



PhD Program in Political Theory, Political History and Political Science

**Changing Nature of Competition in the Weak Party System of Hybrid Regime in
Pakistan**

Ph.D. Candidate: Muhammad Salman

Supervisor: Prof. Lorenzo De. Sio

Abstract

Pakistan as different post-colonial states had experienced three military rules till 2008 since its inception in 1947. During and in between different military rule political parties did not cease to exist barring few. These parties have been engaged in a contentious competition among each other that has paved the way for different military rules. After the end of last military rule in 2008 Pakistan had gone through three consecutive elections with three different parties gaining majority. During this period the nature of competition has been oscillating between contentious and cooperative forms. This dissertation combines the theoretical traditions of hybrid regimes and party-system institutionalization to explain the changing political dynamics of Pakistan. Case of Pakistan is analyzed with reference to configurative approach of Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) in linkage with the concept of party-system institutionalization (PSI), proposed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). It is proposed that in the presence of current degree of PSI in Pakistan, hybridity of the regime will persist.

Key words: Hybrid regime, Party-system Institutionalization, Competition, Party Rootedness, Tutelary Interference

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Changing Nature of Competition in the Weak Party System of Hybrid Regime of Pakistan

A. Introduction

On 10 July 2017, a five-member bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan disqualified Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the charges of asset concealment. The country's apex anti-corruption body, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), was also directed to prepare references against the Prime Minister's children (Dsouza, 2017). It is not the first time that Sharif has failed to complete his tenure. Earlier, he was twice dismissed by the President and by a military coup during the 1990s. During the first democratic government after 2007, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was also de-seated on contempt of court charges. The court punished him for non-compliance of its order to formally request the Swiss authorities to furnish asset details of the then President Asif Ali Zardari (Daily Dawn, June 19, 2012)ⁱ. Their respective parties continued to rule, and the parliaments completed their tenures, whereas this was not the case in the 1990s. The recent disqualification of Nawaz Sharif was followed by an active narrative-building campaign from his party, which nearly accused the Supreme Court of dismissing a sitting PM in collusion with the military establishment.

Pakistan's military has directly and indirectly intervened in the country's politics (Paul, 2014; Talbot; 2017). Four military regimes have usurped power since the country's inception in 1947. The civilian governments of the 1970s and 1990s either ended through a military coup or by the plotting of military and opposition parties against incumbents. However, since 2008, one civilian government did not only complete its tenure, but a relatively smooth transfer of power to another civilian government also took place (Adeney, 2017). Numerous factors contributed to this transition. One crucial determinant is the growth of electronic media, which has strengthened the element of media pluralism, even though the media is not entirely free. A second factor is the stronger role the judiciary has assumed following the later stages of the Musharraf regime, wherein a massive lawyers' movement regarding the restoration of dismissed judges also strengthened the civil society in Pakistan (Belokrenisky and Moskalenko, 2013). A

third important factor, which is the focus of this research, is the changing dynamics of the party system in Pakistan.

The nature of the party system during the civilian rule in the 1970s and 1990s was highly contentious and further weakened by severe trust deficit among competing political parties. This changed after Pakistan's major political parties (the PPP and PML-N), which were at loggerheads during the 1990s (Weinbaum, 1996), adopted the policy of increased cooperation and conciliation. The 20th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 2010 ensured the neutrality of the Election Commission of Pakistan and the National Accountability Bureau by granting constitutional protection to the heads of both offices. Nevertheless, it has not resulted in the consolidation of democracy; instead, Pakistan remains a hybrid regime due to various factors. The military still has a significant say in foreign policy, the rule of law is weak, the neutrality of the bureaucracy is absent due to a culture of patronage and the institutions of horizontal accountability are far from perfect (Shah, 2014). This dissertation aims at understanding the nature of the hybrid regime in Pakistan from the lens of party system institutionalization. In so doing, it claims that Pakistan's transition towards democracy is strongly linked to the nature and quality of party-system institutionalization. The more party system is institutionalized along democratic lines, the more democracy will strengthen in Pakistan.

B. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This dissertation aims at employing middle-range theories to explain the phenomenon of the hybrid regime in the context of Pakistan. It has two theoretical dimensions. First, it tries to establish Pakistan as a hybrid regime. For this purpose, the proposed research will use the concept of "linking with past" proposed by Morlino (2008). He suggests understanding the dynamics of any hybrid regime by focusing on the elements it carries of the former government. A previous regime can be authoritarian or minimal democracy. Morlino (2008) also emphasizes the aspect of the "sustainability" of that regime. He suggests that the supposed hybrid regime should be in existence for almost a decade. This dissertation also incorporates the idea of the "Configurative Approach" put forth by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011). This approach explains the hybrid regime as a combination of two components—first, the democratic element of electoral

competitiveness. Second, the undemocratic components of unfair competition, as well as the presence of tutelary bodies. It proposes a multi-dimensional conceptual framework to explain the complexity and specificity of hybrid regimes. This approach argues for using three dimensions of competitiveness, tutelary interference, and civil liberties to standardize the definition of hybrid regimes.

The second theoretical dimension links party system institutionalization with the phenomenon of the hybrid regime. This approach is preferable to analyze the possibilities of transition (if there are any) to democracy. Party system institutionalization (PSI) framework proposed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) remains central to the discussion in this research. Their idea of PSI revolves around four major areas of party system which are patterns of party competition in terms of stability, rootedness of parties by means of party identification, monopoly of parties in terms of representation and internal structure of parties and existence or absence of hierarchies within the party. They suggest that an unstable party system consisting of parties without substantive roots in the society negatively impacts the quality of democracy. Moreover, if non-party actors continue to be elected in a significant number and parties remain an instrument of maximization of interests of few personalities then the trust of people erodes from democracy in terms of delivering their mutual interests. Hicken and Kuhonta (2011), while discussing institutionalization in Asia, proposed analyzing the party system in the context of historical legacy. This approach suggests that four factors should be taken into consideration while analyzing any party system. These include the historical duration of electoral politics, the period when electoral politics was introduced, the role of the party system in promoting party affiliation, and the impact of previous authoritarian regime on the current party system. This research aims at analyzing the current party system of Pakistan in its historical context. A historical-comparative analysis of the party system of the 1970s, 1990s, and post-2007 will be done to highlight the differences and highlight areas of improvement in the current party system.

C. State of the Art

i. Hybrid Regimes

After the cold war, in the 1990s, we witnessed political transformation in several countries in terms of increased competitiveness in their political system. This phenomenon is known as the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). The fact is many of these countries remained far from meeting even the minimal criterion of democracy (Binder, Francois, & Trebbi, 2014). These countries hold multi-party elections and form legislative bodies, such as the parliament; however, they do not move beyond this step to strengthen the democratic process. Due to this similarity, they are classified as one single type of regime, i.e., hybrid regime. Nevertheless, these are a diverse group of countries that differ on various accounts regarding their deviation from democratic principles. The faltering rule of law, electoral fraud, weak institutions of accountability, infringement of civil rights, and the role of extra-parliamentary forces such as the military are some of the issues which qualify them to be labeled as hybrid regimes. But not all the hybrid regimes lack in all these areas. Some struggle in terms of civil-military relations, while others have weak mechanisms of accountability.

Over the years, scholars have come up with different typologies and labels for such regimes. Zakariya (1997) proposed a new classification of "illiberal democracy" for such regimes that observe just a single aspect of democracy, i.e., elections. In most cases, the fairness of these elections comes under question. He proposes that western democracy is not the final destiny; instead, these illiberal democracies are growing in number and will eventually endanger the exclusive legitimacy of western democracy. O' Donnell (1994) analyzes the political systems of various Latin American countries by labeling them as "delegative democracy." He explains that these are such democracies where the incumbent is bound just by the constitutionally determined term of his tenure and nothing else. He rules the country as he deems suitable. Merkel (2004) introduced the category of "defective democracies." Also added were further sub-classifications of the exclusive, illiberal, domain, and tutelary democracies to capture various defects in these democracies. Diamond (2002) argues that "pseudo-democracies" exist because the ruling elite of such regimes wants to gain some legitimacy to their rule. Still, they do so only

in the procedural sense of democracy. Apart from holding elections (with questionable credibility), these regimes do not reflect any other elements of democracy.

Some scholars, instead of using the adjective of democracy, employ authoritarianism to explain these regimes. Levitsky and Way (2002) consider these regimes as diminished sub-types of authoritarianism instead of democracy. They believe that electoral authoritarianism differs from full-scale democracy because of the absence of a level-playing field for the opposition parties. They differ from full-scale authoritarian regimes because instead of banning the opposition and critics, they use state resources and institutions to harass them. Schedler (2006) introduces the concept of electoral authoritarianism and explains it as a regime in which opposition exists and manages to win the seats in elections. Though held under universal suffrage, the violation of democratic principles is so widespread (in the form of electoral fraud, manipulation of laws, and repression of opposition) that merely conducting elections does not qualify as any form of democracy. Diamond (2002) suggests that three elements are essential to distinguish between competitive electoral authoritarian and hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes. These are a percentage of legislative seats of the ruling party, percentage of the votes, and the number of years of the ruler being in power. Those regimes where elections are nothing but a façade, ruling party, and candidates gain more than 95 percent votes and remain in power for a more extended period. A shift from competitive authoritarian to hegemonic authoritarian can be claimed based on a significant decline in the percentage of votes of the incumbent as happened in the case of Zimbabwe in 2000 (Ibdi, p.32).

These classifications are problematic in two ways. First, while using the adjectives of democracy and authoritarianism, they give the impression of these regimes as regimes in the transition to either direction. They do not recognize the inherent stability of such regimes. Morlino (2008), while acknowledging the potential of transition in specific hybrid regimes, shows with the help of the classification of Freedom House, about partially free regimes from the period of 1991–2006 that 38 regimes remained stable out of 87 for fifteen years. He suggests that it is because of the frozen dynamics of institutions that prevented either of the transitions. This frozen state

is due to a deadlock between "veto players" and the democratic elite. Neither of them can attain enough decisive power to determine the future course of transformation of the regime. Hence, the result is stable hybrid regimes. Morlino (2009) argues that three primary institutions of democracy must be scrutinized to classify a regime as a hybrid regime. These are elections, competing parties, and media pluralism. The minimal criterion of democracy is considered to have been met if elections are transparent, parties are free to compete with each other, and people have access to different sources of information. A lacking of any of these elements disqualifies the regime from being claimed as democratic. Some other classification is required for this. He defines a hybrid regime in linkage with its previous regime, which can be an authoritarian or even a minimal democracy. It should be persistent for about a decade and carry some aspects of its predecessor, but not all.

Secondly, these classifications give similar descriptions of these regimes by merely changing the adjectives. Bogaards (2009) criticizes the one-root strategy of the proponents of defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism and proposes a double-root approach. He claims that ideal-types of exclusive, illiberal, domain, and delegative democracies do not exist; instead, what exists is a mix of all or some of these ideal-types. He further claims that the boundaries between electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracy are too blurred to qualify the classification of electoral authoritarianism as reliable. Due to this conceptual confusion, there seems to be a lack of clarity among different scholars to classify different states. For instance, some countries are classified as both defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism by various authors. Bogaards suggest that his double-root strategy will help integrate the research about that grey area between democracy and authoritarianism. For this purpose, a clear list of the criterion is to be developed to place the countries on a spectrum having consolidated democracies and authoritarianism at extreme ends. Moreover, the focus should be on the specific defects of the democratic process instead of factors leading to possible consolidation of democracy. The proposed dissertation will stick with the term hybrid regime to avoid conceptual confusion while explaining the political system of Pakistan.

Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) also argue along similar lines. They suggest that understanding hybrid regimes as a variant of democracy and authoritarianism does not do justice with the uniqueness of hybrid regimes. They contend that every regime should not be explained in the context of other regimes rather based on its peculiar features. They propose a configurative approach while highlighting three main elements of hybrid regimes. These are the level of competitiveness, the role of tutelary forces, and the status of civil liberties. Competitiveness and civil liberties are also a central feature of democracies, but the hybrid regime differs in terms of both its nature and extent. Similar is the case of tutelary forces, which are a prominent feature of some authoritarian regimes, but in the context of hybrid regimes, their role is relatively limited. Therefore, they propose that hybrid regimes should be analyzed as a separate form of regime instead of using the adjectives of authoritarianism and democracy.

The stability of these hybrid regimes is due to various reasons. For instance, the hybrid regimes of the Caucasian region are due to the existence of an influential culture of clientelism in these regimes, as observed by Wheatley and Zürcher (2008). Following the divergent paths taken by nine south-eastern European states after the end of the Cold War, Alexander (2008) proposed that the impact of state capacity, the strength of the opposition, and international influence should be taken together to analyze the stability and transition of different hybrid regimes. Another observation suggests that the stability of a hybrid regime is determined mainly by the political culture of the regime. If the political culture lacks the consensus on the democratic process being the only way to gain power and channel demands, this uncertainty on the part of the ruling elite and masses contributes to the stability of the hybrid regime. One crucial aspect of this line of argument suggests that people mainly feel attached to the idea of democracy but are not aware of its specific components. Due to this, their attachment to the ideals of democracy remains entirely rhetorical and shallow and sometimes instrumental (Menocal, Fritz & Rakner, 2008). This research proposes the analyses of the party system and political parties as essential for the reasons mentioned above. Political parties are a fundamental institution of democracy, and their interaction with each other, with tutelary players and with their voters largely determines the stability of the hybrid regime or its transition to consolidated democracy.

ii. Party Systems and Political Parties

It is a widely agreed notion among scholars that political parties are the fundamental institution of democracy. They comprise the group of people interested in controlling state institutions utilizing contesting elections. All serious parties have a manifesto that provides a guideline for their candidates and gives the idea to the voters about their policy orientation. Some parties take extreme policy positions to mobilize a particular constituency to gather votes while other parties remain moderate or centrist in their approach to garner votes of social groups of diverse interests. While in government, they try to legislate and use executive powers as per their manifesto and demands of their constituencies (Ware, 1996). In opposition, their principal function is to hold the ruling party or coalition accountable and prevent abuse of executive powers. Execution of all these functions of political parties is highly dependent on the party system they operate within.

The party system encompasses patterns of interaction among different political parties. Sartori (2005) believes that to label any set of interactions as a system, it is necessary that the system contains properties that are independent of the features of its constituent parts. Moreover, it should display a clear pattern of interaction to determine the boundaries of the system. To comprehend the party system, one needs to grasp how different parties perceive each other and how those perceptions assess their policies. This understanding of the mutual perception of parties is essential because it largely determines the nature of the party system. Based on this perception, parties connect with different social groups and institutions of the state. They design their campaigns, devise slogans, train their rank and file, and formulate their bargaining strategies to secure power.

Powell (1982) contends that the strength of the party system plays a significant role in determining the performance of democracy. However, scholars disagree on what constitutes the strength of any party system. One group of thinkers contends that a robust party system should

have few strong parties, all capable of attaining majority but without taking extreme positions on the political spectrum. They suggest so to avoid the overwhelming dominance of any single party because it carries the danger of provoking violence. This type of system also helps in accommodating demands of different factions of society by being aggregative (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957). Yet another group believes that a system is stable when parties take precise positions on issues and mobilize citizens to rally around those issue-specific slogans. In this way, every group feels connected to the political process, and as a result, the system serves best to the interest of people, not the majority (Huntington, 1968; Epstein, 1967). Some scholars take the middle ground and support the two-party system, representing the center but having strong linkages with social groups (Shattschneider, 1940; Burns, 1963). However, competition remains an essential element of the party system. In hybrid regimes, competition takes place differently from stable and consolidated democracies. Political parties face a multi-dimensional competition in hybrid regimes where tutelary actors are influential and retain a significant say in policy making (Przeworski, 1988).

This situation can change if a big party emerges and manages to mobilize people on a massive plane. This massive popular support not only gives the party an overwhelming majority in the parliament but also allows it to confront tutelary forces from the position of strength, as happened in the case of Turkey (Geyikçi, 2014). Such transformation from a multi-party system to a dominant party system might strengthen the civilian position but not necessarily put the hybrid regime on the course of the transition. That prevailing party might take specific constitutional measures that enhances its position at the expense of the competitiveness of the party system (Musil, 2015). To reduce the threat of tutelary intervention, the major competing parties can also reach an agreement to dilute the contentiousness of the competition to some extent. Even this kind of situation does not necessarily guarantee the transition and might weaken the element of horizontal accountability. This element is discussed in the next section.

It is pertinent here to discuss the issue of party system institutionalization. Mainwaring and Scully (1995), emphasize the role of institutionalized party system for democratic consolidation. They

propose four indicators of institutionalization, which include stable inter-party competition, strong roots of parties in society, multi-party elections as the only legitimate rule in determining who will govern, and strong party structures with clearly defined rules. Also important to maintain is the distinction between institutionalization and democratic consolidation. Strong institutionalization may not lead to consolidation, as happened in the case of some Asian countries. Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) emphasize this element and propose a list of four variables that determine the institutionalization of the party system. First, for how long electoral politics has been the dominant game. Second, the timing of the introduction of electoral politics is critical because, in new democracies, universal suffrage did not come about as a result of prolonged political struggle. Instead, it was a given in their case. As a result, in new democracies, parties have to rely on different tools such as mass media to mobilize masses. Third, how much influence the previous authoritarian regime still has on the party system. Fourth, to what extent do electoral rules promote party affiliations and discourage non-party based electoral contestation?

Dalton and Weldon (2007) emphasize the role of party identification for strong institutionalization. For this purpose, a new democracy's party system should work in a way that will create conditions for reliable party identification. In new democracies, there is a weak social learning model because of the short span of the democratic process. Therefore, new voters don't receive such identification from their family or peer groups. Due to the advent of mass media, the monopoly of political parties over information received by voters has declined, and that has resulted in the weakening of party identification in established democracies as well. However, they believe that there is a potential in developing democracies of creating a culture of party identification. Therefore, the political elite must ensure the continuity of the democratic process.

D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

i. Case Study Method

The methodology of any research is essential to gather the temporally and spatially scattered data into a coherent and an intelligible whole. Case study method aims at investigating a spatially

and a temporally bounded unit through a theoretical and conceptual lens that has been used or can be used to investigate other units sharing some of its features. Commonality of the phenomena under investigation of separately investigated units, makes it useful for comparative purposes. Case study has been criticized for being a theoretical and reflective of the biases of the investigator but recent developments in the method has made it as scientific as other research methods are. Confusion about the method arises from the terms that are invoked to denote this method. One such term is single N=1 case. Gerring (2004) clarifies this misconception and said that multiple cases can be investigated in a study of a single unit. He claims that certain developments of a particular unit which can be a state, a province, a family or a region; can be studied both diachronically (historical development) or synchronically (at a single point in time). He claims that N=1 is a misnomer because in every well designed case studies within-unit investigation is done. Within-unit investigation tend to explore multiple cases within a spatially bounded unit. For instance if a particular country is being investigated then lower level cases like provinces, trade unions, political parties, tribes and many more such cases are analyzed for their impact on a broader class of phenomena such as party systems, regime types, democratization etc.

Separately investigated case studies with a research focus in terms of sub-cases and their impact on the broader phenomena can be later combined to develop a general theory about that phenomena. Riddin (2006) discusses about the usefulness of case studies for later generalizations. He claims that case study should not be considered inferior in terms of its scientific utility by wrongly comparing it with statistical inference. Case study should be considered as a “strong form of hypothetico-deductive theorizing (p. 800).” Gallier (1992) argues that the real strength of the case study method lies in its approach to capture the reality in its utmost detail with greater number of variables unlike other methods (p.3). While commenting on the capacity of case studies in terms of theory building Donald T. Campbell (2003) refers to Karl Popper’s (2000) famous example of black swan to explain his concept of falsification. Campbell argues that the in-depth knowledge acquired by case studies can help falsifying or improving the already established theories. He said that what was deemed white was found out to be black after going through a meticulous investigation (p. 422). Stake (1982) argues that case

studies must not be an attempt towards generalization rather the process of generalization took place naturally through using the findings of one case study for analyzing other cases.

George and Bennett (2005) suggest that case studies for the sake of comprehensive explanation should employ the variable which are of theoretical interests (p. 69). Choice of variable should also be made by keeping in mind the future policy choices to influence outcomes or shape the dependent variable in question as suggested by the research. They also emphasize on the clarity of the research objectives in terms of its contribution to the broader field of research regarding the phenomenon under investigation. They suggest that maximum attention should be given to the research to be focused by having specific research objectives with a theoretical focus in line with those objectives. Lack of attention to focus will result into a descriptive monograph which will be of little for the general scholarship about that particular area of research (p. 70). They categorize different case study researches on the basis of their objectives. The category of *Disciplined Configurative* case studies are relevant for the purpose of this dissertation. These kind of case studies use already established theories about certain phenomena to explain the case under investigation. The findings of the research can be put forth to highlight the shortcomings of existing theories or the general scholarship about that particular case. In the light of the objective research questions should be designed which should reflect clarity about the phenomenon being investigated and what aspect of existing theories are operationalized to elaborate the historical developments (p. 77).

To make a case study research design plausible John Gerring (2004) gives multiple suggestions. He argues that case studies should strive for descriptive instead of causal inference. He says that case studies are inherently comparative because of the limitations of the language. When we describe certain cases then we are bound to use certain categories to describe that phenomenon. Therefore, he suggests that "to describe is to categorize (p. 347)." He further says that case studies should be concerned with the depth instead of the breadth of the analysis. The aim should be exploring the variance within the case over the period of time rather than its implications for the cross-unit analysis. Similarly, comparability of different instances within the case should take precedence over its representativeness for different units of the similar class. Unlike quantitative method case studies do not deal with probabilistic estimation of causal effect rather they require

an intelligible causal mechanism where the general knowledge of the phenomena is used to draw a causal linkage between different phenomena with in the case to explain the covariation in a plausible manner (p. 348). The in-depth study of a particular case with reference to certain phenomenon enables the researcher to explore the intermediate causes which are often missed out in cross-unit analysis due to the relatively more intensive nature of that method (p.348). Process tracing is that tool which is often used in the qualitative research like case studies to capture the historical covariation of different phenomena within a single case study.

Nevertheless, there are certain limitations of case study method. It is argued that this method provide little basis for scientific generalization as it deals with fewer cases and at times with only one case. It is usually observed that the data provided in the case study is ambiguous and not coherent enough to reach the merit of a scientific study. At times the investigator's own biases influence the conclusions of the study under investigation (Yin, 1984). Another drawback which is discussed is potential indeterminacy (Nojolstad, 1990), that the researcher narrow down his research to one or other determinant but exclude other possible determinant of the phenomenon under investigation. This might result into an incomplete appraisal of the phenomenon with respect to that particular case study. In this research although the focus is on the impact of PSI on the sustainability of the hybrid regime in Pakistan but other factors like judicial activism and tutelary interference has also been taken into account to provide a holistic account of the case under discussion.

ii. Process Tracing

The original purpose for devising this tool is defined as to provide theoretical explanation of historical developments in a particular case (Falleti, 2006). The early literature on process tracing defines it as a single method, where the concern is either (a) developing a sound theoretical framework and connect it with the empirical observation of the case (Gerring, 2007) or (b) or use the collected evidence to produce a critical commentary on the alternative hypotheses (Bennett, 2010). Beach and Pedersen (2011) argue that process tracing should not be confused as a single method rather there are three major variants of process tracing. First variant of process tracing is theory testing where researchers tests the validity of a hypothesized causal mechanism by deducing theories from existing literature. The aim is to explore whether the

causal mechanism identified in the hypothesis is plausible enough to predict the outcomes. The second variant of theory building is to use the empirical knowledge of a particular case to build a general theory for the sake of explaining other cases. The explaining outcome variant is the least ambitious of all three. The purpose is to provide the explanation of the case in the most sufficient manner possible. No theory testing or theory building is intended rather multiple theories are employed to provide the detailed account of a particular case (pp' 2-3).

