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# THE REGIME OF THE COLONELS IN GREECE (1967-1974) BETWEEN THE EEC AND NATO

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# Introduction

From the 21st of April, 1967, to the 24th of August, 1974, Greece was ruled by a military regime which became known as the Regime of the Colonels (or the Greek Junta). However, the leaders referred to their regime as Revolution of the 21 April. During those seven years, Greece was ruled by force, almost entirely under martial law, with arbitrary imprisonment and tortures, and with political purges involving the entire political spectrum, not only the Left. Despite the revolutionary claims of its leaders, the military regime always lacked an original ideology, political and development programmes, and an appropriate economic strategy to sustain the growth started in the 1960s.

At the time, two other countries in Western Europe, Spain and Portugal, were also led by authoritarian regimes. However, the Greek case was unique because of the country's specific international connections. At that time, Greece was securing its position among Western countries, mainly through its relations both with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1952, Athens became a full member of the Atlantic Organization and its military contingent and, in 1961, it signed an association Treaty (the Treaty of Athens) with the EEC. While also Portugal was a member of the Atlantic Alliance, dealing with a military regime within its associates was a total new for the EEC. Additionally, since 1949 Greece was a member of the Council of Europe, an organization aimed at defending basic civil and human wights throughout its member states, based on the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The authoritarian turn of 1967 had a significant impact in the West, both at governmental and public opinion level. In many countries, national governments were pressured to act against the Junta (individually or collectively, if they were part of regional or international organizations) by citizens, non-governmental organizations, Greek intellectuals or prominent figures exiled abroad after the coup, and also from some political parties. Some of the Western countries, such as the US and Great Britain, were also home to large communities of Greek expatriates. As voters in these countries, their voices should have been heard. However, most of the Western countries had also commercial, economic, and military interests in Greece which prevented from completely cutting relations with Athens. In fact, national governments often behaved differently towards Greece depending on the bilateral or international level (i.e. whether

the same country acted within the EEC, the Council of Europe, and NATO, or within a bilateral framework).

This work aims at analyse and compare the attitudes of NATO and the EEC, as international bodies to which Greece was linked, towards the Junta in its seven years ruling the country. At the time these two international bodies had direct, yet very different relations with Greece. As illustrated in the first chapter, the Treaty of Athens predominantly addressed economic concerns but also provided for future membership once Greece had bridged the economic gap with the other member countries. Many of the EEC members had also a seat at NATO, therefore they shared strategic interests towards Greece with their Atlantic Allies. Conversely, the North Atlantic Treaty focused mainly on defence, and on strategies to implement Allies' military capability. In this respect, Greece was of a geo-strategic importance, being close to the Middle East (where the Arab-Israeli conflict was worsening and reached two peaks during the military rule in Greece, in 1967 and 1973), and to the Balkans (bordering with three communist countries: Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria). Furthermore, Greece was also considered important, especially by NATO, because of its difficult relations with Turkey, another important member of the Alliance. These difficulties dated back to Greek independence from the Ottoman rule, continuing through the conflict in Asia Minor (1922), to the never ended dispute around Cyprus. As discussed in the next chapters, the increasing presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean during the 1970s would make it even more necessary that Greece and Turkey remained reliable elements within the Atlantic Alliance, and that a conflict between the two was avoided. This was also a special interests of some specific NATO members such as the Americans and the British (that joined also the EEC during the 1970s), who still had two military bases on the island of Cyprus.

The difference existing in the nature of relations that Greece had with those two organizations, NATO and the European Community, is what makes the comparison interesting. Did the fact that the membership to NATO implied a role in an international defence system contributed to shape the Allies' attitude towards the Regime of the Colonels? Specifically, how important were the Southern Flank and the Mediterranean region to the Allies? Naturally, the answer depends on the country in question. As discussed in the next paragraphs, the countries who contested Greece's membership the most (Scandinavian countries, and then the Netherlands) were also those who had the fewest interests in the region. Conversely, the United States and Great Britain, who

worked hard to prevent the issue of Greece to be brought up on the NATO agenda, where the countries more deeply linked with Greece. The background of Cold War, the increasing presence of the Soviet in the Mediterranean, the Czechoslovakian crisis, the worsening of the Israelo-Palestinian conflict, and the first *détente* attempts, were all elements taken into account when considering the Greek case from the NATO perspective. The aim of this work was to investigate if, and how, all these factors influenced the Allies in their attitude towards the military regime. And, following possible disagreements among the Allies, which attitude prevailed. In fact, when analysing the behave of NATO institutions it is necessary to consider the "asymmetrical" relation existing between the Allies, and the strong role of the United States both within NATO and as a partner of Greece. In fact, after 1947, the US had succeeded Great Britain as a "protector" of Greece, being its principal economic and military supporter. Washington considered Greece an essential element within the Mediterranean region, and therefore used its influence on the other Allies in favour of Greece many times, especially after the change of administration from Johnson to Nixon. However, starting from the 1970s, Greece started showing sign of anti-American feelings. Was this noticed by the American officers? And if so, had this any consequences on the behaviour of the United States representatives at NATO institutions?

Conversely, on the European side, did the prospect of Greek full membership (which was envisaged by the Treaty of Athens, and therefore implied also a political tie between the organization and Greece) to the EEC put the Six in the condition to express and take decisions concerning association based on Greek domestic affairs? While the text of the Treaty of Athens did not include any explicit mention of democracy or human rights as requirements for association, the *coup* of 1967 put the Six in a very difficult situation. In the aftermath of the coup, the European Parliament took a stance against the acting of the military in Greece, by suspending any further development of the Association Agreement. This was confirmed by the Commission. Therefore, during the entire period of military rule, the collaboration between the EEC institutions and Greece was relegated to "current issues". However, the severe attitude chosen collectively by the Six within the EEC institution did not always reflected the attitude of the singular national governments towards the military regime. The same could be said for the Council of Europe, the most active body in the fight against the Greek dictatorship, led by the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. This work aimed at investigating if, and how, the Council of Europe did influence the EEC institutions. Interestingly enough, it

will emerge that some countries (in some cases even some persons, like Joseph Luns) of these institutions would behave differently depending on in which institution they were acting, NATO, the EEC, or the Council of Europe.

Finally, the troubled relation between Turkey and Greece will be taken into account, especially concerning Cyprus. Turkey became an associated country to the EEC after Greece, and was a full member of NATO. To which degree the need to avoid a conflict between the two of them did influence the acting of the European and the Atlantic institutions?

These are all the questions this work originally aimed at answering to. However, during the first stages of the research, another question emerged: did, considering all the elements already mentioning, NATO and the EEC as international actors influence each other in their behaviour towards the Junta? As we will see, the answer could be a partial yes. There are many documents in which members of the European Parliament affirmed their will not appear as tolerant as the United States and, conversely, many representatives at NATO, and the two Secretary Generals at the time (Manlio Brosio and Joseph Luns) expressed the concern that what was happening in Europe, especially at the Council of Europe, could weaken Greece's position within the Atlantic Alliance.

Since the two organizations acted differently towards Greece in those years, and also followed different timetables according to their goals, it would be impossible to choose a periodization based on the EEC or on NATO. Furthermore, in the same years, both NATO and the EEC were dealing with other international changes that might have influenced their attitude towards Greece. We already mentioned the Arabo-Israeli conflict, the increasing of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, the Czech crisis, and détente for NATO, but we should also consider the first enlargement of the European Economic Community in 1971, and the attempt to initiate a political cooperation between the EEC members starting from 1969. Therefore, I decided to choose a timetable based on Greece. I divided the seven-year period of the Regime into four phases, according to significant changes occurring within the Hellenic Regime and, more important, to their repercussions on foreign relations.

The first period goes from the coup on the 21st of April, 1967, to the failure of a royal countercoup on the 13th of December of the same year; those first six months were significant because, until the attempt of the King, both NATO and the EEC considered the regime as a temporary phenomenon, and reversable. The second period covers the biennium 1968-1969, the most difficult years for the military Junta, which found itself

internationally isolated, except for the USA. Those years culminated in Greece abandoning the Council of Europe in December 1969, in order to avoid expulsion (which otherwise would have been certain). The third period, from the beginning of 1970 to the end of 1972, is characterized by a remarkable degree of internal stability (supported by some very modest signs of liberalization), while also witnessing the leader of the Junta, Georgios Papadopoulos, consolidating power in his own hands. The last period was firstly characterized by a series of manifestations against the Junta that led to the abolition of the monarchy, proclamation of the Republic, formation of a new government, and then to a countercoup in November 1973 (instigated by the Chief of the Military Police, Dimitrios Ioannidis); the second part of this period saw worsening relations with Turkey which culminated in an attempt to oust Cyprus' president Makarios, and in the fall of the Greek Junta in July 1974.

### *Literature and Secondary Sources*

While the preliminary stages of my research are based on existing literature on the topic, the bulk of my work draws from documents from the Archive of the European Union (Fiesole, Italy), the NATO Archives (Brussels, Belgium). I also consulted the Archives of the United States' Foreign Office (FRUS, online Archives), and the French Diplomatic Archives (Nantes, France). Because my research considers the points of view of NATO and the EEC, I did not include documents from the Greek National Archives. However, integrating documents from the Greek Archives would be an interesting future study.

Before analysing in details which documents I used from the Archives mentioned, I will proceed with a short overview of the existing literature on the topic. Given the comparative nature between the EEC and NATO, my research embraces many topics: contemporary Greek history, European Integration, history of NATO and of the Cold War. There are many excellent works covering each one of these themes, and others linking some of them (Greece and the EEC, the importance of Greece during the Cold War, Greece in its relations with NATO, Greece in its bilateral relations with specific national governments, the EEC's role during the Cyprus issue, the US' role during the Cyprus crisis, just to make some examples). All of them were very useful, as this work aimed to offer a wide comparative perspective, which covered two international bodies such as NATO and the EEC in their relation with Greece. And, of course, all the specific

topics that I mentioned contributed to shape the attitudes of the European Community and Atlantic Alliance.

Richard Clogg's *Concise History of Greece* (2003) was the starting point, later integrated by some classic books on the history of the dictatorship in Greece as Woodhouses' *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (1985), and *Modern Greece: a Short History* (1991), Tsoukalas' *The Greek Tragedy* (1969), which was particularly interesting because was written during the regime, the "Athenian"s *Inside the Colonels' Greece* (1972), and some more recent works as Bloudanis' *Histoire de la Grèce Moderne* (2013), and Close's *Greece since 1945. Politics, Economy, and Society* (2014). These works are important to understand the context in which Greece interacted with the EEC and NATO and vice-versa. They were also very useful to understand the differences between what was really happening in Greece and how these events were perceived by members of the EEC and NATO (or how they portrayed their understanding, given that from the end of the 1960s many documents on tortures and abuses circulated in the Western organizations).

Particularly useful were also the researches concerning the relations between national governments and the Regime of the Colonels, like Maragkou's *Britain*, *Greece and the Colonels* (2019), and Nafptliotis' *Britain and the Greek Colonels* (2020) with regard to the Great Britain, Paolo Soave's *La democrazia allo specchio* (2014) for Italy, Sakkas' *The Greek Dictatorship, the USA, and the Arabs,* and Theophylactou's *American Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Turkey, Greece and Cyprus* (2011). All of them analyse the way that the main Western national governments were facing with the Greek dictatorship (diplomatic recognition, commercial and trade links, security considerations). This perspective is essential to better understand the behaviour of those nations in their bilateral relation with Greece and within the international organizations. In fact, many times the bilateral level would differ from the collective one, and the collective one would differ depending on which international body we consider (NATO, the EEC, but also the Council of Europe).

Concerning NATO, Effie Pedaliu's works on Greece and the North Atlantic Organization were the main references (A discordant note: NATO and the Greek Junta; A Sea of Confusion: the Mediterranean and Détente; Human Rights and International Security: the international community and the Greek Dictators, are some examples). All these works point out how the Atlantic Alliance chose to privilege strategic and military consideration over moral ones when dealing with the Greek dictators, during a time when

there was a shared perception that the Mediterranean region could be source of troubles because of the increasing Soviet presence and the instability derived from the Israeli-Arab conflict. This was confirmed by the documents I consulted, which also highlighted a lack of unanimity within NATO bodies concerning Greece. In fact, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands (and later on also Canada) repeatedly tried to question Greece's membership, but they encountered the opposition of the United States and Great Britain. Particularly relevant was also the work by Chourchoulis and Kourkouvelas (*Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War*; 2012) which provided a "counter-part" to the documents I studied by adopting the Greek perspective on NATO. According to the literature, and to the documents I viewed, the Greek Colonels were much more confident in their relations with NATO than with the European Institutions. This was due to the fact that, within NATO, the Colonels had at least two big partners willing to meditate in favour of a "stable Greece" (the US, and Great Britain), and because of the awareness of their geo-strategic importance for defence's purposes.

Finally, the literature on the relations between Greece and the EEC was taken into account, starting from Phinnemore's work on the nature and changes over time of the association agreements (1999), to the studies on the influence that the EEC had on Greek politics during the regime (Coufoudakis, 1977; Soriano, 2017; Tskaloyannis and Verney; 1986). All these works highlighted how the Junta, despite its dismissing attitude towards the EEC, suffered from the isolation derived from the freezing of further development of the association agreement, and repeatedly tried to have it reactivated. The relations of Greece with the EEC were also influenced by the acting of the Council of Europe, the most severe institution with the Greek regime.

As previously mentioned, this work aimed to provide a broaden international perspective on the relations existing between NATO and the EEC during the seven years of dictatorship, and at point out if and how these two international bodies had a reciprocal influence. Karamouzi's *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974-1979* offers a perspective as wide as this work aimed at. However, she covered the following period to the one I studied, the so called "transition" to democracy, before the official entrance of Greece to the EEC. Keeping this reference as a model, I addressed the gap existing on period of the Colonels.

All these specific works on Greece, in addition to a number of more broaden books on the history of European Integration, Cold War, and international relations during the 1960s and 1970s, offer the framework of the research question: did the EEC and NATO

influence each other in their behaviours with the Greek Junta? As argued in the following chapters, it was at least partially so, as any time that the EEC or the Council of Europe took a severe stance against the Greek dictatorship, there was a discussion within NATO on whether this could weaken Greece's position within the Alliance. Conversely, despite there was no unanimity within the EEC bodies on the Greek issue, on different occasion members of the European Parliament and Commission stated that it was necessary not to give the impression to as tolerant as the US or NATO towards a military dictatorship such as the Greek one.

## Primary Sources

As previously mentioned, the main source of this work were the documents I consulted at the NATO Archives in Brussels, and at the HAUE archives in Florence.

In Brussels, I read the entire amount of verbatim records of the North Atlantic Council, Military Council, and Defence Committee's meeting available for the period of 1967 to 1974, involving directly or indirectly Greece. Among these documents, there were also working papers concerning the amount of aids to Greece, officially associated with those of Turkey (as they were the two South-Eastern countries of the Alliance). As further discussed in the following chapters, the internal situation of Greece was never put on the official agenda of this meeting. However, it must also be noted that very often there was a part of the meetings, "discussion on political issues", which was not registered (or disclosed at the public). In addition, some secondary sources, such as the memoirs of NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio and of the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, were used to get to understand the informal discussions taking place in the occasion of the official meetings. They also showed how some topics, such as the Greek dictatorship, created internal disagreement within the member states. At the NATO archives, I also consulted the documents from the collection of the Private Office of the Secretary General, mostly concerning organization of the events, and those from the International Military Staff Working Memorandum, wehre technical documents were collected.

Because of the American strong position within the Alliance, and its close relations with Greece, I also viewed the documentation from the Archives of the US Foreign Office (FRUS). These were used to trace the links between US attitude towards Greek government and its "Atlantic" strategy, while also (as the memoirs previously

mentioned) to "fill the gaps" left by the non-disclosed NATO documents. FRUS documents are grouped according to the administrations, and then with a geographic criterion. Therefore, I looked at the documents contained in volume XVI (1964–1968, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey), volume XXIX (1969-1976, Eastern Europe; 1969-1972, Eastern Mediterranean), and volume XXX (1973-1976, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey). Each volumes contain different kinds of documents, such as the correspondence between the White House and the US ambassadors in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, the record of the letters and conversations of the US President, and reports of the CIA, just to mention some.

Concerning the European Union Archives, the main source I used was the PEO fonds (European Parliament before direct election). This contain every record of discussion concerning Greece at the EP level from 1967 to 1974. I decided to privilege this fonds because it also contains the record of the meeting of the Joint (or Mixed) Parliamentary Association Commission, which was an organ created in order to promote the implementation of the association Agreement. Equally composed by members of the Greek Parliament, and European Parliament members, I discovered that it was the most active organization against the Greek regime within the EEC institutions. Because of the immediate dismission of the Greek Parliament after the coup in 1967, the Joint Commission was *de facto* prevented from its functioning. What emerges from the records of the Commission's meeting is that its members were willing to take further action against the regime, besides the "freezing" of any development of the association process. In fact, this would emerge also in the record of the plenary discussion of the EP. What is particularly interesting about the Mixed Association meetings is that the "human" element emerges, given the fact that there was no certain knowledge about what happened to the Greek members after the coup. It is not uncommon, in fact, that entire meetings were dedicated to the attempt to collect information about specific personalities.

The PEO fonds also contains records of meeting in which representatives of the Commission of the EEC joined the Mixed Commission, as long as all the records of the European Parliament meetings. This fund alone would give a quite broaden picture of the interaction between the EEC institutions on the Greek case. However, when necessary, I also integrated documents from the Commission of the EEC Archives (**CEUE)**, and at the Council of Ministers (CM2). In some specific cases the documentations of the European Bank of Investments (BEI) was also useful, as the

association agreement provided for a series of loans aimed at developing Greece's infrastructures. The documents consulted from these funds are all listed in the References section, at the end of this work.

The personal fonds dedicated to Edoardo Martino's papers (EM) should be mentioned. Martino had been member of the EEC Commission and, from 1967 to 1970, he was Commissioner for External Relations of the EEC (during the Rey Commission). He was particularly active in the Greek case, as a promotor of the resolution by which the EEC decided to interrupt the implementation of further initiative linked with association. He collected not only the records of every official meeting he participated in which had Greece as an item of discussion, but also personal letters from the Greek representatives at the EEC institutions, articles from news-papers from all over Western Europe, reports by international or national organizations about the situation in Greece.

Minutes of the resolutions on Greece by the Assembly of the Council of Europe (and their repercussion on the EEC institutions) were also taken into account (the specific documents are listed in the bibliography).

Finally, documents from the French Diplomatic Archives (Nantes, France), were sourced to investigate the orientations of European states during the last months of the Junta, when Greek domestic affairs were less regularly discussed at a communitarian level. In fact, through the reports of the French Ambassador in Greece during the seven years of the Junta, it is possible to gain insight into what was happening in Athens, especially after the countercoup of 1973. One could argue that FRUS documents, which contain the entire correspondence coming from and going to the American Embassy in Greece, already gave this picture. However, given the competition existing between the US and France at the time (worsened by the abandon of NATO military contingent by France), I considered interesting to look at both perspective on Greece. And in fact, the US officers would often mention France as a US' competitor in trade with Greece, especially when the reactivation of the Military Assistance Programme to Greece was in doubt (and France was selling arms to Athens with no restrictions).

As already pinted out, the military coup in Greece had international resonance. This was amplified by the fact that many Greek politicians, officers, intellectuals, and finally the King himself with his family managed to leave Greece and settle themselves abroad. In the online archives of many newspapers such as *Le Monde Diplomatique*, *the Sunday, the New York Times* and other minor or local gazettes, it was possible to collect interviews and interventions of these Greek personalities living abroad. In fact, while

based in different European countries, they always tried to draw attention on what was happening in their country. Some of them, as Andreas Papandreou, also put together resistance groups, aimed at supporting and coordinating from abroad the opposition to the military in Greece. Others, like the actress Melina Markouri or the Nobel Prize winner Giorgos Seferis, raised their voice against the dictatorship, inviting people not to go in a country which was ruled by people who perpetrated violence and tortures on their enemies. While Costantinos Karamanlis seemed not be practically involved in any activity of resistance, he was many times accused by the Colonels of plotting for the return of the King. This was due to the fact that he criticized many times the methods of the Junta, through the pages of French newspapers. Moreover, newspapers archives, and television and radio records, were also useful to understand how the changes occurring in Greece were perceived outside the political, economic, and military institutions, from the public. In fact, many Western governments had to deal with a national public opinion that did not approve their actions towards the military regime.

# 1. Greece as a Western Country: the origins of the links with NATO and the EEC (1953-1967).

## 1.1. The Truman Doctrine and the Mediterranean: Greece and Turkey as allies.

> *Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is celebrating an important anniversary. On this date thirty years ago, Greece and Turkey officially became members of NATO. Those two great nations thus joined the original twelve parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in pledging to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and freedom. Greece and Turkey have since played a vital role in safeguarding the security of NATO's Southern Flank. Therefore, it gives me great pleasure to take this occasion publicly to salute that role and to extend congratulations and warmest best wishes to the Greek and Turkish peoples and to their governments*[1].

Two of the main characteristics of the relationship between Greece and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are outlined in this NATO press release dated 18th February, 1982: on the one hand, the "special link" between Greece and its neighbour Turkey, eternal enemies despite various attempts to improve relations over the years; on the other hand, the importance of NATO's Southern (and, in this specific case, South-Eastern) Flank of the Alliance in the general system of defence of the Western world.

The geostrategic importance of both Greece and Turkey had been very clear since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. It was not casual choice by President Truman to declare that – "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" – on the occasion of the announcement of a 4.3 billion dollar loan to Athens and Ankara, while Greece was struggling with a civil war that involved, as one of the contenders, the communists forces of the country[2].

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[1] PRESS_RELEASE84(2), NATO Archives, in International Secretariat/Staff (IS).
[2] Westad O. A., *The Cold War. A Word History*, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2017, p. 92.

When talking about *armed minorities* Truman was just referring to civil war, while those *outside pressures* he mentioned indicated strictly the Yugoslavs, that were supporting the communist side, and more broadly the Soviets, whose possible political penetration in the Hellenic country constituted a threat to the West. Considering the shape in which the competition between the USA and USSR was consolidating in Europe, from the Western perspective, the threat of rekindling of internal conflict or even the danger of a communist Greece was to be avoided at all costs.

Two years after Truman's talk, when Western countries reunited in a real defensive alliance with the signature of the twelve original members of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, the importance to gain some support in the Mediterranean, and consequently some foothold in the area in case of a conflict, became more crucial than ever. Given that Greece bordered with three communist countries (Yugoslavia, even if already outside the Soviet sphere after the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, but still communist, Bulgaria, and Albania), and, together with Turkey, it was the "western" country closest to the Middle East, where new conflicts were arising in those years and were just about to become "global", it is clear that the region would constitute a key area of confrontation between the two Super Powers.

Even before entering the NATO Alliance, Greece and Turkey had been trying to improve their relations specifically in response to shared concerns about the Soviet threat in their region. And when both countries joined the Atlantic Alliance, relations had to improve because internal conflict between members would not be tolerated. The reciprocal commitment to cancel their previous conflicts culminated in a formal alliance in 1953, which also included Yugoslavia (politically isolated since its break-up with Moscow in 1948)[1].

Therefore, at the end of the 1940's, the relatively small Mediterranean sea became a crucial juncture for both the Soviet and Western interests, as summarized by David Abulafia, stating that "in NATO vision, the Mediterranean represented a means of contrast to Soviet expansionism: through France with its (still existing) north-African "empire", Great Britain with Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus bases, and US bases all over Mediterranean countries (including Libya)"[2].

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[1] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 147.
[2] Abulafia D., *Il Grande Mare. Storia del Mediterraneo*, p.587, Mondadori, Milano, 2013.

Despite all these considerations, Greece was only admitted to the Organization in 1952, even though it had applied soon after the end of the civil war, in 1949. This was a great disappointment both for Greece and Turkey. Athens was willing to participate in the Alliance for many reasons: not only to secure its territorial integrity, but also to consolidate its position in the West. In fact, neither the Truman Doctrine nor the Marshal Plan constituted a formal alliance, which only would guarantee a long-term programme of military and economic assistance to Greece[1]. At the very beginning, the US was not so willing to accept Athens as an ally; however, it was the Korean War that turned the tables. The idea that the conflict between the two superpowers could impact other areas of the world, made the US more benevolent towards Greece and Turkey as applicants. Moreover, while still not full members of the Western Alliance, both countries sent troops to Korea in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the West and their determination to support the UN initiative[2]. It was Turkey that, in this period, resumed pressures towards the United States and Great Britain for accession to NATO. However, Sophocles Venizelos (leader of the Liberal Party in Greece), prime minister and then foreign minister of Greece during those years, put great emphasis on the importance of the coordination between Greek and Turkish policy within the Western context, supporting *de facto* Turkey's claim to join NATO[3].

Within NATO, the major opposition to their entrance came from the Scandinavians, who believed that including Southern countries would have just slow down collective initiatives. Also the UK, former traditional patron of Greece before the United States, tried to boycott the Greek candidature, because Greece's entrance would modify the defensive schemes in the region[4]. In fact, London would prefer to include Turkey and Greece in a Middle East defensive organization, with a separate Mediterranean and Middle East Command[5]. However, the need for a loyal supporter in the region was stronger than the interests of singular members. Furthermore, for the US the entrance of Greece and Turkey in the Alliance represented a means to prevent the Soviets from

[1] Chourchoulis D., Kourkouvelas, L., "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War", in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 12, n. 4, 497-514.
[2] Hatzivassiliou E., Greece and the Cold War. Frontline state, 1952-1967, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 12.
[3] Chourchoulis D., Kourkouvelas, L., "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War", in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 12, n. 4, 497-514.
[4] Veremis Th. M, Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, pp. 155-156.
[5] Chourchoulis D., Kourkouvelas, L., "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War", in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 12, n. 4, 497-514.

penetrating the Mediterranean area, and it was preferable that the two countries' military command were included in the Alliance[1]. In the early 1950's, Greek accession to NATO seemed to be convenient for both parties: while NATO needed to ensure the Mediterranean from any possible Soviet penetration, Greece benefitted from both strengthened protection against the communist threat, and from becoming part of an integrated community of states instead of being dependent on a unique patron, the USA.

In December 1952, Prime Minister Papagos declared to the Parliament that NATO and the UN were the pillars of the international policy of Greece. Like his predecessor Venizelos, who had negotiated the entrance in the NATO system, he was convinced that security for Greece was only achievable through belonging to the Western alliance; according to him, a credible defense could not be provided by Greece's own resources[2]. This constituted another crucial feature of the relations between Greece and NATO, especially during the era of the Colonels: Athens' claim for the necessity for external aid in order to fulfill its duties in the collective defence system.

In 1953, a year after Greece had become an official member of NATO, Athens signed a bilateral agreement with Washington that guaranteed to the US the right to install military bases on the Greek territory, to supply them, and to use Greek air space for their military operations[3]. As previously mentioned, this was the same year that Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Pact, a project that was destined to failure as soon as relations between Russia and Yugoslavia improved again. In fact, in 1955 the so called "peace-offensive" towards Belgrade eventually succeeded, and relations with Moscow started normalizing. This neutralized the 1953 Balkan Alliance[4]. But a more serious problem arose in 1954-1955, which was to effect relations between Greece and NATO, and between Greece and Turkey, for many years: the Cyprus issue, which will be discussed in the next chapters. For now, it is sufficient to say that the Greek-Turkish clash of the mid-1950s complicated the position of Greece in the Alliance security system, since military cooperation between Athens and Ankara was suspended, and the

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[1] Veremis Th. M, Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, p. 156.
[2] Hatzivassiliou E., Greece and the Cold War. Frontline state, 1952-1967, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 18.
[3] Veremis Th. M, Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, p. 156.
[4] Chourchoulis D., Kourkouvelas, L., "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War", in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 12, n. 4, 497-514.

threat of a possible conflict between the two became a regular source of worry for the Alliance in the following years every time that tensions arose in Cyprus[1].

## 1.2. Greece and the EEC: the "associated" country

Greece was the first country to sign an association agreement with the EEC, the Treaty of Athens, in 1961. In the Greek case, association was thought as an intermediate condition before accession, because Greece would need a time in order to fulfill the necessary conditions to be a full member of the European Community.

The signing of the Treaty of Athens, on the 9th of July 1961, was an achievement of Kostantinos Karamanlis, prime minister of Greece at the time and leader of the National Radical Union. Turkey had also applied, and received the associated status two years later, in 1963. As with the NATO accession, Greek and Turkish paths seemed to proceed in parallel. The legal basis for association agreements had been established in the Treaty of Rome (1957) with article 238:

> *The Community may conclude with a Third State, a union of States or an international organization agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures. These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the Assembly [...]*[2].

As Phinnemore underlines, the description of what association involved was rather vague, and this was intentional[3]. In fact, article 238 could facilitate establishing formal ties with different kind of partners, including industrialized and developed countries such as the United Kingdom, but also less developed European (or non-European) countries such as Greece and Turkey. Therefore, since association was to be used for different purposes and with different countries, the treaty provisions could not be too prescriptive[4].

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[1] Chourchoulis D., Kourkouvelas, L., "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War", in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 12, n. 4, 497-514.
[2] Full text of the Treaty of Rome in https://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.
[3] Phinnemore D., Association, stepping-stone or alternative to EU membership?, UACES, Sheffield Academic Press, London, 1999, pp. 16-18.
[4] Phinnemore D., Association, stepping-stone or alternative to EU membership?, UACES, Sheffield Academic Press, London, 1999, p. 23.

The Treaty of Athens provided a gradual reduction in tariffs and custom duties, and the possibility for Greek industries to become more competitive at the international level; the agreement provided also for a financial protocol that included consistent loans in order to facilitate and accelerate Greek development (this protocol committed the EEC to provide Greece with 125 US million dollars of aid). Both the agreements with Greece and with Turkey saw gradual customs union as an integral part of the association. While with Turkey this was envisaged in a more generical way (even though an additional protocol was produced in 1970), a detailed timetable was included in the agreement with Greece. According to this, customs union would be established within 22 years on an asymmetrical basis, meaning that the EC would remove tariffs and quotas at a faster rate than Greece[1]. Also, the association with Greece envisaged "common actions" and "joint measures"[2] in many areas: harmonization of agricultural policies, free movement of workers, transport policy and competition[3]. A Joint Council of Association was also established with the aim of facilitate the application of the agreement, and the European Parliament established a Mixed Association Commission (consisting of an equal number of Greek and European Parliament members) to supervise the functioning of the agreement[4].

However, Karamanlis' motivation to negotiate the association was not merely economic: by formally associating Greece to the European Community, with the possibility of full membership in the future, he planned to anchor even more firmly his country to the western alliance and, also important, to strengthen Greece's "European identity", that was considered somewhat uncertain[5]. In fact, is important to emphasise that, even though the Treaty of Athens mainly concerned the economy, the prospective of full membership could be interpreted as a political tie between Greece and the European Community. As specified in the preamble, the Treaty of Athens was signed in the "Treaty of Rome's (1957) spirit", with the idea of safeguarding "peace and freedom by joint pursuit of the ideals underlying the Treaty establishing the European Economic

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[1] Phinnemore D., Association, stepping-stone or alternative to EU membership?, UACES, Sheffield Academic Press, London, 1999, p. 45.
[2] Full text of the Treaty of Rome in https://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.
[3] Phinnemore D., Association, stepping-stone or alternative to EU membership?, UACES, Sheffield Academic Press, London, 1999, p. 49.
[4] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.
[5] R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 159.

Community"[1]. Association, as Phinnemore underlines, was more than a trade agreement. According to him, the fact that association agreements should be voted unanimously by the Council (while trade agreements, based on article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, required only a qualified majority) is an indication that "association fall somewhere" between trade agreement and membership[2]. Still, future accession was not guaranteed: in the preamble of the Athens Agreement we can read that the support given by the EEC to Greece was aimed at "facilitate the Accession of Greece to the Community at a later date"[3], and article 72 stated:

> *As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Greece of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the Accession of Greece to the Community*[4].

The same reference to the possibility of future accession was contained in the Ankara Agreement. These two association agreements would remain the only that provided such references to accession, since the later ones would never go so far[5].

As previously mentioned, for the Association with Greece a specific association commission was created in Brussels, two years after the signature of the treaty. Composed a half by European Parliament members, and a half by Greek Parliament members, the Mixed Parliamentary Association Commission had the aim of examining issues connected to association initiatives through an annual report; furthermore, it had the power of giving advice and recommendations to both Parliaments. The first years of association initiatives were successful: annual reports started registering some consistent positive developments in terms of the economy. In 1966, during the annual meeting of the Association Committee in Rhodes, both part expressed the need for a gradual

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[1] Preamble of the Association Agreement between Greece and the European Economic Community. Full text of the Association agreement on the Journal of the European Communities, online on https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31963D0106&from=en

[2] Phinnemore D., Association, stepping-stone or alternative to EU membership?, UACES, Sheffield Academic Press, London, 1999, p. 23.

[3] Phinnemore D., Association, stepping-stone or alternative to EU membership?, UACES, Sheffield Academic Press, London, 1999, p. 63.

[4] Association Agreement between Greece and the European Economic Community. Full text of the Association agreement on the Journal of the European Communities, online on https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31963D0106&from=en.

[5] Phinnemore D., Association, stepping-stone or alternative to EU membership?, UACES, Sheffield Academic Press, London, 1999, p. 63.

harmonization of economic policies; the aim of the initiative was to transform a mere customs agreement into a long-term project of economic and commercial partnership[1].

### 1.3. The Path to Dictatorship

During the years when Karamanlis' governed (1955-1963), Greece experienced a degree of political and social stability it had not known for years. The first sign of his leadership weakening came with the 1961 elections, when Georgios Papandreou (leader of the main opposition party, the Centre Union[2]) accused him of orchestrating an "electoral putsch" and implementing a NATO plan with the participation of the Army[3]. Even though this was never proved in court, the accusation increased Papandreou's popularity. Despite his electoral victory, Karamanlis was to face a series of difficulties. Even though the manipulation of the vote – which in fact was real – did not change the election result (Karamanlis would still have won, even though with a weaker majoriry), the denouncing of electoral fraud in 1961 contributed to Greek people's political conscience becoming more mature and to Papandreou's popularity. In fact, his major campaign for new elections gained massive support[4]. Furthermore, a growing deterioration in Karamanlis' relations with the Royal Family was making him nervous about his liberty of action, and this culminated in a harsh discussion (1963) on whether the King and Queen should visit the United Kingdome that year. According to Karamanlis, the visit would only provide the right occasion for leftist demonstration in London in support of Papandreou's struggle[5]. Additionally, also in 1963, a member of the United Democratic Left (EDA), Georgios Lambrakis, was killed during a public manifestation for pacifism. As subsequently discovered, the murderers belonged to far-right organizations, but it was Karamanlis who was accused at first. Massive protests took place throughout the country[6]. This hardened Karamanlis' idea that the Royal visit

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[1] *Progetto di processo verbale delle riunioni del 26 e 27 aprile 1966 a Rodi*, Commissione Parlamentare mista CEE-Grecia, in HAEU , EM-75 ("CEE-Grèce (01). 1961-1968").
[2] There also was a leftist opposition party, EDA (United Democratic Left), created after the out-lawing of the Greek Communist Party.
[3] R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 159.
[4] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 42.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 1.
[6] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 43.

to London should be postponed, as now the leftist groups had a "fresh outrage to exploit"[1]. Despite Karamanlis' preoccupation, the King did not want to renounce to the visit. Exasperated, Karamanlis resigned in June 1963, and flew to Zurich, claiming that he no would no longer participate in politics. He designated as his successor Panayotis Pipinelis, a supporter of absolute monarchy and member of the present cabinet[2]. In fact, Karamanlis' party (the National Radical Union, ERE) still held the majority in Parliament. This created a situation of political confusion, to which the King decided to put an end by dissolving Parliament after his visit to London, and calling for election. According to the "Athenian", at the moment was clear that the court wanted to get rid of Karamanlis, and that the discussion about the trip to London was just the right pretext to do so. In fact, to the eyes' of King Paul and Queen Frederika, he has become too independent, and, even though no one would claim that he was responsible for Lambrakis' assassination, it was still a fact that it happened under his government[3]. Karamanlis returned to Greece exclusively to fight elections in November. After Papandreou's narrow victory, he flew back to France where he would stay in self-exile until 1974[4].

At November elections, Georgios Papandreou was charged with forming a government, which lasted only fifty days. In fact, he gained a vote of confidence on 24 December, but only thanks to the votes of EDA, which was commonly considered as a "front" for the outlawed Communist Party (KKE). Even though EDA could not simply be identified with the Communist Party, as with the time it has gradually became more bourgeois and democratic (like most Western communist parties)[5], for an anti-communist politician as Georgios Papandreou it was not acceptable to be dependent on EDA's support in Parliament. Furthermore, during the electoral campaign, he had adhered to the "battle on two fronts" idea, meaning the authoritarianism of the right and the totalitarianism of the extreme left[6]. Therefore, in order to strengthen his Party's parliamentary majority, and relying on his mounting popularity, Papandreou resigned

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 2.
[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p.43.
[3] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 43.
[4] R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 159.
[5] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 43.
[6] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p.43.

and called for new elections in 1964. This time, he gained 52,7% of the vote, which was an exceptional parliamentary majority in Greece. ERE, at the time led by Panayotis Kannellopoulos after Karamanlis' leaving Greece, was reduced to 107 in Parliament of 300[1].The Centre Union succeeded in its effort of liberalizing public life, and in designing a reform of education. However, the Party was centred around its charismatic leader, and lacked of organization, discipline, and a detailed programme, all important elements to guarantee continuity in case of crises[2]. And a major crisis occurred, which was building in Cyprus, and peaked in 1964.

Since the establishment of the Republic in 1960 (a brief discussion of the history of Cyprus after WWII will be provided in the next chapter), the two communities of the island had lived separately, rather than trying to make the new Republic function. This had contributed to create a situation of tension and distrust between the two communist, and in fact in December 1963 fighting had broken out. A few months later, the UN Security Council had sent a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) on the island which included the already present British contingent[3]. The UN peace-keeping forces had managed to contain the situation in Cyprus, but Papandreou's decision to refuse a double enosis (i.e. with the Greek part annexed to Greece, and the Turkish part being self-governed) had made him unpopular with the US administration, which supported that solution. According to Andreas Papandreou's *memoirs*, his father's decision to support Makarios' stance for independence and to refuse the Acheson Plan brought the Centre Union government in conflict with the US administration, and "paved the way for its eventual overthrown by the King" (referring to the so-called royal putsch of 1965, which we will discuss in the following paragraphs)[4].

A few days after taking over the government, Papandreou had made clear that he supported the UN approach to the Cyprus issue, affirming his solidarity to Makarios. Moreover, he had stated that, as the "Turkish threat" seemed to continue, he found it necessary to commit to defend Cyprus in case of Turkish attack[5]. In the summer of 1964, fighting broke out again on the island, and again the UNFICYP was able to keep the

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 3.
[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 45.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 4.
[4] Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front, André Deutsch Limited, London, 1971, pp. 102-110.
[5] Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front, André Deutsch Limited, London, 1971, p. 100.

situation under control. Both Papandreou and the Turkish president, Inonu, were invited to Washington to meet president Johnson. Papandreou decided to accept the invitation, as long as he had not to meet with his Turkish counterpart. However, once arrived, President Johnson told him that he believed the only solution to the Cyprus issue was to initiate direct talks between the two interested parties: Greece and Turkey. Papandreou objected that this procedure would have bypassed the UN, and that, if negotiations would not bring to a successful agreement, war could have not been avoided[1]. Still, president Johnson and the Secretary of State Dean Rusk insisted that negotiations would be the only solution. According to Andreas Papandreou, they wanted to convince the Greek delegation that, if they would not follow the American prescription, "Turkey would attack Cyprus and/or Greece, and America would be unwilling to lift a finger"[2].

During the following weeks, Papandreou accepted to meet in Geneva with Dean Acheson, the American advisor appointed by Washington. Acheson would also meet Turkish representatives, separately from the Greeks, both under the supervision of a UN representative. It was in this framework that the Acheson Plan took shape: enosis of Cyprus with Greece, in return to a period (30 to 50 years) lease of a military base to the Turks (on which the Turks would have sovereignty); the creation of two parallel government structures, one for each of the two ethnic groups; and the creation of a joint military command for Greece and Turkey[3].

The American Embassy put great pressure on Georgios Papandreou and his government to accept the solution of double partition. Papandreou was able to maintain his stance on the issue, but this contributed rising tension with the American Embassy on the one hand, and with the King on the other hand. Moreover, in that same period the Greek mainland commander of the Cypriot National Guard resigned, and was replace by the fervent nationalist and pro-enosist Liutenant-General George Grivas, a name which will return in the following chapters[4].

In addition to the Cyprus situation, another "running sore" in the Greek politics preoccupied Papandreou: the emergence of clandestine groups within the officer corps of the Army, both among the right-wing and left-wing. In Greece, the Army had "for

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[1] Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front, André Deutsch Limited, London, 1971, pp. 100-103.
[2] Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front, André Deutsch Limited, London, 1971, p. 103.
[3] Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front, André Deutsch Limited, London, 1971, pp. 104-105.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 4.

long constituted a state within the state, even to the extent of running its on radio station, whose programmes alternated between popular music and primitive, nationalistic slogans, heavily tinged with a crude anti-communist propaganda"[1]. At the beginning of 1965, a supposed communist plot was "unmasked" by a secret army report. The following enquiry proved that no such plot had ever existed, and that a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Papadopoulos had stirred it up in the interest of right-wing propaganda[2]. Such a scheme would be also used in 1967 by the same Papadopoulos when seizing power. Then, in May 1965 General Grivas and other colleagues reported the existence of a secrete organization, named ASPIDA, formed by left-wing Greek Army officers[3]. The right-wing interpretation of ASPIDA was probably more sinister than the reality. However, rumors that at least three members of Papandreou's government, among whom his son Andreas, were associated with ASPIDA caused major reactions.

Andreas Papandreou had left Greece in 1939 and spent twenty years in the United States, where he had graduated, married, served in the Navy and eventually became naturalized. Due to the fact that, since when he had returned to Greece and entered in politics, his political stances had been always "to the left" of his father's, the public perception was that he was sympathetic to socialist ideas[4]. This became also the idea of the United States, as Papandreou had developed the idea that Greece was too dependent from the interests of Washington. Against this background, the ASPIDA case fueled the opposition to the Papandreou's government coming from the far right, both outside and inside the Army. Among the enemies Andreas had made within the Army, were Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos and Colonel Dimitris Ioannidis; both already having conspiratorial experience, they would play a major role in the 1967 coup and following years of dictatorship[5]. Conversely, the supporters of the Centre Union believed that the right-wing reactionaries were trying to cover up their own plan to take the power, by accusing a popular personality like Andreas Papandreou[6].

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 51.
[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 51.
[3] Aspida meant "shield", but it was also an acronym standing for "Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals, Democracy, and Meritocracy". In Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 5.
[4] R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 7.
[6] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 50-53.

With growing of the ASPIDA scandal, Georgios Papandreou became seriously worried. He believed that the Defence Minister, Garoufalias, was covering the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Ghennimatas, whom he considered the responsible of the machinations of the Aspida case. In fact, Garoufalias refused to replace Ghennimatas[1]. Papandreou then thought that his only option was to take control of the Army, and asked to take over also the Ministry of Defence in addition to being Prime Minister. But King Costantinos II, who had succeeded his father Paul in 1964, refused. He claimed that it was not possible to appoint Georgios as Prime Minister while his son Andreas was under investigation, which was constitutionally correct decision. However, Papandreou reacted impetuously by offering his resignation on 15 July. By that time, the King had been making secret contact with right-wing members of the Centre Union (then called "apostates") and with members of ERE in order to form a new government[2]. Therefore, he accepted the resignation of Papandreou (who was bluffing), and appointed a new prime minister. However, the new Prime Minister chosen by the King (Georgios Athanasiadis-Novas) failed gaining a vote of confidence, and resigned in August. Also the second choice made by the King, Ilias Tsirimokos (from the Central Union), failed. The next, and last, choice was Stephanos Stephanopoulos (who had been Karamanlis' rival for the premiership in 1955, but then joined the Centre Union). He formed a government with the support of ERE and part of the Central Union, which finally won a vote of confidence in September[3].

Even though the King had acted within constitutional limits, the "royal putsch", as Papandreou called it, increased political instability in Greece. The conservative wing of the National Radical Union had secured the majority in the new government led by Mr. Stephanopoulos. However, the events of the previous months had made large sectors of the public opinion unhappy. The crisis, lasted more than two months, had delegitimated the parliamentary system, contributing to create disillusion among Greek people[4]. Between July and September, several street demonstrations disturbed public order. The demonstrators recognized Andreas Papandreou as their leader, while the Right, alarmed,

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 52-53.
[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 53.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 11.
[4] R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 158-159..

demanded drastic measures against them[1]. However, once the Stephanopoulos cabinet was well established, the demonstrations practically ceased, and the situation returned to calm.

In 1966, as Woodhouse points out, the Stephanopoulos government "survived by doing very little"[2]. However, when the preliminary investigation into the ASPIDA case was published, Georgios Papandreou started being really concerned about the repercussions the case could have on his son and on Greek politics. The Prosecutor, Magistrate Costantinos Kollias, had declared that civilians might be included in the indictment, and that if they were Deputies, he would request their parliamentary immunity to be lifted.

Moreover, Grigorios Spandidakis, a Lieutenant of the Hellenic Army, was appointed as the new Chief of the Hellenic Army General Staff. He was close to the three organizers of the 1967 coup, Colonels Papadopoulos and Makarezos, and Brigadier Pattakos, even though probably not aware of their plans. In any case, he favoured their escalation to power. In fact, they were appointed by Spandidakis in key positions within the Army, especially Papadopoulos, who was assigned to revise the so called "Prometheus Plan". This was a closely connected with NATO plan for a contingency of war, which implied the collective co-operation of the allies in case of need. Meanwhile, rumors of an "impending military coup" were persistent in the country[3]. Even though Prime Minister Stephanopoulos declared that, if attempted, a military coup was destined to a failure, he was not able to convince neither the King or the other political leaders. After two secret meetings between Georgios Papandreou and Kanellopoulos favoured by the King, the Kannellopoulos withdrew his party support to the government in December. While the "apostates" were ousted, ERE and the Centre Union put together a caretaker government aimed at organizing new elections for the spring. Both the more conservative wing of ERE (led by Pipinelis), and the leftist wing of the Centre-Union (led by Andreas Papandreou) were unhappy with the compromise reached by the two party leaders. However, while Andreas could have split the Party, he decided to accept the decision of

[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 12.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 13.

his father and of the majority[1]. Meanwhile, Magistrate Kollias formally asked for Papandreous' immunity to be lifted, but the Parliament rejected the request[2].

