dominant faction* in the analysed countries. The most interesting descriptive finding to notice, as indicated by the lowess lines, is that, in most cases when the ideological leaning of the dominant faction changes, Western European social democratic parties tend to be led by centrist groups during the heyday of the Third Way, i.e. usually starting from the mid-1990s and up until the early- or mid-2000s. Conversely, the majority of such cases see a consequent recalibration towards a more left-leaning leadership, especially during the 2010s. Overall, the linear trends illustrate how in 60% of Western European party systems (12 out of 20) the

Figure 6.8. Values of *Dominant faction* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

leadership of social democratic parties becomes more leftist over time, whilst the opposite only occurs in three cases (Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg).

6.3.4 The levels of national sovereign debt ('Debt')

The final shorter-term predictor of substantive interest here is economic in nature and concerns the level of national sovereign debt in contemporary Western European countries. This is because, albeit evidently being a fundamental and very impactful factor within the analysed timeframe in light of the massive European sovereign debt crisis that started in the late-2000s (e.g., Lane 2012), the impact of different debtor positions between countries in the regions on the economic positions of parties with legitimate government aspirations such as social democratic formations has been largely neglected by scholars.

Based on the scarce empirical evidence currently available in the literature, two different viewpoints on this matter seem to emerge. On the one hand, some argue that higher levels of national debt push party positions on the economic issue dimension further to the right. This seems to apply especially in the case of mainstream parties (e.g., Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2015) such as social democrats, with this economic condition translating into a greater need for balanced budgets and austerity politics from a positional viewpoint (Bremer 2018). On the other, higher debt levels are also linked to more left-wing economic positions, with parties drawn closer to such stances because of the anti-austerity attitudes of voters (Maatsch 2014). Evidence shows how this leftwards shift seems to be particularly applicable to social democratic parties, which will push for greater economic growth, more market regulation, and higher corporate taxes to fend off the debt crisis (e.g., Clift 2013; Salo and Rydgren 2018). In light of this debate and divided literature, I opted to empirically gauge the hypothesis whereby higher levels of national sovereign debt are an 'external constraint' on parties' economic policy proposals and hence force them to aim for the typically economic-right objective of debt reduction. On this basis, I hence presented Hp. 8, which presents the expectation of higher debt levels pushing social democratic parties' economic positions further to the right.

There are several reliable sources providing data on countries' sovereign debt, including the OECD and WB. Amongst these, I relied on the IMF's Global Debt Dataset (GDD), as it provides the most extensive spatial-temporal coverage of all by collecting related information on most world countries between 1950 and 2020.[48] The IMF's GDD presents several indicators of private and public debt, and amongst the latter I selected 'Central Government Debt (Percent of GDP)' to operationalise the *Debt* predictor included in the analysis. This is a continuous variable representing the total stock of debt liabilities issued by the central government as a share of national GDP. As with other independent variables above, the indicator of sovereign debt is also measured in the year preceding the electoral year of the observation, so as to properly capture the moment in which it influences the economic positions of parties when drafting electoral manifestos.

Summary statistics on *Debt*, available in Table 6.1, report interesting information. For a start, whilst contemporary Western European countries have a debt-to-GDP ratio of roughly 2:3 as indicated by the pooled mean value (62.13), the relatively sizeable pooled standard deviation (36.07) points to considerable variation within the data. This hunch is further reinforced by looking at the minimum and maximum values available in the dataset. Indeed, the former is close to zero (1.66%) and recorded in the small and traditionally very open Luxembourg economy (e.g., Stráský and Wurzel 2015) before the late-2000s European sovereign debt crisis; whilst the latter skyrockets close to 200% (181.43) in 2015 Greece, at the apex of Europe's worst downturn and with the country facing sovereign default despite the ongoing bailout programme (e.g., Micheal-Matsas 2015).

Such a picture is integrated by looking at the evolution of this variable in each analysed country, as per Figure 6.9. Indeed, significant cross-country differences emerge both in the temporal evolution and, consequently, in the levels of sovereign debt recorded in the aftermath of the late-2000s crisis in the region. In the early 1990s, all countries but Belgium and Italy presented a debt-to-GDP ratio well below 100%: however, significant differentiation would then ensue both in terms of the direction and

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[48] The only exception within the thesis' dataset is data for the Netherlands, which is absent from the IMF's GDD. This is hence taken from Eurostat.

the pace of the evolution of national sovereign debts over time.

In terms of linear trends, as expected given the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis at the end of the timeframe, debt levels increase in the vast majority, three out of four, Western European countries (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom). Instead, overall debt levels decrease (to just below a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio) in Belgium, a geopolitically fundamental country in Europe that started from high levels of debt in the early 1990s; in three strong Northern economies such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; and in the economic and financial unicum of Switzerland. When it comes to the rate of change in sovereign debt levels, this has been rather slow in most Western European countries, with particularly flat slopes in Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

Figure 6.9. Values of *Debt* by country. Linear fit and lowess.

Conversely, where there was a steep (upwards) trend in the evolution of sovereign debt levels is in the Cypriot, Greek, and Portuguese (and, to a lesser extent, Spanish) contexts, especially due to the sharp increases from the late-2000s onwards indicated by the lowess lines. This is not surprising, as the Southern European region was hit the hardest by the European sovereign debt crisis and all these countries were subsequently bailed out in the 2010s.[49] The partial exception to this trend is Italy, insofar as its increase in sovereign debt levels has been less sudden: indeed, this country was the only one alongside Belgium (which has instead managed to reduce its sovereign debt over time) to start from a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 100% in the early 1990s. The end result is hence similar, with the Italian debt level comparable with those of fellow Southern European countries in the late-2010s. Therefore, this leads to an overall post-crisis situation whereby very high levels of sovereign debt, that is around or above a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio, are recorded in Southern European and a few other countries (Belgium and the United Kingdom), with the vast majority of the other countries, especially in Northern and Continental Europe, below or well below a 50% debt-to-GDP ratio.

6.4 Control variables

As mentioned above, a number of shorter-term political and economic factors have also been included in the analysis as control variables. In the first group it is possible to find the overall ideological movement of party systems between elections, as this may influence the economic positions of social democratic parties. The concept employed here is that of the ideological 'centre of gravity' of party systems: that is, the mean party position of formations within a party system along a specific issue dimension (e.g., Gross and Sigelman 1984), such as the economic left-right. This centre of gravity signals possible changes in the overall configuration of contestation within a party system between

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[49] The British case is also remarkable as, despite not being in Southern Europe and presenting a vastly different, liberal market economy (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001), it almost perfectly mirrors both the levels of and trajectory of change in the sovereign debt of Spain. Further, these features are also somewhat shared, although to a lesser extent, by France.

electoral contests, with individual formations expected to mirror such movements along the analysed issue dimension (for instance, leftwards or rightwards on economic issues). To operationalise it, a *Centre of gravity* variable has been constructed by taking the difference between the mean value of the deductive economic left-right index for the party system excluding the social democratic party in the observed election, and the same value at the previous election. Similarly to the summative nature of the deductive economic left-right index itself, this is then a continuous measure in which negative values indicate a systemic leftwards movement along the economic issue dimension, and vice versa with positive values. Further, the larger the size of the scores, the more marked the leftwards or rightwards systemic movement between elections. The summary statistics on *Centre of gravity* reported in Table 6.1 provide interesting information. Indeed, the pooled mean value is only slightly negative (-1.49), and hence leftwards, but very close to 0: indicating that, on average, these systemic movements tend to cancel each other out. Further, the comparatively sizeable pooled standard deviation (6.92) indicates that there is considerable variation across the analysed spatial-temporal framework, with systemic movements along the economic issue dimension both to the left and the right. These can even be rather extreme, as testified by the large extreme values ('leftwards' minimum of -32.71 and 'rightwards' maximum of 25.17).

Further, the literature suggests that the government aspiration of parties could also influence their programmatic outlook and, hence, economic left-right positions. More specifically, it was shown how parties that have legitimate aspirations to govern will on average adopt more centrist profiles, both in general terms (Schumacher et al. 2015) and with regard to social democracy in its Third Way variant (Keman 2011). Several mechanisms underpin the decision of moderating the respective ideological stances, including the illustrated 'responsibility' dynamics of governing parties in Western Europe in an 'RR dilemma' framework and the possibility of maximising the coalition potential vis-à-vis possible partners. In empirical works, parties' government aspiration has been measured by calculating the ratio of the years a party has been in office over the total number of years in which that party has been observed in a given dataset (e.g., Schumacher et al. 2015): hence, through a

continuous bound variable ranging between 0 and 1 (i.e., a proportion), in which higher values indicate higher government aspiration, and vice versa. To construct the *Government aspiration* variable, I slightly modify this operationalisation by considering, rather than the ratio of the years spent in government over all observed years, the proportion of cabinets of which the social democratic party was part over all observed cabinets in a given country.[50] Whilst maintaining all the properties of the indicator employed by previous works, this refinement allows for more precise and fine-grained measurement, by accounting for the fact that multiple cabinets may occur within the same year. Data is taken from the ParlGov database, and the temporal baseline is constituted by the first year available for the analysed country in this source or, if later, the first year in which the social democratic party (or its direct predecessor) existed. Further, to properly model the cumulative nature of this operationalisation of government aspiration, the logged version of this variable is included in the regression analyses. Table 6.1, instead, reports the summary statistics for the unlogged variant of *Government aspiration*.

Amongst shorter-term economic controls, it is important to look at whether the analysed observation occurs in a country that underwent a bailout during the late-2000s financial crisis. This is because such comprehensive economic assistance and recovery programmes forced governing parties, often social democratic parties, to adhere to strict austerity measures and conditionalities, as well as to perform extensive structural reforms: hence, exercising a strong and rightwards external constraint vis-à-vis their economic positions (e.g., Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2014; Ezrow and Hellwig 2014; Karyotis, Rüdig, and Judge 2014; Clements, Nanou, and Real-Dato 2016). On this basis, a *Bailout* dummy variable was constructed by assigning value 1 to all observations that occur in a country that underwent a bailout programme, and value 0 otherwise. In order to capture the moment in which the recovery programme impacts the economic positions of social democratic

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[50] Notice that the potential additional indicator to operationalise government aspiration is provided by the MARPOR, its 'per305' on 'Political Authority', is unsuitable for this analysis as it collapses the scores of several different subcodes also operationalising unrelated concepts (e.g., 'personal competence', 'strong government', 'pro-democratic elites'). Further, the most appropriate out of these subcodes, the 'per305.1' on 'Party Competence', provides too few observations, as it is only measured well inside the 2010s in most countries (all details in the MARPOR codebook, Volkens et al. 2021).

parties, value 1 was assigned only to those observations in which the electoral manifestos are published after the adoption of the bailout programme, hence including within the same year (e.g., Portugal in 2011, with the manifesto of the *Partido Socialista* published in April and the bailout programme initiated in May).[51] Moreover, to account for the lasting political impact of these momentous events, value 1 is also assigned to the observations following the completion of the recovery programmes in the countries that underwent such bailouts. The very low pooled mean value reported in the summary statistics in Table 6.1 (0.08) indicates how roughly one-tenth of the observations present a *Bailout* value of 1. This makes sense, as the only countries in which such programmes were put in place are Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain in the 2010s.

Next, and finally, are economic issues traditionally owned (Petrocik 1996) by the political left: unemployment and income inequality. When these socio-economic conditions are unfavourable, that is with higher levels of both income unemployment and income inequality, parties of the left such as social democrats are expected to shift their economic positions further to the left (e.g., Müller 2009), in order to pursue their historical mission of making societies more egalitarian (e.g., Bobbio 1997). Hence, two variables have been included. First is an *Unemployment* continuous variable, which measures the percentage share of the unemployed over the total labour force in a given country. Here, higher values correspond to greater unemployment, and vice versa. Data is from the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Second is an *Income inequality* indicator, which is a continuous variable capturing the percentage share of the top-10% of the national income distribution of a given country, with higher values meaning higher income inequality and vice versa. Data is from the World Inequality Database (WID).[52] The summary statistics in Table 6.1 indicate that, as expected, the observed values of both *Unemployment* and *Income inequality* are in a much narrower range than theoretically possible (minimum and maximum values for the two variables being 2.12 and 26.49 for the former, and 24.71 and 45.59 for the latter). Further, pooled mean values indicate an average of

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[51] Replications in which *Bailout* takes value 1 if the manifesto is published in the same year in which the bailout programme is triggered, regardless of which of the two events is temporally antecedent, confirm the results of the thesis.
[52] Notice that this variable has been rescaled to ease the interpretation of the results.

almost one out of 10 members of the labour force (8.02) being unemployed across the region and around one-third of national income distributions being in the hands of the top 10% of earners (32.79). However, whilst there seems to be a degree of uniformity in terms of income inequality (standard deviation being 3.28), the unemployment situation appears more differentiated across the analysed spatial-temporal framework, as indicated by the relatively sizeable standard deviation value of 4.77.

6.5 The determinants from a diachronic perspective

This chapter introduced the operationalisation of the determinants of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions, illustrating some initial descriptive analyses. It now concludes by presenting additional evidence linking these determinants of different party positions at the individual level to the subsequent varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate level. Indeed, as per both the theoretical argument made in Chapter 3 and the regression equations presented in Chapter 4, different levels of ideological differentiation internal to the social democratic party family will depend on how differentiated the economic positions of the individual parties are, which is in turn determined by the different values of the analysed determinants. This means that, from both a theoretical and a methodological viewpoint, if all the illustrated conditions were to be the same, we would have the realistic expectation of all social democratic economic left-right positions also being the same. However, given that this is unlikely to be the case in an empirical reality made up of comparable yet vastly different national contexts, it is important to explore further evidence on this matter.

To give a sense of how the different such contexts grow increasingly similar or further apart at the different points making up the analysed time frame, and hence how this could impact the economic positions of social democratic parties in the hypothesised directions and subsequently intrafamily ideological differentiation, Figure 6.10 analyses the temporal patterns of statistical dispersion concerning the independent variables. That is, it shows how the pooled standard deviation values of

each determinant have evolved over time in the Western European region, meaning that the higher such values, the more differentiated the related national contexts vis-à-vis that predictor, and vice versa. Given the illustrated vast differences in the operationalisation and measurement of such variables, these have all been standardised first, in order to ensure that they are mutually comparable. This evidence is interesting, pointing already to some preliminary conjectures as to what may cause the varyingly close or distant economic positioning of Western European social democratic parties at different points in the analysed timeframe. For a start, national contexts grow increasingly similar in terms of globalisation, both political and economic, as the pooled standard deviation values of these two variables decrease over time. This is not surprising, as this Western region spearheads the cumulative process of globalisation, which reinforces itself over time due to both the expansion of its

Figure 6.10. Temporal evolution of pooled standard deviations of (standardised) independent variables. Linear fit and lowess.

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institutional and regulatory frameworks and the subsequent, ever-increasing economic interactions and interdependence. Conversely, Western European countries become increasingly differentiated during the analysed three decades in terms of Europeanisation, due to both the Eurozone entering the picture for a selection of countries only around the turn of the millennium and some countries joining European institutions and frameworks along the way; and, especially, in terms of sovereign debt levels, with cross-country differences becoming especially prominent after the late-2000s crisis, as shown by the lowess line. Further, social democratic parties in Western Europe seem to become increasingly differentiated over time in terms of their internal political dynamics and especially so in the 2010s, most likely pointing to some instances veering back to a more leftist programmatic profile vis-à-vis the previously dominant 'Third Way' model. Instead, relative stability in terms of cross-country differentiation over time is recorded in (as expected) the national electoral institutions, in the governmental relevance of social democratic parties, and in the configuration of electoral competition in terms of radical opponents, although especially from the late-2000s onwards Western European party systems become less and less differentiated in terms of having competitive RRPs, which – as illustrated – especially rose in the 2010s. In conclusion, this descriptive information on the analysed independent variables and their different configurations will be useful to better understand the link between intrafamily ideological differentiation and its foundation, that is the different economic positions of social democratic parties. The impact of these determinants on the latter is now to be tested empirically.

7. Large-N Analysis (LNA)

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will present the results of the large-N analysis (LNA) of this thesis, in which the determinants of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions are tested. So far, in this thesis I have: reviewed the history and programmatic evolution of electoral socialism and the party family of social democracy in Western Europe, presenting the debate on the degree of its internal ideological heterogeneity (Chapter 2); discussed the determinants of social democratic parties' different economic left-right positions and, hence, the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation (Chapter 3); introduced the research design and methods of the thesis, as well as the dependent variable of its statistical analysis (Chapter 4); illustrated initial descriptive evidence on the phenomenon under study (Chapter 5); and operationalised and descriptively examined the independent variables (Chapter 6). Building on these steps, I will now move to the explanatory level by performing the first stage of the thesis' multimethod research (MMR), regression-based nested analysis design (e.g., Lieberman 2005; Rohlfing 2008), providing a first (Volkens and Klingemann 2002, 166; Camia and Caramani 2012, 50) multivariate analysis of *what* determines the different economic left-right positions of contemporary Western European social democratic parties.

In the remainder of the chapter, I will proceed as follows: first, I will briefly review the theory-driven explanatory framework concerning the determinants of parties' economic left-right positions, the hypotheses derived from it, and the employed independent variables. Second, I will also review the methodological approach chosen for the statistical analysis, whilst corroborating it by means of diagnostic tests. Third, I will present and comment on the main regression models of the analysis, by employing both unstandardised and standardised predictors, the latter allowing for directly comparing effect sizes. Fourth, in light of the vast and differentiated spatial-temporal framework that was adopted, I will look at the variations in the explanatory power of analysis across space, time, and different clusters of substantive relevance. Fifth, I will conclude by not only briefly recapping the

main findings of this thesis' LNA, but also elucidating through descriptive empirical evidence the conclusions that can be drawn from the predictive function of the regression models in terms the different configurations of three fundamental 'external constraints' – *Europeanisation*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Debt* – and their linkage with different degrees of heterogeneity or homogeneity in the economic left-right positions of social democratic parties in contemporary Western Europe, leading into the SNA of this thesis.

7.2 Hypotheses and independent variables

Prior to introducing the results of the statistical analysis, it is first useful to briefly recap the theoretical, operational, and methodological aspects underpinning it.[53] As per the detailed discussion in Chapter 3, this work relies on a vast scholarship to build an explanatory framework of what determines parties' economic left-right positions: the basis of intrafamily ideological differentiation and the variation in this phenomenon. Here, potential determinants were grouped into two blocs of longer- and shorter-term factors, in turn both divided into political and economic ones. Table 7.1 reports this division, as well as the specific independent variables selected for the analysis, the related hypotheses, and the indicators employed to operationalise them.

The first bloc of longer-term determinants of parties' economic left-right positions includes amongst political factors, for a start, the systemic electoral characteristics that constitute the longstanding institutional backdrop regulating and shaping party competition in the analysed national contexts. To this end, the *Majoritarian* predictor operationalises the proportional or majoritarian nature of electoral systems through a dummy variable. The expectation is that majoritarian electoral systems will lead

Table 7.1. Operationalisation of variables and hypotheses related to independent variables.

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[53] When employed, lags and transformations of the independent variables are reported in Table 7.1 (full details in Chapter 6).

	Variable	Type of variable	Data and operationalisation	Hypothesis
Dependent variable	*Individual deviation from party family economic left-right mean at T-1*	Continuous	Both party position and party family mean calculated through the introduced MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index	
Longer-term determinants: Political	*Majoritarian*	Dummy	IPU Parline dataset; 0 if electoral system PR, 1 if electoral system majoritarian	Hp. 1: If 0, + Left; If 1, + Right
	Political globalisation (year T-1)	Continuous	KOF Globalisation Index; 'Political Globalisation, de jure (KOFPolGldj)' variable	Hp. 2: The higher, + Right; the lower, + Left
	Europeanisation (year T-1)	Ordinal	Based on membership of EU and Eurozone of reference country. 0 if none, 1 if only EU, 2 if EU and Eurozone	Hp. 3: The higher, + Right; the lower, + Left
Longer-term determinants: Economic	*Economic globalisation* (year T-1)	Continuous	KOF Globalisation Index; 'Economic Globalisation (KOFEcGl)' variable	Hp. 4: The higher, + Right; the lower, + Left
Shorter-term determinants: Political	*Competitive RLPs*	Dummy	PopuList and ParlGov database. 0 if RLP bloc does not access parliamentary representation, 1 if RLP bloc accesses parliamentary representation	Hp. 5a: If 0, + Right; If 1, + Left
	Competitive RRPs	Dummy	PopuList and ParlGov database. 0 if RRP bloc does not access parliamentary representation, 1 if RRP bloc accesses parliamentary representation	Hp. 5b: If 0, + Right; If 1, + Left
	Government status	Dummy	ParlGov database. 0 if social democratic party not in government during electoral campaign, 1 if social democratic party in government during electoral campaign	Hp. 6: If 0, + Left; If 1, + Right
	Dominant faction	Dummy	Various qualitative and secondary sources. 0 if internal dominant faction of social democratic party leftist, 1 if internal dominant faction of social democratic party centrist	Hp. 7: If 0, + Left; If 1, + Right
Shorter-term determinants: Economic	*Debt* (year T-1)	Continuous	IMF's Global Debt Dataset (GDD), 'Central Government Debt (Percent of GDP)' variable	Hp. 8: The higher, + Right; the lower, + Left
Controls	*Centre of gravity*	Continuous	Difference in party system's (but social democratic party) mean position measured via MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index	
	Government aspiration (logged)	Continuous (bounded)	ParlGov database. Proportion of cabinets in which social democratic party participated over all cabinets in observed country	
	Bailout	Dummy	If observation following a bailout programme of a country: 0 if it does not, 1 if it does	
	Unemployment (year T-1)	Continuous	International Labour Organisation (ILO), percentage share of the unemployed over the total labour force	
	Income inequality (year T-1)	Continuous	World Inequality Database (WID), percentage share of the top-10% of the national income distribution	

social democratic parties to adopt more right-wing economic positions and vice versa for PR systems (e.g., Dow 2011), as per Hp. 1.

Subsequently, this bloc also consists of political variants of globalisation, including the region-specific version of Europeanisation intended as the integration of Western European countries within the institutions and frameworks of the European Union (EU). These have been measured through, respectively, a continuous *Political globalisation* variable from the KOF Globalisation Index (Gygli et al. 2019) and an ordinal *Europeanisation* indicator that operationalises whether the observation occurs in a country that is neither a member of the EU nor the Eurozone (0), a member of the EU but not the Eurozone (1), and a member of both (2). The theoretical expectation, as reflected in Hp. 2 and Hp. 3, is that higher degrees of both will lead to social democratic parties adopting more right-wing positions, and vice versa (e.g., Dorussen and Nanou 2006; Nanou and Dorussen 2013; Karremans and Damhuis 2020; Romeijn 2020).

Longer-term determinants of parties' economic left-right positions that are economic in nature are looked at through economic globalisation. As per above, the continuous *Economic globalisation* variable is also measured by relying on data from the KOF Globalisation index. Here, concerning the impact of economic globalisation on the economic positions of political parties and social democrats in particular, the literature is divided between the 'efficiency' and 'compensation' theses (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016): the former arguing that higher levels of globalisation will have a rightwards effect; the latter making the opposite argument. As per Hp. 4, I adopt and test the more mainstream viewpoint of a rightwards effect of economic globalisation on parties' economic positions.

The second bloc is constituted by shorter-term determinants of parties' economic left-right positions and includes both election-specific factors and current economic conditions. On the former front, the focus is on three such factors: the presence of competitive opponents from the radical left (RLPs) or radical right (RRPs); the government or opposition status of the social democratic party; and the ideological leaning of the dominant internal faction within the social democratic party. All related

predictors are dummy variables: *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs* take value 1 when 'far left' and 'far right' parties according to the PopuList classification (Rooduijn et al. 2019) manage to access parliamentary representation in the observed election, according to ParlGov data (Döring and Manow 2020), 0 otherwise; *Government status* takes value 1 when the social democratic party is in during the campaign for the analysed electoral contest as per ParlGov data, 0 otherwise;[54] and *Dominant faction* takes value 1 if, according to several qualitative and secondary sources, during the analysed electoral contest the dominant internal faction is ideologically more centrist, and 0 if it is more leftist. We expect that, as per Hp. 5a and Hp. 5b respectively, social democratic parties will adopt more left-wing economic positions when faced with competitive electoral opposition from RLPs and RRPs; and that, as per Hp. 6 and Hp. 7 respectively, government status and a centrist dominant faction will lead the social democratic party to adopt more right-wing economic positions, and vice versa if it is in opposition or if its leading group is leftist. With regard to shorter-term determinants that are economic in nature, in this thesis I look at national sovereign debt levels, which – despite their relevance especially at the end of the investigated framework due to the European sovereign debt crisis – have largely been neglected by the literature concerning its impact on party positions. I do so by including a continuous *Debt* variable based on data from the IMF's Global Debt Dataset (GDD), testing the hypothesis of higher debt levels leading to more right-wing economic positions (e.g., Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2015) of social democratic parties, as per Hp. 8.

Lastly, a number of control variables have also been included in the statistical analysis, as the literature suggests they may impact the economic positions of social democratic parties.[55] These all relate to either election-specific factors (*Centre of gravity* and *Government aspiration*) or current

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[54] Notice that, as per Chapter 6, an alternative operationalisation that lags *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs* at election T-1 is employed in a robustness check, reported in Table A6 in the Appendix. This replication substantively confirms the results of the analysis, although the effect of *Competitive RRPs* does not appear as particularly robust, as it loses levels of statistical significance (from p<0.01 to p<0.1) and becomes only marginally significant.

[55] The controls are discussed in greater detail both theoretically and in terms of operationalisation, respectively in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6. Also notice that potential alternative explanations, and the reasons why the related indicators could not be included in the analysis, are reported in Chapter 3.

economic conditions (*Bailout*, *Unemployment*, and *Income inequality*).[56] Further, it shall be recalled that the dependent variable is constituted by the individual deviation of each social democratic party at any given election (t) from the mean position of the party family at election T-1, both calculated through the original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index introduced in Chapter 4.

7.3 Methodological approach and diagnostic tests

I now turn to a brief recap of the methodological aspects of the LNA, which were spelt out in detail in Chapter 4. In this thesis, I rely on a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset characterised as a cross-sectional dominant pool (Stimson 1985), with more cross-sectional (N of 21, parties) than temporal (T, an average of 7.57 elections per party) units. Due to the nature of the data at hand, the appropriate analytical method to be employed is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck and Katz 1995).

Several statistical issues may arise from this kind of data, leading to incorrect estimation. In this regard, it may be that residuals are not independent and identically distributed (i.e., heteroskedasticity) or that they are serially correlated (i.e., autocorrelation), and there may be unaccounted differences between units (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity). To identify the potential presence of such problems within the dataset and hence ensure that the most correct model specification is adopted, I performed several diagnostic tests. For heteroskedasticity, LR tests of panel-heteroskedasticity did confirm that panels are heteroskedastic in both models. This issue is accounted for by employing PCSEs. For autocorrelation, Wooldridge tests of serial correlation

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[56] Although there is no explicit link in the literature between this variable and the economic left-right positions of parties, a replication with a further control capturing general current economic conditions, a *GDP* variable capturing the average variation in gross domestic product during the electoral cycle preceding the observation, has been included in the robustness checks. This test, reported in Table A7 in the Appendix, confirms the results of the analysis. Moreover, the same considerations as to the robustness of the results apply to the inclusion of a *orty* control variable (Visser 2019) – lagged at year T-1 and insignificant in the replications reported in Table A8, as suggested by both works reported in Chapter 3 (e.g., Pierson P. 1994; Pierson C. 2001) and the theoretical strand of 'Power resource theory' more generally (e.g., see Brady, Blome, and Kleider 2016). Finally, as per Chapter 6, an alternative operationalisation of the *Bailout* control is employed in an additional replication in the Appendix, reported in Table A9, which confirms the results of the analysis.

rejected the presence of this issue in both models, meaning that observations are not correlated to each other over time.[57] For unobserved heterogeneity, Hausman tests between fixed and random effects reassure regarding the absence of this issue, hence allowing to use random effects. Last, a further test for multicollinearity, that is regressors being correlated with each other, shows the absence of this issue, as shown by the variance inflation factors (VIF) being below the conventional threshold of five (e.g., Chatterjee and Hadi 1986). On this basis, the selected method is OLS regression with PCSEs and a random-effects specification.

7.4 LNA (statistical analysis): results

After briefly summarising the explanatory framework of the thesis and the methodological approach of the LNA, outlined in greater detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively, I can now turn to the results of the statistical analysis. Coherently with the adopted approach, I will proceed by introducing each of the two main models separately, in order to discern and assess the impact of focal variables at different causal distances from the outcome.

Starting from Model 1, this tests the impact longer-term determinants of social democratic parties economic left-right positions. Hence, it includes as its predictors the systemic electoral factors constituting the longstanding institutional backdrop to party competition on the economic left-right positions of social democratic formations; the political aspects of globalisation, including the region-specific instantiation of integration within EU institutions and frameworks; and the economic aspects of globalisation. Formally, this can be written as per Equation (1) below:

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[57] Although diagnostic tests indicate the absence of autocorrelation, the main regression models of the thesis have been replicated by including a lagged dependent variable. These replications, available in Table A10 in the Appendix, substantively confirm the results of the analysis. Notice that, in these replications with lagged dependent variable, the German and Italian cases were not included due to qualitatively different objects of study before 1990 in, respectively, the pre-unification West-German context and the fully communist (i.e., not social democratic) *Partito Comunista Italiano* in Italy.

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 maj_i + \beta_2 polgl_i + \beta_3 eu_i + \beta_4 ecogl_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where the dependent variable Y_i is a linear function of the intercept of the regression line (β_0); the

amount of change in the dependent variable for a unitary change in the independent variables, in this

where the dependent variable Y_i is a linear function of the intercept of the regression line (β_0); the

amount of change in the dependent variable for a unitary change in the independent variables, in this

case *Majoritarian* (β_1), *Political globalisation* (β_2), *Europeanisation* (β_3), and *Economic*

globalisation (β_4) for each observation; and the residual of each individual data point (ε_i).

Table 7.2 reports the results of Model 1, which has an r-squared of 0.156 and a Wald Chi-Square of

28 (significant at p<0.001).[58] For a start, the majoritarian or PR nature of the electoral system does

not seem to significantly affect individual parties' deviations from the party family's economic left-

right mean position at election T-1, as indicated by the very large PCSE (2.28) vis-à-vis

Majoritarian's b coefficient (-0.409). Further, *Majoritarian* does not exert a statistically significant

effect on the dependent variable even when including more temporally and causally proximal

(shorter-term) determinants of parties' economic left-right positions (as per Model 2). Still, this

constitutes an interesting empirical finding, as it disproves the hypothesis emerging from the

literature. That is, the longstanding institutional backdrop to party competition constituted by national

electoral systems does not impact the economic left-right positions of the analysed parties. This runs

counter to the expectation that majoritarian systems should have led political formations to adopt

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[58] I have tested both main models vis-à-vis several robustness checks in terms of additional controls, different operationalisations of both the dependent and independent variables, and the use of different data sources to operationalise the dependent variable, with the results substantively confirmed by these probes. Details on all these tests are reported in the Appendix. In particular, the analysis is robust to the inclusion of several temporal controls such as a continuous *Election year* variable (Table A11) and the division of the timeframe in *Decades* (Table A12) and five-year *Periods* (Table A13) through ordinal variables; the replacement of the dependent variable with the MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index introduced in this thesis (Table A14), by its economic left (Table A15) and right (Table A16) subscales, and by the single MARPOR items making up this measure (Model 1 in Table A17; Model 2 in Table A18); and to the employment of the MARPOR-based economic left-right indexes by Bakker and Hobolt (2013) (Table A19) and Prosser (2014) (Table A20), as well as alternative data sources on parties' economic left-right positions such as the Varieties of Party Identity and Organisation (V-Party) (Lindberg et al. 2022) (Tables A21-A22) and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2019) (Tables A23-A24) datasets, to operationalise the dependent variable.