James Mahoney (2015) discusses different approaches of researchers in terms of linking certain causes with their predicted or explained effects in particular cases. He says that researchers deals with causes in three ways. Some causes are necessary conditions for a certain even to be unfolded and some causes contribute to those developments along with other causes. He gives the example of assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and its causal connection with the First World War. If we take that assassination as a necessary condition then in the absence of that event, world war might not have taken place. If we take it as a contributing factor then we can say that outbreak of war was inevitable even if there was no assassination. He discusses the importance of sequence analysis where researchers presents events in a sequence to describe them as causal factors that lead to that particular outcome envisaged in the hypothesis (p.205). The cause, whether a necessary or a contributing condition leads to the outcome through certain intervening mechanisms. These intervening mechanisms are those "critical junctures" in history that led particular causes to make particular outcomes to occur. With reference to this dissertation if the regime type is the outcome and weak party institutionalization (PSI) is the cause then the decisions and choices of different political actors at critical junctures are the intervening mechanisms that led to a particular regime type due to weak PSI. To present a comprehensive explanation of causal mechanisms theoretical focus of the research is essential (p. 206).

He further proposes a "Hoop Test" to test the validity of hypothesis by analyzing closely what the causal factor is comprised of and whether it is corroborated by substantial evidence(s). One way of conducting the hoop test is by presenting the chain of event that shows the occurrence of the proposed outcome due to the causal factor. This he calls inductive process tracing. Failure of identification of such chain might result into the failure of hoop test. Therefore, the hypothesis

connecting the causal factor with the outcome will be rejected. Another way to relate the causal factor with the outcome is through an intervening mechanism that is already considered sufficient enough to produce the proposed outcome but the existence of that mechanism is dependent on the causal factor (p. 209). The causal sequence as a result will be as depicted below.

Causal Factor → **Intervening Mechanism** → **Outcome**

To explain this sequence Mahoney gives an example from the linkage of assassination of Archduke with the outbreak of 2nd World War.

Example of Deductive Logic with a Hoop Test

Premise 1: German mobilization into the local war (**Intervening Mechanism**) was sufficient for the continental war (**Outcome**)

Premise 2: The assassination (**Causal Factor**) was not necessary for German mobilization into the local war (**Intervening Mechanism**)

Conclusion: The assassination (**Causal Factor**) was not necessary for the continental war (**Outcome**)



Source: J. Mahoney (2015)

Aforementioned example should not mislead the reader that process tracing just produces a detailed historical narrative. Vennesson (2008) emphasizes that case study method in general and process tracing in particular presupposes a theoretical framework to determine the causal path that leads to a specific outcome as claimed in the research (p. 238). If a research is causally linking one phenomenon to another then the concepts defining those phenomena must be clearly defined and enough empirical evidence should be available to measure those concepts, not necessarily in numerical terms. If the key concepts defining the phenomenon that is the causal factor and the phenomenon that is proposed outcome are clearly defined then it becomes easier to draw a causal linkage between the two even with the help of an intervening mechanism.

iii. Process Tracing in this Dissertation

In this research I am establishing a linkage between the institutionalization of the party system and its impact on the nature of the regime. I am proposing that weak party system

institutionalization (PSI) results into sustainability of a hybrid regime. The theory of PSI claims it to be a continuum (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Therefore, it is not necessary that a weaker party system necessarily culminates into the existence of a hybrid regime. For instance, it can be claimed that the party system in the United States is weakly institutionalized in comparison to the party system of Germany but it does not necessarily make the US as a hybrid regime. To link the weak PSI with the existence of hybrid regime and intervening mechanism is required which necessitates the existences of hybrid regime and is a result of weak PSI. Tutelary interference is such intervening variable that helps drawing the causal linkage between weak PSI and a hybrid regime. Following can be the causal sequence proposed in this dissertation

Weak PSI  **Tutelary Interference**  **Sustainability of a Hybrid Regime**

This shows that weak PSI in itself is not the sufficient enough condition to result into a hybrid regime but the tutelary interference necessarily makes a polity a hybrid regime. Tutelary interference persists due to weak PSI. It can be further explained with the help of Mahoney's hoop test as mentioned previously.

The Hoop Test for the linkage of PSI and Hybrid Regime

Premise 1: Tutelary interference (**Intervening Mechanism**) necessarily makes a polity a hybrid regime (**Outcome**)

Premise 2: Weak PSI (**Causal Factor**) makes space for Tutelary Interference (**Intervening Mechanism**)

Conclusion: Weak PSI (**Causal Factor**) may lead to the sustainability of a Hybrid Regime (**Outcome**)

This research is linking the theory of PSI proposed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) with the configurative approach of hybrid regime presented by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011). The concepts employed by both theories will be used in this research for the sake of process tracing to

determine the historical evolution of both party system and the regime type in Pakistan. Following are the concepts that will be used for within-case temporal comparisons.

Party Institutionalization – It will be analyzed whether parties are rooted or connect with their voters due to their programmatic orientation or non-programmatic features such as ethnic cleavages or clientelistic favors. Internal party organizations is also another feature to be analyzed that whether the decision making within party is centralized due to the personalistic nature of parties or the members of the parties makes their choices independent of the personal interests of the leadership.

Inter-Party Interactions – The historical pattern of the interaction between different parties. How do they interact during and after the elections? How do the parties operate while in the opposition? How do deal with opposition after forming the government?

Horizontal Accountability – How autonomous the institutions of horizontal accountability such as judiciary are? How other institutions responsible for curbing financial corruption operate independently of the ruling party?

Competitiveness – How high is the electoral volatility? How frequent has been the alternation of power? What is the level of equal opportunity in terms of media representation? What role the anti-party (independent) candidates play in terms of formation of the government? What is the role of inherently exclusivist parties (ethnic or religious) play in terms of government formation?

Tutelary Interference – What is the nature (formal or informal) and extent of tutelary interference? How do parties interact with the tutelary actors? What role the tutelary forces have played historically in the evolution of the party system? Does tutelary interference has an impact on civil liber such as right to assemble and right to association?

All these concepts will be used to provide a theoretically informed historical explanation of the party system and the evolving nature of regime in Pakistan.

iv. Case Selection of Pakistan

Since February, 2008 Pakistan has experienced three successions of government with the parliament completing its tenure of five years. In all three elections, incumbent party has been

replaced by the opposition party. This development is unprecedented in the light of highly checkered political history of the country that has witnessed three long military or semi-military rules since its independence in 1947. As far as literature regarding Pakistan's politics is concerned, the discussions on the role of military dominate (Nasar, 2004; Zaidi, 2005; Siddiqa, 2007; Nawaz; 2011; Ahmed, 2013). Many authors have worked on the role of the military in Pakistani politics. There are some scholarly works where few passages or a chapter have been devoted to the discussion of political parties (Cohen, 2011; Jones; 2003; Sheikh, 2009; Lieven, 2012), but not a systematic study of political parties is done regarding Pakistan. A vast body of literature also exists about politics of ethnicity in Pakistan (Ahmed, 1998; Malik, 1996; Verkaaik, 2001; Siddiqi, 2012), which mostly focuses on ethnic fault lines, ethnicity-based smaller parties, and ethnic conflicts. Major comparative work on the state of democracy in India and Pakistan (Jalal, 1995) focuses more on structural issues of countries as a reason for the failure of democracy in Pakistan. In recent times, no systematic or even descriptive work is done on political parties of Pakistan, some of which are almost 40 years old. K.K. Aziz (1958) presents more of a descriptive than theoretical work in nature. Moreover, he wrote in times when the first military rule just started in Pakistan. Similarly, little work is done about Pakistan in the context of a hybrid regime. Sagheer (2016) deals with the issue of hybridism in the context of the state-society relationship. He contends that the roots of authoritarianism in Pakistan lie in the society, where cultural practices and religious notions cause the emergence of leadership with an authoritarian mindset. This socio-political milieu prevents the establishment of rational democratic order in the country. Oldenburg (2016) contends that the existence of "disloyal opposition" might cause the reverse transition of the hybrid regime of Pakistan towards authoritarianism. He terms Islamist-Jihadist and secessionist elements in Baluchistan as disloyal opposition. Shoukat and Gomez (2017) focus on the cooperation of different types of elites as a crucial factor in terms of determining the nature of the regime. They contend that the Pakistani corporate elite is increasingly colluding with the political elite, which is changing the nature of the hybrid regime in Pakistan.

Adeney (2017) contends that the recent political developments in Pakistan force us to describe it as a hybrid regime. She suggests that due to complexities in the case of Pakistan, it should not

be treated as a diminished subtype of authoritarianism or democracy. Instead, the term hybrid regime is more appropriate to describe the political situation of Pakistan. She further claims that specific constitutional and structural changes in Pakistan lead us to believe that civilian control is gradually increasing in specific policy areas. She proposes an approach of the multidimensional continuum by giving specific indicators to assess and detect the emergence of the hybrid regime. She emphasizes the role of 18th Amendment in the constitution in increasing civilian control and increased competitiveness of the electoral system. The election commission has indeed been formally made neutral by establishing the rule that the members of the election commission will be appointed by mutual agreement of opposition leader and the prime minister. However, the electoral system is still far from transparent. Massive irregularities were found in individual constituencies, and certain petitions regarding electoral fraud are still awaiting a verdict.

The existing literature does not focus on the importance of the party system and the institutionalization of political parties. It is this gap which this research aims to fill. Till the 1990s, the nature of competition among political parties was highly contentious, and the party system was weak due to the mistrust among political parties. This situation has changed at least between two significant parties PML (N) and PPP after Benazir and Nawaz, while in exile, signed an agreement in 2006, which is known as the Charter of Democracy. Under the Charter of Democracy, both of them agreed that they will work to strengthen democracy in Pakistan and will not become part of any conspiracy. The agreement changed the nature of competition between them from contentious to cooperative (Haqqani, 2006). The 18th Amendment was the result of this understanding. This increased cooperation was somehow counter-productive for both of them as it resulted in the emergence of a third major party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).

v. Research Objectives

Following are the two primary objectives of this research:

1. To discuss the classification of Pakistan as a Hybrid Regime

2. To analyze the effect of party system institutionalization on the nature of the hybrid regime in Pakistan

vi. Research Question

This research will address two broad and four specific questions.

1. What are the characteristics and deficits in the democratic process which makes Pakistan a hybrid regime?
2. How has the party system contributed towards the sustainability of the hybrid regime (1947-1956, 1990-1999 & 2002-2018) or previously to its transition to the military rule (1958, 1979 and 1999) in Pakistan?

The following specific questions have been framed to answer these broad questions.

1. What was the nature of competition in the previous party system (1947-1988) in Pakistan?
2. What is the nature of competition in the existing party system in Pakistan (1988-2018)?
3. How much has the role of tutelary forces changed?
4. What is the status of civil liberties in Pakistan?

vii. Sources

Both primary and secondary sources have been used during this research. For secondary sources the existing academic literature including research articles, books, autobiographies, newspaper op-eds have been consulted. To understand the nature of competition and the party-voter linkage the participation of party members in the electronic media and their nature of engagement with the voters on the social media has also been observed. For the primary source 20 in-depth interviews have been conducted in the cities of Karachi and Islamabad. Karachi was chosen due to its diverse demography and being the financial hub of the country. Islamabad was chosen for being the capital of Pakistan. Respondents in those interviews include journalists, politicians, academics and retired military officers. Interviews mostly revolved around three major areas. Firstly, the comparison of the existing party system with the previous party system of 1990s and pre-1990s. Secondly, the prospects of any transition to either a military rule or a

minimalist democracy. Thirdly, the state of media freedom in the country. Interviews were mostly semi-structured and the respondents were given the freedom to provide a historical comparison. Politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties were interviewed to have a balanced understanding of the situation. Journalists, who are critical of the current government and the military establishment and those who are sympathetic to them were interviewed to cross-check the information provided by them. Those retired military officials were interviewed who regular share their opinions on both print and electronic media.

viii. Research Division

Chapter 1 – This section of the research deals with the existing literature regarding the hybrid regime and its defining characteristic. It further deals with the theory of party system institutionalization (PSI) and attempts to draw the linkage between weak PSI with the existence of a hybrid regime. It also briefly deals with the existing literature on the PSI regarding different regions such as Latin America, African and East Asia.

Chapter 2- This section deal with the political development of the first forty years of the history of Pakistan with reference to the theoretical framework of hybrid regime and PSI. It describes that how the inchoate party system and highly contentious nature of the competition between different parties led to different military rules and even the secession of its eastern wing.

Chapter 3 – This section deals with emergence and evolution of the hybrid regime in Pakistan since the elections of 1988. It further explains that how the highly personalistic nature of party organization and the tutelary interference lead to the emergence of new parties and its impact on the nature of competition among different parties.

Chapter 4 – This section includes the findings of the interviews and a theoretically informed conclusion of the research along with highlighting the significance of this research for the future scholarship regarding hybrid regimes and PSI.

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Party System Institutionalization and Hybrid Regimes

A. HYBRID REGIMES

i. Diminished Sub-types

The end of the Cold War brought about a significant shift in terms of the spread of vibrant electoral politics in those parts of the world that were previously under authoritarian and totalitarian control. Such transformation in regime type was witnessed in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia. These developments forced Fukuyama to claim the absolute triumph of liberal capitalism and democratic ideals and on the basis of that presumption he propounded his “End of History” thesis (1989). Not long after his prophetic thesis, researchers started identifying different patterns of consolidation in these newly emerging “democracies”. Observers started to explain such regimes with the help of different adjectives, highlighting their peculiarities. Soon, it was realized that the mere introduction of electoral circus (as was and is the case in many of these regimes) was insufficient to announce the universalization of democracy, and that several socio-political factors act as an impediment in consolidation of democracy in these countries. Remnants of the preceding regimes continue to impact the nature of their politics, at times in a regressive manner. This linkage with the past continues to determine the present and also shapes the future evolutionary course of the regime (Ekman, 2009, p. 8). Zakaria (1997), pointed out that although after the demise of Soviet Union, increasing number of countries were embarking on the path of electoral politics but it would be premature to classify those regime as liberal democracies. He explained that the mere conduct of free and fair election is not the testament of liberal democracy rather the real test of democracy goes beyond elections. The quality of democracy is gauged by different indicators, including state of civil-liberties, mechanisms of accountability and separation of powers (p. 22). He observed that a majority of the new democracies are not only illiberal in their nature but they are also not

showing any signs of transitioning to a more liberal version of democracy. Another variant of such regime type is delegative democracy. O'Donnell (1994) explains that the prominent feature of such sub-type is that the party or the individual who comes to power as a result of an election is not bound by constitutional constraints in terms of exercising his powers (p. 60). Institutions of accountability function at the whims and wishes of the head of the executive branch. The role of the voters tends to become passive after voting the incumbent to power.

Other adjectives are also associated, such as 'pseudo democracy' (Diamond, 2002), 'defective democracies' (Croissant, 2004) and many more. All these adjectives were used to highlight the deficiencies of these new democracies in relation to Schumpeter's concept of 'minimalist criterion of democracy', as identified by Przeworski (1999). Collier and Levitsky (1997) identify twelve such diminished sub-types on the basis of four major deficiencies. Those are limited suffrage, restricted contestation, widespread violation of civil liberties, and interference of non-elected entities in the policy making process. A different approach is proposed by other scholars where they claim that there are certain regimes where adjectives of democracy cannot be used due to their obvious authoritarian feature despite the repetitive exercise of electoral gimmicks. Levitsky and Way (2010) insist that apart from other requirements of a minimalist criterion (free and fair elections, universal suffrage, absence of tutelary forces, and protection of civil liberties) another requirement is essential i.e. level playing field between incumbents and the opposition (p. 6). They claim that if the incumbent's power seriously hampers the chances of the opposition then it is quite difficult to attach the adjective of democracy with that regime.

Hence, they propose the term 'competitive authoritarianism'. In such regimes opposition parties are allowed to exist, open offices, and conduct electoral campaigning; however, the incumbent's excessive abuse of authority makes it extremely difficult to replace them in successive elections. Competitive authoritarian regimes are different from full authoritarian regimes because of an on ground existence of opposition. Elections are not just a façade to seek international legitimacy and the opposition poses a considerable threat to the incumbents of losing the election. Diamond (2002) acknowledges this difficulty of distinguishing between different regime types. Due to this, he proposes the term 'ambiguous regimes', apart from electoral democracy, competitive authoritarianism and hegemonic electoral authoritarianism. He describes all these categories as

ideal types and accepts the possibility of overlapping of categories in some complex cases. Wigell (2008) by employing the two dimensions of democracy i.e. electoralism and constitutionalism, comes up with four broad regime types. Those are democratic, constitutional-oligarchic, electoral-autocratic, and authoritarian. These will be discussed later.

The multiplicity of adjectives in the literature regarding regime types have added more to conceptual confusion instead of resolving it (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011). As Carothers (2002) observed, the assumption of democracy promoters that the countries moving away from dictatorships were regimes in transition, was misplaced. He claims that many of these countries remain stuck in the 'gray-zone' for a significant period of time. Hence he announces the 'end of transition paradigm' and suggests developing more country-specific approaches for the sake of localized democracy promotion. Another reason of the confusion stems from the disagreements about classifying different regimes. It was observed that similar countries are classified as diminished sub-type of both democracy and authoritarianism. To avoid concept stretching and overlapping, it is suggested that a broader term be used which encompass all such cases containing elements of both authoritarianism and democracy. 'Hybrid regime' is one such term which suffices to classify such 'gray zone' cases as a separate regime type (Karl, 1995). If we consider it as a separate regime type then it is imperative to come up with a definition which highlights its distinctiveness vis-à-vis both democracy and authoritarianism.

ii. Explaining Hybrid Regimes

Despite the different nature of hybrid regime from democracy and authoritarianism, its definition cannot be divorced from either. It is the presence and lack of the characteristics of both regime types that defines hybrid regimes. Before defining "hybrid regime", it should be clear that these regimes claim to be democracies for the sake of internal and external legitimacy. Therefore hybrid regimes are mostly analyzed in terms of the lack of democratic features it carries. They do however, differ in terms of socio-cultural, geo-political and economic peculiarities. Some are considered hybrid due to preponderance of a single party which impact the competitiveness of the electoral process. In some regimes elections are highly competitive but the influence of non-elected institutions in the policy making prevent them qualifying as democracies. Poor state of civil liberties due to inter-ethnic or inter-sectarian tensions can also raise the questions about the

democratic credentials of an electoral regime. Strength or weakness of the institutions responsible for ensuring horizontal accountability is another indicator to assess the state of democracy in a regime. Degree of democratic deficit vary from regime to regime but majority of the countries that allowed multiparty electoral politics lack in one or many of the aforementioned aspects.

Wigell (2008) suggests a multi-dimensional approach on the basis of two key features of liberal democracy for the sake of 'mapping hybrid regimes' i.e. constitutionalism and electoralism. He justifies the emergence of scholarship regarding democracy and authoritarianism with adjectives because of the complexities of political processes. He claims that different regimes cannot be analyzed and compared along a single continuum because of the qualitative differences within similar types of regimes. Referring to Polity IV index he elaborates that the populist regime of Juan Perón of Argentina was ranked similarly to the military regime of 1976 despite some stark qualitative differences between both regimes (p. 232). Therefore, the adjectives such as delegative and illiberal (for democracies), and electoral or competitive (for authoritarian regimes) make sense. Grading different regimes helps tackle the issue of parsimony, which was present in the traditional dichotomous approach of classification of regimes (Sartori, 1987).

He further explains that minimal electoral conditions are freedom, fairness, competitiveness, and inclusion, while minimum constitutional conditions are freedom of organization and expression, freedom from discrimination, and right to alternate information. He proposes four broad regime types determined by their performance in these key features of electoralism and constitutionalism. The additional electoral features are electoral empowerment, electoral integrity, electoral sovereignty, and electoral irreversibility. The additional constitutional features are executive accountability, legal accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and local government accountability. On the basis of these features he puts forward four broad categories of democracy (with liberal democracy being the most democratic), electoral-autocratic (meeting minimal electoral conditions at least but not meeting at least minimum constitutional criterion), constitutional oligarchic (not meeting minimal electoral

conditions but minimal constitutional conditions are met), and authoritarianism (not meeting minimal conditions of either of the two dimensions).

The classification discussed above provides a comprehensive list of indicators to compare the qualitative differences of different regimes falling in the similar broad classification. However, by introducing more categories it further complicates the already complex body of literature. Introducing additional categories is a never ending process. One can find minute or glaring qualitative differences among the cases of sub-categories of a broad category. For instance, tutelary democracy is considered to be a diminished sub-type of democracy but if we compare the tutelary democracies of Latin America and Asia, then one can easily identify the differences resulting from different internal and external factors. This is because tutelary forces include heterogeneous institutions such as the military, certain ideological groups, landed elite, clergy and so on. If we start creating sub-categories of tutelary democracy on the basis of different tutelary actors then it will not contribute much except that a discourse which is already overwhelmed by a multitude of adjectives will be much more crowded.

To tackle this situation we must refer back to Giovanni Sartori (1970) who discusses the issues with conceptual stretching in the field of political science. Due to the empirical expansion of the field of political science, a lot of confusion has arrived in terms of the application of democracy and authoritarianism. Sartori suggests that in terms of conception form one needs to take into account the intensional and extensional side of the concept. Intensional side deals with the attributes of the concept that are used to assess the empirical instances of that concept. Extensional side forces the theorists to keep in mind the generalizability of the concept for comparative purposes. In the last three decades, excessive conceptual stretching has been done to the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism, therefore we see the emergence of democracy and authoritarianism with adjectives. The term hybrid regime resolves this issue by encompassing all such cases of non-democracy and non-authoritarianism. Sartori also cautions researchers about parsimony. He suggests that the lower the number of attributes, the easier the operationalization, and by extension the generalizability of a concept. Nevertheless, one should not be over parsimonious as it can compromise the strength of the concept. For a mid-range concept like hybrid regime where detailed analysis is required to grasp the peculiarities of

each case, one needs to retain a certain balance in terms of their approach to the condition of parsimony.

Bogaards (2009) suggests a double-root strategy to tackle the problem of the emergence of new diminished sub-types. He suggests to place all these diminished sub-types into a comprehensive regime classification. A double-root strategy aims to integrate the different variants of democracy and authoritarianism to overcome the classification related inconsistencies. He termed hybrid regimes as pure residual categories that cannot be categorically called either democratic or authoritarian regimes. He further suggests not to confuse the hybrid regime as a regime in transition. The transitional regime cannot be classified as a separate type because of its inherently fluid nature. He said that a shift has already taken place from the issue of the consolidation of new democracies to the consolidation of democratic defect. Therefore, it is pertinent to integrate this scholarship with divergent choices in terms of the root concept into broader classification category.