During the following moths, the Parliament discussed a new electoral law in the view of elections. When the Centre Union proposed a clause which extended the parliamentary immunity period for other forty-five days (covering the vote), Kannelopoulos called it as unconstitutional. This caused the lapsing of the entire law, so as the following election would take place under the previous system. And this caused also an *empasse* in the "service" government. The King then gave the mandate to Kanellopoulos, with the right to dissolve the Parliament when he thought it was necessary. He did it on the 15th of April, 1967. Elections were fixed for May 27[3]. This worried those extremist fringes within the Army (the "state within the state"), for if the Centre Union would have gained the power, there would be severe consequences for them. The concern of a victory of Georgios Papandreou was shared by the US administration, especially since Andreas continued to publicly protest against the US interfering too much in Greek politics[4]. However, Kanellopoulos did not want to depart from constitutional procedures. When, on the 20th of April, he was told by the heads of the Armed Forces that a coup would present no "technical difficulties". This would have secured his leadership, bypassing the vote. Kannellopoulos refused the option. According to the "Athenian", the generals promised to respect Kanellopoulos' orders (which were shared by the King)[5]. And in fact, they did. As many times underlined, the coup was not carried out by high grade officials. On the contrary, other sectors of the Army took the initiative, exploiting that condition, as summarized by Richard Clogg, "of uncertainty and tension" which had "served to feed the paranoia of the extra-parliamentary right and to create a dangerous climate of disillusionment with politicians among the population at large"[6].

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 58.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 13.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 30.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 30.
[5] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 60.
[6] R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 159.

# 2. From the Military Coup to the Failure of the Royal Counter-coup: April-December, 1967.

## 2.1 The "revolution of the 21st of April"

It is hard to tell whether NATO or the EEC institutions expected something like the coup of the 21st of April to happen in Greece. On the preceding days, Greece actively participated in both organizations' activities. On the European side, Greek representatives were advocating against the EEC's perceived intention to turn the association process into a mere commercial plan, leaving out every effort of economic, political, and cultural integration[1]. On the Atlantic side, Greek permanent representative, Christian Palamas, focused on the importance of a stable Southern flank for the Alliance, therefore stressing Greece's need to be supported by external aid in order to be able to fulfill its defensive duties in the NATO framework[2]. Despite the difference in nature, the activities of both Greek representatives show that strengthening the ties with EEC and NATO was equally important for Athens. The association with the European Community represented an opportunity for Greece to increase its political stability and economic prosperity. At the same time, being a solid member of the Atlantic Alliance assured protection for a small and relatively weak country situated in a very unstable area of the world.

On the 21st of April, while the Military was taking Athens by force, Greece was hosting a meeting of the NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group at Portaria (Thessaly)[3]. The Greek representatives, according to the minutes of that meeting, seemed to be behaving normally. They asked for a program of special exchange of views within the Allies on the bilateral treaties of "friendship, peaceful cooperation and mutual

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[1] Final Communication – VIII Session EEC-Greece Mixed Association Commission, 30th-31st March 1967, in Historical Archives of the European Union (from now on HAEU), fond PEO (Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne Et Parlement Européen Avant L'élection Directe) Doc. 18918.
[2] Report Of A Meeting Of Defence Planning Committee In Headquarters, 14th April 1967, in NATO Archives, sub-fond Defence Planning Committee (from now on DPC) Doc R(67)7.
[3] *Note By The Chairman On 11th Meeting In Portiria – Greece*, 18th-21st April, 1967, in NATO Archives, sub-fond Council (from now on C) Doc. M(67)38

assistance" signed by some members of the Warsaw Pact, and did not show any concern about Greek domestic affairs[1]. However, the fact that no record of the events happening in Athens appeared in the minutes of the meeting does not necessarily mean that no one was informed about the facts, especially among the Americans and, of course, the Greeks. In his *NATO Diaries*, NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio reported some general impressions on the coup. According to him, the leaders of the coup were almost unknown to the Allies, and there was the belief that the King had not been informed before. He also reported a talk with the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel, who told Brosio that he was not too concerned with the Greek situation, since he believed that the new regime would not last[2]. While the tone of the Diary seems to suggest that Brosio was not expecting such events happening in Greece (even though one can choose the tone to use in a diary which is meant to be published), this was maybe not the case for other members of the Atlantic Alliance.

For the past year at least, the US Foreign Office had been monitoring Greek domestic affairs through the eyes of the American ambassador in Athens, William Phillips Talbot. More generally, Washington intervening (directly or indirectly) in Greece's domestic affairs, was not unusual after the end of World War II. As previously mentioned, the special attention given to Greece derived from the role of "patron" that the US had assumed after UK's dismission in 1947. Furthermore, in 1967 Washington shared the Greek Army's concern that Athens might fall into the hands of the Centre Union. While the ultra-rightist wings of the Army were concerned with possible purges after a Centre Union's victory, Washington was worried about the growing popularity of Andreas Papandreou, and his "anti-American" stances[3]. As already mentioned, he had more radical ideas than his father, and, more important from the American perspective, he stressed the need for Greece to develop its own policies, independently from the American interests[4]. Andreas was popular especially among the youth, after his leading of the protestations during the 1965 crisis. Even if he was not be associated with the left (the leftist leaders had little sympathy for him at the time, and used to consider him an

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[1] *Communication From The Secretary General To The Permanent Representative*, 21st April, 1967, in NATO Archives – Private Office of the Secretary General series (from now on PO), doc. PO(67)268.
[2] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, p. 393.
[3] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972.
[4] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972.

"adventurer") he was still considered a "radical", for his abrasiveness in his political discourse[1].

Just one day before the coup, Talbot was instructed by the Secretary of State, Rusk, to ask Georgios Papandreou to moderate his language in the public debate, especially regarding the monarchy. In return, he would be given the guarantee that his son Andreas would not to be arrested for his suspected involvement in the *Aspida* "conspiracy"[2]. Washington was that, if Papandreou won the election, he might be persuaded by his son Andreas to take Greece apart from the Western Alliance[3]. Given such a tense situation, the hypothesis of a military *coup de* théâtre was envisaged in the communication between Rusk and Talbot. However, the effort dedicated to the mediation with the Papandreous shows that Washington still considered it a remote scenario. Also, the possibility of a plot which did not include the King was excluded. In a few hours, this evaluation proved to be wrong.

On the morning of the 21st of April, Talbot sent a telegram to the US Department of State saying that he had the "impression that coup was triggered this morning by small army group not including High Command, King or civilian political leaders"[4]. His impression was essentially correct. A few days before, on Tuesday 18 April, a small group of officers had met at Brigadier Pattakos' house. On that occasion, the organizers of the coup had formally designed their asset: the leader was confirmed to be Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, being part of a triumvirate with Colonel Nikaolos Pattakos and Makarezos. The triumvirate stood at the head of a pyramid, whose base was occupied by the so called "revolutionary council". In between, there was an executive circle of about fifteen, called the "revolutionary group"[5]. Dimitris Ioannidis, who would become Chief of the Military Police and eventually had a role in the fall of the Junta, was a member of this group[6].

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 67-70.
[2] *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece*, 20th April 1967, in FRUS 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 272.
[3] *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece*, 20th April 1967, in FRUS 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 272.
[4] *Telegram From The Embassy In Greece To The Department Of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 273
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 20.
[6] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 67-70.

Ambassador Talbot also referred that he had no information of resistance to the coup, which proved to be another almost entirely correct statement. Indeed, one of the most noticeable characteristic of the so called "Revolution of the 21st of April" was a certain passivity of all the actors concerned. The action was guided in the early morning by Papadopoulos, Makarezos, and Pattakos. They implemented the so-called "Prometheus plan", a NATO plan designed for preventing communist attempts to seize power in Western countries. A Plan, as mentioned in the first chapter, that Papadopoulos knew very well, as he had been appointed to revise it just a few months before. Meanwhile, another group of soldiers surrounded King Costantinos' house, and informed him of the *fait accompli*[1]. When warned about what was happening, before the conspirators had arrived at his house, he had made an attempt to counteract by mobilizing the troops at the North of the Country and the Navy. However, the initiative had no success, probably because there were betrayers also in his entourage[2]. It is apparent that the King had not been previously informed of the coup by its organizers. When the military took him to Athens, he tried to convince the triumvirate to step back, claiming that the impression on Greece's allies caused by their action would be "disastrous"[3]. Pattakos answered that the Allies would not interfere, and he proved to be right. In the end, the King accepted to collaborate with the Junta, or maybe felt to have no alternatives. As Richard Clogg points out, he was probably fearing Papandreou's Centre Union victory at the next election, and the possible turn to left led by Andreas Papandreou like the coup leaders and the Americans, and therefore the military initiative did not seem completely negative from his perspective[4]. He did, however, negotiate with the Army for the composition of new government[5].

General Spandidakis, the Chief of the Army General Staff, was also forcibly conveyed to the Ministry of National Defence (which was commonly known as the

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[1] A. Varsori, L'Occidente e la Grecia: dal colpo di Stato militare alla transizione alla democrazia (1967-1976), in M. Del Pero - V. Gavìn - F. Guirao - A. Varsori, Democrazie. L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Le Monnier, 2010, p. 17.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, P. 24.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 26.
[4] R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 159.
[5] The debate on whether the King was involved or not in the planning of the coup seems to have reached the conclusion that he was not. However, as the "Athenian" pointed out, the critics of his acting claim that if he had appealed for resistance, probably the majority of the armed forces would have followed him. However, it is possible that the Colonels made him believe that the situation was more compromise than it actually was. According to those critics, if the King would have led a confrontation with the Colonels, it would perhaps be bloody, but the final outcast would have been better than a dictatorship. In "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 63-65.

"Pentagon") in Athens, where he was offered by Pattakos to join the "revolution". Like the King, he had not been informed of the Colonels' plan, and he probably saw no other option than reluctantly accept. At first, the King discussed with Spandidakis the possibility for him to become Prime Minister of the new government, but Spandidakis refused. He suggested instead magistrate Costantinos Kollias, Chief Prosecutor at the Supreme Court, and in charge of the ASPIDA investigation in the previous months. Spandidakis was appointed as Kollias' deputy and Minister of Defence, Papadopoulos was appointed as Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, Pattakos as Minister of Interior and Makarezos as Minister of Co-ordination[1].

There was an intensive exchange of information between the American embassy in Athens and the Department of State in Washington throughout the day of April 21st. Since communications in the entire nation had been blocked by the Military, Talbot reported to be struggling to get in contact both with the King and the Army leaders. In the late afternoon, he was informed that a new government had been appointed. The news came from the King, who also recounted that the formation of government was the result of five hours long negotiations with the leaders of the coup[2]. Among the newly appointed Ministers, the US administration knew general Spandidakis very well, because he had been involved in NATO activities in the Mediterranean region for many years; when Talbot was finally able to get in contact with him, Spandidakis gave the assurance that Greece would remain completely loyal to the King, and would continue to be a strong supporter of the Atlantic Alliance[3]. As to reinforce his statement, Spandidakis explained that the military action had been implemented in order to avoid a "communist threat". He did not elaborate on this threat, but added that it was to avoid its realization that Greek Army had had no choice but to use American-supplied equipment to carry out the plan that morning[4]. A few days later, in his first public speech, Papadopoulos confirmed the existence of such a plot by talking about some documents found in the EDA offices which, according to him, proved the existence of communist subversive activity, and claimed that the revolution of the 21st of April had saved the country from

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 24-25.
[2] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 275.
[3] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 276.
[4] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 276.

falling into "anarchy"[1]. No evidence of the existence of such a plan or activity was ever provided by the Army.

On the night of the 21st of April, hundreds of suspected supporters of the "communist plan" mentioned by Spandidakis and Papadopoulos were arrested and imprisoned with political charges, including Andreas Papandreou and his father Georgios. As previously mentioned, no such plan ever existed. In fact, not only members of EDA and the left were arrested, but also most of the Right and Centre political leaders. At the same time, journalists were invited to visit the most well-known political prisoners and see that they were not treated badly, but this was of course a propagandistic initiative. In reality, at least one of the prisoners died in those early days, and many of them were deported in remote islands of the Aegean which used to be used as prisoner camps during the Civil War[2]. According to Amnesty International, torture was used from the begging of the Junta's rule, even though reports about it started reaching outside Greece only a few months after the coup[3].

All political parties were immediately dismissed, as well as the Parliament[4]. Some high-grade officers were forced into retirement, which opened the way for promotion of the officers loyal to the Junta[5]. Purges were also carried out among employees in the civil sector, especially in the government offices, education and juridical systems. Even church was put under control. In fact, one of the first acts of the new government was to force the Archbishop of Athens to resign, and to appoint in his place a man loyal to the Junta. This was followed by a purge against all suspected of hostile opinion within the Church[6]. As mentioned before, the leaders of the coup took the over the key ministries,

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 33.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 33.
[3] Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.
[4] Bloudanis N., Histoire de la Grèce Moderne. 1828 - 2012, Mythes et réalités, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2013, p. 353.
[5] According to different sources, Papadopoulos started his 'plotting activities' in the 1950s, when he was in the intelligence services (K.Y.P., Central Intelligence Service). He was probably involved in the 1961 elections, and in the 1965 "affair" that we mentioned before. Meanwhile, he patiently gathered hundreds of young officers like his as supporters, who were ambitious and unhappy with the "traditional" politicians. Those young officers were mainly of humble origin like Papadopoulos himself, they had feelings of class resentment and exclusion by the establishment. For these reasons, they had become impatient, not keen to any compromise and, in the end, developed a strong anti-democratic attitude. They believed that the 'parliamentary corruption' which characterized the Greek political life should be bypassed by a strong initiative, carried out by the armed forces. In "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 80, and Tsoukalas K., *The Greek Tragedy*, Penguin Books, 1969.
[6] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 78.

and those headed by civilian were over-viewed by a military "secretary-general" who held effective power. In addition to that, military were appointed also to lead non-political sectors, such as Tele-Communications, Electric Power, Tourism, the Opera, the National Theatre, Youth and Sport, Civil Aviation, the Agricultural Bank, students' clubs and other institutions[1].

When confronted by the American Ambassador with questions on when the normal course of political activity would be restored, General Spandidakis answered with a vague: "when the country will be ready"[2]. The only additional information he gave, was that the primary objective of the coup (Military leaders never used this word, they preferred "revolution", or a generic "action") had been to protect "all freedoms of Greeks and to restore normality as soon as possible"[3]. From the very beginning the metaphor of Greece as a "sick man", and of the "revolution" as a "medicine" to restore the healthy conditions necessary for a parliamentary rule in Greece became popular among the coup organizers[4].

While negotiating with leaders of the coup, the King also tried to ask the US whether they would be ready to intervene militarily in order to re-establish order. Ambassador Talbot answered that US Department of State thought it was not the case; however, the King was assured he would have remained the official contact for Washington, being still the highest office of the State[5]. Talbot was also instructed to strengthen the hand of the King by keeping close communication with him but, at the same time, not to burn any bridges with the new government[6]. The King's attempt to obtain direct US intervention proves how weak his position actually was in the new Greek political settlement, and how he feared the possibility of a worsening of the situation. In fact, immediately after the coup, he asked the US whether helicopters would be available to

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 78.
[2] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 276.
[3] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 276.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, and "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 123 .
[5] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 275, and 276.
[6] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 277.

evacuate his family from the country[1]. The fact that the King turned to Washington in such occasion should not surprise. The tradition of Greece appealing to one or another of the Great Powers dated back to the Ottoman period. This could also partially explain the "servility" of most of the Greek governments towards the British before, and then the Americans, and the tendence to ally with foreign "protectors" in case of domestic conflict[2]. From the Junta's view-point, at the moment, the King was still useful. His residual popularity within the Navy, and the fact that the US seemed to be reassured by his collaboration with the new government made him a perfect mouthpiece for the Colonels' policies[3]. Conversely, the fact that the King was still in his place, allowed the international partners of Greece not to formally question diplomatic recognition.

## 2.2 International reactions: a comparison.

### 2.2.1The EEC

It took some time for international actors to understand what happened in Greece (news was slow and limited), and to decide how to act. In Greece, the population did not protest. Greek people showed an apathy rooted in a deep mistrust in legitimate politics and parties, and derived from numerous scandals and changes of government occurred since the end of World War II. Conversely, in the rest of Europe, there was a strong public reaction. As a sort of precursor to mass movements in 1968, protestations spread all over the continent, particularly in Italy and France. Of course, discussion ad agitations about the Greek case reflected also within EEC institutions.

As already mentioned, Greece was not the only country in Western Europe led by a non-democratic government (both Portugal and Spain had authoritarian regimes since the 1930s). However, after the coup of April, 1967, Greece became the only non-democratic European state formally associated with the EEC and, as Paolo Soave underlined, this seemed to mortify the European efforts as guarantors and promoters of

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[1] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 275.
[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 67-70.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 35.

their founding values[1]. In fact, the preamble of the 1957 Treaty of Rome stated the resolution to "preserve and strengthen peace and liberty", and to call upon "the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts"[2]. The idea of the European Community as a "democratic guarantor" shaped in 1962, when the German socialist EP member Willy Birkelbach had drafted a report on the general political and institutional conditions for membership or association with the EEC. According to the document, approved by the European Parliament in February 1962, any applicant state should be required to recognize the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms as necessary preconditions for accession or association[3].

After the dismission of the Parliament in 1967, Greece did no long respect these conditions. Making matters worse for the EEC was the news, coming after the coup, that many members of the Greek Parliament had been arrested. Among them, according to rumors, there were some of the Greek participants to the Mixed Association Commission. After becoming aware of that the arrests, all members of the European part of the Commission agreed that, if true, this was not acceptable[4].

On the 8-11 May session of the European Parliament (EP), a resolution draft presented by Edoardo Martino (representative of the Political Commission) and Wilhelmus Schujit (representative of the Mixed Association Commission) was discussed. The resolution asked for suspension of all further initiatives of integration provided by the treaty of Athens, except the current issues, until some conditions had been met. Those were the restoration of a parliamentary system (which was essential for the functioning of the Mixed Association Commission), the respect of the European Convention on human rights (signed also by Greece), and the restoration of fundamental personal rights for political prisoners[5]. This resolution came to be commonly referred to as the "freezing" of the association agreement, even though the definition is not completely correct. It was not the entire agreement that was "frozen", but only further

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[1] Soave P., La democrazia allo specchio. L'Italia e il regime militare ellenico (1967-1974), Rubettino, 2014, p. 14.
[2] Full text of the Treaty of Rome in https://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.
[3] De Angelis E., Karamouzi E., "Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity, 1961-1978", in Contemporary European History, vol. 25, Special Issue 3: European Integration, Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp 439-458.
[4] *Meeting of the association commission with* Greece (European Parliament), 2nd May 1967, in Assemblée parlementaire européenne et Parlement européen avant l'élection directe (from now on PEO) 18909.
[5] *Documenti di seduta 1967-1968*, 10 maggio 1967, Doc. N° 55, in HAEU, Edoardo Martino (from now on EM) n. 76.

initiatives. Every issue concerning parts of the agreement already implemented (current issues), continued to be handled by EEC institutions[1].

From the very beginning, the centre of discussions within EEC institutions was the very nature of the Treaty of Athens: was it just an economic agreement, allowing Greek events to be dismissed as merely "domestic affairs", or had it a political nature? The main supporters of the second position were the Mixed Association Commission and the European Parliament. According to their point of view, since the Treaty of Athens provided for future access of Greece to the European Community, the text was necessarily more than just an economic agreement[2]. They referred in particular to the preamble of the Association Treaty, which stated that both Greece and the EEC were "determined in the common effort to safeguard peace and freedom, through the common pursuit of the ideal that inspired the signature of the funding treaty of the European Economic Community"[3]. However, during the debate, the vice-president of the EEC Commission, Levi Sandri, argued that the Commission was in a difficult position regarding Greece, and that the "status" of the association needed to be considered[4]. In fact, the funding treaty (Treaties of Rome, 1957) only contained a general reference to "liberty", while did not explicitly mention the word "democracy". Conversely, precise references to democracy and human rights were included in the 1949 funding statute of the Council of Europe, of which Greece was a member. This would constitute a major factor in shaping the more severe attitude towards Greece by the Council of Europe, as the political implications of being a member of the Council were clear.

At the end of this first debate, despite Greek permanent representative's (Costantinos Tranos) many attempts to convince his EEC colleagues that the Junta would restore a parliamentary regime as soon as the country was ready, on the 11th of May, 1967, the European Parliament unanimously approved the resolution presented by Martino and Schujit[5]. As already mentioned, a representative of the Commission of the EEC also participated in the EP session and, when questioned about the position of the

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[1] The sections of the treaty that were frozen concerned agricultural harmonization, the discussion of a new plan of financial aid, the engagement of the EEC in the construction of a Greek pole of industrialization and all the initiatives in the fields of technique and culture. In *Commission de l'Association avec la Grèce, le 29 Septembre à Bruxelles*, *note to Edoardo Martino*, 27th September 1967, in HAEU, EM 76 ("Association CEE-Grèce (02). 13 Mars/20 Octobre1967).

[2] *Meeting of the association commission with* Greece (European Parliament), 2nd May 1967, in PEO 18909.

[3] Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes (JOCE). 18.02.1963, n° 26.

[4] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.

[5] *Sessions du 8 au 11 mai 1967, in HAEU, PEO 3068 (proces verbaux des seances plenaries).*

Commission, he answered that the Commission shared the attitude and concern of the European Parliament. However, Levi Sandri also added that the situation was still too fluid and unclear to make any official statement, especially considering that none of the Six had yet decided whether to recognize the new government or not at a bilateral level, and that divergencies between the attitude of the EEC as a whole and singular member states was to be avoided. Furthermore, the Commission considered it to be necessary not to "leave alone" the Greek people by completely cutting ties with Greece[1].

Progressively, however, the major Western governments opted for not interrupting their diplomatic contacts with Greece, given that the ambassadors were accredited to the Court, and the King was still in his place. As Kostantina Maragkou argues, however, this argument was used as a façade to the fact that those governments considered vital to keep commercial and political relations with Greece in light of their national interests. This is proved by the fact that they would not deny diplomatic recognition to Greece neither after the King left the country, nor following the abolition of the Monarchy in 1973[2]. Among the Six, the first national government to restore normal relations with Greece was West Germany, by negotiating with the new Greek government a sale of seventy-five M-47 tanks in the middle of May[3].

As Coufoudakis underlines, the "scheme" of the first internal debate on Greece (with the European Parliament posing oral and written questions to the Commission and the Council) would repeat during the following seven years[4]. This is relevant because it was the first time that the EEC had to deal with a "re-arrangement" of an agreement basing on the change of the regime of one of the contracting parties. Therefore, at the beginning, a certain degree of uncertainty was normal. What interestingly emerged from the very beginning was that there was a consensus among the Six that the political structure of an associate member of the EEC was a matter of concern of the EP and EEC Commission, and that the development of the association could be seriously compromised by the development of the political situation in Greece[5].

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[1] *Note About The Discussion On The Resolution*, 3rd May 1967, in Conseil des Ministres CEE et Euratom - 1967(from now on CM2/1967 – 1101), HAEU.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp 33-34.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 38.
[4] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.
[5] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.

In June, the Mixed Association Commission proposed to organize an information gathering trip to Greece with the aim of dispelling the uncertainty about what was really happening there. Moreover, members discussed the possibility of inviting former Greek colleagues, who were no longer in office since the dismantling of the Parliament, to participate in the Commission's activities as "experts". Finally, the Commission's members addressed the EP and EEC Commission with a formal oral question about the possible consequences of the current situation in Greece on the association process[1].

In September, the Commission of the EEC announced that when approached for advice by the Bank of European Investment (BEI), the EEC had recommended against releasing the second part of the financing for the construction of a high speed road.[2] This was the first concrete action towards suspending any further initiative linked with the Association Agreement coming from the EEC Commission, which at first had been more reluctant than the European Parliament to take an official stance. Indeed, the Treaty of Athens provided funding aimed at improving Greek infrastructure, and high speed road project in Crete had been the first initiative implemented in that framework. Even though the BEI had no formal reason to oppose the funding, in the light of recent tensions between Greece and the EEC it's president decided to ask for the Commission's advice before releasing the money. By giving a negative recommendation, the Commission of the EEC probably wanted to give a clear sign that Europe was not to accept the changes in Greece.

Already in May, the EEC Commission's vice-president for External Relations, the Belgian Jean Rey, had expressed his personal concern about the Greek situation, and his sympathy for the acting of the EP. However, he did so in a confidential meeting, while officially he lined up with the neutral tone that the Commission and the Council of Ministers had decided to adopt at the beginning[3]. Later on, he participated in the Council Ministerial meeting of June, where the idea to intervene on the application of the association, limiting it to the "current affairs", was not opposed by the ministers[4]. At the same time, however, the Council of Ministers decided not to make any public statement

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[1] Minute of the Meeting of the Commission of Association, 19th June 1967, in HAEU, PEO 18910, and Minute of the Meeting of the Commission of Association, 6th July 1967, in HAEU, PEO 18911.
[2] *Letter from Rey (Commission President) to BEI* President, 28th September 1967, in HAEU, CM2/1967 1114.
[3] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.
[4] *221ème session du Conseil de la CEE, Bruxelles, 05 et 06.06.1967*, verbatim record, in HAEU, CM2/1967-38.

on the freezing of new initiatives related to association for the moment. As previously outlined, it was the EP that took a public stance against the regime. Still, as Soriano underlines, the decision of the EC Commission and Council of Ministers to favour the initiative of "freezing" further development of the agreement introduced a "normative yardstick" in the EEC external policy that did not exist before. From that moment on, human rights would have been a concern of the European institutions when dealing with associated or member countries[1].

In July, Rey became the new president of the EEC Commission, and Edoardo Martino the commissioner for External Relations. As emerged from their attitude towards the regime during the first phases of the debate, they shared a similar view on the Greek case. Therefore, their appointment as President and Commissioner for External Relations allowed a "harsher tone vis-à-vis the Greek Junta"[2]. It is not a case that only a few weeks after came the decision of the EEC not to advice the second part of the BEI loan. Of course, such a strong stance provoked a Greek reaction. During a meeting with the Council of Association, the new Greek permanent representative, Stavros Roussos, openly claimed that the EEC was not behaving legitimately by interrupting a *financial* program because of *political* reasons[3]. A few days later, he reiterated the concept to the Association Commission, advocating that a financial decision concerning BEI should be taken in accordance with BEI statute alone[4]. Once again, at the core of the discussion was the nature of Greece's associated status. While the action of the Commission and the Parliament were motivated by political considerations, Roussos defended the economic nature of the engagement between Greece and European institutions, and therefore called the EEC's recent initiatives illegitimate. A final response to such protestations came on the 28th of November during a meeting of the EP, when the President of the EEC Council, Schiller, emphatically reiterated that the association agreement was not only an economic agreement, but it had a political connotation as it would lead to the adhesion of Greece to the EEC[5].

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[1] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.
[2] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.
[3] Minute Of The Meeting Of The Council Of Association Greece-EEC, 17th October 1967, in HAEU, CM2 1967_1099.
[4] Minute of the Meeting of the Association Commission Greece-EEC, 19th October, 1967, in HAEU, PEO 18913.
[5] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.

Meanwhile, the Association Commission and Council had difficulties in getting clear information about the timing of the "normalization" process announced by the leaders of the Junta. Constantinos Rodopoulos, a former member of the Association Commission now appointed as formal interlocutor with the EP by the Greek government, reported the existence of two factions within the government: a moderate one, headed by the King and prime minister Kollias, and a radical one, headed by the colonels who had masterminded the coup. He was convinced that the King still had some room to *manoeuvre*, but it was fundamental that EEC institutions did not cut all relations with Greece, because this would favour the radical faction[1]. He also reported that the government had provided a timetable of stages leading to democratization, according to which a revision of the constitution would be presented on the 15th of December, then submitted for a six-month period of discussion and further revision. The final text would then be submitted to popular referendum and, if approved, parliamentary elections would follow[2]. According to Rodopoulos, the publication of the calendar was a positive sign that the Junta really wanted to restore parliamentary rule in the country as soon as possible. However, many within the European institutions did not trust the promises made by the Junta, and considered the democratization calendar as a means of procrastination. It is impossible to asses exactly whether this was the truth or not. What is certain is that the publication of the calendar followed a number of requests by the US to the Greek government to show some sign of good will. In fact, while Washington reacted enthusiastically to the publication of the timetable, the EEC expressed many doubts about the future implementation of the program. In a meeting on the 9th of November, 1967, the Association Commission members, with a representative of the Political Commission, decided not to take any further stance nor to make decisions before the 15th of December, when the publication of the revised constitution was expected[3].

#### 2.2.1.1 The Council of Europe

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[1] Minute of the Meeting of the Association Commission Greece-EEC with representative of the Commission of EEC, 9th November, 1967, in HAEU, PEO 18915.
[2] Reminder From Greek Ambassador In The US On The Democratization Calendar, 20th October, 1967, in HAEU CM2/1967 1101.
[3] Minute of the Meeting of the Association Commission Greece-EEC with representative of the Commission of the EEC, 9th November, 1967, in HAEU, PEO 18915.

As anticipated in the introduction of this work, the Council of Europe was the international body that most consistently attacked the Hellenic Regime. The fight between the two would become prominent during the biennium 1968-1969. However, the Greek case became part of the Council of Europe's agenda from its very first days. The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe used to meet four times per year, and a meeting was scheduled on the 24th of April, 1967. On that occasion, the Greek members were absent, some of them kept in custody in their houses by the military[1]. Also for this reason, the debate immediately focused on the events occurring in Greece. The majority of the Assembly members was willing to publicly condemn the military action in Greece, and call for action against the new government. However, because some of the members were reluctant to immediately advocate for expulsion, the Assembly decided to adopt a directive (*n. 256*), which urged the Greek government to restore democracy and respect the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights[2]. As outlined in the previous paragraph, only a few weeks later the EP would vote for a very similar resolution. As Sorano argues, this was not a coincidence, as the Council of Europe's directive became a sort of "model" to which national parliaments referred when claiming the necessity to respect human rights. The Austrian Social-Democrat Karl Czernetz, member of the Council of Europe, the German social-democrat Schmidt, and the Danish, Sweden and Norwegiam Foreign Ministers all asked to their national parliaments in which way they thought to implement the directive of the CoE. Also the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Luns, announced that the Netherlands' government would formally complain with the European Commission on Human Rights[3]. This is particularly interesting because, a few years later, when become Secretary General of NATO, Luns would act in a complete opposite manner, urging the

[1] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.
[2] Full text of the directive "*Politique générale du Conseil de l'Europe":* "L'Assemblée, 1. Déplore la suspension en Grèce de la légalité constitutionnelle. Membre du Conseil de l'Europe, la Grèce doit rester fidèle au Statut du Conseil de l'Europe notamment à son préambule; 2. Invite, en conséquence, les autorités grecques à rétablir le régime constitutionnel et la démocratie parlementaire, et s'élève dès à présent contre toutes mesures contraires à la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme ; 3. Charge le Bureau de s'enquérir du sort des députés grecs qui avaient été désignés par le Parlement grec comme membres de l'Assemblée.", in http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-FR.asp?fileid=13464&lang=FR.
[3] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.

Allies not to bring the Greek case to formal discussion, in order not to threaten the cohesion of the Alliance.

Also in this case, the Greek government claimed that they had had to declare the state of emergency because of a "communist threat", and, in a letter to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, they invoked article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, where the possibility to derogate the convention in case of threat to the nation was envisaged[1]. Taken into account the request of the Greek government, the Assembly of the Council of Europe decided, on 23 June 1967, to appoint a rapporteur "with a view to reporting at the next January Session on the reported violations of the fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms committed by the Greek Government so that action could be taken, if necessary, in terms of the Statute, whether or not a member Government presents the Greek case to the European Commission of Human Rights"[2].

In September, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands formally brought the Greek case to the attention of the European Commission on Human Rights. After that, the CoE Assembly and the European Parliament met jointly at the *Maison de l'Europe*. Here, someone suggested that also the EC could start the *iter* for a unilateral suspension of the association process with Greece. However, the project did not develop. In fact, as discussed in the following chapters, from the perspective of international law, a unilateral suspension of the Treaty of Athens would have been impossible to justify, as Greece had formally not violate any article of the Agreement[3].

### 2.2.2 NATO

The first meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee after the coup was held on the 28th of April. Greece was represented not by the permanent representative Christian Palamas, but by a deputy representative, Ioannis Pesmazoglu. The minute of the meeting did not record any comment on the events happened in Greece. The meeting's agenda remained unchanged, and representatives dealt with general issues

[1] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.
[2] *Resolution 346 (1967), Situation in Greece*, 23rd June, 1967, in https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=15761&lang=en.
[3] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.

related to the NATO defense plan and strategies. In that framework, Turkish and Greek defence plans were discussed. Both countries had always benefited from external aid provided by the Allies, aimed at strengthening their local forces and assuring their capacity to fulfil their defence tasks. During the meeting, Mr. Pesmazoglu stressed the importance of that contribution from the Allies, which was essential considering the geo-strategic importance of Greece, and its scarce national resources[1].

No comment about the coup and the following changes in Greek political settlement is recorded in NATO documents covering those months. Greece presented its new national representatives in the different NATO bodies, general Spandidakis for Defence, and Pavlos Oikonomou-Gouras for the Finance, who were warmly welcomed by their colleagues. Also during the NATO's Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting of 9 May the issue of the Greek coup was not formally raised. As Pedaliu underlines, this provided a "preview of how NATO would handle the Greek dictators over the next seven years"[2]. The decision not to mention explicitly the new regime in Greece was taken by the Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, and the permanent representative of the United States, Harlan Cleveland. This also confirms the attitude taken by the Johnson administration towards Athens, according to which disapproval should be communicated at a bilateral level and not in the NATO framework[3]. Another member which advocated the need not to put the issue of Greece on the NATO official agenda was Great Britain. According to London, official admonitions could be counter-productive because they would alienate a country which was fundamental within the Southern flank of the Alliance[4]. However, from the first days after the coup, Brosio had been aware that problems could rise within the Alliance, if the regime would not normalize. In fact, on 26 April 1967, during a meeting with Greek permanent representative Palamas, Brosio warned him that the Norwegian Prime Minister had already publicly declared that he would take initiative against the Greek regime[5].

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[1] *Record of a Defence Planning Committee Meeting*, 28th April, 1967, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(67)8.
[2] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[3] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[4] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 24-26.
[5] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 396-397.

The decision not to raise the issue at a Council level was not surprising as NATO maintained a traditional policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, provided that they posed no a threat to the Alliance as a whole. To this extent, the importance of Greece laid mainly in its geographical position, in its stability and reliability. From the very beginning, the new regime seemed to be in harmony with the West's interests. As Maragkou pointed out, Greece stood in the "eye of the vortex", encircled by a number of communists countries, and Soviet "sympathisers" such as Syria and Egypt. And, when in June 1967 the Six Days War started, with Israel on one side and Egypt, Syria and Jordan on the other, the importance of Greece became even more evident. For the first time, the Soviets deployed their surface fleet to openly challenge the US in the Mediterranean, and this showed their intentions to cultivate good relations with the oil-producing Arab countries[1]. In this picture, Greece was expected to be ready to fulfil NATO requests; considerations about which kind of government it was ruled by seemed not to be so relevant.

From its part, the new Greek government immediately showed a great affection to the Western "cause", and to NATO membership. On the same day of the coup, General Spandidakis publicly stated that Greece was a "strong supporter" of NATO, and that the military action had been designed in order to prevent the country from falling into an "Iron Curtain abyss"[2]. As previously mentioned, no evidence of a communist plan to seize power was ever provided; however, Athens was able to exploit the "spectre" of the Soviet threat, and this became an habit in its relations with the Allies in the following years. From their part, NATO members welcomed the expression of loyalty to the Alliance as an element of continuity with the previous governments, and therefore a sign of Greece's reliability. The importance given to Greek commitment to the Atlantic Alliance was to be expected, given the defensive nature of the organization and the background of the Cold War, and it also explains why NATO institutions had such a different attitude towards the Greek Colonels compared to the EEC ones.

The only NATO members which adopted a posture of resolute opposition to the Junta were Denmark and Norway, starting immediately after the coup in 1967. Even though their fighting against the Junta reached its peak within the Council of Europe, as

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[1] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 23-27.
[2] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, 21st April 1967, in FRUS 275 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 276.

discussed in the following paragraph, they also opposed the Junta within NATO institutions, especially during the 1970s, when the fight against the Colonels in the Council of Europe was won. Not only both Denmark and Norway traditionally followed a foreign policy based on principles of human rights. They also had no interests in Greece, and had opposed to the entrance of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Organization in the first place[1]. This opposition was due to the geographic position of Greece and Turkey as they were no proper "Atlantic" countries, and to a concern that the two countries did not have the democratic "credentials" to be admitted in the group[2]. The events occurred in 1967 seemed to prove that they were right. Still, in the immediate aftermath of the 21st April coup, the majority of the other NATO allies seemed to be concerned on how to best deal with the new regime without damaging NATO's interests and defence plans, rather than with questioning Greece's membership. Therefore, the Scandinavian countries' opposition did not have much resonance.

However, during the weeks that followed, popular protestation spread all over Western countries such as Italy, France, Canada, Belgium, the US and other. For this reason, some permanent representatives suggested the issue be fully discussed in the North Atlantic Ministerial Meeting (NAC) in June. Besides the Scandinavians, also Italy suggested that the Greek case was discussed during the meeting[3]. However, also this time Brosio refused, echoing McNamara's (Secretary of Defence of the United States) suggestion that the issue was treated at a bilateral level. To this extent, as already mentioned, the Six Days War helped the Colonels, as the Arab-Israeli conflict spread in a time in which the south-eastern flank of the Alliance was already threaten by the increase of Soviet presence[4]. In such a situation, a formal discussion of the Greek case would have had the only result to weaken the position of an ally which was fundamental in that moment. For this reason, the US administration excluded such possibility, and the Secretary General supporter its position.

However, a part from the raise of the Colonels, there was a matter of Greek politics which was closely monitored by NATO institutions and discussed at collective level: its

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[1] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[2] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[3] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 399-414.
[4] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.

relations with Turkey, especially regarding the issue of Cyprus. Since 1964, when episodes of civil war broke out on the island, NATO Secretary General had been giving an annual report on the current status of Greek-Turkish relations and on the inter-communitarian relations on the island. After the 1964 crisis, no sign of new conflict had manifested; however, as analysed in the following paragraphs, things would change by November of 1967.

### 2.2.3 The USA

US position towards the new Greek government was midway between NATO and EEC. On the one hand, Washington had always been a supporter of respecting fundamental human rights and democracy, but on the other hand, US administration did not deny its preference for a Greek government faithful to the West, albeit a military one, instead of an unstable yet democratic government. In light of these considerations, the US decided to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards Athens. Many have claimed that the US administration had contributed, or encouraged, the organization of the coup. This was a widely spread belief in Greece during the 1970s, to which had certainly contributed the consistent intervenes by the US administrations in Greek political affairs since WWII. If it is true that Washington did not want a triumph of the Centre Union at May 1967 elections, it is equally certain that it would not have supported a coup organized by some unknown colonels without the King or the high-grade generals of the Greek Army knowing anything about it. However, we are not in a position to be certain that, for instance, no one in the CIA could know something about the plotting, through their close links with the Greek Secret Services[1]. Additionally, what really matters to the aim of this work, is analyse the US *acting* after the coup.

On April 22, US Department of State instructed ambassador Talbot on some points considered as fundamental: first, the King should remain at his place except if forced out; second, he should put every effort in trying to obtain some concessions from the military, so as to make Greek people believe that he was still in control of the situation. In particular, the Head of US State Department Rusk mentioned the suspension of martial law, or a public decree stating the temporary nature of the extraordinary measures

[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 69.

adopted by the new government after the coup, as possible concessions to be negotiated by the King[1]. During this time, given a growing discontent with the Greek Junta among US public opinion, and the existence of a large and rich Hellenic Community in the country, Washington did not want to appear to be directly collaborating with the new government. This is why the US executive decided to adopt a partial embargo of arms to Greece, until they would have received concrete evidence that the new government was making every effort to restore a parliamentary regime[2]. Still, the Department of State instructed Talbot to continue with informal working relations with the Greek government, and the same strategy was adopted in the case of the Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) for Greece[3]. Although the White House decided to withhold from any public statement on the Greek situation in the coup immediate aftermath, the Americans were one of the first international powers to restore formal contacts with Greece. In fact, the US was not ready to take the risk that the Soviet bloc countries, which had approached the Greek government after the coup, could noticed the void left from the Western countries who used to be close to Greece and try to fill it[4].

During the first days after the coup, the correspondence between the White House and the US Embassy in Athens suggests that there was a belief in Washington that a constitutional regime could be restored soon in Greece: they only needed to manage the transition without other *coups de* théâtre. Already by the beginning of May, however, Talbot started reporting that the conditions announced by the new government as prerequisites before restoring democracy did not seem to be achievable shortly. He also communicated the hypothesis that democratic and leftist movements in Greece could recover from the initial shock and arrange some active opposition to the military; finally, he outlined that a huge number of Greeks seemed to think that the Americans were involved in the coup, or at least tolerated it[5]. This latter news appeared to concern the US

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[1] *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece, Washington*, 22nd April, 1967, in FRUS (Foreign Relations United States), 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Document 278.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 39.
[3] *Telegram From The Department Of State To The Embassy In Greece, Washington*, 24th April, 1967, in FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Document 280.
[4] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 39.
[5] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, May 5th, 1967, in 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Document 284.

the most, since a feeling of anti-Americanism in the country was to be avoided at all costs.

Another matter of concern for the US government was the fate of Andreas Papandreou, who had been imprisoned the night of the putsch. While he might represented a political threat because of his "radical" tendencies (as discussed in the introduction, at the moment of the coup he was emerging as the leader of the "left-wing" group within the Centre Union), he was married with an American woman and graduated in the US, he had had the American citizenship before renouncing it to do politics in his country, and he still held influential contacts in the United States, especially in the academic environment. Soon after his imprisonment, journalists had been allowed to visit him and acknowledge that he was "well treated". Of course, as Andreas Papandreou himself affirmed in his memoirs, this was a propagandistic action of the Junta. On that occasion, in fact, Papandreou and the journalists were forbidden to talk about political issues[1]. Ambassador Talbot seemed to have understood that junior Papandreou, with his increasing popularity in Greece and with elections to come, had been one of the reasons for the coup. Even though concern about his political ideas was probably shared by the US administration, Washington insisted that he be freed, because they needed some success to sway public opinion and present to the Congress, which was not entirely aligned with the non-inference stance of Johnson's administration. While Papandreou was in prison, his wife and his attorney managed to mobilize his friends abroad, particularly those among the American academic community. Among them, some very well-known personalities such as Senator Fulbright and Martin Luther King Jr, were very actively promoting Papanreous' liberation[2]. Naturally, the involvement of such personalities constituted a problem from Washington, as it implied some criticism to the US government's position on the Greek issue. Therefore, obtaining the liberation of Papandreou became necessary in order to stop such critics.

The US government still believed that a failure of the coup would be worse than its success, because a failure would have led the country into chaos, favouring the rise of the leftists. This is why they did not withdraw diplomatic recognition, nor took any formal action against the new Greek rulers. Conversely, intellectuals, academics, journalists and many political personalities stood up against the new regime in Greece,

[1] Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front, André Deutsch Limited, London, 1971, p. 27.
[2] Papandreou A., Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front, André Deutsch Limited, London, 1971, p. 36.

and raised their voices against the "tolerance" of their government. This happened not only in the US, as already mentioned, but also in many other Western countries, such as the United Kingdome, France, and Italy, where protests against the Greek dictatorship merged with the ones against the war in Vietnam, and the Greek Junta "became a source of serious political concern"[1]. However, as will be outlined in the following chapters, national governments often failed concrete action against the methods of the Colonels and their military police, while concrete initiatives aimed at pressing for the restoration of democracy and respect for civil rights were directed mostly by non-governmental bodies (just to name some of them: *Amnesty International, the International Red Cross Committee, the Socialist International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Labour Organization, and the World Council of Churces*)[2].

In June, Athens announced that the constitution would be subjected to revision. Even though the US welcomed the news, ambassador Talbot reiterated the importance of showing some improvement in the treatment of political prisoners, and to take some steps forward in the process of democratization[3]. However, when a few weeks later, in July, it became clear that democratization would take more time than expected, Rusk suggested to President Johnson to change their strategy. From the very day of the coup, he said, Washington had been strongly reducing its supply of military weapons (included in the MAP, Military Assistance Program) to Greece. However, this approach did not bring the results the US had hoped for. For this reason, Washington needed to reconsider its position. If the hard line had failed, maybe a softer one could bring better results. And when the Six-Day War started, his stances seemed even more convincing. According to Rusk, the interruption of the military assistance program could give rise to anti-American feelings in Greece, and even make Greece follow the "French example" of withdrawing from the NATO military structure[4]. Despite being convincing, Rusk's suggestions were not adopted at the time because of the opposition they encountered at the Congress[5]. The

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[1] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 154.
[3] *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece*, Washington, 31st May, 1967, in 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Doc. 293.
[4] *Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson*, Washington, 21st July, 1967, in FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Doc. n° 296.
[5] Varsori A., L'Occidente e la Grecia: dal colpo di stato militare alla transizione alla democrazia (1967-1976), in Del Pero, M. – Gavìn, V. – Guirao, F. – Varsori, A., Democrazie. L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Le Monnier, 2010, p. 19.

Six-Day War ended, and the situation seemed to calm down; however, a new source of concern, this time directly involving Greece, was to become an urgent issue.

## 2.3 Cyprus: a never-ending crisis.

Since the end of World War II, both NATO and the US considered good relations between Greece and Turkey to be a crucial element for Eastern Mediterranean security. In fact, worsening relations between the two countries could give the Soviets a further means of infiltration into the region. It was no coincidence that Athens and Ankara had been offered with the aid from the Marshall plan on the same occasion, just when a truce between them was being promoted by the US. As well as the US and NATO, there was another country that was interested in keeping Greece and Turkey from an open conflict, especially if this would involve the island of Cyprus, and this was Great Britain. However, the rivalry between the two countries had very deep roots and was not so easy to erase. Starting from 1821, when the Greeks gained their independence from the Ottoman rule, Greece and Turkey had had frequent conflicts (culminating in the Asia Minor conflict of 1922). This contributed to the creation of an environment where Athens and Ankara did not trust each other. The Cyprus issue was, and still is, one of the reasons of such a climate of distrust. Furthermore, as George Kaloudis underlines, both the governments of Greece and Turkey had in different occasions used the Cyprus issue to divert the attention of their people from domestic issues, as a means to criticize former governments or political opponents, or to improve their popularity[1]. As outlined in the following chapters, this happened also during the seven years of military rule in Greece.