Table 7.2. Determinants of individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1: shorter- (Model 1) and longer-term determinants (Model 2). Full results.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.409	(2.28)	0.752	(2.269)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.031	(0.08)	0.15	(0.098)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	2.356	(2.419)	1.298	(2.974)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	8.028**	(2.551)	4.898	(3.226)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.364***	(0.078)	-0.212*	(0.106)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			1.133	(1.812)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-5.015**	(1.822)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			0.008	(1.375)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			2.954+	(1.685)
Debt (T-1)			0.097***	(0.027)
Centre of gravity			0.19*	(0.097)
Government aspiration (logged)			-2.414	(1.649)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			3.428	(2.805)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.405*	(0.196)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.375	(0.242)
Constant	26.45**	(8.715)	5.778	(16.48)
Wald $\chi2$	28***		82.07***	
R^2	0.156		0.348	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +$p<0.10$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$.

relatively more right-wing economic positions, and vice versa with PR systems (e.g., Dow 2011), thus leading to a rejection of Hp. 1.

Moving on to *Political Globalisation* and *Europeanisation*, it is interesting to see the differentiated effects of these two predictors. Indeed, whilst the former does not exert a significant effect on the dependent variable (b = -0.031, PCSE = 0.08) and hence disconfirms the related Hp. 2 on its expected rightwards impact, the latter does: yet, revealing interesting aspects about the process of Europeanisation itself and its impact on parties' economic left-right positions. Indeed, the regression table shows how it is not all forms of embedment within European institutions and frameworks to matter. More specifically, it is not EU membership taken in isolation to exert a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable (b = 2.356, PCSE = 2.419), but rather being a member of the Eurozone on top of EU membership itself, with a rightwards impact (b = 8.028, statistically significant at p<0.01). This seems to indicate that it is not the embedment in European institutions per se, but precisely the full embedment in the monetary union and its impact on the economic policy of individual countries to constitute a powerful external constraint on the economic positions of mainstream parties such as social democrats, leading to more right-wing stances. This is in line with several arguments in the literature (e.g., Johansson and Raunio 2001; Bernhard 2004; Laffan 2014; Maatsch 2014; Ward et al. 2015) and hence confirms the related hypothesis (Hp. 3), yet specifying that the level of Europeanisation that matters is the higher one of economic and monetary integration. Lastly, the most statistically significant (at p<0.001) impact on the deviations of individual social democratic formations from the party family's mean economic left-right position at election T-1 is exerted by *Economic Globalisation*. In terms of substantive interpretation, it is interesting to note how this effect is in a leftwards direction: indeed, a one-unit change in the *Economic globalisation* variable corresponds to a -0.409 variation in the dependent variable. This is a relevant finding, as it adds to the existing debate between the 'efficiency' (e.g., e.g., Rodrik 1997; Iversen 1999; Milner and Judkins 2004; Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny 2005; Hellwig 2016) and 'compensation' (e.g., e.g., Boix 1998; Garrett 1998; Swank 2002) theses by actually reinforcing the latter and hence

disconfirming more mainstream alternative viewpoint, as well as the related Hp. 4. It follows that this finding seems to strengthen the idea of greater economic interconnectedness leading to a more 'conservative' reaction by leftist parties and in particular formations from the mainstream left: meaning the programmatic exacerbation of economic left stances and the defence of their national-level achievements especially in terms of the construction of the welfare state.

After being able to correctly discern the effects of longer-term determinants in Model 1, the 'fuller' of the two main models, Model 2, adds the shorter-term variables related to current economic conditions and election-specific factors to the picture.[59] From an explanatory viewpoint, this is the most complete and comprehensive model, which should paint a better picture of what determines the relative economic left-right positions of contemporary Western European social democratic parties. Model 2 is formalised through the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 es_i + \beta_2 polgl_i + \beta_3 eu_i + \beta_4 ecogl_i + \beta_5 rlp_i + \beta_6 rrp_i + \beta_7 ingov_i + $$
$$\beta_8 dfact_i + \beta_9 debt_i + \beta_{10} cog_i + \beta_{11} govas_i + \beta_{12} bail_i + \beta_{13} unemp_i + \beta_{14} iineq_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

in which, for each observation, the dependent variable Y_i is now also a function of the coefficients for the focal variables, *Competitive RLPs* (β_5), *Competitive RRPs* (β_6), *Government status* (β_7), *Dominant faction* (β_8), and *Debt* (β_9), as well as of the five additional control variables included within shorter-term determinants.

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[59] The effect of each introduced focal variable in Model 2 is also tested in isolation by controlling for predictors already included in Model 1. These models are commented on and reported in Table A25 in the Appendix. Further, these separate tests allow gauging the explanatory power of each shorter-term determinant against the same baseline (i.e., Model 1) in terms of increase in explained variance. It is evident how the shorter-term independent variable leading to the largest improvement in model performance is – by far – *Debt*, the inclusion of which leads to increase in R2 from 0.156 to 0.212; followed by *Dominant faction* (increase in R2 from 0.156 to 0.179). Instead, the increases in explanatory power due to the inclusion of the other focal predictors related to shorter-term political factors, that is *Competitive RLPs*, *Competitive RRPs*, and *Government status*, are very minimal (R2 increases from 0.156 to, respectively, 0.157, 0.16, and 0.158). Additionally, all shorter-term control variables lead to greater explanatory power. To perform a similar test for longer-term determinants in a substantively meaningful way, Model 1 was still taken as the baseline against which the differentials in R2 by deducting, in turn, each of such independent variables were assessed: meaning that the larger these differentials, the larger the loss in explanatory power and the more relevant the role of the removed variable. As reported in Table A26 in the Appendix, whilst there is no loss in explanatory power by removing either *Majoritarian* or *Political globalisation*, the case is very different for *Europeanisation* (variation in R2 from 0.156 to 0.62) and *Economic globalisation* (variation in R2 from 0.156 to 0.68), highlighting the important role played by both variables.

The results for Model 2 are also reported in Table 7.2. In line with the expectations, this model seems to provide the most comprehensive explanatory account yet as shown by the considerably improved r-squared (0.348) and Wald Chi-Square values (82.07). To start with, amongst the control variables, those able to exert a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$) on the dependent variable are the exogenous positional shift of the respective national party systems along the economic issue dimension from the previous election, *Centre of gravity*, which are indeed mirrored by social democratic parties ($b = 0.19$); and one of the two economic issues traditionally 'owned' (e.g., Petrocik 1996) by the left, *Unemployment*, higher levels of which lead to more leftwards individual deviations from the party family's economic left-right mean position at election T-1 ($b = -405$). Interestingly, neither the other traditionally leftist question of *Income inequality* nor the other included controls (*Government Aspiration* and *Bailout*) have a statistically impact.

In terms of the focal variables of Model 2, national sovereign debt emerges as the most important determinant in shaping the relative economic left-right positions of social democratic parties from the viewpoint of statistical significance. Indeed, it is the only predictor with a statistically significant effect at $p<0.001$, which underlines the importance of providing a comparative empirical account of its impact on the dynamics of party competition in contemporary Western Europe in light of the current scarcity of evidence on this matter. More specifically, as theoretically expected, higher levels of national sovereign debt are associated with relatively more right-wing economic positions by social democratic parties ($b = 0.097$). That is, when faced with a worrying debtor status, mainstream parties that either hold executive power or have a legitimate expectation of accessing government such as social democrats will – or will be forced to – support and resort to a more cautious fiscal approach, most often through austerity politics (e.g., Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2015; Bremer 2018). Because of both its novelty and the relevance of this factor in contemporary Western Europe, for instance in light of the impactful European sovereign debt crisis in the late-2000s (e.g., Lane 2012), this constitutes an important empirical finding, corroborating the related hypothesis (Hp. 8).

Regarding the other focal variables, it is interesting to note the differentiated impact of radical electoral competition by looking at *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs*. This is because whilst the former variable does not exert a statistically significant effect on social democratic parties' relative economic left-right positions, hence disconfirming Hp. 5a, the latter one instead does. Indeed, the presence of competitive RRPs leads these parties to adopt more left-wing economic stances (b = -5.015) at the $p<0.01$ level of statistical significance. This confirms Hp. 5b, with the literature hypothesising that the channelling of the economic discontent of large sectors within Western societies on the part of RRPs (e.g., Angelucci and De Sio 2021) may contribute to a social democratic programmatic recalibration on matters of welfare and regulation of free-markets and their economic dynamics (e.g., Krause 2020; Krause and Giebler 2020).

Finally, whilst government or opposition status do not have a significant impact on the programmatic profile of social democratic parties, hence running counter to the related contributions on external constraints and the 'responsibility versus responsiveness' dilemma (e.g., Mair 2013; Maatsch 2014; Karyotis, Rüdig, and Judge 2014) and rejecting Hp. 6,[60] the picture is somewhat different for dominant internal factions. Indeed, Chapters 3 and 6 already elaborated on the importance of providing an empirical test to the hypothesised link between the ideological leaning of the leading group within a party and its programmatic stances, in light of the collective character of the manifesto-drafting process and the multiple veto points within it (e.g., Däubler 2012; Dolezal et al. 2012). This is made all the more important by the lack of evidence on such fundamental intra-party dynamics, which are mostly caused by the scarce availability of wide and long data (e.g., e.g., Dewan and Squintani 2016; Steiner and Mader 2019). Hence, the test provided here is meaningful and leads to interesting conclusions. Indeed, albeit only marginally significant (at $p<0.1$) from a statistical

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[60] Hp. 6 is also rejected when considering the arguments proposed in the literature by, for instance, Hellwig (2012) and Greene (2016), whereby social democrats will moderate or emphasise their traditional economic stances, respectively, in the absence or presence of robust economic growth, as per Chapter 3. Indeed, when added to Model 2, the interaction between *Government status* and the introduced *GDP* variable does not exert a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, as reported in Table A27 in the Appendix and visualised in the related marginal effects plot, which is necessary to properly interpret the interaction according to the methodological literature (Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012).

Table 7.3. Regression tables for Models 1 and 2 with standardised predictors.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian	-0.409	(2.28)	0.752	(2.269)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.342	(0.866)	1.628	(1.069)
European Union membership (T-1) (Reference: No)	0		0	
European Union membership (T-1) (European Union member)	2.356	(2.419)	1.298	(2.974)
Eurozone membership (T-1) = 0 (reference: No)	0		0	
Eurozone membership (T-1) (Eurozone member)	5.672**	(1.776)	3.599+	(1.837)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-3.315***	(0.711)	-1.934*	(0.964)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)			0	
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			1.133	(1.812)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)			0	
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-5.515**	(1.822)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)			0	
Government status = 1 (In government)			0.008	(1.375)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)			0	
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			2.954+	(1.685)
Debt (T-1)			3.483***	(0.99)
Centre of gravity			1.312*	(0.669)
Government aspiration (logged)			-1.215	(0.83)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			3.428	(2.805)
Unemployment (T-1)			-1.931*	(0.935)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-1.229	(0.794)
Constant	-4.107	(2.892)	-4.373	(3.594)
Wald $\chi2$	28***		82.07***	
R^2	0.156		0.348	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions with standardised predictors; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. $+p<0.10$, $*p<0.05$, $**p<0.01$, $***p<0.001$.

Figure 7.1. Coefficient plot for Model 1 with standardised independent variables.

viewpoint, the *Dominant faction* variable does exert a rightwards effect (b = 2.954) when a centrist faction leads the social democratic party. This means that there seems to be, indeed, a tentative correspondence between the relative economic left-right positions of social democratic parties and the (centrist or leftist) ideological leaning of their leading groups, in line with Hp. 7.

As to the focal variables from the previous model, the only one to retain a statistically significant effect (at p<0.05) is *Economic globalisation* with its leftwards impact (b = -0.212), whilst *Europeanisation* and in particular Eurozone membership is seemingly no longer significant. Overall, the fact that, throughout the illustrated models, this predictor located in more causally distal points from the outcome loses its explanatory power seems to indicate that this gets absorbed and mediated along the way by more causally proximal factors.

As a final point, as the vastly different measurements of the predictors do not allow for a direct comparison of their coefficients to gauge the size of each individual effect, Table 7.3 evens the field by replicating Models 1 and 2 employing standardised independent variables (or *z-scores*). Further, the results related to both models that include the standardised versions of the employed predictors are visualised in the coefficient plots of, respectively, Figures 7.1 and 7.2.[61] As the standardisation of a k-levels ordinal variable requires the dichotomisation of (k-1) levels, the standardisation of *Europeanisation* entailed the dichotomisation of both the *European Union membership* and *Eurozone membership* outcomes, which has been achieved through the standardisation of two separate dummy variables taking value 1 for each observation falling within the respective scenarios, and 0 otherwise. Whilst the appropriateness of this procedure is confirmed by the overall parameters of fit (r-squared and Wald Chi-Square) being the same between the models with unstandardised and standardised independent variables, this change in model specification entails slight changes in the results. These are exclusively related to one of the new dummies deriving from Europeanisation, *Eurozone membership*. Indeed, *Eurozone membership* achieves marginal statistical significance (at p<0.1) in Model 2, confirming both its rightwards effect and the opposite direction compared to *Economic globalisation* from a substantive viewpoint.

This being said, with standardised independent variables being on the same scale it is now possible to directly compare the size and, therefore, the strength of the effects of the statistically significant independent variables on the deviations of individual social democratic parties from the party family's mean economic left-right position in the previous electoral cycle. Starting with Model 1, it is interesting to note how the rightwards effect of *Eurozone membership* (b = 5.672) is larger than the leftwards effect of *Economic globalisation* (b = -3.315), albeit less statistically significant (respectively, p<0.01 and p<0.001). In Model 2 it is evident how, whilst *Debt* maintains its position as the most statistically significant predictor of the individual economic left-right deviations from the

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[61] Notice that lines originating from the point estimates in both coefficient plots represent 95% confidence intervals. In Figure 7.2 (Model 2), control variables are included in the model estimation, but not shown.

Figure 7.2. Coefficient plot for Model 2 with standardised independent variables.

party family's mean at election T-1 (the only one with $p<0.001$), the largest effect of all on the dependent variable is the leftwards one exerted *Competitive RRPs* (b = -5.515 at $p<0.01$), followed by the rightwards ones of *Eurozone membership* (b = 3.599 at $p<0.1$), *Debt* (b = 3.483), and *Dominant faction* (b = 2.954 at $p<0.1$). Smaller and relatively comparable effect sizes are found for *Economic globalisation* (b = -1.934, at $p<0.05$) and *Unemployment* (b = -1.931, at $p<0.05$), whereas the smallest amongst the statistically significant effects is exerted by *Centre of gravity* (b = 1.312, at $p<0.01$).

7.5 Explanatory power across space, time, and different substantive clusters

So far, the presented results pertain to the pooled analysis of the determinants of the different economic left-right positions within contemporary Western European social democracy, hence

depicting a general picture. However, this may hide meaningful and interesting variation across the different clusters that constitute the broad scope of the analysis, be it spatially, temporally, or from other substantive viewpoints. Therefore, I now discuss the explanatory power of its empirical analysis across such clusters. I do so by looking at the performance of the most comprehensive of the main regression models, Model 2, across the geographical areas making up Western Europe; the three decades included between 1990 and 2019; and the clusters of observations based on their 'variety of capitalism' (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001), workforce composition, and type of welfare state.[62] This allows for testing how well the explanatory framework built in this thesis as a whole performs not only generally, but also at a more disaggregated level in which potential differences between the various subunits – which are washed away when only looking at the overall picture – may emerge.

To this end, Table 7.4 reports the r-squared values for Model 2 across the analysed clusters of observations. Starting with a spatial perspective, the broad area of Western Europe is made up of different geographical subregions with historical, cultural, and socio-economic affinities, which often translate into similar characteristics in terms of how domestic politics and features of party competitions are structured. Moving from this premise, observations were grouped in the following clusters according to the respective countries: Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland); an 'expanded' version of Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom); and Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain). Looking at the r-squared values across these clusters, the first noticeable thing is how the performance of Model 2 is everywhere at least roughly on par with the one of the pooled analysis (r-squared being 0.348), pointing to overall geographical robustness of the analysis' explanatory power. However, the model seems to fit the Continental (0.629) and Southern (0.601) European clusters much better than Northern Europe (0.312), indicating that this is the subregion where the thesis' explanatory framework of the different

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[62] The same analyses of the 'Variations across space, time, and different substantive clusters' section are replicated in the Appendix for Model 1 (Tables A34-A39).

economic left and right positions that are taken on by contemporary social democratic parties is less effective.[63]

The replications of Model 2 by geographical cluster, reported in Table A28 in the Appendix, indicate that the good fit in Continental Europe is driven by, the strong rightwards effect (at $p<0.001$) of *Majoritarian* – with electoral systems finally entering the explanatory picture –, radical competition (both *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs*),[64] and *Europeanisation* (at the level of Eurozone membership, although here EU membership is marginally significant too at $p<0.1$); and by the leftwards impact of globalisation variables (*Political globalisation* at $p<0.001$ and *Economic globalisation* at $p<0.01$). As evident, the more disaggregated viewpoint on the empirical analysis allows identifying not only the specificities of each cluster, but also their discrepancies vis-à-vis the pooled results (e.g., here the significance of systemic electoral factors and the opposite direction of the effect of the electoral competition by radical opponents). Similar reasoning applies to Southern Europe, where the strong fit of Model 2 is caused by the leftwards effects of *Competitive RRP*s (at $p<0.001$) and variables related to traditional economic left issues (*Income inequality* at $p<0.01$ and *Unemployment* at $p<0.05$) and *Economic globalisation* (at $p<0.01$); and by the rightwards impact of *Debt* (at $p<0.01$), as expected, and the other globalisation variable (*Political globalisation* at $p<0.05$). Further, *Government status* also enters the picture (at $p<0.1$) in the expected, rightwards direction. As to Northern Europe, instead, the worse fit of the model is explained by the only non-marginally significant effect being exerted by *Debt* (at $p<0.05$) in a rightwards direction, confirming the importance of this factor. There are three further marginally significant effects (at $p<0.1$): the

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[63] This is not related the potential question of social democratic parties from this area being more ideologically homogeneous (and hence leading to lower levels of variance) compared to other geographical clusters, as shown by the standard deviation values related both to simple economic left-right positions (12.02, versus 11.12 in Continental Europe and 8.08 in Southern Europe) and the dependent variable of the LNA (10.17, versus 9.66 in Continental Europe and 7.34 in Southern Europe).

[64] Substantively interesting conclusions deriving from the replications in Table A28 concern radical competition. First, it is noteworthy that, whilst this phenomenon at large in Continental Europe (i.e., both *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs*) has a statistically significant and rightwards impact on the dependent variable, radical competition from the right exerts a significant leftwards effect in the other two geographical groupings. This also entails an interesting differentiation of the impact of *Competitive RRPs* based on the geographical areas: rightwards in Continental Europe and leftwards elsewhere, especially in Southern Europe.

Table 7.4. R-squared values of Model 2 across different spatial, temporal, and substantive clusters.

Geographical clusters	Continental Europe	Northern Europe	Southern Europe	Pooled	
R2	0.629	0.312	0.601	0.348	
N	52	51	41	144	
Geographical clusters (by exclusion)	Non-British Isles	Non-Continental Europe	Non-Northern Europe	Non-Southern Europe	Pooled
R2	0.375	0.394	0.424	0.271	0.348
N	130	92	107	103	144
Decade	1990s	2000s	2010s	Pooled	
R2	0.389	0.415	0.568	0.348	
N	39	51	54	144	
Varieties of capitalism (by exclusion)	Non-CMEs	Non-LMEs	Non-Mixed	Non-SMEs	Pooled
R2	0.476	0.394	0.315	0.3	0.348
N	82	126	122	102	144
Size of industrial workforce	Small (< 22%)	Medium (> 22%, < 26%)	Large (> 26%)	Pooled	
R2	0.583	0.438	0.568	0.348	
N	47	44	53	144	
Type of welfare state (by exclusion)	Non-Conservative	Non-Liberal	Non-Socialist/Social democratic	Non-Southern	Pooled
R2	0.482	0.344	0.457	0.296	0.348
N	93	105	90	90	144

rightwards impact of *Political globalisation* and *Centre of gravity* and the leftwards one of *Competitive RLPs*. Interestingly, *Dominant faction* is never significant across geographical clusters, indicating that its marginally significant effect in the pooled analysis may derive from other characteristics of the analysed population.

As a final point on the spatial differences within Western Europe, Table 7.4 also replicates the analysis by looking at subdivisions by the exclusion of countries rather than by their inclusion. This is done to better contextualise the political, economic, and socio-cultural peculiarities of countries from the British Isles (i.e., Ireland and the United Kingdom), which were considered Northern European from a geographical viewpoint as the low number of observations is not ideal for a standalone cluster. However, this clustering within Northern Europe is rather coarse substantively, as it includes Ireland and the United Kingdom alongside very different political and welfare regimes in Northern European and Scandinavian countries, as well as very different 'varieties of capitalism' (liberal market economies the former, coordinated market economies the latter).[65] Hence, these additional replications – as shown by the r-squared values – confirms the explanatory robustness of the pooled analysis, whilst also highlighting that the worst performance (r-squared of 0.271) is achieved when Southern European countries are not considered; thus, underlying the importance of this geographical cluster for the empirical fit of the analysis. Further, two important substantive findings in particular emerge from these replications, reported in Table A29 in the Appendix. Firstly, whilst the rightwards effect of *Debt* is always statistically significant at least $p<0.01$, it is even more so (i.e., at $p<0.001$) when excluding Southern Europe from the analysis. Whilst unexpected, given the gravity of the European sovereign debt crisis in that area, this reinforces even further the role played by higher levels of *Debt* in determining more rightwards economic positions by social democratic parties in Western Europe at large and, hence, the importance of the comprehensive empirical assessment of this relationship provided in this thesis. Secondly, here the hypothesised

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[65] Recall that the same division in these four geographical areas was also followed in Chapter 5.

effect of *Dominant faction* is statistically significant (at p<0.05) in the non-Southern European cluster and marginally so (at p<0.1) in the non-Northern grouping, indicating that intra-party dynamics are more prominent in the social democratic formations from Continental Europe and the British Isles.

Moving on to the temporal dimension, Model 2 is replicated in the three decades making up the temporal framework of this thesis (1990-2019): the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. It is important to consider both the variation in the empirical fit of the analysis and the factors driving it as these three decades are characterised by very different political (e.g., the heyday of the 'Third Way' in the 1990s) and economic (e.g., the post-Great Recession 2010s) circumstances, that may be very impactful on contemporary Western European social democratic parties' relative economic left-right positions. The r-squared values for each decade reported in Table 7.4 strongly reassure as how robust the explanatory power of the empirical analysis is, as they are all higher than the pooled one. However, another interesting finding emerges. That is, whilst the explanatory power of Model 2 in the 1990s (0.389) and 2000s (0.415) is comparable, it is much stronger in the 2010s (0.568). That is, the explanatory framework of this thesis seems particularly appropriate to explain what causes the different relative economic left-right positions of Western European social democratic parties in post-Great Recession times.

This interesting finding is corroborated by the full replications, reported in Table A30 in the Appendix. Indeed, whilst they highlight the primacy of *Political globalisation* during the 1990s in their rightwards constraint of social democratic parties' economic position (significant at p<0.01) and the importance of party-political dynamics in the 2000s (with the rightwards effect of *Centre of Gravity* significant at p<0.05 and the leftwards effect of *Government aspiration* marginally significant at p<0.1), the picture is much more complex in the 2010s. Indeed, during this decade the strongest and rightwards impact is exerted by *Debt* (at p<0.001), further underlying the momentous consequentiality of the global financial and European debt crises, as well as the need of studying their impact on party positions. Conversely, in such critical years from an economic viewpoint, social democratic parties will further revert to their leftist economic positions when faced with greater

Unemployment (significant at p<0.001). Electoral competition dynamics are also important, especially with the rise to prominence of competitive radical opponents. Interestingly, RLPs and RRPs of formations have opposite impacts on the relative economic left-right positions of social democrats in the 2010s: the former pushing them further to the right (significant at p<0.01), and the latter vice versa (significant at p<0.05). Further, from an institutional and 'external constraints' viewpoint, although it is fascinating to note the absence of any effect of the *Bailout* variable, it is during this decade that *Europeanisation* – Eurozone membership specifically – exerts its strongest rightwards effect (at p<0.05). Lastly, the marginality of *Dominant faction*'s pooled effect does not seem to derive from any decade in particular.

Additional replications are also presented by dividing observations into clusters of substantive interest. First, cases have been sorted on the basis of the 'variety of capitalism' (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001) of each national context, as differences in institutional frameworks, patterns of interaction, and structures within the economic and labour sectors may influence domestic politics, especially along the economic left-right issue dimension (e.g., Korpi 2006). Hence, based on a number of theoretical sources (Hall and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2012; Witt et al. 2018; Ahlborn and Schweickert 2019), four related groups have been identified: coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Sweden), liberal market economies (LMEs) (Cyprus, Ireland, and the United Kingdom), mixed market economies (Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland),[66] and state-influenced market economies (SMEs) (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The 'varieties of capitalism' replications have been performed by excluding each group in turn, in order to ensure an adequate number of observations in all cases.

The r-squared values in Table 7.4 again reassure regarding the general robustness of the overall explanatory power of the thesis' analysis, as they are either higher or not significantly lower than the pooled r-squared. Still, Model 2 seems to perform best in SMEs and worst in CMEs, as shown by the

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[66] Here, the label 'mixed market economies' refers to CMEs with some feature of LMEs, or 'CMEs with a twist', as per Witt et al. (2018, 24).

extreme r-squared values (0.476 for non-CMEs and 0.3 for non-SMEs). Further, the full results, reported in Table A31 in the Appendix, show how the rightwards impact of *Debt* (significant at p<0.01 or at p<0.05) is the most common and consistent effect across all models, and in the hypothesised direction; with a similar reasoning applying, here, to the leftwards effect of *Competitive RRPs* (significant at p<0.05) as well. It is also interesting to note how the *Bailout* variable finally reaches statistical significance (although marginally, at p<0.1) in non-CME cases, hence excluding countries that are mostly Continental and Northern European, generally well-performing from an economic viewpoint, and did not undergo such recovery programmes. As expected, the effect of this variable is rightwards, hence exercising further constraints on the traditionally left-of-centre economic positions of social democratic parties.

Additionally, I focus on the size of the national industrial workforces to further sort cases: an important indicator to capture the relevance of this sector within national economies. In turn, the size of the industrial workforce may exert a relevant influence on both domestic political traditions and how the dynamics with fellow labour societal actors such as trade unions are structured (e.g., Pierson P. 1994; Pierson C. 2001), thus influencing the programmatic profile of social democrats.[67] Further, in light of the sizeable portion of the analysed timeframe occurring in times of crisis after the Great Recession, differently structured national economies in nature may have fared better or worse with the severe economic downturn, again in turn potentially impacting the economic positions of social democrats. For these reasons, employing World Bank data on the percentage of workforce employed in industry over the total workforce, observations have been sorted into groups with relatively small (<22%), average (>22% and <26%), and large (>26%) industrial workforce by looking at where the 33rd and 66th percentiles fell within the distribution of cases. This empirical criterion, which is

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[67] Recall that the replication of Model 2 with the additional *Trade union density* control is reported in Table A8 in the Appendix.

obviously to be intended in relative terms within the Western European region, has been adopted so as to ensure a sufficient number of observations in each group.[68]

Again, the r-squared values reported in Table 7.4 fully reassure regarding the robustness of the pooled analysis' explanatory power in these substantive clusters as well. Whilst, indeed, the number of cases in these group-by-group replications is significantly smaller than in the pooled Model 2, the r-squared values are also considerably larger. The full replications, reported in Table A32 in the Appendix, also show interesting findings as to the rightwards impact of *Debt*, which is only significant (at $p<0.001$) for the positions of social democrats in economies with a smaller industrial workforce, which are hence likely to be more reliant on their financial sectors. Conversely, these formations in national contexts with larger industrial sectors seem to further emphasise their traditional economic left stances the more they have historically been in government (with *Government aspiration* significant at $p<0.001$), whilst other factors – amongst them, first and foremost and unsurprisingly in such economies, *Income inequality* and *Unemployment* (significant at $p<0.001$) – push them further to the economic right.

Finally, I also look at the different welfare traditions within the analysed spatial-temporal scope. Whilst this substantive aspect may to some extent overlap with the other ones introduced above (for instance, LMEs tend to have smaller industrial workforces and a liberal variety of welfare), the configuration of welfare regimes specifically has been shown to be relevant for domestic politics (e.g., Bay, Finseraas, and Pedersen 2013) and party positions – although, most often, socio-cultural ones adopted by parties such as RRPs and RLPs (e.g., Burgoon and Schakel 2021). Therefore it is still interesting to see whether specifically the policy and societal peculiarities of the flagship accomplishment of social democracy in its different forms impacts the electoral supply of these

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[68] Differently from the indicators developed to operationalise the dimensions of 'variety of capitalism' above and different welfare regimes below, which could not be included in fully-fledged replications of my regression analyses due to the excessively problematic levels of multicollinearity highlighted by VIF levels above the conventional threshold of five both for several predictors and the models generally, I could replicate both Models 1 and 2 by also including the additional *Size of industrial workforce* control (lagged at year T-1). These replications, reported in Table A40 in the Appendix, substantively confirm the results of the analysis, whilst also reinforcing size and, when possible, the statistical significance of the shorter-term effects of *Europeanisation* (rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) and the longer-term effect of *Debt* (rightwards).

parties in different national contexts, and hence the explanatory power of this thesis. Following and intersecting the works by Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera (2000), and Scruggs (2007), observations have hence been catalogued as follows: conservative (Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany), liberal (Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), and socialist/social democratic (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden), and Southern (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).[69] Again, group-by-group replications have been performed by exclusion, to ensure an adequate number of observations.

Once more, Table 7.4 shows how the explanatory power of Model 2 is also robust across these substantive clusters, with r-squared values being higher or not considerably lower than the pooled one. The lowest value for non-Southern welfare regimes (0.296) indicates the relevance of such cases for the empirical fit of the analysis, which – in line with the above – seems especially able to explain the different relative economic left-right positions of social democratic parties in these national contexts. The full group-by-group replications of Model 2, reported in Table A33 in the Appendix, particularly highlight and further confirm the fundamental role played by the *Debt* variable, with its rightwards effect the only one being statistically significant (always at least at $p<0.05$) across all regressions.

7.6 Not only positions, but also differentiation: the predictive function of the LNA

In conclusion, it is now necessary to briefly recap the main findings of the LNA of this thesis. Through OLS regression with PCSEs, a method that accounts for the statistical issues arising due to the TSCS nature of the employed dataset, the eight hypotheses concerning *what* determines parties' economic left-right positions in terms of both longer- and shorter-term political and economic determinants were empirically tested in two main models: the first one only included longer-term and more causally

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[69] Hence, due to their lack of classification, observations from Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Malta have not been considered. On the peculiarities of the Southern European welfare state model, also see Rhodes (1996).

distal factors, whilst the second one also factored in shorter-term focal variables and controls. Both unstandardised and standardised versions of the predictors were included in the analyses, with the latter kind allowing for a direct comparison of effect sizes. Further, the explanatory power of the analyses was assessed in several different clusters that were both geographical, temporal, and substantive in nature, providing reassurance as to their empirical fit.

Results provide an interesting and multifaceted picture, as to be expected when empirically analysing such complex phenomena. In terms of longer-term determinants, the lack of statistically significant effects for the long-standing electoral institutions and the different levels of political globalisation meant that the related hypotheses (respectively, Hp. 1 and Hp. 2) were to be rejected. Conversely, an interesting finding emerged in the differentiated impact of different forms of Europeanisation in terms of statistical significance. More specifically, whilst EU membership on its own is not enough to exert a statistically significant effect on parties' economic left-right positions, Eurozone membership has instead a statistically significant, rightwards and hence 'constraining' effect on social democratic parties' economic positions, in line with Hp. 3. Similar considerations apply to the leftwards effect of higher levels of economic globalisation, which went in the direction of the 'compensation' thesis within the related debated and hence contradicted the more mainstream 'efficiency' viewpoint, in a rejection of Hp. 4. The empirical picture emerging from these results is puzzling and deserving further investigation. Indeed, the fact that these two forms of globalisation – economic globalisation at large and the specific form of economic globalisation specific to European integration in Eurozone membership – exert statistically significant but directionally opposite effects on social democratic parties' economic left-right positions is fascinating. In a nutshell, this finding points to not all forms of increased economic interconnectedness and interdependence having the same effects on party positions and, especially, social democrats' economic stances. This is an important conclusion that surely warrants further exploration, especially in terms of the potential mechanisms underpinning it, which will indeed be pursued in the SNA of this thesis.