Mufti (2018) combines the scholarship produced in the aftermath of third wave of democratization under a single label of hybrid regime. She observes that inconsistency in terms of understanding as to what are hybrid regimes, persists even after two decades of deliberation. She feels that these inconsistencies owe themselves to a lack of dialogue among scholars and their unwillingness to build up on a plethora of scholarship that can otherwise help coming up with a definite theoretical framework. She discusses the shortcomings of the two divergent theoretical strands. In the earlier period of third wave, these new regimes were understood in the context of transitology. Therefore, the focus was on democratic defects. However, when these regimes continued in their defective states and resisted the transition to democracy, only then the focus shifted to the persistence of authoritarian traits (p. 116). She refers to the multi-dimensional approach proposed by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) to tackle this problem with the help of single-n case studies to advance our knowledge regarding hybrid regimes by understanding them in their peculiar context.

The multi-dimensional approach of Gilbert and Mohseni proposes the redefining of the broad term i.e. electoral regime. According to their thesis, the conceptual confusion and the overlapping of cases happen because of the misleading definition of an electoral regime. They

opine that a regime cannot be considered an electoral one without a meaningful competitive multi-party system and to measure the competitiveness the turnover is an important indicator (p. 278). Due to this reason they strongly disagree with some scholars who classified Hosni Mubarak's Egypt as a hybrid regime due to lack of meaningful electoral competition by other contenders. They further argue that in some electoral regimes incumbents stay in power for a longer period while in others, they are periodically replaced. This change of incumbents does not necessarily make them a consolidated democracy rather many of them essentially remain a hybrid regime.

They further emphasize on the importance of the element of competition as it is an important indicator to distinguish between authoritarian and hybrid regimes. In authoritarian regimes, powers are heavily concentrated in the center so much so that other contenders are either denied any participation or allowed cosmetic participation in the political process. In hybrid regimes, though the degree of competition as compared to the authoritarian regimes is high but the efficacy of the of the institutions responsible for ensuring a fair competition is relatively low as compared to the established democracies. By referring to Sartori (1970), they share their observation that earlier the competitive regimes were considered democratic and it is the recent scholarship regarding competitive authoritarianism that has brought this fact to light that certain degree of competitiveness exist in non-democratic regimes as well (p. 281). In hybrid regimes like Pakistan, the level of competitiveness is such that since 2002 four different parties have come to power with different or similar coalition partners. In the presence of such fierce competition, Pakistan still remains a hybrid regime due to one pre-dominant factor discussed by Gilbert and Mohseni.

This factor is tutelary interference. Drawing on the idea of Schedler (2002) they treat this factor as the one which can make even highly competitive regimes non-democratic. Tutelary interference can be from any non-elected institution like military, monarchy, or clergy. Interference of non-elected actors in the policy making weakens the democratic credentials by "violating [the] essential link of democratic choices (p. 200)." It goes against the principle of representativeness enshrined in the democratic system. Representatives can employ their services for various reasons but this has to be done by exercising their free agency. If the freedom

of their agency is violated by such interference and elected officials cannot do much about it, then it makes it difficult to categorize such regime as democratic. This does not necessarily make them authoritarian. Hence, hybrid regime seems to be the most appropriate term for such regimes. Another measure that they propose to take into account is the state of civil liberties in any given regime. In the literature such hybrid regimes are identified as tutelary democracy. Przeworski (1988) defines such regimes as tutelary democracy where formal competitive democratic institutions exist but armed forces retain their capacity “to intervene to correct undesirable state of affairs (p. 61).” Stepan’s (1991) observation is relevant in the context of Pakistan as it has historically been engaged with ethnic and religious militancy since its inception (Oldenburg, 2017). Stepan says that if the military retains its prerogative over management of violence then it continues to undermine the authority of civilian leadership. As a result, it prevents the entrenchment of democracy. In Pakistan, military too enjoys certain level of impunity in terms of human rights abuses, specially enforced disappearances. Political parties seem clueless to challenge the military in terms of rectifying the situation.

Rabkin (1993) highlights four major characteristics of a tutelary democracy. There is always a recurring threat of a military coup, preventing voters or candidates from electoral participation, high degree of institutional autonomy both financially and in terms of policy and determining the course of policy making or legislation by means of blackmailing (p. 123). In the cases like Pakistan where corruption is rampant and political parties are run through patronage networks, it preclude political parties from garnering broader societal support (Javid, 2019). In the absence of such support political parties remain vulnerable to the pressure of tutelary actors such as military to accommodate their policy or legislative inputs. Therefore, the legislative business which should be reflective of the general will at times operates to serve the powers that be (tutelary actors) (Shah, 2020). This takes us to another dimension that should be taken into account is the state of horizontal accountability. Strong institutions of horizontal accountability pave the way for fairness in terms of governance where the policy choices of the elected officials are bound by the principles of the rule of law.

In light of Merkel’s (2004) concept of partial regimes of embedded democracy, I suggest that another dimension should be added, which is accountability. Building upon the idea of

delegative democracy propounded by O'Donnell (1994), Merkel discusses that horizontal accountability is one of the essential features of an embedded democracy. He says that vertical accountability is done periodically by means of voting in or out the incumbents through elections. During the inter-election period, horizontal accountability should be done by assuring the autonomy of different institutions. He explains it as "lawful government action checked by the division of power between mutually interdependent and autonomous legislative, executive and judiciary bodies". Without strong practices of horizontal accountability a regime cannot be termed democratic. In the absence of horizontal accountability, the executive can excessively abuse its powers to the detriment of its political opponents. That is what happens in delegative democracy. Therefore, it is suggested to not to ignore this aspect when it comes to the intensional side of the concept of hybrid regime. It is pertinent in the case of Pakistan where corruption and abuse of government office is rampant across different political parties. When politicians are held accountable then they make demands of ensuring across the board accountability, which should include judiciary, military and bureaucracy. They tend to ignore that being parliamentarians and part of the governments it is their responsibility to enact such laws which can assure accountability across the board and end this culture of impunity.

iii. Defining Hybrid Regime

Morlino (2009), comes up with a comprehensive take on the issue of hybrid regime by focusing on the semantics of the term. He defines regime as a set of well recognized formal and informal institutions and norms existing in a given territory with respect to a particular population. He emphasizes that to consider a phenomenon as a regime, minimal stability is required. Stabilization is necessary for regime analysis because of the possibility of confusing a fluid phenomenon with a regime. He too builds on the case for hybrid regime on the basis of a minimum threshold for democracy. If, according to him, any of the minimum conditions including universal suffrage, recurrent competitive elections, multiple parties, and alternative sources of media is lacking then the regime cannot be considered democratic. For this purpose, he emphasizes on the role of institutions like elections, competing parties, and media pluralism. He further added that these institutions cannot be influenced by any non-elected authority. He

comes up with a comprehensive definition of hybrid regimes while others have failed in this endeavor. He defines it as:

“A set of ambiguous institutions that maintain aspects of the past. Second, it is, consequently, a ‘corruption’ of the preceding regime. Lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics of that regime but also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian. Consequently, the term hybrid can be applied to all regimes preceded by a period of authoritarian or traditional rule followed by beginnings of greater tolerance, liberalization, and a partial relaxation of the restriction on pluralism or all regimes, that following a period of minimal democracy... [They] are subjected to the intervention of nonelected bodies—the military, above all—that place restriction on competitive pluralism without, however, creating a more or less stable authoritarian regime (p. 281).”

This definition makes it clear that full-scale authoritarian rule can transition to hybrid regimes but not consolidated democracies. In order to understand hybrid regime it is pertinent to take into account past linkages. Elements of preceding regime type continue to influence the process of political liberalization and resultantly contribute to its sustainability. To understand the linkages with the past, the functioning of institutions has to be analyzed in order to identify such legacies of the preceding rule. When it comes to institutions, political parties and the party system of the country remain central to any discussion. Transition or no transition, how people and different interest groups will engage with the system depends on the aptitudes and attitudes of the political elite. Specifically, in the case of hybrid regimes with tutelary interference, inter-party and intra-party interactions and the manner of engagement of parties with tutelary actors determine the course of the regime. Good or bad performance of all the aforementioned indicators rely heavily on the functioning of political elites.

Brownlee (2009) pins his hope on high levels of contestation by the opposition parties for the sake of breakdown of a hybrid regime. In his four hypotheses he claims that competitive authoritarian hybrid regimes are more prone to collapse give the extent of contestation and resilience shown by the opposition parties. The problem here lies in limiting the element of competition to the elections. In order to analyze role of the parties in a hybrid regime, we should

move beyond competition and rather focus on the element of contention. In the words of Charles Tilly (Tarrow, 2008), contention is a constant process of claim making among different political actors. Governments can be the target of contention or act as a mediator. In order to understand the nature of contention we need to understand the dimensions of the claims being made. In hybrid regimes where institutions are compromised entities and operate in a partisan fashion, the causes and consequences of contention are essential to analyze. Interactions of institutions like tutelary actors with claim making parties determine the future course of hybrid regimes as well, depending on the fact whether tutelary interference is a part of claim making or tutelary role is being sought to arbitrate between different contentious claim makers (read, political parties). This part is very central for the understanding of the hybrid regime of Pakistan and other tutelary democracies. Throughout 1990s, army in Pakistan had been playing this role of an arbitrator between competing parties. This role continued after the restoration of civilian rule in 2008 when army had to broker the deal between the government and opposition parties in terms of restoring the judges in 2009 and in investigating electoral fraud in 2014.

Ekman (2009) also emphasizes on the importance of the impact of political participation on the stability of a hybrid regime. Taking the example of Tanzania, he claims that actions of political parties at times dissuade the voters from active political participation and weaken their trust on multi-party system as they see it as a source of chaos and confusion (p. 15). The decline in trust on parties weakens their bargaining position and resultantly weakens the prospects of any sort of transition to democracy by providing legitimacy to the intervention of non-elected authorities such as, tutelary actors. The role of political parties after assuming power is also crucial to understand how parties abuse the executive branch of the state to entrench their powers in the system by means of clientelist practices. In most of the post-third wave electoral democracies according to Kitschelt (2000), "clientelist politics has constituted the functional equivalent of the welfare state (p. 873)." Such sort of politics have a negative impact on the already weak party system where civil institutions are so weakened as a result that it paves the way for the increased role of tutelary actors. In the same line of argument, Mufti (2018) also suggests to take into account the recruitment of political elite across different political parties in order to better understand hybrid regime functioning. She emphasizes on its centrality because it plays a vital

role to determine the attitude of political parties vis-à-vis their democratic credentials and the overall culture of governance (p . 116). This idea is crucial to the study of Pakistan because of the concept of “electables” (locally-embedded political actors influential by means of kinship, land holdings or religious clout). In the next section, we will discuss the importance of party system in terms of its impact on the nature of the regime being analyzed.

B. Party System Institutionalization

i. Significance and Typologies of Political Parties

Lipset (2000) argues in favor of the “indispensability” of political parties for a stable democracy. He presents the opposition parties as an alternate government who restrain the party or an individual in the government from acting beyond his constitutionally sanctioned powers (p. 48). Addressing the issue of cleavage in politics is a development of his previous understanding of cleavage politics (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). He opines that sources of cleavage can be cultural, rooted in ethnic or religious differences. Apart from the nature of politics the form and structure of political parties is also important. The very internal structure of parties determines their interactions with other parties and different factions of the society. For long, the typologies of political parties were West-centric and these typologies do not do justice with the existing parties across the world after the emergence of electoral politics beyond the West. Gunther and Diamond (2003) propose to solve this shortcoming of classic typologies of political parties by Duverger (1956), Neumann (1956) and Kirchheimer (1966) by introducing new typologies on the basis of three structural dimension of political parties. Those dimensions are: internal party organization, programmatic orientation, and (non) pluralistic tendencies of the party.

The main reason that they highlight the need of new typologies is the advent of television. Parties no longer require a mass membership for the sake of electoral mobilization; and the personalities of leaders take priority over party programs. Moreover, the public poll culture has also been developed at the expense of strong ideological associations with the parties (p. 168). Obviously, social media was not mainstream when they were pondering over the impact of technological development on party systems, otherwise they would have discussed it in detail. They put forth their typology with a disclaimer that it proposes ideal types and not all the parties

necessarily fulfil the criterion of different categories as explained in their typology. In the organizational part they deal with the nature and extent of party members as they differ in terms of their appeal to either a particular socio-economic group or to the masses, in general. This factor depends on another factor of programmatic orientation as they differ in terms of adhering to a clear ideological basis or being less ideological and address the issues of a more universal nature. The third feature pertains more to the behavioral dimension and deals with the adherence of parties with the democratic norm of pluralism (p. 171).

They propose different sub-variants of five broad classification of parties. The first broad category is elite parties of which the first prominent variant was the party of “local notables”. These parties worked until the expansion of suffrage to the sections other than propertied elites. Clientelist parties replaced them as political tactics needed a shift in the light of new enfranchisement. They define these parties as “confederation of notables”, who seek electoral victory by means of exchanging favors and coercion. These parties remain organizationally weak because of being driven by the interests of these notable instead of any clear ideology. They suggest that increased economic modernization and spread of education among the masses leads to decline of clientelist strategy for the sake of electoral mobilization. In some cases this political culture might last for a longer time even after socio-economic modernization because of the entrenchment of these practices in the party structure. This culture where it works as *raison d’être* for these parties might eventually lead to their collapse as happened in the case of Italy (p. 177).

Mass-based parties are divided into six different categories on the basis of two distinctions. First their ideological commitment and secondly respect for pluralism. Pluralist parties whether formed on the basis of ideology, nationalism, or religion are quite open in terms of memberships and tolerant towards other social groups. Membership of ideological mass-based parties is universal as their ideology goes beyond religious and nationalist linkages. These parties are usually well supported by their secondary organizations, such as their different branches all over the country or trade unions (p. 178). They aim to spread their program by means of proselytization and their ideologically trained rank and file perform the function of electoral mobilization. Proto-hegemonic parties put more emphasis on the element of discipline

among their rank and file and their process of indoctrination is intensive. Their aim is to transform the entire society according to their own worldview, therefore, the degree of pluralism is very low in these kind of parties (p. 179). Religious parties in Pakistan, especially Jamati-e-Islami (JI) can be put under this category. JI happens to be the only democratic political party which chooses its leader periodically and enjoys devoted lifetime members. When it comes to staging rallies and protests they are among the most organized parties but interestingly they have been unable to translate this into an electoral victory. Third broad category is of ethnic parties. Purely ethnic parties have no programmatic agenda rather they function on the sole purpose of promoting the welfare of a particular ethnic group and they usually thrive on already existing clientelistic linkages on the basis of ethnicity. At times a coalition of different ethno-nationalist parties is formed which Gunther and Diamond call “congress parties”. National Awami Party (NAP) of Pakistan was one such party which was banned in the 1970s (Rashiduzzaman, 1970).

The fourth broad category of electoral parties is of utmost importance for our purposes. This is because in most hybrid regimes most parties fall in this category owing to their weak programmatic dimension. The first sub-category is catch-all parties. This type of parties rely heavily on the personal credentials of the candidate for the sake of winning election rather than the time and energies they may have invested for the party. They differ from Kirchheimer (1966) on the basis of the evolutionary element of this type rather they claim catch-all parties do not necessarily carry any ideological legacy. They claim that programmatic parties also emphasize upon the charisma of the individual candidate; however, they also carry a consistent and well defined manifesto in comparison to catch-all parties. This type of electoral party is “personalistic party”. This party relies solely on the charisma of its leader and carries no ideology or program rather its entire electoral strategy orbits around getting the leader elected. Personalism as an electoral strategy according to Kostadinova and Levitt (2014) revolves around the generic promises of prosperity and stability not sufficiently backed by a coherent program. They believe that not enough theory building is done on this particular category despite being regularly discussed in the literature in the context of the third wave (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Hawkins, 2009; Ignazi, 1996; Garzia, 2011).

Kostadinova and Levitt further categorize the personalistic parties into two sub-categories i.e. charismatic and non-charismatic. In the charismatic personalistic parties the promises the leader make are transformational in nature. The intention is to inspire people instead of incentivizing them to determine their electoral choices. In the non-charismatic category the relationship is transactional which is based upon the promises of post-election patronage (p. 494). Intra-party organization can be analyzed in terms of two key features. First, a dominant leader and as a consequence weak organizational capacity. The leader of the party enjoys permanence at the top and if he retires or dies then it ensues existential crisis for the party. In the cases of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh the family members are chosen as their successors to continue to invoke the feelings of reverence among their supporters. This culture has created another category of personalistic parties i.e dynastic parties (Chibber, 2011; Cheema, Javid & Naseer, 2013; Chandra, 2014). Chhibber (2011) argues that in the absence of an independent party organization or a broader civil society associations it is likely that dynastic succession takes place in terms of party leadership. Size of the party does not matter in this regards as both large and small parties can be dynastic and non-dynastic. As in the case of India, Congress being a large party is dynastic but Barthiya Janata Party (BJP) is not. Shiv Sena, a small party is dynastic but other smaller parties are not. In Pakistan, most of the parties with few exceptions are dynastic whether ethnically rooted or national parties (Hussain, 2012).

In such scenario where the decision making is centralized and unilateral in nature the organizational capacity of the party remains weak. This is due to the lack of intra-party democracy where for the members the loyalty to the leader takes precedence over programmatic commitments (Kostadinova and Levitt, p. 500-501). Recruitment of party office holder or member is determined by the leader and the rules if there are any, are just for cosmetic purposes (p.502). In some instances there can be a de jure and de factor leaders of the party (Mossige, 2009). The de jure leader deals with the day to day business of the party while the de facto leader enjoys his authority through the direct support of the followers of the party due to his charisma. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Pakistan is one such example where Altaf Hussain, its founding leader never held a party position neither contested a single election but held its firm grip over the party despite being in exile for almost 30 years. In the election commission of

Pakistan the party was registered on the name of convener of the party but Altaf remained the de facto leader, making all decision from nominating the election candidates to recruiting the rank and files to the lowest tier of the party (Verkaaik, 2016). This takes us to the final broad category proposed by Gunther and Diamond i.e. movement parties.

This type is, according to them, open-ended and newly emerging. Parties in pre-institutionalization phase can be put under this category. Kitschelt (2006) observes that movement-parties see traditional parties with contempt and less concerned about the internal organization of their party. They seek the institutional share by means of electoral participation and combine it with mobilization of their followers beyond parliament. Green parties or anti-immigrant right wing parties in different countries of Europe are such movement-parties. Mossige (2009) proposes the category of personalistic movement-parties which he places under the broader category of catch-all parties (p. 15). This type of parties differ from traditional personalistic parties in terms of mobilization during the inter-election period. They emphasis on mobilization of their members and at times engage in anti-institutional activities such as calling for strikes or taking control of public buildings to register their protests (p. 18). They tend to avoid a clear programmatic orientation and instead harp on populist slogans such as eradicating corruption, massive job creation or rapid economic growth. Their main purpose remains to further the agenda propounded by their leader, who usually happens to be their founding leader (p. 22)

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) that literally translates to Pakistan Justice Movement is one such party. Their leader Imran Khan founded the party on a single slogan of tackling the menace of corruption which he considers is the root cause of the poor state of governance in Pakistan. After facing successive electoral defeats when he started making alliance with the traditional politicians, he was criticized by some of the founding members and also by the large section of media for surrounding him with the same breed of politicians against whom he started his “movement”. He replied to his critics that if the leader at the top is honest then it becomes difficult for the lower tier politicians to engage in corrupt practices (Qaiser and M. Wu, 2019). In either full-scale democracies or hybrid regimes one or many types of these political parties exist. The set of rules or norms determining their interaction with each other, with their potential

voters, and how they respond to the interventions by different tutelary actors constitute the party system of any particular regime. In the next section I will reflect upon different types of party systems and its institutionalization.

ii. **Explaining Party Systems and Emergence of New Parties**

Studying party system has been central to the study of political parties and for conducting the comparative analysis of different electoral regimes. Party system can simply be defined as the constellation of two or more than two parties competing for the executive office (Wolinetz, 2006, p. 51). The analysis of party system is, however, not that simple as we see the difference of approach among scholars as to whether to analyze party system on purely quantitative terms, such as the number of parties (Duverger, 1954), the size of parties (Blondel, 1968) or some qualitative aspects are also needed, for instance, competitive strength of the opposition (Dahl, 1966) or their ideological position (Sartori, 1976). There is however, a consensus among scholars that for a political environment to be called a party system, more than one party is required. Therefore, one-party system appears to be a contradiction in terms (Neumann, 1956). One-party system should not be confused with the dominant-party system because in the latter, other parties exist but with relatively weaker position to compete.

Sartori (1974) insists on the distinctiveness of the party system from the parties constituting that system. He defines party system as

“... [the] systems of interaction resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in a mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties (p. 44).”

Here, Sartori emphasizes on the relational aspect of parties i.e. how their strategies are affected by the previous and prospective actions of their opponents. He argues that the number of electorally significant parties determine the level of polarization of the system. In a two-party or dominant party system, parties usually remain closer to centrist positions on issues. In contrast, in multi-party system there are high chances of parties taking more extreme positions. The more polarized the system, the more the degree of instability. However, that will be the case in contexts where parties are formed ideologically and do not exist as a gathering of notables.

In the case of such a party system which is populated by parties with vague ideological dispositions, the element of competition takes the central role for qualitative analysis of the party system. Dahl (1966), analyses different forms of competition faced by the incumbents from the opposition's side. The strategy of opposition vis-à-vis government according to Dahl has three dimensions. They are competitive, cooperative, and coalescent. He suggests that two party system with strong internal party unity tends to be more competitive while low internal unity of parties creates the possibility of cooperation. In multi-party systems, along with the proportional representation systems, the necessity of cooperation is inevitable. In unusual circumstances, such as post-civil war situation in Colombia, liberal and conservatives reached an agreement of alternation and power-sharing for four electoral terms. This, according to Dahl, is coalescent competition where the main element of opposition, which is competition, practically diminishes. In the case of such hybrid regimes where tutelary forces hold a significant position, political parties resort to cooperative competition not necessarily in elections but in the parliament to keep tutelary forces at bay. Dilemma arises when cooperation is done at the expense of another important element of democracy i.e. accountability. To create a balance between the two becomes an uphill task and may result in the emergence of a third party.

Lucardie (2000) puts forth a theory about the socio-political conditions that lead to the emergence of new parties. The first challenge, according to him, the new parties face is to present the social problems as political issues and also to come up with political solutions to whatever milieu they intend to mobilize the voters about. He classifies the newly emerging parties into three categories. Prolocutor parties, he claims are those that try to promote the interests of previously ignored groups by the established parties, due to their lesser electoral weightage. Those social groups can be some ethnic or religious minorities, peripheral regions or farmers (p. 176). Purifier parties are the defendant of the existing ideology of an already existing party. If the parent party shifts its ideology to the center or to either of the extremes of the left-right continuum. Instances of such splinter parties can be found in the evolution of European left leaning parties. During 1950s when the social democratic parties in Denmark and Netherlands adopted a moderate political manifesto then the radicals in those parties formed their own parties such as, People's Party in Denmark and Pacifist Socialist Party in Netherlands (p. 177).