As a small island in the Aegean, between Turkey and Greece, Cyprus had belonged for centuries to the Ottoman Empire. However, its people was mostly of Greek ethnicity. In 1878 the Ottomans allowed Great Britain to occupy the island, in return for protection from Russian expansionism over the area. The *status quo* lasted until the end of the Ottoman Empire when, instead of giving independence to the island, Great Britain decided to abrogate the old agreement (1914), and then to annex Cyprus as an official colony (1925)[2]. The issue of Cyprus rose again during the 1950's, when the Greek

[1] Kaloudis G., "Cyprus: the Enduring Conflict", in International Journal on World Peace, March 1999, Vol. 16, n. 1, pp. 3-18. .
[2] Biagini F. A., *Storia della Turchia Contemporanea*, Bompiani – Storia Paperback, Firenze, 2017, p. 27.

representatives at the UN and at the Council of Europe asked for self-determination for the Greek Cypriots. This was the result of a nationalist struggle going on the island, where an unofficial plebiscite on *enosis* had been organized in 1951, and of riots taking place not only on the island but also in Athens, where there was wide sympathy for the Greek Cypriot nationalist cause[1]. At first, when Greece in bring the issue of Cyprus' self-determination to the attention of the United Nation, in 1954, the UN refused to inscribe it on their agenda. The strongest opponent to the request was Great Britain, who wanted to keep its domination over the military bases on the island. In fact, Great Britain (but also NATO) was concerned with the growing popularity of AKEL, the Communist Party in Cyprus, and therefore with the possibility that Cyprus became a base for the Soviet Union[2]. Such a possibility would threaten British influence on the area enormously and, at the same time, constituted a reason of concern for the NATO Allies. Washington in fact, who had never showed any sign of sympathy for the *enosis* cause, agreed with Great Britain in claiming that Cyprus was a matter of "exclusively domestic jurisdiction"[3].

Meanwhile, Turkey started to be interested in the issue again, stating that, if Cyprus would become independent, a *Greek* domination was not so obvious[4]. This interest was stimulated by British Prime Minister Eden in 1955[5], and brought to new protests and terrorist attacks in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. The refuse to discuss the Cyprus issue in the context of the United Nations renewed the outbreak of riots in Athens and Salonika (especially against the US offices), and in Cyprus, where the attacks were directed against British installations and properties[6]. Riots in Cyprus were orchestrated and directed by General Grivas, a Greek-Cypriot officer, and its nationalist organization EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston)*. At the end of 1955, the situation was so tense that the British government invited the Greek and Turkish government to a conference in London, whose official aim was to discuss the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean[7]. The conference was a failure, since each participant re-affirmed its original position: Greece would not accept any agreement which excluded the possibility

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[1] Woodouse C. M., Modern Greece: a Short History, Faber and Faber, London – Boston, 1991, p. 270.
[2] Kaloudis G., "Cyprus: the Enduring Conflict", in International Journal on World Peace, March 1999, Vol. 16, n. 1, pp. 3-18.
[3] Woodouse C. M., Modern Greece: a Short History, Faber and Faber, London – Boston, 1991, p. 270.
[4] Biagini F. A., *Storia della Turchia Contemporanea*, Bompiani – Storia Paperback, Firenze, 2017, p. 163.
[5] Kaloudis G., "Cyprus: the Enduring Conflict", in International Journal on World Peace, March 1999, Vol. 16, n. 1, pp. 3-18.
[6] Woodouse C. M., Modern Greece: a Short History, Faber and Faber, London – Boston, 1991, 272.
[7] Woodouse C. M., Modern Greece: a Short History, Faber and Faber, London – Boston, 1991, pp 272-273.

for *enosis*, Turkey affirmed the exact opposite, while the UK would not make any commitment on a change of sovereignty on the island. At the end of the year, the Greek government addressed once again the UN with the issue, and the UN refused once again to inscribe it on their agenda[1].

After almost three years of tension and unsuccessful talks between the parties involved, in 1958 Great Britain announced a new plan for Cyprus, the so called MacMillan Plan. Harold MacMillan, the British Prime Minister, brought it personally to the attention of the Greek government in Athens, which was now led by Kostaninos Karmanlis. The proposition consisted of a seven-year scheme, in which the Cypriot Greeks and Turks would be represented by two separate governments division, with two independent administrations, while Great Britain would be in charge of foreign affairs. Karamanlis rejected the proposition, and Great Britain seemed on the verge to impose such a collaboration between Greek and Turks representatives at the government anyway. But Cyprus' archbishop Makarios, also a prominent politician and supporter of the *enosis* cause, turned the table announcing that he would accept independence for Cyprus as an alternative to *enosis*. The announcement was welcomed by the Greek government, which found itself in a very difficult position between the domestic opinion which sympathized with the Greek-Cypriots and its commitment to the British and American allies. However, the idea was refused by Grivas, who almost repudiated Makarios[2].

Private talks between Ankara and Athens started soon after in Paris, with the participation of Great Britain, then continued in London and Zurich, and finally led to the creation of the Independent Republic of Cyprus on 16th August, 1960. The treaty provided for strong Greek leadership of the island, with broad guarantees for the Turkish community; archbishop Makarios, a moderate but nationalist Greek-Cypriot politician, was elected as president, and the sovereignty of the two military bases remained British (these bases would emerge, in the following years, as the only safe left for the defence of British interests in the Middle Eastern region, therefore being considered as vital)[3]. The Greek and Turk communities would have two different communal assemblies, plus

[1] Woodouse C. M., Modern Greece: a Short History, Faber and Faber, London – Boston, 1991, pp. 277-290.
[2] Woodouse C. M., Modern Greece: a Short History, Faber and Faber, London – Boston, 1991, p. 277-290.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 27-35.

a joint national one; both Greeks and Turks could keep a defined number of troops on the island. The agreement was signed by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey; it provided for the integrity of the Cypriot territory and forbade annexation with third countries (namely, Greece)[1].

During the 1960's, stability on the island still appeared to be a far-away objective. Tensions between the two communities kept increasing and led to riots in 1963, and to episodes of civil war in 1964. This time, the crisis arose from the constitution imposed by the London-Zurich agreement, which had *de facto* provided the minority of the Turks (through their disproportionate representation) with the power to frustrate all the administration, a power they consistently exercised. As a consequence of this, in 1963 Makarios announced his intention to abrogate the constitution unilaterally, reducing Turkish representation, and communal violence immediately broke out[2]. Turkey interpreted Makarios' gesture as a step towards creating the conditions for future *enosis*, and therefore Ankara announced that troops would be sent to the island if Greeks did not renounce the idea of enosis. US president Johnson orchestrated a mediation mission, and UN contingents were sent to Cyprus in order to guarantee that the separate zones on the island were respected[3]. For the next two years, Cyprus remained relatively calm. However, the military coup in Greece turned the tables again.

Soon after the seizure of power by the military in Greece, general Grivas (who was now the leader of the *Greek National Guard* in Cyprus) expressed enthusiasm for the idea that *enosis* could return to the Greek governmental agenda. Despite the Military Junta being strongly nationalistic, his hopes remained unfulfilled[4]. In May, US ambassador Talbot informed Washington that he had had a meeting with Papadopolous concerning Cyprus: in his opinion, the military junta was still so engrossed in

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[1] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 3.
[2] Woodouse C. M., Modern Greece: a Short History, Faber and Faber, London – Boston, 1991
[3] Biagini F. A., *Storia della Turchia Contemporanea*, Bompiani – Storia Paperback, Firenze, 2017, p. 168.
[4] During the years of discussion on Cyprus, General Grivas guided the so called EOKA, National Organizations of Greek Fighters (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*). He was a strong nationalist, and the aim of his organization (which counted thousands of volunteers) was fighting to free Cyprus from British rule. Nothing of the sort existed among the Turkish inhabitants of the island, who were a minority. Furthermore, EOKA members were strongly united to one another, and to Greece, by a common religious sentiment; a reference to the Trinity of the Orthodox Church was mentioned in the oath of the Organization, while Turkish Cypriots were not at all as tied with Islam. In Abulafia D., *Il Grande Mare. Storia del Mediterraneo,*, Mondadori, Milano, 2013, p. 591.

"consolidating their position within the army and in familiarizing themselves with […] domestic problems that they have not yet begun to focus seriously on Cyprus"[1].

A month later, Greek and Turkish foreign ministers had a confrontation over Cyprus during the NATO Council meeting of 13th June. The meeting took place immediately after the end of the Six Days War, which had brought about again the importance of having US military facilities and access both in Greece and Turkey. On that meeting, apparently for the first time after the coup of April, the Turkish Foreign Minister openly mentioned the changes occurred into the Greek political system. The aim was not to discuss the nature of those changes, but to underline the fact that, since the seizure of power by the military, bilateral talks over Cyprus (which had begun with the former government represented by Mr. Stefanopoulos) had been interrupted. He also denounced the operations being carried out by Greek military on the island, stating that their aim was to intimidate the Turks[2]. The Greek foreign minister immediately agreed, personally and as a representative of his government, that, as stated by his Turkish counterpart, dialogue over Cyprus was important; however, he totally refused the interpretation of the situation on the island given by his colleague, which he defined as "normal in its abnormality"[3]. In fact, he stated that the Greek government had never ceased encouraging Cypriot institutions to be moderate and calm[4]. Despite the agreement on the importance of keeping contacts and good relations, the impression was that a potential conflict between Turkey and Greece, when Cyprus was involved, was possible at any moment. This is supported by the amount of attention given to the topic even when there had been no real incidents on the island, and considering that Cyprus was not even a NATO member.

In August, Papadopoulos visited Cyprus. He wanted probably to give the Allies a sign of goodwill on an issue they considered crucial. Then, in September, a conference was held between the Greek and the Turkish governments over the problem of finding a solution for Cyprus. Once again, the initiative proved not to be successful, since the two country insisted on their original stances: *enosis* (with compensation for Turkey) was the

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[1] *Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, 10th May 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 287.
[2] *Minute of the Council Meeting*, 13th June 1967, NATO Archives, C-VR(67)26_BIL.
[3] *Minute of the Council Meeting*, 13th June 1967, NATO Archives, C-VR(67)26_BIL.
[4] *Minute of the Council Meeting*, 13th June 1967, NATO Archives, C-VR(67)26_BIL.

Greek idea, while *double enosis* (with the partition of the island) or the maintenance of the status quo decided in 1960, constituted the Turkish proposals[1].

Between June and September, US Department of State, NATO Council, and UN General Assembly discussed the situation in Cyprus and its future in many occasions. Among others, the possibility of a Greek coup on the island was not excluded, especially by Washington. This was the worst scenario that NATO could have imagined, since it would have led without doubt to an open conflict between two members of the Alliance, Turkey and Greece. It was no coincidence that, after being informed by the Turkish ambassador that Ankara believed Athens was only "acting" in its aim at effective bilateral talks in order to make a good impression on NATO[2], Washington proposed to assist the two countries in their discussions[3].

### 2.3.1. November, 1967.

Meanwhile, the international attention on Cyprus was echoing on the island. Discontent was growing among Turkish Cypriots because of the fear of *enosis* and of a possible suppression of their constitutional rights; furthermore, General Grivas and his nationalist supporters were resolute not to give up with the idea of union (*enosis*). In addition, the Soviet Union was fueling international tension, by declaring itself as a guarantor of the independence of the Republic and sympathizing with president Makarios (who was not fully trusted by the US), and, at the same time, supporting the second Turkish solution (maintenance of the 1960 status quo)[4].

This was the general back-ground against which the events of 15th November took place in the village of Agios Theodoros. According to a report by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), three shots and a burst of automatic fire came from Turkish Cypriots after the decision taken by Greek police to resume patrols

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 40-44.
[2] *Telegram From The Embassy In Turkey To The Department Of State*, 29th August, 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 299.
[3] *Telegram From The Department Of State To The Embassy In Turkey*, 18th September, 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 303.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 40-44.

in the area[1]. That first incident resulted in a mass reaction from Grivas controlled forces, leading to the killing of 24 Turkish and 2 Greek Cypriots. After months of suspect and complains about Greek intentions, Ankara's reaction was immediate. Turkey fled fighters over the island, started making preparation for invasion, and massed its troops at the Greek borders[2]. Then, on the 17th of November, Turkey presented its demands to the Greek government in order to end the conflict: the removal of Greek troops from the island, the recall of general Grivas (as a compensation for Turkish casualties), and the end of restrictions on Turkish Cypriots[3]. Efforts of mediation among the two countries carried out by US diplomacy massively increased. The NATO Council and Military Committee immediately met in order to discuss possible implications of a war between Greece and Turkey; in a memorandum of the 21st of November, the NATO Military Committee stated that as they "had previously reported, the Southern Flank of the Alliance is an area of relative weakness: alerts, deployments or, above all, combat operations directed by Greek or Turkish armed forces towards Cyprus or toward one another, would degrade NATO already minimal defenses in this area, in some case drastically, and would expose new or greatly heightened vulnerabilities to the Warsaw Pact"[4].

Few days after the incident, noticing that Greece and Turkey were struggling to find a solution to the crisis, NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio decided to intervene personally. Through an urgent message sent to Ankara and Athens he offered his personal help to both countries (in the framework of the Three Wise Men Report[5]) in order to solve the dispute and avoid a war. On the 22nd and 23rd of November respectively, Greece and Turkey accepted the offer. Reporting his action to the Council, Brosio specified that his mission would concern exclusively the solution of current issues that were threatening peace and coexistence of two allies, and *not* the Cyprus question

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[1] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 4.
[2] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 4.
[3] *Editorial Note*, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 307.
[4] Memorandum for the Members of the Military Committee, 21st November, 1967, in NATO Archives, International Military Staff Working Memorandum fund (from now on IMSWM), Doc. 219-67.
[5] The Three Wise Men Report was created by NATO in 1956 with the aim of enhancing non-military cooperation and coordination within NATO in the areas of politics, economics and science. The report took his name by the foreign ministers selected to submit the study: Lester B. Pearson, from Canada; Gaetano Martino, from Italy; and Halvard Lange, from Norway. According to paragraph 57 of the Report, in the case of the Cyprus dispute, initiatives could have been carried out by NATO only if both Athens and Ankara would accept the offer.

as such[1]. In making this passage clear, he reiterated one of the founding NATO principles, that of non-interference in other countries' issues, as long as not threatening the security of the Alliance. Given that Cyprus was not a member of the Alliance, this principle was even more applicable. According to Brosio's diaries, the idea of the mission was a consequence of the pressure coming from the US[2]. Also Great Britain, which had interest in keeping the situation under control both as a NATO member and at a national level because Cyprus was member of the Commonwealth and there were to British military bases on the island, instructed its Ambassador to intervene in favour of a de-escalation of the crisis[3].

In parallel to the mission conducted by Brosio, president Johnson nominated Cyrus Vance (US Deputy Secretary of Defense) as special mediator. He was instructed to take contact with all actors involved, including Cyprus president Makarios, to convince them avoiding further conflicts. His principal objective, shared with ambassador Talbot, was to convince Greek authorities to make some gestures of good will towards Turkey, and to avoid worsening of the conflict in the short term. Between the 23rd November od and the 4th December, he repeatedly visited Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Despite some difficulties concerning Turkish conditions for peace, at the end of November Ambassador Talbot reported that Greeks were "really committed to avoid war and have accepted to limit military calls-up and movements in order not to provoke Turkey"[4]. The Greek principal representative in negotiations was foreign minister Panagiotis Pipinelis, a politician with a lot of experience that joined the military government from the very beginning. Knowing that Greece could not afford a war with Turkey, understanding that US would remain neutral in that hypothetic war, and having negotiated some points with Ankara, Pipinelis finally announced that Greece was ready to accept Turkish conditions[5].

At the end of November, one lasting problem worried Washington: the attitude of Archbishop Makarios. While Ankara and Athens seemed to have reached an agreement, with the aid of NATO, UN, and US mediation, Makarios publicly stated that Cyprus

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[1] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, 24th November 1967, in NATO Archives C-R(67)48.
[2] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 442-465.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 35.
[4] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, 25th November, 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 321.
[5] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, 28th November, 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 330.

could not just accept decisions taken by two "foreign" powers. Since it was an independent Republic, Nicosia should have a voice in negotiations. Even though he appreciated the US diplomatic efforts and the good results, Makarios' goal was a total demilitarization of the island, except for normal police[1]. This idea conflicted with a section of the agreement reached by Athens and Ankara, which provided for an increase in presence of UN forces in Cyprus, which, on the contrary, he considered inappropriate. Furthermore, a report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) outlined that Makarios still did not trust Turkish good faith and, even worse, that his suspicions about Ankara's intentions had been fueled by the Soviets. According to CIA Director, Mr. Helms, even though there was no report of Soviet military activity on the island, the Russians were "fishing in troubled waters by egging on the Turks and telling the Cypriots that Turkey was bluffing"[2].

It is difficult to determine whether this statement was true; what is certain is that President Makarios never wanted to completely cut relations with the USSR. This, and his tolerance for the presence of a para-communist party on the island, were the reason why Washington never fully trusted Makarios[3]. Furthermore, the neo-born Republic of Cyprus had participated in 1961 to the Belgrade conference, where the "non-aligned" movement was born. This was a sort of evolution of the neutralist movement born in Bandung in 1955. According to the definition adopted in Belgrade, a "non-aligned" country did not support openly, and was not tied in large alliance, related to one of the two "blocs"[4].

However, on the occasion of the 1967 crisis, the US believed that, even though Makarios could cause "troubles in many ways", he would not directly hinder Vance's mediation mission[5]. NATO Secretary General, Brosio, shared that idea, even though he agreed that Makarios could be not fully trusted. In fact, during the days of his mission, he reported on his Diaries that what NATO should have done was to arrange an agreement between the Greeks and the Turks, to the disadvantage of Makarios. Because

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[1] *Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State*, 29th November, 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 333.
[2] *Summary Notes of the 579th Meeting of the National Security Council*, Washington, 28th November, 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 332.
[3] In Di Nolfo, E., *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali. Gli anni della Guerra Fredda 1946-1990*, Edizioni Laterza, Bari, 2015, pp. 374-383.
[4] In Di Nolfo, E., *Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali. Gli anni della Guerra Fredda 1946-1990*, Edizioni Laterza, Bari, 2015, pp. 374-383.
[5] *Summary Notes of the 579th Meeting of the National Security Council*, Washington, 28th November 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 332.

it has been him, in the end, who had caused the last crisis. However, Brosio also admitted that such a solution was not possible, because neither the Turks nor the Greeks were acting "rationally"[1]. Despite these considerations, when he returned to Brussels on the 30th of November, he stated that his mission was accomplished. Even though he recognized that long term initiatives for the problem's solution had been omitted from the agreement, he considered avoiding a war between two NATO members to be a great success. From that point, it was up to Turkey and Greece to restore bilateral talks and find a definitive solution to resolve their hostilities[2]. What also emerges from Brosio's Diaries, however, is that NATO played a secondary role in the management of the crisis, while Vance, instructed by Washington, emerged as the protagonist of the mediation mission. Additionally, Brosio reports that the US and Vance conducted the negotiations under the umbrella of the United Nations, not of NATO[3].

At the beginning of December 1967, the crisis seemed to be overcome. Makarios was still creating some problems, but tensions had strongly subsided. However, a new problem was to "disturb" the Greek Junta, an issue that was somehow connected to Cyprus and would become an opportunity for the military to strengthen its rule.

## 2.5 The Royal Counter Coup

As mentioned in the first paragraph, at the moment of the coup King Kostantine II chose to accept the *fait accompli*. Encouraged by US diplomacy, he initially tried to influence the action of the new government through its non-military members, like Prime Minister Kollias. After a few months, however, it was clear that the King's ideals differed from those of the leaders of the coup, and above all with Georgios Papadopoulos. He probably thought that the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis provided a chance to turn his discontent into action against the military Junta.

On the night between the 12th and the 13th of December, King Costantinos II left Athens with his family and Prime Minister Kollias. They have previously met on the 6th of December with the III Corps Commander Peridis and General Dovas, who had warned

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[1] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, p. 447.
[2] *Greek-Turkish Relations. Secretary's General Watching Brief*, to Permanent Representative from Secretary General, 8th December, 1967, Bruxelles, in NATO Archives PO(67)_873.
[3] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, p. 451.

the King that a military action against the junta would have been difficult, since they could not count on *all* officers in the North (which were those supposed to be still loyal to the King). Still, when on 12 December the King informed Kollias that he was taking the initiative, the prime minister decided to follow him[1]. They moved to Kavala (in the North of the country), where the pro-monarchy contingents of the Armed Forces were located. From Kavala, the King tried to rally his supporters and asked via radio the support of Greek people. Then, he got in contact with US diplomacy, counting on their support[2]. Nothing turned out as he had hoped: Greek people seemed to be almost indifferent to the appeal of their King, and, among the Army, only a few loyalists responded to his call. US administration instructed the Ambassador not to intervene directly for the moment.

While the King failed to organize a successful action, the Colonels wasted no time to respond. The Junta immediately declared that the King and Prime Minister Kollias had been deposed. The latter was replaced by Georgios Papadopoulos himself, and General Zoitakis was appointed regent. On the same day, King Costantinos II and his family flew to Italy, where they would remain for the entire period of the Junta regime[3].

The Junta's readiness in responding to the King's action suggests that the leaders of the Army envisaged the possibility of such an attempt. According to Woodhouse, the Junta was well aware of the meeting of the 6 December[4]. This seems to be confirmed by an undated letter written by Ambassador Talbot to Brewster (US Country Director for Greece), in which he referred to rumors that the Junta was prepared to face a "royal putsch"[5]. According to Talbot, the King could count on Generals who were disappointed by the Junta's attitude during the Cyprus' crisis, and particularly by the decision to withdraw Greek troops from the island[6]. Even though this was a reasonable assessment,

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 45.
[2] The general organization of the counter-coup was not efficient. In a report to his government, French ambassador Jacques Bayens told that Larissa's radio (the one chosen by the King to launch his appeal) didn't even reach large areas of the country. In *L'action du Roi Costantin*, 19th December, 1967, in Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (from now on CADN), Doc. 1145/EU, fond 48PO/B 295 (Athènes).
[3] Varsori A., L'Occidente e la Grecia: dal colpo di stato militare alla transizione alla democrazia (1967-1976), in Del Pero, M. – Gavìn, V. – Guirao, F. – Varsori, A., Democrazie. L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Le Monnier, 2010, p. 22.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p.44.
[5] Letter From The Ambassador To Greece (Talbot) To The Country Director For Greece (Brewster), in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 343.
[6] Letter From The Ambassador To Greece (Talbot) To The Country Director For Greece (Brewster), in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 343.

the King probably overestimated his support among the military; moreover, he took Greek popular support for granted, which was actually almost inexistent.

In Europe, news of the Royal attempt was unexpected. On the contrary, as previously mentioned, the US was at least partially aware of the facts. In September, the King had met US president Johnson and they had discussed his views on the Greek Junta. On that occasion, the King had stressed that the military did not have a real political program, nor political abilities. This, and relations between the Junta and the King becoming more tense every day, was predicted to lead to an open confrontation sooner or later. Kostantinos also had told Johnson that he was considering to move with his family to the North of the country, where the loyalists military were, and had asked whether, in the case of a direct confrontation with the Junta, Washington would provide military support for his effort. In responding, Johnson had made quite clear that a military intervention was not feasible, and that, in any case, it was not a decision he could made on his own[1].

Given the regular contact between the King and US diplomats, the hypothesis of the King taking the initiative without consulting them was probably not envisaged by the US. King Costantinos, from his perspective, maybe thought that, once facing the *fait accompli*, Washington would eventually support the initiative. This could explain why Ambassador Talbot was informed only in the morning of the 13th December, while the plan was already being implemented. Talbot reaction was very cautious. Taking into consideration the high level of uncertainty of the royal quest, he preferred not to take a side and see how things would turn out. However, he communicated to Washington that US interests lied in the King being successful, since his failure would probably not only destroy the monarchy, but also solidify the "extreme military junta on Greece for years to come"[2].

While this was happening in Greece, Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis and General Spandidakis were in Brussels, attending a NATO ministerial meeting. From a telegram sent by Talbot to Washington we know that the King asked him to inform the two (using US diplomatic channel) of what was going on, and to order them to join his action[3]. We

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[1] *Memorandum Of Meeting Between President Johnson And King Constantine*, 11th September 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 301.
[2] *Telegram From The Embassy In Greece To The Department Of State*, 13th December 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 346.
[3] Telegram From The Embassy In Greece To The Mission To The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13th December 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume Xvi, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 343.

do not have records of their response, but we do know that Pipinelis kept his position as foreign minister until his death in 1971, which suggests he declined the King's invitation. Some of those attending the meeting, as Pedaliu reports, expressed their concern about the events in Greece. However, when the news that the King was safe in Italy reached the meeting, formal discussion of the issue was avoided again. In fact, no mention of the events appears in the final *communiqué*[1].

The American Ambassador Talbot was also called by the Junta leader Papadopoulos and, on the very same day of the counter-coup, they met. Papadopoulos asked him whether the US was involved in the attempt to "overthrown" the Revolution, to which Talbot denied US involvement. Then, Papadopoulos asked him to do his best in order to avoid bloodshed in Greece. The Ambassador gave a vague answer, limiting himself to making a comparison between US aims during the Vance mission (avoiding the spread of violence, or a war) and the current situation[2]. At this stage, the US still thought that the royal action could be successful, and this is why Talbot did not commit himself to Papadopoulos. In the afternoon of the 13th December, Washington was still considering the possibility of publicly supporting the royal action if it managed to secure the support of a consistent part of the Army[3]. In fact, even though the Military leaders seemed to guarantee political stability in Greece, the US had always considered the King to be *the* political interlocutor to deal with. In the view of the US, as long as the monarchy could retain some power, the dictatorship could be considered as *temporary*, and *reversible*. Moreover, since the King was the legitimate Head of the State of Greece, the US administration could claim that nothing was changed in diplomatic terms.

The day after the royal attempt, Talbot met Papadopoulos, now as Prime Minister. On behalf of Washington, he tried to convince him to negotiate a peaceful solution with the King, but Papadopoulos categorically refused. He said that, by leaving the country, "the King had crossed the river and cut the bridges behind him"[4]. Later in the afternoon, the US seemed to finally recognize the failure of the King when, in a telegram, the

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[1] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[2] *Telegram From The Embassy In Greece To The Department Of State*, 13th December 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 345.
[3] *Telegram From The Embassy In Greece To The Department Of State*, 13th December 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 347.
[4] *Telegram From The Embassy In Greece To The Department Of State*, 14th December 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 348.

definition "abortive countercoup" appeared[1]. The only one who seemed not to give up was the King himself, who, on the 19th of December, during a phone call with US secretary of state Rusk, asked not to recognize the new government in Greece, and pressure it for his return.

In the aftermath of the military coup of April, when the issue of recognizing the new government came to the fore, many governments had exploited the fact that ambassadors were accredited to the Greek King, and not the Greek government[2]. Among those, the United Kingdome and the US, the main Western Allies of Greece. This time, however, the situation was different. Whit the King gone, and a regent chosen by the self-proclaimed Prime Minister Papadopoulos, Greece's international partners had again to deal with the issue of recognition. In asking the US not to recognize the new regime, the King was probably counting on the fact that such change could not be ignored from Greece's international partners. He was wrong. In fact, this time Washington answered firmly to the King: they could not negotiate for his return[3]. Still, they would try to persuade the new government to make visible steps towards a restoration of the parliamentary.

In the immediate aftermath of the abortive counter-coup, all diplomatic missions in Athens refrained from taking action, waiting for instructions from their national governments. Legally, the acting of the Junta (appointing a Regent and a new prime minister without election) were not in conformity with the Greek constitution of 1952, which was still technically in force. Therefore, automatic recognition of the regime was not guaranteed. The Colonels were aware of the delicate situation too, as they repeatedly claimed that the Head of the State had technically remained unchanged. However, the reality was different from the rhetoric, as the prohibition of broadcasting the King's New Year message testified. After this first phase of indecision, on the 19th of January the American government announced the resumption of its relations with the regime. Nearly a week after, the British government made the same decision, even if refraining from any public declaration about it outside the Parliament. Progressively, all the major

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[1] *Telegram From The Embassy In Greece To The Department Of State*, 14th December 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 349.
[2] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[3] *Telegram From The Department Of State To The Embassy In Greece*, 19th December 1967, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, doc. 350.

aligned with this position[1]. For many of them, recognizing the Greek Regime was the necessary result of considerations which concerned defence (especially for NATO members such as the US, Great Britain, and Turkey), economy, trade, and commercial relations (these were the cases of West Germany, France, and again Great Britain). It should be outlined that, while these national governments decided to restore full diplomatic relations with the Greek Regime, the Council of Europe – in which many of these countries had a representative – was going for a provisional suspension of Greece, on the supposition that "an acceptable parliamentary democracy would not be restored by the spring of 1969"[2].

[1] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 50-61.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 62.

# 3. Papadopoulos and the Authoritarian Turn (December, 1967 – December, 1969)

## 3.1 Authoritarian rule, democratic façade.

The failure of the Royal counter-coup attempt resulted in strengthened the regime. In fact, it presented the new rulers with a pretext to acquire unrestricted powers. Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos emerged as the strong man of the Junta. After the King escaped to Italy, new purges took place within the Armed Forces: between 1967 and 1968, one sixth of the officials were dismissed, especially the monarchists[1]. The new government, headed by Papadopoulos himself, consolidated power by neutralising all possible enemies. Purges took place not only within the armed forces, but also in the civil service sector. Through a series of "constitutional acts", the operation had already started in 1967. The targets were those holding "anti-national opinions" [2]. Therefore, all civil servants were asked to fill out a long questionnaire on the associations to which they have ever belonged, and on their personal possible contacts with political dissidents or communist, and other private details of their lives. As a result, between 1967 and 1968, several thousands of people lost their job. As *Inside Colonels' Greece* reports, in that period, "the newspapers almost every day carried long lists of civil servants and officials who had been dismissed. [...] The majority of these were scarcely opponents of the regime, at least not active ones"[3].

At the beginning of 1968 it was clear, both inside and outside of Greece, that military rule would not be a short-term phenomenon. Papadopoulos himself was certain of this, and exposed his vision to USA president Johnson in a letter, in early January:

> *The latest events (the counter revolution of December 13th, headed by the Sovereign of the State himself) constituted a second test for the Revolution,*

[1] Veremis Th. M – Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, p. 170.
[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 81.
[3] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 82.

*proving once more its necessity, its sway over the people, and its absolute de facto stability*[1].

Despite the undeniable turn to authoritarianism, Papadopoulos and his colleagues repeatedly emphasized that it was not Revolution's intention to impose a permanent regime over the Greek people. In fact, the Junta presented the exceptional measures taken with regard to liberty and security as being necessary for their ultimate objective: guiding Greece to an "healthy" democracy. The exact meaning of this phrase was never clarified by any member of government. Among the exceptional but temporary measures to be taken, there was the suspension of numerous articles of the Greek Constitution (redacted in 1952). However, the Junta assured that a specific commission would provide a draft of the constitution by no later than the end of the year[2].

The Greek Junta's strategy consisted of affirming the need to resort to authoritarian actions so that the country would not fall into chaos again (even though the country was *not* at all into chaos in 1967)[3], while also, presenting their authoritarian actions as temporary, so that Greek's international allies would not be alarmed. This attitude was called by Woodhouse a characteristic "combination of ruthlessness and conciliations"[4], and, although it is now clear in hindsight that the government was creating the foundation for a long-lasting authoritarian regime, this was not necessarily evident at the time. An example can testify the importance given by the Junta to the image that Greece had abroad. While all books, newspapers, radio and tv programmes were strictly submitted to the censorship machine installed by the military, foreign books were sold freely. The same applied for all foreign newspapers, even when they contained articles that criticized the Junta. Only communist newspapers, even if foreign, were forbidden[5]. Such apparently tolerant approach had the aim to impress the foreign visitor who came to Greece.

The ambiguity which characterized Papadopoulos' political discourse in those early months of the regime was also reflected in his actions. In January, 1968, fifty-four

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[1] *Letter from Prime Minister Papadopoulos to President Johnson*, Athens, January 6th, 1968, in FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey; Doc. 352.
[2] *Letter from Prime Minister Papadopoulos to President Johnson*, Athens, January 6th, 1968, in FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey; Doc. 352.
[3] Since the Junta was still pretending to have acted in order to avoid a communist plot, they had also to pretend that, without their rule, such a possibility could still occur.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 49.
[5] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp 99-103.

university professors were dismissed by a governmental decree, accused of being opposed to the "social regime and to national civic values"[1]. Again via governmental decree, the president of the High Court and five of its members, plus twenty-four other judges and prosecutors were dismissed in May of the same year[2]. They were all accused of exercising their work without impartiality, and of trying to create a trade union movement within the judiciary (trade unions were temporarily prohibited by the suspension of the relevant articles of the constitution)[3]. But this was not the worse. All judges and prosecutors dismissed were also forbidden to practise at the bar, which was the only possible job they could do. The logical consequence of this was that the other judges were terrified, and mostly decided to submit to the will of the Junta[4]. Also in May, the Greek government started to plan the "normalization" of the state of emergency: this meant keeping both military and civilian forces mobilized in times of peace, with industries ready to convert their production in case of need, economic resources available for political necessities, and other measures of this nature[5]. Finally, the initiatives taken in the educational field should be mentioned. In 1967, the government had decided that a certificate of 'civic reliability' would be necessary to accede to universities and other institutions of higher education. Soon, however, the system proved to be too difficult to manage. Therefore, Papadopoulos decided to move the controlling effort right *into* the universities. Firstly, the centrist National Union of Greek Students (the most important student body in the country) was dissolved, then reorganized and put under police supervision. Police was present in every university campus, with policeman dressed like

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[1] *Cinquante-quatre professeurs d'université et de grandes ecoles sont limogés,* annex annexe au memorandum du Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautes Europeènnes, in HAEU, EM 77 ("CEE-Grèce 03. 23 Octobre 1967 – 24 Avril 1968").

[2] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 85-87.

[3] *Evolution de la situation politique en Grèce, note to the Association Commission*, Bruxelles, June 14th, 1968, Bruxelles, in HAEU, EM 78 ("CEE-Grèce 03. 23 Octobre 1967 – 24 Avril 1968").

[4] An attempt to have justice was made by the dismissed judges, who appealed to the Council of State, arguing that their dismissal was illegal. Indeed, the Council agreed with them, claiming that those concerned had not had the chance to defend themselves, which is a general unwritten principle of the law. According to the constitution, after the sentence of the Council of State the judges were automatically reinstated. The Junta leaders were furious. On the 26 June, Papadopoulos declared the decision of the Council of State illegal, and publicly demanded its President (Stassinopoulos) to resign. He, accordingly to the Constitution, refused. The Junta then published a fraudulent decree accepting the resignation of Stassinopoulos (non-existing, since he had never resigned) and nominating a new president of the Council of State. As a consequence, a dozen members of the Council resign in protest. However, this act was fruitless, since the Council as guarantor of the rule of law in Greece had in practice ceased to exist. In "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 85-87.

[5] *Note à l'attention de M. Martino, membre de la Commission*, October 8th, 1968, Bruxelles, in HAEU, EM 79 ("CEE-Grèce 05. 11 juillet – 25 novembre 1968").

ordinary students. They also recruited students informers, mostly through various kinds of blackmail. As previously mentioned, teachers and professors were also targets of the purges. Most of them were well-known intellectuals, who had the "guilt" to be considered liberals or generically antagonists of the regime. In all, it was estimated that the universities lost about a third of their teaching staff[1].

However, in parallel with those authoritarian initiatives, Papadopoulos started moving also in the opposite direction. Firstly, he ordered the release of their most famous political prisoner from jail: Andreas Papandreou (for which the US had been asking from the night of the Coup when he was arrested). Once freed, Papandreou Jr. went to Paris where he publicly declared his intention to fight the Junta from abroad, and to restore democracy in the country. There, he founded and became president of the Pan-Hellenistic Liberation Movement (PAK), which had the intent of bringing all opposition groups together[2]. Papadopoulos was probably persuaded to finally free Andreas Papandreou for two reasons: firstly, this could be a concrete response to the critics coming from Europe, and secondly, he wanted to give a sign of good will to his most important international ally, the United States, at the time the only country giving confidence to the Junta. As already mentioned, since the day of the coup, the US had been pressing the Greek government for the liberation of Andreas Papandreou. The US could have been antipathetic, but because Papandreou was married to an American woman and had studied and graduated in the US, where he still had very influential friends especially among the academics, his release was an important achievement for Washington. As mentioned before, such an achievement could also be used to stop internal critics coming from part of the US Congress and from large sectors of the public opinion. Papadopoulos probably waited so long before meeting the US request because he needed to make sure that once Papandreou was freed he would be in a position to organize an opposition movement in Greece. The liberation of Papandreou was a symbolic act, designed to sway international public opinion but did not change the reality of the regime.

In March, the first draft of the new constitution was published, with a four months delay, probably due to the fact that changes to the text were needed after the King's

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 88-95.
[2] Varsori A., *L'Occidente e la Grecia: dal colpo di stato militare alla transizione alla democrazia (1967-1976)*, in Del Pero, M. – Gavìn, V. – Guirao, F. – Varsori, A., Democrazie. L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Le Monnier, 2010, p. 24.

departure in December. From the Colonels' viewpoint, this should have been considered by the international community a significant sign of goodwill coming from the Greek government. However, the revised constitution strengthened the executive power to the extent that, in practice, the division of powers within the state had been abolished. Civil rights were not even mentioned in the text. According to the new construction of the state, the Prime Minister answered directly to the King for his actions, but the King had self-exiled outside the country, and deprived of his leadership of the army by the constitution itself. A conspicuous part of the powers that used to belong to the Minister of Defence were moved to the Army Command, meaning to the Military. Moreover, the Army was charged with the duty of safeguarding the integrity of the current political and civic order, and strikes motivated by political reasons were completely forbidden. The constitution provided for an elected parliament, but to the government made no mention of a possible date for an election[1].

The constitution was produced by a specific commission nominated by the government, but Papadopoulos wanted to give the impression that the Greek people also had a say in it. A farcical method was devised by the government to gather public input, whereby every citizen could fill out a post-card (available in any newsstand) to express the modifications they wanted the text of the constitution. After collecting all civic suggestions, a special commission would examine them and decided whether to modify the text or not. No public debate on the new constitution and its implementation was planned, meaning that the opposition would have no voice at all[2].

On the 29th of September, 1968, the new Constitution was approved by the Greek people in a referendum. The majority of the "yes" was almost absolute, with 92% of the vote. The vote took place under martial law and was mandatory. A number of witnesses declared that voters were subjected to intimidation by the police and military police at polling stations[3]. Despite the referendum result being celebrated by the Junta as confirmation of popular support, the conditions under which the vote took place seems to suggest that this was not the case.

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[1] Veremis Th. M – Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, pp. 170-171.
[2] *Telegram from French ambassador in Athens Durand to Paris*, N°420, Athens, September, 12th, 1969, N. 471/476, Athens, October 3rd, 1969, in CADN, 48PO/B 295 (Athens).
[3] Veremis Th. M – Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, pp. 170-171.

Only a few weeks before, in August, a young Greek poet and activist, Aleksandros Panagulis, had attempted to end Papadopoulos' life by placing a bomb on the street where his car should have passed. The attack failed, and he was arrested in less than 24 hours. During the first interrogation, Panagulis instated that he had no accomplices. Once identified and taken to the Military Security Police (ESA), he was found to have had Cypriot connections in the past year[1]. The report published by the investigators in October indicated the Cypriot Minister of Interior, Yiorkatzis, as the one who had supplied Panagulis with money and explosives[2]. In November, Panagulis was convicted and sentenced to death. During the trial, he tried to show the sign of tortures inflicted by the military police on his body, but the Court not only refused to hear his complaint, but condemn him on the spot to two years in prison for "contempt of the court"[3]. It was an isolated episode, and so it is impossible to say whether Panagulis' attempt represented a common feeling among Greeks. However, a few weeks later, during former prime minister Georgios Papandreou's funeral, which took place in Athens on the 3rd of November 1968, thousands of Greeks held massive protests. They marched in the streets of Athens, shouting "Oxi" ("no" in Greek, with a clear reference to the referendum), "we want freedom", "Papandreou is still our prime minister", "down with the tyranny", and many other similar slogans[4]. Just a few days before, a minute of silence had been observed at the Law Faculty in Athens when the death of the Centre Union's leader had been announced, and then shouts of "everyone to the funeral" had been reported[5].

The government did not give much importance to these facts, at least publicly. However, the Junta must have understood, on that occasion, that its popular support was not as strong as they had thought. In fact, in January 1969, the Junta issued the so-called "Student Code", a decree which provided that "any student convicted in the courts for a political offence is not only to be sent down from his university but may also be permanently excluded from any further chance of higher education"[6]. Furthermore, the decree stated that any student could be expelled if "his conduct and his ideas were

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 55.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 54.
[3] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 151.
[4] *Rapport sur la situation en Grèce, Assemblée Consultative*, Conseil de l'Europe, January, 28th, 1969, Doc. 2525, in HAEU, EM 80 ("CEE-Grèce 06. 27 Novembre 1968 – 25 mars 1969).
[5] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 89.
[6] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 91.

incompatible with national ideals"[1]. According to Woodhouse, already at that time existed a marked division within the Junta between "hard-liners" and "pragmatist"; while the first group wanted Panagulis to be immediately executed, the second one understood that such an action would have effected deeply the position of Greece within the NATO Alliance[2]. This internal division probably contributed to the alternation of repression and conciliatory acts that we mentioned before.

In fact, in the same period, the Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis announced the publication of a *new* timeline for democratization. This was probably the result of an effort to mitigate criticism from the Council of Europe in the previous months, which will be the subject of the following paragraphs. For now, suffice it to say that the first stages of the updated calendar were announced by Papadopoulos in October, 1968, as a series of reforms in the fields of individual liberties, and freedom of the press. Still, he continued to refuse to make any declaration about the date of a parliamentary election, which was expected after the referendum by the international community[3].

As Richard Clogg underlines, the reluctance to countenance elections, even within the restrictive parameters of the authoritarian constitution, was evidence that the Junta was aware that it could not build up any degree of popular support[4]. The protests at Georgios Papandreou's funeral had proved it. However, it is equally true that organized opposition in Greece struggled to be effective. This was partially explained by the fact that the most influential opposition leaders were in jail, under house arrest or abroad. In fact, almost the entire old political class had refused to collaborate with the colonels, including the Right (from which a certain degree of tolerance could be expected, since its past behave towards extra-parliamentary forces). Kanellopoulos, among the others, denounced the actions of the Junta with courage, and spent several months under house arrest. The same fate was suffered by some prominent leaders of the Centre Union, like the two Papandreous, as mentioned before. Also the "apostates" of the Centre Union aligned with their former colleagues in denouncing the Junta. However, all of them could only give moral support to clandestine resistance. Of course, the members of EDA were those most badly hit by the repression. Almost all of them were arrested the very night

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 91.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 54-55.
[3] *Telegram from French ambassador in Athens Durand to Paris*, N°420, Athens, September, 12th, 1969, N. 471/476, Athens, October 3rd, 1969, in CADN, 48PO/B 295 (Athens).
[4] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 161-162.

of the coup, and deported. Mikis Theodorakis, a well-known music composer and leftist deputy, was one of the few that managed to escape abroad (after two arrests). The only politician who showed an attitude of neutrality, if not benevolence, towards the Colonels was Spyros Markezinis, who will have in fact a major role in the future development of the dictatorship[1]. Moreover, according to Amnesty International, in the first period of the Junta's rule (1967-1971) tortures were regularly used to suppress opposition, and a means for extracting information on the resistance activities and deterring the population from political activity[2].

As already said, communist and leftist opponents to the Junta suffered the worst fate, mostly being deported in remote islands and prisoner camps without any sort of trial. Some of them underwent 'individual deportation', a condition in which they could not speak to one another. They could see their families from time to time, but they were strictly prevented from speaking to politicians, journalists or generally anyone involved in public sectors[3]. Not only politicians were deported, but also distinguished ERE and Centre Union supporters, university teachers, civil servants and journalists. Among the prisoners, those who have committed (ore were suspected of) specific acts of resistance were often subjected to physical and psychological cruelty, and torture[4].

Soon after the putsch, those who had been not imprisoned converged in numerous clandestine groups. An organization called the "Greek Democratic Movement of Resistance" (EDKA) survived only a few months, before its leaders were arrested[5]. Other similar groups followed, as the "Democratic Defence" (*Democratiki Amyna*), the "Patriotic Front" (*Patriotiko Metopo*), and "Free Greeks" movements. The already mentioned PAK was directed from abroad by Andreas Papandreou. In Italy there was such a shared sympathetic attitude towards resistance against the Greek Junta that the government of Athens establish a "surveillance organization" called ESESI (National Liason of Greek Students in Italy) which had branches in all the major university cities

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 132-136.
[2] Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.
[3] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 144-155.
[4] Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 37.

in Italy[1]. ESESI pretended to be aimed at helping Greek students with any problem they could face in a foreign country. In reality, it was a means of deterrence from joining resistance groups. In fact, it was just in Italy that one of the most dramatic act against the Junta took place in 1970, when a Greek Student, Costa Georgakis, set himself ablaze as a protest in Genova[2]. Yet, this was a singular gesture.

The resistance organizations based in Greece did not succeed in establishing on a large scale, and therefore the support to the resistance coming from abroad did not converge in mass protestations[3]. The level of repression from the Junta, that in the "Athenian's" book *Inside Colonels' Greece* is defined as a "chain of terror" in which everyone is frightened of his superior[4], still seems not sufficient to fully explain the lack of active popular opposition. This has to deal in part with the lack of coherence and unity in the resistance, where the different organizations were often hostile to one another[5], but has also a lot to deal with Greece's recent history. With the exception of the seven years under Karamanlis' government, in the previous decades Greece had experienced governments which were unstable. Some of them, especially in the aftermath of the civil war and after the crisis of 1965, lasted only a few months, or a few weeks. Even though some of these government had tried to put the basis for a program of economic development for Greece, often a crisis spread and made impossible to enjoy the results of such changes (as for the reforms attempted by Papandreou in 1965). Instead, through a policy of borrowing and offering lavish inducements to foreign and domestic investors, the Regime of the Colonels had been able (more than other governments) to sustain the momentum of economic growth that had developed under democratic governments of the late 1950s and early 1960s[6]. This was an illusion, since the Junta had no coherent economic programme for the development of Greece, but they could exploit the results of the growth of the past years and give to Greek people, who had lost confidence in traditional politics, the illusion that the authoritarian regime had the advantage of

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[1] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[2] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[3] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 123-133.
[4] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 131.
[5] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, pp. 123-133.
[6] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 162.

guaranteeing stability. Moreover, according to *Inside Colonels' Greece*, which was wrote while the Junta was still in force, "the average Greek" did not believe that he could hasten the liberation of the country and this contributed to their passivity. In fact, most of the population was convinced that the regime was backed by the United States[1]. A conviction that would, in the future, converge into a strong anti-American feeling within the Greek people.