In terms of shorter-term determinants, whilst no significant effects were found for the presence of competitive RLPs and the government status of social democratic parties, hence not corroborating the related hypotheses (respectively, Hp. 5a and Hp. 6), the opposite applies to: the presence of competitive RRPs, which leads social democrats further to the economic left; to the economic stances of its dominant internal faction being mirrored by those of the party at large (albeit this is only tentatively confirmed); and to higher levels of national sovereign debt, which constrains economic positions further to the right. Hence, this confirms all the related hypotheses (respectively, Hp. 5b, Hp. 7, and Hp. 8). Further, additional analyses highlight how, despite the largest overall effect is exerted by the *Competitive RRPs* variable, its effect and the effect of other similar 'electoral' variables such as *Centre of Gravity* is not as robust (see, e.g., Tables A19, A20, and A22) and constant across the many presented specifications as the one exerted by *Debt* – the most statistically significant predictor, and consistently so – and the other substantively interesting macro-level predictors concerning structural characteristics of social democrats' national contexts related to the economy and international institutions that were already pointed out: *Economic globalisation* and *Europeanisation*. *Debt* emerges from the statistical analyses of this thesis as the single most robust determinant of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions, whilst – in stark contrast with *Competitive RRPs* and the vast majority of the other election-specific factors – also displaying by far the highest explanatory power amongst all shorter-term predictors (e.g., Table A25).

In sum, whilst overall something as complex as social democratic parties' economic left-right positions seems to be determined by a mixture of political-electoral and structural-economic variables, at different levels of causal distance from the outcome, the main story that seems to emerge from the many presented specifications and robustness checks in the statistical analysis is one of 'external constraints' (e.g., Mair 2011; Lefkofridi and Nezi 2014; Plescia, Kritzinger, and De Sio 2019), the different levels and configurations of which seem to impact social democrats differently depending on their specific national context. Hence, it is worth investigating at greater depth whether varyingly different levels of national sovereign debt especially, but also of economic globalisation

and Europeanisation, effectively translate into varyingly different economic left-right positions of the analysed formations, in turn contributing to the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation; and, especially, the mechanism through which they operate.

Whilst these objectives can and will be more exhaustively pursued in the second, SNA step of this thesis' nested analysis, important information in this regard can also be derived from the statistical analyses of the LNA and, more specifically, the assumed predictive function of the presented regression models. To do so, we ought to go back to the data with the fresh perspective provided by the results of the LNA and especially the story they tell, to more explicitly trace the link between the findings on what determines the economic left-right positions of social democratic parties and how these lead to varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation. In a nutshell, through ample empirical testing and corroboration, the key conclusion that emerges from the LNA can be summarised as follows: different external constraints will lead to different social democracy, in terms of the economic left-right positions of these parties. Of course, this is not all: first, because – as the results of the LNA show –, not all the analysed external constraints have the same directional effect on the economic left-right positions of social democratic parties. That is, whilst higher degrees of *Europeanisation* (specifically, *Eurozone membership*) and higher levels of *Debt* do constrain social democrats by leading them to adopt more right-wing economic positions, *Economic globalisation* goes in the opposite direction of a 'compensation thesis' as the higher its levels, the more to the economic left the social democratic party. Therefore, as these effects are taken in isolation and, hence, net of all the others – as if every other variable were being kept constant –, what we do not know yet is the way in which these effects really operate in the analysed data. To do so, we need a second and most important step: to assess the actual configuration of these independent variables in the data, so as to understand the linkage between the different configurations of such predictors (and, hence, the related effects amongst different social democratic parties) and different economic left-right positions taken by social democrats, in turn explaining the varying levels of intrafamily ideological configuration.

Are the three external constraints of *Europeanisation*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Debt* all configured in the same way for social democratic parties in the analysed spatial-temporal framework, or are there differences in such configurations across time and space? This question, which goes to the heart of the predictive function of the regression models in the LNA and hence the proposed explanation of intrafamily ideological differentiation centred around external constraints, can only be answered by going back to the data. Recall that descriptive analyses concerning all independent variables of this thesis were presented in Chapter 6, thus including evidence on *Europeanisation* (Figure 6.3), *Economic globalisation* (Figure 6.4), and *Debt* (Figure 6.9).

I now combine such evidence and present it in Figure 7.3, to visualise and assess the country-specific configuration of external constraints over time. Given the very different scales on which these three independent variables are measured, I have rescaled all of them so that they vary between zero and

Figure 7.3. Country-specific configuration of external constraints over time.

one, respectively equating to the minimum and maximum values each of them takes on in the analysed population, which allows for assessing the relative levels of each variable and hence a more level comparison between them. What useful information can be taken from this visualisation with regard to the predictive function of the regression models in the LNA? The main takeaway seems clear: these external constraints are configured very differently depending on the specific spatial-temporal context, and their effect on social democratic parties' economic left-right positions will hence depend upon these different context-specific configurations. Indeed, many interesting differences are evident both cross-sectionally and longitudinally: for instance, within and between national contexts, at the same point in time as well as over time, there are different levels of the three external constraints, as well as different directional variations, rates of change, and rankings amongst them – each of these characteristics with the related consequences in terms of direction and size of the effect they exert on social democratic parties left-right positions.

To this end, some exemplary contexts that emerge from this pooled visualisation and seem defined by interesting configurations are particularly illustrative. For instance, the national contexts with the relatively leftmost social democratic parties on the economic dimension (e.g., Switzerland, average economic left-right position of -35.36; Denmark, -27.3; Luxembourg, -26.92; Norway, -26.35) are characterised, either for the entirety of the timeframe or large portions of it, by much higher levels of economic globalisation (usually high or extremely high) than debt (usually low to very low). Further, three out of these four national instances of social democracy are in contexts that either never joined the European Union (Switzerland and Norway), or never joined the Eurozone (Denmark) across the three analysed decades. Conversely, two Southern European countries that underwent some of the most severe economic crises in the 2010s, Greece and Italy, present the opposite situation: they are EU member states that joined the Eurozone either very early on (Greece in 2001) or at its very onset (Italy in 1999) that also present relatively higher levels of *Debt* compared to *Economic globalisation*, and in such contexts two of the relatively more right-wing national instances of social democracy along the economic issue dimension emerge (Italy, -10.23; Greece, -18.04). So, descriptively, these

very different configurations of external constraints are, in turn, associated with different economic left-right positions of social democratic parties between the two groups, although similar within them. Of course, these are in a way extreme cases as to the specific configuration of these external constraints and their linkage with well-defined national instances of social democracy, in terms of being either relatively more to the left- or right-wing of the economic issue dimension. However, such similarities can also be found in the overall configurations of external constraints for other national contexts associated, instead, to relatively more average social democratic parties in terms of economic left-right positions. Instances of this, amongst others, are Austria (-22.37), Finland (-24.22), and the United Kingdom (-23.21), all defined by at least a degree of *Europeanisation* throughout the analysed framework – both Austria and Finland joined the EU in 1995 and the Eurozone in 1999; higher than average, but far from the highest, levels of *Economic globalisation*; and much lower, but neither the lowest nor insignificant, levels of *Debt*, both rising over time. Hence, this further evidence adds to the linkage between the similarity of external constraints and configuration of economic left-right positions holding across multiple and varied cases. By also taking the above examples into consideration, this descriptive all points to the confirmation of a general principle: if the economic positions of social democrats are more similar when the respective configuration of external constraints is more similar, regardless of the nature of both, they will be more different when the configurations of external constraints are also more different.

Hence, the explanatory power of the LNA and the emerging story of external constraints, both confirmed by the many different empirical tests and probes performed on the results of the main regression models, lies in this exemplary descriptive evidence. That is, there is significant variation in the spatial and temporal configuration of these external constraints and, in light of it, the predictive function of the regression models, which indeed rests on the specific configuration of external constraints across the specific spatial-temporal context analysed exactly on the basis of the direction and size of the effects related to each constraint, allows for providing a better understanding of why there is variation in intrafamily ideological differentiation and hence social democratic parties are

more similar to each other or more different from each other in terms of their economic-left right positions. In simpler terms: where and when these external constraints are configured in a similar way, the economic positions of social democratic parties will be more similar; where and when these configurations are more varied, the economic positions of social democratic parties will also be more different.

To sum up, we know from an extensive empirical analysis in the LNA that the key external constraints of *Europeanisation*, *Economic Globalisation*, and *Debt* have statistically significant, directionally diverse, and robust effects on the economic left-right positions of contemporary Western European social democratic parties. Further, we also know from the descriptive evidence associated to the predictive function of the regression models that different configurations of these external constraints in given spatial-temporal contexts lead to different economic-left right positions of contemporary Western European social democratic parties, either more similar to or different from each other depending in turn on the degree similarity or difference of these very configurations.[70] However, after answering the '*what*' question in the LNA, the completion of this explanatory account of what determines intrafamily ideological differentiation now needs answering the fundamental '*how*' question. To do so, it is necessary to leverage the multimethod research (MMR) design of this thesis and especially its SNA component, in order to answer the following questions: how, exactly, do external constraints lead social democratic parties to adopt varyingly different economic left-right positions? What mechanism underpins this linkage, which was brought to light and predicted by the LNA? The following chapter (Chapter 8) will be dedicated to this specific analytical endeavour.

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[70] In other words, the post-analysis assessment of the LNA results through descriptive evidence that moved from the predictive function of the regression models proved satisfactory in terms of the analytical goals of this research, the substantive meaningfulness of its conclusions, and the overall specification of said statistical analyses. As will be detailed out later in Chapter 8, this endeavour already corresponds to the second step in the analytical protocol related to regression-based nested analysis (Rohlfing 2008), whereby the empirical evidence emerging from regression analyses – after the regression results have been evaluated as satisfactory and before the SNA – is probed visually, e.g. through descriptive evidence.

8. Small-N Analysis (SNA)

8.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I empirically analysed the determinants of Western European social democratic parties' economic left-right positions, the building block of intrafamily ideological differentiation, by means of statistical methods. In highlighting the statistically significant impact of a number of predictors across several different model specifications and robustness checks, the LNA uncovered above all a story of 'external constraints' (e.g., Mair 2011; Lefkofridi and Nezi 2014; Plescia, Kritzinger, and De Sio 2019). In particular, the especially prominent rightwards effect of *Debt* – previously underexplored in comparative empirical investigations – emerged, both in terms of consistent statistical significance across multiple specifications and explanatory power; alongside the theoretically puzzling opposite impact of analogous phenomena in *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) and *Europeanisation* (rightwards), particularly with regard to Eurozone membership. Further, I also subsequently provided a first empirical assessment of the linkage between the different configurations of these three external constraints and the different economic left-right positions of parties, hence resulting in varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation, through descriptive evidence.

In order to provide a more complete explanatory account of how these economic and structural variables determine the different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation observed in the descriptive data of Chapter 5, I now depart from the '*what*' question of the LNA at the cross-case (or type) level in order to proceed with answering the '*how*' question through the SNA of additional related evidence at the within-case (or token) level (e.g., Rohlfing and Zuber 2021), within the adopted nested analysis design (e.g., Rohlfing 2008). More precisely, the SNA will pursue a twofold goal. First, following up on the conclusions related to the effects of the three external constraints drawn comparatively at the type level, I will look at specific empirical instantiations within cases of particular interest to see both whether these associations do hold at the token level and if the

differences in such predictors are – as hypothesised – connected to the different economic left-right positions of social democratic parties in practice, hence leading to varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation. Second, I will go a step forward in the explanation of *how* precisely this linkage between the different configurations of the three external constraints and the varyingly different economic-left right positions of social democratic parties, i.e. the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation, unfolds. Specifically, I will trace (e.g., Bennett and Checkel 2014; Beach and Pedersen 2019) the process whereby social democratic parties justify the adoption of more left- or right-wing economic positions – depending on the specific relationship analysed – by using the rhetorical means of the specific external constraint in question being present. Of course, this is far from the only process that leads social democratic parties to adopt more left- or right-wing economic positions, neither generally nor specifically in the formulation of their programmatic outlook within and beyond the electoral arena (e.g., Däubler 2012). However, whilst the empirical assessment of other processes – e.g., the collective process of manifesto drafting and the internal and external dynamics related to power relations and closed-door discussions between different groups to name one alternative process – would require going beyond the design features of this thesis, tracing the rhetorical justification of economic position-taking by explicitly citing said external constraints as the underlying motive is feasible through the employed textual data and would still further corroborate and elucidate, at the token level, the dynamics underpinning intrafamily ideological differentiation and its variation that emerged from the LNA.

To pursue these goals, in this chapter I will go back to and deeper into the analysed party manifestos from the Manifesto Project (MARPOR), textually analysing whether and how *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation* were explicitly used as a rhetorical means to justify to the adoption of more left- or right-wing economic positions by social democratic parties. Similarly and further, to enhance the results and demonstrate their validity also outside of party manifestos and the campaign arena, this step will be integrated by further evidence from the executive speeches

performed by social democratic politicians provided by the Comparative Agendas Project (henceforth, CAP) (Grossman and Guinaudeau 2021), which will likewise be textually analysed.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will proceed as follows: in the second section, I will illustrate the rationale and methodological framework informing this analytical step, alongside the selection criteria of the chosen cases. In the third section, I will present extensive evidence from the thematic analysis of party manifestos from the MARPOR, focussing on *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation*. Finally, in the fourth section, I will conclude the chapter by integrating the textual evidence from party programmes with additional findings from the thematic analysis of CAP data on the executive speeches of social democratic politicians.

8.2 Rationale, methodological framework, and case selection

In this thesis, I set out to investigate the reason why formations from the same party family, in this case contemporary Western European social democracy, adopt different ideological positions, intended in economic left-right terms. Further, I sought to understand the variation in this aggregate-level phenomenon: that is, why at different points in time social democrats in the region are considerably closer to each other, and at others considerably further away from each other, in their economic positioning. To achieve this research objective, the type-level statistical analysis (LNA) presented in Chapter 7 told us what, in general, moves social democratic formations in Western Europe further to the economic left or right during the analysed timeframe. Further, subsequent empirical assessment of descriptive evidence leveraging the predictive function of the regression analyses in the LNA showed that different configurations of the three external constraints of *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation* are, indeed, linked to different economic left-right positions, and hence varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation. Now, the innovative multimethod research (MMR) design for the study of intrafamily ideological differentiation that I introduce in this thesis allows for enhancing this explanation, so far drawn comparatively, at the level

of single cases. More specifically, moving from the results of the LNA, the SNA will pursue a twofold goal. First, it will verify whether the relationships between the three external constraints and social democratic parties' economic left-right positions posited at the type level effectively hold at the token level in illustrative individual cases. Second, and most importantly, whereas the LNA answered the '*what*' questions as to the determinants of intrafamily ideological differentiation, the SNA will instead add the answer to the '*how*' question to the explanatory picture, by tracing the process that links said external constraints to the adoption of more left- or right-wing economic positions by social democrats by means of their use as a rhetorical means justifying such economic position-taking. Hence, the SNA will not only further empirically corroborate the results of the LNA, but it will also show exactly *how* the different economic left-right positions of social democratic parties and hence the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation depend on the different configurations of external constraints.

From a research-design perspective, the combination of regression with within-case analysis is one of the research strategies that have come to be known as 'mixed-method' or 'multimethod' research (MMR) (e.g., Simmons 1994; Lieberman 2003, 2005; Rohlfing 2008; Rohlfing and Zuber 2021). Whilst there are viewpoints arguing that large-n (LNA) and small-n analyses (SNA) cannot be combined due to logics of inference considered by some as incommensurable (see, e.g., Chatterjee 2013), Rohlfing and Zuber (2021) demonstrate that these different perspectives can be fruitfully combined, as each is suited to draw inference at a different level: either the type (cross-case, comparative) or the token (within-case, case study) level. The selected combination of an earlier regression analysis (LNA) followed by token-level case studies (SNA), a specific variant of MMR also labelled as regression-based nested analysis (e.g., Rohlfing 2008), is especially useful for the analytical purpose of this thesis. In particular, within the regression-based nested analysis protocol of Rohlfing (2008), the subsequent will be the third step, following the previous ones already tackled in the LNA. Indeed, first, the regression analyses' results were considered to be satisfactory in terms of statistically significant effects, substantive plausibility and meaningfulness, parameters of fit of the

models, and robustness of the results. Second, the visual probe through descriptive empirical evidence presented after the statistical analyses also proved satisfactory, as the regression models appeared well-specified for the analytical purposes of this thesis in light of their predictive function and the linkage between different configurations of external constraints with different economic left-right positions, and hence varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation, of social democracy. I hence now move to the third step of this protocol, generally referred to as the assessment of the model specification in the SNA, specifically with the two aforementioned objectives in mind: testing whether the relationships between the different external constraints and the economic left-right positions of social democrats established comparatively hold within significant cases; and assessing *how*, i.e. according to which process and mechanism, the different configurations of external constraints lead to different economic positions and, hence, varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation.

With this in mind, it is now possible to discuss the hypothesised process that leads the presence of each of the three external constraints of *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation* to a greater emphasis on either more left-wing or more right-wing economic positions by contemporary Western European social democrats. In particular, the available textual data on economic position-taking allows empirically analysing the process of rhetorical justification whereby the economic positions endorsed by the social democrats are justified with explicit reference to such external constraints. As per above, this is of course far from the only process underlying the adoption of specific economic positions by parties and in particular social democrats. For instance, we do not know about the intricate negotiating dynamics that underpin the definition of a party's programmatic outlook, which often involve actors both within (e.g., factions and leaders) the party structure and outside of it (e.g., trade unions, funders, and different interest groups). Their – often asymmetric – power struggle will lead to a complex definition of party positions and especially so within the collective process of manifesto drafting, which by definition needs to account for a multitude of different interests and constituencies and has multiple veto players along the way (e.g., Däubler

2012). However, the widely available textual data allows for empirically assessing another process at the token level, which is equally illustrative of how the different configurations of external constraints lead to social democrats adopting different economic left-right positions and, hence, varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation: the rhetorical justification of economic position-taking based on such external constraints.

On this basis, this hypothesised process of rhetorical justification can be more explicitly elucidated. As per Figure 8.1, the process – seen in the mechanistic terms of production (Beach and Pedersen 2019) – is very straightforward. We know that processes are made up of entities that engage in activities within different mechanism parts, moving from a cause and leading to the outcome. In this case, the entities are contemporary Western European social democratic parties and the activities are constituted by justifying the adoption of more left- or right-wing economic positions due to the presence of a specific external constraint (i.e., a high or substantively relevant level of *Debt* or *Economic globalisation*, or *Eurozone membership*) – which constitutes the cause –, leading to an overall more left- or right-wing economic profile. Conversely, where the cause – i.e., the specific external constraint – is absent, the adoption of economic positions rhetorically justified by means of that external constraint will also be absent, and consequently the overall economic profile of the social

Figure 8.1. Proposed process of rhetorical justification leading to different economic positions and varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation of social democrats.

democratic party will be less characterised in that direction. Taken in conjunction and according to this mechanism, this process will lead social democratic parties in different contexts to adopt either more similar or more different economic left-right positions, depending on whether the specific external constraint in question is configured more similarly or more differently: this will hence explain the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation and *how* they occur.

Hence, with these premises and the results of the LNA from Chapter 7 in mind, it is now possible to move to the case selection criteria for the present SNA, which will consist of a theory-testing, confirmatory process tracing (e.g., Bennett and Checkel 2014; Beach and Pedersen 2019) through the thematic analysis of party manifestos from the MARPOR, integrated by a subsequent thematic analysis of executive speeches from the CAP. In particular, thematic analysis is a qualitative text analysis method for analysing the content of textual data in the search for shared themes pre-defined deductively (e.g., Boyatzis 1998; Lapadat 2012): in this case, on the basis of the results of the regression analyses, the three themes of *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation* (*Eurozone membership*), and their impact on the economic left-right positions of social democratic parties.

For the first of these two steps, it is useful to go back to graphically visualising the phenomenon of interest, intrafamily ideological differentiation in contemporary Western European social democracy. This can most intuitively and effectively be done by looking again at the scatterplot of parties' economic left-right positions reported in Figure 8.2, which provides a telling representation of intrafamily ideological differentiation and its variation; and integrating it with the information on yearly standard deviations, i.e. the most routinely employed statistical measure of intrafamily ideological differentiation in the literature, already reported in Chapter 5. Indeed, on the one hand it is evident how there are considerable differences between the economic left-right placements of social democratic parties during some election years, at times going up to a staggering almost 50% of an entire manifesto. On the other, however, there also seems to be relevant variation in this intrafamily ideological differentiation, with social democratic parties from different Western

European countries being much closer to one another on other occasions. Therefore, these important differences allow for the selection of cases in significant election years that can be leveraged to verify if and how the different impact of the identified external constraints in different national contexts lead, in turn, to different economic left-right positions across the analysed timeframe. By doing so, I will test whether the regression results extend to the case level and ultimately contribute to explaining the ideological differentiation internal to this party family.

On this basis, in this chapter I will present a selection of the extensive within-case textual evidence that was collected by pooling and analysing the electoral manifesto data of the MARPOR related to

Figure 8.2. Economic left-right positions of Western European social democratic parties (1990-2019) and selected election years for the SNA.

key cases in the following election years, which were selected *a priori* as they are particularly significant from a substantive viewpoint for the following reasons:

(1) 1994: a year close to the beginning of the selected timeframe (in the 1990s) that presents quite differentiated economic left-right positions (standard deviation of economic left-right positions = 15.78), with the analysed cases being the Danish (leftmost, economic left-right index = -23.96) and Swedish social democrats (rightmost, 16.99);

(2) 1999: a year in the earlier parts of the selected timeframe (late-1990s) with particularly close economic left-right positions by social democratic parties (standard deviation of economic left-right positions = 4.05), in which the Swiss (leftmost, -30.85) and the Austrian cases (rightmost, -18.69) are analysed;

(3) 2007: the election year, located midway through the selected timeframe, immediately preceding the outbreak of the global financial crisis, in which the Finnish (leftmost, -40.96) and Danish social democrats (rightmost, -10.26) are analysed (standard deviation of economic left-right positions = 8.74);

(4) 2010: the most immediate post-crisis time point in the Western European context, located at the beginning of the final decade of the selected timeframe, in which the Swedish (leftmost, -42.2) and Dutch cases (rightmost, -11.06) cases are analysed (standard deviation of economic left-right positions = 13.28);

(5) 2011: an immediate post-crisis year towards the end of the selected timeframe (in the 2010s) with extremely stark differences (standard deviation of economic left-right positions = 21.1) between the leftmost outlier being the Swiss Socialist Party (-69.02) and the rightmost social democratic party in Finland (-8.41);

(6) 2015: a year midway through the last decade (mid-2010s) of the selected timeframe (standard deviation of economic left-right positions = 10.59). Here, three cases are selected: the leftmost outlier being the Swiss Socialist Party (-51.54), the leftmost non-outlier case being the Finnish Social Democratic Party (-36.29), and the rightmost case being the Portuguese Socialist Party (-18.41);

(7) 2019: the final year from the selected timeframe, constituting the closest available time point, in which the Swiss (leftmost, -45.08) and Portuguese cases (rightmost, -16) cases are analysed (standard deviation of economic left-right positions = 8.9).

Moreover, in order to integrate the findings based on party manifestos and the stage of political campaigning and verify their validity externally (e.g., Drost 2011), i.e. in other relevant arenas, I will also focus on key actors of democratic representation such as government officials vis-à-vis elected representatives in parliament. More specifically, in the second part of the presented SNA, the MARPOR data will be integrated by relevant evidence from the executive speeches of social democratic politicians when holding government positions. These are provided by the CAP and the case selection is based on data availability. In particular, this leads to the analysis of social democratic politicians in executive positions during the selected timeframe in two countries: Spain, for which evidence from the Prime Minister investiture speeches (*Discurso de Investidura*) and the state of the nation debates (*Debate sobre Política General en torno al Estado de la Nación*) is presented;[71] and the United Kingdom (UK), for which evidence from the *Speech from the Throne/Queen's Speech* is presented.[72]

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[71] The CAP website (https://www.comparativeagendas.net/datasets_codebooks) describes these two forms of executive speeches as follows: '*In the investiture speech the candidate to the presidency of the Spanish government presents his program in order to seek the confidence of the Parliament providing important information about the policy priorities of the government for the next legislature. As defined in article 99 of the Spanish Constitution, the proposed candidate (designated by the King after consultation with the representatives designated by parliamentary group with representation in the Spanish Parliament) has to submit to the Parliament the political program of the Government he intends to form. In the state of the nation debate, that takes place annually (with the exception of election years), the Prime Minister informs the Parliament about his future policy priorities as well as about the evolution and implementation of the electoral program, informing about variations in the content of the governmental agenda since the beginning of the term*'.

[72] As per the CAP, the *Speech from the Throne/Queen's Speech* '*sets out executive and legislative priorities of British government in the forthcoming session of parliament*'.

8.3 Within-case evidence from party manifestos

8.3.1 Debt

The regression analyses of Chapter 7 demonstrated how *Debt* was the most significant and consistent predictor of contemporary Western European parties' economic left-right positions, exerting the most statistically significant and second-strongest effect (as per the models employing standardised independent variables). In particular, this indicates that the higher the levels of national sovereign debt at a given election, the more to the right the economic positions of the related social democratic party, hence confirming Hp. 8. The considerable rightwards impact of *Debt* is fully confirmed by extensive within-case textual evidence from party manifestos, with its role as a constraint to economic policy proposals explicitly laid out in the most economically right-wing manifestos, whilst being virtually absent from the most economically left-wing documents. Further, whilst obviously this is a particularly prominent factor after the Europe-wide crisis that broke out in 2009 (e.g., Lane 2012), the present thematic analysis highlights how national sovereign debt is a very pervasive factor even in earlier campaign documents of social democrats.

Indeed, already in 1994 the rightmost electoral manifesto of social democrats that competed in national elections during this year, i.e. the Swedish Social Democratic Party's, spells out the intent to

> 'create healthy government finances and stabilise debt' ('*skapa sunda statsfinanser och stabilisera statsskulden*'),

in the same vein as the MARPOR's economic right 'per414 – Economic Orthodoxy' code, as

> 'central government debt is growing, the interest burden is increasing' ('*statsskulden växer, räntebördan ökar*').[73]

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[73] Unfortunately, the MARPOR only provides the uncoded party manifestos for 1994, meaning that the information related to the coding of specific quasi-sentences cannot be retrieved.

Indeed, on this occasion Sweden presented a level of sovereign debt that, despite not being amongst the highest ones in the analysed population, is its second-highest in all covered pre-electoral years and above the mean value calculated on all observations (62.13%): therefore, definitely a constraint do be reckoned for this national context. Further, the priority of debt reduction also ought to be tended to via the traditionally economic-right policy provision of saving resources by reducing public spending:

> 'State finances must be cleaned up! The goal is clear: the budget deficit must be reduced and the national debt stabilised during the mandate period. We do not accept increased inflation to reduce the budget deficit or the national debt. We want to save the most, where the centre-right government spent the worst' ('*Statsfinanserna måste saneras! Målet är entydigt: budgetunderskottet ska minska och statsskulden stabiliseras under mandatperioden. Vi accepterar inte ökad inflation för att ta ned budgetunderskottet eller statsskulden. Vi vill spara mest, där den borgerliga regeringen slösat värst. Det ar arbetslösheten som är den viktigaste faktorn bakom underskottet och lånebehovet. Arbetslösheten är det stora slöseriet, med såväl pengar som människor*'), with 'measures that […] reduce government spending' ('*åtgärder som […] minskar statsutgifterna*').

Conversely, there is no mention of economic or political dynamics related to national sovereign debt in the electoral manifesto of the Danish Social Democratic Party, that is the leftmost document from this election year, which is almost the equivalent of half an entire manifesto to the economic left of the Swedish counterpart (the difference between the economic left-right index of the two documents being 40.95).[74]

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[74] That the Danish Social Democratic Party presents the economically leftmost manifesto during this electoral year is somewhat surprising, not least because the Danish level of national sovereign debt in the year preceding the 1994 election (78,39%) was its highest across the pre-electoral years within the analysed spatial-temporal framework and higher than

The case of 1999 is, instead, rather different, as social democratic parties that were involved in elections during this year tended to be much closer to each other in terms of their economic left-right positions. The similar and peculiar treatment of the debt issue, in both cases amounting to below-average levels (56.84% in Austria, 25.03% in traditionally lower-indebted Switzerland), seems to contribute to this similar positioning. Indeed, it was not mentioned at all even in the Austrian Social Democratic Party's manifesto, the economically rightmost platform from that year. Instead, the leftmost programme by the Swiss Socialist Party presents an original approach to debt reduction, seen from a left-wing economic viewpoint, as evident from this passage in which left-wing economic MARPOR labels such as 'per403 – Market State Regulation' and 'per504 – Welfare State Expansion' are coded:

'In the 1990s, under the pretext of globalisation and the recession, the centre-right parties began to question basic state tasks and redistribution functions with growing aggressiveness. They are increasingly audacious in defending the tax privileges of the rich and even demanding new ones. The SP, on the other hand, values a functioning state that continues to fully guarantee social security and public services and which finances itself as fairly as possible. Without falling into centre-right savings hysteria, the SP is therefore also committed to restructuring the federal finances and limiting the debt ratio. Such efforts must be made on the expenditure and revenue side and must not slow down the economy, because a growing economy is the best means for healthy finances' ('*In den 90er Jahren haben die Bürgerlichen*

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the Swedish one. As already said, the proposed process of rhetorical justification of the adoption of more left- or right-wing economic positions by social democratic parties in the presence of a specific external constraint is only one out of many potential routes towards economic position-taking. Here, for reasons that would need to be tested beyond the reach of this work such as, for instance, the collective process of manifesto drafting or other strategic choices, the actual presence of a constraint does not translate into an explicit linkage and directional impact on the economic positions of social democrats. Even considering this, the absence of the constraint as a *rhetorical means* employed in the manifesto still has the expected directional consequences: the Danish Social Democratic Party does not mention it in 1994, hence not associating it with the expected right-wing economic positions, hence making its overall economic outlook more left-wing. The interesting question for future research, then, becomes why are there differences in the strategic decision of social democratic parties concerning whether to emphasise external constraints or not in their manifestos, and what determines the different choices.

unter dem Vorwand der Globalisierung und der Rezession mit wachsender Aggressivität begonnen, grundlegende Staatsaufgaben und Umverteilungsfunktionen in Frage zu stellen.[75] Immer unverfrorener verteidigen sie die Steuerprivilegien der Reichen und fordern sogar neue. Die SP dagegen legt Wert auf einen funktionierenden Staat, der die soziale Sicherheit und den Service public weiterhin voll gewährleistet und der sich möglichst gerecht finanziert. Ohne in die bürgerliche Spar-hysterie zu verfallen, setzt sie sich deshalb auch ein für die Sanierung der Bundesfinan-zen und für eine Begrenzung der Verschuldungsquote. Solche Anstrengungen müssen ausgaben- und einnahmenseitig erfolgen und dürfen die Konjunktur nicht bremsen, weil eine wachsende Wirtschaft das beste Mittel für gesunde Finanzen ist', p. 7).

This politically exceptional view of debt reduction even translates to foreign policy, in which the Swiss Socialist Party proposes solidarity towards countries in greater need:

'In the international organisations, especially in the IMF and the World Bank, the SP advocates further debt relief on reasonable terms for the heavily indebted developing countries' ('*Sie setzt sich in den internationalen Organisationen, insbesondere im IWF und der Weltbank für weitergehende Schuldenerlasse zu vernünftigen Bedingungen gegenüber den hochverschuldeten Entwicklungsländern ein*', p. 28).