New ideologies are also propounded in the wake of changing social or ecological circumstances. This may cause the emergence of new parties, comprise of the members who are concerned about those changes and believe that the established parties tend to ignore those concerns. These parties, Lucardie proposes, are prophetic parties (p. 178). Another residual category he proposes is of idiosyncratic parties that are ideologically ambiguous and deemed as propagating personal problems of the founders of the party as the social problems (p. 178)

Tavits (2008) claims that the emergence of new parties in new or comparatively weaker democracies is not the exception rather a norm. He observes that in post-communist democracies new parties had emerged in every elections with the average of 5.6. Their average vote share is 19% while some managed to get 50% share of the casted votes (p. 114). Entry of new parties depends on the calculation of aspiring elite whether the benefits to participate exceed its cost. It is determined by the notion of party viability. In newer electoral regimes voters are unable to vote strategically due to the shorter history of parties. They don't have much data at their disposal to determine the viability of parties. Therefore, incentives are high for new parties to emerge (Cox, 1997). If the elections cycle continues and certain parties survive multiple elections then it becomes less viable for new parties to contest in the presence of such established parties. Electoral laws also determine the emergence of new parties. If laws are stringent about party formation and its registration then it will dissuade the new aspirants. Degree of institutionalization of the older parties is also a major factor in this regard. If parties are too personalistic then any change at the leadership level of the party may cause split within those parties or force their members to join emerging parties (Chibber, p. 287). Disappointment of voters due to massive failures in terms of governance also plays a vital role in the volatility of the party system.

Political opportunity structure also contribute to the blocking or emergence of new parties. It is observed that in the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, lesser opportunities are available for the new parties unless they are bringing the grievances of an ethnic or religious collectivity into contention (Lijphart, 1990; Shugart, 1992). Similarly, the presidential system is also prone to fostering polarization and party concentration (Lucardie, p. 180). In hybrid regimes where tutelary actors have some formal or informal role to play, survivability of new parties heavily

depends on the approval of these actors. For instance, the Refah Party in Turkey despite securing majority in 1995 elections faced a ban because of their Islamist ideals being antithetical to the Kemalist notions of modernization. Turkish military being the self-proclaimed custodian of the secular foundations of the constitution, banned the Refah party and incarcerated its leaders (Gulap, 1999). In Pakistan the major leaders and parties emerged either under the tutelage of military or by securing tacit approval of the military. All these leaders and parties later develop a support base of their own but their rise to prominence and the first securing of government was a result of collusion with the military (Shah, 2019; Baxter, 1970; Weinbaum, 1977; Syed, 1991). It will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.

iii. Towards the Institutionalization of Party System

A prominent feature which distinguishes advanced democracies with most of the post-third wave electoral regimes is the rootedness of political parties in society. Manwaring and Torcal (2006) deliberate upon the importance of institutionalization for the analysis of party system. Developing a critique of Sartori's idea of party system consolidation, they contend that it should not be understood in a dichotomous fashion as suggested by Sartori rather it should be perceived as a continuum, where institutionalization exists in varying degrees. This approach is essential to grasp the nature and extent of institutionalization of party system as it exists in hybrid regimes. They defined institutionalization as "a process through which practices and organizations become well established and widely known, if not universally accepted" (p. 206). The institutionalized party system establishes the fact as to who are the main parties and provides high level of predictability about their course of action in the wake of election or legislations. Manwaring and Scully (1995) put forth four indicators of an institutionalized party system. First, the patterns of competition should be stable. They consider it the most obvious element as stability and institutionalization are interlinked. Second, strong party systems are rooted in society by means of strong party identification and close linkage with certain interest groups, such as working class or traders. The rootedness of parties contributes to the overall stabilization of the party system and furthers its institutionalization. Third, parties should be understood as the only legitimate source of representation. This element of legitimacy provides primacy to parties over other non-party contenders of power. Fourth, parties should work as an organization

composed of interdependent members, instead of being the instrument to further the personal interest of few leaders (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005, pp' 205-207)). Comparing the electoral volatility of advanced democracies with new electoral regimes,

It is observed that most of the party systems in the developing countries are fluid as compared to the "frozen" party system of western democracies as observed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). There can be multiple factors causing this volatility. One factor which contributes to decrease in volatility is improvement in human development index (HDI) (Mainwaring and Torcal, p. 207). It was observed that every increase of 0.100 in the HDI caused the reduction of 12.5% in electoral volatility (p. 208). GDP per capita is also observed as an important indication as an increase of \$1000 in GDP per capita led to the decline of 1.25% in terms of electoral volatility (p. 209). Therefore, it is observed that advanced industrialized countries enjoy more stable party system as compared to lower income countries. Mainwaring and Torcal argue that reason for the consolidation of the party system in western democracies is not improved standard of living rather in advanced democracies parties were responsible for the expansion of enfranchisement while new electoral regimes' parties did not play such a role. Instead, enfranchisement was a given in the case of the latter. They differ from Converse (1969) over the issue of declining volatility over a certain period of time if multiple elections have been held. They argue that the data does not support this proposition and the volatility remain high in the developing countries despite going through successive elections.

Strong roots of parties is also an important indicator to measure the institutionalization of parties. Various theories deal with this issue from different perspectives. Ideological linkage of party has been the most dominant dimension discussed in the literature. The proximity spatial model (Budge, 1994; Hinch and Munger, 1994; Downs, 1957) argues that voters associate with parties on the basis of ideological harmony with the parties. They chose the parties on the basis of their proximity with their programmatic interests (p. 210). The directional spatial model (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989) says that voters have preferences in terms of programmatic choices. They associate with the parties in terms of strong alignment of their most preferred programmatic choices with the programmatic orientation of the parties. The cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) argues that voters develop linkages with the parties as per their

sociological positions. That can be class, religion, ethnicity or the urban/rural divide. Manifestos of parties may resonate with the aspiration of any sector of the society. As a result, they develop strong bond with those parties in terms of their electoral choices.

Drawing upon the aforementioned body of literature Mainwaring and Torcal contend that in post third wave regimes such voter linkages do not necessarily exist. They claim that the previous theoretical traditions ignore that voting can be personalistic. Voters choose to vote for a party or a candidate for purely different reason. These reasons include clientelistic favors, personal or kinship linkages, or the leader's charisma, among others. A voter can chose a candidate to advance his material interests irrespective of his programmatic or ideological congruence with the candidate (p. 216). Personalization and characteristic of leaders has taken prominence over parties even in most of the parliamentary forms of government (Kaase, 1994). In the fluid party systems individual candidate and its linkage with the voters becomes more important than parties. The ability of that candidate to win the elections does not depend on his association with any particular party rather parties compete for bringing the winnable candidates to their parties. This fluidity of the party system can also be measured with the number of anti-party or independent candidates contesting and winning the elections (p. 216). Pakistan is one such example of fluid party system where parties tend to depend on notables in certain regions specially the rural areas. Party switching among these notables can make a great impact on electoral results. When PML-N came back to power in 2013, it had to accept many such politicians in the party who previously sided with the Musharraf regime. When many among them switched to PTI, especially in the South Punjab region, PML-N had to face a defeat in 2018 elections despite having strong clientelist network in northern and central Punjab.

One of the reasons of such fluidity in different electoral regimes even after multiple cycles of elections is due to the advent of television before the entrenchment of parties, which provided a medium to various political leaders to spread their electoral message without establishing their parties at the grassroots level. In the advanced democracies parties become rooted before the advent of mass media and created strong party identification within different strata of society (p. 219). Moreover, dismal performance in service delivery of governing parties in post third wave regimes has discredited the parties altogether (Tavits, 2005). This paves the way for non-party

politicians to secure constituencies and sometimes the presidential office as well, as it happened in Peru in 1990 and Colombia and Ecuador in 2002 (Mainwaring and Torcal, p. 216) . Constant fluctuation in parties' stances also makes it difficult for voters to identify with the party as they appear unreliable in terms of delivering upon their electoral promises. Weak ideological or programmatic standing of the parties also leads to constant party switching among candidates, thus weakening institutionalization. Non-party candidates or independents in Pakistan also fare well but over the years their vote percentage is declining and party labels are gaining more importance than contesting as an independent candidate.

Dalton and Weldon (2007) too highlight the importance of partisanship for the institutionalization of the party system. They propose that the social learning model (Converse, 1969) about partisanship is not useful for the new democracies or the regimes that has experienced periodic disruptions in electoral politics due to military coups. This is due to short history of elections which prevents the development of partisanship among voters. Therefore, the new voters don't get the "partisan push" (p. 184) through their families and their regions of residence. If the electoral process is periodically disrupted then the partisanship that was earlier developed loses its impact with the next generation of voters. They believe that low level of partisanship among voters of new electoral regimes can be solved by a consensus among elites regarding periodic and sustainable electoral process. Participation of citizens after every 4 or 5 years would inculcate the element of party identification among voters. Signs of emerging party identifications are visible in the recent elections of Pakistan where parties retained their strongholds for two or three consecutive elections (Mohmand, 2014). Luna (2014) argues that the element of stability and party rootedness in terms of programmatic orientation should be dealt with separately. This, he believes, is necessary because it is found in certain instances that parties stabilize on non-programmatic linkages. This can be due to different socio-political factors. He presents the example of Latin American countries such as Honduras, Chile, El Salvador where stability exists without strong programmatic orientation. Nevertheless, the ideal that should be pursued is the stability by means of programmatic linkage.

Randall and Svåsand (2002) suggest to make a distinction between party institutionalization and the institutionalization of the party system. They propose this due to the unevenness of party

institutionalization across the political spectrum as witnessed in various new electoral regimes. This could be because of the institutional advantages certain parties enjoy due to their proximity with the preceding authoritarian regime. In relation to some African countries he observes that certain parties consolidate their positions with respect to certain ethnic group and as a result institutionalization of parties take place along ethnic lines. Such consolidation of parties on the basis of ethnic cleavages kills the element of competition and resultantly weakens the party system. He also highlights the importance of funding in sustaining the political parties. Citing Malaysia and Taiwan as examples, he argues that there is a vast difference between the ruling party and the opposition parties in terms of resources to run effective campaigning. This asymmetry in terms of funding also hampers strong institutionalization of the party system because of its impact on the competitiveness of different parties. He therefore suggests that party institutionalization can be high but it does not necessarily translate into high institutionalization of the party system because of the unevenness present in the process of party institutionalization.

Robbin (2010) discusses the impact of party system institutionalization (PSI) over government spending and claims that weak institutionalization leads to less spending on public goods. In weakly institutionalized systems, when parties form the government, they have little incentive for public spending towards large social groups as their electoral success is not determined by their entrenchment in various social groups, rather among notables. As a result, the policy making revolves around benefiting a small group of elites that resultantly reflects the weak PSI. A comparative analysis of government spending on public and parochial goods is needed to measure the degree of PSI. Here by public goods, the reference is made to education, health, public infrastructure whereas parochial goods refer to the provision of government support to industrial or agricultural elite via subsidies (p. 243). This indicator is important to comprehend to understand the fact whether the party system of a given country is driven by masses or captured by a certain rent-seeking elite. Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) along with other elements, discuss the impact of previous authoritarian regime over the party system. Every authoritarian regime leaves a legacy of a certain elite that has been patronized during authoritarian rule. After the collapse of authoritarian rule, however, this elite retains some power which enables it to be a significant

party of the newly emerged party system. In the case of Pakistan, two major political leaders Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif gained their political stature under the patronage of a military ruler and subsequently they and their parties continue to dominate the party scenario of Pakistan.

C. Linkage of Weak PSI with the Stability of Hybrid Regimes

Existence and survivability of hybrid regimes defy the notions of regimes in transition about the electoral regimes that emerged after the third wave of democratization. This phenomenon gave birth to a body of literature to understand the peculiarities of these regimes which makes them distinctive to both authoritarian regimes and democracies. Despite of being the amalgam of both, hybrid regimes take a form of its own. Due to the multiparty competitive political milieu of hybrid regimes they cannot be termed as diminished sub-type of authoritarianism as proposed by Levitsky and Way. Similarly, due to the absence of either of the minimalist conditions of democracy they cannot be labelled as diminished sub-types of democracy. Therefore, a multi-continuum approach is proposed to understand the phenomenon as complex as hybrid regimes (Gilber and Mohseni, 2011) They propose three features to analyze the functioning and prospects of a hybrid regime. Those features are competitiveness, civil liberties and tutelary interference. The first element of competitiveness linked with the notions of electoral volatility and party rootedness proposed in our previous discussion of PSI. Gilbert and Mohseni claim that the quality of competition distinguishes the non-democratic regimes from democratic regimes. Competitiveness of any regime is determined by its impact on the distribution of power. If electoral competition does not alter the status-quo for successive elections then that regime cannot be classified as competitive. Therefore, it will be termed as an authoritarian regime. It is proposed that there has to be at least one alternation in terms of parties securing victories over at least four consecutive cycles of elections or over the period of twenty years. If any regime failed to demonstrate such alternation of power then it would not be considered as an electoral regime due to the futility of electoral process (p. 278). If a regime demonstrates multiple alternation of power and condition of hybridity persists then the notions of electoral volatility, degree of party institutionalization and party-rootedness needs to be analyzed. In this dissertation I argue that successive alternation of power should not mislead the observers in

terms of consolidation of democracy. Lack of programmatic linkage of parties with the voter and resultantly the non-rootedness of parties lead to another democratic deficit, found in different hybrid regimes i.e. tutelary interference.

Tutelary interference exist in hybrid regimes due to multiple reasons. The ideological orientation of the state render tutelary actors with certain privileges due to which they continue to interfere in the electoral and legislative processes. Iran is one such example of a tutelary regime where the clerics can ban individuals from contesting election and veto any legislation which they deem is against the ideological orientation of the state. Yet, the frequent turnover of power is observed and high degree of competitiveness culminates into a certain degree of uncertainty about the results of the elections (p. 292). Lack of consensus among the elite about democracy and periodic elections as the only “rule of the game” (Dore, 2014) also makes tutelary interference a permanent feature of a hybrid regime. In Pakistan the mobilization by the opposition parties against the governing party has been a constant phenomenon. Inability of the opposition parties and the governing party to reach an agreement has resulted into the intervention of military. In pre-2008 period that has resulted into three military coups. In the post-2008 period that has enabled military to retain some of its prerogatives in terms of policy making by exploiting the vulnerability of the ruling party (Hussain, 2017). This role of arbitrator has also provided the immunity to the military from parliamentary and judicial scrutiny. This impunity results into poor state of civil liberties as military agencies continuously engage in activities that hamper the fundamental freedom of political forces and ordinary citizens (Shah, 2014).

An important dimension that is missing from the multi-continuum approach of Gilbert and Mohseni is accountability. Due to clientelistic linkage of party and candidates with voters instead of programmatic linkage, abuse of power on the part of the ruling party to grant those clientelistic favors to their voters is rampant in certain hybrid regimes (Menocal et al., 2008). If it becomes a norm across all parties whenever they secure power then it weakens the institution of horizontal accountability. Granting government jobs is one of such clientelistic favors which political parties resort to. Such abuse of power results into decreasing efficiency of the bureaucracy and impacts the overall quality of governance. Poor service delivery due to the politicization of bureaucracy further diminishes the possibility of consolidation of democracy. Trust of people over democracy

declines as they associate political competition with corruption and elite capture of the system (p. 35). If political parties will remain the vehicle of the ambitions of individual leaders then it will continue prevent the transition of such hybrid regimes to consolidated democracies. Following are the indicators which I will deal with in this dissertation to analyze the impact of weak PSI over the sustainability of the hybrid regime in Pakistan.

- Competitiveness – Electoral Volatility and frequency of the alternation in power
- Quality of Competition – Party institutionalization in terms of programmatic linkage with the voters
- Tutelary interference – As a result of lack of party rootedness, lack of consensus among the elite about democracy as the only rule of game - Its impact on the state of civil liberties
- Horizontal Accountability – As a result of personalistic nature of party organization and clientelistic linkage with the voters

D. Party System Institutionalization in Different Hybrid Regimes

i. LATIN AMERICA

The region of Latin America has demonstrated a great degree of diversity in terms of party system institutionalization. Some countries remain institutionalized since 1990s while those that were inchoate in 1990s became more institutionalized till 2014 (Mainwaring in ed. Mainwaring, 2018. p.8). Uruguay and Chile remained institutionalized consistently with the decline of partisanship in Chile. Honduras remained the same until the military coup of 2009. This case tell us that high institutionalization does not necessarily prevent military intervention. Brazil showed immense improvement moving from an inchoate to a relatively better institutionalized system. In the case of Mexico, the hegemony of a single party was followed by a much more competitive party system. Some countries like Argentina where the level of institutionalization was high due to the presence of an old party i.e. the Radical Party, experienced a decline due to the erosion of traditional parties from the electoral scene. In the case of Colombia, the traditional liberal and

conservative parties have also experienced significant decline in their vote share but have not disappeared like the Radical Party of Argentina. These cases show a pattern of deep erosion. A pattern of collapse is observed in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela where old parties lost their dominant position with no signs of revival. Later, attempts were made to develop hegemonic party system in these countries by the governing party (p.9).

The strength and weakness of the party system in different countries of Latin America is highly determined by their performance when they are in government. Hagopian (2005 in ed. Hegopian and Mainwaring) presents three indicators to compare the performance of different countries. Those are strength of democracy (accountability and political stability), effectiveness (democratic governance and regulatory quality), and transparency and fairness of the regime (rule of law and control of corruption). These three indicators determine the trust of people over the parties in terms of their capacity to deliver. Highly competitive political regimes at times score low in terms of delivery. The lack of performance dents the credibility of individual parties and overall party system. As a result, the quality of democracy is affected. The countries in Latin America fare well in terms of their quality of democracy. They also show high performance in terms of governance. Costa Rica and Uruguay come to mind. Even Mexico and Brazil are mid-level performers, and therefore, exhibit stable party system. Popular consensus about democracy as the only legitimate system also diminishes due to bad performance in terms of governance. In 2002, 62 percent of Brazilians, 64 percent of Guatemalans, 57 percent of Colombians and 55 percent of Salvadorans were open to the possibility of non-democratic government if it manages to solve the economic crisis of their respective countries.

ii. East Asia

In the post third wave electoral regimes of Asia, the party system is marked by high volatility but certain countries show relatively high degree of stability due to the presence of strong parties that emerged during preceding authoritarian regimes. Examples include Indonesia, Mongolia and Taiwan (Croissant *and* Völkel, 2012, p. 249). Golkar in Indonesia, Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) in Mongolia and Kuomintang party (KMT) in Taiwan resemble in terms of their party strength, resulting from country wide organization. In the case of Thailand

and Philippines, parties remain inchoate and mostly focused on seeking office instead of policy formulation. Clientelist and kinship ties remain the main engine for electoral mobilization and resultantly weak party systems (Hicken, 2006). In the case of these Asian countries it is pertinent to note that the duration after the introduction of democracy did not have a correlation with the quality of party system because South Korea and Philippines, being the oldest electoral regimes, fared relatively poor as compare to relatively new electoral regimes. The important factor here is the existence of strong parties that played a role during authoritarian regime. After the collapse of authoritarian regime they still retain strong party organization and the new parties build up their organizational breadth to catch up with older parties (*Croissant and Völkel, 2012, p. 252*). Different forms of societal cleavages also factor in to determine the party system in East Asia. Indonesia has one predominant political cleavage of Islam vs Secularism. This is complemented by less electorally influential cleavages including, centre-periphery and rural-urban divide. In the case of Philippines such cleavages do not determine the electoral alliances or competition, therefore, a relatively weaker party system exists there in comparison to Indonesia. In Thailand, the situation changed in the 1990s when Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party elite somehow managed to invoke the cleavage between the urban middle class on the one hand, and the nexus of rural peasants and urban labor class on the other hand (Ockey, 2005). TRT championed the cause of the peasants and the labor class which were poorly represented before. In the case of Philippines the instability of party system in post-1986 period was because of the limitation of the presidential term to a single term. This resulted into intra-party conflicts due to the presence of multiple contenders for the office and culminated into party defection and in more extreme cases, party splits (Choi, 2001). In the case of Taiwan and South Korea, due to modernization, a strong working class emerged but the parties in both countries responded differently on the question of incorporating them as an organized group in parties. In Taiwan, KMT maintained strong ties with the labor unions and helped them unionize while in South Korea different parties failed to engage them. To incorporate such cleavages is important for strong party institutionalization and resultantly for the party system.

Another reason for the non-rootedness of parties in the societal cleavages is the existence of crosscutting cleavages which lead to the increased popularity of catchall parties. Emergence

of catchall parties can be by design to suppress societal fault lines for the sake of conflict management (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011, p. 581). By analyzing Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) reach a surprising conclusion. They suggest comparatively these three countries had a strong PSI due to the presence of strong authoritarian parties at the time of introduction of electoral politics. A relatively high institutionalized system may emerge from undemocratic practices. To counter such hegemonic parties, opposition forces have to come up with equally strong organization. Therefore, they suggest that it is imperative to understand party system institutionalization separately from democratic lens as there is a possibility that the roots of a stable party system lie in the preceding authoritarian regime.

iii. Africa

Many parties in African countries emerged as a result of anti-colonial struggle. The example of one such party can be the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) which started as a movement, then turned into a political party and later formed the government (Zolberg, 1969). These parties emerging from an anti-colonial struggle later formed a single party rule in many African countries. Many of these came to power through free elections but after assuming power put restrictions on the opposition and established their hegemony over the political scenario (Lewis, 1965). Therefore, after the third wave, the electoral process actually provided many authoritarian leaders to build up the façade of democracy in their countries by posturing themselves as true representative of their people (Ake, 1996). Many parties that participated in those elections demonstrated poor organizational capacities, which fostered pessimism regarding the consolidation of democracy in these countries. However, it is of our interest to take into account those factors which prevented the creation of strong party system required for better democratic performance.

By employing the PSI criterion of Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Kuenzi and Lambricht (2001), proposed their comparative analysis of inchoate and institutionalized party systems in Africa. They agree with Mainwaring and Scully (1995) insofar as the highly organized parties in hegemonic systems may give the illusion of high level institutionalization but the lack of competition may tell us otherwise (p. 442). They compare thirty African countries with the condition of at least two multi-party elections. The democratic reversals of Cote d'Ivoire and

Gambia did not stop them from the inclusion of these countries because they suggest that some lessons can be drawn with their experience with multi-party system before the democratic reversal. For the sake of determining the level of institutionalization—election is widely agreed as the only legitimate way to determine who will govern—they come up with three indicators. First, participation or boycott of elections by the opposition, second, the acceptance of defeat by the loser party and third, level of satisfaction of the international observers if there were any. They observe that in countries where the quality of democracy is very low, it could be possible that indicators of PSI show high results. This can be due to the controlled environment where electoral competition takes place which ensures the regular holding of elections without any boycotts. High electoral volatility could be because of the process of “deinstitutionalization”, where country is breaking away from the shackles of hegemonic party system and voters have yet to adjust with the new parties as happened in the case of Benin (p. 459). They rated these countries with the highest score of 9 and lowest of 3. Five countries that achieved aggregate score of 8 and above are those where the average age of parties is higher than other countries and resultantly have established constituencies. Elections held in these countries remain relatively free and fair due to party stability. Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire, although scoring between 6 and 8, have hegemonic party systems with some potential of transition. Their high aggregate score is due to the high institutionalization of the founding parties. Moreover, due to the founding parties’ role in the anti-colonial struggle, they enjoy loyalty of their supporters. Mauritius scores 7 because of low level of party loyalty due to the fluid nature of party alliances— even though the level of competition is high and history of competitive elections is quite long. The countries scoring below 6 constitute an inchoate party system, with low level of party loyalty, weak party roots and acceptance of party as the only medium of representation is very low.¹

iv. Hybrid Regime of Turkey

The case of Turkey is special to mention separately because of its resemblance with Pakistani politics vis-à-vis tutelary interference. It is important to take into account how in the case of

¹ This analysis of African countries holds true prior to 2001, when this research was published. The work is referred for it offers the richness of comparison across cases, and applies the PSI model of Mainwaring and Scully (1995).