Strong stands against the Junta came also, as already mentioned, from former politicians, intellectuals, and artists living in exile. In fact, from the 1950s Greece and up to the coup, Greece experienced an exceptional flourishing of arts and letters, which did not go unnoticed abroad. In 1963, the poet and diplomat George Seferis had been awarded with the Nobel Prize for literature. The popular movie, Zorba the Greek (1964), was an adaptation of the novel by Nikos Kazantakis. Melina Mercouri was considered and international movie star, and the Greek composer Manos Hatzidakis had won an Academy Award in 1960 for best original song (for the movie *Never on Sunday*). And, of course, there was Mikis Theodorakis, whose work had been performed in 1959 at the Royal Hopera House[2]. Besides Theodorakis, who was arrested two times in Greece by the Junta, most of the other artists and intellectuals openly manifested their opposition to the dictatorship. Most of Greek writers who did not leave the country after 1967 refused to publish under censorship, and the same did a large group of sculptures and painters for at least a year after the coup. Also, actors and artists living abroad launched various appeals to boycott the regime by not going on holydays in Greece[3]. However, as Pedaliu pointed out, "the huge international and transnational effort failed to force Greece's principal allies to take punitive action against the regime directly"[4], with the exception of the Council of Europe which, however, had the only power to expel Greece. In fact, as Woodhouse underlines, in the major Western capitals protests against the Junta came from unofficial bodies or vehicle of public opinion, more than from executive bodies[5].

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[1] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972, p. 131.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 38.
[3] Eleanor Fisch interviews Melina Mercouri, on New York Public Radio (WNYC), 1967, in New York Public Radio Archive (https://www.wnyc.org/story/interview-with-melina-mercouri/), and "*Ο Γιώργος Σεφέρης και το BBC, Γιάννης Καραβίδας*", reporting a declaration by Nobel Prize winner Giorgos Seferis in 1969, http://www.bbc.co.uk/greek/seferis.shtml.
[4] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 39.

In 1968, Amnesty International published two reports (January and April), denouncing the systematic use of torture in Greece. Its delegates were able to reach 16 released prisoners who had been victim of tortures, and gathered evidence of at least other 32 cases. They documented twenty-two methods of torture only within the Athens' police station (they were not allowed outside the city), including "sexual abuse, psychological pressure, electric shock and, most commonly, falanga (beating on the soles of the feat), which in almost every case was the initial form of torture"[1].

As mentioned, the major forum of criticism to the Junta's "democratic façade" hiding the real methods used in Greece, was the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. After the 1967 coup the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands had raised the issue of democracy in Greece to the Assembly. After the failure of the royal countercoup, and Papadopoulos becoming Prime Minister, they decided that the fight against the Greek regime was even more necessary. This fight lasted almost two years, and culminated in the (almost forced) abandonment of the Council of Europe by Athens. The decision to quit the Council was not taken with lightly by the Junta and represented a failure in their attempt to mask the real face of the regime. In fact, it was finally taken in order to avoid a formal expulsion from the organization, which would have certainly been voted by the Council the same day. The publication of a new democratization calendar had been an initiative aimed at avoiding being expelled from the Council in Europe and, more generally, to convince European nations of Junta's goodwill. We will analyse the struggle with the Council of Europe in the following paragraphs. However, it is important to mention that, after leaving the Council in December 1969, Foreign Minister Pipinelis tried to give the impression that Greece was not deeply affected by what had happened in Strasbourg. In fact, he publicly stated that the Greek government would have progressed along the timeline to democratization, *despite* what happened in the Council of Europe. Most of the European countries, he said during a public press release, had not understood the real reasons for the military action in 1967. Had Greece been aware of that, the government would not have made any changes to its domestic or international policies. Greece would have followed its path towards an healthy democracy, "in collaboration with those countries that had demonstrated loyal friendship

[1] Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.

to her"[1]. Of course, the reality was different: Greece had looked for avoiding expulsion (not only through farcical initiatives as the democratization calendar, but also through the mediation of the countries which were more benevolent towards the Junta, as Germany and France) but in the end this resulted impossible[2]. It was only when it became clear that the majority would have voted for expulsion, that Athens quit.

## 3.2 Europe: the EEC, the Council of Europe, and Greece

### 3.2.1 The Association Commission and the Information Trip

Unlike the US, which was immediately able to establish a direct channel with the new government through their Ambassador Talbot in Athens, the EEC struggled to get accurate information of what happened in Greece. They were particularly interested in discovering what had happened to their colleagues from the Mixed Association Commission. As already mentioned, the day after the coup it had been communicated that the Parliament in Greece had been dismissed, and that some members of it had been arrested. Among them, there was a group of Association commission members. Then, no further news about their condition had arrived to the EEC, except for some very vague reassurances by the Greek permanent representative that all political prisoners were safe and well.

Because of this lack of information, the possibility of sending a European delegation to Greece had been discussed within European institutions since the first weeks after the coup. The EEC body which had advocated for the initiative was the Mixed Association Commission, as it had been directly affected by the coup and prevented from its functioning by the dismission of Greek parliament. After the failure of the royal counter-coup, and the following turn to a severer authoritarianism, it seemed even more

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[1] *D'une Conférence de presse de M. Pipinelis*, relation from Bernard Durand (French ambassador in Athens) to the French Foreign Ministry, Athens, December 23rd, 1969, in CADN, 48PO/B 295 (Athens), Doc. N° 1155/EU.

[2] As Pedaliu underlined, besides arms export, Greece had been also considered of interest by De Gaulle when recalibrating France's position in the Mediterranean. In order to reduce the American influence in this area, even the Greek Colonels could be useful. Conversely, as Willy Brandt said in June 1969, Greece was considered by West Germany in its role of NATO ally. In Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, 38:15, 1014-1039, 2016

necessary to clearly understand the real situation in Greece. For this reason, early in 1968 the Association Commission again brought the possibility to organize an "information trip" to Greece to the EEC political Commission and European Parliament[1]. The idea was to send a group from the Association Commission in Greece with the aim of getting information about the Greek Commission's members, but also to get a clearer idea of the internal situation. While the Commission presented strong justification for the trip, not all European institutions seemed to share the will to adopt such an active approach.

The Association Commission received its first answer from the European Parliament in the month of May, 1968. In a letter to Schujit, the EP president Alain Poher reported that the Bureau of the European Parliament judged that the project designed by the Mixed Commission for the information trip was not feasible. In fact, the Bureau did not agree to declare a *political* aim of the trip, because this would be immediately interpreted by the Greek government as an act of interference with Greece's domestic affairs. By alarming too much the Greek government, a good outcome of the mission could be compromised[2]. For this reason, the Beaureu was willing to make a counter-proposal: a very restricted group (chosen within the Beaureu of the Association Commission, accompanied by an EP Secretariat representative) could go to Greece with the *single* declared objective of getting in touch with former members of the Association Commission and, if they were in prison, of trying to obtain their liberation. In general, the Beaureu considered necessary that such a delicate mission required the utmost discretion[3].

The answer and counter-proposal by the European Parliament showed that the majority of its members wanted to be cautious at this stage, because the situation was still perceived as fluid. Furthermore, no one of the member states of the EEC had already make any official declaration about the new regime in Greece, even if they had not withdrawn diplomatic recognition and this meant, in practice, that formal contacts at bilateral level would continue. What emerges from the response of the EP is that, while going to Greece to get in contact with former colleagues and to observe their conditions was completely acceptable, this would not be the case if the intention of the trip was to

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[1] Minute of the Association Commission EE-Greece, March 8th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 18917, and Minute Of The Association With Greece Commission Meeting, April 8th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19129.
[2] Copie de la lettre addressé le 21 mai 1968 par M. Alain POHER, Président du Parlament Europeén, à M. W.J. SCHUJIT, Président de la Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, in HAEU, PEO 19131.
[3] Copie de la lettre addressé le 21 mai 1968 par M. Alain POHER, Président du Parlament Europeén, à M. W.J. SCHUJIT, Président de la Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, in HAEU, PEO 19131.

get information on the general political situation in the country. This attitude seems to contradict the resolution adopted by the EP in the aftermath of the military coup of 1967, when *political* motivations were provided for the freezing of the association process, meaning the incompatibility between the nature of the new government of Greece and the aims of the Treaty of Rome. Maybe, the more cautious approach taken on the information trip could be explained by the fact that some member states of the EEC still believed that some changes could occur to the Greek political situation.

Despite the first negative response by the European Parliament, the Association Commission did not give up. The Mixed Commission president, Mr. Schujit, encouraged a second attempt and asked the Commission members to enquire within their respective political European groups if such a trip was still possible. The answers coming from the different European political groups were then collected and discussed in a meeting held in June, 1968. The majority of those present supported the trip, but proposed some changes to the original idea: the Christian-Democrats (with a small majority) approved the possibility of a very restricted group to be sent to Greece; the same response came from the Socialist Group, endorsing the idea with a strong majority; the Liberal Group declared that it was in favour of a small delegation traveling to Greece, but only after the results of the constitutional referendum (meaning not before two months); finally, UDE (European Democratic Union) did not support the project, without specifying its reasons[1]. After a long discussion, the Association Commission opted formally proposing to the European Parliament that an information trip be taken after the referendum results, as suggested by the Liberals. They seemed very confident that this would be approved, but yet again it was not. According to the EP Beureau, the environment was not suitable for such an initiative. The project would have never been implemented. This failure revealed a substantial passivity in managing situations by European institutions, being especially averse to taking concrete actions.

In parallel with the topic of the information trip, another debate held the stage in 1968 within European institutions: how to manage current association issues, and the work already done since 1961. The issue became urgent after the publication of the new Greek Constitution in March, when it became clear that elections were not imminent, and so parliamentary rule would not be restored any time soon (which was one of the necessary conditions posed by the EEC to restore the association process). In such

[1] Minute of the Meeting of the Association Commission, June 27th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 18910.

conditions, the situation seemed paralyzed. This is why the Mixed Association Commission started debating on the possibility of working separately from its Greek (now non-existant) counterpart, with the aim of creating the best conditions possible to restore the association process when Greece became ready. This meant, for example, establishing contacts with the members of the opposition, in view of a possible future collaboration[1]. In this framework, the Permanent Representatives' Commission envisaged the possibility of a partial resumption of harmonizing agricultural policies between Greece and the EEC. According to this idea, initiatives related to the current issues of Greece-EEC association should be moved to the "Third Countries" framework (countries that had economic, commercial, and financial relations with the EEC, without an association treaty). Third Countries did not have the political provisions that were afforded to Greece thorough its association treaty, and had no scheduled prospective of full membership[2].

Between March and April the documentation about EEC-Greek current affairs started to be transferred to the Commission for the Third Countries. The passage was formalized by a report produced by the Association Commission, together with permanent representatives of the nation states in June. The document underlined why it was necessary not to completely interrupt the harmonization process with Greece, but only to limit it. Indeed, a complete interruption of the harmonization would have benefited Greece only, meaning that Greece could have kept profiting from the free movement of goods (almost completed when the military coup had occurred), without the obligation to respect the competition rules imposed to the other countries by the common policy[3].

This approach lasted for the entire year, and for the remaining period of Junta's life. The Association with Third Countries Commission and the EEC-Greece Association Commission (which was not dismantled) kept working together, with special agendas planned year by year. In 1972-1973, for instance, new negotiations on the Greek wines

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[1] *L'associazione tra la Comunità Europea e la Grecia: problemi e prospettive*, nota confidenziale ai membri della Commissione per l'associazione con la Grecia, March, 1968, in HAEU, EM 77 ("CEE-Grèce 03. 23 Octobre 1967 – 24 Avril 1968").

[2] Comunication orale à la Commission sur la reprise èventuelle de certains travaux dans la cadre de l'association CEE-Grèce, Bruxelles, March, 26th, 1968, note to E. Martino, in HAEU, EM 77 ("CEE-Grèce 03. 23 Octobre 1967 – 24 Avril 1968").

[3] *Harmonisation des politiques agricoles de la Communauté et de la Grèce,* report by the EEC-Third countries association Committee to the permanent representatives' Committee, Bruxelles, June 6th, 1968, in HAEU, EM 77 ("CEE-Grèce 03. 23 Octobre 1967 – 24 Avril 1968").

were linked with discussion on the territorial extension of the Agreement following the EEC first enlargement[1].

### 3.2.2 The new Greek constitution, the EEC and the Council of Europe

As previously mentioned, the King's attempt to overthrow the regime in December, 1967 and the events that followed with his failure caused a slowdown in the process of elaborating the new Greek constitution. According to the first time-table provided by the Greek government in the summer of 1967, the constitution would have been published and discussed in December of the same year. This did not happen. The delay on the calendar of democratization did not go unnoticed, and in the month of February, 1968, Edoardo Martino, representative of the External Relations at the Commission of the EEC, gave a harsh speech in which he defined the Greek government as

> *"un régime qui a supprimé les libertés democratiques et qui malgré les affirmations souvant répétées de ses dirigeants, nous parait encore loin de s'engager dans la voie du rétablissement d'un régime parlamentaire et démocratique en Grèce"*[2].

As mentioned before, the first draft of the Constitution was announced as being ready only in March 1968. However, the full text was not published until April, 1968. Before that date, the EEC was only able to become aware of some "key points" of the constitution, which were published by a Hellenic newspaper written in English. Of course, the Association Commission followed the process closely, and immediately met to discuss those first key points of the new Greek constitution.

According to the record of a meeting held on the 8th of April, 1968, the very first impression of the new text was negative. At the end of the debate Edoardo Martino, who participated in the meeting of the Mixed Association Commission as a representative of the Executive Commission of the EEC, stated that the European Community still had no

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[1] Note a l'attention de messieurs les members de la Commission. Object: régime applicable aux vins hellènique dans le cadre du Protocole complémentarie en raison de l'élargissement, March 8th 1973, in HAEU, Archive Historique de la Commission Europeenne (from now CEUE), fond Secretariat General (SEGE), doc. SEC(1973)0955.

[2] *Proget d'exposé de M. Martino, devant la Commission Politique du Parlament Européen*, February, 27th, 1968, in HAEU; EM 77 ("CEE-Grèce 03. 23 Octobre 1967 – 24 Avril 1968").

reason to change its position towards Greece. No parliamentary rule had been restored, nor had significant steps towards this objective been taken. His colleagues all agreed[1].

The Association Commission returned to the subject a few weeks later. Before pronouncing on the possibility of a future restoration of the association program they asked for an expert report to be written comparing the new Greek constitution with the previous. On the same occasion, a first report by Max Van Der Stoel (Foreign Minister of the Netherlands) for the Council of Europe on the text of the constitution was distributed to the meeting participants. At the time, the Council of Europe was the only European organization with a specific commitment on human rights, even though it had no political powers. In a few weeks, it had become the largest forum of discussion on the Greek case. When the coup happened in 1967, Greece was an official member of the Council of Europe, and a signatory of its European Convention on Human Rights. Greece was represented in all the Council's institutions, including the European Court on Human Rights (created in 1959)[2]. Choosing Van Der Stoel as a rapporteur, member of the socialist group and Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, one of the countries that had brought the Greek case to the attention of the European Commission of Human Rights, already meant taking a tough stance[3]. This was confirmed by the content of the report, which set the pace for the debate around Greece also in the European Parliament.

According to his report, it was still possible to restore democracy in Greece but only if the opposition acted quickly, setting aside its internal divisions. Had this not been the case, the period allowed for the debate on the text would have been completely useless. Moreover, Van Der Stoel urged European national governments to put pressure on Greece so that conditions for a democratic electoral campaign would be respected[4]. These considerations concerning electoral campaigns were too optimistic, since no real public debate took place in Greece, in the sense that no voice was accorded to the supporters of "no".

Later in the summer, when the entire content of the constitution became available also outside of Greece, the debate among European institutions continued around the

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[1] Minute Of The Association With Greece Commission Meeting + EEC Commission Representative, April 8th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19129.
[2] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017..
[3] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.
[4] Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, proces verbal de la réunion du mardi 14 mai 1968, May 29th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19130.

question of how to judge the text. It was Schujit who first stated, during a meeting of the Mixed Association Commission held in July, that the text should have been examined in the perspective of Association, reiterating the political implications of the process. According to him, the prospect of full membership implied by the Association Treaty gave the EEC the 'right' to take Greek domestic affairs into account when making decisions. Given the fact that the Treaty of Athens had a political nature (expressed in the preamble, with the mention of the Treaties of Rome and its aims), he believed that Greek constitution should be studied by taking into account the principles of the Treaty of Rome[1].

What emerged to be the most alarming characteristic of the text of the constitution was the arbitrariness with which norms and articles would be applied. Even though a large number of fundamental rights concerning personal and civilian freedom, liberty of expression, association, reunion and political rights were mentioned in the text, there were also many exceptional situations in which all these rights could be suspended by the government. And what was worse, the criteria of suspension were not clearly specified. Furthermore, it was up to the Junta to decide whether to invalidate the vote or not in case of elections. Also in this case, the criteria for invalidating the vote were not explained[2]. Moreover, as Edoardo Martino underlined, the new text created an enormous concentration of power (including legislative) in the hands of the executive; in fact, once a parliament was elected, it would not have had the right to censor any action of the executive government. The Constitutional Court of Justice, designed by the new text, had the duty to protect the constitution; however, it seemed more like the "protector" of the executive itself.

The impression was that the constitution gave the government and its leader all means to limit the exercise of power of the other institutional bodies. In fact, even in the case of election of a Parliament, this would have had difficulties in concretely influencing the government's action. Similarly, the King, who was formally indicated as the "guardian" of the text and the master of the Army, was in reality was no longer in the country, and therefore the government was also in charge of acting "in his name"[3].

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[1] *Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, Procès verbal de la réunion du vendredi 12 juillet 1968*, September 6th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19134.
[2] *La situation en Grèce et les perspectives d'avenir, by E. Glinne*, September 5th, 1968, working document PE 20.433, in HAEU, EM 79 ("CEE-Grèce 05.11 juillet – 25 novembre 1968).
[3] *Commission de l'Association avec la Grèce, Procès verbal de la réunion du vendredi 12 juillet 1968*, September 6th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19134.

For all these reasons the Association Commission decided to produce a press declaration, in which they expressed their concern about the most problematic points of the Greek constitution. Under the constitution, a real change in the regime was considered almost impossible. Indeed, many articles prescribed the necessity to keep the *status quo* in the interest of the Greek people for a non-specified time. According to prime minister Papadopoulos, the country needed a period of preparation before the full application of political freedoms and rights. In fact, political opposition was substantially limited by the Constitution, since all activities were interdicted that "voted to threat the principles of the social and political regime, and to threat national security"[1]. The reconstitution of political parties (all dismissed after the coup in 1967) was not strictly prohibited, but the government had to be notified of such initiatives, which would then be regulated by the executive itself.

A specific study on the possible consequences of the constitution on Greek domestic affairs and international relations was assigned to Hernst Glinne, a socialist member of the European Parliament. His work resulted in a report submitted to the Association Commission in September 1968, a few days before the Greek *referendum*. According to his judgment, the constitutional text created by the military was a mere "mask" which tried to give a legal face to a regime that was completely illegal in substance. To be more persuasive, he made a double comparison: on the one hand with the Spanish regime led by Franco, where there was a formal constitution yet the real power was in the hands of the few; on the other hand, with the Greek 1936 coup carried out by Metaxas, with the pretext to avoid a communist plot. After listing, article by article, all the elements that made the Greek constitution non-liberal and undemocratic, he asked the European Parliament to unilaterally denounce the Association Agreement. Additionally, he stated, the singular EEC members should act also at a national level, for instance suspending military trade with Greece[2]. He strongly emphasized the ethical bearing of the attitude to take towards the events in Greece: Europe, he said, must ask itself which kind of Greece the Europeans wanted; if they wanted a moral, liberal and free Greece, they should act immediately[3]. The request to unilaterally denounce the Treaty was ignored by

[1] Commission de l'Association avec la Grèce, Procès verbal de la réunion du vendredi 12 juillet 1968, September 6th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19134.
[2] Commission de l'Association avec la Grèce, Procès-Verbal de la reunion du 18 Septembre 1968, Bruxelles, October 1st, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19135.
[3] Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, Procès-Verbal de la reunion du 18 Septembre 1968, Bruxelles, October 1st, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19135.

the Commission, because it was considered not feasible according to international law. This requests would repeat from time to time in the following years, with some member of the EP asking for complete suspension of the Treaty, and Rey or Martino (and later on their successors) explaining that there was no legal justification for such an initiative, and that the "freezing" of every further development of the association process was as far as the EEC could go[1].

In parallel to the EEC, the Council of Europe also kept discussing the Greek case. On the 25th of September 1968, Council members examined a second report produced by Van Der Stoel on the constitution. A severe judgement of the text emerged from the debate. Moreover, after having read the two reports produced by Amnesty International that year, the countries who had denounced the Greek regime to the European Commission on Human Rights (as already mentioned: the Scandinavians and the Netherlands) decided to amend their application, including also article 3[2]. Article 3 of the statute of the Council of Europe was mentioned, which stated that every country belonging to the Assembly of the Council of Europe should guarantee to its people full respect of civilian and human rights, according to the relative Convention[3]. At that moment, article 3 of the statue was no longer being respected by Greece and therefore the Council formally asked the Greek government to take three fundamental actions: 1) to return immediately to a democratic parliamentary system, and to give back to Greek people the right to vote; 2) to abolish the state of martial law and the restrictions to political freedoms, along with re-establishing a full regime of human rights and respecting fundamental freedoms ; 3) free elections to be carried out in no more than six months[4]. Based on the response to these requests, during the following meeting of the Council in January 1969, the Council would decide whether to ask for a suspension (or expulsion) of Greece or not. Additionally, after hearing the witnesses collected by Amnesty International, the Commission on Human Rights charged a sub-commission with gathering more information. This sub-commission, unlike Amnesty International, was able to gather evidence of torture concerning also police stations outside Athens.

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[1] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017..
[2] Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.
[3] *Projet de resolution, in Rapport sur la situation en Grèce*, *Council of Europe*, September 25th, 1968, doc. 2467, p.2, in EM 79 ("CEE-Grèce 05.11 juillet – 25 novembre 1968).
[4] *Projet de resolution, in Rapport sur la situation en Grèce*, *Council of Europe*, September 25th, 1968, doc. 2467, p.2, in EM 79 ("CEE-Grèce 05.11 juillet – 25 novembre 1968).

The process would last one year, and would culminate in the writing of a four-volume report released in 1969[1]. From both reports by Amnesty International and the sub-commission on human rights of the Council of Europe, and from the words of many witnesses (both before and during the trials of the late 1970s), emerged that the Greek Military Police (ESA), guided by Brigadier Ioannidis, was the body orchestrating the system of tortures on political prisoners in Greece. The pattern was schematic: arrest in the middle of the night, usually with a first beating of the prisoners, physical injuries when arrived at the prison or police station, psychological pressure usually by threating the safety of the family of the prisoners, and other tortures consisting in denying food or water, forcing prisoners to stand upright for days, all of these repeated several times. According to many witnesses, for the first about 20 days of this routine, prisoners were not allowed to wash or change clothes[2].

Only a few days after the announcement of the Council of Europe's requests to the Greek Junta, on the 29th of September 1968, 92% of Greeks voted, under a state of martial law, the approval of the Constitution. Also in September, the Greek government banned Van Der Stoel from returning to their country. This was due to the facts that his reports had had much resonance in the Western world, and were causing too much troubles to the Junta. As a reaction to that, the Socialist group at the EP immediately asked again the Commission for the suspension of the Treaty of Association[3]. While many within EEC institutions would have probably personally supported such a proposition, the possibility of suspension was not provided by the Treaty itself, as underlined by Edoardo Martino, who joined a meeting (as a representative of the EEC Commission) of the Mixed Commission held in the month of October 1968. The only course of action, according to the text of the Association Agreement, was an arbitration procedure, and this would take time. Things were different for the Council of Europe, which would pursue its fight against the Greek Junta for the whole of the following year[4].

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[1] Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.

[2] For a complete analysis of the method implemented by the officials of Military Police in torturing their prisoners and shadowing the evidence of that, see Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977; for a personal witness on tortures and imprisonment see the interview released by Alekos Panagulis to the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in Fallaci O., *Un Uomo*, Rizzoli Libri, 1979, and his poetry in Panagoulis A., Vi scrivo da un carcere in Grecia. Memorie di un partigiano contro la dittatura dei colonnelli, PGreco Edizioni, Milano, 2017.

[3] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017.

[4] Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, proces-verbal de la réunion du mercredi 9 octobre 1968, October 15th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19136.

As for the European Community, there were not many possible choices. Noticed that elections were not in Greece's plans over the short-term, the Association Commission could only admit that it was impossible to continue its tasks, and therefore decided to completely suspend its activities. Current affairs were definitively delegated to the institutions responsible for the relations with the "third countries"[1]. From that moment, all concrete initiatives against the Greek Regime were conducted by the Council of Europe. The Scandinavian countries proved to be the most resolute, and denounced the partial application of the constitutional text, the persistence of martial law in the country, and the reiterated violations of human rights occurring even after the implementation of the Constitution.

### 3.2.3 1969, the most difficult year.

The new constitution protected the Junta from internal threats: the King, even though in exile, and the Parliament. In general, the result was to strengthen executive. And, what was worse, no reference to parliamentary elections was made in the aftermath of the referendum and consequent implementation of the text. The reluctance in calling elections even within the restrictive parameters of the new constitution was probably a signal of the difficulty that the regime had encountered in gaining popular support. As already pointed out, more evidence of the lack of popular support was provided by the funerals of Georgios Papandreou, in November 1968, when half a million of Greeks implicitly manifested their personal "distance" from the regime.

The European public followed the Greek events closely, and this was also reflected in international institutions. Moreover, since he got his passport, Andreas Papandreou had been travelling across the major European and American cities in other to stimulate the international opposition to the Junta[2]. While the EEC seemed to have no further means to fight the Junta than those already being used, the Council of Europe met early in 1969 to discuss the second report by Mr. Van Der Stoel. The new text confirmed the previous one, together with the decision taken by the Council in their meeting of

[1] Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, proces-verbal de la réunion du mercredi 4 décembre 1968, December 19th, 1968, in HAEU, PEO 19139.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 67.

September, 1968[1]. In addition to article 3 of the statute (which, as already said, imposed the respect of basic liberties and human rights to the governments of the member states), this time article 7 was also cited. This referred to the possibility for member countries to quit the organization, should they no longer endorse the institution's guiding principles. Also, the Council decided not to recognize any Greek representative to their bodies until the establishment of an elected parliament in Athens[2].

To worsen the situation, according to the Council of Europe, there was the fact that the referendum had taken place under martial law and that no public debate had been permitted. If it was true that some leaders of a possible opposition, like Andreas Papandreou, had been released from jail some months before the referendum, it was equally true that they could not have advocated for the "no" in an equal, public debate. Furthermore, voting for the "no" would have made no sense, because the Greek population was perfectly aware that the Military Junta would have stayed in its place regardless the result. In fact, before the referendum vice prime minister Pattakos had declared that if the "no" vote had won, the government would have produced a new text, which then would have been then subjected to another referendum, and so on[3]. Moreover, the report underlined, after being approved the constitution was implemented only partially. Many articles, especially those concerning personal and political freedoms, were still suspended. For all these reasons, after a long discussion, the Council of Europe scheduled the final decision about the expulsion of Greece for the next December (1969)[4].

A few days later, the Association Commission met for constitutional reasons (even though not actually working, it had not been dismissed). The aim was to discuss by which degree the Commission's members could continue to accomplish their tasks. On that occasion, Hernst Glinne was elected as the new Commission president, while the meeting was postponed in order to discuss with EEC Commission representative if, and how, to manage association activities[5]. A second meeting took place two weeks after,

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[1] *Rapport sur la situation en Grèce, Assemblé Consultive*, Council of Europe, January 28th, 1969, in HEAU, EM 80 ("CEE-Grèce 06. 27 Novembre 1968 – 25 mars 1969).
[2] *Rapport sur la situation en Grèce, Assemblé Consultive*, Council of Europe, January 28th, 1969, in HEAU, EM 80 ("CEE-Grèce 06. 27 Novembre 1968 – 25 mars 1969).
[3] "Athenian", *Inside Colonels' Greece*, (translated and with an introduction by Richard Clogg), Chatto & Windus, London, 1972.
[4] *Rapport sur la situation en Grèce, Assemblé Consultive*, Council of Europe, January 28th, 1969, in HEAU, EM 80 ("CEE-Grèce 06. 27 Novembre 1968 – 25 mars 1969).
[5] Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, Proces Verbal de la rèunion constitutive du jeudi 13 mars 1969, April 24th, 1969, in HAEU, PEO 19375.

with Edoardo Martino present as the representative of the Commission of the EEC. Once again, he declared that the Commission believed that no significant changes had occurred in Greece so as to modify the decisions taken by the EEC bodies so far[1].

On the 7th of May, 1968, the Association Commission and the European Parliament reiterated formally that no former initiatives would be taken unless conditions for a normal parliamentary regime would be restored in Greece. Moreover, the intention to collect information on the possibility of suspending or denouncing the Association Treaty was expressed during the debate[2].While the two Van Der Stoel reports had convinced the Council of Europe to take concrete steps towards the expulsion of Greece, the EP resolution of May, 1969 had no practical consequences. Even though the resolution was transmitted to the six national governments, only in Belgium the national Parliament approved the text with an official act[3]. In November, the EEC commission was still waiting for juridical advice regarding the possibility of severer actions against Greece. Of course, the two situations were different: the Council of Europe had in its statute some rules that Greece was evidently not respecting, and therefore the motivations for expulsion were difficult to criticize. On the contrary, the political tie existing between Greece and the EEC was not so clearly stated by the Association Treaty, and consequently it was not universally recognized as a plausible motivation for taking measures against the Greek government.

Meanwhile, the Military Junta had announced some softening in restrictions against the press, and some political prisoners were freed. This was clearly the last attempt to avoid expulsion from the Council of Europe, but it probably arrived too late. At the end of November, a report by the Commission of Human Rights was sent to the press, in which the Junta's disregard for the rule of law, and its regular use of torture were openly denounced[4]. The Scandinavian countries reiterated their intention to advocate for Greece's expulsion in the following meeting of the General Assembly. As Pedaliu underlines, among the northern countries, Denmark and Norway were experiencing in the 1960s deep changes in the political system, characterised by a "a process of

[1] Commission de l'association avec la Grèce, Proces Verbal de la rèunion du mercredi 26 mars, April 10th, 1969, HAEU, PEO 19376.
[2] Minutes of the Meeting of the 14 May 1968, Mixed Association Commission with a representative of the Commission of the EEC, in HAEU, PE0-19130.
[3] Commission de l'Association avec la Grèce, Procès-verbal de la réunion du mercredi 26 mars 1929, April 10th, 1969, in HAEU, PEO 19379.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 69.

fragmentation that gave rise to splinter movements and parties"[1]. Especially in Denmark, the Greek issue became a "totemic issue" for the Left, to the point that a referendum on membership on NATO was proposed[2]. By the end of 1969, the voices in favour of the expulsion of Greece from the country have increased. From Italy, King Constantine openly pronounced in favour of expulsion[3]. Finally, on the 9th of December, also the United Kingdom announced that its representatives would have voted for expulsion[4]. This was quit a significant decision, since until then Great Britain had had an ambiguous attitude on the matter. Until most of 1969, Great Britain had adopted an ambivalent stance towards the possibility of Greece's expulsion from the Council of Europe, claiming that it could do "more harm than good to the Greek people"[5]. The reason of this was that Great Britain had commercial and trading interests in Greece, and therefore was trying not to damage relations with the regime by taking a clear stance against it in the Council of Europe. Additionally, the British government was concerned with the possibility that the expulsion of Greece from the Council of Europe could damage the country's credibility within the Atlantic Alliance. This reflected also the American interests, even though the US were not part of the Council of Europe. Like London, also Washington was concerned that if Greece was expelled from the Council of Europe, the issue of its NATO membership would be officially raised. It was Great Britain, in the end, to suggest Greece the possibility of voluntarily withdraw from the Council of Europe. After having tried in many occasion to convince the Colonels of the necessity of real steps towards democratization, and after having understood that expulsion was not avoidable, this seemed the only possibility. In fact, international opposition was mounting against the Greek regime after the reports on tortures by Amnesty International, and it would have been very difficult for any government to justify a vote against the expulsion of Greece[6].

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[1] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[2] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 69.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 69.
[5] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 90.
[6] For the ambivalent attitude of Great Britain during the long debate at the Council of Europe (1968-1969) see Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 85-106.

In order to avoid what it seemed to be inevitable, Greece decided to quit the organization in December 1969, a few days before the meeting. The Greek delegation also denounced the Human Rights Convention, even this such an action could not have any consequences on the proceedings of the reports on violation of human rights in Greece, which in fact would be discussed in the following months. During the following days, Papadopoulos publicly declared that abandoning the Council of Europe had been his choice, motivated by the unbearable animosity of certain nations against Greece. Europe, explained Papadopoulos, had not understood the real sense of the 21st April revolution: the desire to stop the anarchic regime that was in force in Greece[1]. This, as previously seen, was specific of the Junta discourse about Greece. According the their narration, before the "Revolution" Greece was into chaos, and it would return to chaos without the necessary "preparation" to democracy (we mentioned before the "sick man" metaphor, so often used by Papadopoulos).

During the same days, Greek Foreign Minister Panagyotis Pipinelis declared that the calendar of democratization would continue, even though the majority of the European states had not understood the reasons behind the Greek actions. As a consequence, no changes would have occurred to Greek domestic affairs or foreign policies. The Junta would have followed its pattern, in collaboration with those countries that had demonstrated loyal friendship to her[2].

For Greece, the decision to quit the Council in order not to be expelled represented certainly the peak of international isolation. While the suspension of further development in the association agreement with the EEC could still be presented to Greek public opinion as reversable, the condemnation to the Junta by the Council of Europe was total and undeniable. In contrast with the EEC, the situation at the Council of Europe was clearly defined: the acting of the Greek Junta violated the legal and political commitments coming with the participation in the Council. By continuing to be a member of it, Greece would have undermined the credibility of the Council itself. This could also be true for the European Community, a group of democratic states belonging to the Council of the Europe and respecting the Covenant of Human Rights, but there were no legal clauses in the Association Agreement that could justify an "expulsion" of

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[1] *Discours de M. Papadopoulos à la Nation*, relation from Bernard Durand to the French Foreign Minister, Doc. N° 1155/EU, Athens, December 18th, 1969, in CADN, 48PO/B 295 (Athène).
[2] *D'une Conférence de presse de M. Pipinelis,* relation from Bernard Durand (French ambassador in Athens) to the French Foreign Ministry, Doc. N° 1155/EU, Athens, December 23rd, 1969, in CADN, 48PO/B 295 (Athens).

Greece (i.e. unilaterally denouncing of the Treaty). However, as Soriano recently pointed out, even though the Council of Europe and the EEC did not officially cooperate on the Greek case by joint action, there was an interplay between the two organization. According to him, the EEC imported political ideas and norms from the Council of Europe, and the Greek crisis represented the moment in which "the EC started to incorporate human rights into its political portfolio"[1].

## 3.3 NATO, the US, and Greece.

### 3.3.1 The "Mediterranean threat"

No mention of the political changes in Greece was made during NATO institutions' meetings in the aftermath of the failed royal counter-coup. Many members of the Alliance were the same countries criticizing Greece in other international bodies, such as the EEC and the Council of Europe; however, when in the Atlantic institutions, they seemed unwilling to translate rhetorical condemnations into concrete actions[2]. This reluctance seems to suggest that, despite all the rhetoric linked to the values of Treaties of Rome and the importance of Greece as a political partner, the military relations with Greece were much more important than any other kind of relations Athens could have with the powers of the West, and certainly when considering the aims of NATO. To this extent, the Diaries of Secretary General Manlio Brosio are very relevant. In fact, they show that, despite no mention to the Greek issue was made in the official transcripts of the NATO meetings, there were some countries pressing to raise the issue formally. Those were, besides the Scandinavians, the Netherlands and, occasionally, Italy[3]. Greece from its part, with Pedaliu's words, "did not feature prominently in the deliberations of the Alliance during 1968-1969"[4].

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[1] Soriano V. F., "Facing the Greek Junta: the European Community, the Council of Europe and the rise of human-rights politics in Europe", European Review of History, vol. 24 n. 3, 358-376, 2017..
[2] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 162.
[3] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, see chapters "millenovecentosesantotto" and "millenovecentosessantanove".
[4] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.

During the biennium, a series of studies on the situation in the Mediterranean in general appeared very frequently in the agendas of the Defense Planning Committee and Council of Ministers' meetings. The origin of this particular attention was to be found in the so called *Harmel Report*, the 1967 Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (a study initiated by the Belgian Foreign Minister at a time when the very existence of the Alliance was being put into question)[1]. Starting from the assessment that the international situation had changed since 1948, the Report advocated the adoption of a "dual-track policy": on the one hand deterrence, on the other hand détente. Of course, the need to keep an adequate power of defence in order to promote détente was stated. Many political issues were addressed in the report, like the need to find a solution for German division, and the possibility of a balanced force reductions in the East and in the West. Militarily, the report spoke of examining some "exposed areas", specifically citing the Mediterranean[2]. This topic was considered in light of two possible new threats in the area: on the one hand, the strengthening of the Soviet presence in the Sea, and its possible military, economic, and political consequences; on the other hand, the worsening of the conflict between Israel and some Arab countries. According to NATO, in 1968 the two phenomena were closely related, because of the possible exploiting of the situation in the Middle East by the Soviets (who had established good relations with many Arab countries, mostly based on economic aid and military furniture). In fact, the North Atlantic Council considered increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean to be "one of the principal factors in accelerating the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the Middle East/Mediterranean area, especially since the Arab/Israeli war, and despite the loss of face suffered by the Soviets at that time"[3]. For this reason, NATO's once secure Southern Flank was thereby considered increasingly exposed. Even though it seemed unrealistic that the USSR could seek direct conflict with NATO in the area, the Soviet presence still constituted a threat. Indeed, according to the Allies, from their position in the area the Soviets could look for a safer way than direct conflict to "pursue their long-term objective of a Communist world under Soviet leadership through exerting influence and pressures on the non-NATO nations, thus outflanking the Alliance and at the same evading much of the risk of all-out war"[4].

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[1] *Harmel Report*, in https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm.
[2] *Harmel Report*, in https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm.
[3] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, 7th February, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)5.
[4] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, 7th February, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)5.

A very detailed document was discussed in February 1968, in which possible Soviet Union's strategical objectives in the Mediterranean area were listed: provision of political and psychological pressure in furtherance of Soviet aims; provision of a Soviet presence when Soviets supporter regimes found themselves in difficulties; active surveillance of NATO sea power; the possibility to train Baltic and Northern Fleet crews in operating under Mediterranean conditions; and, finally, the possibility to counter NATO naval presence in the Mediterranean[1]. Moreover, the document analysed one by one those countries from which the USSR could seek support in the Eastern Europe, Middle-East and North Africa. Given all the elements analysed in the report, Northern Italy, Eastern Turkey, and Greek Thrace emerged as the NATO areas most exposed to the Soviet threat[2]. In other words, the South-Eastern flank of the Alliance. Furthermore, part of those countries (Greece, of course, but also Turkey) still needed external support in order to be able to accomplish their defence tasks.

Given the picture provided by the two reports on the Soviets in the Mediterranean, it is clear how important it was that Greece and Turkey continued to be reliable partners. From its part, Greece showed that it was aware of this, and never missed the opportunity to stress how important the external aid provided by its allies was in order for Greece to fulfil its duties in the area. On many occasions, Greek representatives demonstrated that they understand the difficulties of the major economic and military contributors, especially the US, in providing resources also for Greece. In fact, the US had started in the same period advocating the importance of a more balanced system of contribution among the Alliance's members. Though at the same time, Greece's representative to the Defence Review Committee gave a speech in February in which he underlined that it was impossible for Athens to carry out its commitments without support. NATO institutions seemed to understand the Greek position, even if not unanimously, to the extent that in the April document on the future work on defence of the Alliance "means of strengthening Greek and Turkish Local Forces" appeared among the first three items[3].

The Soviet threat in the Mediterranean, an item which would be recurring in the following years, was also used by Greek representatives when talking about *détente* and

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[1] *The Threat to NATO in the Mediterranean Area*, Brief from Secretary General to Permanent Representatives – 1968, February 15th, in NATO Archives, PO(68)98.
[2] *The Threat to NATO in the Mediterranean Area*, Brief from Secretary General to Permanent Representatives – 1968, February 15th, in NATO Archives, PO(68)98.
[3] Report By The Defence Review Committee – Programme Of Work On Defence Planning, February, 15th, 1968, in NATO Archives, DPC-D(68)6.

mutual force reduction. In relation to both issues, Athens always underlined how important it was not to let NATO's guard down when considering the Mediterranean. In fact, while most of the Allies considered the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean not to be a military threat but only a political one, in more than one occasion Greek representatives claimed that it could also become military[1]. Turkey seemed to share Athens' view on this. In particular, Turkish representatives believed that not enough emphasis had been laid on the significance of the Israel-Arab confrontation, which was the greatest Soviet' asset, and on the contrast between the policy of *détente* and the actual Soviet Union's attitude in the Mediterranean[2]. Even though Greece considered the Soviet threat to date back to well before the Arab-Israeli dispute (in connection to the traditional willingness to gain an influential position in the Balkan and Mediterranean area), Athens did share with Ankara the idea that the two facts should be linked[3]. In the light of these considerations, both Greece and Turkey welcomed with enthusiasm the decision to discuss with NATO military authorities specific external aid to the Southern flank[4].

After identifying the Soviet interests in the Mediterranean, NATO defined its own interests in the area, and the possible repercussions of the Soviet presence. Firstly, NATO needed to maintain peace throughout the area, and the respect of the political independence and territorial integrity of all states; it was also fundamental to keep a free and unhindered Western strategic access in the Mediterranean area including the free use of air shipping routes, with particular emphasis on the Suez Canal; in addition, the maintenance of NATO security and defence arrangements and those of individual countries bordering the Mediterranean and friendly to the West were important; finally, it was necessary to keep access for the "Free World" to the area for purposes of commerce, investment, and other forms of economic and technical co-operation, and to the oil supplies of the area, on "mutual acceptable terms"[5].

Despite NATO seeming to be very attentive to the evolution of the situation in the Mediterranean, Greece had some grievances. During a discussion on the follow up to the Harmel Report held in June, 1969, a specific item of the agenda was dedicated to some

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[1] *Summary record of a meeting of the Council*, April 15th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)17.
[2] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, May 8th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)22.
[3] Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council, Follow up on paragraph 14 of the Harmel Report, May 22nd, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)25.
[4] *Verbatim Record of a Meeting of Defence Planning Committee* – second part, May 10th, 1968, in NATO Archives, DPC-VR(68)8.
[5] *Follow-up on Paragraph 14 of the Harmel Report – the Situation in the Mediterranean*, section "Attitude of the countries in the Mediterranean area", April 22nd, 1968, in NATO Archives, PO(68)226.

statements made by the Greek permanent representative about the NATO commentary to the Plan for Defence Future Tasks of the Alliance. According to the commentary, détente and defense were still fully compatible. From the point of view of the Greek representative, however, this was no longer completely true. In fact, while in the Western idea détente meant a search for peace, to the eyes of the Soviets it constituted a means to realize their initial objective: global expansion. To this extent, NATO commentary had minimized the communist threat in the world. Also, according to Greece, it was erroneous to promote the image of a weakening Soviet Union to the Western public, because this was an idealistic and aspirational view reflecting Western hopes and not reality. The Greek representative concluded by stating that Greece wanted "to proceed with a détente, taking security as a starting point. This is not in accord with the present tendency of having security conditioned by détente"[1].

It was peculiar that a country as Greece, not prominent in the Alliance's equilibrium, took such a firm position against a general tendency of the Alliance. Furthermore, the Greek representative's statements seemed overestimating the Soviet aims for expansion. While it was certainly true that the USSR had not yet abandoned its competition with the West for the role "global model", it is difficult to imagine that, with all internal problems connected to satellite countries at that time, Moscow still had to the primary objective of expanding communism all over the world. It is even more difficult to think that, against this background, *détente* could be considered a means to realize that plan. This attitude makes one wonder whether Greece was truly concerned about such a threat, or whether it was trying to exploit its geo-strategic importance in order to gain more resources from the Allies.

The answer is probably mixed. However, it must be recalled that the Greek Junta had once before justified its action (in the immediate aftermath of the April 1967 coup), and its following stay at power, with the menace of a "communist plot". Of course, the proximity of the Soviets in the Mediterranean and of the centre of a growing conflict in the Middle East constituted a serious source of concern for Athens. However, the Junta leaders were also intelligent enough to understand that this concern could be a resource when dealing with the Allies. In fact, a South-Eastern flank freed from the Soviet threat would have made the Allies less willing to accept the requests coming from Athens, and

[1] *Follow-up to the report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance – part 1*, Review of the East/West Relations and their prospects, June 13th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-M(68)21.

maybe also an authoritarian regime in the country. Scandinavian countries had started to raise their voice against the Junta also within Atlantic institutions. The words of Denmark's permanent representative pronounced during a NATO Council meeting (June 1968) can be quoted as an example of that:

> *"But if we are to preserve broad popular support for NATO, we must keep our own house in order. We must make it clear that NATO serves the cause of democracy – also within our countries. That is why my government feels disturbed about setbacks to the cause of democracy within our own circle. The principles of the Treaty and our basic convictions commit us to vigilance, not only with regard to danger arising in the world around us bust just as much with regard to threats to democracy arising in our own midst. Violation of fundamental human rights constitute one of the most dangerous threats to democracy"*[1].

Of course, Portugal could also fit that description, and Greece was not explicitly mentioned. However, since Portugal was a founding member of the Alliance, the timing of such an attack would seem strange. Also, during the weeks preceding the meeting, Brosio had been reporting in his Diaries about the meetings on the Greek case he had had with the Danish representative and with Greek foreign minister Pipinelis. Knowing that the Danish representative would not renounce to at least mention the relevance of democratic principles to the Allies, it was Brosio who obtained that he would not openly refer to Greece[2]. Greece made no comment in response during the meeting, but the possibility that NATO could also turn its back on the Junta must have appeared as real threat to Athens, and maybe contributed to the emphasis put on the communist menace by its representatives. In fact, during the same meeting, Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis asked in addition to the studies on the Mediterranean area an official question to consider the implications of a reduction of foreign forces in the region, and the time necessary to bring them back again in case of escalation of tension[3]. This proposition was met with the support from the Turkish delegation, and the motion was accepted.

Maybe Greece felt pressure to ensure its position also because of recent events threatening to "steal the scene". In fact, from the month of May, 1968, the events related

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[1] *Verbatim Record of the Council Held in Reyjkjavik*, June 24th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-VR(68)30_PART2.
[2] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 529-534.
[3] *Verbatim Record of the Council Held in Reyjkjavik*, June 24th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-VR(68)30_PART2.

to the Prague Spring and Czechoslovakia in general were capturing NATO's attention. The news coming from Prague, and possible consequences of the uprisings to the Eastern balance of power, were considered very important. Even though the situation was still fluid, a continuing exchange of information and comments among members was formally requested by the US representative[1]. However, while developments were being closely followed by the Allies, no public statements on the topic would have been provided, in order to avoid the impression of interfering.

### 3.3.2 The Czechoslovakian crisis through the eyes of NATO

After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the Summer of 1968, NATO increased the level of attention to developments. It is not the aim of this research to define details of NATO's involvement in the Czechoslovakian crisis; it would suffice to say that the Allies feared that, through direct control of the region, the USSR could strengthen its direct influence over the area of Central and Eastern Europe. What is relevant to our topic is how Greece acted within the NATO framework in those weeks.