The examples above from the 1990s demonstrate the importance of the issue of debt for the programmatic profile of social democratic parties even in the earlier portion of the selected timeframe, in which this topic was not yet as salient as after the late-2000s European debt crisis. Hence, one would expect the prominence of debt in shaping these parties' economic positions in their

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[75] In Switzerland, similarly to the rest of the German-speaking world, '*die Bürgerlichen*' or '*die Bürgerlichen Parteien*' is an expression referring to centre-right parties such as, in this case, *Die Mitte*, the *FDP - Die Liberalen*, and the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP).

party manifestos to increase even further in the 2010s. The data empirically confirms this assumption. Indeed, in 2011, the economically leftmost programme by the Swiss Socialist Party bears no mention of debt-related dynamics. In the pre-electoral year, indeed, Switzerland had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 17.11%, extraordinarily low and especially so from a comparative perspective. Instead, this issue is central in shaping a number of key positions in the most economically right-wing platform from this electoral year, which was drafted by the Finnish Social Democratic Party. In particular, this electoral manifesto reports a staggering number of quasi-sentences devoted to the economic right code of 'per414 – Economic Orthodoxy': 63 out of a total of 612 quasi-sentences (10.29%) and 571 assigned quasi-sentences (11.03%). Many of these were directly related to the issue of debt, which – although still comparatively contained (debt-to-GDP ratio in the pre-electoral year of 41,46%) and well below the 60% threshold set up by the regulatory frameworks of the Eurozone – was considerably higher than in the previous pre-electoral year (33.56% in 2006, an almost-eight percentage-point increase in just four years).[76] In this light, preserving the country's creditor status would be one of the central priorities of Finland's main centre-left party, concerned above all with the instability of the Euro area and prospecting the need for massive fiscal consolidation:

> 'The uncertainty of the euro area and the crisis-proneness of the international financial system support the goal of stopping the indebtedness of the state economy during the next election period. Compared to the current development, this means a strengthening need of two billion euros' ('*Euroalueen epävarmuus ja kansainvälisen finanssijärjestelmän kriisialttius puoltavat tavoitetta, että valtiontalouden velkaantuminen pysäytetään ensi vaalikauden aikana. Tämä merkitsee nykykehitykseen verrattuna 2 miljardin euron vahvistamistarvetta*', p. 7, per414 coded twice).

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[76] For a review of the European Union's economic governance rules, see https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact/history-stability-and-growth-pact_en.

This uncertainty is exactly what, in the Finnish Social Democratic Party's programme, should lead Finland to adopt debt reduction as the central strategy towards a healthy and balanced public budget, alongside the typically economic right policy measure of saving on public expenditure:

'The past four years have taken the state economy from a strong surplus to a deep deficit. Uncertainties in the euro area are great, which in part justifies stopping further indebtedness. During the next election period, the state economy must be balanced. The growth rate of the economy is formed by the sum of economic policy, strategic successes of companies and international demand. Therefore, the balancing of the state economy cannot be built on the hope of growth alone. We also need spending savings and a fair tax policy. […] The sustainability of the public economy means the ability to cope with future expenses without the public debt growing too large in relation to the carrying capacity of the entire country's economy or having to tighten taxation unreasonably' ('*Menneet neljä vuotta ovat vieneet valtiontalouden vahvasta ylijäämästä syvään alijäämään. Epävarmuudet euro-alueella ovat suuret, mikä osaltaan perustelee lisävelkaantumisen pysäyttämistä. Ensi vaalikauden aikana valtiontalous on käännettävä tasapainoon. Talouden kasvuvauhti muodostuu talouspolitiikan, yritysten strategisten onnistumisten ja kansainvälisen kysynnän summana. Siksi pelkän kasvutoiveen varaan ei voida valtiontalouden tasapainotusta rakentaa. Tarvitaan myös menosäästöjä ja oikeudenmukaista veropolitiikkaa. [...] Julkisen talouden kestävyys tarkoittaa kykyä selviytyä tulevista menoista ilman, että julkinen velka kasvaa liian suureksi suhteessa koko maan talouden kantokykyyn tai että verotusta joudutaan kiristämään kohtuuttomasti*', p. 20, per414 coded six times).

Other passages further underline some of the fundamental and economically right-wing guiding principles of the Finnish Social Democratic Party's programmatic agenda. These are not only related to balanced and sustainable budgets, but also to financial surpluses even in the flagship policy area

of social spending and – most importantly – deficit reduction explicitly in light of the ongoing debt crisis and the potential future issues related to it, to preserve the country's creditor status:

> 'Finland's economic policy will be built in such a way that the national economy will be balanced by 2015, municipal finances will be strengthened and social security funds will be kept in surplus. With regard to the sustainability of the deficit of public finances as a whole, the equilibrium situation will be reached by 2019. The ongoing debt crisis in the Eurozone highlights the need to purposefully reduce the deficit so that Finland's good credit rating can be maintained and so that, if necessary, action can also be taken in the event of possible new disruptions' ('*Suomen talouspoliittinen linja rakennetaan siten, että valtiontalous tasapainotetaan vuoteen 2015 mennessä, kuntataloutta vahvistetaan ja sosiaaliturvarahastot pidetään ylijäämäisinä. Koko julkisen talouden kestävyysvajeen osalta tasapainotilanne saavutetaan vuoteen 2019 mennessä. Euroalueen käynnissä oleva velkakriisi korostaa tarvetta supistaa määrätietoisesti alijäämää, jotta Suomen hyvä luottoluokitus voi säilyä ja jotta voidaan tarvittaessa toimia myös mahdollisten uusien häiriötilanteiden syntyessä*', p. 22, per414 coded three times).

Further, although it does not directly contribute to the measurement of the Finnish Social Democratic Party's economic position, it is also interesting to look at how relevant outward-looking considerations regarding the creditor versus debtor status vis-à-vis other partners in the international arena are for this formation, in terms of the general ethos informing its electoral manifesto. Indeed, here Finland's creditor status seems to greatly impact the relatively right-wing economic positions of its social democratic formation. In particular, the aforementioned measures and policy proposals are advanced against a background setting made up by the collapses of insolvent countries such as Greece and Ireland. In this light, prevention from contagion is centre stage for Finland, and again it should be pursued by limiting the costs and expenditures faced by the public finances:

239

'In the fall of 2010, the Ministry of Finance corrected the forecast development of expenditures for the years 2011-2015 significantly upwards. The Greek and Irish debt crises led to increased uncertainty in the money markets. It is estimated that, in the medium term, this will also be reflected in an increase in financial costs in Finland. The expected growth of interest expenses in the state budget in the next election period is about 0.5 billion per year' ('*Valtiovarainministeriö korjasi menojen ennustekehitystä vuosille 2011 -2015 syksyllä 2010 merkittävästi ylöspäin. Kreikan ja Irlannin velkakriisit johtivat rahamarkkinoiden epävarmuuden lisääntymiseen. Sen arvioidaan keskipitkällä aikavälillä heijastuvan myös Suomeen rahoituskulujen kasvuna. Korkokulujen ennakoitu kasvu valtion budjetissa on ensi vaalikaudella noin 0,5 miljardia vuodessa*', p. 22).

This story finds further confirmation in 2015, further down the line of the Eurozone crisis, with its effects now fully unravelled and felt widely across the region, albeit with numerous cross-country differences. This electoral year is an excellent example with regard to the differentiated impact of both the debt crisis itself and the issue of debt on social democratic parties' economic positions. Indeed, on the first front, debt levels are very different across the three selected cases. The most sheltered country is Switzerland, a financially strong and independent country that was not part of the severely hit Eurozone, recording again a very low debt-to-GDP ratio (15.78%) in the pre-electoral year. Within the Euro area, instead, we observe two starkly diverging cases: Finland, where despite being higher than in Switzerland the debt-to-GDP ratio in the pre-electoral year is still comparatively low and below the 60% threshold (50.94%), hence *de facto* maintaining its creditor status within the region; and Portugal, a Southern European debtor country, which was hit so severely by the crisis that it had to be bailed out in a massive three-year recovery programme between 2011 and 2014 (e.g., Pereira and Wemans 2015), and still recording a very high debt-to-GDP ratio in the pre-electoral year (131.19%).

These differences in national sovereign debt levels are mirrored by the different impacts of this topic issue in the party manifestos of the respective social democratic parties. Indeed, the issue of debt is absent in the platforms from the two countries where the debt situation is less worrying, the left-outlier case of Switzerland and the leftmost non-outlier case of Finland. Instead, debt is again present as a constraint in the manifesto of the Portuguese Socialist Party, leading the economic positions of this left-wing formation further to the economic right. This occurs by, again, accentuating further a sober approach to public finances, especially through the emphasis on the MARPOR 'per414 – Economic Orthodoxy' code. This is evident from the eloquent quote reported below, with typical right-wing goals in economic 'governance' such as balancing budgets and debt reduction are described as a central priority:

> 'The sustainability of public accounts and the stabilisation of indebtedness are fundamental principles of governance. It is necessary to clearly commit to a sustainability trajectory for public accounts, to guarantee the reduction of the structural deficit and allow the start of a downward trajectory of the debt ratio. The quasi-structural balance of public accounts and the reduction of indebtedness are objectives assumed as a priority' ('*A sustentabilidade das contas públicas e a estabilização do endividamento são princípios basilares da governação. É necessário um compromisso claro com uma trajetória de sustentabilidade das contas públicas que garanta a redução do défice estrutural e permita iniciar uma trajetória descendente do rácio de endividamento. O quase equilíbrio estrutural das contas públicas e a redução do endividamento são objetivos assumidos como uma prioridade*', p. 11, per414 coded three times).

The within-case excursus on the fundamental role of debt for the economic position-taking of contemporary Western European social democratic parties in their party manifestos ends with the latest time point in the selected timeframe, 2019, in which the telling Swiss and Portuguese cases are

again compared. Once more, the observed social democrats are immersed in, respectively, a non-Eurozone country with healthy finances (debt-to-GDP ratio in the pre-electoral year of 13.2%), and a country within the Euro area still with a very concerning debt situation (debt-to-GDP ratio in the pre-electoral year of 123.31%). And so, while on the one hand the issue of debt is absent from the economically leftmost manifesto in this electoral year, the one by the Swiss Socialist Party, it still permeates the economic agenda of the rightmost platform. This was presented in Portugal by the Socialist Party that – already in the previous legislature, in which it enjoyed the external governmental support of the radical left – had to combine leftist goals with the financial rigour required by European institutions (e.g., Fernandes, Magalhães, and Santana-Pereira 2018). Both renewing and successfully upholding the international commitments with regards to public finances and debt reduction already in the previous government spell are, indeed, remarked upfront, constituting one of several thematic emphases on the MARPOR's economic right 'per414 – Economic Orthodoxy' code:

> 'We promised to respect our international commitments in terms of budgetary consolidation and for three years we have had the lowest deficits in our democracy, we have lowered the debt to 118% of GDP and with that we have freed ourselves from paying more than two billion euro in interest' ('*Prometemos respeitar os nossos compromissos internacionais em matéria de consolidação orçamental e temos há três anos os défices mais baixos da nossa democracia, baixámos a dívida para 118% do PIB e com isso libertámo-nos do pagamento mais de 2 000 milhões de euros em juros*', p. 3, per414).

The effectiveness of the previous Socialist government in pursuing these economic-right policy goals is further underlined in other passages as well, such as the following one:

> 'This trajectory paves the way for certain, balanced and sustainable accounts, with the lowest deficit in democracy and public debt falling from 129% in 2015 to around 118% of GDP in

2019' ('*Esta trajetória abre o caminho para contas certas, equilibradas e sustentáveis, com o défice mais baixo da democracia e a dívida pública a recuar de 129% em 2015 para cerca de 118% do PIB em 2019*', p. 5, per414).

Still, in the 2019 electoral manifesto the Socialist Party contends that the reduction of high debt levels shall remain the central economic policy goal to be met by the Portuguese government in the new legislature, to both responsibly manage the public finances and keep building confidence in the Portuguese economy:

> 'In the budgetary framework, the main constraint will continue to be the still high level of public debt that Portugal has, which entails high interest payments, even with rates at historically low levels. The path of responsible fiscal consolidation and public debt reduction must continue, allowing income stability and the maintenance of confidence in the Portuguese economy' ('*No quadro orçamental, a principal condicionante continuará a ser o nível ainda elevado da dívida pública que Portugal apresenta e que acarreta um elevado pagamento de juros, mesmo com as taxas em níveis historicamente baixos. O caminho da consolidação orçamental responsável e da redução da dívida pública deve prosseguir, permitindo a estabilidade de rendimentos e a manutenção da confiança na economia portuguesa*', p. 6, per414 coded twice).

Finally, this agenda of economic rigour – which is an organic medium-term plan, designed for the four-year duration of a legislature – is spelt out in greater detail in the following passages, which set precise objectives in terms of debt and deficit reduction and describe these achievements as the only way of guaranteeing a stable and secure future for Portugal and its economy, safe from potential international disruptions. Further, any future growth in public expenditures must be linked with the

stability of the country's fiscal policy, in line with what is required by the European frameworks of economic governance.

'The path outlined for the next four years should allow the reduction of public debt to close to 100% of GDP by the end of the legislature. This is the first objective to retain: public debt dropping to close to 100% of GDP at the end of the next legislature. The achievement of this objective will allow Portugal to acquire the necessary adaptation margin so that it can face the future with greater confidence and stability and stop being so exposed to the vicissitudes of international financial markets, which burden the country with interest and instability and compromise its potential of economic growth. The path outlined for the next four years requires the maintenance of a primary balance of around 3% of GDP. This is the second objective to retain: the primary balance should remain close to 3% of GDP. This objective must be ensured in a context in which compliance with the expenditure rule will gain relevance in the European framework, and Portugal must seek to ensure that the trend growth in expenditure is in line with the trend growth in revenue within a framework of fiscal policy stability. Only in this way will we keep accurate accounts and contribute to a more stable future' ('*O caminho traçado para os próximos quatro anos deverá permitir reduzir a dívida pública para próximo dos 100% do PIB no final da legislatura. Este é o primeiro objetivo a reter: a dívida pública desce para próximo dos 100% do PIB no final da próxima legislatura. A concretização deste objetivo permitirá que Portugal adquira a margem de adaptação necessária para que possa enfrentar o futuro com maior confiança e estabilidade e deixar de estar tão exposto às vicissitudes dos mercados financeiros internacionais, que sobrecarregam o país com juros e instabilidade e comprometem o seu potencial de crescimento económico. O caminho traçado para os próximos quatro anos exige a manutenção de um saldo primário de cerca de 3% do PIB. Este é o segundo objetivo a reter: o saldo primário deve manter-se perto dos 3% do PIB. Este objetivo deve ser assegurado num quadro em que o cumprimento*

da regra da despesa ganhará relevância no quadro europeu, devendo Portugal procurar garantir que o crescimento tendencial da despesa esteja em linha com o crescimento tendencial da receita num quadro de estabilidade da política fiscal. Só assim manteremos contas certas e contribuiremos para um futuro mais estável', p. 7, per414 coded four times).

8.3.2 Economic globalisation

I now move to the analysis of within-case textual evidence related to the impact *Economic globalisation* on the economic left-right positions adopted by contemporary Western European social democratic parties in their party manifestos. As evident from the specialised literature presented in Chapter 3, there are two existing viewpoints as to the directional effect of this phenomenon on parties' economic left-right positions: a rightwards, 'efficiency' thesis, and a leftwards, 'compensation' thesis (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016). The regression analysis in Chapter 7 shows how it is the latter that prevails, with a statistically significant negative effect on the economic left-right index; hence rejecting the presented hypothesis based on the most widespread 'efficiency' perspective in the literature (Hp. 4). This means that higher levels of economic globalisation are associated with more left-wing economic positions by social democrats, which will above all rally around their flagship welfare achievements vis-à-vis the strong pressures exerted by this international process. This finding is not only important for contributing to the related debate, but also substantively interesting in the comparison with the directionally opposite effect of *Europeanisation* and in particular Eurozone membership, leading further to the economic right instead, which will be discussed in the following sub-section.

Interesting evidence emerges from the thematic analysis of social democratic parties' manifestos. Indeed, in an electoral year in which social democratic platforms seem to be relatively similar to each other in terms of economic positioning such as 1999, the leftwards impact of the issue of economic globalisation can be identified in both the leftmost and rightmost manifestos. These similarities also seem to be justified by the virtually identical levels of economic globalisation recorded in both,

respectively, Switzerland and Austria in the pre-electoral year (KOF Economic Globalisation index of 79.36 for the former, 79.32 for the latter). As expected, in the leftmost case, that is the one by the Swiss Socialist Party, the issue of economic globalisation is explicitly linked to economic left stances, especially through the MARPOR 'per403 – Market Regulation' code. Firstly, as already reported above, globalisation is depicted as one of the pretexts to instil doubts in citizens concerning some functions of government considered fundamental, such as redistributive ones, that come under fire from the centre-right forces:

> 'In the 1990s, under the pretext of globalisation and the recession, the centre-right parties began to question basic state tasks and redistribution functions with growing aggressiveness' ('*In den 90er Jahren haben die Bürgerlichen unter dem Vorwand der Globalisierung und der Rezession mit wachsender Aggressivität begonnen, grundlegende Staatsaufgaben und Umverteilungsfunktionen in Frage zu stellen*', per403).[77]

Perhaps the most telling excerpt as to the left-oriented framing of the globalisation issue is the title of the entire subparagraph dedicated to it: '*shaping globalisation politically*'. In this part of the manifesto, the Swiss Socialist Party expresses the need to halt the neoliberal turn of this phenomenon, going as far as openly criticising not only the 'exploitation' carried out by multinational corporations, but also key international organisations (IOs) shaping globalisation such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation:

> '17. Shaping globalisation politically – The result of accelerated globalisation and internationalisation – especially of the economy – is frightening in terms of the increase in prosperity for the population of this world, as the latest report on human development by the

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[77] The reported passage is available on line 86 in related the .csv file, which is downloadable from the MARPOR repository.

UN development program UNDP once again drastically demonstrates. But even the most recent financial crises do not prevent the promoters of neoliberal economic policy from continuing to focus on accelerated liberalisation and deregulation and to drive them forward. The International Monetary Fund is to be given a new mandate to promote the liberalisation of capital transactions (investments) and a new round of negotiations at the WTO is to be started at a ministerial meeting in Seattle at the end of November 1999. As liberalisation and deregulation progress, more and more vital areas are slipping out of political control. Nowhere is this more visible than in multinationals, for example in food production, where the monopolised combination of industrial food production, pharmaceutical and chemical companies, genetic engineering and biological piracy in developing countries is destroying traditional and sustainable forms of production that make farmers dependent, shamelessly exploit countries and deliberately undermines consumers' freedom of choice' ('*17. Globalisierung politisch gestalten – Die Bilanz der beschleunigten Globalisierung und Internationalisierung – insbesondere der Wirtschaft - ist gemessen am Wohlstandsgewinn für die Bevölkerung dieser Welt erschreckend, wie der neuste Bericht über die menschliche Entwicklung des UNO-Entwicklungsprogramms UNDP wieder drastisch vor Augen führt. Aber auch die jüngsten Finanzkrisen hindern die Promotoren neoliberaler Wirtschaftspolitik nicht daran, weiterhin auf beschleunigte Liberalisierung und Deregulierung zu setzen und diese voranzutreiben. So soll der Internationale Währungsfonds neu das Mandat erhalten, die Liberalisierung des Kapitalverkehrs (Investitionen) voranzutreiben und Ende November 1999 soll an einem Ministertreffen in Seattle eine neue Verhandlungsrunde der WTO gestartet werden. Mit fortschreitender Liberalisierung und Deregulierung entgleiten immer mehr lebenswichtige Bereiche der politischen Gestaltung. Nirgends wird dies so sichtbar wie bei den Multis, beispielsweise bei der Nahrungsmittelerzeugung, wo das monopolisierte Zusammengehen von industrieller Nahrungsmittelproduktion, Pharma- und Chemiekonzernen, Gentechnologie und biologischer Piraterie in Entwicklungsländern*

traditionelle und nachhaltige Produktionsformen zerstört, die Bauern abhängig macht,

Länder schamlos ausbeutet und die Wahlfreiheit der KonsumentInnen gezielt untergräbt',

per403 coded seven times).[78]

Although not directly linked to economic left MARPOR codes, the necessity to control and shape globalisation politically is so prominent in the manifesto of the Socialist Party that it leads it to even propose a monumental shift in traditional Swiss foreign policy, suggesting the country joins the European Union (EU):

'The SP wants Switzerland to join the EU as quickly as possible. This is the only possible

logical step in order to […] provide a political response to economic globalisation' ('*Die SP*

will mit der Schweiz möglichst rasch in die EU. Dies ist der einzig mögliche logische Schritt,

um […] eine politische Antwort auf die ökonomische Globalisierung zu geben').[79]

Yet, as mentioned, even in the economically rightmost social democratic manifesto from 1999, the one by the Austrian Social Democratic Party, economic globalisation is tied to left-wing economic stances; although much less prominently, hence contributing to explaining at the same time the relative similarity between the platforms during these years as well as the existing differences between them. In particular, the Austrian social democrats focus on another fundamental issue: workers and their rights, and how they must be protected against the negative effects of globalisation. This occurs by emphasising the MARPOR 'per701 – Labour Groups: Positive', as in this passage:

'Our achievements in this area must not be undermined and pushed back – on the contrary:

the co-determination rights of the works councils are particularly important in the age of

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[78] Passage from lines 491-498.
[79] Lines 204-206.

globalisation with its dramatic effects on the individual employee and must therefore be expanded or adapted to new circumstances ('*Unsere Errungenschaften auf diesem Gebiet dürfen nicht ausgehöhlt und zurückgedrängt werden – im Gegenteil: Mitbestimmungsrechte der Betriebsräte sind im Zeitalter der Globalisierung mit ihren dramatischen Auswirkungen auf den einzelnen Arbeitnehmer und die einzelne Arbeitnehmerin besonders wichtig und daher auszubauen bzw. an neue Gegebenheiten anzupassen*', per701).[80]

The leftwards impact of economic globalisation on the economic positions of social democrats can also be tracked in the ethos informing the leftmost electoral manifesto of 2007, the one by the Finnish Social Democratic Party, in a national context with a level of economic globalisation in the pre-electoral year (81.94) above both the pooled (76.25) and yearly (80.96) average. In particular, this formation puts its focus on two forms of solidarity that should be considered a priority when shaping globalisation. The first is solidarity amongst citizens and their equal and fair treatment, specifically in redistributive terms:

> 'The task of politics is to ensure that we can respond to the challenges of globalisation in an efficient and socially sustainable way, and that the benefits of globalisation are distributed fairly among citizens' ('*Politiikan tehtävänä on huolehtia siitä, että voimme vastata globalisaation haasteisiin tehokkaasti ja sosiaalisesti kestävästi, ja että globalisaation hyödyt jakautuvat kansalaisten kesken oikeudenmukaisesti*', p. 3).

The second is, again, a redistributive form of solidarity vis-à-vis the output of globalisation, but this time at the international level:

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[80] The reported passage is available on line 323 in related the .csv file, which is downloadable from the MARPOR repository.

'We want to actively participate in the development of globalisation's international management mechanisms, with the goal of a more even and fair distribution of globalisation's results' ('*Haluamme osallistua aktiivisesti globalisaation kansainvälisten hallintamekanismien kehittämiseen, tavoitteena globalisaation tulosten tasaisempi ja oikeudenmukaisempi jakautuminen*', p. 14).

Conversely, reinforcing its differentiated impact on social democratic parties' programmatic outlooks, the issue of economic globalisation, and therefore its leftwards effect on economic positions, is – in fact – not mentioned at all in the rightmost manifesto from this electoral year, the one by the Danish Social Democratic Party, which is considerably more to the economic right than the Finnish instance.[81]

As a final within-case piece of evidence demonstrating the leftist reaction of social democratic parties to increasing levels of economic globalisation and the key events related to this phenomenon,[82] in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis criticisms to this phenomenon came even from one of the most economically open countries and trading powerhouses in the world. Indeed, this quote from the Dutch Labour Party in 2010 (the Dutch value of KOF Economic Globalisation index in the pre-electoral year being 86.67) is very telling as to the need for backtracking from pro-market enthusiasms, typical of 'Third Way' social democracy (e.g., Giddens 1998), even by endorsing some of the anti-bank rhetoric typical of populist and radical left parties (e.g., O'Malley and Fitzgibbon 2014; Ciocchetti 2019):

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[81] Again, as per above, the Danish social democrats emerge as an exception to the hypothesised process (external constraint: present – KOF Economic Globalisation index of 79.36 in the pre-electoral year –; rhetorical justification of economic position-taking in the expected direction by explicitly mentioning the external constraint: absent), although not to the amply ascertained linkage between the economic position-taking in the expected direction and the explicit mention of a given external constraint, when indeed made.

[82] The increase in levels of *Economic globalisation* within the region during the selected timeframe is confirmed by the statistically significant (at $p<0.001$) and positive Pearson's *r* correlation coefficient (0.47) between this variable and election years, with this process already well underway in previous decades – or, according to some, even centuries (e.g., O'Rourke and Williamson 2002).

'Greedy bankers and failing regulators have pushed entire economies to the brink of collapse. They were able to go about their business thanks to an irresponsible economic and interest policy. There was an unlimited belief in globalisation and deregulation of financial markets' ('*Hebzuchtige bankiers en falende toezichthouders hebben hele economieën aan de rand van de afgrond gebracht. Zij konden hun gang gaan dankzij een onverantwoordelijke economische en rentepolitiek. Er heerste een onbegrensd geloof in globalisering en deregulering van financiële markten*', p. 18, per403 coded three times).

8.3.3 Europeanisation

The last factor for which textual evidence in party manifestos will be traced is *Europeanisation*. As already mentioned, the puzzling finding emerging from the literature does not derive from the confirmation of Hp. 3 of itself, but rather from the opposing direction of this effect compared to *Economic globalisation*. More specifically, the regression analyses in Chapter 7 illustrate how it is Eurozone membership specifically to exert a statistically significant and rightwards effect on social democratic parties' economic positions. This finding, which is in line with the relevant literature concerning the external constraints on economic policy deriving from membership in the Euro area and the related regulatory frameworks (e.g., Laffan 2014), is corroborated by a large amount of textual evidence emerging from the thematic analysis of the selected party manifestos provided by the MARPOR. Hence, by looking at party manifestos in a given electoral year, one should expect the issue of Eurozone membership to be most prominent and constraining for social democrats' economic policy proposals in the rightmost platforms, and not at all or less so in the leftmost ones.

For a start, this finds confirmation even well before the Eurozone crisis of the early 2010s, in the earlier portion of the selected timeframe. In 1999 already, whilst issues of integration in European institutions and frameworks are absent in the manifesto of a party from a non-member state such as the Swiss Socialist Party – the leftmost one from this electoral year –, Euro-area membership is impactful in the rightmost document, presented by the Austrian Social Democratic Party. Indeed,

Eurozone membership is explicitly linked by this leftist party to a typically economic-right policy approach, centred around concepts such as responsibility in managing public accounts, balancing budgets, a frugal approach to fiscal policy, and maintenance of net-creditor status within the EU. Once more, all of this accentuates the coding focus on economic-right MARPOR categories, with 'per414 – Economic Orthodoxy' particularly prominent:

'The basis for a long-term successful economic, employment and social policy is a secure budget situation and thus the responsible use of taxpayers' money. The stability of the economic and monetary union, i.e. the euro, and low interest rates also depend on frugal budgetary policies. We will make socially just savings and halve the budget deficit by 2003. Therefore, no measure is proposed in this election program that cannot be financed in the long term. Only in this way can it be guaranteed that no further austerity package will be necessary and that scope will be created for new and important tasks in the areas of employment, education and research. This also applies at European level: Austria has achieved a significant reduction in its contributions to the EU and will ensure that these funds are used carefully. Currently, this means efficient financial controls that prevent incidents of the kind that occurred in the Commission's previous term of office, as well as very careful preparation for EU enlargement that does not cause unreasonable costs to the net contributors' ('*Grundlage für eine langfristig erfolgreiche Wirtschafts-, Beschäftigungs- und Sozialpolitik ist eine gesicherte Budgetsituation und damit der verantwortungsvolle Umgang mit Steuergeldern. Auch die Stabilität der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, also des Euro, und ein niedriges Zinsniveau hängen von sparsamer Haushaltspolitik ab. Wir werden sozial gerecht sparen und das Budgetdefizit bis 2003 halbieren. In diesem Wahlprogramm ist daher auch keine Maßnahme vorgeschlagen, die auf Dauer nicht finanzierbar ist. Nur auf diesem Weg kann garantiert werden, daß kein weiteres Sparpaket notwendig ist und daß Spielraum für neue und wichtige Aufgaben in den Bereichen Beschäftigung, Bildung und Forschung geschaffen*

wird. Dies gilt auch auf europäischer Ebene: Österreich hat eine deutliche Verringerung

seiner Beitragszahlungen an die EU erreicht und wird sehr genau darauf achten, daß mit

diesen Geldern sorgsam umgegangen wird. Aktuell bedeutet dies eine effiziente

Finanzkontrolle, die Vorfälle, wie es sie in der vergangenen Amtsperiode der Kommission

gegeben hat, verhindert, sowie eine sehr sorgfältige Vorbereitung der EU-Erweiterung, die

den Nettozahlern keine unzumutbaren Kosten verursacht', per414 coded six times).[83]

Unsurprisingly, the role of Eurozone membership and compliance with its constraints becomes absolutely crucial in the wake of the Euro-area crisis during the 2010s. This is most evident in 2010, an electoral year in which perhaps the most convincing evidence yet concerning the rightwards impact of Eurozone membership on social democratic parties' economic positions emerges. Indeed, whilst as expected there is no mention of such dynamics in the leftmost manifesto from this electoral year, drafted by a formation from a country that does not adopt the Euro such as the Swedish Social Democratic Party, some of the quotes reported in the rightmost platform, by the Dutch Labour Party, are most telling of how the programmatic outlook and ethos of this party is shaped by related considerations. For the representative of the Dutch mainstream left, Eurozone membership does not just mean the need for guaranteeing balancing budgets, reduced deficits, and refraining from protectionism. Indeed, it also signifies the necessity of ensuring other partners are being held accountable for how they manage to keep their public accounts in order, decisively advancing the 'lazy South' rhetoric that was typical during the Euro crisis in several Continental and Northern countries (e.g., Hall 2014, Van Vossole 2016, Ervedosa 2017), at a time where many Southern economies were struggling the most:

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[83] The reported passage is available on lines 252-267 in related the .csv file, which is downloadable from the MARPOR repository.

'In Europe we agree on how to stimulate economic growth without falling into protectionism. We share one currency, the euro, with sixteen other countries. That is why we benefit from every country having its household book in order. Laziness of one should not be at the expense of prosperity of the other. The Netherlands must therefore also adhere to the European agreements to bring the financing deficit down again' ('*In Europa spreken we af hoe we economische groei stimuleren zonder in protectionisme te vervallen. We delen met zestien andere landen één munt, de euro. Daarom zijn we erbij gebaat dat ieder land zijn huishoudboekje op orde heeft. Laksheid van de één mag niet ten koste gaan van welvaart bij de ander. Nederland moet zich dus ook houden aan de Europese afspraken om het financieringstekort weer naar beneden te brengen*', p. 7).

Further, an entire subsection of the programme is devoted to principles of fiscal policy, informed by economic-right ideas such as cautious management of public finances, saving through a systematic approach to public spending cuts via structural reforms, and closely adhering to the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact:

'1. Context and principles – Public finances must be put in order. This means that major savings will have to be made in the coming years. That requires caution. […] From an economic point of view, it is better to achieve structural reforms with longer-term returns than to cut spending arbitrarily just to maximize short-term returns. […] Even without additional policy, the Netherlands complies with the agreements made in Europe to bring the structural and actual deficit back below -3% by 2013. From that moment on, the normal standards of the Stability and Growth Pact will apply. These require a systematic structural improvement of the balance of at least 0.5% until the balance has achieved the so-called medium-term objective of around 0. This means that the minimum necessary balance improvement path is as follows: to at least meet the standards of the Stability and Growth Pact, i.e. at least 1.3%

extra (net 8.5 billion euros) must be saved by cutting public expenditure or by increasing taxes' ('*1. Context en uitgangspunten – De overheidsfinanciën dienen op orde te worden gebracht. Dit betekent dat er de komende jaren grote besparingen moeten worden gerealiseerd. Dat vergt wel behoedzaamheid. [...] Economisch gezien is het beter om structurele hervormingen met opbrengsten op de langere termijn te realiseren dan willekeurig te snijden in de uitgaven alleen maar om zoveel mogelijk opbrengsten op de korte termijn te realiseren. [...] Ook zonder aanvullend beleid voldoet Nederland aan de in Europa gemaakte afspraken om het structurele en feitelijke tekort in 2013 weer onder de -3% gebracht te hebben. Vanaf dat moment gelden de gewone normen van het Stabiliteits- en Groei Pact. Deze vragen een stelselmatige structurele verbetering van het saldo met tenminste 0.5% totdat het saldo de zogeheten middellange- termijndoelstelling heeft gehaald van om en nabij 0. Dit betekent dat het minimaal noodzakelijke saldo- verbeteringspad er als volgt uit ziet: Er zal in de komende kabinetsperiode om tenminste aan de normen van het Stabiliteits- en Groei Pact te voldoen, dus minstens 1.3% extra (netto 8.5 miljard euro) bespaard moeten worden door te bezuinigen op de uitgaven of door de lasten te verhogen*', pp. 83-85).