Turkey, tutelary interference has declined but it does not necessarily transition from a hybrid regime. Instead, the nature of hybrid regime changed from a tutelary multiparty regime to a dominant party regime. Turkey, like Pakistan, had three military coups, not for equally longer periods of time though. The last successful coup of 1980 lasted only for three years but the military remained an influential actor even during civilian rule. The 1997 military intervention came when Erbakan's Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) managed to form a coalition government. Due to the Islamist orientation of that party, the Turkish military (which considered itself as the protector of Turkish secularism), pressurized the government to resign. Erdogan, with his Justice and Development party (Adalat ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP), took a different route than his Islamist successor. He projected himself as a pro-EU political leader and gradually gained the trust of the civil society through such tactics. He continued to win successive elections and cemented the position of his party by winning the constitutional referendum of 2010.

The judiciary, backed by Fethullah Gulen Movement (FGM), started prosecuting military officers on the charges of planning a military coup. This caused the rise of pro-FGM elements in the army as others were fearing judicial scrutiny. The entire senior military command resigned in 2011 in protest instead of launching a coup. This event can be marked as the end of tutelary regime of Turkey. FGM had already made inroads in the military, bureaucracy, and judiciary by benefitting from the alliance with AKP. When the difference grew between the former allies, FGM finally left the alliance in 2013. After that the relationship between the two took a bitter path when Erdogan started blocking the inclusion of individuals associated with FGM in the bureaucracy, provoking FGM to run a strong mobilization campaign against AKP before 2014 elections. Erdogan emerged stronger with more votes percentage. All of this led to the last ditch attempt of a military coup in 2016 when FGM sympathizers in the army took hostage most the senior military leadership and even tried to kidnap Erdogan. The attempt failed as thousands of people came on streets to thwart an impending military coup.

Caliskan (2017), discusses different 'pull' and 'push' factors proposed by Alfred C. Stepan (1988). Pull factors are those where the military, although incorporated in different policy related bodies, is reduced to a merely advisory role. It also involves the structural evolution of the state which eventually leads to the demilitarization of politics. Caliskan suggests that in the context of Turkey,

the increased business interests of the military, which gradually bound them by the discipline of the market, were instrumental pull factors. Another important factor was the changing international scenario in terms of tolerance towards military regime because of the fall of Soviet Union. This caused the shift in the policy of NATO and specially EU which became increasingly intolerant towards any sort of democratic defects if a country wanted a meaningful engagement with the EU. Turkey's inclusion in European Customs Union and later entering into the negotiations for the accession led to the declining role of military. Moreover, the inclusion of FGM sympathizers in the military affected the ideational integrity of the military and their inclusion in the bureaucracy created an anti-tutelary state elite.

Push factors can be defined as the set of strategic choices the civilian leadership resorts to, to gradually create a political scenario which is devoid of any military prerogatives. AKP, using the negotiations with the EU, started introducing certain amendments in the system. The wise thing they did was to avoid the framing of those moves as demilitarization but as necessary steps to gain the membership of EU. This led to the liberals in Turkey supporting such initiatives and Erdogan managed to get a substantive backing from the civil society. When the AKP's political position got consolidated through successive electoral victories, they made a bold but controversial move of holding the trial of military officers in the civilian courts. This did not lead to a coup, rather the resignation of military leadership. FGM tried to revive the tutelary role by instigating the 2016 coup but their attempt met a tremendous failure. After the end of tutelary role in Turkey, we still cannot consider it as a consolidated democracy or even a regime in transition due to the changing nature of the party system. The end of tutelary rule was achieved at the expense of the competitiveness of the party system.

Many observers have deliberated upon the emergence of dominant party system in Turkey and its implications for the nature of the regime (Gumuscu, 2013; Musil, 2015; Sayari, 2016; Carkoglu, 2011). In the case of AKP, according to Carkoglu (2011), the criterion laid out by Sartori for the dominant party system is satisfied. This is demonstrated by AKP's three consecutive electoral victories since 2011. Apart from the electoral victories, AKP vote share has substantially increased from 34.3 % in the first election to 49.8% in 2011 elections. The rise of AKP has also decreased the electoral volatility to 10%. On the sub-country level, AKP has also consolidated its position in

all the major metropolitan regions with the exception of Izmir. Gumuscu (2012) discusses the symbolic significance of this predominance of a party for the future electoral scenarios. He says that although this predominance bears positive results in terms of electoral volatility and political stability but it also delegitimizes the opposition. It sends signals to the voters about the insignificance of voting for the opposition parties because of their decreasing chances of winning. It creates a vicious cycle for the opposition which leads to either decline or stagnation of their vote percentage. This results into excesses of the ruling party and their abuse of power due to the weakening of vertical accountability. This might even lead to constitutional amendments to further cement the ruling party's power, such as recently in the referendum regarding the presidential system. Gumuscu in 2012 predicted that Turkey is transforming into a competitive authoritarian regime as proposed by Levitsky and Way (2002).

Caliskan (2018) labels contemporary Turkish regime as competitive authoritarian with the potential of turning into full scale authoritarian regime after the 2017 constitutional referendum. The referendum took place under the state of emergency, which was extended for six times after the failed military coup of 2016. All the 72 amendments were presented as a package instead of letting the public vote separately on each amendment, with only two options of Yes and No. There is a huge crackdown against dissenters by prosecuting them through a compromised judiciary. Due to the constitutional amendments, the President has been given immense executive power with shrinking space for both vertical and horizontal accountability. The case of Turkey demonstrates that party institutionalization does not necessarily translate into party system institutionalization and the end of tutelary interference does not necessarily pave the way for democratic consolidation.

We have established in our previous discussion that both party institutionalization and party system institutionalization are necessary for the quality of democratic practices in the country. Strong parties are necessary to counter tutelary forces but multiple strong parties are necessary to prevent the emergence of hegemonic party system. A lack of rootedness of the parties continues to create the space for non-political actors and in certain cases provides legitimacy for their interventions. In the context of this theoretical and empirical background we now move on

to the case of Pakistan and will analyze how parties in Pakistan have historically shown their incapacity in terms of the institutionalization of the party system.

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FORTY YEARS OF CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITARIANISM (1947-1988)

A TALE OF POLITICAL VOLATILITY

Pakistan was created on the demands of the Muslims of British ruled India of a separate state due to the fear of Hindu majoritarian rule after British authorities left India. After the creation Pakistan faced political and economic crisis right from the onset. Death of the founding Leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 and subsequent tug of war among different political leaders and parties caused a constitutional crisis and till 1956 the leadership was unable to come up with an agreed constitution. This turmoil led to the first military rule of General Muhammad Ayub Khan which lasted for eleven years. After a massive political agitation he transferred his powers to General Yahya Khan who after agreement with the parties conducted Pakistan's first multiparty nation-wide elections in 1970. Instead of creating a competitive multiparty democratic regime that election culminated into the dismemberment of Pakistan after the secession of its eastern part. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who did serve in the cabinet of Ayub Khan emerged as the populist leader but failed to capitalize on the weakness of the army after losing the war of 1971. He, on the contrary, demonstrated highly authoritarian tendencies and his high handedness vis-à-vis his political opposition resulted into another political crisis after 1977 elections. This provided the army a pretext to intervene and impose a military rule. The military rule of Zia-ul-Haq came amidst Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which disturbed the social fabric of the country by spreading the culture of Jihad (Holy War). In this section of this dissertation we will discuss that how the constant failure of the political leadership created an environment of volatility and political instability and resulted into two ideologically different but tactically similar military rules.

A. Creation of Pakistan as a result of a Contentious Political Process

Pakistan came into existence as a result of a political struggle by All India Muslim League (AIML), founded in 1906. The party was created due to the political aspiration of a Muslim elite of British India, mostly the graduates of Aligarh College (Bahadur, 1954). Initially, the idea was to protect the rights of the Muslim minority by remaining loyal to the British colonial powers but later due to the changing local and international circumstances, started demanding more autonomy for Muslim majority states and then later a separate country for them. Muhammad Ali Jinnah

happens to be the central key politician who kept pushing the British authorities regarding this demand. He had to face multiple challenges in the forms of British colonial authorities, Indian National Congress (INC) and other Muslim faction that include both pan-Islamist forces and ethnically charged Muslim political leaders in different Muslim majority provinces (Jalal, 1994). After the 1919 reforms, introduced by the colonial authorities the provincial legislative councils were given more autonomy. This caused the Muslim leadership of Muslim majority provinces more regional in their orientation instead of backing the national level movement of all the Muslims of India. Initially the Muslim League was mainly supported by the Muslim minority provinces as they felt the direct threat of Hindu majority (Pirzada, 2007). Failure of the Muslim League regarding making inroads in the majority provinces, caused Jinnah to leave India in disappointment. Jaffrelot (2015) rightly said that Muslim League was initially a club of elite that was in search of not only a state but also in search of nation due to the stark differences in the political aspirations of the Muslim leadership.

Jinnah came back in 1935 after the persuasion of Liaquat Ali Khan, an advocate of land owner's right and later the main confidante of Jinnah. The Government of India Act of 1935 also contributed to his decision of assuming the leadership of Muslim League. By that time he had no such aspirations for the separate state, therefore he offered to the Congress to agree to a power sharing formula on the basis of equality. He repeated this offer after the 1936-37 provincial elections after meeting a humiliating defeat of Muslim League when it managed to secure no seat or less than other Muslims parties in the Muslim majority provinces. Muhammad Iqbal, another prominent leader of Muslims and a popular poet wrote to Jinnah in 1937 that Muslim League has to decide between representing the upper class Muslims or the masses as they have shown no sign of interests in the politics of Muslim League (Jafferlot, 2015, p. 53). Jinnah's offer of making a coalition governments in different provinces. In United Provinces (UP) INC offered one ministry to the Muslim League and also demanded the dissolution of the party and INC claimed to be the true representatives of all the Indians irrespective of their religious associations. This proposal was not acceptable to the Muslim League, therefore it started campaigning against INC and portrayed it as a party aiming at Hindu majoritarian rule (Sayeed,

1968, p. 85). This campaign gained momentum especially in the minority provinces and Muslim League gained strength out of it.

A pact was signed between Jinnah and Sikandar Hayat of Punjab province and agreement was reached with Fazl-ul-Haq in the Bengal province. According to these agreements all the Muslim parties were to maintain their separate identities at provincial level but at central level Muslim League will be considered as the sole representative party of all the Indian Muslims (Parveen, 2013, p. 41). Resignation of Congress ministers in 1939 to protest the Indian inclusion in 2nd World War without consulting the Indian people, gave Muslim League opportunity to negotiate with the British authorities about the future of the Muslims. In the Annual gathering of Muslim League in Lahore in 1940, a Resolution was passed that proposed the idea of the creation of two Muslim states in North-Western and Eastern part of India. That was later supported by the resolution in Sindh legislative assembly in 1943. This was followed by different missions sent by British government to negotiate a settlement about the Future of India. The Cripps mission of 1941 failed to broker any agreement between INC and Muslim League. The Cabinet mission of 1946, after meeting the representatives of both the parties refused the idea of Pakistan and termed it impractical due to the substantive non-Muslims minority in the proposed parts of Pakistan (Sayeed, 1969). This situation got changed after 1946 provincial elections.

As the war-torn British authorities were ready to grant India its freedom the political solution between the Hindus and Muslims was imperative. Muslim League started mobilizing the masses of majority provinces by invoking their religious fervor. As a result, they managed to gain a resounding victory which was unimaginable few years back. Muslim League secured two-thirds of all the reserved Muslim seats. That strengthened the case of Muslim League as the sole representative of all the Indian Muslims. Both parties almost reached an agreement of a looser confederation of Muslim majority and Hindu majority provinces with the center dealing with foreign affairs, defence and communications but due to Nehru's ambiguous statement about not honoring the agreement after British authorities leave, Muslim League retreated from the agreement (Jafferlot, p. 95). On 16th August, 1946, Muslim League call for a countrywide demonstration. During which in Calcutta riots took place that resulted into few thousands killings. This was followed by riots in Bihar and then Punjab. This ended any hope of an amicable solution

between both the parties and then the dreams of the Muslim of a separate state came to fruition on 14th August, 1947. In the next section we will see that how Muslim League failed to emulate the INC in terms of sustaining as the hegemonic party that was needed to bring about political stability in a new born country. How the ethnic tensions and internal party rifts, coupled with the economic and migration crisis, Pakistan failed to achieve a vibrant party system facilitated by a mutually agreed constitution.

B. Constitutional and Political Crisis

The partition of India created a geographically most unique situation. Pakistan was constituted of the North-Western territory, including the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the eastern party was at the east of India. The two parts of Pakistan were divided by 1000 miles of the territory of India. Although, it was established on the name of religious identity of Muslims but it was comprised of different ethnicities and ethnic cleavages were not subsided by the common ground of religion (Kundi and Jahangir, 2002, p.24). Pakistan had to face a massive refugee crisis due to migration of Muslims from the Hindu majority provinces of India and the border disputes emerged on the question of the Kashmir region due to which Pakistan right at its beginning in 1948 engaged in a small scale war with India and managed to secure one-third of the Kashmir region. With certain amendments, government of India Act, 1935 was adopted as an interim constitution. Jinnah was appointed as the first Governor General of the country. This provisional constitution gave the Governor General executive and legislative powers. Right from the ministers to the judges every single constitutional appointments were to be made by the orders of the governor general. In the original act of 1935, discretionary powers were given to the Governor-General but in the adapted act such powers were abolished and he had to act on the advisory of the cabinet (Burks, 1954, p. 547).

The two constituent assemblies were created at the time of partition for both India and Pakistan. They were to perform two primary functions of preparing a constitution and legislating before the promulgation of the first constitution. Pakistan's constituent assembly was comprised of members from two parties, Muslim League with fifty-nine seats and Pakistan National Congress

with 10 seats. In September, 1948 Jinnah succumbed to his long illness that created a void in terms of leadership. There was no leader in the entire Muslim League to match his authority. Khawaja Nazimuddin replaced him as the Governor-General but the real authority in the party remained with the Liaquat Ali Khan as both the Prime Minister but also as the perceived successor of Jinnah. Liaquat, from the onset embroiled in a political conflict with the provincial and central political leadership. The first challenge came after the submission of Objective Resolution to the assembly which contained certain Islamic clauses, which were included on the pressure of Ulema (Islamic clergy), that worked to the dismay of Hindu members of the assembly, who were mostly from the East Pakistan region. They also campaigned for the greater autonomy for the eastern wing and demanded that Bengali should be declared as a national language apart from Urdu (Choudhury, 1955, p. 590).

In 1951 two events took place that sow the seeds of political instability in the following years. A failed coup attempt was made by General Akbar Khan in collusion with the communist leadership and a prominent literary figure, Faiz Ahmed Faiz. That coup attempt which is known as "Rawalpindi Conspiracy", showed the early signs of impatience among the ranks of Pakistan military (Innes, 1953, p 307-9). Another event was the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan by an associate of Jamat-i-Islami (a religio-political party), Syed Akbar. It was later found that he had worked with British and Pakistani intelligence agencies. To date, no findings has been made public about the motives of that assassination. He was killed on the spot, which made post-assassination investigation a difficult task (Zaidi, 2010). Khwaja Nazimuddin was made the Prime Minister and Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat, who also served as the finance minister, made the governor general. That was the beginning of the bureaucracy replacing politicians in terms of managing the affairs of the state. Nazimuddin couldn't show the mettle of leadership like his predecessors and failed to prevent the internal party rifts. The factions within the party was on ethnic lines and were comprised of Punjabis, Bengalis and Muhajirs (Wright, 1966). There was also a split from the party of the leftist faction that turned into a powerful opposition party, Awami Muslim League (AML). This party was led by Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, who happened to be the Chief Minister of Bengal province in 1946-47. He developed differences with Jinnah on the issue of division of Bengal at the time of partition.

Language issue gained currency in East Bengal, where riots broke out on the demands of the recognition of Bengali as the national language. At this point, the Muslim League's leadership demonstrated their incapacity to manage an issue and because of their rigidity this conflict blew out of proportion. It weakened the position of Muslim League in the eastern part as the feelings of disenchantment among Bengalis were growing. The drafting of the constitution was further delayed because of the pressures of the religious clergy to make it in accordance with their interpretation of the Islamic teaching. The first draft which was proposed, was rejected by the Bengali representatives as it asked for the parity in terms of the representation of both the eastern and western party. Eastern part, being more populous than the western part demanded more seats and that resulted in the deadlock (Lambert, 1959). That draft did also suggested Urdu as the only national language which was another point of contention between the politicians of both parts. Islamic parties also got united on the issue of Ahmedi, sect, which they considered heretic because of their different belief on the finality of Prophet-hood than other Muslims. Mainly two religious parties, Jamat-i-Islami and Majlise-e-Ahrar led a campaign that resulted into massive killings (Haroon, 2008). Lahore was the epicenter of that unrest, therefore, for the first time a Martial Law was imposed which was limited to one city. Interestingly, these two parties were against the creation of Pakistan but later became highly invested in the project of the Islamization of Pakistan.

This resulted into the arrest of the leadership of these Islamist parties and also dismissal of the Punjab government. Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad also sacked the Prime Minister in a very unceremonious fashion. Legal battle started and Nazimuddin challenged the decision in the court. The high court termed it illegal but the Supreme Court affirmed the decision by invoking the infamous "Doctrine of Necessity" (Newberg, 2002). This was not the last time that the Supreme Court legitimized the unconstitutional moves. Later, we will see that how the courts were used by military dictators to legitimize their coups and other unconstitutional measures. The dismissal of Nazimuddin strengthened the civil and military bureaucracy at the expense of political leadership. Muhammad Ali Bogra was made the Prime Minister, who was actually serving as the Ambassador of Pakistan in the United States. Iskander Mirza, a retired major general, as the defence secretary and Ayub Khan as the commander-in-chief of the army became

the most powerful individuals in the circle of confidantes of the Governor-General (Kiran, 2012, p.210). Muslim League, on the other hand as a party suffer the decline of its popularity and couldn't demonstrate the role of the uniting force as the founding party of the country. After securing victory in 1951, 1953 provincial elections of Punjab, NWFP and Sindh amidst the accusations of massive electoral rigging but the major setback came in 1954 provincial elections of Bengal where it was defeated by the coalition named, United Front.

This defeat of Muslim League might suggest the emergence of a multiparty system but it wasn't a stable one. Parties were emerging and splitting at a rapid pace. The ideological coherence wasn't there as both the leftists and rightist were divided into several parties. Apart from the Muslim League the only national level party was the Islamist Jamat-i-Islami, which was capable of street agitation but did not have the party machinery to assure the electoral victory (Aziz, 2007). Shurawardy, who earlier formed the Awami Muslim League, but due to the regional divide within the party later joined Krishak Sramik Party of Fazl-ul-Haq to form the United Front. Another attempt was made to form a national level party by combining the regional leadership of Bengal, Sindh and NWFP in the form of National Awami Party (NAP) but due to growing intensity of Bengali nationalism could not grow as a national level party (Rashiduzzaman, 1970). Republican Party was another splinter group of Muslim League, formed in 1955. Most of the parties had either regional character or weak ideological or programmatic basis. Muslim League itself was an ideologically confused party and was amalgamation of land lords and urban educated middle class. Another factor that contributed to both intra party and inter party tensions was Public and Representatives Officers (Qualification) Act (PRODA) which was promulgated on 26th January, 1950. As per the act anyone including government officials and common citizens could launch a complaint against the ministers or elected official regarding abuse of the office through corrupt practices. If found true, those officials could be disqualified for ten years. Politicians invoked this act for settling their vendettas against their political rivals. These practices also led to the declining credibility of the political class and further enhanced the grip of civil and military bureaucracy over state apparatuses (Jafferlot, 2002, p. 261).

C. Adoption of Constitution and its aftermath

Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the constituent assembly and constituted 'all-talents cabinet' to run the affairs of the state in a non-partisan manner. Contrarily, it strengthened those politicians and civil servants who were in favor of integrating all the provinces of the western party into a single unit (Kennedy, 1993). As a result, the federation of Pakistan would be composed of two provinces East Pakistan and West Pakistan. New constituent assembly was created through indirect elections by making provincial assemblies as the electorate. On the advice of Prime Minister, the Governor-General passed the ordinance to create the infamous "One-Unit". Prominent leader of the Republican Party, Dr. Khan Sahib was made the chief minister of West Pakistan as a consolation to the enraged Pashtun community. Due to deteriorating health of Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza replaced as governor-general. Bogra was replaced by Chaudhary Muhammad Ali as Prime Minister as a result of the alliance of convenience between Muslim League and Awami League. This alliance didn't last for long and Muslim League then made an alliance with their political rivals, United Front (Kiran, p.210).

On 23rd March 1956, new constitution was adopted despite widespread opposition which relinquished Pakistan of its dominion status of the British Commonwealth. Objective Resolution of 1949 was adopted as the preamble and to the pleasure of religious parties it was mentioned that no law can be made against the principles of Islam. Only Muslims were allowed to be the head of the government and the state. Post of governor-general was replaced by President. Universal suffrage was assured and tens seats were reserved for women in the assembly. It also talked about protection and economic development of backward regions and groups (Choudhury, 1956). Iskander Mirza was elected the President through constituent assemblies. He showed his unwillingness to conduct elections on the pretext of the differences among political parties over the electorate system. Majority of the members of assembly were also not in a hurry as they themselves were elected in an indirect manner. Date of elections were announced but later it was postponed. Between 1956 and 1958 four Prime Ministers were elected from different parties. The parliamentary politics was full of chaos. One among those four Prime Ministers lasted for less than three months. Eventually, Iskander Mirza, who did already propose a Presidential system, imposed Martial Law on 8th October, 1958, abrogated the constitution, dissolving the assemblies and banned all the political parties (Pardesi, 2012).

D. Impact of the Inchoate Party System

Like most newly decolonized state Pakistan too struggle with the mammoth challenge of finalizing the constitution which is acceptable to all sections of the society. What was Pakistan lacking were strong parties that were well entrenched in terms of their grass root level organization. In most of the newly decolonized countries the founding parties, which played central role in the freedom struggle, used their popularity to build up the consensus over the constitution. In India, the Indian National Congress (INC) had such nation-wide organization which provided the political pivot to a country which was immensely rich in terms of both ethnic and religious diversity (Kothari, 1964). Therefore, it took India merely 3 years to bring the constitution into effect while political parties in Pakistan struggled till 1956 to complete the task. The emergence of dominant party system was not unique to India rather in many countries the parties that either struggled against the colonial powers or the authoritarian rule, dominated the political landscape for many years to be followed (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2005). The dominant party system is considered detrimental to the quality of democracy but it provides political stability that is mostly needed for the newly independent countries and the transitional regimes (Karume, 2004). The absence of stability may result into democratic reversal as happened in the case of Pakistan in its formative phase.