At the end of September, the Council discussed a paper in which some general considerations about Czechoslovakian events and NATO were listed. A specific paragraph entitled "general lessons of the crisis" seemed to conclude that NATO had a strong capacity to correctly assess the developing situation. This had been possible mainly thanks to specific members' data being given to the Alliance, and to regular and close consultations among nations at Council level[2]. The practice of exchanging information, intelligence data, and opinions should have been continued and improved, according to the specific Working Group, especially concerning the speed of distribution of messages within the Headquarters of the Alliance when a crisis occurred[3]. But still, the general evaluation of the crisis management was mostly positive. However, the resolute action of the Soviets, who invaded Czechoslovakia in August with Warsaw Pact troops, also reminded to the NATO Allies the persistence of the "omnipresent

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[1] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, May 14th, 1968, in NATO Archives, in C-R(68)23.
[2] *Crisis Management Aspects on the invasion of Czechoslovakia*, Report by the Council Operations and Exercise Co-ordination Working Group, September 25th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-M(68)42.
[3] *Crisis Management Aspects on the invasion of Czechoslovakia*, Report by the Council Operations and Exercise Co-ordination Working Group, September 25th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-M(68)42.

Communist threat"[1]. Therefore, the importance of being in good terms with regimes as fiercely anti-communist as the Greek was confirmed. As Maragkou argues, it was therefore plausible enough for most NATO allies "to be content on strategic ground with the Greek regime, and hence feel no desire to influence its downfall"[2].

During the Czech crisis, Greece seemed to be well aware this. Like the Six Days War in 1967, the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia could be used as a means to reinforce Greece's position within the Alliance. In fact, while sharing the common satisfaction for NATO's attitude during the crisis, the Greek representative at the Council seemed willing to reiterate the argument of "Soviet expansion's aims" also in the Czechoslovakian context. Once again, Athens stressed the connection between this argument and the difficulties still existing for a *détente* process which, although desirable, was still far off. For this reason, his government was considering improving its national defence, and increasing the presence of Greek officers under NATO command. According to Greece, the unstable situation in Czechoslovakia could affect the stability of all of Eastern Europe[3]. For these reason, the Greek representative proposed that NATO, at least unofficially, made a statement in which *détente* was declared as impossible unless the Soviets stopped the occupation of Czechoslovakia[4]. The importance of including military considerations on the possibility of increasing NATO presence in the region, and the perplexities about détente were also shared by the Turkish representative on that occasion.[5]

From Greece's perspective, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the following occupation were steps in the direction of a larger expansionist design in Eastern Europe and Middle East. Of course, the plan included the Mediterranean region, which was made clear by Greek representative in the Reykjavik meeting of October 1968, when he said that Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, backed up by the

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[1] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 78.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 79.
[3] *Examination of evaluation reports on the invasion of Czechoslovakia*, Summary Record of a Meeting of the Country, October 2nd, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)51_PART1.
[4] *Examination of evaluation reports on the invasion of Czechoslovakia*, Summary Record of a Meeting of the Country, October 4th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)51_PART2.
[5] *Examination of evaluation reports on the invasion of Czechoslovakia*, Summary Record of a Meeting of the Country, October 4th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)51_PART2.

presence of troops in Bulgaria, was clearly intended as a means of exerting pressure in the Balkans[1].

### 3.3.3 The Mediterranean threat: the debate continues.

While the Czechoslovakian crisis had been at the centre of the debate during its most acute phases, the Mediterranean was never forgotten by the Allies. In fact, the monitoring of both areas proceeded in parallel, and sometimes intersected. By the end of November, 1968 the USSR announced the so called Brezhnev Doctrine, declaring the "right" of Moscow to intervene anywhere that socialist rule in Central and Eastern Europe was under threat. The Alliance evaluated the declaration as a 'retrospective' theoretical justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia but, once again, Greece believed that the doctrine was more Machiavellian than the Allies had thought. According to Greek representatives, the Brezhenev Doctrine hid something more than a justification; it constituted a precedent which could be used in the future to justify other initiatives aimed at expansion. In particular, if applied to the Balkans, the doctrine could have resulted in the "permanent presence of Soviet troops much closer to the border-line between NATO and Warsaw Pact members"[2]. The reference was to the Northern border of Greece, in particular to three countries that corresponded to the idea of "socialist rule" intended by Brezhnev: Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania[3]. Even though Yugoslavia had broken its ties with Moscow in 1948, and Albania in 1961, the two countries were still listed in the document. According to the analysis, the Brezhnev theory could justify interventions also in countries that "has been under communist rule" in the past, such as Yugoslavia and Albania[4]. This geographical proximity, added to the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean could jeopardise Greece in times of need.

The Alliance partially shared Greek concerns, as demonstrated by the fact that already in November 1968 Defence Planning Committee had been working on reinforcements in a number of contingencies, and on the set-up of working groups aimed

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[1] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, October 16th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)53.
[2] *Confidential Summary Notes on a Private Council Meeting With President Nixon at 10.25 a.m. on Monday*, 24th February, 1969, in NATO Archives, PR(69)11.
[3] *Analysis of the Soviet Threat in Europe and the Mediterranean and it Implications – Further Developments in Eastern Europe: Contingency Studies*, March 16th, 1969, in NATO Archives, C-M(69)16.
[4] *Analysis of the Soviet Threat in Europe and the Mediterranean and it Implications – Further Developments in Eastern Europe: Contingency Studies*, March 16th, 1969, in NATO Archives, C-M(69)16.

at studying the strengthening of the local forces in Greece and Turkey[1]. Furthermore, the USA had announced an increase in its engagement in the Mediterranean.

Also in November, during a Defence Committee ministerial meeting, the Greek Foreign Minister, Pipinelis, reiterated the connection existing between the Czechoslovakian situation and the Mediterranean. According to him, "recent events had created a new situation in the balance of forces to the disadvantage of NATO"[2]. He thought that the threat of a further invasion was not yet over, and that Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania and other countries could be affected by similar events. In such an eventuality, he stressed, the whole NATO defence structure in the Southern flank would find itself in an inferior position. Also, the increasing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean could become very dangerous for the defence of the Greek insular areas as it could impede the early arrival of external reinforcements. While the Greek government had enormously improved its Armed Forces in recent years, foreign assistance to the Hellenic Armed Forces was continuously decreasing in spite of recommendations from NATO authorities. This was worse, continued Pipinelis, considering that it was well known that Greece depended considerably on foreign aid for the acquisition of major equipment[3]. Turkish foreign minister agreed with his Greek colleague, together with the Italian representative, who expressed concern about the possible implications in the Mediterranean of the new attitude of the Soviets. Great Britain and Canada also shared that fear. However, most of the Allies still believed that Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean had the exclusive aim of strengthening USSR *political* influence in the area, especially on the Arab countries[4].

It was not a coincidence that Pipinelis referred to Greek dependence of foreign aid on that occasion. In fact, in those months Athens was negotiating a full restoration of the MAP (Military Assistance Program) from the US. As previously mentioned, the programme had been partially interrupted by Washington soon after the military coup, in 1967. However, two major changes had occurred from that date. On the one hand, the election of a new president, Richard Nixon. On the other hand, the American

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[1] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee*, November 14th, 1968, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(68)21.
[2] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee*, November 14th, 1968, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(68)21.
[3] Summary Record of a Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, November 14th, 1968, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(68)21.
[4] Analysis of the Soviet Threat in Europe and the Mediterranean and it Implications – Further Developments in Eastern Europe: Contingency Studies, March 16th, 1969, in NATO Archives, C-M(69)16.

Ambassador in Athens Talbot had been succeeded by Henry Tasca. Despite being seeming paradoxical, 1969 for Greece constituted the peak of international isolation in Europe, yet at the same time was a positive turning point in its relations with the US (even though the results of this change would be visible in the following years). The US had come from a period of internal conflict, especially regarding its intervention in Vietnam, and for this reason Nixon believed that it was of utmost importance to regain popular support and confidence for foreign policy. This is why the new line promoted by Nixon stressed for the first time the *limits* of American capability to intervene abroad, instead of the contrary. Starting from the statement that it was impossible to completely defeat the Soviet Union, the most desirable aim to pursue was to keep the already existing balance, *with* the Soviet Union and not *against* it[1].

In this framework, the Colonels as reliable interlocutors were preferable to more democratic but unstable ones. In fact, when considering *detènte*, Greece was considered crucial both by Nixon and Kissinger. As Pedaliu underlines, Nixon's preoccupations with superpowers *detènte* (from which local powers such as those on the Mediterranean basin were excluded) was that tensions in the Middle-East (i.e. the conflicts between Arabs and Israelis) could threaten the process[2]. According to him and Kissinger, the threats to Mediterranean security had been underestimated in previous years, and the region, in which there were numerous sources of tension, should be kept under strict control. For this reason, it was vital for the US to continue to support the NATO forces in Greece, and the Greek national forces[3]. In order not to fuel internal criticism coming from some members of the Congress and from public opinion, Nixon and Kissinger would pressure the Greek government to put a "mask" of respectability on the one hand, and "made sure not to meet people who wanted to discuss the plight of Greek political prisoners" on the other hand[4]. But still, Nixon and Kissinger found it more convenient to "deal with an authoritarian rather than a potentially unstable, but democratic, Greece"[5].

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[1] M. Del Pero, *Libertà e Impero, gli Stati Uniti e il Mondo. 1776-2011*, Laterza Editori, Bari, 2011, pp. 354-363.
[2] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[3] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[4] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[5] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.

Noticing the change that had occurred in the USA, Athens tried to ask for the full restoration of the MAP programme in March 1969. At the time, the Secretary of State could not say a direct "yes". However, he did not hide from the Greek representative that he was positive about the final decision. Negotiations lasted the entire year. Even though by November, 1969, Greece had still received no official answer, the decision seemed to have been taken in substance. From US Foreign Relations documents, it emerged that MAP would be restored, provided that some liberalization initiatives be implemented by the Junta in the near future. With the words of Henry Kissinger in a letter to his president Nixon:

> *"my solution would be to [...] release the suspended equipment without condition, but urge the government to make some moves to improve the public atmosphere for our action"*[1].

Despite president Nixon's personal will to restore the aids with no conditions, he was aware that some signals of goodwill were necessary in order to prevent critics from the American public, and maybe also from NATO Allies. Indeed, as previously mentioned, some European countries (the Scandinavians in particular) were trying to bring their fight against the Junta from the Council of Europe to the NATO bodies. In fact, as Brosio reported in his Diaries, in March 1969 the Italian representative Nenni threatened to leave the Council meeting when Pipinelis would talk[2]. And, more important, during the meeting of November 1968, in which Pipinelis advocated for a strengthening in external support of Greek forces, the representative of Denmark formally expressed his regret that actual conditions existing within the Alliances' own circle did not, in "certain cases", correspond to the ideas expressed in the founding Treaty concerning the determinations of member governments to safeguard principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law[3]. Already in May the representative of Denmark had expressed his opposition to the strengthening of external aid for Greece. On that occasion, Brosio had managed to erase the statement against Greece from the minute of the meeting, just declaring that

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[1] *Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon*, Washington, undated, in FRUS, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972, doc. 261.
[2] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 512-514.
[3] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level*, "Continuation", November 15th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)61 and C-R(68)62.

the proposal of strengthening Greek local forces had been accepted unanimously with Danish reservation[1].

This time, Pipinelis did not respond to the comment, also because his Danish colleague made no explicit reference to Greece. However, given also what was happening in the Council of Europe in the same weeks, the message seems clear. The only affirmation made by Pipinelis that could be read as a response to the Danish declaration concerned the "great importance that the countries of the East, which were always on the look-out for possible divergencies between the Allies, should be in no doubt whatsoever as to the unity of the Alliance"[2]. This could mean that no divergence concerning Allies' domestic affairs should affect the general attitude of the Alliance, because this could have constituted a threat to security for everyone. To strengthen his position, Pipinelis could refer to one of the funding guidelines of the NATO Alliance: not to intervene the domestic affairs of members countries, as long as they did not interfere with the aims of the Alliance as a whole. In fact, Danish comments seemed to fall on deaf ears, and 1969 began with usual discussions on reinforcement plans for the Alliance[3].

Even without the same alarmism of Greek representatives, the NATO Defence Planning Committee recognized that "events in Eastern Europe during the past six months have created an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and latent crisis", and that for this reason NATO forces "required a greater degree of flexibility than heretofore if they are to be a possible instrument of dissuasive diplomacy and a means of forestalling indirect threats"[4]. No substantial steps forwards were made in the rest of the year towards the measures to be taken concerning Greece and the Mediterranean; however, another topic emerged which would caught Athens' attention in the following months. This was the possibility of a pan-European conference on security, proposed by the Soviet Union (Budapest appeal, 17th March 1969). They also proposed that a discussion be held on the possible extension of economic, political, and cultural relations among all European countries. Talks about those issues started immediately among the two blocks, but also

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[1] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, 574-575.
[2] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level*, "Continuation", November 15th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)61 and C-R(68)62.
[3] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Committee*, January 9th, 1969, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(69)1.
[4] Overall Summary Appraisal by the Secretary General of the Defence Planning Committee Defence Review of 1968, January 9th, 1969, in NATO Archives, DPC-D(69)1.

within the respective international *fora* (Warsaw Pact, NATO, EEC)[1]. It is interesting that Greece acted in the same way as it had towards *détente*, stressing the possible threats coming from any collaboration with the East. According to Greek representatives, the USSR was not to be trusted in any case, because its actions always hid a second aim. When discussing the possibility of a security conference, Greece stated that Soviet proposal was "merely intended to secure a recognition by the Western Powers of the *status quo* in Europe, and to gain access to Western industrial, technological, and financial resources"[2]. According to Greece, as with *détente*, such initiatives could only be pursued if a corresponding engagement and signs of goodwill were shown by the Russians, and that was not yet the case[3].

The end of 1969 was approaching and the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe with it. The efforts made by Brosio, the Americans (and the British) not to bring the issue of Greek on the official agenda of the NATO bodies were succeeding. However, after the final clash with the Council of Europe, the need for supporting Greece within the Alliance would rise again.

### 3.4. Cyprus

Before moving to the next phase of the Greek regime, it is necessary to briefly mention the evolution of the situation in Cyprus. Even though tensions among Greek and Turkish communities had been consistently decreasing since the 1967 crisis, the island was still closely monitored, especially by NATO (and the US). In fact, the increasing presence of the Soviet forces in the Mediterranean Sea could constitute a destabilizing factor for Cyprus, because of President Makarios' alleged sympathies for the Soviet Union. According to a working paper on the follow-up of the Harmel Report, dated April 1968, the Allies shared the idea that, in case of "severe tension" [between East and West], the attitude of Nicosia would be very difficult to predict[4]. Still, even though the present government was not very favourable to NATO or the West, its attitude would probably

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[1] Westad O. A., *The Cold War. A Word History*, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2017.
[2] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, December 4th, 1969, first and second part, in NATO Archives, C-R(69)55.
[3] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, December 4th, 1969, first and second part, in NATO Archives, C-R(69)55.
[4] *Follow-up on Paragraph 14 of the Harmel Report – the Situation in the Mediterranean*, section "Attitude of the countries in the Mediterranean area", 1968, April 22nd, in NATO Archives, PO(68)226.

be affected by purely regional considerations. In any case, "tending to be more neutral than anti-NATO"[1].

Having established that Cyprus would not engage in a direct conflict with NATO only because of Makarios' sympathy for the USSR, another problem did concern NATO members: possible problems deriving from the rivalry between Turkish and Greek Communities, and their repercussions on relations between Ankara and Athens. Actually, Greece and Turkey had been engaging in bilateral talks since the end of 1967. According to their representatives, the common aim was to find a definitive solution to the problems generated by the presence of the two communities on the island. Of course, since the beginning, NATO had been following the development of bilateral negotiations. Even though it did not bring an exhaustive solution to the issue, the 1968-1969 biennium can be considered as positive for Greco-Turkish relations, also concerning Cyprus. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, Greece and Turkey agreed many times on NATO issues, especially concerning defence, and this was also reflected in their bilateral relations.

A key personality in the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process had been the Greek Foreign Minister of that period, Panagyotis Pipinelis. He was a well experienced diplomat, and then politician (one of the few professionals within the government). He had previously been permanent representative of Greece to NATO (1952-1953), then Minister for Trade in Karamanlis' cabinet (1961-1963), and interim Prime Minister for a brief period after Karamanlis' resignation and self-exile. The presence of a politician like Pipinelis, even if he was almost the only one who had political experience and good reputation to join the Junta, also served to contradict the general impression that the military had neither political programme, nor a coherent long-term ideology for reform. He had always had a good reputation in NATO circles, and indeed he was appointed by the Junta in November 1967, just during the crisis in Cyprus. In fact, from the records of the NATO meeting of the following months, it can be assumed that his Turkish counterpart also had deep respect for him. During a NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting held in Reykjavik in June 1968, Turkish Foreign Minister called Pipinelis "his friend", and stressed the importance of bilateral talks initiated by Turkey and Athens[2]. Even

[1] *Follow-up on Paragraph 14 of the Harmel Report – the Situation in the Mediterranean*, section "Attitude of the countries in the Mediterranean area", 1968, April 22nd, in NATO Archives, PO(68)226.
[2] *Verbatim Record of the Council Held in Reykjavik*, June 24th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-VR(68)30_PART2.

though this was probably rhetoric, it still shows that Turkey was keen to show its goodwill to the Allies. He largely emphasized the need to find a rapid solution, and the importance that the presence of UN forces still had in keeping peace on the island. While Pipinelis agreed with the expressions of goodwill of his Turkish counterpart, he did not seem willing to dedicate the same amount of time on the topic, turning after a few words on Cyprus to the issue of the Soviets[1]. Still, the importance attributed to the issue by NATO members is testified by the paragraph 11 of the press release about the Reykjavik meeting, which is dedicated to the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations[2]. A few days later, the topic was also mentioned by the chairman of the 324th Meeting of the Military Committee of NATO, who stressed the "encouraging friendly attitude taken between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, who referred to talks that had recently taken place between their two countries in Beirut and Nicosia on the Cyprus problem and they were hopeful of a successful outcome in due course"[3].

The good climate established between Athens and Ankara seems to be confirmed by the fact that, during this biennium, Brosio met occasionally Pipinelis and his Turkish counterpart, Caglayangil, togheter[4]. At the end of 1968, the NATO Secretary General produced his regular Watching Brief on Greek-Turkish relations, in which he reiterated that they had improved. This was largely attributable to the "personal constructive approach" of the two Foreingn Ministers involved, Mr. Pipinelis for Greece and Mr. Caglayangil for Turkey[5]. He also reported that he met them in New York the past October, and they could discuss the numerous achievements resulted by the bilateral talks started in March 1968. One of those was the understanding reached on the educational system of the respective minorities in Greece and Turkey, which was at that moment being implemented. Such a result, he concluded, was important for the Alliance as a whole, because an improvement of relations between the two members countries was vital to the general interests of NATO. However, when turning specifically to Cyprus, the Secretary General seemed less optimistic. That issue, he wrote, was still of

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[1] *Verbatim Record of the Council Held in Reykjavik*, June 24th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-VR(68)30_PART2.
[2] *Final Communiqué about the Reykjavik meeting,* June, 26th, 1968, in NATO Archives, PRESS_RELEASE_M2(68)4_1.
[3] Summary Record of the 324th Meeting of the Military Committee, June 28th, 1968, in NATO Archives, RECORD_MT_324_
[4] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, see chapters "Millenovecentosessantotto", and "Millenovecentosessantanove".
[5] Greek-Turkish relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 7th, 1968, in NATO Archives, PO(68)576.

a "very delicate character"[1]. However, he also felt free to express his personal positive sentiment for a possible improvement in a middle-term period, especially considering the difficult situation from which the two countries had started less than a year before[2].

Positive sentiments towards the process were also expressed a few weeks later by Turkey, together with words of appreciation for the precious contribution brought by Minister Pipinelis. Furthermore, the Turkish representative affirmed that "if both communities showed a goodwill and a constructive approach to the problem, he hope that their differences could be settled and that like would return to normal under the Republic"[3]. On the same occasion, Mr. Pipinelis shared positive remarks on the Cyprus situation and the engagements of the governments of Turkey and Greece, even though he dwelled on the topic less than his Turkish colleague. He seemed more interested in discussing the Mediterranean situation in connection with Soviet initiatives and détente[4].

There were no signs of significant change in the following year. Indeed, in the 1969 Watching Brief, NATO Secretary General admitted that no decisive developments had been reached on the issues of the two Cyprus communities in the past year. However, it was reiterated that bilateral talks were still the only possible road to a "constructive, enduring, and peaceful solution"[5]. Meanwhile, the prevailing situation of calm on the island it was considered as a reason for satisfaction. While sources of tension were still present, it could be hoped that nothing would unfavourably affect the climate of negotiations. Also, the extension that the United Nations accorded to the presence of peace-keeping forces on the island could only be welcomed with favour and hope, in the interest of both the Allied countries and of Cyprus itself[6].

What the Secretary General could not know at the time was that Mr. Pipinelis, who had been so important in reducing tensions between the two allies, was soon to die of cancer. In the following months, and years, Greek foreign affairs would change, and Cyprus would become a source of internal tension between the different factions of the

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[1] Greek-Turkish relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 7th, 1968, in NATO Archives, PO(68)576.
[2] Greek-Turkish relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 7th, 1968, in NATO Archives, PO(68)576.
[3] Summary record of a Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, November 15th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)61.
[4] Summary record of a Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, November 15th, 1968, in NATO Archives, C-R(68)61.
[5] Greek-Turkish relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 24th, 1969, in NATO Archives, PO(69)564.
[6] Greek-Turkish relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 24th, 1969, in NATO Archives, PO(69)564.

military, generating an escalation of tension that would lead to internal and external crises.

# 4. The Calm Before the Storm (1970-1972)

## 4.1 Greece and the rule of Georgios Papadopoulos

Despite showing disregard for the opinions of the Council of Europe and of European states' citizens, which were accused of not understanding the real aim of the Greek government, Papadopoulos knew that Greece could not remain internationally isolated forever. Therefore, he decided to channel his efforts towards those countries which had showed some confidence in the Junta, like the US and a few member states of the EEC, particularly France.

By the beginning of 1970, he started showing some signs, more propagandistic than concrete, of liberalization. He ordered the freeing of the famous poet and musician Mikis Theodorakis, imprisoned under political charges since the coup in 1967. During a press conference held in April 1970 he also announced that article 10 of the new constitution, which concerned personal rights in terms of arrest, detention and pre-trial detention, was about to be activated. Furthermore, about three hundred political prisoners were to be released within ten days, so as the number of political prisoners would diminish from 1,970 (of the previous year) to 1,270. Further liberal measures, he concluded, would be implemented during the course of the year[1]. However, he did not mention a possible date for the election, nor for the re-legalisation of political parties. Also, the issue of the monarchy was avoided by Papadopoulos, who did not mention the (self-exiled) King in his speech[2].

While openly celebrating his government' action, which was creating the conditions for a healthy parliamentary democracy in Greece (which was, according to the Junta discourse, the very aim of the Revolution of the 21 April, even though these mysterious "conditions" had never been precisely described), Papadopoulos kept consolidating his personal rule. In 1971, Greece was divided into seven administrative areas, each one supervised by a direct branch of the central government. Those areas, with their respective governors, pretended to be part of a general reform of devolution

[1] De la Conference de Presse de M. Papadopoulos du 10 Avril, note from Ambassador Durand to French Foreign Office, doc. N° 365/EU, Athens, April 17th 1970, in CADN, 48PO/B 296 (Athens).
[2] De la Conference de Presse de M. Papadopoulos du 10 Avril, note from Ambassador Durand to French Foreign Office, doc. N° 365/EU, Athens, April 17th 1970, in CADN, 48PO/B 296 (Athens).

(decentralization of administrative power), even though it seemed to be more of a means to control the peripheries. The increase of resources given to the Ministry of Public Order (which had grown 40% by 1968), and the power granted to the military concerning internal security, seems to confirm this interpretation of the administrative reform[1]. Dimitrios Iannidis, already chief of the Greek Military Police (ESA), was also charged with control of the military internal security system. As already mentioned, as chief of the ESA, he was also directly responsible for the cases of torture and violence on political prisoners. While at the time he did not appear publicly as a prominent figure in politics, in a few months Ioannidis would become the most influential member of the far-right faction of the Military, and finally overthrow Papadopoulos himself in 1973.

On the 19th of June 1970, Foreign Minister Pipinelis died at the age of 71. Both inside, and especially outside of Greece, his departure was considered to be a great loss. As previously mentioned, Pipinelis had been a strong promotor of dialogue between Turkey and Greece, and his political stature (which dated long before the establishment of the Junta) had contributed to make Papadopoulos' government more credible to the eyes of the international community. A few days after Pipinelis' death, Papadopoulos announced that he would take his office personally, and nominated a former diplomat as Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas. By choosing Palamas, Papdopoulos probably hoped for two outcomes: on the one hand, to reassure the Junta's extremist wing, by not charging a professional politician with that important office; on the other hand, to give a sign of continuity with Pipinelis by appointing a well experienced diplomat, who was not a member of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, Papadopoulos publicly stated that the loss of Pipinelis would not change Greek foreign policy. However, it was undeniable that Palamas was not as esteemed as Pipinelis, and this would become clear in the long term. Conversely, Pipinelis' death had its immediate impact on the Greek internal asset of power. At the time when the Pipinelis died, Papadopoulos already held the offices of Prime Minister and Interior Minister; by also

[1] Veremis Th. M – Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, p. 172.

taking the Foreign Office, he amassed the most important powers for himself[1]. This accumulation of power caused criticism both from outside and inside the Junta. As Woodhouse reports, the accusations coming from his colleagues were contradictory: some of them accused him of aiming to put an end to the dictatorship, while others of trying to maintain it indefinitely. The point on which they all converged was the accusation of having caused the stagnation in which the Junta stood. For some days the situation was unstable. Papadopoulos' objective was to satisfy international opinion, especially Washington, without going too far in liberalization and therefore losing control of the radical wing of the Junta[2]. By taking the key ministries himself, while giving some sign of superficial liberalization, he probably thought to have found a right balance. To complete the transition, by March 1972 he would take over also the regency from General Zoitakis, becoming both the Head of the Government and of the State.

On the summer of 1970, five hundred political prisoners were released. This decision could have been made to counter the impression of authoritarianism derived from Papadopoulos taking control of the Foreign Office, or to give to the US a sign of good will in order to secure the military aid program. On the same occasion, Papadopoulos announced that further measures towards normalization of the regime would be taken in September. However, neither the suspension of martial law, nor the announcement of a date for parliamentary election were included among these measures[3]. The year o ended without any great changes to the regime's structure, nor to Greece's international relations. The partnership with the US was still strong, even though the MAP had not yet been restored, while there had been no improvement in relations with the EEC. The Junta had taken some initiatives aimed at softening the regime, like freeing political prisoners, but those had not altered the authoritarian nature of the regime. The Greek population still seemed to be accepting the regime passively, and there was no record of organized,

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[1] In a report to the French Foreign Office, French Ambassador Durand noted that Palamas had a very different political orientation from Pipinelis. While the former Foreign Minister was a conservative right-wing man (above all, close to the Junta's political orientation), Palams was a diplomat with a liberal formation. Therefore, according to Durand, it would have been difficult for him to exercise some real influence over Papadopoulos. The choice of a man so ideologically far from himself, revealed Papadopoulos' intention to dictate the Foreign Office's political line without any interference. In *Visite au Nouveau Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangères*, telegram N° 15/DA-EU, Athens, July 30th 1970, in CADN, 48 PO/B 296 (Athènes).

[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 81-82.

[3] *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece*, Washington, July 27th 1970, and *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece*, Washington, August 11th, 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. 287 and 288

mass opposition. But this was also probably the year in which Papadopoulos started to realize that divergencies existing within his own circle could become serious. A report coming from the French Embassy at the end of November 1970 underlined the existence of a conservative wing of the military (that, according to their sources, was headed by Colonel Makarezos) which was unhappy with Papadopoulos' decision to introduce a high number of civilians into the government, especially in the economic field[1]. According to Woodhouse, hostility towards the Junta was growing also within the officer corps. Of course, they could not express it, with exception of retired officers. According to the figures of the period 1967-1972, the annual rate of retirement had been between two and three times as high as the rate during the previous five year period[2]. This was the result of the purges.

Despite the divergencies and the malaise growing within some sectors of the armed forces, which were at the time still under control, the period between 1971 and the end of 1972 was characterized by internal stability, and by the usual Junta 'dualism'[3]. While Papadopoulos kept accumulating power, he also granted some other (moderately) liberal reforms. At the beginning of 1971, he attended the inauguration of the 'Consultative Committee', an assembly partially elected serving as a 'mini-parliament', the creation of which had been announced the previous year. At the inauguration, Papadopoulos made a speech in which he asserted the need to avoid 'stagnation' at all costs, and invited the newly constituted Committee to exercise 'criticism in good faith'. However, he also stated that the military power was still out of question[4]. By the end of the same year, press censorship had been eased and the penalties from political trials had been mitigated[5]. As a consequence of this, political prisoners decreased in number, and by the end of 1971 they counted no more than four or five hundred people (depending on

[1] *Situation politique en Grèce*, coded telegram from B. Durand, Athens, November 26th, in CADN, 48PO/B 295 (Athènes), Doc N°437-444.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 92.
[3] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 90.
[5] *Actes de torrorisme. Procés politiques*, communiqué from B. Durand to the French Foreign Office, Athens, July 1971, doc. N° 549/EU, and *Procés Politique: épilogues*, communiqué from B. Durand to the French Foreign Office, Athens, August 10th, 1971, doc. N° 609/EU, both in CADN, 48 PO/B 329 (Athènes).

whether the news came from the government or the opposition). Furthermore, at the beginning of 1972 former politicians were granted the possibility of leaving the country[1].

Conversely, martial law was abolished, but only in the peripheries (apparently considered to be less dangerous than the big cities), and the regular use of tortures on prisoners continued as nothing had happened in the Council of Europe. According to Amnesty International, the period from 1971 to 1973 saw, however, a change of methods: tortures and abuses were now perpetrated against students, especially after the first protestations against the regime in 1972, and against the "unfaithful" elements within the Army, especially after the attempted mutiny in 1973[2] (both the students protestations and the Army attempted mutiny will be analysed in the following paragraphs). Morevover, Papadopoulos kept delaying the announcement of the election date. He only declared that it was his personal decision when Greece would be "ready" for election. As previously underlined, Papadopoulos continuous postponement of election rooted in the awareness that the Junta did not have enough popular support to win in a free election. However, this was probably not the only reason: according to article 34 of the 1968 constitution, after parliamentary election the King would be allowed to come back to Greece from exile. The only way Papadopoulos could get rid of the King was by calling for a referendum of the existence of monarchy itself in Greece, but this was a very risky move at the time. Greek popular support for the institution of the monarchy was not so strong. However, if the scarce political opposition existing in Greece would coordinate and decided to vote in favour of the monarchy, this could severely impact the Junta's credibility. Still, Papadopoulos decided to make a move in this direction by taking the place of general Zoitakis as Greek Regent in 1972. By doing so, he united de facto the two highest national positions, Prime Minister and Regent, in one person: himself. It was only a matter of time (and of "right occasion") for the final blow to the monarchy, but such an occasion did not present until the spring of 1973.

Finally, those years were also characterized by a growing tolerance of Communism, at least abroad. In 1971, Greece established diplomatic relations with Albania for the first time since the war; in the same year, Papadopoulos invited the Bulgarian and

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[1] *Notes sur la Politique Intérieure de la Grèce en date du mois de Decembre 1971*, French Foreign Office, South Europe Direction, general report N° 14/EU, Paris, December 1971; and *Cinq Ans de Régime Autoritaire en Grèce*, communiqué from B. Durand to the French Foreign Office, Athens, April 26th 1972, Doc. N° 335/EU, both in CADN 48PO/B 330 (Athènes).

[2] Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.

Rumanian Foreign Ministers to visit Greece. Also, Greece improved its relations with Yugoslavia[1]. After the international crisis culminated in the abandonment of the Council of Europe, such initiatives could represent the attempt to build new international contacts with neighbouring countries[2]. In fact, while such initiatives could seem paradoxical for a nationalist and fiercely anti-communist regime such as the Greek, by opening relations with Albania and therefore renouncing its ancient claims on Northern Epirus, the Colonels could break out from international isolation[3]. Also, as Pedaliu points out, this "micro-*détente* in the Balkans" served as a means of pressure against Greece's Western detractors, as it showed that Greece was not "short of options"[4], or, with Marakgou's words, "a way of blackmailing the West"[5]. In any case, the tactic seemed to work, at least within the Atlantic environment.

### 4.2. The EEC: what to do next? The debate around Greece during the first 1970s.

In the aftermath of the clash between Greece and the Council of Europe, the debate concerning the Military Junta rose again within European institutions. As during the years before, it was the Mixed Association Commission which promoted discussions on the possibility of unilaterally denouncing the Association Agreement. Indeed, according to some members of the Association Commission, a link existed between the Council of Europe and the EEC. This meant that what had happened in Strasbourg should also have repercussions within the EEC. During a meeting of the Mixed Association in February 1970, the Socialist Mile Lulling stressed polemically that some members of the Council of Europe were also members of EEC institutions, and that they gave the impression that they changed their minds about the Greek Junta depending on where they were seated[6].

The issue was brought to the attention of the Commission of the EEC through the oral interrogation 15/69. From the debate that followed at the European Parliament, at

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[1] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p.130.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 108.
[3] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[4] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[5] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 130.
[6] Minute of a meeting of the EEC-Greece Association Commission, February 12th 1970, in HAEU, PEO 19384.

the beginning of February 1970, two main lines delineated: a "severe" one, headed by the president of the Mixed Association Commission, Hernst Glinne, and a "softer" one, supported by the President of the Council of Minister, Pierre Harmel. Given a shared and complete condemnation of the means used by the military in Greece, the two groups had different ideas concerning the measures to be adopted to support the Greek population, and concerning the relations between Athens and the EEC and their possible evolution. Such divergencies reflected also on the propositions made by the supporters of the two groups. Hernst Glinne formally asked his colleagues of the EP to consider unilaterally denouncing the Association Treaty with Greece. According to him, given that the Greek regime had even ceased to pretend to be temporary, this was a necessary measure. He stressed once again that an association treaty implied political ties between the two parts, and that economic relations could be maintained even without the prospective of membership. In fact, the EEC had economic ties with a number of countries without an association agreement and, since conditions for the development of the association program had not yet been restored, this should be the case also for Greece[1]. Glinne also recalled the lack of collaboration demonstrated by the Greek authorities during EEC institutions' attempts to get in contact with former Greek members of the Association Commission, and, finally, he reported that the opponents to the Regime which were outside the country agreed on the idea of completely suspending the Association Agreement[2]. From Glinne's perspective, the EEC institutions' priority should have been to gather a collective stance in defence of their founding values, such as democracy and freedom, even if this involved sacrifices (such as economic disadvantages deriving from the suspension of the Association Treaty). The Socialist and Communist Groups of the EP lined up on his position, represented in this meeting respectively by Fernand Dehousse and Giorgio Amendola[3].

As representative of the opposite group, Mr. Harmel affirmed that, even though the members of the Council shared the same concern of the EP and Association Commission,

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[1] *Interrogazione orale N° 15/69 con discussione: funzionamento dell'associazione CEE-Grecia*, edizione provvisoria della Gazzetta Ufficiale del Parlamento Europeo, resoconto stenografico delle sedute, p. 99, February 3rd, 1970, in HAEU, EM 82 (CEE-Grèce, 08. 9 Décembre 1969 – 8 Juillet 1970).
[2] *Interrogazione orale N° 15/69 con discussione: funzionamento dell'associazione CEE-Grecia*, edizione provvisoria della Gazzetta Ufficiale del Parlamento Europeo, resoconto stenografico delle sedute, p. 99, February 3rd, 1970, in HAEU, EM 82 (CEE-Grèce, 08. 9 Décembre 1969 – 8 Juillet 1970).
[3] *Interrogazione orale N° 15/69 con discussione: funzionamento dell'associazione CEE-Grecia*, edizione provvisoria della Gazzetta Ufficiale del Parlamento Europeo, resoconto stenografico delle sedute, p. 99, February 3rd, 1970, in HAEU, EM 82 (CEE-Grèce, 08. 9 Décembre 1969 – 8 Juillet 1970).

they also believed that unilaterally denouncing the Treaty was not appropriate. According to them, the EEC institutions should confirm of the decisions made in the aftermath of the military coup: dealing with current association's issues, in order to be ready to restore the entire programme as soon as democracy was restored in Greece[1]. The UDE (European Democratic Union) group expressed in favour of Harmel's stance, through the voice of its representative Triboulet; according to him, a complete break with Greece would exclusively damage the democrats who were still in the country, and not the Military Junta. Speaking on behalf of the Christian Democratic group, the Italian Scarascia-Mugnozza stressed the need to harmonize the singular positions of the Six member states and the EEC as a whole towards the Regime (in fact, almost all European countries had already normalized their bilateral relations with the Greek government). Finally, Nicola Romeo observed that interrupting commercial and diplomatic relations with Greece would ultimately result into pushing the Junta towards new partners (Balkan countries, or even the Soviet Union) as well as old ones (the United Kingdome and the United States).

What emerges from the debate is that, even though for different reasons, the "soft line" supporters "shared the idea that suspending the Treaty of Athens would be counterproductive for both Greece and the European Community"[2]. This position provoked harsh criticism from a group of people who had participated in the creation of the Association Agreement, who sent a memorandum to the European Parliament in which they stated the conviction that a simple announcement of the suppression of the Agreement would create such pressure on the Greek domestic situation that the disintegration of the Junta would have inevitably followed[3].

In the following months the debate on Greece continued, focusing mostly on two topics. The first one concerned the possibility that the internal situation of Greece could also impact economic relations, not only political ones. According to some members of the Association Commission, some countries, which showed a severe stance towards Greece when in communitarian institutions, were consistently promoting bilateral

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[1] *Interrogazione orale N° 15/69 con discussione: funzionamento dell'associazione CEE-Grecia*, edizione provvisoria della Gazzetta Ufficiale del Parlamento Europeo, resoconto stenografico delle sedute, p. 99, February 3rd, 1970, in HAEU, EM 82 (CEE-Grèce, 08. 9 Décembre 1969 – 8 Juillet 1970).
[2] *Interrogazione orale N° 15/69 con discussione: funzionamento dell'associazione CEE-Grecia*, edizione provvisoria della Gazzetta Ufficiale del Parlamento Europeo, resoconto stenografico delle sedute, p. 99, February 3rd, 1970, in HAEU, EM 82 (CEE-Grèce, 08. 9 Décembre 1969 – 8 Juillet 1970).
[3] *Minute of a meeting of the Association Commission with the Commission of the EEC*, March 6th 1970, in HAEU, PEO 19385.

economic and commercial contacts with Greece[1]. Once again, it was Glinne who provocatively questioned how it was possible that the same governments criticizing the Greek Junta when seating in the EEC institutions were at the same time selling them arms[2]. The second topic on which the debate focused was whether Greece had actually started a path towards liberalization or not, and if the initiatives taken until then could be considered to be a prelude to complete democratization. Regarding the last issue, it should be emphasized that the EEC institutions, especially the Association Commission, seemed to be in more sceptical than NATO ones, and the US about the Junta's real intentions. However, within the different EEC institutions and political groups different point of views emerged. The differences mirrored the already mentioned two lines towards Greece, with supporters of the "severe line" underling how instrumental the liberal reforms implemented by the Regime were, and the supporters of the "softern line" claiming that, even if instrumental, those reforms were still a fact[3].

Meanwhile, a juridical commission had been instructed by the Commission (after the proposition of the Association Commission) to give a report on the possibility of unilaterally denouncing the Treaty of Athens; by spring of 1971 a answer had not arrived yet. Despite the Association Commission's members complaining about the delay, this seemed to reflect the position already expressed by the Council of Ministers in the previous year, that it was not a good idea to give such a sign of complete break with Greece[4]. In the end, in fact, the agreement would not be unilaterally denounced. As previously mentioned, there were no legal conditions in the Treaty of Athens to justify such an action. Moreover, as Coufoudakis pointed out, a complete renunciation of the agreement would have meant admitting the "Community's inability to cope with the challenge posed by Greece"[5].

In the same period, the president of the "Council of People Economically Active in Greece" Papageorgiou made a proposal to the EEC institutions. In a letter sent to the

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[1] *Minute of Association Commission Meeting with EEC Commission representative*, on April 29th 1971, in HAEU, PEO 19879.
[2] *Note à l'attention de M. Dahrendorf*, August 24th 1970, in HAEU, European Commission General Secretariat ( from now on CEUE_SEGE-SEC) doc. (1970)3113 SEC(1970)3113.
[3] *Minute of Association Commission Meeting with EEC Commission representative*, on April 29th 1971, in HAEU, PEO 19879.
[4] *Minute of a meeting of the Association Commission*, July 6th 1970, in HAEU, PEO 19628, and *Minute of a meeting of the Association Commission and report on evolution of economic relations EEC-Greece (With representative of the EEC Commission)*, January 7th, 1970, in HAEU, PEO 19629.
[5] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.

President of the European Parliament, he asked to establish relations between the Council he directed and the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC, without involving the European Parliament[1]. The Economic and Social Committee of the European Community was an organ created with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which included representatives of all member states aimed at promoting economic, social and cultural interests of the member states. Despite not having decision-making power, it was considered important because of its function of concerting and coordinating the different interests of the members towards a common benefit. The initiative of Papageorgiou immediately caused reactions within the EEC institutions, especially the Association Commission: while some suggested that sporadic contacts on a technical level with the EEC could also foster political improvements in Greece, the majority thought that the idea was unacceptable because it would be a sort of substitution of the Greek counter part of the Association Commission (at the time prevented from functioning because of the abolition of Greek Parliament)[2]. After a few weeks of discussion, the second position prevailed, and a letter in response to Mr. Papageorgiou stated the impossibility to substitute the Greek part of the Association Commission, according to article 71 of the Association Agreement.

On March, 1972, the Association Commission met with a representative of the Commission of the EEC to discuss possible implications of the EEC first enlargement on the association with Greece. Should the new members sign a separate association agreement with Greece? According to the representative of the Commission, it was sufficient to add a protocol to the Agreement extending the day-to-day management of the association process which had been going on since the coup[3]. The juridical problems connected to the first enlargement constituted also an occasion for the Association Commission to return on the Greek issue. According to some members, such as Luns, it was necessary not completely burn bridges with Athens, given its importance in the NATO framework. Conversely, Van Der Stoel believed that there was no danger that Greece could look for new alliances, nor that Athens could join the "non-aligned" countries. According to him, the enlargement should not have as a consequence any

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[1] *Minute of a meeting of the Association Commission with EEC Commission representative*, May 13th 1971, in HAEU, PEO 19880.
[2] *Minute of a meeting of the Association Commission with EEC Commission representative*, May 13th 1971, in HAEU, PEO 19880, and *Minute of a meeting of the Association Commission with EEC Commission representative*, June 14th, 1971, in HAEU, PEO 19881.
[3] *Minute of a meeting of the Association Commission with Greece*, March 11th, 1972, in HAEU, PEO 19884.

modification in the *status quo* between Greece and the EEC. It was necessary to state, once again, that the restoration of a parliamentary rule in Greece was the preliminary condition to any sort of evolution in the association process, or to any other new initiatives between Athens and the EEC institutions[1]. The representative of the Commission of the EEC answered that, according to the body he represented, the "enlargement protocol" did not constitute any advantage for Greece; it would only guarantee the current commercial regime between associated countries and the enlarged Community. Furthermore, the new members were perfectly aware that by joining the EEC they would automatically be "associated" with Greece[2]. In fact, the enlargement brought no real change in the relations between Greece and the European Community. However, Greece had different hopes. Given the long relationship existing between Athens and London, and given the efforts made by Great Britain to safeguard good relations with Greece also during the dictatorship, the Colonels were probably expecting that enlargement could benefit them. In fact, on May 1972, Dimitris Tsakonas, the new under-secretary for foreign affairs in London, was sent by the Greek government in an unofficial visit to London. According to the report of the meeting, the Greek effort to secure British support for the restoration of the association initiatives stood out[3]. While not opposing in principle such an opportunity, the British government did find it unfeasible in practice because of their newly granted admission to the European Community. Additionally, supporting Greece would mean engage in a direct confrontation with Norway and Denmark, which were scheduled to join the EEC concurrently. Therefore, London decided not to satisfy the Greek hopes[4]. However, this shows how, despite their dismissing claims, the Colonels were still hoping for a restoration of their relations with the European Community.

### 4.2.1 Association from Greece's perspective

[1] *Proces-verbal de la rèunion du Mardi 25 Avril, 1972, Commission de l'Association avec la Grèce*, in HAEU, PEO 20144.
[2] *Proces-verbal de la rèunion du Mardi 25 Avril, 1972, Commission de l'Association avec la Grèce*, in HAEU, PEO 20144.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 149-150.
[4] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 149-150.

While the EEC institutions decided not to modify their decisions concerning Greece, Greece itself changed its attitude drastically towards the Community. This change was probably driven by the turning point in US-Greece relations following the election of President Nixon. Greece had been claiming, from the aftermath of the "freezing" of the association agreement, that the coup had been only a pretext, so that the scope of the Treaty of Athens could be limited. As already mentioned, according to Athens, the behaviour of the European Community had been unilateral, and illegitimate[1]. Still, their criticism had always been confined into diplomatic terminology, as Coufoudakis points out. The Greek officials had been stressing the correct application of the association agreement by the Greek government, but never openly criticized the behaviour of the EEC, or of its singular members[2]. At least until the 1970's, when the change in the US administration occurred. The open support by Washington probably made Padapoulos more confident, and encouraged him to be more resolute in his relations with the EEC members states. In fact, during a press conference held in April 1970, he affirmed that European states were not in the position to criticize Greece, given the stature of the internal problems that many of them were unsuccessfully trying to face[3].

However, Foreign Minister Pipinelis, a more experienced politician than Papadopoulos, knew that Greece needed not to completely cut ties with the other European countries. This shows in a letter he wrote in the month of April to Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the EEC. In addressing Rey, on the one hand Pipinelis underlined the bounds existing between Greece and the EEC (and, more in general, Europe), on the other hand, he accused the EEC institutions not to have understood the real objectives of the Junta:

> *"alors que le gouvernement grec donnait des preuves concrètes de ses efforts pour instaurer le nouvel ordre démocratique dans la limite des délais comuniqués depuis l'été dernier au Conseil de l'Europe, une campagne acharnée était menée contre la Grèce par ceux-là memes qui se rendaient compte que la consolidation de l'ordre démocratique en Grèce marquerait leur échec […] il nous sera difficile d'oublier qu'en cette period de redressement sans precedent, des pays étrangers aient fait le jeu*

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[1] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.
[2] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.
[3] *De la Conference de Presse de M. Papadopoulos du 10 Avril, note from Ambassador Durand to French Foreign Office*, doc. N° 365/EU, Athens, April 17th 1970, in CADN, 48PO/B 296 (Athens).