Similar mechanisms are evident in the rightmost manifesto of 2011, the one by social democrats in a Eurozone country such as Finland, which – contrary to the lack of mentions related to this issue in the leftmost Swiss Socialist Party's manifesto – links both Eurozone membership and its crisis to the need for adopting economic-right policy approaches, especially through an emphasis on the MARPOR 'per414 – Economic Orthodoxy' code. Indeed it is because of the instability in the Euro-area and potential new troubles that Finland ought to stabilise its economy through both debt and deficit reduction and large-scale fiscal consolidation, as per the quotes already reported above in this chapter.

The differentiated impact of Eurozone membership on social democratic parties' economic left-right positions in their party manifestos can also be tracked in 2015. This issue is absent in the leftmost

manifesto from this electoral year, i.e. the already mentioned outlier of the Swiss Socialist Party. Conversely, it is present in the rightmost platform, the one by the Socialist Party in a Eurozone member country such as Portugal, contributing to taking it further to the economic right. First, in terms of the ethos informing the economic agenda of Portugal's main leftist party, an almost textbook description of Eurozone membership as an external constraint – though, a welcome one:

> 'What is an inherent constraint, in particular, participating in the Economic and Monetary Union and sharing a common currency also represents an enormous advantage' ('*O que é um constrangimento inerente, em particular, à participação na União Económica e Monetária e à partilha de uma moeda comum representa também uma enorme vantagem*', p. 8).

Along these lines, the document also sets out the principles in the medium-term economic plans proposed by the party in the 'Agenda for the Decade' ('*Agenda para a Década*'), which sees as some of its core principles the commitment to the Economic and Monetary Union's (EMU) rules, fiscal rigour, and debt and deficit reduction. Again, the accent is put on the 'per414 – Economic Orthodoxy'. Further, the Portuguese Socialist Party that convergence within the Euro area is achieved by a number of means, including measures aimed at economic growth that could be put to use for the key goals of balancing budgets and reducing debt, as evident from the following passage:

> 'For the PS and for the European socialist, social-democratic and labor parties that propose different "structural reforms", the possibility of creating a specific program for each Member State must therefore be adopted, in order to deepen the path of convergence within Europe. This program should seek to respond to the following challenges: Re-launching economic growth, considering the objective of consolidating public finances (gradual reduction of the budget deficit as a medium-term goal and depending on the results of the reforms to be introduced and the sustained "deleveraging" of the economy, both in terms of public and

private debt) […]’ (‘*Para o PS e para os partidos socialistas, sociais-democratas e trabalhistas europeus que propõem "reformas estruturais" diferentes, deve ser assim adotada a possibilidade de criação de um programa específico para cada Estado-Membro, no sentido de aprofundar o caminho de convergência com a Europal. Esse programa deve procurar responder aos seguintes desafios: Relançar o crescimento económico, considerando o objetivo de consolidação das finanças públicas (redução gradual do défice orçamental numa meta de médio prazo e em função dos resultados das reformas a introduzir e "desalavancagem" sustentada da economia, tanto no plano da dívida pública como da privada) […]*’, p. 22, per414).

Finally, the central role of Portugal and its Socialist government in the deepening of European monetary integration, which as amply shown is characterised by eminently right-wing economic principles, is also underlined and informs the Socialist Party's electoral manifesto at the last time point observed in this thesis, 2019:

> ‘Portugal is now at the forefront of all relevant European agendas, from the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union to the reception of refugees or the energy transition to the defense of the rule of law; and all multilateral agendas, from the Sustainable Development Goals to the Climate Agenda and the Global Compact on Migration’ (‘*Portugal passou a estar na linha da frente de todas as agendas europeias relevantes, do aprofundamento da União Económica e Monetária ao acolhimento dos refugiados ou da transição energética à defesa do Estado de Direito; e de todas as agendas multilaterais, dos Objetivos do Desenvolvimento Sustentável à Agenda do Clima e ao Pacto Global das Migrações*’, p. 48).

Instead, as expected, the issue of Eurozone membership is absent entirely from the leftmost platform of 2019, the one by the Socialist Party of non-member Switzerland.

8.4 Within-case evidence from executive speeches

Party manifestos already demonstrated that the cross-case findings emerging from the statistical analyses in Chapter 7 hold within single cases with textual evidence from the thematic analysis of party manifestos themselves, in the vast majority of cases in line with the proposed process visualised in Figure 8.1. However, to further validate these findings from an external viewpoint, it is necessary to also look at evidence outside of the data on programmatic platforms provided by the MARPOR, hence related to the stage of electoral campaigns. That is, it is useful to look into other relevant arenas, to explore whether the associated relationships between social democrats' economic positions and the statistically significant predictors of substantive interest also apply more broadly, beyond manifestos. In this vein, the data provided by the CAP makes it possible to look at a fundamental component of representative democracies and party government (e.g., Katz 1986, 1987; Mair 2008[a]): the governmental arena, and especially its relationship with the institution directly linking it to electoral representation, i.e. parliament. It does so by collecting and making available the executive speeches of government representatives in front of the respective national assemblies, allowing to examine the connection between the analysed factors and the economic positions of social democrats when they are in power. As already mentioned above, data availability means that it is only possible to look at executive speeches from two countries here: Spain, with the Prime Minister investiture speeches (*Discurso de Investidura*) and the state of the nation debates (*Debate sobre Política General en torno al Estado de la Nación*); and the UK, with the *Speech from the Throne/Queen's Speech*. Selected evidence from the thematic analysis of these speeches will now be presented.

Starting with the rightwards impact of debt, this is confirmed in numerous Prime Ministers' Speeches in Spain during the selected timeframe. In 1994 already, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)'s

prime minister Felipe González underlined the priority of decisively adopting a much more restrictive approach to public finances due to high debt levels in the state of the nation debate:

> 'The debt of all public administrations is already close to 60 percent of gross domestic product and even if interest rates remain low and activity recovers, unless we decisively apply a rigorous budgetary policy, we may find ourselves in the future with serious financing problems' ('*La deuda de todas las administraciones públicas se acerca ya al 60 por ciento del producto interior bruto y aunque los tipos de interés se mantengan bajos y la actividad se recupere a menos que apliquemos con decisión una política presupuestaria rigurosa podemos encontrarnos en el futuro con serios problemas de financiación*', line 3890).[84]

Likewise, in a state of the nation debate in 2006 and hence before the European sovereign debt crisis, socialist prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero fully endorsed the hegemonic neoliberal paradigm in economic policy-making (e.g., Cerny 2010), *de facto* arguing that 'there is no alternative' (e.g., Watson and Hay 2003) to prescriptions such as, but not limited to, the reduction of debt in order to achieve the credibility of and confidence towards the Spanish economy:

> 'Confidence is generated by maintaining credibility and budgetary rigour with clean accounts and reducing indebtedness and with sound fiscal reforms' ('*Se genera confianza manteniendo la credibilidad y el rigor presupuestario con cuentas saneadas y reduciendo el endeudamiento y con reformas fiscales acertadas*', line 7906).

– also remarking how, in the first two years of the first Zapatero government, the PSOE-led executive managed to already reduce Spain's debt:

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[84] All reported lines in this subsection refer to the related .csv files, downloadable from the CAP website at: https://www.comparativeagendas.net/datasets_codebooks.

'The public debt stood at 432 percent [*of national GDP*] and we have reduced it by almost six points since 2004' ('*La deuda pública se ha situado en el 432 por 100 y la hemos reducido en casi seis puntos desde 2004*', line 7908).

In the following year, Zapatero still linked the reduction of debt and achieving goals such as saving on public expenditure and budget surpluses to a healthier view of Spain's present and future economic prospects:

'Spain, Ladies and Gentlemen, accumulates consecutive surpluses in public accounts since 2004, reduces the debt every year, saves and alleviates the burden for the future' ('*España Señorías acumula superávit consecutivos en las cuentas públicas desde 2004 reduce cada año la deuda ahorra y alivia la carga para el futuro*', line 8232).

The messages of the socialist prime minister did not change during the investiture speech of 2008, which marked the beginning of its second government mandate. Indeed, this was the occasion to further underline the achievements of the previous term, which managed to reduce debt and achieve typically economic-right policy goals such as budgetary stability and saving:

'In the last four years we have grown more and created more employment than any other country in our neighbouring area. We have known how to be faithful to our commitment to budgetary stability. We have been able to save and reduce public debt, and for all of this, in 2008, Spain has a stronger economy than in 2004' ('*En los últimos cuatro años hemos crecido más y hemos creado más empleo que cualquier país de nuestro entorno hemos sabido ser fieles al compromiso de estabilidad presupuestaria hemos sido capaces de ahorrar y de*

disminuir la deuda pública y por todo ello en 2008 España tiene una economía más fuerte que en 2004', line 8609).

The positions of the socialist executive in terms of economic policy positions would remain unchanged throughout the end of the government experience in 2011, when Zapatero remarked in a state of the nation debate how Spain and the other European partners had agreed on the need for further fiscal policy rigour as a fundamental takeaway from the ongoing Greek sovereign debt crisis:

'After the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the members of the Union agreed to change course and accelerate the fiscal consolidation effort' ('*Tras la crisis de la deuda soberana griega los miembros de la Unión acordamos cambiar el rumbo y acelerar el esfuerzo de consolidación fiscal*', line 9763).

Hence, CAP evidence on executive speeches seems to confirm the rightwards impact of debt on social democrats' economic positions, therefore enhancing the validity of the MARPOR-based findings outside of the realm of party manifestos and electoral campaigns. Whilst most evidence on this front emerges from the Spanish case, this emblematic quote on the need for tough fiscal policy linked to the debt issue by British Prime Minister and Labour Party Leader Tony Blair in the 1997 *Speech from the Throne* demonstrates how this relationship is not exclusive to the case of leftist governments in Spain:

'*My Government will also ensure that public borrowing is controlled through tough fiscal rules and that the burden of public debt is kept at a stable and prudent level*' (line 5489).

Along these lines, the thematic analysis of executive speeches' content will now test – and confirm – the leftwards impact of economic globalisation on social democrats' economic positions when in

power. Starting with Spain, towards the beginning of the selected timeframe in 1993, socialist prime minister González highlighted in his investiture speech how the effects of this pervasive and inherently economic-right phenomenon, informed by principles such as international competition, economic openness, and free markets, should be contained:

> 'In Europe today there are around twenty more States than then and coinciding with these phenomena that have brought new opportunities, there has also been a globalisation of the economy in numerous areas whose effects have not yet been fully calibrated or controlled' ('*En Europa hay hoy una veintena de Estados más que entonces y coincidiendo con estos fenómenos que han traído nuevas oportunidades se ha producido también una globalizacíóon de la economía en numerosos ámbitos cuyos efectos todavía no se logra calibrar ni controlar en su totalidad*', line 3716).

Later on, in the midst of the global financial crisis and its most intense period in Europe, in a state of the nation debate PSOE's Zapatero set out the need to accommodate globalisation with reforms that, still, had the protection of workers' rights and good working conditions at their core:

> 'I encourage you to complete a reform that, by maintaining the network of workers' rights and the balance between workers and employers within companies, effectively reduces duality, promotes job stability and facilitates companies' adaptation to increasingly demanding conditions of economic globalisation' ('*Les animo a culminar una reforma que manteniendo la red de derechos de los trabajadores y el equilibrio entre éstos y los empresarios en el seno de las empresas consiga reducir efectivamente la dualidad promover la estabilidad laboral y facilitar la adaptación de las empresas a las condiciones cada vez más exigentes de la globalización económica*', line 9539).

A similar leftwards impact of economic globalisation can also be observed on the position of 'New Labour' governments in the UK during the selected timeframe. In particular, consecutive *Speeches of the Throne* of executives under the leadership of both Blair (2000 and 2002) and Gordon Brown (2007) highlighted the need to shape globalisation so that it fights poverty worldwide from a viewpoint of international solidarity.[85] More explicitly, this typically left-wing economic goal had to be pursued through the international instruments of economic globalisation, such as the related *fora* and large-scale IOs:

> '*A White Paper will be published outlining how my Government will work to shape the forces of globalisation to benefit the world's poor*' (line 5863).

> '*My Government will continue to work for a more effective global effort to reduce poverty, building on the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and on progress achieved at the recent Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development*' (line 6013).

> '*Reducing global poverty will be a high priority for my Government, with renewed efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals*' (line 6396).

Finally, the same within-case thematic analysis of executive speeches is replicated vis-à-vis the issue of Eurozone membership, to verify its rightwards impact on governing social democrats' economic positions. Coherently with the fact the UK has never been a part of it, questions related to the Euro area are never mentioned in Labour governments' *Speeches to the Throne*. Instead, a number of key passages underline how this issue is relevant for socialist executives in Spain, pushing their policy positions further to the economic right. 2011 in particular is a prime example of this, with prime

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[85] The excerpts are reported in their respective chronological order.

minister Zapatero touching upon it several times in the state of the nation debate. Firstly, the head of government noted how the fundamental economic-right principles that derive from the European economic governance should be reinforced internally through legislative measures that enhance existing regulatory frameworks (e.g., Stability and Growth Pact) and ensure better compliance with objectives consistent with this policy paradigm:

> 'Thus, we have launched a reinforcement of the European economic governance that is specified in six legislative proposals, among which are the measures to reinforce the Stability and Growth Pact, the requirements demanded of the national budgetary frameworks and the new scheme for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances' ('*Así hemos puesto en marcha un refuerzo del gobierno económico europeo que se concreta en seis propuestas legislativas entre las que se incluyen las medidas de refuerzo del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento los requisitos exigidos a los marcos presupuestarios nacionales y el nuevo esquema de supervisión de los desequilibrios macroeconómicos*', line 9775).

Perhaps even more telling is the explicit linkage traced between Spain's status as a member of the Eurozone and the explicit appraisal of economic-right policy prescriptions such as salary moderation:

> 'In the last two years we have already taken some encouraging steps: salary moderation together with productivity gains have made it possible to recover a third of the price-competitiveness that we had lost since our entry into the euro in 1999' ('*En los dos últimos años hemos dado ya algunos pasos alentadores: la moderación salarial junto a las ganancias de productividad han permitido recuperar un tercio de la competitividadprecio que habíamos perdido desde nuestro ingreso en el euro en 1999*', line 9848).

Finally, complying with the ongoing commitment to the economic-right objective of fiscal consolidation deriving from Eurozone membership is framed as a fundamental step both for Spain and the stability of the Euro area as a whole:

> 'Compliance with the path of fiscal consolidation that allows us to meet the objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2013 is essential to gain confidence in our economy and provide stability to the euro zone as a whole' ('*El cumplimiento de la senda de consolidación fiscal que nos permita cumplir en 2013 con los objetivos del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento es imprescindible para ganar confianza en nuestra economía y dotar de estabilidad al conjunto de la zona euro*', line 9873).

Therefore, this excursus shows how this relationship, emerging from the presented LNA, is also confirmed not only at the within-case level confined within electoral manifesto data from the MARPOR, but also beyond it in the governmental sphere captured by CAP data: hence, further reassuring as to the validity of the thesis' results. Overall, it is possible to conclude by saying that the ample empirical evidence presented in this SNA confirms both the impact of each specific external constraint on the economic left-right positions of contemporary Western European social democratic parties, each in the direction posited by the LNA and, in the vast majority of cases, the hypothesised process of rhetorical justification of such economic position-taking by social democrats explicitly linked to such constraints, based indeed on their actual presence. Further, as shown by the CAP data on executive speeches, these dynamics are also externally valid, as they are all present also beyond the electoral arena. This all contributes to corroborating the explanation and predictive function emerging from the regression analyses in the LNA: it will be the context-specific configuration of different external constraints and the complex interplay between their individual impacts on the economic position-taking of social democrats to determine more similar or more different economic left-right positions and, hence, the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation.

9. Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

Western European social democratic parties are at times ideologically heterogeneous between one another from the point of view of economic left-right positions, whilst also displaying a variation in this intrafamily ideological differentiation that leads them to be much more homogeneous on other occasions. In this thesis, I sought to understand why this is the case: what are the determinants of intrafamily ideological differentiation within this party family and its variation over the analysed timeframe; how these determinants operate; and what story they tell us vis-à-vis both the evolution of social democracy and the internal differences between national instances across the region.

To conclude this extensive piece of research, I will now move to some final considerations. To do so, I will adhere to the following structure: first, I will provide a brief recap of the research questions and design underpinning the analysis of intrafamily ideological differentiation. Second, I will also summarise the findings of this thesis. Third, following from what was reported in Chapters 1, 7, and 8, I will return to the story of 'external constraints' shaping intrafamily ideological differentiation within contemporary Western European social democracy and its variation over time that emerges from the empirical analysis of this thesis. Fourth and final, I will elaborate on the contributions of this work to the relevant strands of literature, as well as the avenues for potential future research opened up by this thesis.

9.2 Analysing intrafamily ideological differentiation in contemporary social democracy

This thesis was first and foremost informed by a puzzling preliminary descriptive observation emerging from Manifesto Project (MARPOR) (Volkens et al. 2021) data on party positions. That is, in the 30 years spanning between 1990 and 2019, Western European social democratic parties

adopted, at times, very different economic left-right positions, whilst the levels of this differentiation also varied and made them much more similar on other occasions.

This picture was interesting, and worth delving deeper into, for a number of reasons. To start with, as illustrated across the thesis, formations classified into a party family such as social democracy should be defined, according to the main criterion that sorts them into such an analytical tool, by the congruence of their ideological positions (in this case, along the economic left-right dimension) (e.g., Mair and Mudde 1998). Yet, the observed presence, at times, of considerable levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation emerging within this party family challenges this criterion, which instead seems to hold when social democrats are more alike in terms of economic left-right positions. Hence, understanding not only the reasons for intrafamily ideological differentiation, but also the sources of its observed variation at different points in time becomes the interesting research agenda.

Further, it follows that, beyond the phenomenon of intrafamily ideological differentiation at large, the practical instantiation related to contemporary social democracy in Western Europe allows for a close investigation of this party family specifically. Indeed, throughout the thesis and particularly in Chapter 2, I have paid a great deal of attention to the evolution of social democratic politics and the ideological connotations of this party family over time, introducing and focussing on the related academic debates. Therefore, this extensive piece of research on social democracy enhances a more comprehensive academic assessment of this core (e.g., Smith 1989) party family within Western European party systems (e.g., Keman 2017).

Moving from all this, in this thesis I set out to answer two sets of research questions: one more specifically centred on the concept of intrafamily differentiation and its relation to 'party families', the other more substantively focussed on contemporary Western European social democracy. On the former front, I asked: why do formations from the same party family adopt different ideological positions, here investigated along the economic left-right dimension? That is to say, what determines these differences in party positions between formations belonging to the same party family, in this

specific case contemporary Western European social democracy, and the variation in intrafamily ideological differentiation?

On the latter front, the research I carried out for this thesis allowed me to address these broad substantive questions: that is, what is contemporary Western European social democracy? Is it the same across the analysed spatial-temporal framework in terms of economic left-right positions? Beyond this descriptive level and in an explanatory fashion, more specifically linking into the ultimate research objective of this thesis, I also then asked: what determines Western European social democratic parties to be different – and varyingly so – from one another?

As outlined throughout the thesis, these are important but also complex questions that are not straightforward to answer. Hence, a dedicated research design had to be devised in order to do so, whilst also facing the additional obstacles specifically related to studying intrafamily ideological differentiation of itself. Indeed, such difficulties – detailed out in Chapter 4 –, including measures of statistical dispersion such as standard deviations routinely employed to quantify the degree of ideological heterogeneity internal to a party family rarely providing an adequate enough number of observations for statistical analyses, contribute to a situation whereby, admittedly (e.g., Camia and Caramani 2012, 50), there have not been attempts at *explaining* intrafamily ideological differentiation yet.

This is why such an ambitious explanatory goal was matched by an innovative approach to the analysis of intrafamily ideological differentiation, which in terms of research design relied on a specific variant of multimethod research (MMR) (e.g., Lieberman 2005; Rohlfing and Zuber 2021): regression-based nested analysis (e.g., Rohlfing 2008). More specifically, this approach combines a former large-N analysis (LNA) in the form of regression models with a subsequent small-N analysis (SNA) via process tracing. In particular, the integration of quantitative analysis with complementary qualitative evidence seems especially appropriate to understand and explain complex political phenomena in the social sciences – according to some, an otherwise even more difficult task (e.g.,

Morlino 2018) –, as a comprehensive explanation needs answering both the *what* (here, answered through the LNA) and *how* (here, answered through the SNA) questions.

In this practical application of regression-based nested analysis, the LNA ascertained in general terms the determinants moving social democratic parties leftwards or rightwards along the economic issue dimension, further assessing in predictive terms the conditions that lead to varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation, meaning the different context-specific configurations of the three identified external constraints of *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation*. Subsequently, the following SNA based on the thematic analysis of both party manifestos and executive speeches aimed at enhancing the conclusions of the LNA by explaining *how* exactly such external constraints lead to different economic left-right positions by social democratic parties, tracing a hypothesised process concerning the rhetorical justification of economic position-taking made with explicit reference to such constraints. By doing so, this two-step research design and analytical process allowed for an explanation of the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation in contemporary Western European social democracy.

9.3 Recapping the results of the thesis

The empirical analysis of the thesis was built on a theory-driven explanatory framework of the different economic-left right positions of social democratic parties at the individual level, which determine the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate, party-family level. Specifically, in order to properly discern the effects of determinants at different causal and temporal distance from the analysed outcome, the explanatory framework was divided into two blocs of longer- and shorter-term factors, in turn each consisting of both political and economic determinants. These were, in terms of longer-term factors, the long-standing nature of electoral systems as well as the levels of political globalisation – including the degree of the context-specific variant of Europeanisation – and economic globalisation; and, in terms of shorter-term factors, the

presence of competitive electoral opposition from radical left (RLP) or radical right formations (RRP), the government or opposition status of the social democratic party, the ideological leaning of its dominant faction, and the levels of sovereign debt in each specific national context. Additional shorter-term factors (i.e., the exogenous inter-election movement of party systems along the economic left-right issue dimension, the government aspiration of social democrats, and the levels of unemployment and income inequality in a given national context) were also controlled for.

Unsurprisingly in the analysis of such a complex phenomenon, the LNA painted a multifaceted picture of what determines, in general terms, social democratic parties being more economically left- or right-wing, as per Chapter 7. Looking at the expectations that were formulated to guide the empirical analysis, Hp. 1 on the rightwards effect of the *Majoritarian* variable, positing that majoritarian electoral systems should push social democratic parties' economic positions further to the right and vice versa for PR systems (e.g., Dow 2011) was disproved in the main regression models, as this variable never exerts a statistically significant effect. The same applies to Hp. 2 concerning *Political globalisation*, higher levels of which were posited to lead to more economic right-wing positions and vice versa (e.g., Fairclough 2000), as this variable is not significant in the main regression analyses.

Yet, the picture is different for the other two longer-term variables: *Europeanisation* and *Economic globalisation*. Indeed, the former exerts the expected significant rightwards effect on social democratic parties' economic positions, hence confirming Hp. 3, but the most interesting aspect is that it is not any degree of European integration to matter, but specifically the highly consequential membership in the Eurozone (e.g., Johansson and Raunio 2001; Bernhard 2004; Laffan 2014; Maatsch 2014; Ward et al. 2015), whilst EU membership on its own does not suffice to significantly shape the economic positions of social democrats. Conversely, and very intriguing from a substantive viewpoint if compared to the other significant form of the broader globalisation process in this analysis, *Economic globalisation* exerts a statistically significant, but directionally opposite effect. That is, higher levels of economic globalisation push social democratic parties in contemporary

Western Europe further to the economic left. Recall that, in Chapter 3, a rich and long-standing debate between the 'efficiency' and 'compensation' theses was presented (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016): the former arguing that more economic will have a rightwards effect, the latter arguing the opposite. Hence, whilst the adopted Hp. 4 based on the more mainstream 'efficiency' viewpoint in the literature was therefore rejected, it seems as if in the face of more economic globalisation social democrats rally around their traditional economic left stances and in particular their flagship policy and historical achievement in the building of national welfare states, as discussed throughout the thesis.

Regarding shorter-term factors, the two-fold Hp. 5a and 5b on, respectively, competitive RLPs and RRPs leading to social democrats being more economically left-wing was rejected in terms of the first component, and confirmed with regard to the latter, as competitive radical left formations do not exert any statistically significant effect whilst parties of the radical right do so (e.g., Krause 2020; Krause and Giebler 2020). Further, whilst the Hp. 6 on the government status leading social democrats further to the economic right and the opposite applying to being in opposition (e.g., Mair 2013; Maatsch 2014; Karyotis, Rüdig, and Judge 2014) was rejected due to the lack of significant effects, an interesting albeit tentative finding emerges with the ideological leaning of the dominant internal faction within social democrats, which seems indeed mirrored by the party at large in its overall economic positions. This tentatively confirms the related Hp. 7 and provides a so-far missing comparative and longitudinal empirical test of such intraparty dynamics, partially confirming their role within a process such as party manifesto drafting which is collective in nature and has a lot of veto points (e.g., Däubler 2012; Dolezal et al. 2012). Finally, by far the most statistically significant and consistent effect on social democratic parties' economic left-right positions is the rightwards one exerted by higher levels of *Debt*, confirming Hp. 8 and going in the direction of the existing (and rather scarce) literature on this matter (e.g., Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2015). Further, it is worth recalling that the effects of the shorter-term *Centre of gravity* and *Unemployment* control variables (respectively, rightwards and leftwards) are also significant.

To sum up, it is evident both from the findings of the main models summarised here and the many different specifications and robustness checks presented across the thesis, and especially in the Appendix, that in general the economic left-right positions of contemporary Western European social democratic parties are determined by a complex mixture of longer- and shorter-term factors, which are political and economic in nature. Yet, it is exactly the wealth of additional analyses, different tests and multiple specifications to show that the most consistent and substantively relevant effects seem to be exerted by macro-structural variables that could be potentially linked to a story of 'external constraints' that affect, according to their context-specific configuration, the room for manoeuvre and hence the programmatic profile adopted by social democrats on the economy. These are, as per above: *Debt*, first and foremost, and *Economic globalisation* and *Europeanisation*. More specifically, the hunch emerging from these comprehensive statistical analyses in the LNA and a subsequent targeted assessment of related empirical evidence at the descriptive level that leverages the predictive function of the regression models is that it will be the different configurations of such external constraints in different, case-specific national contexts, to lead to different (and varyingly so) social democratic parties' economic left-right positions at the individual level and, therefore, different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate, party-family level. The related statistically significant relationships, or in other words this story of external constraints, were further confirmed at the level of individual cases in the SNA by means of the thematic analysis of documents from within the electoral arena (party manfestos) and beyond (executive speeches). This corroborated the hypothesised process of rhetorical justification with explicit reference to such constraints in the act of economic position-taking by social democrats, hence enhancing the explanatory power of the LNA by showing exactly *how* the different external constraints determine different left-right economic positions adopted by these parties, with their complex interplay leading to varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation.

9.4 Different constraints, different social democracy

The empirical analysis of this thesis, as a whole, speaks and provides answers to the different research questions presented here. From a substantive viewpoint in particular, I raised the following questions: what is contemporary Western European social democracy? And is it the same across the analysed spatial and temporal contexts? The answers emerging in particular from the detailed descriptive analyses reported in Chapter 5 are interesting and nuanced, contributing through the empirics to the related debate concerning the ideological homogeneity or heterogeneity of this party family reported throughout this thesis. In general, contemporary Western European social democratic parties are left-of-centre, either relatively centrist or more out to the left, from an economic viewpoint. Further, they become more economically left-wing over the analysed timeframe, hence corroborating recent literature going in this direction (e.g., Emanuele 2021; Polacko 2022; Trastulli 2022). However, social democrats are not at all the same thing across the analysed spatial-temporal framework and, additionally, they are varyingly different from (or similar to) one another at different points in time.

In greater detail, at large Western European social democratic parties tend to be both relatively more homogeneous and more centrist between roughly the mid-1990s and early-2000s. This is the period when, in the Western world, globalisation has its heyday, economies are on the up and liberal democracy has triumphed over the alternative communist model, and hence social democracy modernises too by adopting its notorious 'Third Way' outlook (e.g., Giddens 1998), which in its early days was also quite successful electorally (as shown in Chapter 2). So, until everything seemed to be working out fine – e.g., politically, economically, and electorally –, social democratic parties were really 'sibling' formations belonging to the same party family in the true sense of the academic classification into this analytical tool, meaning by matching the related criterion of ideological homogeneity (e.g., see the related discussion in Mair and Mudde 1998). Social democrats across the continent looked, at that point, as if they were going together 'hand in hand' towards a very similar programmatic profile from an economic viewpoint.

However, as testified and quantified by the standard deviation values reported in Table 5.2 in particular, the true turning point in this regard is represented by the late-2000s global financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which translated in the extremely consequential European sovereign debt crisis across the continent (e.g., Lane 2012). This massive economic downturn was the catalyst for the inherent differences between different national instances of social democracy across Western Europe. Indeed, in the years immediately following the crisis and across the 2010s in general, significant differences and considerable intrafamily ideological differentiation across the continent ensued in terms of social democratic parties' economic positions. Some formations relatively stayed their historical course, others veered further (if not much further, as shown in Chapter 5) to the economic left, whilst other ones even became relatively more right-wing. But despite these differences being on occasions even staggering across the analysed timeframe, it is always the same type of party we are talking about: social democrats, the mainstream centre-left corresponding to a historical core (e.g., Smith 1989) component of Western European party systems (e.g., Keman 2017), belonging to the same party family in spite of their different profiles. Siblings, once more alike, now turned much more different from one another.

The hunch emerging from the descriptive analyses summarised here given the timing of the outlined trends, and confirmed by a two-step explanatory analysis through both in-depth and robust statistical analyses in the LNA as well as extensive textual evidence qualitatively traced through the thematic analysis of party manifestos and executive speeches by social democratic politicians in the SNA, can essentially be summarised as a story of external constraints. In other words, it is chiefly the macro-structural variables of levels of sovereign debt, economic globalisation, and the degree of Europeanisation represented namely by membership in the Eurozone to cause the varying levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation observed within contemporary Western European social democracy. This was determined empirically both in light of the robustness of the related effects across the several alternative specifications and checks performed with regard to the main regression models in the LNA, including through a subsequent empirical assessment of related descriptive

evidence building on the predictive funtion of the regression models; as well as in the qualitative assessment of text data from both party manifestos and executive speeches through thematic analysis in the SNA, which enhanced the explanation based on the LNA by showing exactly *how* these three external constraints impact the economic left-right positions of social democrats at the level of individual cases. Recall that the term 'external constraints' has now become widely used to refer to the obligations and pressures put by actors, institutions, and frameworks well beyond the level of national politics on national governments and their independent policy-making in the age of increasing political and economic interconnectedness across the world. These are especially powerful and, indeed, constraining vis-à-vis policy options in the economic domain.