Arian and Barnes (1974) suggest that the dominant party system has been neglected as a model that combines democracy with stability. They explain that the dominant party system is different from single party system due to the existence of the political opposition but the weakness of the opposition lead to similar electoral results in multiple successive elections. The dominant party is constrained due to being held vertically accountable through elections but enjoy greater degree of freedom than their counterparts in the multiparty system. The electoral stability enable the ruling party to adopt long term policies without being bothered by the electoral scrutiny. This predictability of electoral results can have an adverse effect in the form of complacency which further results into dismal state of governance. The dominant party can prolong their preponderance by bringing different fragments of society into their fold to make their party organization as inclusive as possible (p. 603). This can have two fold effects. First it will help the party devising policies reflective of diverse concerns of different sections of the society and

prevent the monopoly of a particular interest group. Second, it provides political stability by restricting the opportunities for the opposition to mobilize aggrieved sections of the society. If the predominance of the party is achieved through brutal suppression of dissent instead of prudent political strategies than it will not be considered as dominant party system rather it will be termed as single party authoritarianism (Greene, 2010).

Muslim League despite being the founding party could not achieve that predominance due to multiple factors. Death of Jinnah, the founding father and the assassination of the first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan deprived Muslim League of the leadership capable of holding the party together. Another factor was the poor organization of the party in the Muslim majority provinces which constituted Pakistan. Among all the Muslim majority region, the league was most organized in the Bengal region, half of which became the eastern part of Pakistan. By 1944, Muslims had 500,000 registered members in Bengal as compared to 150,000 member in Punjab and merely 48, 500 in Sindh (Talbot, 2017, p. 156). Due to the lack of programmatic clarity the party was fragmented on both ethnic and ideological lines. Growing influence of the conservative faction which was against the land reforms and insistent on denying the Bengali language the status of national language, sowed the seeds of resentment among the progressive and Bengali members of the party. This led to the defection of the members to form a new party, Awami League in 1949 (Nair, 1990).

Religion was also instrumentalized to delegitimize the demands of provincial autonomy. Those who raised such demands were declared as fifth columnist who are working against the unity of the country. Some of those conservative leaders took their propaganda to an extreme level and declared those who voted against League as Kafirs (infidels) and not worthy of getting buried in the Muslim graveyard (Talbot, p. 157). Insistence on the Islamic identity had to do with the composition of the party. The dominance of the faction comprised of the Muslim minority provinces of India resulted into the policy of strong center because of the lack of power base of these migrant politicians. They did not see plurality as the strength of the parliamentary politics rather they fear it due to their smaller numbers. They found strong partners in the form of landed elite of Punjab which was also fearful of Bengalis being the majority ethnic group. Such exclusivist politics of the migrant and Punjabi politicians led to the language riots of 1952 in East Pakistan

that resulted into killings of students. This policy of high handedness on the part of politicians from the West Pakistan made Muslim League face its first electoral defeat in the provincial elections of 1954 in East Pakistan. Muslim League was almost wiped out in the eastern wing as it secured only 9 seats as compared to the thumping majority of the United Front of 223 seats (Ibid).

Such turbulent political environment led to civil and military bureaucracy taking the center stage. Weak party organization of Muslim League in West Pakistan also contributed to the rise of bureaucracy to prominence. It is pertinent to note here that at the time of independence both bureaucracy and military was short of skilled personnel and also poorly equipped yet they gradually replaced politicians in terms of managing the affairs of the state (Jalal, 1995). This happened due to the existence of ideologically incoherent founding party and consequently highly contentious political environment. Bureaucracy was used to maintain a strong control of the center over provinces and military was deployed to deal with ethnically and religiously charged protestors. Introduction of PRODA (1949) also strengthened the bureaucracy by using it to disqualify politicians on the charges of corruption. Ghulam Muhammad's rise to the office of governor general expedited this process of de-democratization of politics. The judiciary instead of holding him accountable, legitimized his dismissal of the constituent assembly. The 2nd constituent assembly that eventually finalized the first constitution was indirectly elected and another bureaucrat Chaudhary Muhammad Ali was made the Prime Minister. Iskander Mirza's replacement of Ghulam Muhammad cemented the iron grip of military and bureaucracy over both executive and legislative organs of the state (Griffiths, 1959). Therefore, the fragility of a nascent party system and unwillingness of political forces to overcome it paved the way for the first military rule in Pakistan.

E. Ayub Khan's military rule: Experimentation with "Democracy"

Iskander Mira appointed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law administrator but the latter was interested in absolute control of the executive powers. He on 28th October, arrested Mirza and sent him to exile to Britain. Supreme Court again legitimized the Martial Law as a usual international practice. Civil servants of all ranks were scrutinized related to their corrupt

practices. A tribunal was formed comprised of the retired judges of high courts and Supreme Court was formed to investigate the allegations against them. Around three thousand civil servants were either dismissed or demoted. For politicians an ordinance was promulgated. Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO), was very broad in its scope. Apart from corruption, it also held politicians accountable for any activity resulted into political instability (Wheeler, 1963). In the case of disqualification, an arbitrary date of 31st December, 1966 was set in that ordinance for the duration of disqualification. What could be expected of a military rule except of arbitrariness? Several notable politicians of national stature were specifically targeted and humiliated during the hearing and personal grudges of Ayub Khan vis-à-vis some politicians resulted in their disqualifications (Kaushik, 1963, p. 388).

Ayub Khan after proclaiming himself as Field Marshal transferred the command of the army to General Muhammad Musa. Military also took over the bureaucracy as several generals took the charge of various departments. Much delayed land reforms were introduced to tackle the issue of dismal agricultural productivity. These reforms though brought about some changes but common peasants remained largely unbenefited (Ul Haq, 1973). A private sector oriented industrial policy was adopted by easing the existing regulatory mechanisms regarding the access of raw materials and also deregulation of the sales of wheat and rice. Tax reforms were introduced to benefit the private sector by reducing the maximum tax rates. Policy of five years plan was introduced to boost the economy and creating a certainty among the business community regarding the government policies. Ayub's economic policies though massively increased the industrial productivity but it contributed to increase gross inequalities. Monopoly of few families was created due to the relaxed taxation policies. It was later became a slogan for anti-Ayub campaign that twenty two families are ruling Pakistan (Ibid))

Due to his personal disliking of the existing political class, he took upon himself to introduce new political actors through the policy of devolution. He termed this policy as "Basic Democracies". It was termed as devolving the democracy to the grass roots level but inherently it was a bureaucratic authoritarian system. The lowest tier was the union council whose head was though elected but with nominal powers. Councils were comprised of both elected and nominated members. Nomination was done by the district bureaucracy. The real financial powers lied with

commissioners and deputy commissioners. For every ten thousand people there was one union council. This BD system further reinforced the already colonial mindset of the bureaucracy. These eighty thousand members of different councils were termed as “Basic Democrats” and they also constitute the Electoral College for the presidential elections and for the election of legislative assemblies, according to the 1962 constitution. The 1962 elections of central and provincial assemblies were conducted on a non-party basis that further entrenched the powers of influential individuals at the expense of the party system (Musarrat & Azhar, 2012). Very reluctantly, he lifted the ban on the opposition party to allow the existence of a symbolic opposition faction within the assembly named, Council Muslim League. The ruling faction was Convention Muslim League and Ayub Khan was ‘elected’ its president in 1963. It is amusing to note that how the original Muslim League was in tatters just after a few years of the creation of the country, but all the dictators named their puppet parties as Muslim League just to use the goodwill attached with the name by virtue of being the founding party of Pakistan (Qureshi, 1966).

i. Resurgence of Political Parties and Presidential Elections of 1965

After transferring the command of the army to General Musa, Ayub became an ordinary civilian president, although backed by the army. Council Muslim League started voicing its dissent in the assembly over the policies of the regime. Nazimuddin and Mumtaz Daultana were the prominent leaders of the Council League. Another opposition party which became active was the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman after the demise of Shurawardy. National People’s Party was another left-leaning party comprised mainly of aggrieved ethnic groups such as Baloch, Pashtuns and Bengalis. After the announcement of 1965 presidential elections, a coalition of both left and center-right parties was formed to defeat Ayub Khan for the sake of restoration of parliamentary democracy. It was a highly ideologically incoherent alliance with each party having different post-election agendas. Fatima Jinnah, sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was fielded as the joint candidate of the opposition. She led a nation-wide campaign and addressed massive political rallies. It was an indirect election with basic democrats constituting the Electoral College, Ayub Khan managed to secure victory. Nevertheless, the elections provided an opportunity to the opposition to mobilize masses on the issues of public concern (Sayeed,

1966). The 1965 war with India provided Ayub an opportunity to deviate the attention of people from growing economic inequalities. The war lasted for few days and ended in a stalemate. The war further increased the estrangement between the eastern and western party and Mujeeb proposed his famous six points demanding greater regional autonomy for East Pakistan with a separate currency as well. Another opponent of Ayub, was his former minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who resigned in protest after the Tashkent declaration with India (Ziring, 1973). He formed his own party Pakistan People's Party (PPP). These opposition forces used the growing unrest among the people for their benefit. The main reason for the unrest was that the large chunk of the population was not able to reap the benefits of the industrial and overall economic development. Indirect taxes were increased significantly while the direct taxes on the rich capitalists and landlords declined in both relative and absolute terms (Wilcox, 1969). In 1968, the opposition gained momentum and started demanding the resignation of Ayub. They wanted new elections to be held as per the norms of parliamentary form of democracy. Bhutto was pitching the idea of 'Islamic Socialism' to mobilize the masses by exploiting the existent economic inequalities for his political gains. Ayub's regime tried both repression and negotiation to tackle the opposition but it did not pacify the situation. Eventually, on 25th March, 1969 he transferred the authority to General Yahya Khan and resigned from the presidency.

ii. 1970 Elections and Dismemberment of Pakistan

Yahya Khan imposed another Martial Law but did not ban the political parties rather limited their activities. He had two major challenges to deal with. First was the political instability especially in East Pakistan and the economic prices due to the price hikes of basic necessities. The military regime decrease the prices of wheat and provided tax exemptions to the farmers to control the prices of food items. Increase in minimum wage was promised. On administrative side, after abrogating the 1962 constitution, the infamous one-unit was abolished and former provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab and NWFP were restored. To tackle the instability of East Pakistan, they were promised higher representation in the military and civilian bureaucracy. Half of the ministers of Yahya administration were from East Pakistan (Ziring, 1974). New elections were announced earlier on October 1970 but due to cyclones in East Pakistan they were postponed till December, 1970. These elections were unique in the sense that for the first time a national level

parliamentary elections was being held in a direct fashion. All previous assemblies at central level were the result of indirect elections.

Elections were contested in a highly competitive environment in terms of participation of multiple parties and gave a hope of beginning of sustainable multiparty parliamentary democracy. However, two major parties Awami League and People's Party (PPP) chose to limit their campaigns in East and West Pakistan respectively. Awami League, led by Mujeeb was mainly focusing in East Pakistan and did not file a single candidate in West Pakistan and the focus of their campaign was greater provincial autonomy. PPP, led by Bhutto on the other hand was a new entrant but gained popularity in West Pakistan in a short span of three years. Bhutto being an excellent orator, mobilized his electoral support on the promises of socialism and anti-imperialism. PPP also left the electoral field of East Pakistan open for the Awami League by not contesting even in a single constituency. Absence of direct contest between two major parties diluted the quality of electoral competition (Mujahid, 1971). Electoral results did shake the military establishment as Mujeeb secured a landslide victory in East Pakistan by securing 160 out of 162 allotted seats for East Pakistan. Bhutto also fared well in West Pakistan by securing 81 seats out of 138 and he was followed by two Muslim Leagues. Army did not accept the results and delayed the transfer of power. By March, 1971 massive protests engulfed East Pakistan. A rebellious force Mukti Bahini was formed which was composed of both civilian and defected military officers. That resulted into military action in East Pakistan and eventually a war broke out between India and Pakistan in December. This war ended in the secession of East Pakistan and a new country emerged named Bangladesh. The elections which were expected to bring stability to the country resulted into its dismemberment. However that led to the emergence of a populist political leader in the remaining part of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He went on to leave a massive impact on the political landscape of Pakistan (Baxter, 1971).

F. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Democrat with an Authoritarian Mindset

Bhutto remains to be a divisive icon across the political spectrum of Pakistan. Some criticized him for his authoritarian and repressive policies while other hail him for his pro-poor policies and for the 1973 constitution. His rule was mix of both. He assumed the premiership when the wound of losing a part of the country was very much fresh and military was at its lowest after the defeat.

It provided him with an opportunity to begin a political process in the country which would lay a strong foundation of democracy but due to his obsession with absolute power prevented the fruition of such dream. During the campaign for 1970 election he was mainly focused on West Pakistan and left the Eastern part uncontested for the Awami League. He came up with the election slogan of “Roti, Kapra aur Makaan” (food, clothing and shelter) and promised to bring a socialist revolution. When the right wing parties started criticizing his socialist agenda as heretic, he changed it into “Islamic Socialism” by invoking the religious concept of “Masaawat” (equality among followers). The complete slogan was “Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity; socialism is our economy (Hussain, 1994).” After Awami League secured majority, Bhutto sided with the military establishment to deny the league to form the government. During the military operation in East Pakistan he sided with the army and apart from persecution done by army, Bhutto’s rigidity also contributed to the secession of East Pakistan.

He wasn’t a novice in politics. Hailing from a strong feudal background and being educated from prestigious British and American universities he managed to secure cabinet positions in both Iskandar’s and Ayub’s administrations. During Ayub’s tenure he rose to the post of foreign minister and abandoned him after the 1965 war, accusing Ayub of losing the war on the negotiation table. Being an intelligent man he already sensed the waning of Ayub’s rule. He first tried to join Muslim League because of it being the congregation of landlords like him but on the failure to do so he turned socialist. Due to his charismatic appeal, leftist of all walks of life started joining him and his demagoguery won him the support of masses (Burki, 1988). More than a socialist he was actually a populist. Soon he started accepting the landed elite into his party to the dismay of his leftist supporters. In one of the party meeting the leftist zealots of the party demanded to not to fill the ranks of the party with such landed elite, because of it being contradictory to the manifesto of the party (Herring, 1979). Bhutto upon hearing such demands expressed his displeasure and reprimanded them. This event demonstrated his approach towards the dissent within the party. In one of the congregation of factory workers, when he saw workers passionately raising the slogans of socialism he said to his colleague, “We may not mean it, but they really mean it! (Khan, 2009)”

i. From Civil Martial Law Administrator/President to Prime Minister

Yahya Khan, sensing the anger of both the army and the masses because of the debacle of East Pakistan, transferred his powers of president and chief martial law administrator to Bhutto. Because of his vast experience in the previous administrations he was welcomed by the army. The first challenge he had to face was the release of more than 90,000 prisoners of war in Bangladesh. Before starting the negotiation with India he embarked on a world tour and visited important countries such as China, Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. To deal with the economic challenges he managed to secure aid of millions of dollars from Saudi Arabia, UAE and Libya. In June, 1972, he negotiated a deal with India known as, Simla agreement for the release of PoWs. On the initiative of India, he met Mujeeb in Delhi and signed a Delhi agreement regarding the release of people from both sides who wanted to join their respective countries of choice (Hagerty, 1991). After making some changes in the military he finally lifted martial law in April, 1972. Before doing that he passed the provisional constitution through national assembly, which was comprised of the winning candidates of 1970 election of all the parties. Bhutto was in a comfortable position in terms of numbers in the assembly as his party had the majority seats and had a support of a faction of Muslim League, members from the tribal areas and non-party members. Opposition members were mainly from the two provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan. Main opposition parties were National Awami Party (NAP), Convention League, Council League and some religious parties. As per the provincial constitution he was conferred upon full executive powers as president. Assembly was given the task to come up with the draft of new constitution.

Bhutto himself had a leaning towards presidential system but due to multi ethnic composition of the country it was an agreement across the political spectrum that parliamentary system is best suited to the country (Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2013, p. 215). The drafting process was overseen by a committee, comprised of the members of both the ruling and opposition parties. After one year of deliberation the draft was presented and was accepted with a thumping majority of 125 votes out of 133. The reason of such unanimous support was the nature of the constitution. It had features to which gave it the character of a federation to the pleasure of the ethno-nationalist political parties. It also had some Islamic features to incorporate the suggestions of religious parties. Because of such unanimity it gained such a sanctity that later

in two military rules it was temporarily suspended but never abrogated. The real executive powers lied with the office of prime minister and president was given powers of appointment on some constitutional posts such as governors and members of judiciary. To ensure the political stability certain restriction were imposed on no-confidence motions against the prime minister for next ten years. Given his popularity, Bhutto was confident of ruling the country at least for next ten years. On 14th August, 1973 he assumed the office of Prime Minister (Ibid).

ii. Unfulfilled Promise of Reforms

Bhutto came with the promise of bringing revolutionary changes in the system by abolishing feudalism and constraining the powers of Punjabi and Sindhi landlords. Had it been achieved the socio-political landscape of Pakistan would have been starkly different. Although, right from the beginning such promises seemed contradictory because of his own linkage with the feudal system but the intellectual left, the political left and common people fell for it. He started the process of land reforms but it failed to achieve the desired results as intra-family land transfers were still allowed. Fake transfer of land also took place and landlords let go such pieces of their lands which were least productive or barren. Many landlords from Punjab region managed to join the ranks of PPP to avoid the harsh implementation of such reforms (Herring, 1979). As it was witnessed that those landlords or industrialists faced discriminatory treatment who were either opponents or played no role in the rise of Bhutto. Those who joined PPP were able to do so because of weak institutionalization of the party. Labor reforms were somehow more profound as the labor union were empowered by establishing labor courts. Employers were asked to provide assistance to their workers for their housing needs and to some extent education for their children. Although it gained Bhutto immense popularity among the labor class but due to increased power of unions took a toll on already small and medium industries (Ibid). Tensions mounted between workers and their employers and in one incident army had to be called in to control the clashes between them.

Nationalization of industries was another hallmark of Bhutto's regime due to its haphazard nature. It affected from large manufacturers to small and medium enterprises; from banks to insurance companies and even private schools and colleges were also nationalized. Due to weak management and inefficiency of the bureaucracy, this nationalization project turned out to be a

disaster (Chengappa, 2002). Growth of economy almost stagnated and it was worsened due to flight of capital and brain drain. Nationalization of banks opened the door of corruption for the landlords as they started using these banks for cheap loans and used to default on them. This practice continued to effect the Pakistan's financial sector in the following decades.² Nationalization of education institutions was done on the promise of making education accessible to the poor strata of the society but the dismal performance of these institutions didn't bring about any massive change in terms of literacy rate or school enrollments. Bureaucracy also went through a process of 'reforms' and large number of high ranking bureaucrats were dismissed on the charges of corruption. Old bureaucratic elite was replaced by party loyalists and quota system was introduced to induct more individuals from the rural party of Sindh, strongest constituency of the party. Bureaucrats were deprived of their autonomy by placing the issue of transferring and postings under the prerogative of the government officials (Ibid).

The most disappointing case was Bhutto's dealing with the army. He had the golden opportunity to build such a political culture where army had no role to play. Army was highly demoralized after the fall of Dhaka and they were openly criticized in the print media. When Yahya transferred his office to Bhutto, army welcomed him and when Bhutto dismissed the chief of the army Gul Hasan Khan, he without any resistance submitted to Bhutto's decision. He established parallel forces in the form of Federal Security forces (FSF) and People's Guards. FSF was claimed to be formed to assist the police force but his opponents blamed him for establishing a private force to purge against his political opponents. He asked the army to put the tanks and other military equipment at the disposal of FSF, and this demand was received with immense displeasure within the army (Ahmad, 1974). Bhutto took certain measures to put the army under his control by reducing the tenure of the chief to three years and further dividing the command by creating a post of Joint Chiefs of Staff. A provision was added in the constitution to declare any activity related to the abrogation of constitution as a high treason act. Armed forces were also asked to take an oath of non-involvement in any political activities. But later, Bhutto reversed the process by coopting the military and around three thousand ex-servicemen were inducted in FSF. Military

² Currently, Bhutto's son-in-law Asif Ali Zardari, who is also a former president of Pakistan, is being investigated in the fake accounts case.

personnel were also given appointments in the nationalized banks, insurance companies and industries (Burki, 1988). They were given vast amount of agricultural lands and increase the military budget by almost two hundred percent. Through such practices he made military very much part of his administration to establish his hegemony over his political opponents.

iii. Relation with Provincial Governments and Political Opponents

During the initial period of his tenure, Bhutto maintained cordial ties with his major opponent NAP who had secured the provincial governments in Baluchistan and NWFP. He appointed the governors from their parties but by 1972 the relation with provinces started getting tensed. The main reason was the demand of Baloch nationalists to transfer the “outsiders” from the administration of Baluchistan, mainly Punjabis. Bhutto couldn’t accept these demands. Later it was revealed that some radical Baloch groups are engaged in subversive activities and pursuing their plans of independent “Greater Baluchistan”. A Baloch faction in Iran was allegedly involved in that conspiracy, due to that the government of Iran pushed the Bhutto administration to tackle them militarily. Bhutto dissolved the provincial government and sent army in the province to curb the ethnic insurgency (Sayeed, 1980). NWFP government, in protest resigned and resultantly a new government was installed in alliance with Qayyum League. The insurgency was successfully dealt with but resulted into hundreds of casualties. The situation in NWFP deteriorated due to change in government in Afghanistan. The new president of Afghanistan, Sardar Muhammad Daud, was an active supporter of Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan. After the assassination of the chief minister of his party, H.M. Khan Sherpao the conflict with the NAP got intensified. Their leader Wali Khan was arrested along with his followers and prosecuted in an ad hoc tribunal for accusation of treason, but the tribunal was unable to establish their guilt (Ibid). They were released by the succeeding military regime of Zia-ul-Haq.

In his own native province Sindh, a language controversy led to violent clashes between the Urdu speaking Mohajirs and Sindhis. Karachi and Hyderabad were the epicenter of these clashes. Controversy started when Bhutto tried to make Sindhi the official language of the province that made proficiency of Sindhi language a pre-requisite for securing government jobs. This move wasn’t welcomed by the Mohajir community who saw this development as their economic persecution (Haq, 1995). Apart from his political opponents he resorted to suppress the dissent

within the party as well. His once close associate and the architect of the ideological literature of the party J.A. Rahim grew resentment towards Bhutto because of his arrogance. He criticized him in a public meeting and Bhutto upon receiving the information sent the FSF personnel to his house, who brutally tortured Rahim and his son (Zahoor, 2017, p. 102). He was later sent to exile. The major moment of the weakness of his regime was when Bhutto surrendered to the demands of the religious parties to declare the Ahmedi community as non-Muslims. This appeasement of religious forces strengthened their position in the society and it continued to haunt Pakistan in the following decades.

iv. Elections of 1977 and Fall of Bhutto

Confident about his popularity and strong hold of rural areas of his party, Bhutto called for an early election in 1977. In order to gain further electoral strength he announced new land reforms by further reducing the land ceiling. As the election campaign started, opposition forces made an alliance of nine parties, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The alliance was the combination of both ultra-right and leftist parties. Mufti Mehmud of JUI was elected its chairman. Ari Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan was among the key personalities of that alliance. He used his oratory skills to paint Bhutto as a dictator to mobilize the ideologically divided voter base of that alliance. Bhutto and ten of his party members were elected before the Election Day because of absence of any contender against them in their constituencies (Weinbaum, 1977). Opposition accused the government of persecuting the opposition candidates and their forced disappearance before the submission of their candidacy. The electoral turnout was better than 1970 elections as 60% of the registered voters cast their votes. PPP as expected secured 58% of votes and 155 parliamentary seats out of 200. PNA on the other hand, secured 38% of votes and mere 36 seats (Ibid, p. 599). PNA rejected the results and called for a boycott of provincial elections. The electoral turnout as result drastically dropped to the half of the national elections.