*de ceux qui visent à render l'effort de redressement encore plus difficile et à pousser de nouveau la Grèce vers l'anarchie"*[1].

The fact that such an attempt to convince the Commission of Greece's good faith came from Pipinelis himself testifies that the association with the European Economic Community was still considered to be important by Greece, despite Papadopoulos' dismissive attitude to the EEC. In fact, Greece was economically dependent on the Common Market and, given the lack of proper economic and development program by the Junta, had no real alternatives (in 1967 the Greek exports to the EEC was 40% of the total, and the imports 44%; in 1973, exports to the EEC will be 47%, and imports 43% of the total)[2]. Still, the Junta's official line towards Europe was that the EEC did not understand their actions, which were actually aimed at affirming the principles shared by the Community: to create the necessary conditions for a healthy democracy, and for a full implementation of political and personal freedoms.

According to Greek governmental press, in Europe there was a public campaign against the Junta. From Athens, the French Ambassador Durand reported that Greek press periodically edited an almost complete review of all public statements against Greece made by European newspapers, with the intention to prove their point[3]. The accusations coming from European press annoyed also the United States; in fact, one of the hypotheses which circulated was that the CIA had favoured the 1967 coup in Greece[4]. This idea survived for many years in Greece and in some sectors of European public opinion, even though no evidence of that was ever provided. Still, the moderate line adopted by Washington towards the military from the day after the coup had probably contributed to the spread of such an hypothesis, and, most important, had created the basis for a feeling of anti-Americanism in Greece, which would grow in the 1970s. However, the condemnation of the Junta by some sectors of European public opinion had no concrete repercussions on Greek people; maybe, if the internal opposition had been stronger it could have been encouraged by European stances. But Greek population

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[1] Reactions greques à la prise de position de la Commission de la CEE sur la Grèce, telegram from the Ambassador at Athens B. Durand to the French Foreign Office, Athens, April 22nd 1970, Doc. N° 399/EU, in CADN, 48PO/B 295 (Athènes).
[2] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.
[3] De la campagne menée à l'étranger contre la Grèce, communiqué of the French Ambassador B. Durand to the French Foreign Office, Athens, April 30th, 1970, in CADN, 48PO/B 295.
[4] De la campagne menée à l'étranger contre la Grèce, communiqué of the French Ambassador B. Durand to the French Foreign Office, Athens, April 30th, 1970, in CADN, 48PO/B 295.

was still inactive at the time, and this allowed the Junta to instrumentally present the criticism coming from Europe, which were exclusively against the government, as criticism to the Greek nation itself.

As a matter of fact, after the Pipinelis' failed attempt to reconcile with the Commission of the EEC, relations between the Community and Athens fell again into stagnation. Regular discussions about the future of association and current issues related to the process kept going on with the Association Commission, the European Parliament, and the Commission of the EEC. However, no remarkable changes occurred[1]. While officials of the European Parliament repeatedly expressed concern that even routine contacts with the Greek representatives could give the impression that the EEC was cooperating with the Junta, Greek officials tried to "use the remaining ties with the EEC for domestic purposes"[2]. They publicly emphasized every news on the Association Commission meeting again, on negotiations on Greek wines and on the territorial extension of the association agreement (enlargement) as indications of the vitality of the association process[3]. However, this was mere propaganda as the association process, as already mentioned, stagnated. Conversely, in the same years EEC experienced his first internal great change: enlargement. As mentioned in the last paragraph, this did not affect the association process actively, except for a redaction of a protocol stating the extension of the Treaty of Athens to the new member states[4].

### 4.2.2 The Council of Europe

Before turning to the Atlantic institutions and Greece during the 1970s, a brief mention should be made of the European institution which had been the most active actor in the fight against the Junta in the previous years: the Council of Europe. Despite the fact that Greece was no longer a member of it, the Council decided to still monitor the evolution of the situation there. By a resolution voted in January 1970, the Council designated the Commission for Non-member states and the Commission for Political Issues to regularly inform the Assembly on the evolution of internal changes, and

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[1] Minute of a Meeting of the Association Commission, October 29th, 1971, in HAEU, PEO 19883.
[2] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.
[3] Coufoudakis V., "The European Economic Community And The 'Freezing' Of The Greek Association, 1967–1974", in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 16, n. 2, 1977, pp. 114-131.
[4] Minute of a Meeting of the Association Commission, March 11th 1971, in HAEU, PEO 19884.

international relations of Greece. In case of conditions for a re-admission would be met, the Assembly would have gone for it[1]. After one year, in 1972, the Assembly met again and noted that no significant changes occurred in Greece. Then, Council's members endorsed a resolution by which all member states were invited to do everything they could in order to: 1) promote the activity of impartial observers in Greece, with the aim of inquiring into political prisoners' conditions, suspected cases of tortures, and the activity of the military police; 2) put a stop to the arbitrariness of imprisonments and trials; 3) abolish the martial law on the entire Greek soil[2]. Moreover, the resolution invited all the member countries to endeavour to make Greek people in the condition to express its opinion about the nature of its regime and government[3].

Some countries, especially those of the Scandinavians which seated also in the Atlantic Alliance, took this recommendation very seriously.

## 4.3. The Atlantic Perspective on Greece during the first 1970s

### 4.3.1 The US: Nixon and the Junta

Greece abandoning the Council of Europe was considered both a success and a failure among the European institutions. In fact, it was clear that Greece had quit in order to avoid to be expelled, and this was the proof of the clear stance the Council had taken against the disrespect of human rights and civil liberties, and against violence and tortures. On the other hand, however, the pressure on Greece had proved not to be sufficient to implement real changes. Conversely, the US administration feared that the rupture between Athens and the Council of Europe could have negatively affected Greece's credibility (and reputation) within the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in a moment when conflicts in the Middle East were increasing[4]. This concern constituted

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[1] Document d'information sur la situation en Grèce, Assemblé Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe, Commission des Pays Européennes non Membres, Strasbourg, March 4th 1971, in CADN, 48PO/B, 323 (Athènes).
[2] *Resolution 529, in Projet de Resolution*, Doc. 33114, Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, April 24th, 1972, in CADN, 48PO/B 323 (Athènes).
[3] *Resolution 529*, in *Projet de Resolution*, Doc. 33114, Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, April 24th, 1972, in CADN, 48PO/B 323 (Athènes).
[4] *Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon*, Washington, December 19th, 1969, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 1.

the final boost to reactivate the program of financial aid (MAP) interrupted in 1967. Ambassador Tasca was charged with communicating the news to Prime Minister Papadopoulos, though stressing that financial aid was tied to a commitment from Greece to show signs of liberalization of the regime in Greece. However, the decision to reactivate MAP had in essence been taken[1].

Ambassador Tasca and Prime Minister Papadopoulos met for the first time in January 1970. On that occasion, Tasca assured the Greek leader that the US would always support the principle of non-interference in other NATO countries' domestic affairs. However, he stressed how important it was for Greece to improve its public "image" abroad, possibly by implementing some liberalization of the regime. Papadopoulos confirmed that he was aware of the problem, but he also added that it would not always be possible to translate US suggestions into actions [2]. According to Tasca's personal opinion, the line adopted by the Council of Europe and by the EEC had not yielded results; on the contrary, the military Junta portrayed it as an attack against the Greek nation, and consolidated its rule even more. For this reason, he considered an opposite strategy to be necessary, and to finally translate declarations on restoring the MAP into concrete actions. Otherwise, he wrote in a report to Washington, Greece would find help elsewhere[3]. He probably referred to France, which in the past months had tried to mediate in favor of Greece both within the EEC and in the Council of Europe, and which had also developed special economic relations with Greece for a few years. In fact, Paris seemed ready to sell military equipment to Greece without posing political conditions[4]. This special relationship with France could represent a problem for the US for many different reasons, starting from the attitude taken by France towards NATO and the US in the previous years, which could have an influence on Athens, to the divergence between the two countries concerning the Israeli-Arab dispute in those years. In fact, according to Tasca, the importance of Greece in the Atlantic framework was enhances by the worsening of the situation in the Middle East. And this growing importance should

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[1] *Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon*, Washington, December 19th, 1969, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 1.
[2] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, January 26th, 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 268.
[3] *Report by the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)*, Athens, March 31st, 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 273.
[4] *Compte-rendu d'un entretien entre M. Alphand et l'Ambassadeur De Grèce*, Paris, Political Affairs – Europe Direction, March 31st, 1970, in CADN, 48PO/B 304 Atènes.

be acknowledged by the US through an adequate military assistance[1]. In parallel to the restoration of the military aid, Tasca was charged with another task: negotiating an home-porting agreement with Greece, since the Sixth Fleet was having difficulties in Turkey[2].

While the US government shared the considerations made by Ambassador Tasca, officially announcing the full restoration of the Military Aid Programme for Greece was not so straightforward. The first difficulty lay in the opposition of the Scandinavian countries within NATO. In fact, those who participated both in the Council of Europe and NATO institutions were moving their fight against Greece from the former to the latter. The possible international repercussions of restoring MAP constituted a further problem; an evidence of this could be seen by the fact that Washington considered it to be necessary to delay announcing any move until after the next Italian election on 7th June, because the reactivation of military aid for Greece could influence the vote, strengthening the communists and the other anti-NATO political forces[3]. Despite these obstacles, the possibility that Greece's credibility could diminish in the eyes of the Atlantic Allies was a great concern for the US government. For its part, Greece seemed to be aware of this. In fact, during a meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee, held in January 1970, in which NATO force goals for the following year were discussed, the Greek representative stressed how the "implementation of some proposals concerning Greek forces would not be wholly dependent on the Greek effort"[4].

Furthermore, Papadopoulos himself wrote a letter to president Nixon in April 1970. After welcoming with enthusiasm Nixon's declarations about the objective of creating a safe and stable Europe, he underlined that Greece had always faithfully played its role in that construction. In fact, the American aims for Europe were the same as those of Greece. As a matter of fact, he wrote, this had been proved by the 21st April 1967 revolution, which was designed to prevent the country from a revolution and to avoid

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[1] *Report by the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)*, Athens, March 31st, 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 273.
[2] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[3] Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies), Washington, April 22nd 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 276.
[4] *Summary Record (20th April) of a Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee*, March 23rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(70)71.

the creation of a communist regime dominated by chaos and anarchy[1]. The tone of the letter was cordial (Papadopoulos seemed to suggest that he understood why the announcement of the MAP restoration could present difficulties to the US), but still firm: in order to maintain its role, Greece needed to be concretely supported.

During a meeting with Nixon, Kissinger, and Tasca, held in in June 1970, the US Secretary of State Rogers reported about a meeting of the Atlantic Council that he attended some days before. He stressed that Scandinavian countries had asked to see some progress from Greeks before restoring military aid, and the European public in general was still doubtful about the honesty of the Greek Colonels[2]. President Nixon seemed to be really surprised by the fact that European states and their people seemed to give more importance to the internal political asset of Greece, than to the possible dangers coming with a complete break with Athens, and made his point in a colorful way:

> *"The TV in Europe is state-controlled and leftist-oriented. What is involved is a barrage of propaganda unfavorable to the US and also a negative picture of Greeks. […] If we follow the Danes, the Norwegians and other Socialists, the French and Italians, we do nothing. They are weak; we've got to lead. We've got to support the Greeks. It must be made palatable. The others all know if we weren't there, they'd be terrified. We look all the more important because the European can't sell security to their own people"*[3].

Then, he designated Ambassador Tasca to assist Greek authorities in improving their public image. He privately informed the Foreign and the State Secretaries that the National Security Council had planned to reactivate military aid programme for Greece around the beginning of September, 1970[4]. A series of hijacking of civil American and European flights connected to the conflict between Palestinian and Jordan forces, finally gave the occasion to publicly announce the restoration of the MAP. President Nixon publicly claimed that the initiative was necessary in such condition, because Greece was needed do its part in the general NATO defensive structure. In fact, Nixon said, the

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[1] *Letter from Greek Prime Minister Papadopoulos to President Nixon*, Athens, April 9th 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 274.
[2] *Editorial Note*, Washington, in FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972), Doc. N° 283.
[3] *Editorial Note*, Washington, document N° 283, in FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972).
[4] *National Security Decision Memorandum*, Washington, June 25th 1970, document N° 284, in FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972).

decision to resume the military assistance rested entire on these considerations, and on recent events occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East[1]. Like the Six Days War in 1967, Papadopoulos' approval of an operation called "Fig Hill" which provided for Jordanian relief via Athens during the 1970-1971 crisis proved the importance of the Greek role in defending the Western interests in the Middle East and Mediterranean areas[2]. Additionally, the decision of Malta's new prime minister, Dom Mintoff, to close down the US military base on the island and impose restrictions on duty-free fuel contributed to highlight the strategic importance of Greece[3].

Meanwhile, negotiations for the home-porting agreement were taking place. Tasca's activities in Athens gave rise to criticism within the US Congress. On November 1971, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco claimed that military hardware sales to Greece, which were part of the negotiating process, could only be interpreted by the Congress as the ultimate evidence of US support to the military regime in Greece[4]. Still, negotiations continued and on 8 February 1972 Kissinger reported that formal discussion had opened about home-porting. This would mean an 150% increase in naval presence of the United States. The agreement was signed a year after, and was strongly criticized by the House Armed Services Committee (HFAC), which visited NATO capitals the same year[5].

The new line towards Greece adopted by the Nixon administration was also apparent in dealing with opponents to the Regime. The case of Eleni Vlachos is a perfect example of that. Vlachos was the editor and owner of two major conservative newspapers in Greece, *Kathimerini* and *Messimvrini*, both suspended in publication after 1967 as a sign of protest against the dictatorship. She was a conservative, anti-communist and pro-NATO. Still, she was considered an "opponent" by the Colonels. Indeed, in June 1970, she made a trip to the United States as a part of a campaign aimed at exposing human right abuses in her Country to the West. Once there, she found out that her request to

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[1] Note from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 9th 1970, Doc. N° 291, and Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece, Washington, September 14th 1970, Doc. N° 292, both in FRUS 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972).
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 140.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 140.
[4] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[5] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.

meet Richard Nixon and his vice Spiro Agnew had been blocked, because this would have caused some unhappiness in Greece[1].

### 4.3.2 NATO and Greece

Given the importance of the US within the Alliance system, Washington's view had a strong influence in the decisions and orientations of the NATO Council, and other bodies. As promised by US Ambassador Tasca to Papadopoulos, the US representatives at the NATO institutions kept supporting a line of non-interference in Greece. Nixon stance against putting Greece's position in NATO in jeopardy was supported also by Great Britain, who shared the American concern about Greece losing credibility after the almost expulsion from the Council of Europe[2]. Considering also the general perception of the possible dangers coming from the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the majority of the Allies seemed willing to line up with the US stance, and accept whichever regime in Greece was in power in Greece, as long as it was reliable and stable. Moreover, a number of intelligence reports sent from Athens at the end of 1969 exposed the fact that Moscow seemed willing to install with Greece cordial relations[3]. This certainly seemed another good reason not to isolate Greece. However, the Scandinavian countries opposed this general attitude and, by the beginning of 1970, they moved their fight against the Greek Junta into NATO institutions. After winning elections for the second time, Danish prime minister Otto Krag committed himself publicly to raising the suspension of Greece from NATO[4]. At the beginning, their attempts were almost ignored by the other Allies, at least publicly. In fact, the new Secretary General Joseph Luns (in charge from November 1971) believed, as his predecessor, that no issue should be allowed to weaken the Alliance, and that Greece should be evaluated on its military capability, and not on its human right record[5].

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[1] Pedaliu, E. G. H, "Human Rights and International Security: the International Community and the Greek Dicators", in The International History Review, vol. 38, n. 15, 2016, pp. 1014-1039.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 130-140.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, pp. 130-140.
[4] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[5] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.

However, with years passing, some other countries (such as the Netherlands) started joining the Scandinavians in their (more or less direct) appeals to member countries to respect the basic principles of the Alliance, like freedom and democracy. The close co-operation between the Nixon administration and the Greek regime gave the necessary confidence to the Greeks to ignore the attacks coming from the Scandinavian countries at least until the end of 1972[1]. By the begin f 1973, however, much had changed in the international scenario (Yom Kippur War, oil crisis, Watergate Scandal), and the Alliance's internal balance was impacted by those events.

Still, the period from the beginning of 1970 to the end of 1972 was characterized by two apparently contradictory lines: the first one implicitly affirmed the importance of supporting Greece, so that it could play its role in the defence of the Southern Flank of the Alliance. The second one, was a limited (in the number of members states supporting it) but growing movement which asked for liberalization in domestic policies of those countries which did not respect NATO basic principles, like Greece and Portugal. This second "voice" became stronger with the years passing, but already in 1970 was a matter of concern for Manlio Brosio[2].

The background of this, at the beginning of 1970s, was *détente*. Negotiations for mutual force reductions, discussions about the best way to establish a dialogue with Eastern Countries, and the preparation of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were the central issues in the NATO institutions' agendas at the time. Greece participated in every debate, ignoring the attacks coming from the Scandinavians, and was particularly active during discussions concerning the Mediterranean region. According to the annual report by the *Ad Hoc Intelligence Working Group* (charged with studying the military implications for NATO of the Soviet Penetration of the Middle East and North Africa) the Soviet Union was becoming a Mediterranean Power[3]. In fact, the consistent growing (both in terms of number and importance of deployments) of its military presence in the Mediterranean, and its policy

[1] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[2] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 690-692, 693, 697, 699.
[3] *Memorandum For The Members Of The Military Committee* – "the military significance to NATO of Soviet Bloc Penetration of the Middle East, and North Africa, and of related Soviet Activities in the Mediterranean", April 20th 1970, in NATO Archives, MC_0255_70_DRAFT.

towards the Arab countries, proved it[1]. However, the Soviet Union was still considered by the Report to have political and psychological aims in the region, and not at all military ones. The increase of the Soviet Military presence in the Mediterranean Sea had the one aim of limiting NATO's naval supremacy, and so reducing Western *political* influence over the countries of the region[2]. A crucial step to realizing this objective was to make local forces as dependent as possible on assistance from the Soviet Bloc (for instance, by providing training programs, and logistic assistance). Thanks to such a condition of dependency, the Soviets could exercise some power (or at least influence) over the policies of those countries[3].

What emerges from the documentation of the period, is that NATO did not consider the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean to be an imminent military threat, but rather a long-lasting disturbing factor which could have had negative repercussions on Western interests. To this extent, Greece and Turkey were vital elements in the Southern Flank defensive structure, and therefore they should be enabled to carry out their tasks. In fact, during the month of April, 1970 (while Nixon still hesitated in choosing the right moment to restore MAP for Greece), the NATO Military Defence Review Committee formally invited "all countries in the position to do so, to take all the appropriate steps for the strengthening of the Greek local forces […] in order to facilitate the implementation of the defence planning for the years 1971-1975"[4]. Given that NATO Defence Plans generally covered a five-year period, it is natural that (especially in traditionally unstable countries as Greece and Turkey) they did not rely on political considerations. Whatever change could occur in the domestic political asset of a member country, the NATO defense plans should survived it, being designed at a supranational level.

For the Turkish case, there is no record of objections from any NATO member to the request of implementing the recommendations on local forces given by the Military Review Committee. On the contrary, the Greek case took a longer period to be discussed.

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[1] Situation In The Mediterranean – Memorandum From Chairman To Political Committee, January 27th 1970, in NATO Archives, POLADS(70)7.
[2] Situation In The Mediterranean – Memorandum From Chairman To Political Committee, January 27th 1970, in NATO Archives, POLADS(70)7.
[3] *Memorandum For The Members Of The Military Committee* – "The military significance to NATO of Soviet Bloc Penetration of the Middle East, and North Africa, and of related Soviet Activities in the Mediterranean", April 20th 1970, in NATO Archives, MC_0255_70_DRAFT.
[4] Strengthening Of The Greek Local Forces – Defence Planning Committee – Note From The Chairman Of The Defence Review Committee, April 6th 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-D(70)9.

Also this time, opposition came from Denmark and Norway (and, less vehemently, from the Netherlands). Both the foreign ministers of the countries, Poul Hartling for Denmark, and Svenn Stray for Norway, repeatedly argued that the benevolence with which Greece has been treated by NATO was causing hostile attitude domestically towards the Alliance[1]. However, also this time, the two foreign ministers were asked to discuss the issue in private, and not during the ministerial sessions[2]. Brosio's aim was not to include their statements of opposition in the final declaration on Greece's aids, and just annexing them to the document as an appendix (or a footnote)[3]. Brosio's action was strongly supported both by the American and British officials, who urged the Norwegians and the Danes not to make difficulties in NATO over the handling of the report[4].

After several weeks during which Brosio had been trying to "contain" the threat coming from the Scandinavian countries, claiming that a frontal attack to Greece within NATO would have brought to a clash[5], in September 1970 the Defence Planning Committee circulated a note reporting that some countries would not be able to support the implementation of the proposals on strengthening Greek local forces[6]. Then, during a meeting of the NATO Council, the representatives of the countries not willing to endorse the program were invited to speak.

The Danish representative spoke first, and reported that he had been instructed by his government not to endorse the measures on Greek local forces because of the "present circumstances in that country"[7]. The Norwegian representative agreed with his colleague[8]. This time, the Greek representative had to respond. He opened his speech by underlying how unusual it was for an Ally to comment on the domestic situation of another Ally. What was even worse, according to him, was that Denmark and Norway based a negative response to a military plan promoted by NATO institutions on the basis

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[1] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[2] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[3] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 709-716.
[4] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 117.
[5] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 709-716.
[6] Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Committee Held In Bruxelles, July 27th, 1970, in NATO Archives, C-M(70)33, and Report On The Strengthening Of Greek Local Forces, September 17th 1970.
[7] Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Defence Planning Committee, October 2nd, 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(70)17.
[8] Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Defence Planning Committee, October 2nd, 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(70)17.

of such considerations. This was poles apart from the fundamental NATO guideline of non-interference in members' internal affairs, which had been stated in the founding treaty, and in several communiqués.

Then, he quoted the words pronounced by former Foreign Minister Panayotis Pipinelis:

> *The Allies efforts, especially in the DPC, were directed at achieving as much as adequate a defence as possible. The report the Committee was examining at the present meeting explained the defence problems of one member country and recommended solutions. At a time when it was generally recognized, if less generally applied, that maintaining and adequate defence posture was a fundamental condition for the Alliance as such, and as a meaningful instrument of détente, some countries chose not to associate themselves with the recommendations of this report. This was a choice of great seriousness, in that it put in question the solidarity and cohesion of the alliance that was, the fundamental elements of the Allies' defence effort. When he spoke of the seriousness of the situation, he was thinking less of his own country and more of the Alliance. By historical tradition and because of her geographical position, Greece attached great importance to matters of defence. As a member of the Alliance, Greece had never thought for one moment that she could reduce her efforts and rely exclusively on the others for her defence. On the contrary, she had developed a sense of added responsibility. In saying this, he wished to stress that, whatever the fate of the report, Greece would continue her defence effort, mindful of her obligations to herself, to her tradition and to her Allies. Would this effort be adequate, especially in view of the very sensitive sectors should remain so weak as to invite increased political and eventually military pressure? These were the grave problems that arose for the Alliance as a result of the attitude of some of its members*[1].

The discussion ended without the parties reaching an agreement, and the report on Greek Local Forces was approved by the Defence Planning Committee and Council, with Denmark and Norway dissociating themselves. This was the result of a long negotiation, according to which Norway and Denmark had renounced to put a "veto" on the aid-program, provided that this was not extended for five years as originally designed[2].

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[1] Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Defence Planning Committee, October 2nd, 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(70)17.
[2] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 715-716.

Even though in this case Greece ended up obtaining the approval of the programme, the Junta knew that the internal opposition of some members could still bring problems in the future. At the same time, the dangers coming from the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, and the growing violence in the Middle East constituted a means to be exploited with the Allies to Athens' advantage, especially when discussing topics like the mutual force reductions, a possible opening to the East, or the strategy to adopt in the initiative of talks with the East on the Conference on European Security. On each one of these topics, Greek representatives adopted a sceptical stance towards the Soviets' good faith, claiming that their expansionist aims had never altered, and that the only reason why they were acting as willing to dialogue with the West was that the USSR and its satellite countries were facing internal economic problems, and they hoped to find new strength by creating ties with the Western countries[1]. Moreover, according to the Greek representative Tsistopoulos at the Military Defence Committee, the "Soviet threat" in the Mediterranean was equally political and military (contradicting the general assumption that the Soviet presence in the area had exclusively political and psychological aims)[2]. According to Tsistopoulos, "an effort should be made to obtain a *ratio* of forces that would minimize as much as possible the actual risks run by the Alliance in this area"[3]. In fact, Greece considered a reducing of forces in the country to be inadmissible, given its exposed position. The situation was similar, stated the Greek representative, to the one Greece had experienced at the verge of Nazi invasion in 1941[4]. Despite the parallel seeming completely exaggerated, during the same week of Tsistopoulos' intervention, the Military Committee decided to settle up a working group studying possible measures to be taken to offset Soviet expansion in the area[5].

Six months later, no significant change had taken place in the region. Despite the recording of a general deepening in relations between the Soviet Union and many Arab

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[1] Follow-Up On Paragraph 6 Of The Final Communique Following The Meeting Of The Council In Ministerial Session Of December 1969 – Report On The Situation In The Mediterranean, May 19th, 1970, in NATO Archives C-M(70)12-FINAL, and Verbatim Record Of The Meeting Of The Council Held On Tuesday 26th May At Palazzo Dei Congressi, Rome, May 26th, 1970, in NATO Archives, C-VR(70)28-PART1, C-VR(70)28-PART2, and C-VR(70)28-PART3.

[2] Verbatim Record of a Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, June 11th, 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-VR(70)11_PART_3.

[3] Verbatim Record of a Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, June 11th, 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-VR(70)11_PART_3.

[4] *Verbatim Record Of The Meeting Of The Council Held On Tuesday 26th May At Palazzo Dei Congressi*, Roma, May 26th, 1970, in NATO Archives, C-VR(70)28-PART1, C-VR(70)28-PART2, and C-VR(70)28-PART3.

[5] Dpc – Decisions Of The Defence Planning Committee In Ministerial Session In 11th June, 1970, June 17th 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-D(70)14.

countries, the Working Group assessed that Soviet stance in the Mediterranean would not present a direct military threat for the Alliance in the near future[1]. Not surprisingly, Greece had a different interpretation of the data. During the ministerial meetings of the Council and of the Defence Planning Committee held in December 1970, the deputy Greek Foreign Minister Palamas once again claimed that the situation in the Mediterranean was deteriorating also from a strictly military point of view, and that the increase of Soviet presence not only in the Mediterranean sea but also in the Balkans constituted a "grave menace to Allied security and called for effective counteraction on the part of the Alliance"[2]. To this extent, Greece was "doing her best, but her limited resources were unequal to the tasks"[3].

The only other country to share the Greek evaluation was Turkey, which claimed that the situation in those areas was "serious", and that adequate measures should be taken by the Alliance[4]. On the same occasions (in June and December the meetings were attended also by Foreign Ministers of the member countries, not only by permanent representative) the Norwegian and Danish Foreign Ministers reiterated the importance that all the Allies endorsed the funding principles of NATO, meaning democracy and freedom. This time, they explicitly mentioned Greece. In response, the Greek representative Palamas made a heartfelt appeal to the memory of Greece as the birthplace of democracy and its principles, according to which no one could question his country's attachment to those values[5]. The answer seems a little bit vague, and not really related to the accusation of the Scandinavians, but this could probably be explained by the fact that Palamas was a politician with liberal ideas, who had to defend a regime which did not correspond to them.

During the following 1971-1972 biennium, no significant changes occurred in NATO-Greece relations. A new military coup in Turkey, in 1971, probably contributed to reinforce the position of Greece within the Alliance[6]. In December 1971, the new

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[1] Follow Up On Paragraph 5 Of The Final Communique' Following The Meeting Of The Council In Ministerial Session Of May 1970 – Report On The Situation In The Mediterranean June-November 1970, November 16th 1970, in NATO Archives, C-M(70)58.
[2] Summary Record Of A Meeting Of Defence Planning Committee, December 2nd 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(70)24
[3] Summary Record Of A Meeting Of Defence Planning Committee, December 2nd 1970, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(70)24
[4] *Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Council*, december 3rd 1970, in NATO Archives, C-R(70)61-PART1, C-R(70)61-PART2.
[5] *Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Council*, December, 3rd 1970, in NATO Archives, C-R(70)61-PART1, C-R(70)61-PART2.
[6] Stone N., *Turkey. A Short History*, Thames & Hudson, London, 2013.

Segretary General Joseph Luns visited Greece, and gave an interview to a Greek journalist in which he acknowledged the preparedness and state of Greek armed forces[1]. Also the new American Ambassador, Henry Tasca, was crucial in the building a Greece-USA-NATO equilibrium. As already mentioned, he had arrived in Athens in January 1970 with the task of negotiating a home-porting agreement for the American Sixth Fleet, which was finding the Turkish ports "increasingly inhospitable"[2]. Tasca proved to be able to underline the importance of Athens in the security framework of the Mediterranean area, and to mediate with the Greek Government for liberalization[3]. The home-porting agreement would be signed only on 8 January 1973, not without internal criticism in the US, especially within the Congress[4].

### 4.4. Cyprus: apparent calm

As already mentioned, the period between the beginning of 1970 and the end of 1972 in Greece was characterized by internal stability, and by a moderate liberalization of the regime. The same could be said for Cyprus, but only partially; as Mallinson summarizes, "the period to the end of 1972 was on the surface reasonably crisis-free"[5]. In fact, the departure of Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis (1971) greatly affected the relations with Turkey, because of his prestige and reliable reputation, even though it took some time before this showed. Also in 1971 a coup in Turkey brought to power a military government, which was expected and encouraged (especially by the US) to install a dialogue with the Colonels on matter of common concerns. In fact, an attempt of bilateral talks began, even if were not successful as hoped[6].

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[1] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:1, 101-120, and Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019.
[2] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[3] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, February 8th 1971, in FRUS, 1969-1976, in FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972, Doc. 302.
[4] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[5] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 5.
[6] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 139-140.

As it had been for the past two years, from 1970 to 1972, the Turkish and the Greek governments tried to hold off the extremists from the political scene, and so did president Makarios in Cyprus. In 1970 Makarios visited Athens. Papadopoulos welcomed him warmly and, when asked about rumors of his government secretly supporting the "National Front" in Cyprus (consisting mostly of former EOKA members) he strongly deny any involvement[1]. In December 1971, General Ismet Inonu, leader of the Turkish Republican People's Party, visited Athens. This constituted the "apogee" of Greece's diplomacy with Turkey[2]. In fact, some reasons for tension persisted both within and outside the island: the worsening of a rift between Athens and Makarios, who did not trust the Greek government, conspiracies on the island (an assassination attempt on Makarios failed on the 8th of March), and, on the background, a growing involvement of the USA in Greek and Cypriot internal affairs[3]. In fact, when visiting the US in March, NATO Secretary General Brosio participated in a meeting of the US State Department on the situation in Cyprus. Thomas Davis (Director of the Office of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the US State Department) reported that all sorts of rumors were spreading about the Cypriot situation. According to him, the Soviets had denounced a Greek plot for *enosis,* which the Greeks denied; according to other rumors, the Greeks and the Turks were secretly negotiating a partition of the island, at the expense of Makarios. At the end of the meeting, Davis and Brosio decided that the NATO Secretary General would sent an encouragement message on the issue both to the Greek and the Turkish foreign ministers[4].

From the NATO perspective, a stable Cyprus was fundamental for at least two reasons: contributing to avoid Alliance's internal conflicts between Greece and Turkey, and securing the Island from Soviet propaganda, with the consequent Soviet cultural, or worst political, penetration. In a report to the Military Committee, the implications of the Soviet penetration in the Middle East, North Africa, and Mediterranean regions also included Cyprus as a case studied. According to the document, Cyprus "as long as satisfactory solution to its problem is not attained, will be exposed to Soviet

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 75.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 140.
[3] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 5.
[4] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, pp. 687-688.

propaganda"[1]. Even though the government of the island was not expected to completely change the basic line of its policy under the Soviet influence, the Atlantic Alliance seemed to believe that the USSR would "strive to keep alive Cyprus problem as a divisive factor within the South-Eastern NATO region"[2]. Also, the ties established by the USSR with many Arab countries, the aid supplied to them in terms of equipment and training, and the yet permanent presence of Soviet military forces in the Mediterranean Sea, had made the Soviet Union a Mediterranean Power. While it was considered to be almost impossible that their presence could constitute a direct military threat (since the Soviets would avoid direct conflict with Western Forces), once again only political aims were attributed to the Soviets: on the one hand, "to influence the political disposition of countries in such a way as to make the areas as inhospitable as possible to military cooperation with the West"[3]; and, on the other hand, "to establish relations with governments which would make it possible to encourage them to take actions directed against Western interests and against regimes unfriendly to the Soviet Bloc, while, if at all possible, maintaining control of these actions"[4]. The NATO Council discussed again the report a month after, in May, and no significant changes were reported[5].

By November 1970, the NATO Secretary General presented his annual report on Greek-Turkish relations. While expressing satisfaction with the lack of actual danger on the island (due to the strong willingness of the two governments of Greece and Turkey to maintain their good mutual contacts, he stressed), he also added that he felt bound to state his "concern at the re-emergence of sentiments of misgivings and mistrust on both sides"[6]. The lack of progress in inter-community talks in the Island, he added, increased this concern. Then, he underlined that despite being no immediate danger of the situation

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[1] Memorandum For The Members Of The Military Committee – The Military Significance To NATO Of Soviet Bloc Penetration Of The Middle East, And North Africa, And Of Related Soviet Activities In The Mediterranean, April 20th, 1970, in NATO Archives, MC_0255_70_DRAFT.
[2] Memorandum For The Members Of The Military Committee – The Military Significance To NATO Of Soviet Bloc Penetration Of The Middle East, And North Africa, And Of Related Soviet Activities In The Mediterranean, April 20th, 1970, in NATO Archives, MC_0255_70_DRAFT.
[3] Memorandum For The Members Of The Military Committee – The Military Significance To NATO Of Soviet Bloc Penetration Of The Middle East, And North Africa, And Of Related Soviet Activities In The Mediterranean, April 20th, 1970, in NATO Archives, MC_0255_70_DRAFT.
[4] Memorandum For The Members Of The Military Committee – The Military Significance To NATO Of Soviet Bloc Penetration Of The Middle East, And North Africa, And Of Related Soviet Activities In The Mediterranean, April 20th, 1970, in NATO Archives, MC_0255_70_DRAFT
[5] Follow-Up On Paragraph 6 Of The Final Communique Following The Meeting Of The Council In Ministerial Session Of December 1969 – Report On The Situation In The Mediterranean, may 19th 1970, in NATO Archives, C-M(70)12-FINAL.
[6] Greek-Turkish Relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 23rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, PO(70)522.

getting out of hand on the island, he had the impression that a settlement based on negotiations between the two communities was not close at hand. In fact, while the Greek and the Turkish national governments seemed to share the belief that negotiations should be the only means to solve the issue, this seemed not to be mirrored in the attitude of the two communities on the Island. In this respect, the major concern for the Allies was that the lack of talks between the two Cypriot communities could have negative repercussions the relations between Greece and Turkey[1]. An internal conflict between NATO members was always to be avoided, even more so in such an unstable area as the Southern Flank of the Alliance. In fact, Brosio did not forget to mention in his report the dangers coming from a possible Soviet penetration in the region, both military and political, and the increasing intensity of the conflict between Arabs and Israelis. Against such a background, any divergence between Turkey and Greece would constitute a threat to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, which the Soviets could exploit to their advantage[2]. In the light of all these considerations, the Secretary General Manlio Brosio stated that he felt entitled to strike a note of concern at the lack of progress in the negotiations between the two communities and the possible impact upon Greek-Turkish relations. He concluded with a sort of exhortation to "all concerned" about making special efforts "to avoid this contingency which, if matters are allowed to drift, may well materialize in a manner and at a moment which would be neither in the interest of the two allied countries nor in that of the Alliance as a whole"[3].

The report did not mention the assassination attempt on Makarios (March, 1971), nor the assassination of Polycarpos Georghadjis (a former Cypriot politician who had resigned a few years before due to an accusation of being involved in the 1968 assassination attempt to Papadopoulos), maybe because those facts were not considered to be directly related to Turkish-Greek relations. A number of theories flourished on the island about them, but no one was confirmed by the evidence. What seems certain, is that some plotting was occurring on the island and that the stability claimed by Greek and Turkish representatives as a major success was only at the surface[4].

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[1] Greek-Turkish Relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 23rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, PO(70)522.
[2] Greek-Turkish Relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 23rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, PO(70)522.
[3] Greek-Turkish Relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 23rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, PO(70)522.
[4] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 5.

The Secretary General's Watching Brief of December 1970 was briefly commented by the Turkish and the Greek Foreign Ministers during a meeting of the Council a few days later. The Turkish Minister limited to state his regret that the inter-community talks had not led to an early result; in fact, the hopes to find a common solution, in his opinion, decreased with the passing of time. He then expressed his hope that each one of the parties involved would do its part for the common objective. Before talking about Cyprus, the Turkish representative paid his tribute to the former Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis, who had died few weeks before[1].

Mr. Palamas, the Greek representative, spoke just after his Turkish counterpart. Both dedicated only a few words to Cyprus. However, the tone of the two ministers was different. Palamas seemed to be more positive than his Turkish colleague and the Secretary General, and he affirmed that, "although negotiations were marking time", he still hoped that "they would ultimately lead to an agreement"[2]. He explicitly cited Brosio's report, saying that he did not share his pessimism. While, according to Palamas, it was true that inter-community negotiations had not yet led to a successful conclusion, there had been progress on a number of important points; for instance, the relations between Greece and Turkey. Since these relations depended exclusively on the two governments, the Allies should not fear of any possible repercussions coming from Cyprus[3].

Mentioning Pipinelis and his great contribution to peace on the island was probably not a casual choice by the Turkish representatives. In fact, only two months after he died, general Grivas had returned to Cyprus. This return not only concerned Turkey about a new rise of extremism on the island, but it also suggested, for the first time, the existence of fractures within the Junta. While Papadopoulos had always given his total support to Pipinelis' policies (which were intended to find a long lasting solution to the issue of Cyprus), there was a fringe in the Armed Forces calling for a stronger policy towards the "Cypriot Hellenism"[4]. Among the supporters of this radical wing, there was the Chief of the Greek Military Police Ioannidis, an extreme nationalist and fervent "enosist". After

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[1] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, December 3rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, C-R(70)61-PART2.
[2] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, December 3rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, C-R(70)61-PART2.
[3] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, December 3rd, 1970, in NATO Archives, C-R(70)61-PART2.
[4] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 5.

Pipinelis' death, he was able to gradually exercise more influence on Papadopoulos, and he certainly contributed to the clandestine return of general Grivas to Cyprus[1]. This aggravated the tension between Makarios and the Junta. In fact, the Archbishop believed that Papadopoulos' words did not always correspond to his real acting[2]. Also NATO Secretary General Brosio, besides the neutral tone of his reports for the NATO institutions, in his Diaries defined the Cyprus issue "insoluble"[3].

During the Ministerial Meeting of NATO in Lisbon (June 1971), the Greek representative Palamas seemed to be less optimistic than in December. He affirmed that the Greek government shared the preoccupation of the secretary general that an impasse in inter-communitarian talks could not only have a negative effect on Greek-Turkish relations, but also bear on the situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East. However, he also highlighted some positive achievements, such as the three year period of relative peace on the island, which was directly linked with the negotiating talks. According to him, no other way to find a solution was possible, because any unilateral action coming from one community or the other would certainly cause a new crisis on the island. In accordance with his government, he agreed with secretary general's idea that any public statement by Greek and Turkish governments was to be avoided. Meanwhile, he expressed the necessity of strengthening the already existing ties between Athens and Ankara, as possibly a factor favoring the finding of a solution to the issue of Cyprus[4]. However, it must be said that the calm on Cyprus had probably been possible thanks to the UN peace keeping forces on the island way more than to the improvements of the Turkish-Greek relations. In fact, after the crisis of November 1967, UN engagement on the Island had increased, and the costs of such a mission was another reason of concern to the US and NATO[5].

The Watching Brief of November 1971 was enriched by the impressions of the Secretary General after a recent visit to Tukey and Greece. He enthusiastically underlined how reassuring it had been to find both governments deeply convinced that

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[1] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 5.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 97-99.
[3] Brosio M., Diari NATO (1964-1967), a cura di Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, Edizioni Il Mulino, 2011, p. 780.
[4] Summary Record of a Ministerial Meeting of the Council Held in Lisbon, June 3rd 1971, in NATO Archives, -R(71)30-PART1.
[5] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, July 29th 1971, in NATO Archives, C-R(71)42.

good relations between Greece and Turkey was one of the key elements in finding a peaceful solution to the question of Cyprus. However, given the special position of the countries involved, the efforts of Ankara and Athens should be incorporated in a broader strategy of strengthening the South-Eastern flank of the Alliance. For this reason, he asked everyone who was in the position to do so, to put their best efforts in promoting the success of negotiating talks between the two communities; in fact, if successful talks would benefit all the Allies, the implications of failing negotiations would equally damage the Alliance as a whole[1]. More concerning, from the Greek and American perspectives, was the attitude of Makarios. In fact, he had visited Moscow in June, where he found that he could still rely on Soviet support against any attempt to impose a new settlement in Cyprus without his government and the population being consulted[2].

During the following Ministerial Meeting of the Council, the Turkish representative commented on the report and claimed that the situation had become more urgent than ever because of the worsening conflict in the Middle East. He reported that he and his Greek colleague agreed upon the idea of enlarging the discussion between the two communities in Cyprus, by also including the UN special representative in Cyprus alongside representatives of Greece and Turkey. They had not yet defined the modalities in which "enlarged talks" would take place, but they believed that introducing new elements in the negotiation could help reactivate the process[3]. The Greek representative Palamas confirmed his Turkish colleague's words, and endorsed the report of the Secretary General. Onge again, he ended his speech by expressing the hope that all parts involved could follow the suggestions made by the UN representative regarding the better way to conduct negotiation and inter-communities talks[4].

Neither the Secretary General, nor the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers mentioned the already existing new rise of extremism on the island. In fact, after the return of Grivas in September of 1970, Makarios had made clear that no extremist activity would be tolerated, because such activities could give the Turks the perfect excuse to enter the game actively again, and intervene in Cyprus. A few months later, he reported to the British Ambassador that the money coming from Greece was being used

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[1] Greek-Turkish Relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 29th, 1971, in NATO Archives, C-M(71)75.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 96.
[3] *Summary Record of a Ministerial Meeting of the Council*, December 8th, 1971, in NATO Archives, C-R(71)69-PART1/ C-R(71)69-PART2/ C-R(71)69-PART3.
[4] *Summary Record of a Ministerial Meeting of the Council*, December 8th, 1971, in NATO Archives, C-R(71)69-PART1/ C-R(71)69-PART2/ C-R(71)69-PART3.

to finance pro-Grivas newpapers, and that a number of officers in Cyprus were openly taking a pro-Grivas line[1]. Of course, Makarios was not neutral. His medium-term aims (stabilization of the situation, in the view of long-lasting negotiation that could bring to enosis in the future) were far different from those of Grivas (enosis by force, or double-enosis of the two communities with the respective motherlands). For this reason, he could possibly have exaggerated the information about Grivas activities on the island with the English Ambassador. However, it is certain that episodes of tension between the two communities were increasing. Grivas denied to have received any help from the Junta, but it is hard to believe that Papadopoulos was not at least informed of his intention, which was to form a force (EOKA-B), based on the existing National Front, aimed at imposing *enosis*. In response, Makarios also created an armed force: the Tactical Reserve Police, and openly accused Grivas of "leading the way towards civil war in Cyprus"[2].

Still, the Alliance kept monitoring the situation mostly in the framework of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and, during a Council meeting held in May 1972, the Greek representative Palamas reported that inter-community talks were about to resume on the island following the formula proposed by UN Secretary General, who intended to personally visit Nicosia, Ankara and Athens shortly[3]. Even though it was normal for the UN Secretary General to periodically visit personally the area involved in peace-keeping projects, the period in which he chose to visit Cyprus testifies the connection between the Island, the intensification of conflict in the Middle East, and the increasing Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 1972 annual Watching Brief on Turkish-Greek relations had the signature of the new NATO Secretary General, Joseph Luns. He emphasized his "full agreement" with the conclusion made by his predecessor in the previous reports, and then he made an appraisal to the importance that Turkey and Greece seemed to attribute to an harmonious development of their relations, which was fundamental to the stability of the whole Alliance. The report ended with some more signs of optimism that the two previous ones, since negotiating talks had been restored and broadened, as the UN Secretary General had suggested[4]. What the report seems to

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[1] Mallinson W., *Cyprus. A Modern History*, Paperback edition, Tauris & Co., London, 2009, e-book edition, chapter 5.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 101.
[3] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, May 30th, 1972, in NATO Archives, C-R(72)25-PART1/PART2/PART3.
[4] Greek-Turkish Relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 24th, 1972, in NATO Archives, PO(72)422.

underestimate is the growing frictions between the Athens and Nicosia governments. At the beginning of 1972, a Danish ship carrying a cargo of weapons from Czechoslovakia, order by Makarios during a visit to Moscow the previous year, arrived in Cyprus. Makarios had no trust in the National Guard, which he believed to be under Grivas influence, and therefore intended to reserve the weapons to the newly created Tactical Reserve Police[1]. But General Grivas learned the news, and sent a unit of EOKA-B to seize the weapons. After a fight, the man of the Reserve Corps managed to take the arms. However, when the fact became known in Greece, the Junta asked that the weapons were delivered to the National Guard. Makarios denied that any such fact has ever happened. The Junta, after a meeting with some senior officers from Cyprus, asked then that the army were surrendered to the UN Peace Keeping Force. Makarios initially refused[2]. This episode impeded the resumption of inter-communal talks (which had been interrupter in September 1971, and planned to be resumed by January 1972) until June, when Makarios finally accepted to entrusts the arms to the UNFICYP control. However, both the Americans and the British (who, as already mentioned, was one of the guarantors of the London-Zurich agreement, and had direct interests in Cyprus) were concerned with the deteriorating atmosphere on island[3].

The year of 1972 was also the one in which Papadopoulos took the regency of the country. He did not publicly declare his motivation for the decision, but both the American and the French Ambassadors suggested a possible link with the Cyprus issue. In fact, according to Tasca and Durand, Papadopoulos knew that the interruption of inter-communitarian talks could bring new conflict and, in such a scenario, he probably wanted to be in the position to act promptly, and "speak at one voice"[4]. Also according to Woodhouse, the decision was taken after the Greek regent Zoitakis had criticized Papadopoulos' stance against Makarios on the issue of the weapons. In fact, Zoitakis believed that trying to undermine Makarios would have benefited exclusively the Turks[5].