In other words, the more national contexts across Western Europe found themselves in different positions concerning these external constraints – in particular, consider that they grew increasingly different in terms of their sovereign debt and degree of European integration, whereas even if they all became more economically globalised considerably different levels of this phenomenon can be observed across the analysed spatial-temporal framework, as shown in Chapter 6 –, the more the respective mainstream centre-left parties grew different in their economic left-right positions.[86] Specifically, where the debt levels increased, there was a very strong constraining pressure – i.e., economically rightwards – aimed at their normalisation, whilst social democrats in relatively 'creditor' countries were in a position in which more fiscal leverage, and hence more programmatic leeway in terms of their traditional economic left stances, was realistically available. We have seen that Western European national contexts have become increasingly different over the analysed timeframe in terms of relative debtor or creditor status, and the same applies to the other rightwards constrain emerging from the empirical analysis: the different degrees of Europeanisation. Indeed, roughly a decade into this investigation, the single currency area was introduced, joined at different

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[86] Interestingly, though, it should be noted here that this picture does not apply to the the relevant constraints of government status (e.g., Mair 2013; Maatsch 2014; Karyotis, Rüdig, and Judge 2014) and undergoing bailout programmes (e.g., Afonso, Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2014; Ezrow and Hellwig 2014; Karyotis, Rüdig, and Judge 2014; Clements, Nanou, and Real-Dato 2016). Yet, the overall empirical conclusions concerning the external constraints of *Debt*, *Economic globalisation*, and *Europeanisation* stand in their relevance, fully confirmed by this empirical analysis.

stages by different EU member states. This means, at different points in time, increasing pressures to the economic right faced by national governments and, hence, parties with legitimate aspirations of accessing the executive, such as social democrats, in those countries where economic policy became tied to the requirements and obligations set out within the Eurozone (e.g., Laffan 2014). Conversely, some countries are never members of neither the EU nor the Eurozone, or perhaps they are EU members without being a part of the Eurozone, hence retaining control over monetary policy – which is key in order to be able pursue traditional economic left expansionary and countercyclical fiscal policies. These, therefore, have greater leeway to adopt relatively more left-wing economic positions. Finally, both of these increasingly different constraints operate in conjunction with another factor: *Economic globalisation*. In particular, it was demonstrated how social democratic parties react differently to the constraint represented by the ever-increasing economic interconnectedness: that is, they rally around their traditional economic stances and especially the flagship accomplishment of building national welfare states and hence become more left-wing, in a 'compensation' fashion (e.g., Adam and Kammas 2007; Hellwig 2016). As a consequence, similarly to the other determinants, the SNA demonstrated how different configurations of this factor, which despite becoming more similar in the various national context with the passing of time is still configured in considerably different ways across the analysed spatial-temporal framework (as shown in Chapter 6), will lead to different reactions of social democratic parties in the direction identified through the statistical analysis of the LNA. In other words, where these constraints were more 'loose' in their collective configuration and interplay, in terms of the direction of the respective effects emerging from the LNA and as shown in the SNA, social democrats had more room to 'shape globalisation politically', meaning from the economic left (e.g., Meyer and Spiegel 2010) – and vice versa in the opposite case.

As I move to conclude the thesis with reflections on its contributions and implications, related preliminary considerations on this story of external constraints are imperative. Indeed, the differentiated impact of these external constraints on the economic left-right positions of social democratic parties, traditionally associated with markedly left-wing stances on redistribution and

state intervention in the economy before the 'Third Way' phase (e.g., Giddens 1998), and especially the rightwards 'limitations' exerted by specific configurations of such factors raise questions as to the autonomy of national politics across Western Europe in an age of consolidated globalisation.

That is, if some policy options – chiefly, and of greatest interest here, in the domain of economic policy at large – are unavailable to governments in the region, and hence to parties aiming to access political power via the electoral game, this may very well raise questions on the state of contemporary representative democracies. In particular, the workings of the party government model, which is the predominant form of structuring politics in Western democracies and particularly parliamentary systems (e.g., Thomassen and Andeweg 2004), entail that, in order to meet the conditions for it to work (e.g., Katz 1986), different parties should electorally compete for political power on the explicit basis of clear, different policy programs offered to citizens. The latter, then, choose which party to vote for based on how close they are to their own preferences. It follows that executives are partisan in their nature and composition, and such is their policy output, which is supposed to realise in the governmental arena the programmatic content for which government parties were chosen by the electorate, thus materialising the *responsiveness* to citizens' preferences. Hence, elections should realise the fundamental democratic principle of continued responsiveness already set out in Robert Dahl's (e.g., 1971) seminal contributions to democratic theory.

Yet, as it is well known in a literature to which this thesis now also contributes, party government has been increasingly challenged in contemporary times (e.g., Mair 2008[a]). Indeed, as testified in the empirical analysis of this thesis by the relevance of the aforementioned macro-structural variables, the transnational processes related to such external constraints put increasing pressure on national polities and their domestic politics (e.g., Mair 2011; Lefkofridi and Nezi 2014; Plescia, Kritzinger, and De Sio 2019), with significant impacts on party competition through the curtailment of policy options along a given issue dimension. At this point, political formations are at Mair's famous crossroads between the responsibility towards such constraints deriving from transnational processes and the economic, political, and institutional actors dictating them, and the responsiveness towards

voters' preferences, which in the economic domain often diverge (e.g., Mair 2008[a]) from the neoliberal paradigm that is hegemonic in actual policy practice (e.g., Cerny 2010). As empirical work has already shown (e.g., Blyth and Katz 2005), national parties and in particular social democrats are willing to accept such policy constraints to acquire political legitimacy and the privileged access to resources and interest groups deriving from being in government, whilst 'responsive' policy positions and opportunities are left to more entrepreneurial, newer, innovative actors (e.g., De Sio and Lachat, 2020). Yet, if such dynamics bind parties to converge towards a predetermined and restricted set of policy alternatives, meaning in the economy that social democrats may lose track of their cleavage origins and traditional stances (e.g., Mair et al. 2004; Dalton 2013), this corresponds to (at least) a degree of depoliticisation of Western democracies and, perhaps, their 'hollowing' at large (Mair 2013). By illustrating the variation in both the configuration of such fundamental external constraints and the different impact they consequently have on social democrats' positions in Western Europe, the empirical analysis of this thesis contributes to a nuanced and wide comparative understanding of these fundamental dynamics, as well as their impact on domestic politics, party competition, and representative democracies at large.

9.5 Contributions, implications, future research

In this thesis, I provided a first explanatory empirical assessment of intrafamily ideological differentiation from a comparative perspective, focussing on the party family of Western European social democracy in the pivotal three decades between the 1990s and 2010s. As illustrated throughout this work, this is an innovative piece of research shedding light on important questions surrounding not just party families in general, but also substantively focussing on the mainstream left formations that have become a 'core' component of Western European party systems over time. In doing so, this large piece of research contributes in several ways to existing strands of literature in political science, whilst opening up new pathways for potential future research.

In terms of contributions, the thesis introduces an innovative approach to analysing and, for a change (e.g., Camia and Caramani 2012, 50), explaining intrafamily ideological differentiation. It does so through an original multimethod research (MMR) design, which allows for a comprehensive explanation, at the cross-case level as well as at the within-case level, of both *what* leads social democratic parties to adopt different economic left-right positions at the individual level, hence leading to different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation at the aggregate level of the party family, and *how* this occurs.

As already illustrated, this allowed showing how the different configurations of 'external constrains' are conducive to different levels of intrafamily ideological differentiation, making parties usually defined as belonging to the same – social democratic – group more or less in line with the criterion of ideological congruence underlying the classification into party families. In particular, this story first emerged through the in-depth, varied statistical analyses performed on the data in terms of multiple robustness checks of the main models and alternative specifications, and was corroborated in the second step of the explanatory analysis by means of within-case analysis. Hence, this constitutes an important and wide contribution on external constrains, usually analysed through single cases (e.g., Tsoukalis 2000; Damgaard 2004; Raunio 2004), which can hopefully be approached more frequently in the future through wide and long designs such as the one of this thesis.

Further, the combination of extensive descriptive and explanatory empirical analyses made it possible to answer substantive questions as to what contemporary social democracy in Western Europe is, where and when it is not the same from an economic left-right viewpoint across the analysed spatial-temporal framework, and why. Importantly, this twofold effort brought much greater nuance to the existing debate concerning, specifically, the nature of Western European social democracy as an ideologically homogeneous or heterogeneous party family, contextualising the existing variation in intrafamily ideological differentiation within this group of parties and explaining it.

Additionally, the presented analysis adds to a number of different debates across different strands of literature that lack empirical evidence, hence providing other elements of originality to this work.

Exemplary, in this regard, are the investigations about the impact of (specifically) political globalisation, levels of sovereign debt, and the ideological leaning of the dominant internal faction on parties' economic left-right positions, especially in the case of social democrats. At the same time, the thesis contributes to debates that are already richer in evidence, either by corroborating existing viewpoints or by providing greater nuance to them. Examples are, on the first front, the clash between the 'efficiency' and 'compensation' theses within existing assessments of how economic globalisation impacts the investigated economic left-right positions, by reinforcing the latter side; and, on the second front, the existing body of literature on the external constraint constituted by Europeanisation, showing that it is not all forms of European integration or the mere EU membership to matter in shaping parties' economic positions, but specifically Eurozone membership.

From the above, it follows that the fundamental role played by the *Debt* variable in all components of the explanatory analysis of this thesis sheds light on the importance of another novel aspect and contribution: the empirical investigation of what causes different party positions in economic left-right terms in the key decade of the 2010s, especially in the case of Western European social democracy. Indeed, as well known, the European sovereign debt crisis that broke out in the midst of the global financial crisis was extremely impactful for domestic – and particularly social democratic – politics across the region, and yet direct and fresh investigations not just of the debt factor, but of the 2010s at large were surprisingly missing. Moreover, descriptive evidence showed how this is the period to be studied with the greatest interest, as in the early portion of this decade the contradictions between the different national instantiations within the social democratic party family emerged in all their relevance. Therefore, by finally covering the important post-Great Recession period with extensive and comparative empirical evidence, this thesis provides an important novel contribution to the literature, which is especially important given both that it was so far missing and that the explanatory fit of the analysis and, hence, its underlying framework seems especially good particularly in this decade.

The thesis also provides some innovative elements and contributions from more strictly empirical and methodological viewpoints, more specifically through the measurement of both the employed determinants and the phenomenon to be explained in the thesis. Indeed, in terms of intrafamily ideological differentiation, the innovative MMR design allowed assessing and explaining this phenomenon without being limited from the aggregation required by measures of statistical dispersion – such as, most often, standard deviations – and the loss in number of observations they entail, with consequences that are detrimental to statistical analyses. Further, in terms of the dependent variable employed in the main regression models, the innovative measure of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions represented by the signed deviation at election t from the average economic left-right position of all social democratic parties at election T-1 introduces additional nuance to the statistical analyses. It does so by allowing to take into account not just the overall movement over time of the party family as a whole along the analysed issue dimension, but also the so-called 'period effect' (e.g., Corbetta 2002; Blais et al. 2002, 2004; Franklin 2004), which as illustrated is particularly prominent in the historical evolution of Western European social democrats in recent decades (e.g., with the 'Third Way' period).

On another related point, in this thesis I have also introduced new and so far missing empirical measures, such as the one about the ideological leaning of dominant factions that contributes to a strand of literature in which empirical measures are notoriously hard to come by (e.g., Dewan and Squintani 2016; Steiner and Mader 2019), and refined existing indicators, such as the one related to the control variable of *Government aspiration* (for the original version, see Schumacher et al. 2015). Lastly, the detailed descriptive evidence presented not only with regards to social democratic parties' economic left-right positions and intrafamily ideological differentiation, but also the different determinants analysed in the thesis, made it possible to provide a detailed and substantively interesting breakdown of the different national contexts and time periods making up the analysed spatial-temporal framework, as well as the different trends and patterns over time, from an empirical viewpoint.

To conclude, my doctoral research opens up new avenues for potential future work that follows on from it. As mentioned, one of the most important contributions of my thesis is the introduction of an innovative approach to the explanation of intrafamily ideological differentiation, through an original MMR design that allows overcoming the limits of previous research. This design can, hence, be applied to other party families beyond contemporary Western European social democracy as well, including notoriously differentiated ones such as liberal and radical right parties (e.g., Ennser 2012; Carroll and Kubo 2019). This means that it will now be possible to investigate party families at large, and intrafamily ideological differentiation in particular, more systematically, hence providing important contributions to the literature. Further, the combination of cross-case and within-case analysis inherent to this MMR design allows for following up on the results of the previous steps with specific, single-case investigations related to the causal mechanisms that lead specific determinants to have a given effect on party positions. Additionally, whilst for the illustrated reasons I only dealt with the economic left-right dimension in this thesis, such a design is obviously replicable by looking at intrafamily ideological differentiation along other issue dimensions, such as for instance the broad socio-cultural 'second' dimension.

Already from the above, it is clear that a myriad of possibilities is opened up by this work, for instance in terms of which party family to analyse, which issue dimension to consider, which determinants to include in the explanatory framework, and which combination of such factors and relevant cases to follow up on in the small-N analysis. At any rate, to properly move towards the *explanation* of complex phenomena such as intrafamily ideological differentiation, future research should maintain the same meticulous approach to the theory-based selection and in-depth empirical analysis of the role played by the determinants of ideological heterogeneity within single party families and its variation that was adopted in this thesis.

Lastly, from a substantive viewpoint, one of the key contributions of the thesis is, as mentioned, highlighting from an empirical viewpoint, both descriptively and in an explanatory fashion, the current state of contemporary social democracy in Western Europe, especially in the post-Great

Recession period. Indeed, the potential fresh developments within this party family, which were already pointed to from a theoretical viewpoint, were confirmed in the analyses of the thesis, going well beyond the dichotomy between being 'simply centrist' and 'simply leftist' and following on the footsteps of the often neglected 'Good Society Debate' (e.g., Meyer and Spiegel 2010) on the recalibration of contemporary social democracy in the current times of crises. It has been shown how, nowadays, social democrats can be both, depending on the different national circumstances illustrated in this work. Therefore, future research should go back to systematic empirical investigations of social democratic parties' ideological outlook and its evolution, contextualised within a longitudinal perspective: with a differentiated approach and without taking any ideological 'stalemate' for granted. By adopting such a point of view, my doctoral research eventually told us about a torn party family, that has changed the course of its history at multiple points in time even in recent decades, with individual formations often going in different directions when all the political contradictions within this group and the pressures of different national contexts exploded. For Western European politics and party systems, the real-life implications of the state of social democracy – the mainstream centre-left – are far-reaching, and hence the related research agenda in academia ought to maintain a lively and attentive disposition.

Appendix

Table A1. Economic and cultural left-right: salience, mean position, and standard deviation (yearly and pooled values).

Year	Economic left-right: Salience	Cultural left-right: Salience	Economic left-right: Mean position	Cultural left-right: Mean position	Economic left-right: Standard deviation	Cultural left-right: Standard deviation
1990	30.58%	5.43%	-26.13	1.46	11.44	5.74
1991	22.63%	4.05%	-11.77	1.65	5	2.13
1992	30.84%	2.32%	-19.67	1.01	14.72	1.85
1993	23.62%	4.03%	-18.12	0.01	3.85	2.12
1994	26.62%	5.23%	-9.18	0.65	15.78	1.73
1995	25.73%	5.06%	-17.44	0.64	7.25	5.73
1996	25.07%	5.37%	-14.71	-1.79	6.04	1.06
1997	21.39%	5.95%	-12.21	0.52	2.83	2.93
1998	33.76%	5.34%	-17.24	-2.06	7.41	3.46
1999	30.16%	4.42%	-22.14	2.71	4.05	3.27
2000	26.83%	4.14%	-20.86	1.27	1.06	2.84
2001	26.73%	5.27%	-20.41	-0.51	7.2	1.82
2002	27%	5.17%	-19.14	0.19	4.96	3.12
2003	33.45%	4.74%	-24.34	1.48	7.57	3.26
2004	27.54%	5.51%	-20.45	1.97	8.49	1.63
2005	32.17%	6.74%	-22.32	-3.14	13.69	4.2
2006	29.04%	8.64%	-22.19	-0.3	7.96	3.1
2007	30.06%	7.11%	-25.04	2.36	8.74	3.6
2008	29.34%	4.88%	-16.77	2.38	4.58	2.28
2009	31.84%	5.3%	-23.84	0.27	9.45	1.98
2010	34%	6.69%	-25.42	0.06	13.28	5.1
2011	38.68%	3.53%	-24.55	0.57	21.1	2.36
2012	33.07%	4.65%	-13.94	-0.02	12.31	2.38
2013	32.07%	6.99%	-25.98	0.55	9.38	2.08
2014	44.24%	8.75%	-36.7	-0.08	22.84	2.39
2015	40.72%	7.5%	-29.32	-3.49	10.59	6.43
2016	38.1%	11.17%	-30.06	4.86	6.24	3.55
2017	34.25%	12.44%	-30.24	-3.3	4.88	3.61
2018	35.1%	16.34%	-27.47	-10.72	15.9	14.94
2019	33.4%	10.82%	-30.38	-1.1	8.9	6.04
pooled average:	30.9%	6.4%	-21.98	-0.05	10.95	4.2

Table A2. Cultural left-right positions by party family: mean and standard deviation values.

Party family	Mean	Cultural left-right positions Standard deviation	observations
Agrarian	2.3	4.25	32
Christian democratic	7.29	7.73	142
Conservative	5.11	6.18	117
Ethnic/regional	-3.54	9.43	120
Green	-4.01	4.08	116
Liberal	1.28	7.01	150
Nationalist/radical right	17.34	13.97	116
Social democratic	0.05	4.2	159
Social democratic (parfam=30)	-0.34	4.28	186
Socialist/communist	-4.31	5.15	166
Special issue	4.38	10.1	54

Comment: note, e.g. as in Table 5.2, the inclusion of both versions of the social democratic party family, i.e. the one considered in the thesis and the broader one with all parties having 'parfam=30' in the MARPOR dataset in the analysed spatial-temporal framework; as well as the reported change of the Italian Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) from 'parfam=20' to 'parfam=30' in 1992, 1994, and 1996.

Table A3. Pooled mean economic and cultural left-right positions by party family.

Party family	Mean positions	
	Economic left-right	**Cultural left-right**
Agrarian	-11,94	2,29
Christian democratic	-11,76	7,30
Conservative	-6,34	5,11
Ethnic/regional	-14,68	-3,49
Green	-17,36	-4,01
Liberal	-7,25	1,37
Nationalist/radical right	-4,92	17,46
Social democratic	-21,99	0,07
Socialist/communist	-26,95	-4,25
Special issue	-13,01	4,38

Scatterplots

Comment: when analysing the pooled mean economic and cultural positions derived from the introduced deductive left-right indexes for each Western European party family categorised by the MARPOR between 1990 and 2019, both the numerical data and its graphic representation convey a number of fundamental findings. First, all party families adopt left-of-centre economic positions, whilst all of them but socialist/communist, ethnic/regional, and green parties position themselves right-of-centre culturally. Only one clear outlier emerges from the distribution of party families, i.e. RRPs in light of their considerably more marked right-wing cultural positions. The rest of the distribution along the cultural left-right dimension and the distribution along the economic left-right dimension seem instead rather homogeneous, with expected patterns along both dimension (e.g., the clear demarcation between relatively more and relatively less left-wing parties on the economy, and leftist and centre-right party families dividing themselves quite evenly between, respectively, the cultural left and right, with the exception of social democrats). Given these characteristics of the MARPOR data – especially, its economic left-wing bias –, I have replicated this descriptive scatterplot by dividing the two-dimensional political space with reference axes that, instead of origination from the two dimensional centres (0, 0), originated from the pooled mean economic and cultural left-right values across all observed parties from all party families (respectively, -13.25 and 2.58). By doing so, the distribution of parties in the four quadrants follows expected patterns. Firstly, leftist and progressive parties position themselves in the bottom-left quadrant, i.e. where the relatively more left-wing party families along both the economic and cultural dimensions can be found, whilst also displaying realistic differences (e.g., social

288

democrats being more moderate overall, greens being more radical culturally, socialists and communists being more radical both economically and culturally). The same, but in reverse, applies to right-wing parties in the opposite, top-right quadrant, where relatively more right-wing parties can be found both on the economic and cultural dimensions (again, with realistic differences highlighted, e.g. the greater radicalism of RRPs especially on the cultural dimension) – as if this division, in a way, mirrored the classical 'axis of competition' argument. Finally, agrarians and, especially, liberals stray away from this pattern, locating themselves in the bottom-right (more 'free-market cosmopolitan) quadrant of parties that are more economically right-wing and culturally left-wing than average. It should finally be noted that, both here and in Table A4 but differently than elsewhere (e.g., Table 5.2 and Table A2), here only the analysed version of the social democratic party family has been included due to graphical reasons, whilst the same considerations concerning the Italian Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and its inclusion amongst social democrats instead of socialist and communist parties in 1992, 1994, and 1996 still apply.

Table A4. Pooled mean economic and cultural left-right positions by party family, per decade.

Party family	Decade	Mean positions	
		Economic left-right	**Cultural left-right**
Agrarian	1990s	-0,81	2,44
Agrarian	2000s	-16,76	0,52
Agrarian	2010s	-18,70	3,75
Christian democratic	1990s	-7,18	8,09
Christian democratic	2000s	-15,04	6,49
Christian democratic	2010s	-14,30	7,12
Conservative	1990s	-1,11	3,41
Conservative	2000s	-6,38	2,92
Conservative	2010s	-10,50	8,22
Ethnic/regional	1990s	-10,55	-4,66
Ethnic/regional	2000s	-11,65	-5,12
Ethnic/regional	2010s	-17,88	-2,16
Green	1990s	-11,70	-4,87
Green	2000s	-16,37	-3,60
Green	2010s	-22,43	-3,68
Liberal	1990s	-0,98	1,16
Liberal	2000s	-9,10	0,25
Liberal	2010s	-10,62	2,31
Nationalist/radical right	1990s	-0,09	13,50
Nationalist/radical right	2000s	-5,28	13,46
Nationalist/radical right	2010s	-8,06	22,94
Social democratic	1990s	-16,49	0,67
Social democratic	2000s	-22,08	0,57
Social democratic	2010s	-27,39	-1,03
Socialist/communist	1990s	-21,14	-3,46
Socialist/communist	2000s	-25,40	-4,22

Socialist/communist	2010s	-31,14	-4,59
Special issue	1990s	-5,59	5,10
Special issue	2000s	-10,76	4,18
Special issue	2010s	-19,05	4,04

Scatterplot

Comment: the evidence reported in Table A4 and the related scatterplot complements the considerations concerning all party families and their two-dimensional positioning in the analysed spatial-temporal framework from a decade-by-decade perspective. Here, two main findings emerge over time: first, a generalised movement further to the left of the economic dimension; and, second, a movement further to the cultural right of RRPs, subtle between the 1990s and 2000s but much more pronounced in the key decade of the 2010s, whilst all other party families tended to stay much more static along this issue dimension.

Table A5. List of sources employed to construct the *Dominant faction* variable.

Country	Sources
Austria	Encyclopedia of World Biography; Oesterreichische Nationalbank; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; The New York Times; orf.at; progressonline.org.uk; suffragio.org; thelocal.at
Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia)	Deschouwer, K. (2016). The reform-resilient Belgian welfare state. *The Low Countries. Arts and Society in Flanders and the Netherlands*, *24*, 234-241; POLITICO; flandersnews.be; flanderstoday.eu; https://www.the-low-countries.com/
Cyprus	US Congress Library; Financial Mirror; balkaneu.com; countrystudies.us; greeknewsonline.com; goldnews.com.cy; stockwatch.com.cy
Denmark	Encyclopædia Britannica; Financial Times; The Guardian; POLITICO; The New York Times; un.org; dr.dk;
Finland	Publications of the Finnish Government; Finnish Institute of International Affairs; EURACTIV; Ilta-Sanomat
France	Ambler, J. S. (ed.). (1991). The French Welfare State: Surviving Social and Ideological Change. New York: New York University Press; Parti Socialiste; The Guardian; reformer.fr; marianne.net
Germany	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Der Spiegel; Die Welt; The New York Times; Seeheimer Kreis; vorwaerts.de
Greece	Sassoon, D. (ed.). (1997). Looking left: European socialism after the Cold War. Krefeld: teNeues; BBC; LSE EUROPP Blog; Atlas of Transformation (http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation); economywatch.gr; ekathimerini.com
Iceland	xs.is (Samfylkingin); mbl.is
Ireland	Irish Independent; The Irish Times; The Workers' Party; joanburton.ie; thejournal.ie
Italy	Pasquino, G. (2013). Italy. In De Waele, J. M., Escalona, F., & Vieira, M. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union (pp. 222-243). London: Palgrave Macmillan; Giannetti, D., & Mulé, R. (2006). The Democratici di Sinistra: In Search of a New Identity. *South European Society and Politics*, *11*(3-4), 457-475; Diamond, P., & Guidi, M. (2019). The PD and social-democratic parties in Europe. *Contemporary Italian Politics, 11*(3), 251-262
Luxembourg	Luxembourg Government; Thewes, G. (2011). Les gouvernements du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg depuis 1848. Report, Service Information et Presse, Luxembourg Government. https://web.archive.org/web/20170111005206/https://www.gouvernement.lu/1828371/Gouvernements_depuis_1848-version_2011.pdf; Luxemburger Wort;Tageblatt.
Malta	Briguglio, M. (2001). Ideological and Strategic Shifts from Old Labour to New Labour In Malta. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277308092_Ideological_and_Strategic_Shifts_from_Old_Labour_to_New_Labour_In_Malta; Sammut, C. (2007). *Media and Maltese Society*. Lanham: Lexington Books (Rowman & Littlefield)
Netherlands	Oudenampsen, M. (2021). The riddle of the missing feathers: rise and decline of the Dutch Third Way. *European Politics and Society*, *22*(1), 38-52; Euronews
Norway	Heidar, K. (2005). Norwegian parties and the party system: Steadfast and changing. *West European Politics*, *28*(4), 807-833; Aftenposten; Dagbladet; Jacobin; POLITICO
Portugal	Costa Lobo, M., & Magalhães, P. (2003). The Portuguese socialists and the Third Way. In Social Democratic Party Policies in Contemporary Europe. In Bonoli, G., & Powell, M. (eds.), *Social Democratic Party Policies in Contemporary Europe* (pp. 83-101). Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge; Lisi, M. (2016). U-Turn: The Portuguese Radical Left from Marginality to Government Support. *South European Society and Politics*, *21*(4), 541-560; Jornal de Negócios
Spain	Marx, P., & Schumacher, G. (2013). Will to power? Intra-party conflict in social democratic parties and the choice for neoliberal policies in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain (1980–2010). *European Political Science Review*, *5*(1), 151-173; letraslibres.com

Sweden	Jackson, B. (2013). Social democracy. In Freeden, M., & Stears, M., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (pp. 348-363). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Financial Times
Switzerland	Hirashima, K. (2004). Regime Shift in Japan? *Two Decades of Neoliberal Reforms. Swiss Political Science Review*, *10*, 31-54; swissinfo.ch
United Kingdom	Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press; Giddens, A. (ed.) (2003). The Progressive Manifesto. New Ideas for the Centre-Left. Cambridge: Polity Press; Theakston, K. (2011). Gordon Brown as prime minister: Political skills and leadership style. *British Politics*, *6*, 78-100; Whiteley, P., Poletti, M., Webb, P., & Bale, T. (2019). Oh Jeremy Corbyn! Why did Labour Party membership soar after the 2015 general election? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(1), 80-98; The Daily Telegraph

Table A6. Replication of Model 2 with alternative operationalisation

of *Competitive RLPs* and *Competitive RRPs*.

	Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)		
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.509	(2.093)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.115	(0.102)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)		
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.729	(3.024)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	5.34	(3.318)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.223*	(0.109)
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	-0.11	(1.73)
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	-3.504+	(1.917)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)		
Government status = 1 (In government)	0.426	(1.419)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)		
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	3.546*	(1.709)
Debt (T-1)	0.084**	(0.028)

Centre of gravity	0.185+	(0.098)
Government aspiration (logged)	-2.779+	(1.641)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)		
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.197	(3.016)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.337+	(0.196)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.365	(0.255)
Constant	8.609	(16.61)
Wald χ2	77.19***	
R²	0.325	
N of observations (party per election)	144	
N of parties	21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: all effects from the main specification of Model 2 are confirmed, although most often at different levels of statistical significance. *Economic globalisation* stays significant at p<0.05, whilst *Dominant faction* gains in statistical significance (p<0.05). *Debt* maintains its status as the most statistically significant predictor (at p<0.01), whilst *Centre of gravity* and *Unemployment* are only marginally significant (p<0.1), similarly to *Government aspiration* (not significant in the main specification). Lastly, with the new operationalisation, *Competitive RRPs* significantly loses out in terms of statistical significance: its leftwards effect now only marginally significant (at p<0.1, compared to p<0.01 in the main specification). *Competitive RLPs* stays not significant.

Table A7. Replication of Model 2 with additional *GDP* control.

	Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)		
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.8	(2.247)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.149	(0.096)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)		
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.397	(2.964)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	4.88	(3.226)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.206*	(0.105)
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	1.031	(1.816)
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	-4.968**	(1.822)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)		
Government status = 1 (In government)	0.122	(1.367)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)		
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	2.993+	(1.689)
Debt (T-1)	0.095***	(0.028)
Centre of gravity	0.187*	(0.095)
Government aspiration (logged)	-2.539	(1.657)

Bailout = 0 (reference: No)		
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.549	(2.782)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.401*	(0.195)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.366	(0.242)
GDP	-0.191	(0.265)
Constant	4.874	(16.37)
Wald χ2	83.81***	
R²	0.35	
N of observations (party per election)	144	
N of parties	21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: all effects from the main specification of Model 2 are confirmed in terms of direction and levels of statistical significance.

Table A8. Replication of Model 2 with additional *Trade union density* control.

	Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)		
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	1.097	(2.386)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.144	(0.1)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)		
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	0.918	(3.171)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	4.168	(3.643)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.199+	(0.109)
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	1.117	(1.82)
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	-4.992**	(1.826)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)		
Government status = 1 (In government)	-0.018	(1.377)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)		
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	2.847+	(1.711)
Debt (T-1)	0.099***	(0.028)
Centre of gravity	0.185+	(0.096)
Government aspiration (logged)	-2.332	(1.634)

Bailout = 0 (reference: No)		
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.089	(2.893)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.404*	(0.196)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.409+	(0.248)
Trade union density	-0.019	(0.053)
Constant	7.471	(17.17)
Wald χ2	82.31***	
R²	0.348	
N of observations (party per election)	144	
N of parties	21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: the *Trade union density* control variable employs data from the 'UD' indicator in the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database (Visser 2019). This captures the union density rate, that is the net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment. Where data is missing, the closest available real estimate within a range of 2 years was used as a proxy for the trend over time (giving precedence to values before rather than after the observation, where available). All effects from the main specification of Model 2 are confirmed in terms of direction and most effects also retain the same levels of statistical significance, whilst however *Economic globalisation* and the *Centre of gravity* control become marginally significant (at p<0.1). Further, the *Income inequality* control also achieves marginal statistical significance (at p<0.1).

Table A9. Replication of Model 2 with alternative operationalisation of *Bailout*.

	Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)		
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.697	(2.267)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.146	(0.098)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)		
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.366	(2.992)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	4.937	(3.232)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.212*	(0.105)
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RLPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	1.097	(1.815)
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RRPs (T-1) = 1 (Present)	-4.929**	(1.832)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)		
Government status = 1 (In government)	-0.03	(1.369)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)		
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	2.928+	(1.682)
Debt (T-1)	0.095***	(0.028)
Centre of gravity	0.187+	(0.097)
Government aspiration (logged)	-2.401	(1.645)

Bailout = 0 (reference: No)		
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.509	(2.694)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.404*	(0.192)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.386	(0.244)
Constant	6.576	(16.66)
Wald $\chi2$	84.15***	
R^2	0.348	
N of observations (party per election)	144	
N of parties	21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: all effects of longer- and shorter-term independent variables from the main specification of Model 2 are confirmed in terms of direction and levels of statistical significance.