Call for strikes by PNA was followed by complete shutdown of urban centers. Bhutto invited the opposition for negotiations but opposition refused. The PNA turned its movement to a more fundamentalist agenda by calling the establishment of "Nizam-e-Mustafa", Islamization of the state. Bhutto as a concession to the opposition, put a ban on alcohol consumption and closed all the casinos and night clubs. By April, Bhutto intensified his repression of the opposition and put

30,000 people behind the bars. In June, the representatives of the government and opposition started negotiating and government lifted the emergency imposed in the major urban centers. By the mid of June, they agreed on holding a new election and establish an interim government, comprised of both PPP and PNA. Before the finalization of an agreement, Bhutto went on to a tour of friendly Muslim countries for their support to secure victory in the next election. Opposition saw it as breach of trust and suspended the negotiations (Ali, 1977). Bhutto, tried to restart the negotiations but on 5th July he was arrested by military and another Martial Law was imposed by General Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto and other PNA leadership were put in a prison and were asked by the military to settle their differences before the new elections. After the release on 29th July, Bhutto started holding political rallies all over the country. His growing popularity was unsettling for the army. A case of political assassination was registered against him and after lengthy judicial hearings at high court and Supreme Court Bhutto was sentenced to death. He was hanged on 4th April, 1979. This tragic judicial episode was followed by the darkest period in the history of Pakistan in the form of the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq (Hussain, 1994).

Impact of Zero-sum Politics on Fragile Democracies

In a newly emerging party system of a regime preceded by an authoritarian rule, parties are usually weakly rooted and party loyalties are not well established. Therefore, it is not plausible to scrutinize parties on the basis of their rootedness at such early stages of a developing party system. Although, the programmatic orientation of parties could be analyzed to assess the potential of parties regarding their prospective growth. Pridham (1996) argues that the performance and prospects of democracy fundamentally depends on the performance of the party system it fosters. To prevent the reversal of democracy a party systems should ensure two fundamental features. First, parties should assure such mechanisms with mutual understanding which would prevent monopoly over power (p. 5). Parties should maintain minimum level of cooperation without compromising on their program to maintain the neutrality of the system. Second, pluralism should be respected as an essential value across the parties for the sake of promotion of a vibrant civil society. These cooperative strategies will provide parties the legitimacy and credibility which is required for a new party system to thrive. In new democracies, parties usually engage in an intense competition because of poorly established party loyalties.

Therefore, due to low level of mutual trust they engage in zero-sum competition with the sole agenda of acquiring and sustaining power. Abuse of executive powers, electoral violence and electoral fraud are such means through which parties maintain their hold over power. Such scenario increases the vulnerability of a fragile democracy which may result into democracy reversal. Such contentious competition among the parties of Pakistan in 1970s paved the way for heavily discredited military (due to 1971 debacle of East Pakistan), to impose another military rule.

In a regime like Pakistan where tutelary interference is rampant and which had a history of multiple military rules, programmatic orientation of parties becomes an essential analytical category. It helps researchers analyze the impact of their manifesto and policy choices on the future of party system and how it reduces or increases the frequency of tutelary interference. Programmatic orientation present parties as agents of change rather than being an instrument to further the agenda of a particular group of elite. Sawadsee (2018) in his comparative study of hybrid regimes of Indonesia and Thailand argues that in fragile democracies that change has to be gradual in order to avoid unrest of huge proportion which could hamper the sustainability of the democratic process. Moreover, the programmatic orientation of a party should not be pursued at the expense of inclusivity of the system. If one or more factions feel excluded for a longer period of time then their subsequent agitation might lead to the derailment of the system. Parties should work together to make parliament as a functioning entity and invest their energies on legislation to improve governance for the sake of democracy entrenchment. If parties will keep engaging outside the parliament by means of agitation and counter-agitation then it may result into democratic backsliding. He concludes that Indonesia managed to consolidate its democracy because of being more inclusive as compared to Thailand and necessary constitutional amendments were made to make democracy entrenched. While in Thailand lack of cooperation among the parties keep the interfering capacity of the tutelary actor intact (pp'269-292).

The 1970s episode of democracy in Pakistan started with a massive post-election crisis that led to the secession of its eastern wing. Apart from the mishandling on the part of the military establishment the rigidity of political parties also played a key role in exacerbating those crisis.

Bhutto supported the military when it postponed the transfer of power to the majority party Awami League. Both major parties were not representative of the entire country as they limited their electoral participation to either the eastern or the western wing of Pakistan. This limitation of party organization to only one party of the country deepened the ethnic tensions. Growing feelings of resentments among Bengalis forced the Bengali officers of bureaucracy and military to rebel and joined the secessionist movement. As a result, the first multi-party national elections of the country did not culminate into a smooth transition to a civilian rule. Nevertheless, the fall of East Pakistan did provide Bhutto with the opportunity to demilitarize the politics by eliminating their tutelary interference through necessary reforms but he chose to do otherwise. In his quest of concentration of power he pursued the policy of lateral entry in civil service to place the party loyalists in bureaucracy. To consolidate his grip over bureaucracy he dismissed 2000 civil servants.

Regarding military he pursued a policy of accommodation and patronage. His policy of nationalization of industries and banks made the industrial and business class resentful towards him. To forestall any organized reaction he started recruiting the retired and serving military officers in the nationalized banks and industries. The military run Fauji Foundation saw its revenue risen from 152 million in 1972 to 2000 million by 1982 due to the state patronage it enjoyed during the rule of Bhutto. Hundreds of retired military personnel were also recruited in a newly established Federal Security Force (FSF) whose primary purpose was to tackle his political opponents through detention on fabricated charges. This policy of patronage regarding military benefitted the military more than Bhutto himself. When he dismissed the opposition led government in the province of Balochistan then it resulted into an insurgency. Military was deployed to deal with the insurgent and military's success in curbing the insurgency helped it gain its lost credibility in terms of being an efficient force. Manipulation of 1977 election provide the organizationally weak and ideologically incoherent opposition alliance the opportunity of mass mobilization. Prolonged agitation by the opposition worsen the already deteriorating economic conditions. Such contentious politics due to the approach of high handedness by Bhutto resulted into democratic reversal in 1977.

G. Zia-ul-Haq, Islamization and its Impact on the Society of Pakistan

Zia-ul-haq was made chief of the army by Bhutto after giving him premature promotion from major general to the post of lieutenant general. While doing this he ignored the seniority of six other generals who were also the contenders. Bhutto did so on the impression that his extraordinary favor to him will make Zia remain grateful to Bhutto and he will act as a loyal servant like his predecessor General Tikka Khan. He build this impression of Zia during the proceedings of Attock tribunal, which Zia was heading. Zia used to report Bhutto about the proceedings on the daily basis. Bhutto found him a very docile and obedient person with no strong family or kinship linkage in the army. After the retirement of Tikka Khan, Bhutto found Zia as the most appropriate choice to further solidify his position as the ruler (Nawaz, 2008). Zia appeared to be a much intelligent and a clever individual, who knew all the tricks to rise in the eyes of a ruler who was in search of not much efficiency but extreme obedience. The manner in which Bhutto's trial was conducted and he was sent to the gallows is a strong testimony on the kind of person Zia was.

When Zia showed his intentions of staying in power he found the support in the landed class, aggrieved industrialists who felt the brunt of Bhutto's policies of nationalization and the Islamists. One of those industrialists were Sharifs and their ittefaq foundaries was among the nationalized enterprises. Zia's regime saw the rise of Nawaz Sharif as a prominent politician and future prime minister of Pakistan. Being a migrant himself from the east Punjab, Zia found a strong base of migrant Punjabis. Due to the land reforms of Ayub, military men had acquired vast area of agricultural land. That also became Zia's support base. Zia also let some religious group to proselytize among the army officers to invoking discipline among them through making them commit to as strong religious moral code. Some of them grew affection for Jamat-e-Islami and after retirement some of them eventually joined the organization (Noman, 1989). Zia went on to incorporate Shariah Laws in the constitution. He set up a consultative assembly, naming it Majlis-e-Shura (inspired by Islamic history). He introduced the system of shariat benches in high courts and set up Islamic Ideology Council. These addition were further reinforced by the introduction of Qazi courts. Islamic provision were also incorporated in the penal code as per the twisted interpretation of Islam. Islamic seminaries were given state patronage and their number rose to 12,000 in 1984 from 250 in 1947. All these developments were taking place in the wake of Afghan

Jihad, when different group Mujahideens were fighting against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan with the financial backing of United States patronized these Mujahideens and this wave of Islamization later engulfed Pakistani society and marginalized the liberal and progressive forces (Hussain, 1994).

Zia's rule was the toughest in terms of media freedom in the history of Pakistan. Public flogging of journalists and political activist was a routine during his initial years. In 1983 after the Movement on the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) started in Sindh province, Zia put a ban on all political parties. A sham referendum was also held to seek legitimacy to his rule, which he won with a comfortable margin of 97%. Although it was observed that there were hardly any voters to participate in that referendum. A non-party base election for the National Assembly were held in 1985. These elections further strengthened the role of kinship linkages and political clientelism. Surprisingly, six ministers were defeated during the election and same was the fate of close ally of Zia, Jamat-e-Islami. Many members of the infamous Majlis-e-Shura were also defeated (Noman, 1989). MRD boycotted the election which also had an effect on the turnout of the elections. After the elections martial law was lifted but Zia remained the real force to reckon with. He handpicked an apparently a docile Sindhi politician Muhammad Khan Junejo as the prime minister. Zia was later elected as the president. He made the assembly incorporate 8th amendment in the constitution to confer upon him the powers to dismiss the prime minister and dissolving the assemblies. Zia assumed a trouble free future ahead as his grip on the power was strongest ever and after getting elected from the assemblies the question of legitimacy was also settled in his view. Soon the differences started developing between him and the prime minister over the issues of certain appointments and also the Afghan policy. After the Geneva agreement of 1988 on the Afghan situation after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Zia showed his displeasure over the nature of the agreement (Rais, 1989). He thought it to be not in line with Pakistan's foreign policy objectives. He blamed Junejo for this failure and dissolved the assemblies by invoking article 58 (2) (B).

Zia, formed the new cabinet and appointed governors of different provinces but the level of discontent was very high among different factions of the society. When he announced another non-party elections in November 1988, then it further contributed to his declining support. Even

judiciary was feeling the heat and in one petition by Benazir Bhutto, Supreme Court gave the verdict to allow the political parties to contest the elections. Explosion at the arms depot at Ojhri camp and dozens of killing as a result of that explosion and the assassination of a Shia leader also caused the weakening of his grip (Hilali, 2002). Shias staged protests across the country. United States also started pressurizing him to hold a party based elections. His regime was rapidly facing both internal and external isolation. Before the political developments started unravelling, Zia died in a plane crash on 17th August, 1988. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of Senate, assumed the office of presidency. General Aslam Baig, became the chief of the army, who repeatedly stated that army will remain out of politics (Hanif, 2018). On the suggestion of Supreme Court new elections were held with the participation of political parties. Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif entered into an alliance with JUI and JI, while PPP contested independently after the dissolution of MRD. Eleven years long rule of Zia, though introduced a new political class of industrialist and landowners in Punjab and Sindh but could not damage the power base of build up by Bhutto (Syed, 1991). PPP won the elections with a very thin majority and was in need of coalition partners to form the government. A coalition was formed with smaller parties including Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), a new entrant in the political landscape of Pakistan, having their power base in urban Sindh. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sworn in as the first female prime minister of not only Pakistan, but of the entire Muslim world. Her rise to power marked the beginning of a new party system and also a hybrid regime with tutelary forces retaining certain prerogatives.

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A New Party System and Consolidation of a Hybrid Regime (1988-2018)

In the following sections we will discuss the aftermath of Zia's regime where a new party system emerged with weakly institutionalized parties. During this period military's tutelary role continued to determine the political process. Parties engaged in a highly contentious competition in both electoral and parliamentary arenas. During the 90s government were unable to finish their tenures due to the contentious nature of the party competition and also because of heightened tension with the military establishment. A brief interlude of an authoritarian rule of three years put a break on the electoral politics but after 2002 three different political parties completed their tenures of five years without a single prime minister finishing his tenure. Growing role of judiciary also made a huge impact on the changing dynamics of power distribution among the institutions but the military establishment continued to maintain its grip over the system. In 2018 electoral triumph of the third party further increased the intensity of the competition.

A. Benazir Bhutto's First Tenure: Tale of Compromises, Corruption and Tutelary Interference

Benazir was the only popular leader during 1988 elections. She was heading a party that had survived the repressive regime of a military dictator. Element of sympathy was there with her due to the tragic fall of his father. Her party was more organized than her opponents and she had a dedicated party workers whose association with the party was devotional. Benazir's main opposition was an alliance of Islami Jamhori Ittehad (IJI) led by Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Junejo stepped aside to make the way for Mian Nawaz Sharif, who belonged to an affluent business family. At the center PPP had 48 percent of the seats while in the case of provinces it entered into a coalition government in NWFP and Baluchistan, while in Sindh it was in a comfortable position with 90 percent of the seats. Punjab went to IJI. She supported Ghulam Ishaq for the presidential elections and made another compromise by retaining the foreign minister Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, both were part of previous Zia administration (Shafqat, 1996). Apart from being the first female prime minister she was the youngest as she assumed the office at the age of 35.

From the onset she faced ethnic tensions in Karachi, the only port city and the financial hub of Pakistan. Due to the Afghan conflict there was a massive influx of Afghan refugees, mainly Pashtuns in Pakistan. Many among them chose Karachi to reside. This demographic change of the city heightened the tensions among different ethnicities mainly between Urdu speaking Mohajirs and Pashtun as the competition increased for unskilled jobs (Gayer, 2007). Mohajir in Karachi were mainly the descendants of the migrants from the North-Indian region who came and settled in the urban centers of Sindh after the partition in 1947. In the initial phase of Pakistan due to better educational standards they enjoyed lucrative positions in the government and the bureaucracy. After Ayub Khan the situation started changing when Pashtuns replaced them as the junior partners of Punjabi elite. After Bhutto, Sindhis were given preferential treatment in terms of government jobs. This led to the creation of an identity driven movement among Mohajirs that culminated into the formation of a party, Mohajir Qaumii Movement (MQM). This party was led by a former student leader Altaf Hussain known for his firebrand speeches and authoritative style of politics (Ibid).

Initially MQM formed an alliance with PPP both in center and Sindh but later developed differences over the issue of repatriation of Biharis from Bangladesh who were stranded there after the fall of Dhaka (Haq, 1995). They also demanded higher share in the government jobs at both federal and provincial level. Due to increased tensions MQM left the ruling coalition after just 10 months and joined IJI and supported to move to bring no confidence motion against the government (Ibid, p. 1000). The motion failed and the government sustained. Due to the increasing menace of kidnapping for ransom by organized criminal groups many businessmen shifted their businesses from Karachi to either abroad or up North. Business class was already wary of Benazir because of her slogans of alleviating poverty and bring social justice they feared that she might emulate the policies of her father nationalization. She pledged during her campaign to privatize the previously nationalized enterprise but little was done in that regard. Economic situation deteriorated as all the micro indicators were showing the signs of a sick economy. The government tried to bring stability through an IMF program but it further tightened the capacity of the government in terms of developmental expenditure (Ziring, 1991).

Apart from the economic challenges she was also engaged in a power tussle with the bureaucracy under the influence of President Ishaq, who himself was a former bureaucrat, and also the army that was skeptical of her due to the bitter past between PPP and the army. This power tussle was because of the legacy of Zia era in the form of the 8th amendment that gave immense powers to the president including dissolution of the assemblies. This provided army the role of an arbitrator to intervene in case of the increased tensions between the prime minister and the president (Talbot, 2002). Judiciary, media, civil society and political parties were however, operating in a relatively free environment as compared to the previous military rule. Her dependency on the army was unavoidable due to the deteriorating security situation in Karachi and thousands of para military troops were sent to Karachi to bring calm to the city. Due to ongoing turbulence in Afghanistan and deteriorating relations with India due to uprising in Kashmir, army's influence over foreign policy could not be done away with. She also accommodated landlords in her party at the expense of the ideological cadre of the party including some close associates of her father. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, another confidante of Z.A. Bhutto, after the restoration of political parties, formed his own party National People's Party (NPP) and did not join Benazir (Akhter, 2009). Notwithstanding the challenges she was facing from the president and the army, Benazir tried to enforce her authority when she challenged the president's right to appoint the judges. She also demonstrated her authority over the premier intelligence agency, ISI by dismissing its chief, Hamid Gul and appointed a lieutenant general who was at odds with the army chief (Weinbaum, 1991). The political battle with Nawaz Sharif was another source of inconvenience for her government. Nawaz was the chief minister of Punjab, the largest province in terms of population and the center of power. He went on the course non-cooperation with the central government and led a continuous effort to oust Benazir from the power. This was the first time in history of Pakistan when the victor in Punjab was in the opposition in the center. Nawaz tried to invoke the sentiments of Punjabis by constantly declaring Benazir as a risk for the national security. Nawaz's fierce opposition consumed most the energies of Benazir as she was unable to control the largest province of Pakistan. In the midst of such arising political tensions, the military establishment saw an opportunity to get rid of Benazir. Army communicated its desire to the president and he invoked again the 8th amendment and dismiss the government on 21 July 1990 (Wasseem, 1992).

Her first stint as the prime minister lasted for only eighteen months. He mentioned excessive corruption as the reason and there was some truth to that. Apart from that he referred to the incident of “Pakka Qila” in Hyderabad, Sindh where indiscriminate killings took place and Mohajirs blamed the government of negligence (Verkaaik, 2004).

B. Nawaz Sharif’s First Tenure: Rise and Fall under the Tutelage of Military

Nawaz’s rise to power was due to his close association with the military. After the dismissal of Benazir there were still strong chances that she will make a comeback in the next elections. Army Chief Aslam Baig, appointed Asad Durrani as the head of ISI and he devised a strategy to counter PPP. They patronize Jatui as the opponent of Benazir in Sindh to split the votes of Sindhis and financially backed the IJI through granting them 140 million rupees through two banks (Nasr, 1992). As a result, IJI secured majority with 106 out of 207 while PPP lead alliance PDA secured 44 seats. Elections were bought in a bitter environment where PPP’s opponents hurled serious accusations at Benazir of being an American agent and pursuing the policies of “Zionists”. To use the “religious card” in Pakistani politics has been a constant practice. Right wing parties resort to such tactics to belittle their relatively liberal opponents by invoking the religious sentiments of masses against their opponents. To call your opponent a “Western agent”, “Jewish agent” or an “Indian agent” is a common practice among right wing and center-right parties (Misra, 2003). At that time such slogans were relevant because the religious fervor was high of the conservative segment of the society due to proliferation of Jihad culture gaining strength from the rise of religious fundamentalists in Afghanistan. Benazir’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, was also arrested before the elections on the charges extortion and ransom.

Nawaz Sharif, of PML formed the government with the support of his allies of IJI. He was from a giant business family having their investment in multiple sector including; sugar, textile, cement and steel. They faced the wrath of nationalization during Bhutto’s era but got restored it due to close association with Zia. He first became the finance minister of Punjab during Zia’s regime and later became chief executive of Punjab during Benazir’s first tenure (Kochanek, 1997). There was an ideological rivalry between both as Benazir was the symbol of progressive and liberal ideals and Nawaz was towing the ideological line of Zia that the Islamic values needs to be protected from these liberal forces. He went on to pursue an ultra-nationalist agenda by portraying Benazir

as a conspiracy of west against the values of Pakistani society. Benazir following the path of Nawaz led a fierce opposition inside the parliament and on roads. She held various political rallies against the government to not let it settle. Decreasing foreign remittances due to the first gulf war was burdening the economy as the current account deficit was looming large (Amin, 1993). Security situation in Karachi also deteriorated because of increased tension between the MQM and its splinter group. MQM was an ally of Nawaz but army intervened in Karachi that put Nawaz in a precarious position.

During the gulf war, Pakistan's government sided with Kuwait while the predominant public sympathies were with Iraq. Army chief even in one of his statements declared Iraq's action as justified. This became the source of tension between army and the government (Samina, 1994). The army was also supporting the rise of Gulbadeen's government in Afghanistan, who was the head of a conservative faction Hizb-e-Islami. Nawaz's was in a tight position as he didn't wanted to go openly against the policies of army neither he wanted to cause displeasure to the US which was not in favor of conservative factions assuming power in Afghanistan (Weinbaum, 1991). US was also pressurizing the government by stopping the military and civilian aid through "Pressler Amendment" because of the intelligence reports of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. Aslam Beg was replaced by Asif Nawaz Janjua as the chief of army, who was a moderate individual but the ISI was headed by an Islamist, Javed Nasir. At this point, there was a division of approach within the army vis-à-vis Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan. There were also differences across the political actors about the Afghan situation. Some were suggesting to normalize relations with Moscow to have stability in both Afghanistan and newly independent Central Asian Republics (Singh, 1999). They were of the critical view of Pakistan's policy of supporting conservative forces of Afghanistan. Prominent among them were Pashtun nationalists.

During all that chaos there was a change of leadership in the army as Abdul Waheed Kakar was appointed as chief by the president Ishaq. Nawaz agreed with the appointment but had qualms about not consulting him before the appointment. Nawaz later expressed his intentions of eliminating the 8th amendment to strip the president off his powers to dissolve the assemblies. But he did not have the required numbers and the relations with the opposition was highly antagonistic. To add to his problem, his ally Jamat-e-Islami left the government because of the

differences regarding the Afghan policy and also not being proactive about the enforcement of Shariat in Pakistan as promised during elections (Samad, 1994). Sensing the opportunity, Ishaq dismissed the government and dissolved the assemblies. The government was later restored by the Supreme Court and termed the presidential action as unjustifiable. Such concession were not made to Benazir when her government was dismissed. This showed the partisan attitude of judiciary and the establishment towards the two parties. It ensued a constitutional crisis as president refused to retreat from his position. Benazir on the other hand put her weight behind the President against the wishes of her party members, despite herself being the effete of the 8th amendment. Army intervened by suggesting famous “Kakar Formula” and made both the president and prime minister resign (Yasmeen, 1994).