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 100-103.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 100-102
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 147.
[4] *Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, March 22nd 1972, in FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972, Doc. 336.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 103.

## 4.5 Internal and External Opposition: first signs of crisis.

A part from a few attempts of organized protests against the regime, there is no record of mass popular opposition in Greece against the Junta during the first years of its rule. It must be said that the memory of the civil war was probably still vivid in the Greek population at the moment of the coup, and that the majority of the people would refuse the idea of a new internal conflict. The only episode of mass protestation had been the funeral of Georgios Papandreou, but the slogans and protests against the regime brought no serious consequences. Traditional parties and political forces had been dismissed, and, being fragmented and unorganized, they seemed unable to provide Greek people with real alternatives to the military. Moreover, Greece was enjoying a period of economic stability, even though it was exclusively the result of previous initiatives implemented in the 1960s. Still, with the passing of time, some sections of society started to feel the weight of long lasting restrictions to their liberties.

A first notable case of student agitation was recorded at Salonika University in May 1972. While the protest initially concerned mere internal issues of the university, during the next days the event took up an anti-regime theme. The national police arrested the leaders of the political protestations, and charged them with severe crimes[1]. In the following months the government tried, on the one hand, to make some concessions towards liberalisation, and, on the other hand, increased the surveillance on university organizations. Furthermore, a wave of bombing 'incidents' was recorded in the summer of 1972, among which a 'guerrilla-style' attack on the US embassy[2]. In September, bombs exploded again in Athens. The responsible appeared to be a new resistance organization, called "the 20th October Movement". As in the past, its members were rapidly arrested, and sentenced by the Martial Court in the following month[3].

Outside Greece, a new group was created in January 1971, the National Resistance Council. This comprehended some organizations of different political orientations, among which the "Free Greeks" (mainly composed of officers), the "Defenders of Freedom" (of right wing orientation), the Democratic Defence (DA, a centrist

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[1] *Le problème étudiante. Situation politique*, report by B. Durand (French Ambassador in Athens) to the French Foreign Office, Doc. N° 917/EU, Athens, November 23rd 1971, in CADN, 48 PO/B 329 (Athènes).
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 108-109.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 110.

organization), and other leftist movements. However, Papandreou's PAK, the most important resistance organization outside Greece, did not join, because the programme of the organization did not comprehend a plebiscite on monarchy[1]. More generally, the National Resistance Council did not gain much international recognition, and was weakened from the start from internal differences. Still, spontaneous protests against the Junta took place throughout the Western Countries. In England, for example, a group of protesters disrupted a Banquet organized by the Colonels for the promotion of tourism in Greece, while fundraising campaign for Greek prisoners were organized throughout the continent[2].

The most worrying problems for the Junta, however, did not come from the Greek population nor from abroad. Within the Council of the Revolution (an organ created soon after the coup in 1967), two "lines" had shaped in the years. A moderate one, headed by Papadopoulos, and a more radical one, that referred primarily to Ladas, and to Makarezos. They were the only two of the original 1967 group who were still in charge of political offices. The other members of the military had been gradually replaced with civilians and "technicians", people who did not have political ambitions. Even though this change did not mean that Papadopoulos took no more in consideration the military stances, the tendency to accumulate power on himself was not appreciated by the radical wing of the Junta. Already in 1971, some signs of dissatisfaction were recorded, but Papadopoulos managed to control the situation[3]. But when he took the regency of Greece in 1972, discontent rose again. If the problem was momentarily put aside because of the Salonika protests, against which the Junta had a commune cause, Papadopulos could not ignore it forever. In December 1972, the vice-prime minister Pattakos publicly dissociated himself from the foreign policies of Papadopoulos by attacking NATO through the pages of an Italian newspaper written in English (the Daily American). He said that if NATO would keep getting involved in Greek domestic affairs, this could have led to a "suicide"; indeed, he said, Greece had survived many years without the help of the Atlantic Council, and it was still able to do so, if necessary. While Papadopoulos did not comment directly the words of his colleague, in his official speech

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 90-91.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 118.
[3] *Notes sur la politique interieure de la Grèce en date du mois de Decembre 1971*, French Foreign Office, Southern Europe Direction, Bordeau Collectif N° 14/EU, Paris, December 1971, in CADN, 48PO/B 329 (Athènes).

for the end of the year he reiterated Greek attachment to the Atlantic Alliance and the need to keep collaborating loyally and constructively with both NATO and the European states[1].

By the end of 1972, as Woodhouse summarizes, at least *four* possible sources of opposition threatened Papadopoulos' rule. Starting from within the Junta, there was the already mentioned group of "hard-liners", who wanted the Junta just to remain in power, with no openings to any development. Then, there was the discontent within sectors of the armed forces: those who were loyal to the 'original' Junta, and therefore aligned with the 'hard-liners' position, and, at the opposite site, those still loyal to the King. Outside the Junta, a third source of concern was the body of students in higher education; they constituted the most active resistance to the regime, as it would become clearer in the following months. Finally, there were the organizations expressly formed with the purpose of resistance, both inside and outside Greece[2]. As already said, those constituted a relative threat for the Junta, but they could still give support and help if popular initiatives were taken against the regime.

[1] *Discours du Premiere Ministre*, coded telegram, French Diplomacy, Athens, December 18th 1972, in CADN, 48PO/B, 329 (Athènes), Doc. N°528-533.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 112-113.

# 5. The Junta in crisis (March, 1973 – July, 1974)

## 5.1 From Papadopoulos to Ioannidis' rule (January – November, 1973)

At the beginning of 1973, Greece still enjoyed a remarkable internal stability. However, the protests which had taken place in Salonika, showed that some groups of the population were no longer willing to accept every restriction imposed by the Military Junta. For the first years after the coup, Greek citizens had benefited from a political and economic stability, the latter mostly due to reforms which dated previous the Colonels' coup. However, despite the liberalization program announced by the Junta, and despite the implementation of some reforms of the calendar during the biennium 1970-1972, the crucial initiatives aimed at the restoration of a parliamentary rule had been postponed by Papadopoulos year after year. Moreover, after six years from their seizure of power, the fact that the military leaders substantially lacked a coherent ideological and political program became evident. Added to these, the economic growth, which had been consistent until the end of 1972, stopped. By the beginning of 1973, inflation started rising again consistently[1]. In other words, it was becoming apparent that the Junta had until that moment befitted from the programs and the reforms implemented before their seize of power. However, with the association with the EEC not proceeding, and the lack of a real economic program for the country's development, the Junta found itself in a stagnation. In fact, despite the close relationship with the United States, Greece's major trading-partner was the EEC. In 1972, the European Community provided 55% of Greece's total imports and 61% of the exports[2]. Conversely, the US provided 6% of Greece's imports, and 10% of the exports[3]. Given this dependence of Greece on the EEC, it was necessary for the Junta to try a rapprochement with the Nine. As already mentioned, after the EEC's first enlargement, Greece had hoped that Great Britain could lead this rapprochement. However, this did not happened, because London was not willing to take such a controversial initiative.

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[1] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 162-163.
[2] Verney S., Tsakaloyannis P., Linkage Politics: the Role of the European Community in Greek Politics in 1973, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10 , 1986 , pp. 179 – 194.
[3] Verney S., Tsakaloyannis P., Linkage Politics: the Role of the European Community in Greek Politics in 1973, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10 , 1986 , pp. 179 – 194.

Against this background, Papadopoulos had also to deal with a growing internal discontent within the Council of the Revolution. A section of the Armed Forces composed mainly of the youngest officers, believed that Papadopoulos should not carry on with the implementation of the democratization calendar's reforms, because the country was not ready yet for a full restoration of personal and political liberties, and neither for elections[1]. In practice, they believed that the Junta had merely to remain in power. Conversely, he seemed to understand that a "revolution", and the Junta had called the 1967 coup, should at some point bring something new to the *status quo*[2]. The agitations among students had proved that, and Papadopoulos tried to meet the need to participate in politics of the Greek people by creating an organization called the "National Cultural Movement" (EPOK), and by declaring that other such organizations could be created freely[3]. However, the fractions existing within the Junta made almost impossible for Papadopoulos to move into one direction or the other, and in fact the stalemate was noticed by both the French and of the American ambassadors in Athens. Despite the cordiality with which Henry Tasca had treated Papadopoulos during the previous years of his mandate in Athens, at the beginning of 1973 he started to doubt about the leader's action: "[a] *number of unresolved problems* – wrote Tasca to Washington, on the anniversary of the coup – *had increased, causing embarrassment and highlighting regime inability to take decisions in timely fashion*"[4].

The main concern of the American diplomats was that internal divisions in the Junta could present an opportunity for the opposition (internal or external) to organize. In fact, in March 1973, new demonstrations among the students took place in Athens, culminating in the occupation of the Law Faculty[5]. A few months later, on the morning of the 24th of May, a secret plan designed by some Navy officers aiming at bringing back the King and reversing the military regime, was discovered and foiled by the Greek authorities[6]. According to the Government's spokesman, almost fifty officers were

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[1] *Rapport de fin de mission*, report of the French Ambassador B. Durand to the French Foreign Office, Athens, April 20th 1967, in CADN, 48PO/B 350 (Athènes), Doc. N° 355/EU.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 112.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 115.
[4] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, April 21st 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 2.
[5] Varsori A., L'Occidente e la Grecia: dal colpo di stato militare alla transizione alla democrazia (1967-1976), in Del Pero, M. – Gavìn, V. – Guirao, F. – Varsori, A., Democrazie. L'Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Le Monnier, 2010, pp. 42-43.
[6] *Télégramme chiffré au depart*, Diplomatie Paris, Athens, May 25th 1973, in CADN 48PO/B 362 (Athènes), Doc. 164-167.

arrested, and the pro-government press did not hesitate to accuse the King of orchestrating the plan. As Verney and Tsakaloyannis underline, these events were not the result of a process of "spontaneous combustion"[1]. On the contrary, they were part of a movement which was deeply connected to a wider international net[2]. The Junta was aware of that, and in fact the former prime minister Costantinos Karamanlis was named and accused by the pro-regime journalists of being the "inspirator" of the project. On 23 April, the former prime minister had made a statement, published in the newspaper *Vradyni*, inviting the Junta to call back the King, who was the sole symbol of legality, and "to surrender its position to a strong, experienced government"[3]. A months later, during a NATO exercise in Sardinia, the escalation of events culminated into the munity. The plan, designed by Commander Pappas, was to first seize the island of Syros, and then from there sailing in two directions: Pireus and Salonika. On the occasion of a naval exercises, he thought, the presence of many ships at sea would not attract suspicion from the security service. Unfortunately, the participation of some officials to the resistance was already known by the Junta, so as they were "observed". On the 24th of May, the Junta announced that a naval conspiracy had been discovered and the participants arrested[4]. The Greek ship *Velos,* guided by Pappas, seemed to be the only one which had escaped the Junta security services, being at sea from the 22nd and participating to the NATO exercise. When Pappas heard the announcement, he re-routed his ship to Fiumicino (Rome) and anchored there[5]. He and his crew were granted with political asylum, and Pappas claimed that he would not go back to Greece until the regime had been dismantled. According to Woodhouse, Pappas had begun sounding fellow officers since the very day after the coup. Then, a plan to kidnap Papadopoulos, and another to take Crete were abandoned respectively in 1969 and 1970, because they were discovered[6]. In the end, this was the case also in 1973, since the real plan was prevented to be carried out by the Junta security services. However, this time Pappas was able to speak publicly against the Junta, and therefore to bring attention on Greece.

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[1] Verney S., Tsakaloyannis P., Linkage Politics: the Role of the European Community in Greek Politics in 1973, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10 , 1986 , pp. 179 – 194
[2] Verney S., Tsakaloyannis P., Linkage Politics: the Role of the European Community in Greek Politics in 1973, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10 , 1986 , pp. 179 – 194
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 116.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p 116.
[5] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[6] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 116.

The event was remarkable for many reasons: firstly, because of the spectacle of the action; but, more importantly, because this time the initiative came from the main traditional source of support to the Junta: the Greek Armed Forces. According to Pappas, the officers who participated in the mutiny were all young and had taken office after the 1967 coup. This should have been particularly concerning for Papadopoulos, since he was perfectly aware that his major source of support came from the Army and those young officers had been formed under his rule. In such a situation, the need of reassuring the Atlantic Allies on one side (especially considering that the mutiny had taken place during a NATO exercise), and of keeping internal fractures under control on the other one, could possibly explain Papadopoulos' actions in the following weeks.

Following the discovery of the plot, Evangelos Averoff (foreign minister in the Karamanlis cabinet, from 1956 to 1963) was arrested as "instigator" of the mutiny. He was discovered to have had in April a conversation with Karamanlis in Paris about the feasibility a mutiny plan, but he denied that the former prime minister was involved in the actual conspiracy[1]. There were also many other arrests both within the students who had participated in the protests and within the Armed Forces. One again, tortures on the prisoners were reported. At the 1975 trials on ESA officers and soldiers, it would emerge that ESA soldiers were particularly cruel on students, because of the resentment they felt against those they considered as "privileged". In fact, on that occasion, a witness would claim that, when beating him and some other students, an ESA guard at the Pireus interrogation centre said: "I learned about life the hard way, but you in the university learn nothing"[2].

On the 1st of June 1973, a few days after the failure of the *Velos* mutiny, Papadopoulos declared that King Constantine II had been deposed, and proclaimed the creation of the Hellenic Republic, a parliamentary presidential one. In fact, even though the King had not participated in the conspiracy, he would presumably supported it, if successful[3]. Then, Papadopoulos announced that the election would take place by no later than the end of 1974. By taking such decisions, he was probably seeking two major results: firstly, to please the international community, by finally announcing the election; secondly, to give the most radical wing of the Junta what they had been seeking for a

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 117.
[2] For a detailed analysis of the social and cultural background of the ESA officers and soldiers: Amnesty International Report, *Torture in Greece. The First Torturers' Trial 1975*, Amnesty International Publications, 1977.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 117.

long time: the abolition of the monarchy. This had been one of mostly debated item within the Junta from the beginning of the regime, and now Papadopoulos had a real reason to please the hard-liners and "get rid" of the King. In addition, the complete absence of solidarity to the King showed by Greek people also contributed to the final decision[1].

As a natural consequence of the abolition of the monarchy, the 1968 constitution needed to be adapted to the new type of regime. Papadopoulos announced that the revised text would be submitted to a popular vote no later than the end of July, and this actually happened. However, the referendum shared some significant similarities with the referendum of 1968: the voting was mandatory, it would take place under the martial law regime (at least in the big cities), and Papadopoulos would be the only candidate running for the presidency of the Republic[2]. Furthermore, the declared objective of the referendum was not to make the Greek people express about their preference between the monarchy of the republic. Greek population was called exclusively to express their opinion on the structure of the Republic designed by the constitution. In the event that the "no" vote won, the Republic constitution would be evaluated again by a group of experts, and modified accordingly[3]. The King made two statements, on 9 and 24 July, denouncing the proceeding of the plebiscite. The same did Karamanlis from Paris, who publicly asked the Greek people to vote "no", in order to avoid the catastrophe of a civil war. According to him, the vote was not about choosing between the monarchy or the republic. The Junta, he claimed, was asking the Greek people which type of dictatorship they preferred[4]. Also Andreas Papandreou pronounced against the referendum, announcing his support the returning blank ballot-papers. In Athens, Kanellopoulos guided a group of former politicians in the campaign for the "no". Only Spyros Markezinis, like in the aftermath of the 1967 coup, showed benevolence towards the government, saying that he would vote "yes" with reservations[5].

The referendum took place on the 29th of July, and Greek citizens expressed their opinion on the changes to the constitution, on the candidature of Papadopoulos as

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[1] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 162-164.
[2] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, . pp. 162-164.
[3] *Préparation du referendum*, dépeche d'actualité, French Ambassy in Greece, for the European Direction, Athens, June 14th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 350, (Athènes), Doc. N° 11/DA-EU.
[4] *M. Constantin Caramanlis invite les Grecs à voter "non" au référendum du 29 juillet*, Le Monde, 19 July, 1973.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 119-120.

President of the Republic, and on General Anghélis being his vice-president. As widely expected, "yes" won with78.4% of the vote (according to governmental sources)[1]. As before the referendum, after the result the King denounced the methods used by the Junta during the vote[2]. Maybe aiming at balancing the critics of the referendum methods, Papadopoulos abolished martial law in the whole country immediately after the vote, as he had promised. Then, in his first public speech as President of the Hellenic Republic, Papadopoulos confirmed his plan to organize parliamentary election by the end of 1974. Martial courts were abolished all over the country. He also announced that the stages of the democratization calendar would accelerate, and that a new government composed exclusively by civilians would be formed by October of that year[3]. Finally, an amnesty for all political crimes committed since the 21st of April 1967 was announced[4]. At the same time though, Papadopoulos brought back to office some of the "hard-liners" (Ladas and Aslanidis), who had questioned his leadership in the past. This seems to suggest, according to Woodhouse, that the liberal measures taken were only a "smoke-screen"[5].

Maybe as a reward for not having opposed to the Junta, or maybe because he was the only one willing to cooperate in the new government, Spyros Markezinis was appointed as prime minister. As outlined before, he had been the only former politician who had not spoken out against the military regime in all those years. For this reason, Papadopoulos probably viewed him as a possible "bridge" figure between the regime and a more democratic system to be built in the near future[6]. With the exception of Ladas and Aslanidis, Papadopoulos excluded from the cabinet the few military who were still part of the government after the "revolution" of 1967. While this could appear as a good sign to eyes of the Western allies, the grievance from those excluded only added to the already numerous causes of discontent within the Armed Forces deriving from Papadopoulos' actions.

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[1] *Intelligence Note prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research*, Washington, August 1st 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 5.
[2] King Warns of Greek Violence, the Daily Mirror, 31 July 1973 (full article).
[3] *Message du President de la Republique, M. Georges Papadopoulos, à l'occasion de sa prestation de serment* (10 Aout 1973), annex to *Situation Interieure*, communiqué by the Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, August 23rd, 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 350, (Athènes), Doc. N° 649/EU.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 119-121.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 120.
[6] Veremis Th. M – Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, p. 174.

Not only there was a radical part of the Army, mainly composed by senior officers, who supported the ideas behind the 1967 coup, who did not approve the liberal turn taken by Papadopoulos; dissatisfaction was also spreading among young officers who were waiting for promotions that did not arrive, and were unhappy with the accusations of inefficiency and corruption against the Hellenic regime coming from abroad, and blamed Papadopoulos of such situation. According to them, the international accusation towards the Junta discredited the Hellenic Army as a whole[1]. The new government was losing support from within the Armed Forces and was not able to find it among civilians either: no former politician was willing to participate as a candidate in the elections, nor to collaborate with the new cabinet. In addition to all these difficulties, the major result of the softening of the regime promoted by Papadopoulos in the previous weeks, seemed to be the creation of a "space" for manifestations of popular discontent[2].

On 4 November, the fifth anniversary of George Papandreou's funeral, many students took part in a demonstration. Thirty-seven people were arrested after clashes with the police, seventeen of which were then sent for trial. During the trials, and after their end, students assembled in the Polytechnic of Athens. They demanded that elections for the Student Unions be hold within the 4 December. Markezinis' minister of education, Siphanaios, met the students at the Polytechinc, but he failed convincing them to withdraw their demands. However, the Principal of the Polytechnic supported the students, and allowed them to gather in a general assembly on the 14th of November[3]. Meanwhile, a crowd of students and other sympathizers gathered in the forecourt of the University, and outside the gates. At the first, the meetings were aimed at defining a strategy to protest against the government's decision to postpone the student elections to the next year. Several meetings took place in the following days, and when the principal of the Polytechnic was informally asked to let the police into the University, he refused[4]. The protest was turning into an uprising against the Junta and its supporters and, on 16 November, students decided to occupy the main building of the Polytechnic[5].

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[1] Veremis Th. M – Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, pp. 173-174.
[2] Veremis Th. M – Koliopulos I.S., *La Grecia Moderna. Una storia che inizia nel 1821*, Edizioni Argo, Lecce, 2014, p. 173.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 130.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 130-133.
[5] Kotea M., "The Athens Polytechnic Uprising: Myth and Reality", in American International Journal of Contemporary Research, Vol. 3 N. 8, August 2013.

At first, the authorities did not attribute much importance to the events, adopting a soft line towards the protesters. The Greek government hoped probably to avoid criticism that would certainly coming from abroad if they had repressed the protests with violence. During the last year, the Junta was struggling to convince its international partners that a real process of liberalization was going on in the country, and therefore it was necessary not to give signs in the opposite direction. Moreover, the Police Force and the government were convinced that students' protests would end soon, as previously. However, this time it was different: the protests had a much more definite *political* connotation than the previous ones at the Law Faculty and at Salonika, and it soon became apparent that they were turning into a real revolutionary movement. More than three thousands students, from within the University, launched an appeal to all Greek citizens for a general strike[1]. Still, the Ministry of National Education officially responded that the police would not enter the University. Also, the Police decided not to block the accesses to the area next to the Polytechnic. This allowed the citizens to join the students, or just to bring them food and support. According to Woodhouse, also Kanellopoulos was seen on the streets outside the Polytechnic with his daughter, even though he did not enter the building. Still, once again, he denounced publicly the Junta and gave his support to the students in a statement published by the English-language newspaper "Athens News"[2].

By the night between the 16th and the 17th of November, according to a report of the French ambassador in Athens, almost twenty thousand people were reunited into the rooms of the Polytechnic[3]. After hours of *guerrillia* between protesters and the police, the government decided to call for the intervention of the Armed Forces. Only the day before, Papadopoulos had told Markezinis that even in case of need of drastic action at the Polytechinc, there must have been *no* casualties[4]. But on the 16 November, violent demonstrations took place outside the University, particularly in front of the Ministry of Public Order. The crowd was reported to be "extremely provocative" and, in the end, the police was ordered to fire. It was only assumed that the protesters came from the

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[1] *Troubles à Athènes*, code telegram, Diplomatie Paris, Athens 17th November 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 350, (Athènes), Doc. N° 415-418.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 130-144.
[3] *Troubles à Athènes*, code telegram, Diplomatie Paris, Athens 17th November 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 350, (Athènes), Doc. N° 415-418.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 130-144.

Polytechnic, also because some of those wounded in the fighting at the Ministry of Public Order were brought there. According to Woodhouse, the decision to call the Army was taken by Papadopoulos himself, without Markenizis knowing[1]. After a few hours, at 1.00 a.m. on 17 November, tanks were seen in the streets outside the Polytechnic. When they entered the University, the repression was brutal, and culminated in hundreds of injured and around thirty people dead[2].

The following day, new fights in the streets of Athens between groups of protesters and Papadopoulos pushed Markezìnis to declare (again) the regime of martial law in the entire country. Papadopoulos intervened personally, declaring that such special measures would only be temporary and that, once public order had been restored, the democratization path would be resumed. Meanwhile, several teachers and professor were arrested, and their houses were searched. Kanellopoulos and other former political leaders were placed under house arrest to substance Papadopoulos' theory that the Polytechnic uprising was the result of a conspiracy of former politicians against the new government[3]. On the morning of the 20th of November, the situation seemed to have calmed down. However, the events of the Polytechnic represented a double failure for Papadopoulos: on the one hand, the protests proved that the space of freedom created by the liberalization led to a revolt against him and his rule; on the other hand, the ingenuity with which the issue was managed at the beginning (and the consequent necessity to use force), provided the perfect means for the extremist wing of the Junta to demonstrate that the country was not ready for democracy. With Woodhouse's words, "the revolt, though wholly spontaneous, was quickly exploited by both political extremes"[4].

In fact, on the early morning of the 25th of November, a bloodless military coup deposed Papadopoulos. The scheme was very similar to that of the 21st April 1967. During the night, tanks stationed in central Athens. Meanwhile, the telephone system was cut off and centres of telecommunication occupied by the Army. Armoured vehicles arrived at Papadopoulos' residence, carrying a message: *"At the request of the Armed Forces, you have submitted your resignation; so have the Vice-President and the*

[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985.
[2] Kotea M., "The Athens Polytechnic Uprising: Myth and Reality", in American International Journal of Contemporary Research, Vol. 3 N. 8, 2013, pp. 18-24.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 139-141.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 142.

*Markezinis government. You will follow further development on the television. Your credit and that of your family will be respected"*[1].

General Ghizichis, chief of the Armed Forces, was nominated as President of the Republic, while as Prime Minister was appointed Adamantions Androutsopoulos, a civilian who had served twice in Papadopoulos government. However, the real soul of the coup was the chief of the Greek Military Police: general Dimitrios Ioannidis[2].

The countercoup was the result of months, if not years, of malaise within the Junta. According to General Gizikis, Papadopoulos would have been removed from office anyway. As already mentioned, the original allies of Papadopoulos had never really accepted Papadopoulos accumulation of power, the elimination of his original colleagues from power, and the consequent formation of an almost entirely civilian government, and some "liberal" acting as the general amnesty, or the announcement of elections. For all these reason, the events at the Polytechnique constituted the right occasion for the "hard-liners" to finally overthrow Papadopoulos[3].

## 5.2 International reactions: a comparison

### 5.2.1 The EEC and Europe

The day after the proclamation of the Hellenic Republic, the French ambassador De Margerie reported that diplomatic activities in Athens were continuing as always. This was motivated by specific national governments' instructions to their representatives in Greece, and by the general diplomatic doctrine in such cases, which establish to keep normal relations with the local authorities. This was the third time that the EEC members had to deal with diplomatic recognition of Greece, the first being after the 1967 coup, the second after the failure of the royal counter-coup and the exile of the King. However, referring to the theory that they recognized the State, non the government, they always decided not to interrupt diplomatic contacts. De Margerie also recorded that all the EEC ambassadors had consulted in order to take a coherent attitude, except for the British one,

[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 144.
[2] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 142-145.

who had been instructed by his government to interrupt every contact with the Greek Authorities[1]. De Margerie seemed to underline the fact with a hint of hostility, highlighting how the British struggled to put into action the purpose of "political cooperation" stated by the EEC member states at the Hague Conference in 1969[2]. Meanwhile, according to Maragkou, the EEC members including Great Britain discussed the issue at governmental level, and decided to proceed as though no governmental change had occurred[3].

The speech made by Papadopoulos in the aftermath of the referendum, in which elections were announced, made a deep impression both inside and outside the country. According to ambassador De Margerie, the internal opposition was so surprised by the change of course that needed forty-eight hours to analyse the new situation[4]. Moreover, Papadopoulos decided to grant pardon to Alekos Panagoulis, the man who had attempted at his life in the summer of 1968, and was then condemned with death penalty. However, it is worth noting that the effects of a substantially anti-democratic legislation did not erase the fact that the same legislation was still in force. According to the 1973 revised constitution, the President of the Republic (Papadopoulos) still retained legislative power when dealing with issues of public order. He could, for instance, declare martial law in the country (and, as previously mention, he used this power in the aftermath of the Polytechnic protestations)[5].

Papadopoulos' speech seemed to be the groundwork for important changes in Greek domestic policies, but not for the international ones. In fact, in late August, the pro-regime newspaper *Eleftheros Cosmos* published an article, clearly stating that no changes would occur in Greek foreign policy. Greece would pursue the "Papadopoulos Doctrine", meaning loyalty to the Western cause and to the Atlantic Alliance, respect of the principle of non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs, and engagement in bettering bilateral relations with every country, especially those of the Third World[6]. The

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[1] *Attitude des missions diplomatique à la suite de la proclamation de la République*, communiqué of the French Ambassador C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, 21st June 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 350 (Athènes), Doc. N° 503/EU.
[2] Mammarella G. – Cacace P., *Storia e Politica dell'Unione Europea. 1926 – 2013*, Laterza, Bari, 2013.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 167.
[4] *Situation Interieure*, communiqué by the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, August 23rd 1973, in in CADN, 48 PO/B 350 (Athènes), Doc. N° 649/EU.
[5] *Télégramme chiffré*, Ambafrance Athènes, Paris, August 28th 1973, in in CADN, 48 PO/B 350 (Athènes), Doc. N° 179.
[6] *Situation Interieure*, communiqué by the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, August 23rd 1973, in in CADN, 48 PO/B 350 (Athènes), Doc. N° 649/EU.

only change in Greek foreign policy, wrote the journalist, would be in the *tone*. Since Greece had proved to be engaged in a new path towards liberalization, following the referendum and the announcement of a new government to be formed entirely of civilians, any kind of recommendation coming from abroad and concerning Greek domestic issues would not be admitted anymore. It was also stated that, after the 1974 election, Greece would have requested to the Council of Europe a reconsideration its position. Finally, the article suggested that, if the European institutions would still hesitate to reactivate the association process after the Greek election, it could have been inferred that their position was motivated by economic reasons, and not ideological or political ones, as always affirmed[1].

The tone of the journalist was quite arrogant, but what emerges from his words seems to be a renewed interest to the EEC. Being *Eleftheros Cosmos* a newspaper completely aligned with the government and with Papadopoulos, it can be inferred that the article mirrored with a certain precision the new orientation of the government. Actually, it was at least from 1972 that Greece was trying to have the association process re-activated. As reported by the British Ambassador, after England joining the European Community, the Greek government seemed expecting some mediation with the other member states in favour of the Greek case[2]. The importance attached to the association seemed to be confirmed also by some broaden considerations. In fact, the amount of foreign investment, which had massively contributed to economic prosperity in Greece during the past years, was no longer sufficient to hold the economic structure of the country. As Paolo Soave underlines, this exposed the complete lack of a coherent long-term development program, and the inevitable severe consequences for Greece's stability[3]. We already underlined that Greece was completely dependent on the EEC on the economic ground. Therefore, the interruption of the economic initiatives provided by the Treaty of Athens could only worsen the situation, and this was probably one of the reasons behind the renewed interest of Papadopoulos in mending with the EEC.

The fact that all the members chosen for the new cabinet were civilians, as promised in early summer, could also be interpreted as a sign of change directed to the foreign

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[1] *Situation Interieure*, communiqué by the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, August 23rd 1973, in in CADN, 48 PO/B 350 (Athènes), Doc. N° 649/EU.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019.
[3] Soave P., La democrazia allo specchio. L'Italia e il regime militare ellenico (1967-1974)., Rubettino, 2014.

partners of Greece. Spyridon Markézinis, the new Prime Minister, was a traditional politician. His first public speech after the appointment focused on the confirmation of future parliamentary election, on the need to stop inflation, and on the intention to improve Greece's international relations, especially those with the EEC and with the other European nations. Papadopoulos, who still represented the strong man of Greek institutions at the time, probably thought that those signs of change could be sufficient to convince the Nine that Greece was genuinely determined to restore democracy and parliamentary rule. In fact, the intention to take back Greece to its "natural place" among European powers was reiterated on many occasions, both publicly and in a private meeting with the French ambassador De Margerie[1].

From the 1970s, discussions at communitarian level on the evolution of the Greek political situation had been decreasing. This was probably due to the fact that, given the stance that the association process would have not been restored until the return to a parliamentary regime, no significant changes occurred in this sense. Also, the EEC had been dealing with some great changes on the inside, as the first enlargement from six to nine members, and the establishment of the European Political Cooperation[2]. In 1970, through the Luxemburg report, the EEC had reiterated the purpose of political coordination by establishing regular confrontation on important issues of foreign policy[3]. Further steps were decided in Paris in the October 1972 Summit, when the Nine declared their intention to establish an Economic and Monetary Union and to transform the relationship existing between them into a "European Union" by 1980[4].

Greece, given that the EEC statement that no changes has occurred in Greece which could justify the reactivation of the association process, was excluded from all these developments.This was even more meaningful considering that Turkey, which was at the time led by another military government, did not receive the same treatment. In fact, in 1970, the EEC signed an "additional protocol" by which they agree to consult with Turkey in the course of European Political Cooperation. Therefore, as Verney and

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[1] *Télégramme chiffrè au depart*, reserved, Diplomatie Paris, Athens, October 18th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 362 (Athènes), Doc. N° 395-397.
[2] Verney S., Tsakaloyannis P., Linkage Politics: the Role of the European Community in Greek Politics in 1973, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10 , 1986 , pp. 179 – 194.
[3] Luxemburg Report (Davignon Report), 27 October 1970, in *Bulletin of the European Communities*. November 1970, n° 11. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. "Davignon Report (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970)", p. 9-14.
[4] Verney S., Tsakaloyannis P., Linkage Politics: the Role of the European Community in Greek Politics in 1973, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10 , 1986 , pp. 179 – 194.

Tsakaloyannis argued, the EEC was probably trying to "shape" events in Greece by its severe stance[1]. This tactic could have maybe been successful in the middle-tern, as the timid signs of liberalisation after the referendum of 1973 suggest. At least some diplomats seemed to be thinking so. Through the reports and talks among the European ambassadors in Greece, it is possible to understand their general impressions about the new government. The majority of European governments seemed to cautious, but also timidly positive. Soon after the proclamation of the Republic, Papadopoulos' announcement of future election had not been taken seriously, or not believed at all. However, after the formation of the Markézinis government, Papadopoulos' announcement probably seemed more real. As Maragku underlines, there was awareness abroad that Papadopoulos' initiatives towards liberalisation were aimed at "palliating" EEC's opposition to the restoration of association. Still, those initiatives constituted "more political developments than the preceding six years"[2]. In particular, the political amnesty granted by Papadopoulos in August was seen as a great victory from those who had been fighting for the restoration of a regime respecting basic human rights[3]. However, what happened at the Polytechnic, and even more what happened after, prevented any actual rapprochement between the EEC and Greece from happening, and proved that it was "*easier to build up a dictature, than to exit from it*" (as French Ambassador De Margerie summarized)[4].

The events of the Polytechnic had a strong resonance all over Europe. In Britain, students protested in front of the Greek Embassy in sign of solidarity with their Greek colleagues, while in West Germany the West German Social Democratic Party condemned the acting of the government[5]. In almost every European country, newspapers reported the events happening in Greece. Since the situation appeared to be extremely fluid in the first place, the major European governments preferred to maintain a cautious *wait and see* attitude. However, the restoration of martial law, and the announcement of political trials immediately after the protests, were certainly not

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[1] Verney S., Tsakaloyannis P., Linkage Politics: the Role of the European Community in Greek Politics in 1973, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10 , 1986 , pp. 179 – 194.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 174-175.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 174-175.
[4] *Vers un gouvernement civil*, communiqué from the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, September 13th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N° 682/EU.
[5] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 178.

encouraging signs[1]. The fragility of the liberal turn taken by Papadopoulos became apparent. In fact, at the first signs of easing the regime, the opposition had taken the occasion to organize and demonstrate. Then, the difficulty in managing the crisis, coupled with the severe repression which followed, revealed that Papadopoulos did not have a real "transition to democracy" plan. Under such conditions, from the perspective of the EEC institutions, the chances for parliamentary election in Greece in the near future seemed almost inexistent. Furthermore, the threats coming from the internal opposition to Papadopoulos were at the time already foreseeable. In fact, already in February, the British Defence Attaché Brigadier Baxter, had prophetized that "students riots with major bloodshed might be sufficient provocation for a further military coup"[2]. And, also in London, it has been discussed the possibility that an effective challenge to Papadopoulos could come only from within the Army, following a dramatic event such as a mass protest or a debacle in Cyprus[3].

### 5.2.2 NATO and the USA

The stalemate characterizing Greece at the beginning of 1973 was also noticed by American diplomats. However, this time the attitude of Washington proved to be different from the past. If the discovery of the secret plot to bring back the King, or the failure of the *Velos* mutiny, would have happened just a few months before, Ambassador Tasca would certainly have been charged with giving some advice to the Greek Junta. This did not happen. Instead, the US decided just to monitor the evolution of the events in Greece. Of course, Washington had not lost interest in Greece, nor was it enthusiastic about events in Greece. In fact, the US had always considered the institution of the monarchy to be a crucial element of continuity and stability in Greece. Also, they believed that in the future the King could be a key element in the process of restoration

[1] *Emeutes à Athènes et proclamation de la loi martiale*, news dispatch, for Diplomatie Paris – Direction Europe, Athens, November 23rd 1973, in CADN, 48PO/B 350 (Athènes), Doc. N° 16 DA/EU.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 159.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 159.

of a Parliamentary regime. Despite this, when King Costantinos II asked Washington to intercede to prevent the abolition of the monarchy in Greece, the response was negative[1].

The decision was probably motivated by a number of reasons. Firstly, the complete absence of popular support for the King in Greece. Secondly, the relations between Greece and the US had started changing (not significantly, but consistently) in recent months. Also, even though Nixon had been re-elected in 1972, the Republicans did less well in the Congressional election. Therefore, the support to the Greek regime need to be more cautious. In addition to all these elements, the *Velos* incident showed that Greece, could no longer be trusted to be the loyal and reliable NATO Ally it had been in the past. The internal weaknesses of the regime had started effecting the external duties of the country, and this was probably the most important lesson the US learnt from the incidents in May. By June, the US Secretary of State Rush expressed uncertainty about the possibility that election would actually take place by the end of 1974. Even if so, according to him, it was impossible to foresee the possible implications the election could have on "American interests"[2]. However, the USA Intelligence System still believed that the Greek attitude towards Washington could not change much, because "*of all Greece's Western associates, the US is the most important. Bilateral ties are strong, and there is a very substantial interaction between the UA and the Greeks*"[3]. Besides the decades of friendship and American patronage, the CIA's estimation of future Greek behaviour towards the US was supported by the fact that Greece had just started experiencing an economic recession, and that the EEC did not seem willing to reconsider its position towards the association process in the near future. However, a slow but steady loosening of Greek relations with the US was recorded in the same report:

> *"whatever Washington's policy on Greek domestic policies in the months ahead, the US has probably already experienced the best years of its relationship with the Greek Junta. In the regime's early years in power, the appearance of US support was more important to Papadopoulos then it is today. The regime no longer sees such a compelling need to accommodate US desire. There will be frictions arising from the proposed*

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[1] *Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon*, Washington, June 12th 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 3.
[2] *Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon*, Washington, June 12th 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 3.
[3] *National Intelligence Estimate*, Washington, July 19th 1973, in *Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon*, Washington, June 12th 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 5.

*major expansion of US military facilities in Greece. […] This is not to say that the second phase of the homeporting program will not go through on schedule, nor that Greeks necessarily will want to halt or cut down on other US military facilities, or programs under ways. Most of these are related to NATO Alliance and, in addition, are of benefit of Greece. But the regime is likely to be fussier on details, less willing to agree to some project on short notice, and more disposed to exercise supervision to see that the facilities are not used in a way the Greeks regard as derogating from their sovereignty. In addition, the junta will probably, in certain circumstances, seek domestic advantage through criticism of the US presence"*[1].

What emerges from these words is that Greece was perceived to be seeking for a higher degree of independence from US interests. From Washington's perspective, this attitude could even strengthen if the country would manage to normalize its relations with the EEC, after 1974 election[2].

Despite these considerations, the first public speech of the newly-elected President of the Republic Georgios Papadopoulos received the praise of American Secretary of State Rogers. However, month by month, the contacts between the White House and Athens became increasingly rare. It would suffice to say that, in the aftermath of the incidents at the Polytechnic, the US Ambassador Tasca only communication with Prime Minister Markézinis was to tell him that Washington did not welcome the proclamation of the martial law, and hoped for a rapid return to the path towards liberalization[3].

Given the amount of communication between Athens and Washington during the last years, the attitude of Ambassador Tasca during the Polytechnic protests is peculiar. However, it would be wrong to attribute such a change exclusively to the Greek desire for independence from the US, or to Greece's possible rapprochement with the EEC. In fact, it must be considered that, even though Greece was still very important from the Atlantic perspective, the US had other priorities at the time. By the end of 1973, the economic consequences of the oil crisis were impacting the US along with the rest of the Western World. Meanwhile, Washington had to deal externally with the changes coming

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[1] *National Intelligence Estimate*, Washington, July 19th 1973, in *Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon*, Washington, June 12th 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 5.
[2] *National Intelligence Estimate*, Washington, July 19th 1973, in *Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon*, Washington, June 12th 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 5.
[3] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, 18th November 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 7.

from the Yom Kippur War (during which Greece had refused to let the USA to use their airspace) and, internally, with the chaos which followed the Watergate scandal[1]. Therefore, the importance of the Greek domestic situation was limited to its the possible consequences on the equilibrium of the Atlantic Alliance.

To this extent, the increased tension in the Middle East was a matter of great significance to NATO. The Soviet support for the "Arab cause" against Israel was a source of concern, not so much for the possibility of a direct confrontation (which the Soviet Union needed to avoid), but rather for the possible Soviet political penetration in the area. Moreover, even though most of the Arab countries were believed by NATO to consider their relations with the West as being very important, the possibility that the oil-producing countries among them could be tempted to use the Western investments in the oil sector as a "political lever against Western countries, should Israeli dispute be prolonged indefinitely" was not excluded[2]. According to the regular report on the area presented in April 1973 to the NATO Council, if the situation would worsen, "the danger of cut-back or even an interruption in oil supplies should not be discounted"[3]. The report proved to be reliable. The same considerations on oil supplies and Soviet political aims were provided also in the Report on the Mediterranean situation, which was discussed in the same period[4]. In other words, to the eyes of the Alliance, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean did constitute a threat, especially for the Southern Flank, but not a military one (for the time being). Again, Cyprus was among the countries considered as being under the possible influence of the Soviets. However, as in the previous reports, the country was expected not to change the basic line of its policy, even though, "as long as a satisfactory solution to its problem is not attained", Cyprus "will continue to be exposed to Soviet and local Communist propaganda"[5].

The two reports on the Middle East and the Mediterranean situation were discussed in May by the NATO Council and Military Planning Committee, on the very same days of the *Velos* mutiny. Despite this, the only mention of Greece in the documents of that

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[1] Valdevit G., *Stati Uniti e Medioriente dal 1945 a oggi*, Carocci Editore, Roma, 2003.
[2] The Situation In The Middle East – Note By The Chairman Of The Expert Group, April 13th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-M(73)36.
[3] The Situation In The Middle East – Note By The Chairman Of The Expert Group, April 13th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-M(73)36.
[4] *Report on the Situation in the Mediterranean; November 1972 – May 1973*. Note by the acting Secretary General, May 18th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-M(73)49.
[5] Final Decision On Mc 255/73 A Report By The Military Committee On The Military Significance To The NATO Of Warsaw Pact Penetration And Military Presence In The Middle East, North Africa And Adjacent Sea Areas, May 18th 1973, in NATO Archives, MC_0255_73.

period concerned the establishment of diplomatic relations between Athens and East Germany[1]. In late May, a report by the Defence Planning Committee described the deficiencies in the combat effectiveness of the Greek and Turkish local forces, and their dependence on external aid to meet the NATO authorities' recommendations[2]. The complete absence of comments on the Greek attempt to reverse the military rule during a NATO exercise (at least in the disclosed documents) suggests that, while the fact must not have passed unnoticed, it was probably not considered as genuinely dangerous threat for the Alliance.

Greece, for its part, showed no change in its behaviour within NATO institutions. By the beginning of June, while discussing Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction, the Greek representative advocated the necessity not to diminish the defence posture of the Alliance, a traditional Greek stance. His country, he said, was aware of its national responsibilities and obligations to the Alliance and, consequently, "devoted one of the highest percentage in the Alliance of its gross national product to defence"[3]. However, he underlined that the current effort was the highest Greece could afford; therefore, if more was necessary to fulfill the Alliance's "force goals", external aid would be necessary[4].

By this period, a new country joined Norway and Denmark in their demands for all member states to respect the founding principles of the Alliance. During the ministerial session of the NATO Council held in June of 1973, the representative of Netherlands (Mr. Van Der Stoel, who had been previously charged by the Council of Europe with reporting on Greek constitution between 1968 and 1969) stated that "*in order to secure widespread popular support the Alliance needed, it was essential that the principles of individual liberty and political democracy were respected by all member countries*"[5]. In agreeing with his colleague, the Norwegian representative added that his country noticed with "deep regret and concern"[6] that those principles were not adhered to in practice

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[1] *Summary record of a meeting of the Council,* May 30th 1973, in NATO Archives, C-R(73)33.
[2] DPC – Alliance Defence Problems For The 1970s Follow-Up Action (Spring 1973) – Report By The Defence Planning Committee In Permanent Session, May 30th 1973, in NATO Archives, DPC-D(73)7.
[3] *Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Committee*, June 7th 1973, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(73)10-PART_1/ DPC-R(73)10-PART_2.
[4] *Summary Record Of A Meeting Of The Committee*, June 7th 1973, in NATO Archives, DPC-R(73)10-PART_1/ DPC-R(73)10-PART_2.
[5] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, June 14th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-R(73)36-PART_1/ C-R(73)36-PART_2/ C-R(73)36-PART_3.
[6] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, June 14th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-R(73)36-PART_1/ C-R(73)36-PART_2/ C-R(73)36-PART_3.

throughout the Alliance. According to Norway, it was necessary to give serious consideration to the question of how this situation could be remedied"[1].

This time, the Greek representative responded openly to the criticisms. He claimed that, if all the member countries must be guided by the principles embodied in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, "they also had to protect them in cases where the institution deriving from them were threatened with erosion or collapse"[2]. Then, he moved on to the other topics of the meeting. No comment on the *referendum*, nor the election of Papadopoulos as President of the Republic is recorded in the meetings of the following months, but this is no surprising, given the aforementioned NATO guideline of not interference with domestic affairs of the member states.

During the months of September, October, and November, the Greek participation in NATO's discussions focused on its traditional topic of external aid to local forces, in order to strengthen the Alliance's flank, in a period of great instability in the Eastern Mediterranean[3]. No references to the events happening at the Polytechnic can be found in the documentation, nor to the counter-coup that overthrew Papadopoulos and brought a renewed "Junta" to power in Greece.

### 5.3 The last months of the Military Regime (December 1973 – July 1974)

The French Ambassador in Athens, Claude De Margerie, defined the government constituted after the 25th of November counter-coup as "*un government d'ombres*"[4]. On the 29th of November, four days after the coup, the most important offices were still vacant (Ministries of Economy, Finance and Education), while those politicians who had

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[1] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, June 14th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-R(73)36-PART_1/ C-R(73)36-PART_2/ C-R(73)36-PART_3.
[2] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, June 14th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-R(73)36-PART_1/ C-R(73)36-PART_2/ C-R(73)36-PART_3.
[3] *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, October 16th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-R(73)56, and *Financial Problems arising from the Stationing of United States Forces in Europe*, report by the Study Group on Financial Problems Arising from the Stationing of Forces on the Territory of other NATO countries, October 20th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-M(73)93, and *Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council*, November 16th, 1973, in NATO Archives, C-R(73)66.
[4] *Le nouveau cabinet grec: un gouvernement d'ombres*, communiqué by the ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, November 29th, 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N° 878/EU.

accepted the other offices were of a low-level profile, and almost unknown[1]. From the outside, the situation must not have seemed encouraging.