Table A10. Replication of main models with lagged dependent variable.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Lagged dependent variable	0.267**	(0.092)	0.164	(0.102)
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.457	(2.142)	-0.079	(2.281)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.055	(0.08)	0.102	(0.099)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	0.879	(2.377)	0.779	(2.962)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	5.86*	(2.478)	4.249	(3.192)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.273***	(0.077)	-0.161	(0.108)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			1.792	(1.802)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-4.299*	(1.811)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			0.062	(1.36)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			2.734	(1.673)
Debt (T-1)			0.086**	(0.028)

Centre of gravity			0.232*	(0.1)
Government aspiration (logged)			-1.303	(1.782)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			2.336	(2.865)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.36+	(0.201)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.314	(0.233)
Constant	23.19**	(8.638)	6.196	(16.41)
Wald χ2	33.75***		78.42***	
R²	0.218		0.359	
N of observations (party per election)	155		143	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: even with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, which exerts a statistically significant effect, the directionally opposite effects of the longer-term *Europeanisation* and *Economic globalisation* independent variables remain statistically significant in Model 1 (the former now at p<0.05, the latter still at p<0.001). Most effects are also confirmed in Model 2, where *Debt* still exerts the most statistically significant effect (at p<0.01). *Competitive RRPs* is significant at p<0.05, and two control variables in *Centre of gravity* and *Unemployment* are also significant (the former remains at p<0.05, the latter now marginally significant at p<0.1). The only longer-term predictor that was significant in the main specification, *Economic globalisation*, is no longer so in this replication: however, it convincingly retains the statistical significance of its effects in Model 1. Other than that, the only shorter-term predictor to lose its previously statistically significant (marginal) effect is *Dominant faction*, which is no longer significant. This is, *de facto*, the only substantively meaningful change in this replication of Model 2, where the lagged dependent variable is not statistically significant. Further, by looking at r-squared values it is worth pointing out the very small increase in explanatory power that derives from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, especially in the case of the more comprehensive Model 2 (R² of 0.359, versus 0.348 in the main specification). This, alongside the other aspects discussed in the methodological sections of the thesis, provides further reassurance as to the main models being correctly specified.

Table A11. Replication of main models with continuous temporal variable (*Election year*).

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.488	(2.336)	0.739	(2.277)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.006	(0.083)	0.163	(0.104)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.788	(2.593)	0.885	(3.324)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	8.291**	(2.526)	4.796	(3.258)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.337***	(0.08)	-0.196+	(0.111)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			1.213	(1.821)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-4.996**	(1.812)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			-0.12	(1.39)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			2.795	(1.707)
Debt (T-1)			0.099***	(0.028)
Centre of gravity			0.184+	(0.097)
Government aspiration (logged)			-2.367	(1.642)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			3.791	(2.881)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.417*	(0.197)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.355	(0.247)
Election year	-0.106	(0.118)	-0.06	(0.131)
Constant	233.9	(233.3)	122.2	(256.357)
Wald χ2	28.08**		83.15***	
R²	0.161		0.349	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: all effects of longer-term determinants from the main specification of Model 1 are confirmed in terms of direction and levels of statistical significance. Most effects of shorter-term independent variables are also confirmed in Model 2 direction- and significance-wise, the only change being *Dominant faction* losing its marginally significant status. The picture is also similar with regard to the previously significant shorter-term controls (*Unemployment* stays significant at p<0.05, *Centre of gravity* becoming marginally significant at p<0.1). Across both models, *Election year* is never statistically significant.

Table A12. Replication of main models with ordinal temporal variable for decades (*Decades*).

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.685	(2.397)	0.698	(2.314)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.005	(0.082)	0.179+	(0.103)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.513	(2.648)	0.206	(3.325)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	8.759***	(2.573)	5.172	(3.22)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.328***	(0.079)	-0.166	(0.111)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			1.378	(1.815)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-5.15**	(1.796)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			-0.319	(1.39)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			3.08+	(1.722)
Debt (T-1)			0.102***	(0.028)
Centre of gravity			0.175+	(0.097)
Government aspiration (logged)			-2.528	(1.633)

Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			3.482	(2.892)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.456*	(0.196)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.319	(0.249)
Decade = 0 (reference: 1990s)				
Decade = 1 (2000s)	-2.794	(2.553)	-2.883	(2.571)
Decade = 2 (2010s)	-2.759	(2.676)	-2.648	(2.727)
Constant	23.43**	(8.747)	-0.108	(17.47)
Wald χ2	28.55*		83.78***	
R²	0.165		0.355	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: all effects of longer-term determinants from the main specification of Model 1 are confirmed in terms of direction and levels of statistical significance, with the third level of *Europeanisation* (EU and Eurozone membership) becoming even more significant (from p<0.01 to p<0.001). All effects of shorter-term independent variables are also confirmed in Model 2 direction- and significance-wise. The picture is also similar with regard to the previously significant shorter-term controls (*Unemployment* stays significant at p<0.05, *Centre of gravity* becoming marginally significant at p<0.1). Across both models, neither level of *Decades* ever exerts a significantly different effect compared to the reference category.

Table A13. Replication of main models with ordinal temporal variable

for five-year periods (*Periods*).

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.662	(2.429)	0.647	(2.357)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.008	(0.084)	0.178+	(0.106)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.269	(2.704)	0.137	(3.494)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	8.567**	(2.623)	5.226	(3.423)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.313***	(0.082)	-0.16	(0.122)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			1.418	(1.819)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-5.307**	(1.829)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			-0.26	(1.393)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			3.289+	(1.756)
Debt (T-1)			0.105***	(0.031)

Centre of gravity			0.165	(0.102)
Government aspiration (logged)			-2.452	(1.64)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			3.044	(3.148)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.459*	(0.198)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.34	(0.258)
Period = 0 (reference: 1990-1994)				
Period = 1 (1995-1999)	-1.971	(2.561)	-0.597	(3.073)
Period = 2 (2000-2004)	-4.349	(3.369)	-4.123	(3.85)
Period = 3 (2005-2009)	-3.867	(3.275)	-2.775	(3.658)
Period = 4 (2010-2014)	-4.159	(3.534)	-3.537	(3.881)
Period = 5 (2015-2019)	-4.039	(3.358)	-2.564	(4.03)
Constant	22.51*	(8.767)	0.438	(18.48)
Wald χ2	29.99*		84.19***	
R²	0.169		0.358	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: all effects from the main specification of Model 1 are confirmed in terms of direction and levels of statistical significance. All effects of shorter-term independent variables are also confirmed in Model 2 direction- and significance-wise, whilst interestingly here the rightwards effect of the longer-term determinant of *Political globalisation* reaches marginal statistical significance (at p<0.01). In terms of previously significant shorter-term controls, there is no change for *Unemployment*, whilst *Centre of gravity* is no longer statistically significant. Across both models, no level of *Periods* ever exerts a significantly different effect compared to the reference category.

Table A14. Replication of main models by employing the original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index as the dependent variable.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Economic left-right position		Economic left-right position	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.032	(2.527)	0.921	(2.636)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.07	(0.093)	0.042	(0.119)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	4.226	(2.785)	4.864	(3.321)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	5.482+	(2.953)	5.117	(3.643)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.467***	(0.093)	-0.351**	(0.123)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			0.62	(2.09)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-5.271*	(2.052)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			1.337	(1.544)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			4.62*	(1.863)
Debt (T-1)			0.082**	(0.032)
Centre of gravity			0.231*	(0.114)
Government aspiration (logged)			-2.495	(1.948)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				

Bailout = 1 (Yes)			-0.668	(3.254)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.273	(0.214)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.569*	(0.272)
Constant	16.04	(9.823)	8.129	(18.62)
Wald χ2	29.25***		68.81***	
R²	0.153		0.351	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: by employing the original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index as the dependent variable, the results of the regression analyses are confirmed. In Model 1, statistically significant effects are retained for both *Europeanisation* and *Economic globalisation* (marginally for the former). The same applies to all statistically significant independent variables and controls in Model 2: *Competitive RRPs* (at p<0.05), *Dominant faction* (at p<0.05), *Debt* (at p<0.01), *Centre of gravity* and *Unemployment*, as well as the longer-term independent variable of *Economic globalisation* (now statistically significant at p<0.01). In particular, it is interesting to note how the impact of *Dominant faction* generally gains in statistical significance (here at p<0.05) when employing purely positional economic left-right indexes: a result confirmed in other tests too (see, e.g., Tables A19, A20, and A22).

Table A15. Replication of main models by employing the economic left pole of the

original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index as the dependent variable.

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
| | Economic left emphasis | | Economic left emphasis | |
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-1.149	(1.964)	-1.696	(2.083)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.066	(0.085)	-0.021	(0.109)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	-2.794	(2.472)	-4.416	(2.904)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	-3.543	(2.656)	-4.916	(3.186)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	0.368***	(0.077)	0.333**	(0.106)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			-0.693	(1.788)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			4.027*	(1.654)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			-1.386	(1.293)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			-4.265**	(1.625)
Debt (T-1)			-0.051*	(0.025)
Centre of gravity			-0.218*	(0.095)

Government aspiration (logged)			1.685	(1.462)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			0.094	(2.877)
Unemployment (T-1)			0.386*	(0.181)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			0.351	(0.226)
Constant	-4.07	(8.33)	0.307	(15.57)
Wald χ^2	28.4***		66.7***	
R^2	0.137		0.319	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. $+p<0.10$, $*p<0.05$, $**p<0.01$, $***p<0.001$.

Comment: the replications employing the economic left pole of the original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index as the dependent variable confirm the results of the main specifications. Here, we would expect to find positive coefficients, i.e. greater emphasis on economic left issues, where, instead, the coefficients in the main models and in the replications of Table A14 are negative, hence indicating more leftist economic positions, due to the summative nature of the original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index. In this regard, we find confirmation of the statistically significant and leftwards effect of *Economic globalisation* in Model 1. Additionally, in Model 2 the leftwards effects of *Competitive RRPs* and the *Unemployment* control are also confirmed, whilst the negative and statistically significant coefficients of *Dominant faction*, *Debt*, and the *Centre of gravity* control confirm their rightwards impact.

Table A16. Replication of main models by employing the economic right pole of the

original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index as the dependent variable.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Economic right emphasis		Economic right emphasis	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-1.117	(1.119)	-0.776	(1.226)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.004	(0.029)	0.021	(0.042)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.433+	(0.76)	0.448	(1.057)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	1.938*	(0.766)	0.2	(1.076)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.098*	(0.042)	-0.017	(0.047)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			-0.07	(0.792)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-1.244	(0.768)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			-0.05	(0.595)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			0.356	(0.682)
Debt (T-1)			0.031*	(0.133)
Centre of gravity			0.124	(0.037)

Government aspiration (logged)			-0.81	(1.12)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			-0.572	(1.372)
Unemployment (T-1)			0.113	(0.089)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.218*	(0.096)
Constant	11.97***	(3.382)	8.431	(6.892)
Wald χ2	10.96+		59.13***	
R²	0.083		0.236	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: the replications employing the economic right pole of the original MARPOR-based deductive economic left-right index as the dependent variable confirm the results of the main specifications. Here, we would expect to find positive coefficients, i.e. greater emphasis on economic right issues, where the coefficients in the main models and in the replications of Table A14 are also positive. In this regard, in Model 1 we find confirmation of the statistically significant and rightwards effect of *Europeanisation*, also marginally at the level of EU membership (p<0.1), whilst the negative and statistically significant coefficient of *Economic globalisation* corroborates its leftwards impact. Additionally, in Model 2 the rightwards effect of *Debt* is further confirmed by the positive and statistically significant coefficient. In conjunction with the previous analogous replications, this test too effectively complements the evidence presented in the main models.

Table A17. Replications of Model 1 by employing each selected MARPOR item making up the deductive economic left-right index

as the dependent variable.

	Economic right MARPOR items											
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	per401 - Free Market Economy		per402 - Incentives: Positive		per414 - Economic Orthodoxy		per505 - Welfare State Limitation		per507 - Education Limitation		per702 - Labour Groups: Negative	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)											0	(.)
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.2	(0.298)	-0.833+	(0.472)	-0.147	(0.696)	0.056	(0.086)	0.001	(0.012)	0.006	(0.03)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.002	(0.008)	-0.003	(0.013)	+0.000	(0.02)	+0.000	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(+0.000)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)											0	(.)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	-0.109	(0.185)	1.044***	(0.294)	0.422	(0.598)	0.044	(0.087)	0.004	(0.022)	0.026*	(0.013)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	-0.000	(0.201)	1.556***	(0.293)	0.269	(0.586)	0.115	(0.085)	-0.016	(0.021)	0.013	(0.013)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.021+	(0.011)	-0.037*	(0.017)	-0.045	(0.029)	0.006	(0.004)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.001*	(0.001)
Constant	2.551**	(0.816)	4.761***	(1.37)	4.962+	(2.621)	-0.38	(0.338)	0.041	(0.12)	0.04	(0.051)
Wald χ2	8.06		34.13***		3.6		5.23		7.09		7.92	
R^2	0.048		0.177		0.025		0.035		0.024		0.041	
N of observations (party per election)	159		159		159		159		159		159	
N of parties	21		21		21		21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table A17. *Continued.*

Economic left MARPOR items

	(1) per403 - Market Regulation		(2) per409 - Keynesian Demand Management		(3) per412 - Controlled Economy		(4) per413 - Nationalisation		(5) per504 - Welfare State Expansion		(6) per506 - Education Expansion		(7) per701 - Labour Groups: Positive	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)														
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.843	(0.843)	-0.434	(0.351)	-0.148	(0.323)	-0.586**	(0.225)	0.413	(1.21)	-0.288	(0.832)	0.739	(0.88)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.006	(0.029)	0.006	(0.006)	-0.005	(0.013)	-0.03**	(0.011)	0.008	(0.052)	0.003	(0.029)	0.079**	(0.028)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)														
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	-1.727*	(0.869)	-0.045	(0.186)	-0.359	(0.422)	-0.195	(0.212)	-1.234	(1.341)	0.072	(0.85)	0.693	(0.836)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	0.637	(0.954)	-0.025	(0.166)	-0.36	(0.465)	-0.072	(0.232)	-3.003*	(1.373)	-0.97	(0.86)	0.249	(0.866)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	0.032	(0.029)	-0.004	(0.007)	0.032*	(0.013)	0.021*	(0.008)	0.212***	(0.051)	0.058+	(0.032)	0.018	(0.033)
Constant	1.693	(3.045)	0.551	(0.833)	-0.79	(1.342)	2.218*	(0.87)	-4.456	(5.088)	1.760	(3.167)	-5.046	(3.126)
Wald χ2	24.34**		3.73		6.13		16.62**		20.54**		5.1		15.14**	
R²	0.118		0.031		0.033		0.149		0.112		0.034		0.072	
N of observations (party per election)	159		159		159		159		159		159		159	
N of parties	21		21		21		21		21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: notice that the different levels of *Europeanisation* significantly increase the emphasis on supply-side, economic right stances (per402) and opposition to labour (per702), whilst decreasing the emphasis on the regulation of free-market economy (per403) and the expansion of welfare provisions (per504). Interestingly, *Economic globalisation* runs counter to this by exerting negative and statistically significant effects on almost all these dependent variables, whilst also decreasing the salience of free-market economics at large (per401) and increasing the emphasis put on greater state intervention in the economy (per412 and per413), as well as the expansion not only of welfare, but also of education provisions (per506).

Table A18. Replications of Model 2 by employing each selected MARPOR item making up the deductive economic left-right index as the dependent variable.

	Economic right MARPOR items										
	(1)		**(2)**		**(3)**		**(4)**		**(5)**		**(6)**
	per401 - Free Market Economy		per402 - Incentives: Positive		per414 - Economic Orthodoxy		per505 - Welfare State Limitation		per507 - Education Limitation		per702 - Labour Groups: Negative
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
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Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)												
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.199	(0.306)	-0.352	(0.535)	-0.726	(0.783)	0.075	(0.123)	0.015	(0.02)	0.013	(0.027)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.01	(0.011)	0.017	(0.018)	-0.008	(0.03)	0.002	(0.006)	-0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)												
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	-0.025	(0.211)	1.059**	(0.403)	-0.705	(0.831)	0.057	(0.116)	0.016	(0.025)	0.046*	(0.021)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	-0.021	(0.219)	1.404***	(0.425)	-1.288	(0.852)	0.086	(0.13)	-0.017	(0.026)	0.037	(0.023)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.005	(0.011)	-0.033	(0.022)	0.015	(0.037)	0.007	(0.006)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.002*	(0.001)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)												
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	-0.320	(0.204)	-0.707*	(0.354)	0.964+	(0.552)	0.038	(0.102)	-0.017	(0.02)	-0.029+	(0.016)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)												
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-0.109	(0.155)	-0.234	(0.291)	-0.756	(0.61)	-0.089	(0.109)	-0.045*	(0.019)	-0.01	(0.018)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)												
Government status = 1 (In government)	0.071	(0.131)	0.054	(0.247)	-0.25	(0.449)	0.047	(0.082)	0.035*	(0.015)	-0.007	(0.014)

Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)												
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	0.256	(0.159)	0.238	(0.285)	-0.097	(0.505)	-0.035	(0.094)	-0.004	(0.013)	-0.002	(0.014)
Debt (T-1)	0.003	(0.003)	-0.000	(0.00527)	0.028**	(0.01)	0.001	(0.002)	+0.000	(+0.000)	-0.001*	(+0.000)
Centre of gravity	-0.009	(0.009)	0.004	(0.0167)	0.004	(0.028)	0.01+	(0.005)	0.003*	(0.001)	+0.000	(0.001)
Government aspiration (logged)	-0.644*	(0.301)	-0.688	(0.431)	0.64	(0.77)	-0.102	(0.094)	-0.022	(0.022)	0.006	(0.013)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)												
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	-0.408	(0.317)	0.535	(0.598)	-0.96	(1.013)	0.21	(0.184)	0.039	(0.029)	0.013	(0.035)
Unemployment (T-1)	0.008	(0.019)	0.016	(0.035)	0.1	(0.07)	-0.011	(0.011)	-0.003+	(0.002)	0.004+	(0.002)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.026	(0.022)	-0.026	(0.042)	-0.151*	(0.074)	-0.011	(0.016)	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.001	(0.003)
Constant	-0.15	(1.544)	2.749	(3.184)	5.899	(5.086)	-0.344	(0.811)	0.1	(0.24)	0.182	(0.152)
Wald χ^2	24.14+		57.9***		32.51**		12.64		21.36		16.73	
R^2	0.219		0.242		0.188		0.081		0.198		0.144	
N of observations (party per election)	144		144		144		144		144		144	
N of parties	21		21		21		21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table A18. *Continued.*

Economic left MARPOR items

	(1) per403 - Market Regulation		(2) per409 - Keynesian Demand Management		(3) per412 - Controlled Economy		(4) per413 - Nationalisation		(5) per504 - Welfare State Expansion		(6) per506 - Education Expansion		(7) per701 - Labour Groups: Positive	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)														
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.560	(1.016)	-0.45	(0.412)	0.163	(0.38)	-0.734**	(0.234)	-0.862	(1.354)	-0.848	(0.852)	0.474	(1.052)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.0521	(0.038)	0.008	(0.01)	0.004	(0.018)	-0.057***	(0.014)	-0.038	(0.064)	-0.038	(0.039)	0.048	(0.038)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)														
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	-3.814***	(1)	0.161	(0.268)	-0.425	(0.539)	-0.155	(0.252)	-1.782	(1.639)	1.163	(1.158)	0.438	(1.072)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	-1.983+	(1.127)	0.14	(0.232)	-0.531	(0.587)	0.033	(0.283)	-3.605*	(1.826)	0.516	(1.21)	0.514	(1.214)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	0.09*	(0.043)	-0.014	(0.01)	0.049**	(0.019)	0.012	(0.012)	0.185**	(0.068)	-0.011	(0.047)	0.021	(0.045)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)														
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	-0.249	(0.662)	0.08	(0.178)	-0.584+	(0.316)	0.232	(0.18)	-1.141	(1.229)	0.759	(0.747)	0.211	(0.714)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)														
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-0.603	(0.573)	-0.184	(0.199)	0.478+	(0.264)	0.0852	(0.141)	2.013+	(1.079)	0.313	(0.715)	1.925**	(0.731)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)														
Government status = 1 (In government)	-0.971*	(0.484)	-0.008	(0.167)	0.203	(0.212)	-0.159	(0.123)	0.186	(0.85)	0.14	(0.561)	-0.779	(0.553)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)														
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	-1.617**	(0.603)	-0.164	(0.166)	-0.102	(0.299)	-0.153	(0.134)	-0.162	(1.049)	0.208	(0.674)	-2.276***	(0.669)

Debt (T-1)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.002	(0.003)	0.001	(0.004)	0.001	(0.002)	-0.022	(0.017)	-0.02	(0.012)	-0.018	(0.012)
Centre of gravity	-0.032	(0.031)	0.009	(0.01)	-0.022	(0.014)	0.006	(0.011)	-0.087	(0.065)	-0.054	(0.039)	-0.038	(0.036)
Government aspiration (logged)	-0.939	(0.67)	0.087	(0.157)	-0.546+	(0.332)	0.276*	(0.138)	1.826*	(0.918)	0.995	(0.771)	-0.015	(0.7)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)														
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	-1.964	(1.257)	0.537	(0.417)	-0.441	(0.457)	-0.381	(0.303)	3.183+	(1.817)	1.145	(1.203)	-1.986	(1.262)
Unemployment (T-1)	0.146*	(0.073)	-0.013	(0.025)	0.049	(0.032)	-0.006	(0.017)	0.141	(0.114)	-0.117	(0.079)	0.186*	(0.09)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	0.335***	(0.088)	-0.027	(0.03)	0.022	(0.04)	0.008	(0.02)	0.097	(0.144)	-0.027	(0.097)	-0.058	(0.094)
Constant	-17.78**	(6.484)	2.244	(2.168)	-4.72+	(2.826)	5.446**	(1.946)	1.653	(10.48)	13.30+	(6.861)	0.171	(6.625)
Wald χ2	60.63***		10.2		24.75+		35.68**		71.77***		20.58		53.5***	
R²	0.289		0.063		0.141		0.275		0.252		0.127		0.271	
N of observations (party per election)	144		144		144		144		144		144		144	
N of parties	21		21		21		21		21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: amongst the most interesting findings, it is worth noticing the statistically significant (at p<0.01) increase in the emphasis put on economic orthodoxy and austerity measure deriving from higher levels of *Debt*. The substantive association emerging from this statistical relationship also been confirmed in the case-oriented SNA of Chapter 8. In terms of other shorter-term independent variables, additional and interesting findings can be noticed with regard to *Competitive RRPs, Dominant faction*, and *Government status*. First, more competitive opposition from the radical right will lead to a statistically significant (at p<0.01) increase in the emphasis put on workers' rights and labour questions, in line with existing theoretical contributions. Second, the opposite effect on this MARPOR item is, instead, exerted by a more centrist dominant leading faction (significant at p<0.001), which also significantly reduces the emphasis on the regulation of markets (p<0.01). Third, this issue is less emphasised when also social democrats are in government, with the negative effect of *Government status* being significant at p<0.01: this goes in the direction of the 'responsibility' and 'external constraints' arguments in the literature.

Table A19. Replication of main models by employing Bakker and Hobolt's (2013)

economic left-right index as the dependent variable.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Bakker and Hobolt's economic left-right index		Bakker and Hobolt's economic left-right index	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.368	(3.096)	-1.504	(3.217)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.099	(0.103)	-0.079	(0.145)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	9.189**	(2.94)	10.75**	(3.442)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	9.281**	(3.13)	9.349*	(3.795)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.634***	(0.111)	-0.591***	(0.146)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			4.937*	(2.389)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-4.314+	(2.263)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			2.866	(1.767)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			7.693***	(1.997)
Debt (T-1)			0.077*	(0.039)

Centre of gravity			0.107	(0.128)
Government aspiration (logged)			-0.44	(2.222)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			7.086	(4.387)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.648*	(0.275)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.411	(0.313)
Constant	25.59*	(10.91)	27.46	(22.19)
Wald χ2	41.99***		103.52***	
R²	0.225		0.426	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: by employing Bakker and Hobolt's (2013) economic left-right index as the dependent variable, the results of the regression analyses are confirmed. In Model 1, statistically significant effects are retained for both *Europeanisation* and *Economic globalisation*, with the former also being statistically significant at the EU membership level (p<0.01). In Model 2, all significant effects from the main specification are confirmed and maintain the same direction, although levels of statistical significance vary at times. In particular, the most eye-catching changes are the now extremely significant effect of *Dominant faction*, which goes from the p<0.1 level to p<0.001, and the decrease in significance of *Competitive RRPs* in particular, now marginally significant (at p<0.1). Further, differently from the main specification, a rightwards and statistically significant (at p<0.05) effect of *Competitive RLPs*. In general, as testified by the higher r-squared and Wald Chi-Square values, by the higher level of statistical significance of some predictors and the retained statistical significance of all previously meaningful shorter-term independent variables in Model 2, the explanatory power of the regression analyses seems higher with this positional index.

Table A20. Replication of main models by employing Prosser's (2014)

economic left-right index as the dependent variable.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Prosser's economic left-right index		Prosser's economic left-right index	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-1.749	(2.857)	-3.365	(2.921)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.187+	(0.098)	-0.135	(0.139)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	7.456*	(2.933)	9.11**	(3.396)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	6.8*	(3.093)	7.241+	(3.778)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.532***	(0.105)	-0.421**	(0.138)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			4.348+	(2.29)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-2.892	(2.22)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			2.845+	(1.714)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			6.497***	(1.963)
Debt (T-1)			0.099**	(0.036)
Centre of gravity			0.174	(0.126)

Government aspiration (logged)			-0.44	(2.222)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			3.07	(4.09)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.55*	(0.263)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.73*	(0.304)
Constant	15.82	(11.01)	27.46	(22.19)
Wald χ2	41.99***		103.52***	
R²	0.203		0.426	
N of observations (party per election)	159		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: the same considerations from the previous replication apply here, when employing the analogous positional index by Prosser (2014) as the dependent variable. All statistically significant effects from the main specifications are confirmed across both models, which also display higher explanatory power, whilst here too *Dominant faction* emerges as particularly prominent (significant at p<0.001) in Model 2. However, it must be noticed how *Competitive RRPs* is no longer significant when employing this measure as the dependent variable. Lastly, amongst the control variables of Model 2, it is interesting to note how *Income inequality* also gains in statistical significance (now significant at p<0.05), joining the other traditional economic left issue represented by *Unemployment* in its leftwards impact.

Table A21. Replications of Model 1 by employing economic left-right measures from the Varieties of Party Identity and Organisation (V-Party)

dataset as the dependent variable.

	Model 1		**Model 1**		**Model 1**	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1 (1996-2019)		V-Party economic left-right scale (v2pariglef)		V-Party economic left-right scale, arithmetic mean of coder answers per country-party–year (v2pariglef_mean)	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.409	(2.28)	0.259	(0.18)	0.174	(0.159)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.031	(0.08)	-0.007+	(0.004)	-0.007	(0.005)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	2.356	(2.419)	0.473**	(0.147)	0.387**	(0.15)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	8.028**	(2.551)	0.692***	(0.162)	0.594***	(0.165)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.364***	(0.078)	-0.013**	(0.005)	-0.012**	(0.005)
Constant	26.45**	(8.715)	-0.78	(0.504)	2.905***	(0.492)
Wald $\chi2$	28***		20.59**		15.94**	
R²	0.156		0.13		0.114	
N of observations (party per election)	159		159		159	
N of parties	21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported.

+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Comment: by employing two measures of social democratic parties' economic left-right positions based on an alternative source of data, i.e. expert survey data from the Varieties of Party Identity and Organisation (V-Party) dataset ('v2pariglef' and 'v2pariglef_mean' variables), to operationalise the dependent variable, all the statistically significant effects of Model 1 are retained in both replications. Further, it is noteworthy that the rightwards effect of *EU membership* also becomes statistically significant, albeit in a less statistically significant fashion ($p<0.01$ versus $p<0.001$) and with smaller effect sizes compared to *Eurozone membership*, hence confirming the expected increasing constraints put on social democratic parties' economic left-right positions with higher degrees of *Europeanisation*.

Table A22. Replications of Model 2 by employing economic left-right measures from the Varieties of Party Identity and Organisation (V-Party) dataset as the dependent variable.

	Model 2		Model 2		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1 (1996-2019)		V-Party economic left-right scale (v2pariglef)		V-Party economic left-right scale, arithmetic mean of coder answers per country-party–year (v2pariglef_mean)	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.752	(2.269)	0.134	(0.151)	0.058	(0.132)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.15	(0.098)	-0.012*	(0.005)	-0.014**	(0.005)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.298	(2.974)	0.698***	(0.166)	0.627***	(0.159)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	4.898	(3.226)	0.805***	(0.211)	0.734***	(0.196)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.212*	(0.106)	-0.02**	(0.007)	-0.019**	(0.007)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	1.133	(1.812)	-0.025	(0.12)	-0.084	(0.113)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-5.015**	(1.822)	-0.125	(0.123)	-0.016	(0.112)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)						
Government status = 1 (In government)	0.008	(1.375)	0.001	(0.092)	0.021	(0.085)

Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)					
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	2.954+	(1.685)	0.456***	(0.113)	0.476***	(0.107)
Debt (T-1)	0.097***	(0.027)	0.005*	(0.002)	0.004*	(0.002)
Centre of gravity	0.19*	(0.097)	0.009	(0.006)	0.008	(0.006)
Government aspiration (logged)	-2.414	(1.649)	0.299***	(0.09)	0.242**	(0.006)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)					
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.428	(2.805)	0.598**	(0.205)	0.552**	(0.189)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.405*	(0.196)	-0.061***	(0.016)	-0.049***	(0.014)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.375	(0.242)	-0.007	(0.014)	-0.005	(0.013)
Constant	5.778	(16.48)	1.326	(1.302)	4.316***	(0.967)
Wald $\chi 2$	82.07***		141.35***		105.98***	
R²	0.348		0.391		0.378	
N of observations (party per election)	144		144		144	
N of parties	21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported.

+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Comment: replications of Model 2 by employing the introduced economic left-right measures from the V-Party dataset as the dependent variable confirm the robustness of the effects related to the predictors operationalising 'external constraints', i.e. *Economic globalisation* and *Debt*, which both retain statistically significant effects in the same directions, whilst even reinforcing the introduced picture by resurfacing very statistically significant (at p<0.001) rightwards effects for both *EU membership* and *Eurozone membership* – again, coherently with both theoretical expectations and the results reported in Table A21, with larger effect sizes for the latter. The statistically significant effects of the *Dominant faction* focal variable and the *Uneployment* control variable are also retained and reinforced (respectively, from p<0.1 to p<0.001 and from p<0.05 to p<0.001), with the same directions (respectively, rightwards and leftwards). Further, statistically significant effects in the expected directions emerge for *Political globalisation* (leftwards), *Government aspiration* (rightwards), and *Bailout* (rightwards), whilst they disappear for *Competitive RRPs* and *Centre of gravity*.

Table A23. Replications of Model 1 by employing various indicators from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)

as the dependent variable.

	Model 1 Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1 (1996-2019)		**Model 1** CHES' Left-right stance on economic issues (LRECON)		**Model 1** CHES' Public expenditure VS taxes reduction (SPENDVTAX)		**Model 1** CHES' Deregulation (DEREGULATION)		**Model 1** CHES' Redistribution (REDISTRIBUTION)		**Model 1** CHES' State intervention in the economy (ECON_INTERVEN)	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)												
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.523	(2.229)	0.342	(0.29)	0.339	(0.285)	0.629	0.655	0.025	(0.489)	0.795	(0.28)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.192*	(0.09)	-0.032***	(0.009)	-0.04*	(0.016)	-0.068***	-0.07***	-0.055***	(0.016)	-0.035*	(0.012)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)												
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (reference in CHES models: EU membership)	8.745**	(3.082)										
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	13.68***	(2.876)	-0.224+	(0.134)	-0.003	(0.22)	-0.88**	(0.316)	-0.258	(0.185)	0.092	(0.337)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.441***	(0.09)	-0.051***	(0.011)	-0.036+	(0.021)	-0.09***	(0.025)	-0.031*	(0.014)	-0.058*	(0.027)
Constant	42.41***	(11.53)	10.98***	(1.463)	9.558***	(2.699)	17.91***	(3.301)	10.81***	(2.124)	10.56**	(3.57)
Wald χ^2	37.39***		29.55**		10.85*		28.43***		21.21**		13.33**	
R^2	0.275		0.323		0.142		0.313		0.235		0.263	
N of observations (party per election)	127		85		61		61		61		31	
N of parties	21		17		17		17		17		16	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

Comment: MARPOR-based findings are traditionally validated against expert survey data on party positions, from sources such as the aforementioned V-Party or, most often, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). Yet, CHES data proved extremely problematic for performing additional tests and robustness checks vis-à-vis the presented analyses, due to its shorter timeframe and the exclusion of specific countries: indeed, this source only covers EU member states since 1996 at the earliest. Already this characteristic made it difficult to arrive at a coherent comparison between models employing MARPOR or CHES data. I first tried to replicate the original Models 1 and 2 on the vastly reduced number of cases for which CHES data was present: however, whilst the results of Model 1 were substantively confirmed, no statistically significant effect at all (excluding a leftwards effect of *Government aspiration* at p<0.001) was retained, forcing me to find an alternative solution. Therefore, in Tables A23 and A24 I report, for illustrative purposes only given the difficulty of directly comparing these models, replications of Models 1 and 2 constrained to the same temporal scope as the one employed by the CHES (1996-2019). In terms of CHES data, I then replaced the dependent variable with both the CHES measure of parties' economic left-right positions ('LRECON'), as well as more fine-grained (although more scarcely available) positional measures with regard to parties' approach to economic issues such as public expenditure and taxes ('SPENDVTAX'), deregulation ('DEREGULATION'), redistribution ('REDISTRIBUTION'), and state intervention in the economy ('ECON_INTERVEN'). Despite all these caveats, the overall substantive results seem confirmed by these CHES replications. With regards to Model 1, as evident here in Table A23, the same statistically significant and leftwards effects are retained for the globalisation variables, both *Economic globalisation* and *Political globalisation*, across all CHES models. Instead, the oddity related to the effects of *Europeanisation* in the CHES replications already emerges here. Indeed, as it will also be evident below in the replications of Model 2 in Table A24, in the models where *Eurozone membership* retains statistically significant effects, these are in the opposite direction: leftwards. However, two points must be made, both related to the exclusion of non-EU member states from the CHES dataset mentioned above. First, this means that, in such models, the base category for *Europeanisation* becomes *EU membership*. Hence, when significant, the results from some of these CHES models would seem to suggest that, compared to only being from an EU member state that does not belong to the Eurozone, being from a country in the Eurozone would lead social democratic parties to adopt more left-wing economic positions, in contradiction with both theoretical expectations and all the empirical evidence presented in this thesis – including with alternative and more complete expert survey data from the V-Party dataset, see Tables A21 and A22 above. This leads us to the second point that must be made: amongst the excluded, non-EU countries are in fact cases such as Switzerland, Norway, Malta, and Iceland, of which some present social democratic parties amongst the most economically left-wing on average (e.g., the average economic left-wing position of Swiss, Norwegian, and Maltese social democrats being, respectively, -35.36, -26.35, and -22.84, against a pooled average value of -21.98). Hence, whilst even these idiosyncratic and problematic replications seem to confirm, overall, the findings of this thesis – both here and in Table A24 below –, it seems reasonable to suggest that, because of all the presented reasons, CHES data is not ideal to test the robustness of this thesis' findings about the impact of *Europeanisation* on social democratic parties' economic left-right positions.

Table A24. Replications of Model 2 by employing various indicators from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) as the dependent variable.

	Model 2 Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1 (1996-2019)		Model 2 CHES' Left-right stance on economic issues (LRECON)		Model 2 CHES' Public expenditure VS taxes reduction (SPENDVTAX)		Model 2 CHES' Deregulation (DEREGULATION)		Model 2 CHES' Redistribution (REDISTRIBUTION)		Model 2 CHES' State intervention in the economy (ECON_INTERVEN)	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)												
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.649	(2.52)	0.136	(0.295)	0.343	(0.352)	0.463	(0.403)	-0.088	(0.221)	0.212	(0.304)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.044	(0.116)	-0.033**	(0.012)	-0.017	(0.02)	-0.058**	(0.02)	-0.041*	(0.017)	-0.006	(0.03)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)												
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (reference in CHES models: EU membership)	5.696	(3.588)										
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	9.428**	(3.66)	-0.261+	(0.157)	0.014	(0.245)	-0.776*	(0.31)	-0.233	(0.203)	0.013	(0.259)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.254+	(0.14)	-0.054***	(0.015)	-0.009	(0.025)	-0.075**	(0.025)	-0.021	(0.019)	-0.076*	(0.031)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)												
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	1.466	(1.835)	0.252	(0.216)	0.913**	(0.282)	1.157***	(0.325)	0.632**	(0.217)	1.306**	(0.45)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)												
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-3.83*	(1.829)	-0.189	(0.148)	-0.343	(0.304)	-0.421	(0.275)	0.037	(0.225)	-0.714	(0.517)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)												

Government status = 1 (In government)	0.322	(1.356)	-0.064	(0.134)	-0.021	(0.185)	0.061	(0.211)	0.072	(0.158)	-0.156	(0.2)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)												
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	3.657*	(1.739)	0.227+	(0.134)	0.042	(0.197)	0.545**	(0.211)	0.238	(0.156)	0.257	(0.265)
Debt (T-1)	0.076*	(0.03)	0.003	(0.003)	0.007+	(0.004)	0.009*	(0.004)	0.002	(0.003)	-0.002	(0.004)
Centre of gravity	0.108	(0.103)	0.015	(0.01)	0.028+	(0.015)	0.036*	(0.015)	0.002	(0.012)	0.037	(0.027)
Government aspiration (logged)	-1.249	(1.658)	0.368*	(0.171)	-0.01	(0.339)	0.391	(0.329)	0.023	(0.206)	-0.119	(0.209)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)												
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.883	(2.851)	0.698*	(0.273)	0.094	(0.45)	0.851+	(0.476)	0.736*	(0.310)	1.164**	(0.419)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.4+	(0.207)	-0.037*	(0.018)	-0.055	(0.038)	-0.141***	(0.04)	-0.056+	(0.03)	-0.101*	(0.041)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.295	(0.248)	-0.017	(0.028)	-0.026	(0.037)	-0.072+	(0.042)	-0.003	(0.034)	-0.114*	(0.049)
Constant	22.46	(21.42)	11.97***	(2.849)	5.336	(3.932)	17.79***	(4.168)	8.516*	(3.387)	13.71***	(4.04)
Wald χ^2	74.39***		101.81***		39.37**		151.78***		55.28***		298.57***	
R^2	0.39		0.479		0.345		0.605		0.446		0.605	
N of observations (party per election)	124		84		61		61		61		31	
N of parties	21		17		17		17		17		16	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. $+p < 0.10$; $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$.

Comment: Regarding the CHES replications of Model 2 in Table A24, the same caveats illustrated in the comment to Table A23 apply. Overall, most statistically significant effects are retained across the CHES models – or even reinforced, such as in the case of the leftwards effect of *Economic globalisation* when the CHES measures of party positions on the economic left-right dimension, deregulation, and state intervention in the economy were employed (with a similar reasoning also applying to the rightwards effect of *Dominant faction* and the leftwards effect of *Unemployment*). *Debt* also retains a statistically significant rightwards effect and, interestingly, it does so specifically with regards to more economically right-wing stances on public spending and taxation and, especially, deregulation. Overall, these results contribute to reinforcing the idea of the findings concerning the illustrated 'external constraints' being the most robust, alongside the lack of significant effects retained for other predictors such as *Competitive RRPs*. Lastly, the aforementioned oddities concerning *Europeanisation* are also confirmed here.

Table A25. Replications of Model 1 by adding in turn each shorter-term determinant.

	(1) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(4) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(5) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)										
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.581	(2.302)	-0.088	(0.299)	-0.565	(2.311)	-0.793	(2.369)	-1.042	(2.22)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.035	(0.079)	-0.007	(0.014)	-0.037	(0.081)	-0.039	(0.08)	-0.034	(0.081)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)										
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	2.26	(2.444)	2.1							
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	7.888**	(2.643)	7.719**	(0.16)	2.446	(2.414)	2.461	(2.371)	-0.584	(2.519)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.354***	(0.084)	-0.358***	(0.017)	8.185**	(2.562)	8.204***	(2.489)	4.377	(2.745)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)										
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	0.627	(1.647)			-0.37***	(0.079)	-0.338***	(0.08)	-0.286***	(0.078)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)										
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-1.254	(1.516)						
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)										
Government status = 1 (In government)					0.711	(1.433)				
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)										

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)							3.057+	(1.595)		
Debt (T-1)									0.068***	(0.02)
Constant	25.9**	(9.075)	24.43**	(9.177)	27.07**	(8.855)	23.32**	(8.667)	19.66*	(9.09)
Wald χ2	30.09***		28.93**		28.36**		29.92***		39.79***	
R²	0.157		0.16		0.158		0.179		0.212	
N of observations (party per election)	159		159		159		158		148	
N of parties	21		21		21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. $+p<0.10$, $*p<0.05$, $**p<0.01$, $***p<0.001$.

Comment: Adding to what was already said with regard to Table A25 in Chapter 7, notice how the only shorter-term independent variables to retain their statistically significant effects when added in turn to the baseline represented by Model 1 are *Debt* (at $p<0.001$) and *Dominant faction* (marginally, at $p<0.1$), whilst this does not apply to *Competitive RRPs*.

Table A26. Replications of Model 1 by removing in turn each shorter-term determinant.

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)								
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)			-0.161	(2.155)	0.756	(1.982)	-2.148	(2.399)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.028	(0.076)			-0.091	(0.073)	-0.154+	(0.087)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)								
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	2.42	(2.389)	2.152	(2.213)			1.76	(2.561)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	8.028**	(2.554)	7.705***	(2.213)			6.547*	(2.644)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.366***	(0.079)	-0.376***	(0.082)	-0.297***	(0.081)		
Constant	25.94***	(7.839)	24.56***	(6.154)	13.5+	(7.566)	12.22	(7.912)
Wald χ2	27.37***		25.89***		13.38**		9.53*	
R²	0.156		0.156		0.062		0.068	
N of observations (party per election)	159		159		159		159	
N of parties	21		21		21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: Adding to what was already said with regard to Table A26 in Chapter 7 in terms of the differentials in explanatory power, the statistically significant effects of *Europeanisation* (EU and Eurozone membership) and *Economic globalisation* of the main specification of Model 1 are confirmed across all these specifications.

Table A27. Replications of Model 2 by including interaction between *Government status* and *GDP*.

	Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)		
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.916	(2.254)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.087	(0.104)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)		
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	2.245	(3.044)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	5.824+	(3.269)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.199+	(0.103)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	0.509	(1.857)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)		
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-5.046**	(1.791)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)		
Government status = 1 (In government)	-0.457	(1.818)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)		
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	3.28+	(1.703)
Debt (T-1)	0.079**	(0.03)
Centre of gravity	0.181+	(0.095)
Government aspiration (logged)	-2.997+	(1.681)

Bailout = 0 (reference: No)		
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.105	(2.87)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.44*	(0.195)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.335	(0.241)
GDP	-0.819+	(0.488)
Government status*GDP	0.403	(0.559)
Constant	10.88	(16.48)
Wald χ2	85.86***	
R²	0.358	
N of observations (party per election)	144	
N of parties	21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Marginal effects plot

Average marginal effects of Government status with 95% CIs

Table A28. Replications of Model 2 by geographical cluster.

	(1) (Continental Europe) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) (Northern Europe) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) (Southern Europe) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	15.11***	(0)	3.887	(0.676)	-4.258	(0.263)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-2.191***	(0)	0.599+	(0.081)	0.467*	(0.018)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	8.991+	(0.062)	-4.629	(0.469)	0.476	(0.938)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	21.66***	(0)	2.587	(0.69)	7.687	(0.304)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.693**	(0.004)	-0.148	(0.759)	-0.602**	(0.001)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	13.94***	(0)	1.637	(0.715)	-0.558	(0.903)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	8.861***	(0.001)	-8.676+	(0.05)	-9.819***	(0)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)						
Government status = 1 (In government)	1.771	(0.36)	-0.688	(0.810)	2.951+	(0.088)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)						
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	3.221	(0.104)	3.907	(0.408)	-3.85	(0.142)
Debt (T-1)	0.079	(0.129)	0.187*	(0.04)	0.096**	(0.003)
Centre of gravity	0.022	(0.894)	0.28+	(0.051)	0.054	(0.699)

Government aspiration (logged)	-6.422	(0.405)	-13.07	(0.295)	0.391	(0.834)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)						
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			-2.244	(0.727)	5.248	(0.127)
Unemployment (T-1)	0.537	(0.371)	-0.542	(0.381)	-0.448*	(0.018)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.118	(0.762)	-0.248	(0.661)	-1.041**	(0.004)
Constant	209.9***	(0)	-53.1	(0.137)	40.15+	(0.055)
Wald χ2	82.06***		24.02+		94.98***	
R²	0.629		0.312		0.601	
N of observations (party per election)	52		51		41	
N of parties	8		7		6	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table A29. Replications of Model 2 by geographical cluster (by exclusion).

	(1) (Non-British Isles)		(2) (Non-Continenal Europe)		(3) (Non-Northern Europe)		(4) (Non-Southern Europe)	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)								
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	3.732	(2.601)	-2.267	(3.132)	0.609	(2.22)	3.463	(3.476)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.162	(0.155)	0.287**	(0.106)	0.083	(0.094)	0.127	(0.145)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)								
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.431	(3.142)	-3.121	(3.112)	7.881*	(3.828)	1.399	(3.806)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	6.092+	(3.53)	1.882	(3.391)	10.23*	(4.178)	4.89	(3.864)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.317*	(0.133)	-0.161	(0.116)	-0.213+	(0.113)	-0.32+	(0.194)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)								
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	1.505	(2.015)	0.914	(2.693)	2.472	(2.009)	3.649	(2.68)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)								
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-4.419*	(1.907)	-7.416**	(2.386)	-2.045	(2.061)	-4.42+	(2.282)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)								
Government status = 1 (In government)	-0.059	(1.479)	0.896	(1.666)	1.377	(1.375)	0.822	(1.814)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)								
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	2.783	(1.827)	0.418	(2.527)	2.766+	(1.655)	4.099*	(2.054)

Debt (T-1)	0.089**	(0.029)	0.091**	(0.032)	0.072**	(0.027)	0.156***	(0.044)
Centre of gravity	0.176	(0.109)	0.224*	(0.105)	0.112	(0.113)	0.249*	(0.12)
Government aspiration (logged)	-2.031	(1.809)	-2.281	(1.771)	-2.308	(1.592)	-2.503	(5.449)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)								
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	3.055	(3.083)	2.246	(3.113)	4.432	(2.745)	4.755	(6.243)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.39+	(0.213)	-0.252	(0.217)	-0.417*	(0.192)	-0.744+	(0.419)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.566*	(0.265)	-0.611*	(0.306)	-0.275	(0.253)	0.177	(0.343)
Constant	15.51	(17.53)	5.449	(17.73)	1.948	(18.1)	-6.592	(25.18)
Wald χ2	84.74***		76.96***		73.01***		33.17**	
R^2	0.375		0.394		0.424		0.271	
N of observations (party per election)	130		92		107		103	
N of parties	19		13		16		15	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

	(1) (1990s) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) (2000s) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) (2010s) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	4.25	(3.745)	3.822	(3.125)	-2.765	(5.091)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.37**	(0.143)	0.222	(0.203)	-0.212	(0.241)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	-7.513	(4.784)	3.591	(6.153)	9.213	(6.36)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)			5.725	(5.658)	14.32*	(5.87)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.077	(0.129)	-0.236	(0.268)	-0.444	(0.283)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	-1.162	(3.118)	-3.015	(2.234)	9.268**	(3.341)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-4.735	(3.889)	-4.025	(2.99)	-7.283*	(3.043)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)						
Government status = 1 (In government)	-1.375	(3.442)	-0.645	(2.371)	1.057	(2.264)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)						
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	-1.997	(3.215)	4.553	(3.09)	4.261	(2.749)
Debt (T-1)	0.091	(0.062)	0.013	(0.059)	0.157***	(0.043)
Centre of gravity	0.048	(0.176)	0.314*	(0.125)	0.051	(0.222)

Government aspiration (logged)	-4.135	(3.008)	-4.52+	(2.556)	3.821	(2.864)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)						
Bailout = 1 (Yes)					1.443	(3.213)
Unemployment (T-1)	0.386	(0.282)	-0.545	(0.401)	-1.131***	(0.264)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.06	(0.446)	-0.041	(0.391)	-0.394	(0.48)
Constant	-31.2	(19.57)	-11.62	(42.57)	56.68	(40.52)
Wald $\chi 2$	26.35*		41.09**		75.45***	
R^2	0.389		0.415		0.568	
N of observations (party per election)	39		51		54	
N of parties	20		20		20	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +$p<0.10$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$.

Table A31. Replications of Model 2 by 'Varieties of capitalism' group (by exclusion).

	(1) (Non-CMEs) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) (Non-LMEs) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) (Non-Mixed) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(4) (Non-SMEs) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)								
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	1.029	(2.636)	4.48+	(2.471)	1.626	(2.178)	-5.136	(3.775)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.226+	(0.126)	0.036	(0.175)	0.279**	(0.099)	0.023	(0.13)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)								
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	6.093+	(3.581)	1.324	(3.177)	-6.2	(3.916)	-0.026	(3.812)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	6.633+	(3.813)	5.372	(3.553)	-3.138	(4.5)	6.823+	(3.987)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.181	(0.131)	-0.186	(0.145)	-0.107	(0.112)	-0.228	(0.194)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)								
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	3.95	(3.453)	2.026	(2.055)	1.104	(1.985)	5.182+	(2.656)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)								
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-5.11*	(2.603)	-4.321*	(1.935)	-4.568*	(2.058)	-4.909*	(2.366)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)								
Government status = 1 (In government)	-0.413	(1.655)	-0.308	(1.493)	1.183	(1.38)	-0.007	(1.79)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)								
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	3.254	(2.213)	2.779	(1.804)	1.052	(1.713)	4.6*	(2.063)
Debt (T-1)	0.079*	(0.035)	0.096**	(0.029)	0.085**	(0.028)	0.134**	(0.043)

Centre of gravity	0.184	(0.13)	0.195+	(0.111)	0.143	(0.093)	0.219+	(0.121)
Government aspiration (logged)	-3.183+	(1.839)	-4.175*	(1.999)	-3.822*	(1.697)	2.178	(3.583)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)							
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	6.078+	(3.166)	3.553	(3.069)	2.08	(2.719)	-0.335	(5.778)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.425*	(0.213)	-0.333	(0.217)	-0.172	(0.194)	-0.654	(0.413)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.405	(0.366)	-0.387	(0.274)	-0.141	(0.256)	-0.205	(0.307)
Constant	-8.161	(23.45)	8.097	(17.72)	-17.69	(17.46)	18.59	(24.4)
Wald $\chi2$	68.97***		93.45***		64.52***		38.63**	
R²	0.476		0.394		0.315		0.3	
N of observations (party per election)	82		126		122		102	
N of parties	11		18		18		16	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table A32. Replications of Model 2 by size of industrial workforce.

	(1) (Small industrial workforce) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) (Medium industrial workforce) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) (Large industrial workforce) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-3.328	(7.083)	2.988	(6.307)	4.976*	(2.457)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.005	(0.248)	0.141	(0.371)	0.276***	(0.083)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	3.783	(5.288)	-0.102	(6.438)	-9.613**	(3.151)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	7.018	(4.812)	1.883	(9.145)	-8.604*	(3.994)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.045	(0.364)	-0.134	(0.37)	0.171	(0.111)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	2.867	(4.535)	5.05	(4.603)	-3.082	(2.073)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)						
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-5.576*	(2.586)	-6.723	(4.644)	1.124	(2.159)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)						
Government status = 1 (In government)	0.743	(2.228)	-3.424	(3.1)	1.634	(1.615)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)						
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	6.406*	(3.253)	5.168	(4.093)	1.693	(1.904)
Debt (T-1)	0.165***	(0.049)	0.047	(0.091)	-0.054	(0.034)
Centre of gravity	-0.114	(0.196)	0.617***	(0.186)	0.018	(0.115)

Government aspiration (logged)	-2.541	(5.6)	1.684	(3.793)	-12.57***	(2.178)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)					
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	0.076	(5.905)	8.747	(6.962)		
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.612	(0.416)	0.005	(0.712)	0.719***	(0.212)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.615	(0.424)	-0.334	(0.679)	1.09***	(0.31)
Constant	9.832	(44.02)	1.399	(36.61)	-87.39***	(18.09)
Wald χ2	84.43***		57.63***		82.73***	
R²	0.583		0.438		0.568	
N of observations (party per election)	47		44		53	
N of parties	15		17		16	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table A33. Replications of Model 2 by type of welfare state (by exclusion).

	(1) (Non-Conservative)		(2) (Non-Liberal)		(3) (Non-Socialist/ Social Democratic)		(4) (Non-Southern)	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)								
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-7.746*	(3.852)	4.45+	(2.53)	1.529	(2.112)	0.942	(3.888)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.12	(0.122)	0.009	(0.416)	0.104	(0.113)	-0.098	(0.221)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)								
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	0.454	(3.426)	-3.751	(3.842)	6.99	(4.833)	1.505	(4.121)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	6.425+	(3.631)	0.644	(4.503)	8.194+	(4.741)	7.087+	(4.004)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.247+	(0.13)	-0.124	(0.19)	-0.172	(0.132)	-0.463+	(0.258)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)								
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)	8.146*	(3.91)	1.682	(2.334)	1.894	(2.489)	7.334*	(3.341)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)								
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)	-6.291**	(2.408)	-4.36*	(2.183)	-2.317	(2.377)	-4.015	(2.702)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)								
Government status = 1 (In government)	-0.865	(1.772)	-0.238	(1.577)	1.449	(1.479)	-1.183	(1.968)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)								
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)	2.942	(2.189)	1.254	(1.919)	2.852	(1.759)	4.617*	(2.211)

Debt (T-1)	0.094**	(0.035)	0.086**	(0.033)	0.079*	(0.032)	0.165**	(0.059)
Centre of gravity	0.216	(0.134)	0.127	(0.128)	0.129	(0.119)	0.27+	(0.154)
Government aspiration (logged)	-1.95	(2.026)	-4.661*	(2.346)	-4.156*	(1.698)	5.304	(8.005)
Bailout = 0 (reference: No)								
Bailout = 1 (Yes)	4.43	(3.237)	3.148	(3.116)	5.338+	(2.758)	5.501	(7.116)
Unemployment (T-1)	-0.478*	(0.213)	-0.226	(0.221)	-0.347	(0.214)	-0.853+	(0.481)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)	-0.579+	(0.298)	-0.236	(0.295)	0.0329	(0.333)	0.369	(0.377)
Constant	21.59	(24.91)	6.229	(31.26)	-15.53	(24.04)	25.1	(38.77)
Wald χ2	90.35***		60.29***		66.95***		31.82**	
R²	0.482		0.344		0.457		0.296	
N of observations (party per election)	93		105		90		90	
N of parties	12		14		12		13	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table A34. Replications of Model 1 by geographical cluster.

	(1) (Continental Europe) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) (Northern Europe) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) (Southern Europe) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	8.628**	(2.696)	-6.111	(4.094)	-7.29+	(3.955)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.473*	(0.212)	-0.067	(0.114)	0.207	(0.152)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	9.177*	(3.838)	-6.099	(4.129)	0.722	(5.018)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	16***	(4.413)	-0.8	(4.957)	6.264	(5.926)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.617**	(0.195)	-0.018	(0.231)	-0.282+	(0.161)
Constant	73.7**	(23.66)	13.83	(15.4)	7.683	(14.4)
Wald $\chi 2$	22.61*		4.48		29.05***	
R²	0.338		0.098		0.327	
N of observations (party per election)	59		55		45	
N of parties	8		7		6	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. $+p<0.10$, $*p<0.05$, $**p<0.01$, $***p<0.001$.

Comment: Tables A34-A39 replicate the analyses related to Model 2 of Tables A28-A33, which were already commented on in Chapter 7, for Model 1. In Table A34, notice how, albeit the results of the main specification are substantively confirmed, the pooled significant effects of *Europeanisation* (rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* are mainly driven by Continental Europe. No significant effects are found in the Northern European model, whilst the negative effect of *Economic globalisation* is only marginally significant (at p<0.1) in the Southern European model.

Table A35. Replications of Model 1 by geographical cluster (by exclusion).

	(1) (Non-British Isles)		(2) (Non-Continenal Europe)		(3) (Non-Northern Europe)		(4) (Non-Southern Europe)	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)								
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	2.454	(2.511)	-5.235+	(2.956)	0.475	(2.187)	0.85	(2.767)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.022	(0.107)	0.085	(0.083)	-0.053	(0.083)	-0.134	(0.094)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)								
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.78	(2.579)	-2.81	(2.494)	7.541*	(3.362)	3.222	(3.097)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	7.914**	(2.798)	5.241*	(2.545)	12**	(3.685)	7.614*	(3.301)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.448***	(0.091)	-0.326***	(0.094)	-0.306***	(0.079)	-0.363*	(0.153)
Constant	25.29**	(9.132)	21.24*	(10.2)	19.42*	(9.237)	34.38**	(12.31)
Wald $\chi 2$	31.89***		24.02**		22.69**		10+	
R²	0.185		0.2		0.222		0.096	
N of observations (party per election)	145		100		118		114	
N of parties	19		13		16		15	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: in this replication, the results of the main specification of Model 1 related to the significant effects of *Europeanisation* (rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) are fully confirmed across the board.

Table A36. Replications of Model 1 by decade.

	(1) (1990s) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) (2000s) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) (2010s) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	Pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.001	(4.326)	-0.333	(3.43)	-1.667	(4.665)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.153	(0.104)	-0.121	(0.092)	-0.495*	(0.204)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	-2.93	(2.791)	4.478	(3.546)	12.34+	(6.941)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)			7.786***	(2.089)	18.78***	(5.155)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.235*	(0.099)	-0.382***	(0.11)	-0.685***	(0.208)
Constant	5.968	(9.573)	35.41**	(13.62)	88.01**	(27.5)
Wald χ2	6.93		21.14**		22.75**	
R²	0.096		0.182		0.389	
N of observations (party per election)	54		51		54	
N of parties	21		20		20	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: in this replication, the results of the main specification of Model 1 related to the significant effects of *Europeanisation* (rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) are fully confirmed across the board. Notice how *Europeanisation* only becomes significant in the 2000s, once Eurozone membership is also factored in. Further, marginal statistical significance (at p<0.1) is also reached by EU membership in the 2010s. Additionally, also notice the temporal increase in statistical significance of the effect of *Economic globalisation* between the 1990s (p<0.05) and the 2000s and 2010s (p<0.001).

Table A37. Replications of Model 1 by 'Varieties of capitalism' group (by exclusion).

	(1) (Non-CMEs) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(2) (Non-LMEs) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(3) (Non-Mixed) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		(4) (Non-SMEs) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)								
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	0.227	(2.555)	2.553	(2.492)	0.687	(2.27)	-3.279	(3.412)
Political globalisation (T-1)	0.008	(0.097)	0.031	(0.113)	0.108	(0.088)	-0.083	(0.086)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)								
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	7.07*	(3.059)	1.398	(2.673)	-3.493	(2.867)	3.272	(3.051)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	12.0***	(2.892)	7.557**	(2.897)	0.605	(3.256)	9.17**	(3.297)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.297**	(0.097)	-0.467***	(0.094)	-0.279***	(0.079)	-0.411**	(0.151)
Constant	12.94	(12.8)	26.14**	(9.5)	12.89	(9.094)	36.9**	(12.16)
Wald χ2	28.94***		32.58***		17.34**		12.19*	
R²	0.301		0.19		0.108		0.111	
N of observations (party per election)	87		140		135		115	
N of parties	11		18		18		16	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: the results of the main specification of Model 1 related to the significant effects of *Europeanisation* (rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) are substantively confirmed.

Table A38. Replications of Model 1 by size of industrial workforce.

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	(Small industrial workforce) Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		**(Medium industrial workforce)** Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		**(Large industrial workforce)** Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	Pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)						
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-3.891	(5.464)	1.402	(3.904)	0.346	(3.153)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.307*	(0.156)	0.188	(0.317)	0.091	(0.078)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)						
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	6.123	(4.7)	4.31	(6.141)	-3.026	(2.596)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	15.2***	(2.741)	5.238	(6.77)	1.231	(3.021)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.587**	(0.188)	-0.509**	(0.192)	-0.272**	(0.096)
Constant	69.08**	(21.32)	15.27	(22.35)	13.58+	(8.249)
Wald χ2	33.8***		8.49		14.3*	
R²	0.392		0.103		0.16	
N of observations (party per election)	47		46		66	
N of parties	15		17		18	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: the results of the main specification of Model 1 related to the significant effects of *Europeanisation* (rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) are substantively confirmed. Two interesting aspects should be noticed in these replications. First, across the board the leftwards effect of *Economic globalisation* is significant at p<0.01 and, hence, at a lower level compared to the main model (p<0.001). Second, it is interesting to note how the rightwards effect of the *Europeanisation* (EU and Eurozone membership) 'external constraint' is only significant in contexts where the size of the industrial workforce is small, whilst it does not seem to make a difference where the industrial workforce is larger.

Table A39. Replications of Model 1 by type of welfare state (by exclusion).

	(1) (Non-Conservative)		(2) (Non-Liberal)		(3) (Non-Socialist/ Social Democratic)		(4) (Non-Southern)	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)								
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-5.922+	(3.058)	2.519	(2.631)	-0.289	(2.293)	0.755	(2.826)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.051	(0.107)	0.127	(0.166)	-0.102	(0.099)	-0.197+	(0.111)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)								
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	1.728	(3.348)	-3.451	(2.948)	6.539	(4.144)	3.584	(3.259)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	11.1***	(3.011)	2.116	(3.11)	11.26**	(4.113)	8.58*	(3.481)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.351***	(0.095)	-0.397***	(0.11)	-0.327***	(0.092)	-0.384*	(0.19)
Constant	31.63*	(14.19)	16.99	(13.63)	26.77*	(13.05)	41.65*	(17.69)
Wald $\chi 2$	30.21***		18.02**		19.27**		8.84	
R²	0.251		0.147		0.232		0.1	
N of observations (party per election)	100		116		98		100	
N of parties	12		14		12		13	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. $+p<0.10$, $*p<0.05$, $**p<0.01$, $***p<0.001$.

Comment: the results of the main specification of Model 1 related to the significant effects of *Europeanisation* (rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) are substantively confirmed.

Table A40. Replication of main models with lagged dependent variable.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1		Individual economic left-right deviation from party family mean at election T-1	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Majoritarian = 0 (reference: PR system)				
Majoritarian = 1 (Majoritarian system)	-0.05	(2.317)	0.294	(2.383)
Political globalisation (T-1)	-0.034	(0.088)	0.142	(0.098)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 0 (reference: no EU or Eurozone membership)				
Europeanisation (T-1) = 1 (EU membership)	4.055	(2.779)	0.793	(3.164)
Europeanisation (T-1) = 2 (EU and Eurozone membership)	9.541***	(2.729)	4.41	(3.369)
Economic globalisation (T-1)	-0.407***	(0.09)	-0.18	(0.113)
Competitive RLPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RLPs = 1 (Present)			1.557	(1.897)
Competitive RRPs = 0 (reference: Absent)				
Competitive RRPs = 1 (Present)			-5.007*	(1.817)
Government status = 0 (reference: In opposition)				
Government status = 1 (In government)			-0.152	(1.381)
Dominant faction = 0 (reference: Leftist)				
Dominant faction = 1 (Centrist)			2.861+	(1.679)
Debt (T-1)			0.103***	(0.028)
Centre of gravity			0.184	(0.096)
Government aspiration (logged)			-1.927	(1.781)

Bailout = 0 (reference: No)				
Bailout = 1 (Yes)			3.974	(2.852)
Unemployment (T-1)			-0.425*	(0.196)
Income inequality (rescaled) (T-1)			-0.389	(0.243)
Size of industrial workforce (T-1)	-0.019	(0.146)	0.124	(0.164)
Constant	28.8*	(11.77)	2.288	(17.34)
Wald χ2	32.32***		84.24***	
R²	0.182		0.350	
N of observations (party per election)	148		144	
N of parties	21		21	

Note: OLS regressions; panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are reported. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Comment: with the inclusion of the additional *Size of industrial workforce* control (lagged at year T-1), the size of the effects of both *Europeanisation* (*Eurozone membership*, rightwards) and *Economic globalisation* (leftwards) and the statistical significance of the former are reinforced in the replication of Model 1. In the replication of Model 2, all the statistically significant effects of shorter-term independent variables and controls in the main model are confirmed (at least marginally at p<0.1, in the case of *Centre of gravity*) and maintained the same direction, with the rightwards effect of *Debt* not also retained in terms of statistical significance (at p<0.001), but now also stronger in size. *Size of industrial workforce*, instead, is never statistically significant.

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