During his first public speech, the new Prime Minister Androutsopoulos announced that his government would retain a line of continuity from the previous one. According to Androutsopoulos, Greece would keep its traditional allies as close as ever, would try to strengthen the economic and commercial ties with Europe, and would also pursue the policy of amity with Turkey, started some years before[2]. However, he also declared that Greece would no longer pay attention to those countries interfering with Greek domestic policies. In fact, the new government was not interested in "irresponsible criticism" coming from countries outside Greece[3].

The thing which probably concerned the foreign interlocutors of Greece the most was not the arrogant tone of Androutsopoulos, but the suspicion that Ioannidis and his Military Police could use the new government as a mere façade through which they masked their own policies[4]. In fact, despite Ioannidis' spectacular announcement of the abolition of censorship, the reality seemed to be different. As evidence of this, the French Ambassador in Athens drew attention to a number of actions taken in the aftermath of the 25th of November: by the end of the month, the Military Police suspended the publication of some opposition newspapers, without previously consulting the government, nor warning the Information Ministry; then, they distributed a communiqué to be immediately transmitted to the nation on radio and television, which stated that the democratic opposition to the Junta was the only responsible for the events at the Polytechnic[5]. Additionally, the martial law was extended indefinitely, the concentration camp on Gioura was opened again, and the Constitutional Court was simply abolished[6]. Practically, the "hard-liners" within the Junta were able to reinvigorate the dictatorship, instead of softening it.

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[1] *Le nouveau cabinet grec: un gouvernement d'ombres*, communiqué by the ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, November 29th, 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N° 878/EU.

[2] *Politique étrangère du nouveau gouvernement*, communiqué by the Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, December 6th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N°888/EU.

[3] *Politique étrangère du nouveau gouvernement*, communiqué by the Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, December 6th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N° 888/EU.

[4] *Le gouvernement Androutsopoulos ne parvient pas à s'imposer*, code telegram, Diplomatie Paris, Athens, December 14th, 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N° 481-484.

[5] *Situation Intérieure*, communiqué of the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie, to the French Foreign Office, Athens, December 13th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N° 914/EU.

[6] Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 145.

As outlined in the last chapter, the radical wing of the Junta had been opposed to the program of partial liberalization started by Papadopoulos, but not to Papadopoulos himself, nor to the original aims of the 21st April Revolution. According to them, by being too permissive and too soon, Papadopoulos had betrayed their mission. For this reason, they had to overthrow him; but what the radical members of the Junta had not taken into account, was that Papadopoulos had a personal ability of containing the internal divergencies within the Army. Not having the same charisma, and being concerned with the possibility of new popular protestations, the new leaders could only keep control of the country by harshening the repression system.

In addition to the frictions existing inside the Junta, and between the government and the Military Police, the months following the counter-coup of November, were complicated by multiple factors: an economic crisis which was consistently worsening; the consequences of an increasing feeling of anti-Americanism spread both within the Armed Forces and among the Greek people (the last one fueled by the general believe that Ioannidis was backed by the United States, or by the CIA)[1]; and by a rapid deterioration of relations with Ankara[2]. This last factor impacted the Junta greatly during its last month, and was deeply connected with a renewal of tensions between the Greek and the Turkish Community in Cyprus, and with the consequent frictions between Athens and Ankara.

The period of Papadopoulos' rule had corresponded to a phase of substantial lack of intercommunal violence in Cyprus. As long as he retained power, he proved to be able to contain the divergencies existing within the Junta about the Cyprus issue. However, as the years passed, the "threat of force became a dominant element in the Greek Junta's relations with Makarios"[3]. The deep cause of the tension was routed in a different idea about the future of Cyprus. While the Greek Junta (and especially its ultra-radical wing) hoped for a nationalist *enosis* (union) with Greece, the Cyprus' president Makarios

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[1] One of the element that seemed to strengthen such theory was that, after the restoration of democracy, Ioannidis was never charged of complicity in the coup against Makarios in 1974. In fact, the trial was suspended by a decree of Karamanlis' government in "avoidance of a possible disturbance of the country's international relations". This was interpreted as Ioannides being in a position to produce evidence that would implicate the CIA. However, the possibility that the CIA was implicated in the Cyprus facts of 1974 does not necessarily mean that it also was in the counter-coup in November 1973. In Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 145-148.

[2] *Situation Intérieure*, communiqué of the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie, to the French Foreign Office, Athens, December 13th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N° 914/EU.

[3] Joseph S. J., "International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem", in Independent Cyprus 1960-2010. Selected Readings", edited by Hubert Faustmann and Emilios Solomou, published by University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 2011, pp. 95-118.

supported the "independence solution". Moreover, Makarios was suspected by the US (and by the Greek Regime) to sympathize with the Soviets, and this contributed to the deterioration of relations with Athens, which was greatly dependent on the US support. Between 1967 and 1973, Makarios dealt with more than one attempt to this life, and with many plans to overthrow him. All those elements show that, even if Makarios and Papadopoulos had been able to keep the situation under control, some tensions were still running deep.

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, a first significant step towards the deterioration of Ankara-Athens relations over Cyprus was the departure of the Greek former Foreign Minister, Pipinelis. The Turkish authorities had always had a deep respect for him. However, it was the return of general Grivas to Cyprus, in September 1971, which constituted the ultimate start of the escalation which would lead to the 1974 crisis. In fact, as soon as he had arrived on Cypriot soil, he started organizing the underground military organization EOKA-B (EOKA had been the previous organization he had led, in 1967), aimed at overthrowing Makarios and then at pursuing *enosis*[1]. Being aware of the negative repercussions that Griva's behaviour could bring to the Junta, in late August 1973, Papadopoulos publicly condemned the activities carried out by EOKA B and its supporters[2]. In November of the same year, the new Prime Minister Androutsopoulos stated that is governments would pursue the inter-communitarian talks programme on Cyprus, and would continue the policy of improving relations with Ankara[3]. Apparently, his words were a signal of continuity with Papadopoulos' policy. However, it soon became clear that something had changed. General Grivas was not able to gain his objective, since he died in January 1974. The public tribute payed to him on that occasion, as a War hero and protagonist of the resistance against the Nazi (completely forgetting his role in the 1967 Cyprus crisis), gave the first evidence of Ioannidis' ideas on *enosis* and Cyprus. Another significant change occurred at the beginning of 1974: the formation of a new government in Turkey, led by Bulent Ecevit.

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[1] Joseph S. J., "International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem", in Independent Cyprus 1960-2010. Selected Readings", edited by Hubert Faustmann and Emilios Solomou, published by University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 2011, pp. 95-118.
[2] *Des Relations Gréco-Chypriotes*, communiqué of the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens 29th August, 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 341 (Athènes), Doc. N° 659/EU.
[3] *Problème de Chypre*, Note, Foreign Office, European Direction, Under-Direction Southern Europe, Paris, January 1974, in CADN, 48 PO/B 325 (Athènes).

In February, during his first speech at the Parliament, he spoke about a 'federal solution' to the Cyprus issue, which would be unacceptable for Greek Cypriots[1].

In April, while the situation on the island seemed to have calmed down after the death of Grivas, relations with Turkey were still cold. A dispute among the two countries about Turkish claims to the right to prospect for oil in parts of the Aegean Sea claimed by Greece as part of her continental shelf had contributed to the negative climate already created by the recent happenings in Cyprus and by the ambiguity of the Greek government. The actual discovery, in February, of oil in exploitable quantities in the Greek island of Thassos, had led to a revived discussion between Ankara and Athens[2]. Possibly fueled by this new source of tension, violence in Cyprus started raising again in spring, after a few weeks of peace following the death of Grivas. Makarios could not do anything but repeatedly declare that the activity of the EOKA B was illegal and had to stop immediately. He also reiterated, as he had done in the immediate aftermath of Grivas' death, that he would granted an amnesty for those who had been in the organization. Makarios also claimed that he, and not the Greek government, must be responsible for choosing the officers of the National Guard. The Greek government did not respond to the call of President Makarios and, at the beginning of July, violence and tension in Cyprus were almost uncontrollable. The tension was so high that, after on the 26th June a spokesman for Makarios declared that the leaders of EOKA-B were in Athens, and were also the agents of the revolutionary military regime, the Greek Foreign Minister Tetenes resigned[3]. The same did Angelos Vlachos, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, who knew Cyprus very well as he had served as Consul-General under British rule, and suspected that Ioannidis was plotting[4]. The conflict, at that point, seemed to be no more between Greece and Turkey, but between Greece and Makarios.

On the 3rd of July, president Makarios wrote a public letter to the Greek Government, in which he accused Athens of supporting the clandestine activities aimed at seizing power by force on the island[5]. Furthermore, he asked the Junta to withdrawn its support to the EOKA B, and to recall the 650 Greek officers who controlled the Cypriot National Guard. The letter was formally addressed to the Chief of the State, General Ghizikis, but

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 148.
[2] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[3] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 150.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 152.
[5] Joseph S. J., "International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem", in Independent Cyprus 1960-2010. Selected Readings", edited by Hubert Faustmann and Emilios Solomou, published by University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 2011, pp. 95-118.

it had to be intended to be directed towards Ioannides. Two copies were also delivered privately to Karamanlis in France, and King Costantine in London[1]. Makarios probably thought that a direct confrontation was at that point inevitable, and wanted to be the first to make his position clear, and the position of those he considered to be responsible of the current situation:

> *"I have always held and repeatedly expressed the principle that cooperation with every Greek government constitutes for me a national duty. I cannot say I feel any sympathy with military regimes, particularly in Greece, the country where democracy was born and cradled. Yet in this case I adhered to my principle of cooperation. You must realize, however, the das reflections which tormented me after I learned that some members of the Government of Greece were constantly hatching plots against me and, which is worse, were dividing and driving Cypriot Greeks to mutual destruction, leading to catastrophe. More than once, I have sensed, and on one occasion almost felt, the invisible hand stretched out from Athens seeking to destroy my human existence"*[2].

Two weeks later, Brigadier Ioannides' gave his response to the letter, by launching a coup on the island, and forcing President Makarios to flee the island[3]. A puppet regime under Nico Sampson, the new leader of EOKA-B, was brought to power.

Ioannidis has been preparing the plan for at least weeks, with the complicity of some officials of the National Guard. While Makarios had always known that an action would be taken eventually, he had always declared that he did not believe that Ioannidis would attempt to his life. He probably did so in order to give as much publicity as possible to Ioannidis' plotting, and so to warn Ioannidis that he was prepared[4]. According to Woodhouse, Makarios misjudged Ioannidis' intentions, believing that he would never attempt drastic actions, while Ioannidis' misjudged the Turks, believing that his action would not lead to war[5]. Through a very complicated and long way (going from the Troodos mountains, through a monastery, to the British bases on the island), Makarios managed to escape and to fly to London. At his arrival, the Turkish Prime Minister was

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 152.
[2] Joseph S. J., "International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem", in Independent Cyprus 1960-2010. Selected Readings", edited by Hubert Faustmann and Emilios Solomou, published by University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 2011, pp. 95-118.
[3] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p 163.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 153-155.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada publishing, London, 1985, pp. 153-155.

also there, demanding joint action, according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. London was reluctant, and decided to wait until the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, on the 18th of July. There, Makarios gave a speech in which he openly accused the Greek regime of aggression against Cyprus[1]. Meanwhile, Ecevit returned to Ankara. He had received no guarantee from London, nor concessions from Athens (where Joseph Sisco, assistant secretary of Kissinger, had been sent to mediate). Therefore, he decided to take military action on Cyprus[2].

Ankara claimed to have formal reasons to do that, since the Greek coup was clearly aimed at annexation, which was prohibited by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Moreover, the Treaty had established a responsibility for the guarantors to protect the two communities on the island and, according to Turkey, the extreme nationalist policies of the Greek Junta represented a danger for the Turkish Cypriot community on the island[3]. Before actually being informed of the Turkish ships sailing towards Cyprus, Ioannidis seemed to believe that Turkey was mobilizing only to make a show of strength. However, when he understood that the danger was real, he called a council of war[4]. During the meeting, Ioannidis dictated immediate mobilization, with the intention to declare war on Turkey. However, the efficiency of the army had been deeply undermined by seven years of regular purges, and the mobilization only made apparent the military superiority of Turkey[5].

With the two countries mobilizing, war seemed to be imminent for a time; however, the refusal of Greek military commanders to attack Turkey gave the *coup de grace* to the Ioannides' regime, which lacked domestic support, legitimacy, and any international partners whatsoever. A demand by some powerful elements within the Greek Armed Forces to return to a civilian government forced Ioannides to step back. Together with some prominent members of the former political establishment, the military leaders called on Kostantinos Karamanlis to oversee the dismantlement of the dictatorship, and to guide the country in its return to democracy[6].

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[1] Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 155.
[2] Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985, p. 156.
[3] Joseph S. J., "International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem", in Independent Cyprus 1960-2010. Selected Readings", edited by Hubert Faustmann and Emilios Solomou, published by University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 2011, pp. 95-118.
[4] Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985.
[5] Woodhouse C. M., *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, Granada publishing, London, 1985.
[6] Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 163-165.

## 5.4 International reactions: a comparison

### 5.4.1 Europe and the EEC

During the short life of the Markezinis government, the Prime Minister had claimed many times that Greece had its "natural place" among the European states. On the contrary, Androutsopoulos showed an arrogant attitude towards Europe from the very beginning, and more generally towards foreign countries which expressed their opinions about Greek domestic policies. In his already mentioned first public speech of November 1973, he referred to those countries "outside Greece" who had given "manifestations of irresponsibility" by providing Athens with unrequested advices[1]. The French ambassador had immediately understood that behind any declaration or decision taken by the government stood Brigadier Ioannidis, and this was also underlined by British officials[2]. After the discussion on the additional protocol extended the Association Treaty to the new EEC members, there are few records of discussion on Greece on a communitarian level. From November 1973 to the beginning of July 1974, the Nine seemed to be "observing" the evolution of the situation in Greece. This could be explained by a shared perception that the new phase of the Hellenic regime was not going to last very long, and by the consequent reluctance to engage in new discussions about Greece before having a clear picture of its near future. In fact, despite the arrogance showed in public by Androutsopoulos and his colleagues, it was probably also clear outside Greece that Ioannides struggled to gain any support, both from within the population and the Armed Forces. The members of the new government, who the French ambassador had defined "ombres" (ghosts), were considered also by his British colleague as "a collection of non-entities", that constituted a government without any distinguished personality[3]. Still, the EEC governments decided not to interrupt diplomatic relations with Greece, opting for the "state, non-government" doctrine[4].

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[1] *Politique étrangère du nouveau gouvernement*, communiqué by the Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, December 6th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N°888/EU.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 179.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019,p. 179.
[4] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 180.

By the beginning of January 1974, the new Foreign Minister Spyridon Téténès gave an interview to newspaper *Eleftheros Cosmos* about internal and international policy. Again, what emerges from the articled is an aggressive posture towards the European "issue", which was similar to the first period of the Papadopoulos' era. After accusing the Nine (at the time Six) of having "frozen the association without a legitimate reason", he stressed the economic nature of the Treaty of Athens, and the commitment with which Greece had fulfilled the economic objectives required by the Association Agreement in those years[1]. Given the difficult moment that Greece was enduring in terms of the economy, the Foreign Minister should have done all he could to convince the EEC to reactivate the process of association. But on March 28 the EEC reiterated its position, by declaring that the present situation in Greece remained very far from the democratic standards on which the European Community was based, and therefore its relations with Greece would continue to be strictly confined to routine business[2].

It is difficult to understand why the Foreign Minister opted for such an arrogant tone and attitude. In fact, the interview only resulted in increasing the already consistent distrust that the European held towards the new Junta, which was also increased by the discrepancy existing between the words of the government and its actions, especially regarding Cyprus. As a proof of this, on the same days in which Grivas fueled the radicalism on the island, with the secret support of Ioannides, Téténès declared, through the pages of *Eleftheros Cosmos*, that Greece would carry on with the policy of inter-communitarian talks policy on Cyprus, and with the promotion of a constructive dialogue with Turkey[3]. Another confirmation of Athens' ambiguity was the already mentioned behaviour which followed to the death of General Grivas. Radio, television, and newspapers all seemed to ignore the criminal actions carried out by Grivas in Cyprus, and exclusively celebrated the heroism he had shown during the resistance against the Nazis in World War II.

Meanwhile, the French ambassador in Cyprus reported very concerning news coming from President Makarios, who complained about the attitude of the new Greek

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[1] *Interview du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères*, communiqué by the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, January 9th 1974, in CADN, 48 PO/B 342 (Athènes), Doc. N° 18/EU.

[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 194.

[3] *Interview du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères*, communiqué by the French Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, January 9th 1974, in CADN, 48 PO/B 342 (Athènes), Doc. N° 18/EU.

government, which reminded him of the first months of the Papadopoulos regime[1]. In April, the situation worsened on every front: tension regarding the Aegian Sea increased between Athens and Ankara, the US seemed to be less willing than ever to participate in Greek policies, and consequently less willing to support Greece within the Atlantic Alliance, and the EEC showed no sign of change in their position. Even France, which had been, together with Germany, one of the most conciliatory countries among the EEC during the years of the dictatorship, complained about a decrease in commercial relations with the Hellenic country, as stated in an internal note of the Foreign Office:

> *"nous pouvons également nous nous estimer mal récompensés de la discretion que nous avons observée de meme que les Allemands sur la question de l'accord d'association dont plusieurs de nos partenaires veulent le blocage"*[2].

While experiencing the escalation of violence on the island of Cyprus, the harshening of tensions with Turkey, and the open confrontation with President Makarios, the Greek government seemed to be losing all its traditional allies on the way.

### 5.4.2 NATO and the USA

As for the EEC ambassadors, after the 25th of November 1973, the US diplomats immediately understood that the real leader of the new government was Brigadier Ioannides. According to Ambassador Tasca, this was extremely worrying. In fact, given the strong nationalism which characterized the radical wing of the Junta and the Military Police, a "new course" in foreign relations could be expected, in which Greece would be less willing to accept advices on domestic issues, even from a traditional partner like the US. Additionally, the authoritarian turn that would certainly follow the coup, could bring the already existing popular dissatisfaction with the Junta to the surface, and present an opportunity for the different opposition factions to unite in one front[3]. The predictions made by Ambassador Tasca seemed to be confirmed by the first public speech by

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[1] Entretien avec le président Makarios, communiqué by the French ambassador in Cyprus Alain Chaillous to the French Foreign Office, Nicosia, February 15th 1974, in CADN, 48 PO/B 341 (Athènes), Doc. N° 73/EU.

[2] *Grèce,* note, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Direction Affaires Politique – Europe, S/Direction d'Europe Méridionale, Paris, April 8th, 1974, in CADN 48 PO/B 360 (Athènes).

[3] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, 26th November 1973, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 8.

Androutsopoulos (quoted previously), where he clearly stated that no recommendations of any kind would influence Greece anymore[1].

According to Tasca's overview of the new Greek asset, the recent changes within the internal balance of balance of the Armed Forces had brought medium-grade officers to power, who were not as reliable nor as expert as their predecessors. Moreover, they were "*reported to be intensively nationalistic*", and "*not particularly attracted to the notion of early political normalization via the reestablishment of constitutional government*"[2]. The US Ambassador was particularly worried about the fact that, after more than two months from their installation, the new government leaders still had no clear political nor economic program, and that they did not seem to be concerned about that[3]. Given all those preoccupying factors, and the feeling of anti-Americanism growing in Greece (where the population seemed to be convinced that the CIA was somehow involved in the countercoup of November 1973), by February 1974, Ambassador Tasca warned Kissinger that they should change their attitude towards Greece[4]. He explained to the Secretary of State that the regime in Greece was more unstable than ever, and that it was expected to last one year at longest. Therefore, according to him, the US should take a stance promoting the restoration of parliamentary rule in the country. Meanwhile, Tasca suggested to secretly get in contact with the leaders of the moderate opposition. This could allow the US to be in the position of keeping its special relationship with Greece also after the fall of the Junta[5]. Finally, the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean, constituted a further reason for the US to distance itself from the Junta. Despite the detailed motivation for a change that Tasca gave to Kissinger, he simply answered that he saw no reason why Washington should act differently with Greece than it did with all other military regimes in the world. More generally, he needed more time to

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[1] *Politique étrangère du nouveau gouvernement*, communiqué by the Ambassador in Athens C. De Margerie to the French Foreign Office, Athens, December 6th 1973, in CADN, 48 PO/B 352 (Athènes), Doc. N°888/EU.
[2] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, February 9th 1974, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 9.
[3] *Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State*, Athens, February 9th 1974, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 9
[4] Action Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of the State Kissinger, Washington, February 15th 1974, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 10.
[5] *Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Regional Staff Meeting*, Washington, March 20th 1974, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 12.

think how to act in that specific situation[1]. Some of reasons of concern related exclusively to US domestic affairs, while others were shared with the Allies.

During the Brussels NAC meeting of December 1973 Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Canada openly denounced the dictators' failure to normalise the Greek political situation, as they had repeatedly promised in the past. Also Luns, who had always been primarily concerned with matter of defence, was now worried about Greece's military capability, deeply affected by the continuous purges since 1967[2]. Still, with the Americans and the British continuing to show their support for Greece within NATO, no formal decision against the regime was even considered. As Maragkou underlines, the attitude showed by the Americans and the British reflected the "Alliance's asymmetrical relationships", as they were not at all preoccupied about the lack of cohesion caused by the Scandinavians' opposition to the Greek membership, nor by the protestations now coming also from other allies[3].

A special report on the situation in the Mediterranean, and the aftermath of the Suez crisis was provided by March 1974 to the member states. The report covered a shorter period than usual, from December 1973 to March 1974. According to the document, after reaching a peak in November/December 1973, the Soviet marine presence had then returned to the pre-war level[4]. However, according to NATO authorities, the consolidation of their position in the Mediterranean continued to be a basic element of Soviets' policy. Additionally, the reopening of the Suez Canal was expected to improve the Soviet capacity to reinforce their naval presence also in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean, even though this would not alter the importance of the Mediterranean to them[5].

The deterioration in the relations was certainly monitored by the Allies, even though no record of discussion about the topic appears in the documentation of this period. By mid-December 1973, the Secretary General had presented his usual annual report on the relations between Greece and Turkey, and had seemed quite positive and optimistic[6].

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[1] *Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Regional Staff Meeting*, Washington, March 20th 1974, in FRUS, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Doc. 12.
[2] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 182.
[4] *Report on the Situation In the Mediterranean. December 1973-March 1974* – note by the secretary general, March 22nd 1974, in NATO Archives, C-M(74)18.
[5] *Report on the Situation In the Mediterranean. December 1973-March 1974* – note by the secretary general, March 22nd 1974, in NATO Archives, C-M(74)18.
[6] Greek-Turkish Relations – Secretary General's Watching Brief, November 30th, 1973, in NATO Archives, PO(73)160.

The last explicit reference to the Greek regime before the crisis of 1974, was made by Denmark and the Netherlands, during the ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in June. The two representatives asked once again for all member states to respect the principles of liberty and democracy. This time, another important voice joined the ones of the Scandinavians and the Dutchs. Two months earlier, the Portoguese authoritarian regime had fallen. The new Foreign Minister, Mario Soares, at his first participation in a ministerial session, openly expressed astonishment that within the Alliance "regimes could continue to be accepted", even if they "respected neither the rights of men nor the rules of democracy which the Atlantic Alliance held sacred"[1]. This time the Greek representative did not answer[2]. As Pedaliu underlines, the Allies were increasingly worried by NATO's growing unpopularity, and by the damage to its image that the relation with the Greek dictators was causing[3]. At the meeting, all members agreed that the final *communiqué* included a statement that underlined the need to develop and improve the application of the principles of democracy, human rights, justice and social progress[4]. This was the last before the Junta collapsed.

## 5.5 Management of the Cyprus crisis

After Ioannidis launched the coup in Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios managed to get to the British Ambassy, which gave him protection. Two days after, he was escorted to London. Britain was obviously interested in avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey, and was also one of guarantors of the independence setting of the island. During the previous years, London had been supporting intercommunal talks, whilst at the same time highlighting the importance of the London Zurich Agreement, which guaranteed a special status to Britain with its military bases on the island[5]. After the countercoup orchestrated by Ioannides, the fear that the situation in Cyprus could precipitate had been

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[1] *Verbatim Record Of The Meeting Of The Council*, June 18th, 1974, in NATO Archives, C-VR(74)28-PART_1/ C-VR(74)28-PART_2/ C-VR(74)28-PART_3.
[2] *Verbatim Record Of The Meeting Of The Council*, June 18th, 1974, in NATO Archives, C-VR(74)28-PART_1/ C-VR(74)28-PART_2/ C-VR(74)28-PART_3.
[3] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[4] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.
[5] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019

one of the reason why London decided not to question diplomatic recognition to the new government[1]. According to British Ambassador in Athens, Hooper, some of the new military leaders had records of past link with Grivas. Moreover, the repeated purges within the army of the recent years had seriously compromised the Greek Army's efficiency. In such a situation, with nationalistic and ultra-conservatives new leaders at the guide of the Army, the possibility that moral exhortation coming from abroad may produce violent reactions had been seriously envisaged by the British diplomacy. Hence, the decision not to interrupt relations with the regime, even though the British officers were no optimistic about its future. Such concerns had then been increased by the escalation of tension over the exploitation of the Aegean oil. Concerned with the possibility of a war, Britain had become more active: firstly, by urging Turkey to be more tolerant with Greece, for the sake of the stability of the West[2]. Then, by turning to the American partner, asking to urge caution both to Greece and Turkey. At first, Kissinger had declined the request, stating that it was not necessary[3]. As already mentioned, he was probably too occupied with the pressing domestic problems following the Watergate scandal and failed to recognize that the threat in the Mediterranean was imminent.

In fact, in July, when the crisis spread and the possibility of a war between members of the Atlantic Alliance became apparent, Kissinger dispatched the Under-Secretary Sisco to the region as a mediator. However, the attempt was a failure: while in Ankara his offer was refused by the government, in Athens Sisco could find no one to talk with, since the Junta was collapsing[4]. On that occasion, the "neutral" attitude taken by the USA, tending to mediation, had the effect of favouring *de facto* the stronger contender: Turkey. In fact, without any diplomatic and military support from the US, Greece was completely prevented by the Turkish Army.

The Turkish invasion, ordered by Ankara with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, soon became an actual occupation of some areas of the island. Great

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[1] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, p. 180.
[2] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019, pp. 180-182.
[3] Maragkou K., Britain, *Greece and the Colonels, 1967-1974. Between Pragmatism and Human Rights*, Hurst & Co., London, 2019
[4] Joseph S. J., "International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem", in Independent Cyprus 1960-2010. Selected Readings", edited by Hubert Faustmann and Emilios Solomou, published by University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 2011, pp. 95-118.

Britain immediately called for a meeting with the other two "guarantor" powers, Turkey and Greece, with the aim of discussing possible conditions for a cease-fire. Differently from the US, this time the EEC took a strong and unitarian position, through a declaration voted by the Council of Ministers. This asked the two contenders to apply a ceasefire, to collaborate fully with the UN authorities in order to re-establish peace in Cyprus, and to allow the restoration of the constitutional order on the island[1]. Moreover, the Council of Ministers stated that, despite Turkey being called as well to collaborate on the resolution to the crisis, the major responsibility of its outbreak was to be attributed to the Greek Military Regime (not to Greece *per se)*[2].

Ioannides' attempt to finally gain some support by a spectacular action such as the annexation of Cyprus failed, both when the US declared their neutrality, and, mostly, when the Armed Forces decided to ask him to step back, and to call for Karamanlis' intervention. The former Prime Minister, who had spent the entire period of the Junta's rule in self-exile in Paris, responded immediately. On the 24th of July 1974, he flew back to Athens on a plane provided by the French President, and his personal friend, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The Military Regime in Greece finally ended on that day[3].

Of course, the NATO institutions followed the crisis day by day, but they were exclusively concerned with the possibility of a war between two member states. The aforementioned feeling of anti-Americanism, and, progressively, anti-Atlantism in the country exacerbated in August when, during the second invasion launched by Turks, Karamanlis appealed to the Alliance and, as an answer, was told that almost all the Allies could not be disturbed because they were on vacation. As a sign of protest against the US and Western attitudes, Karamanlis decided to withdraw the Greek Armed Forces from the NATO integrated military structure[4]. As Karamouzi underlined, "a cleavage in Greek political culture developed where the right was projected representing the post-civil war system; one which lacked legitimacy and was associated with American infiltration"[5]. The collaboration between the Junta and the US administration had already

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[1] *Cooperation politique Chypre*, Criculaire N° 498, Paris, 23rd July, 1974, in CADN, 48 PO/B 3 (40 Athènes).
[2] *Role joué par les Neufs dans la crise de Chypre*, code telegram, to Diplomatie Paris, Ankara, July 22nd 1974, in CADN 48PO/B 340 (Athènes).
[3] *Dèpart de M. Karamanlis pour Athènes*, code telegram, Paris, July 24th 1974, in CADN 48PO/B 340 (Athènes).
[4] Chourchoulis D., Kourkouvelas, L., "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War", in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 12, n. 4, 497-514.
[5] Karamouzi E., "Negotiating the American Presence in Greece: Bases, Security and National Sovereignty", in The International History Review, 2021, pp. 1-16.

reinforced this cleavage and had exacerbated the need to emancipate from the US patronage, but the double Turkish invasion of 1974 was probably *the* turning point. In fact, the decision to withdraw from the NATO integrated military command was immediately followed, in 1975, by the decision to renegotiate the US military bases on Greek soil[1].

Conversely, the British aid to Archbishop Makarios, the close collaboration between Karamanlis and the French government (which would continue during the following years of transition to democracy), and the unitarian stance of the EEC on the Cyprus fights constituted the final steps of a process of a progressive rapprochement with Europe. The fact that this rapprochement coincided with a distancing from the traditional partner, the US, was probably attributable also to the fact that Washington was facing the most acute time of the Watergate scandal crisis. Even though the US surely considered the Mediterranean region to be crucial for the stability of the Atlantic Alliance, Kissinger probably believed that his position was too weak to risk international initiatives which could cause further diminish public opinion towards him in the US[2].

So, even though the shifting of Greece from the Atlantic to the European partner was not in any way orchestrated by the US or the EEC, it could be inferred that their respective actions towards the Junta caused this shift, and more generally influenced each other during the seven years of the military rule in Greece. As Pedaliu underlines, after Karmanlis withdrawing Greece from the NATO integrated military forces, the European Community became "the anchor with which to steady Greece's pro-Western orientation"[3]. The identification between NATO and the United States, and between the United States and the regime (which has been mentioned many times in this work) increased anti-NATO and anti-American feelings also in some of those who in 1967 were NATO's supporters[4]. In fact, somehow, in 1974 (and for the years to come) the EEC did fill the gap that Washington had left, even though at a political and economic level, and not military.

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[1] Karamouzi E., "Negotiating the American Presence in Greece: Bases, Security and National Sovereignty", in The International History Review, 2021, pp. 1-16.
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[4] Pedaliu E. G. H., "A discordant Note: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-1974", Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, n. 1, 2009, pp. 101-120.

# Conclusion

For many reasons, the Greek Junta constitutes for an *unicum* in history of international relations. Even though it shared some characteristics with the authoritarian regimes of Spain and Portugal, they still differ. In fact, as underlined in the introduction, Portugal entered in the NATO Alliance as an authoritarian regime, while had no direct link with the EEC until the mid 1970s, when the regime collapsed, and Lisbon applied for a full membership. Spain, instead, was not a member of the EEC nor of NATO for the entire period of the Franco regime. Another element which makes the Greek case unique was the extreme importance of Greece's geo-strategic position in the years of the Colonels' rule. Bordering with communists countries, close to the Middle East, where the growing hostilities between Israel and the Arabs concerned the US and the Soviets for different reasons, and, equally important, bordering with Turkey, eternal rival but also NATO ally of Greece. Additionally, the years from 1967 to 1974 constituted a period of changes in the Western countries, with the first enlargement of the European Community, and the initial stages of détente between the East and the West.

One of the elements which emerges the most from this research, is the importance of this unique Greek position in shaping international attitudes towards the Junta. NATO had a general approach of not interfering in its members' domestic affairs, some Allied countries questioned the Greek membership. These were the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands, the same countries who had led the fight against Greece within the Council of Europe. However, as emerges from this work, the Greek case was never brought on the NATO agenda as an official item. This was mainly due to the mediation of the strongest partner of Greece, the United States, who was also supported by the British. According to them, questioning the Greek position within the Alliance (as it had been done with the membership to the Council of Europe) would have not only weakened the cohesion of the Alliance, but also left a "gap" which the Soviets could have tried to fill. The Colonels, from their part, proved to be well aware of their country's relevance to defense and deterrence within the Atlantic Allies, and were able to exploit this position. The same cannot be said for the EEC and the Council of Europe.

The difference in the nature of Greece's relationships with the EEC and NATO also implied a difference in the attitude of these international bodies towards the Junta and vice-versa. While within the Atlantic Alliance the Junta could exploit Greece's fundamental role in order to avoid excessive criticism from its Allies, the situation within

the EEC institutions (and even more the Council of Europe) was different. In fact, while NATO was primarily concerned with strategic, military, and defensive issue, the EEC institutions had mainly economic and commercial links with Athens. This does not mean that when linking the EEC with Greece through the Association Agreement, the Six had no strategic consideration in mind. As outlined in the first paragraph, in the specific case of Greece the association agreement was intended as a transitional step towards full membership. This implied that the relationship between Greece and the EEC had a political connotation, and that the EEC was willing to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean. However, the Treaty of Athens did not contain any military clause nor engagement. Therefore, considerations of military and defensive nature were not at the core of EEC institutions' debates over Greece after the military coup in 1967. Conversely, Greece could not leverage its importance for defense with the EEC as it did with NATO. As a consequence of that, the position adopted by the EEC was, from the very beginning, completely different from those of NATO and the US. In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 coup, the European Parliament and Commission agreed upon the decision to suspend any further developing of the association process, limiting their role to manage the current issues, and they never changed their position up to the fall of the military rule. This does not mean that no divergencies manifested within the EEC members, or the EEC different institutions. As underlined in the introduction, the documents analysed in this study releaved how active the Joint Association Commission was in promoting initiatives within the EEC institutions aimed at investigating what was really happening in Greece, and subsequently taking a severe stance against the Junta, to the point of proposing to unilaterally denounce the Treaty of Athens. This proposition was considered by the Commission, which charged a legal commission to study the Greek case. In the end, it was concluded that denouncing the Treaty would not have been legal. However, from the documentation emerges that, around 1969, two main "lines" had delineated within the EEC. A more sever one, supporting the a complete break with Greece, which was mainly composed by Socialist and Communist members of the European Parliament. And a more "soft" one, which advocated for a moderate attitude towards the Greek regime. According to the supporters of the latter, it was necessary to maintain contact with Athens, in order to be ready to facilitate a sspeedy transition to democracy as soon as possible. Despite the suspension of the association, and the shared condemnation of the regime by all EEC institutions, it was the second line which prevailed in the facts.

While the Treaty of Athens did not provide legal ground to cut ties with Greece completely, the Council of Europe had no such impediment. Being an international body with a specific function in monitoring and promoting the respect of human rights throughout its member countries, the Council of Europe was certainly entitled to take action against the Colonels. As repeatedly stated in this work, the initiative was taken by the Scandinavian countries. However, with a number of reports repeatedly showing escalating disrespect for basic human rights in Greece and exposing the systematic use of torture on political prisoners, every member of the Council of Europe eventually aligned on the possibility of expelling Greece if the regime would not stop these abuses. The attitude of the Council of Europe had an influence on EEC institutions, even if the latter could not "expel" Greece. However, the comparison between the acting of the Council of Europe, the EEC, and NATO also showed how differently the same countries could behave when seated in different organizations. For example, Great Britain, while feeling forced to finally pronounce for Greece's expulsion from the Council of Europe, repeatedly advocated against bringing the Greek issue to the fore within NATO. And later on, when the British joined the EEC as an official member state, Greece seemed to expect a mediation from the British in her favor to restore the association process. However, the British decided not to do so because they recognized their position within the Nine as still too weak to take such an initiative.

Considering all the above, it can be argued that the countries who behaved most consistently were the Scandinavians. In fact, they adopted the same line in every organization to which they belonged. The same could be said for the United States, even if they had a complete opposite stance towards Greece. Indeed, they never hide that they would prefer an authoritarian but stable and reliable regime, than a leftist and unreliable democratic government. The strong anti-communist stance of the Colonels corresponded with the Atlatic Alliance's interests. And in fact, NATO *de facto* ignored the political changes occurred in Greece after the 1967 coup, considering them as merely domestic issue. Washington had the same approach, but repeatedly tried to convince Papadopoulos and the other Junta leaders that it was necessary to show some signs of democratization, in order to avoid too harsh criticism from abroad. Signs of democratization and liberalization were also necessary for the American Administration to justify its tolerant attitude towards the Junta with the internal opposition and public opinion.

Another crucial point emergin from this thesis is the importance given by NATO to the evolution of Greek-Turkish relations, especially concerning Cyprus. From NATO's

perspective, the worst possible scenario was that those two members could come to a direct confrontation, which the Soviets could exploit. Given that NATO's main priority was to maintain unity and stability within the Alliance in order to fulfill its defensive aims, it seems that any government in Greece was acceptable, as long as it was reliable and committed to the Western cause. To this extent, the Junta was able to choose representatives to the NATO institutions who had been diplomats, or former politicians, and therefore gave the impression of professionality and reliability. The NATO's concerns were shared by the US (and, of course, also by Great Britain, who had direct interest in Cyprus). Relations between Turkey and Greece were considered so important that American officials repeatedly intervened in Greek affairs.

No evidence had ever been provided of a US participation in the coup organization. However, what emerges from the analysis of the Foreign Office documentation is that Washington considered to be preferable a Greek government, albeit military, which proved to be faithful to the Alliance's cause, than a democratic, but unreliable one. In fact, while probably not expecting a military coup, in 1967 the US shared the military concern about a possible triumph of Papandreou at the May election. For these reasons, American diplomats tried to help the Junta to improve its public image, and supported the Greek government within international organizations such as NATO, and the Council of Europe. In fact, while the US was not a member of the Council, it favored the British policy towards the Greek case, which was to avoid until the very last minute to pronounce in favor of expulsion. Moreover, in November 1967, while a crisis was about to bring Greece and Turkey to an open conflict over Cyprus, the US sent a mediator (in addition to the NATO Secretary General) to convince all parties that it was necessary to avoid a war. It was probably this close involvement in Greek political affairs that contributed to generate a feeling of intolerance towards American interference among the Greek people, starting from the 1970s and culminating in Greece's withdrawing from NATO integrated forces in the summer of 1974. At the time, it was widely believed that the Americans had had a direct involvement in orchestrating the 1967 coup. As a consequence of that, an noticing that the Junta was weakening Washington started "disengaging" with Greece. This is shown by the decreasing number of letters from Washington to the Embassy in Greece, and also by the diminished attention that President Nixon accorded to the Greek issues. Documents in this thesis addressed the subject in detail. However, it is worth highlighting that this slow but continuous deterioration between the Junta and the US, corresponded to some attempts by the Greek

government to re-approach the European Community. In fact, after a few years of economic stability due to the results of the social and economic reforms implemented in the 1960s, and to the effects of the first years of association, by 1972 the Greek economy was stagnating. Given that the Junta completely lacked a coherent program of development and economy, restoring the association activities became urgent. With the first enlargement, and the following decision to adapt the Association Agreement by simply adding a protocol to extend the Treaty of Athens to new members, Greece understood that the situation would not change without some real steps towards democratization. To this extent, the events that followed the 1973 referendum on the monarchy, ()i.e. the political amnesty, the formation of a government led by a traditional politician as Markezinis, the abolition of martial law), were all aimed at pleasing the European countries and convincing them to reconsider the status of the association process. From their part, the Nine seemed to show some timid optimism, even though they were aware that those initiatives were aimed at having the Treaty reactivated. Still, if free elections would have been organized as promised by Papadopoulos, the situation could have really changed. These hopes were vanished after the Polytechnic riots and the counter-coup orchestrated by Ioannidis that followed. As showed by the definition given from Europeans Diplomats to the new governments ("government of shadows"), and by the skepticism showed by the American Ambassador, it can be argued that from the very beginning the majority of Western countries had the impression that the new regime would have not last long. However, the disengagement from the "patronage" of the US started in the 1970s, and the progressive rapprochement with the European Community would continue after the collapse of the regime, and culminated during the period of transition to democracy, which was also the period of negotiations for full membership to the EEC.

The considerations above help address the first question: did the EEC and NATO influence each other in shaping their attitudes towards the Military Regime in Greece? The answer is evidently complex. However, there are some interrelated factors which seems having influenced the two organizations. Firstly, the EEC was in the condition to adopt a more severe attitude towards Greece *also* because it benefitted from NATO's military protection to external dangers, and so had not to take defence considerations into account; if it was legally possible, maybe the EEC could have taken even more severe actions, such as unilaterally denouncing the Treaty of Athens. However, there was no unanimity on this matter. Moreover, such an irreversible decision would have

been at odds with the fact that no one within the EEC nation members questioned diplomatic recognition to Greece, nor interrupt bilateral contacts. Conversely, the NATO institutions could not ignore geo-strategic, military, and defense implications of any actions they could take. Despite the fact that many Allies criticized the Colonels when in other *fora*, such as the Council of Europe or the EEC, when dealing with defense concern Greece was recognized as a pillar of the Southern Flank of the Alliance. Therefore, not only was Greece's membership to the Alliance left unquestioned, but when the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean started to be considered a real threat, an increase in external aid to Greece and Turkey was also approved by the Council (even though with Denmark and Norway dissociating themselves). The documents also showed that NATO and the EEC did refer to each other when discussing the issue. Concerning the EEC, many members of the EP claimed that they should not take the risk to be associated with the "tolerant" attitude towards the Junta shown by the Americans and by NATO. Conversely, the NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio and his successor, Joseph Luns, repeated many times their concern that what was happening between Greece and the EEC, and mostly between Greece and the Council of Europe, could have weaken Greece's position within the Alliance. This concern was shared by the American Administration, especially by President Nixon, who harshly criticized the attitude of the Western European government (as reported in this thesis). Many argued that the EEC's condemnation of the military junta was more of a symbolic stance, rather than a concrete one. This was due mostly to the lack of coherence between the actions of the Community as a whole, and those of the constituent member states, which in some cases kept promoting bilateral commercial and economic relations with the Greek government. This contradiction was used by both supporters of the "severe" and "soft" lines in their arguments. However, as the concern of NATO leaders and American Officials showed, the position taken by the EEC was far from having no political consequences. Firstly, it constituted the first time that human rights and democracy were officially affirmed as requisites for membership. Additionally, the economic consequences of the "freezing" of further developments of the Association Agreement did have a role in convincing Papadopoulos to implement some liberalization initiatives during the 1970s.

Finally, public opinion had probably contributed in shaping the various positions. Both American and European public opinion seemed to condemn the means used by the Junta but, while in the US this translated more into an "electoral" issue (especially after

the election of Nixon, who was able convince the Junta that they should improve their public image) in Europe protests against the Colonels were widespread, especially in France and Italy (where they were linked with the social riots of 1968). Moreover, it was from the Western European countries that Greek personalities such as Andreas Papandreou, Costantinos Karamanlis, the King, and many intellectuals and artists raised their voices against the Greek dictatorship. Organization of resistance were created in many countries and, even if they did not manage to organize mass protestations in Greece, they still pressured their national government to take a stance against the Greek regime. In Europe, it was common idea that the US was somehow involved in the organization of the Greek coup, and this probably influenced the EEC members, who wanted to publicly differentiate themselves from the Americans. Conversely, during the last months of the Junta, the US felt that Greek people were no longer willing to receive their help, and that a feeling of anti-Americanism was negatively impacting relations between Washington and the Athens. In addition, they were concerned that the last government, led by the ultra-nationalist Brigadier Ioannidis, could have taken an anti-Atlantic stance, if not fully supported by the US in its policies. Therefore, Washington decided to reduce its commitment in Greek domestic affairs, as the neutral position taken during the 1974 crisis testifies. As discussed, this corresponded to a period in which the EEC, encouraged by some signs coming from the short parenthesis of the Markezinis government, became timidly optimistic about the evolution of the situation in Greece, and therefore the possibility to reactivate the association. The counter-coup of 1973 and the crisis in Cyprus in 1974 constituted a breaking point. While the US refused to directly intervene in favor of Greece, remaining outside of the conflict, the EEC tried to take a unified stance by condemning the Greek initiative and asking for a ceasefire. The readiness of Karamanlis to fly back to his country by a presidential air-plane offered by his friend, the French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing, testifies that the "Karamanlis' solution" had been considered in Western circles for a while. Meanwhile, Great Britain offered its protection to Cyprus' President Makarios who, managed to fly to London from the British Embassy in Cyprus, would remain in Great Britain until the situation would calm down. After the return of Karamanlis, during the summer of 1974 the invasion of the Turkish troops became occupation of a portion of the Cyprus island. After being ignored by his NATO Allies when asking for help, Karamanlis decided to withdrawn from the integrated military forces. This was the culmination of the disengagement process between Greece and the US (and consequently NATO) that was

mentioned previously. For the onwards, Karamanlis would look mainly at the EEC as a partner to support the process of transition to democracy and, when successfully ending the negotiations for full membership, we would complete the process started during the 1960s with the Association Agreement.

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- Fond: **Ambassade Athènes**

**CoE (**Council of Europe**),** and **ECHR (**European Commission on Human Rights**)** digital documents:

- The Greek Case at the Council of Europe – Report of the Sub-Commission, Volume 1. Containing:
  Application n. 3321/67 – Denmark v. Greece;
  Application n. 3322/67 – Norway v. Greece;
  Application n. 3323/67 – Sweden v. Greece;
  Application n. 3344/67 – Netherland v. Greece;

**FRUS** (Foreign Relations US), digital archives:

- 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey
- 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean (1969-1972)
- 1973-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey.

**HAEU** (Historical Archives of the European Union), in Fiesole (European University Institute), Italy:

- **EM** (Edoardo Martino)
- **PEO** (*Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne Et Parlement Européen Avant L'élection Directe*).

- **CEUE** (European Commission)
  Fonds: SEGE (Secretariat General);
- **CM2** (Conseil Des Ministres CEE et EURATOM – until 1967); (Council of the European Communities from 1968).
  Fonds: CM2/1967; CM2/1968; CM2/1969; CM2/1970; CM2/1971; CM2/1972; CM2/1973;
- **BEI** (Banque Européenne d'Investissment)
  Sub-fond: EIB Studies; Code-Pays: GR (Grèce)
  BEI-3060, "Grèce: situation économique et financière 1967-1974"

**NATO** archives, Brussels:

- **MC** (Military Committee)

Serie IMSWM (International Military Staff Working Memorandum)

- **NAC 01** (North Atlantic Council)

Subfond C (Council)

Subfond DPC (Defence Planning Committee)

- **SG** (Secretary General fond)

Subfond PO (Private Office of the Secretary General)

## Other documents (digital version)

- Full text of the Treaty of Rome of 1957
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