C. Benazir’s Second Tenure: A Tale of Betrayal

A former vice president of World Bank, Moeen Qureshi was appointed as the interim prime minister, whom not many in Pakistan have heard of. October 1993 elections brought a hung parliament as PPP gained a razor thin majority in terms of seats. PML with 40% votes had 72 seats while PPP with 38% votes had 86 seats. Such difference in term of vote percentage and seats percentage is common in an electoral process based upon first-past-the-post system (FPTP) (Blais, 2008). In NWFP and Baluchistan, religious parties were replaced by regional parties as majority parties. Benazir secured the Punjab government for the first time with the help of the Junejo faction of Muslim League – PML (J). Benazir was again elected as prime minister and got his party member Farooq Leghari elected as the president. She faced multiple challenges in her second tenure. The turbulent situation in Afghanistan forced Benazir’s administration, to work in close cooperation with the army. Army along with her interior minister, Naseerullah Babar, who himself was a retired army man, was planning to support a new force in Afghanistan in the form of Taliban. The main purpose was to have a friendly government in Afghanistan to promote the trade with the central Asian republics and also to have a gas supply from the gas rich Central Asia (Ahmed, 2012). United States, was also initially in support of the plan on the prospects of involvement of American companies in the gas pipeline project, TAPI (Gasper, 2001). Heightened tensions with India due to an armed resistance in Kashmir was another source of concern. 1992 demolition of Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by a Hindutva mob also severe the relations between

the two countries. Benazir tried to engage India into a dialogue process but it turned out to be futile. During her tenure, Pakistan took active participation in the peace keeping mission of United Nations.

Domestic challenges were also mounting as the situation of Karachi was deteriorating because of an almost civil war like situation resulting from violent clashes of different groups of MQM and also between sectarian groups. During a one year period almost 6000 people got killed in Sindh as a result of political clashes. Those victim included two representatives of US diplomatic mission. Babar, the interior minister gave a free hand to police and they resort to the policy of dubious encounters and extra judicial killings. Karachi's volatility negatively impacted the economy and the life was at standstill due to continuous shutdowns and prevailing uncertainty (Ahmar, 1996). Islamist parties which performed badly during elections, joined Nawaz Sharif to start a campaign against the government. Continuous success of Taliban in Afghanistan also reinforced the Islamist parties in Pakistan as they were raising the slogans in favor of similar change in Pakistan. Even a coup was planned by some Islamist elements of the army, which was timely uncovered. Army tried to not publicize it but one of PPP parliamentarian disclosed the details in the parliament (Ziring, 2003, p. 293)). Her coalition partners also resigned from Punjab to make the situation worse. In the wake of poor economic showing, Transparency International in its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranked Pakistan the second most corrupt country. Her own husband was accused of massive corruption in privatization agreements. Benazir's brother, Murtaza Bhutto who was among her strongest opponents, was killed by police in an exchange of fire in Karachi. That was a massive shock to her government. President Leghari on the other hand, was meeting the opposition leader which grew her bitter towards her former party member. Supreme Court was also at odds with the government over the issue of the appointment of judges. Eventually, Leghari, citing his "constitutional obligations", dismissed the government and announced new elections.

D. Nawaz Sharif's Second Tenure: Turning against the Former Patron

Leghari established a new policy making body, the Council for Defence and National Security. This body was comprised of the president, different ministers and the heads of different armed forces. The idea, though initiated during Zia's rule and the purpose was to provide a legal cover to army's

intervention in the policy matters. This body continued to work even after the elections (Bray, 1997). In February, 1997 elections PML-N of Nawaz Sharif secured a thumping victory of 135 seats. That gave him a two-third majority making him capable of amending the constitution as per his wishes. Turnout in the election was very low as only 36% of the registered voter exercised their rights (Medhi, April 14, 2013). It was due to growing disconnect of the people with the political class because of their incompetence, growth in corruption and the political instability due to constant change of governments. This change in governments had an impact on policy stability which was much needed due to severe economic crisis. However, as a result of electoral victory, Nawaz formed the government not only in the center and Punjab but also for the first time in Sindh. Immediately he introduced 13th amendment to revoke the presidential powers of dissolving assemblies and appointing the chiefs of armed forces. PPP supported him as Benazir was twice a victim of infamous clause of the constitution (Rizvi, 1998). This gave the hope that it might be beginning of a new era of civilian supremacy but soon the dream was shattered because of Nawaz's autocratic tendencies.

He immediately developed conflict with both the Supreme Court and the president Leghari. Nawaz presented an act before the parliament to establish special courts to tackle with the problem of terrorism as the sectarian violence was on increase in Punjab. These special courts as proposed by the act were not be subordinated to higher courts including the Supreme Court. This means those who are convicted through these courts will not be rendered with any right to appeal. There were also apprehension that this act will be used to target the political opponents. Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah openly criticized this act and that started the power tussle between the government and the Supreme Court. The chief tried to increase the number of judges but Nawaz reduced the number from 17 to 12. Chief Justice started contempt of court proceedings against him and the day he was to attend the court, his supported stormed the building of the court and halted the proceedings (Sharaf, March 11, 2017). Nawaz asked Leghari to dismiss the Chief Justice but Leghari refused the suggestion. Seeking no support from the army, both the president and chief justice resigned in December. Nawaz late presented a controversial "Shariat Bill" in the form of the 18th amendment, which would have empowered him to the extent that he would not be bound by the diktat of constitutions. The bill got passed through national

assembly but due to lack of majority in senate the law did not the light of the day (Ziauddin, March 3, 2013).

Army chief General Jahangir Karamat later proposed a suggestion to form a National Security Council (NSC) on lines of the council formed by Leghari during the interim government. Nawaz did not like the idea as he saw it as an institutionalization of army's interference. He asked Karamat to resign although he stood with the government in its conflict with the judiciary. This resignation caused displeasure among top army echelons but Karamat, being a pro-democracy general, resigned (Rizvi, 1998). Nawaz Sharif then following the mistake of Bhutto to choose a new chief, Pervez Musharraf by ignoring the rule of seniority. Reasons were the same as Musharraf being from a Mohajir family had no apparent kinship linkages in the army. A non-Punjabi was also needed as the chief as all the other constitutional positions were occupied by the Punjabis. Nawaz wanted to do away with an impression of a Punjab centric leader, which he actually was and he remained to be so. His nine years long coalition partner ANP parted ways with him on the issue of the name of NWFP province. ANP wanted it to change to Pakhtunkhwa but Nawaz did not honor his pre-election agreement (Bleokrenitsky & Moskalenko, 2013, p. 350). Differences developed with MQM, who was his ally in the Sindh government over the issue of militancy in Karachi. Governor rule was imposed in Sind as PML-N had no majority without MQM as its ally. Sectarian killings was also on rise in all over Punjab. He also bureaucratized the local government system by introducing the system of nominated members of union council instead of holding elections. This was due to the desire of members of national and provincial assemblies to get control over development expenditure and they did not want to share the pie with another tier of the government (Ibid, p. 351).

A façade of accountability was among the key features of his government. Ehtisaab (Accountability) Commission was formed for the purpose of accountability but it operated as a tool to exert control over political opponents. Special benches were formed in the high courts for accountability related proceedings and in April 1999, both Benazir and Zardari were sentenced to jail for five years by the Lahore High Court and ordered to confiscate their properties and put a ban on their public activities (Marqusee, 1997). Later an audio surface of Nawaz's brother Shehbaz of calling a judge to give the verdict as per the wishes of "Bhai Sahab" (Big Brother). In

May, 1998 the government decided to go on with the nuclear tests in response to the Indian tests earlier in the month. International community especially USA tried to dissuade Pakistan but due to increased public pressure, Nawaz had no choice but to pursue the plan despite the threats of sanctions. Subsequent, international sanction worsen the already struggling economy. These tests were followed by diplomatic exchanges between the Pakistani and Indian officials on the persuasion of the US, which followed by a historic visit of Lahore by Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vaajpayee. Lahore declaration was signed, promising a new beginning in the bilateral relation between the two countries (Kumar, 1999). Army, however, wasn't pleased with the visit and Pervez Musharraf didn't even attend the dinner in the honor of the visitors.

Soon after the Indo-Pak summit in Lahore, Pakistan military launched a military expedition in the Kargil region. This small-scale conflict lasted for two months resulted into casualties on both sides. Pakistan emerged as aggressor and international community including China asked both the countries to deescalate the situation. It gained international attention because two nuclear armed countries were at the verge of war. Nuclear deterrence worked and the conflict did not grow in terms of intensity (Joeck, 2008). Nawaz Sharif after meeting President Bill Clinton, announced the withdrawal. This invited the anger of Islamist parties and they conducted anti-government rallies in the major cities. There were widespread rumors that these pro-Islamist forces will assume power in Pakistan similarly to Taliban and army's takeover is inevitable. Tensions were growing between the military and Nawaz as they were not pleased with the sudden announcement of withdrawal. Nawaz tried to lure Musharraf by giving him the post of Joint Chief of Staff but it did not ease the tensions. On 12 October, 1999, Nawaz replaced Musharraf with his ally in the army General Ziauddin Butt. Musharraf was coming back from an official visit of Srilanka when Nawaz ordered the airport authorities to not let his plane land in Karachi. Military responded quickly and took control of the airport and other important government buildings and arrested Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf while addressing the nation announced another military takeover (Rizvi, 1999).

E. Rule of Pervez Musharraf: A Parliamentary Authoritarian Regime

The beginning of the Musharraf's rule was different from his predecessors. Instead of declaring martial law he imposed emergency and did not abrogate the constitution rather suspended it. Nevertheless, his military coup was not welcomed internationally and he was heavily criticized in international media as a usurper. Supreme Court though legitimized the coup but for the first time put a time frame for the restoration of parliamentary politics. The court gave him three years for the restoration. His regime devised a plan of action, named "Path to Democracy" (Talbot, 2002). In 2001, local government elections were carried out. The voter turnout was higher in comparison to previous general elections of 1997. 50% of voters participated in those elections. Although, the elections were conducted on non-party basis but the candidates backed by PML-N and PPP gained considerable number of districts (Abbasi & Musarrat, 2015). In June, 2001 he assumed the role of president while earlier he was acting as "Chief Executive". After becoming the president he gave himself an extension as the army chief. In the absence of an electoral college he called for a referendum to legitimize his presidency. This invited strong criticism from both PPP and PML-N but some he found support in some politicians who were forming a new political party with the assistance of military. Prominent leader of the new party were the former associates of Nawaz who were annoyed on Nawaz's decision to strike a deal with Musharraf and to go on exile in Saudi Arabia. Before making the deal Nawaz did not inform his party associates except his family (Kumar, 2001).

Referendum provided a lease to Musharraf for next five years. He announced his plans for the next parliamentary election and introduced certain reforms in terms of number of seats of the parliament and reserved seats for both women and minorities. All these changes were done through presidential ordinance which was later incorporated in the constitution. Another presidential ordinance barred the possibility of becoming prime minister for the third time which denied both Benazir and Nawaz for contesting for the post. Presidents were again given the powers to dissolve the assemblies and appointing the chiefs of armed forces by exercising his own discretion (El-Khawas, 2009). Musharraf was able to make such drastic changes due to the confidence he was drawing from the support of international community specifically from the US and Europe. During the initial phase of his rule he was condemned as a usurper but after the US announced the war on terror and Pakistan's decision to join the US led coalition turned the tables

in Musharraf's favor (Zaidi, 2002). Economic sanctions were lifted and he was able to reschedule the international debts that eventually provided him the space to move on with his economic reforms. Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank employee, was appointed as the finance minister to further the program of structural adjustment, focusing on promoting the private sector and easing the financial regulations.

On the social front, he was facing a massive challenge in the form of religious extremism which saw a rise due to Pakistan's changed foreign policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the Taliban regime. Religious parties, as we have discussed previously, did not fare well electorally but they had an organized force at their disposal in the form of Madarssah's (religious seminaries) network. Most of the resistance Musharraf faced from the Islamist faction was from a Deobandi school of thought, which was ideologically proximate with the Taliban. Musharraf to counter this extremist narrative introduced his twin doctrine of "Enlightened Moderation" and "Pakistan first". In his piece for the Washington Post he put forth the details of his idea of enlightened moderation. He suggests that the Muslim should engage with the international community in a more productive way by abandoning militancy and focusing on socio-economic uplift. In his argument he intentionally drew examples from the "glorious past" of the Muslim world and consciously termed it as Islamic Renaissance rather than a project of westernization (Musharraf, 2004). For furthering his agenda of countering an extremist narrative, immense space was given to such religious scholars who were famous for challenging the traditional narrative of conservative clergy. Most prominent among such luminaries was Javed Ahmed Ghamidi. A culture of religious talk shows flourished across the private media channels where controversial issues such as Islamic penal code, culture of Jihad, issue of the veil of women were discussed. All this was aimed at reversing the impact of Islamization of the society during Zia's regime (Amin, 2012).

Another major development during Musharraf's rule was the meteoric rise of private media channels. Journalists hosting political talk shows became national celebrities. Private media became the arena of heated debates between different political parties and different factions of the society. There was obviously a level of censorship on media when it comes to security-related matters but the strict "moral code" was lifted which was imposed on government-run channels after Zia. During the period between 2002 and 2010, 89 private channels were granted

licenses and 138 licenses were issued to FM radio channels in both regional and national languages. This mushrooming of private media was beneficial to Pakistanis in two ways. First, it enhanced the state of media pluralism and also contributed massively in terms of job creation (Zafar, 2012). Soon after its establishment, the private media engaged in an unhealthy competition of breaking the news and sensationalism became the defining feature of the media in Pakistan. In the wake of War on Terror, leading private channels air the news with the images of severed bodies and also reported live the military operations against terrorists in the urban areas. Red Mosque incident of Islamabad in 2007 is crucial in this regard where the religious extremist were given airtime and they were engaged in live negotiations with the authorities on private media (Hassan, 2014). Gradually, media realized the shortcomings of its editorial policy but still it struggles both in terms of quality of the content and its financial model which is heavily relied on private and governmental advertisement. Nevertheless, the opening of media helped strengthen the civil society in Pakistan by giving the voice to the people who were unrepresented before the advent of private media. More will be discussed regarding the role of media in the last chapter.

i. Party System during Musharraf Era

Like his predecessors, Musharraf also followed the policy of patronage vis-à-vis the political elite, which was willing to be coopted by the military regime. The major chunk of such political elite came from the landed elite of the province of Punjab, led by the chudhary brothers of Gujrat. Chaudhary Shujaat and Chaudary Pervez were the former associates of Nawaz Sharif, defected from the PML-N after Nawaz decided to go to exile. Many of the PML-N members followed the suit and formed a “King’s Party”, PML-Q (Goodson, 2008). It was one of the several Muslim Leagues, capitalizing on the title of Quaid-e-Azam (Greatest Leader), given to Jinnah, the founding leader of Pakistan. Hence, the letter Q in the name of the party. The party was formed and participated in the elections drawing its strength from the military’s patronage. Another new political actor emerged, was the collation of different religious parties, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) which was formed in the wake of American invasion of Afghanistan. This coalition too was tacitly supported by Musharraf by relaxing the corruption investigations against some of their leaders (Magnus, 2007). The primary reason to support this coalition was to undermine the

importance of other centrist parties like PML-N and PPP also the ethno nationalist party of NWFP, the Awami National Party (ANP).

General elections were conducted in October, 2002 and that resulted into a hung parliament with PML-Q gaining most number of seats but was left in search of coalition partners to form the government. It is important to note that PPP, despite missing its leader Benazir gained more votes than PML-Q but in terms of seats it was lagging behind with the tally of 81 while PML-Q secured 126 seats. MMA's performance was the most surprising one as it gained 11% votes but in terms of seats it secured 63 out of 342 seats. It was for the first and the last time that religious parties gained so many seats in the assembly, as earlier they fared poorly in terms of electoral politics. They went on to form the government in the province of NWFP later which was the most affected region due to the ongoing wave of religious terrorism in Pakistan. PML-N on the other hand, performed miserably due to the massive defection from the party to the PML-Q. Another major party which emerged with the tally of 17 seats was MQM, drawing its strength mostly from urban Sindh. Around 70 parties participated in those elections, which shows the highly competitive nature of the elections (Waseem, 2006). Despite all the riggings and military patronage of certain parties, the opposition managed to gain significant number of seats to prevent the hegemony of military backed parties. Due to such competitiveness, we cannot categorize the regime 2002 onwards as an authoritarian regime. Another factor which forces us to term it a competitive authoritarian regime was the presence of a controlled but a vibrant media. Although the military was spared initially, but the ruling coalition went through intense scrutiny by media in terms of their performance related to the matters of governance and foreign policy. To incorporate the pre-election ordinances into the constitution the government was always in need of some support from the opposition benches as it wasn't able to secure two-third majority, which was required for the constitutional amendments.

The usual suspects in the form of religious parties came to the rescue and 17th amendment was adopted with their support to provide the legitimacy to all the laws promulgated by the military regime before the elections. It again transformed the parliamentary system to a semi-parliamentary by restoring the presidential powers of dissolving the assemblies and dismissing the government. It also helped Musharraf getting elected from the parliament as the president

and he also retained his post of army chief (Nelson, 2010). These constitutional developments rendered the polity of Pakistan as the combination of a tutelary democracy and a competitive authoritarian regime. Due to this theoretical overlapping we prefer the term hybrid regime, as discussed in detail in the first chapter. Earlier, a politician from the Baluchistan province, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali was elected as the prime minister but he was soon replaced by Musharraf's favored technocrat, Shaukat Aziz, who had no political roots in Pakistan prior to his appointment as finance minister during the interim government before the elections. Local Bodies elections were conducted later in 2004 but on non-party basis. The ruling party was unable to provide any substantive reasons to justify the non-party nature of the elections but the political parties came up with the alternate strategy of forming a coalition of different candidates having the backing of political parties (Ahmed, 2009). These "independent" candidates were openly using the party platform and party flags during their campaigns and parties continue to participate in these elections using different names for their coalitions. These local bodies paved the way for financial devolution to the district level but failed to deliver substantively due to massive corruption and politics of patronage in both urban and rural areas.

ii. The Judicial Activism and its Role in Regime Change

The lawyers' movement (2007-2009) brought about a fundamental change in the inter-institutional power dynamics of Pakistan by causing the emergence of a hyper active judiciary. Judiciary has historically been the junior partners of the military establishment and not only opted to ignore the excesses of military but also provided legitimacy to different military rules by means of judicial sanctions. The infamous doctrine of necessity has repeatedly been invoked by the judiciary to provide the legal cover to the suspension and abrogation of constitution throughout the history of the country. Thing started changing in terms of the conduct of the judiciary when an ambitious judge, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary, assumed the role of Chief Justice. He altered the role of Supreme Court from a relatively passive observer with occasional glimmer of upholding the spirit of constitutionalism to a more assertive institution by not only challenging the executive but also the military by frequent exercise of its suo-motu powers enshrined in article 184(3) of the constitution of Pakistan. This increasingly assertive role of the judiciary, backed by the lawyers' associations, human rights NGOs and different political parties

not only caused the fall of Musharraf but also resulted into the dismissal of two elected Prime Ministers in the following years. Constant intervention of judiciary in the matters related to the executive branch though was justified by the courts on holding the government accountable but it also raises the question about it acting beyond its mandate.

Iftikhar Chaudhary, as the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court, was among the judges who legitimized the military coup of Musharraf by taking oath under provisional constitutional order (PCO), promulgated by the military regime. In return to this support he was promoted to the Supreme Court (SCP) in 2002 and later appointed as the Chief Justice in 2005. Immediately after assuming the office he caught the attention of media and common people through his interventionist mode of adjudication. Summoning the bureaucrats and ministers and admonishing them publicly became the common feature of Chaudhary led court proceedings. From saving the public parks and taking notice of unregulated proliferation of religious seminaries to seek the report regarding declared assets of politicians, Chaudhary assumed the role of a reformer (Oldenburg, 2016). Newly established electronic media turned his statements into breaking news and print media made front page headlines out of it. Initially, Musharraf chose to ignore this judicial activism as he himself was not of the high opinion of bureaucrats and politicians but things turned sour between Musharraf and the Supreme Court when the latter obstructed the privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM). The court observed that rules were not duly followed to proceed with the privatization of PSM. The government was of the view that it is becoming increasingly difficult to run public enterprises like PSM and its better to privatize it even at a price far less than its actual worth. The court, however, deemed it as the violation of privatization laws and termed the deal invalid. Riding high on the confidence the court gained through supportive media reporting, it activated its human rights cell and started entertaining the appeals regarding the “missing persons” as several human rights organizations were accusing the security agencies of illegally detaining the suspected terrorists without providing them their due legal rights (Ibid).

By entertaining these appeals SCP posed a direct challenge to the military establishment and in the words of Ilhan Niaz (2020), “....Chaudhary turned into a folk hero, a Pakistani Theseus meting out justice to the powerful in a republic long dominated by the wicked (p. 31).” The SCP started

questioning the unquestionable or the sacred cow as commonly referred in the Pakistani media. Musharraf, in retaliation on 9th March, 2007, suspended Chaudhary and initiated proceedings against him in the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) on the charges of abusing his powers for facilitating illegal appointments for his son. Contrary to the expectations of Musharraf, unlike judicial purges of previous military and civilian rules, this move against the judiciary met with massive resistance. SJC, overturned the suspension and restored Chaudhary as the Chief Justice. The situation exacerbated when SCP initiated the criminal proceedings against those involved in the Laal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation in Islamabad. A commando action was conducted against the religious vigilantes supported and provided with safe havens by the chief cleric of the mosque. Several students, both male and female, of the religious seminary were allegedly killed during the operation (Khan, 2008). Aggrieved clerics approached SCP and the court conveniently ignored their vigilantism and initiated proceedings against Musharraf and other government officials. This move by SCP was received with a mixed response among different segments of society as Pakistan was dealing with the menace of religious terrorism. Since, the beginning of so-called War on Terrorism, the security forces have been operating with impunity. So, this step of SCP provoked the military establishment and deemed it as “infringement” in their domain. Musharraf was further challenged by SCP when it ordered the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to withhold the results of the re-election of Musharraf as the President until the court decides about his eligibility. Musharraf, as a result, declared an emergency and dismissed around 60 judges and replaced them with the “compliant” judiciary (Waseem, 2012)s. He made himself re-elected as the President but eventually gave up the post of the army chief. The leadership of the lawyers’ movement was either put in jail or under house arrest. Return of Benazir and her subsequent assassination culminated into the loss of elections for the political allies of Musharraf. Benazir’s husband Asif Ali Zardari assumed the command of the party and PPP emerged as the majority party but was short of numbers required to constitute the government. PPP made an alliance with MQM (their political rivals in Urban Sindh) and Awami National Party (ANP), who managed to get majority in NWFP, the province most affected by terrorism. Initially, PML (N) also joined the cabinet but this politics of reconciliation did not last for long and PML (N) joined the opposition benches. Political pressure was mounting on Musharraf and sans the post

of the army chief he had little support from his former his real constituency, the military. He eventually resigned in August, 2009 and Zardari replaced him as the President. Zardari reneged on the promises made by Benazir during her election campaign about the restoration of judiciary. Lawyers, political parties and civil society organizations started mobilizing and a political crisis emerged within a year of newly established civilian rule. The crisis continued till March, 2009 and then eventually Zardari succumbed to the pressure and on the advice of the military directed his Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani to restore the deposed judges (Ibid, p. 24).

F. Zardari's Rule: Combining Reconciliation with Confrontation

PPP's return to power in 2008 came at the cost of them losing their highly celebrated and globally recognized leader Benazir Bhutto. She did develop a reputation of a liberal leader who is most suitable to tackle the issue of religious extremism. Musharraf also portrayed himself as indispensable but he lacked the political legitimacy. Therefore, US brokered a deal between Musharraf and Benazir that resulted into Musharraf promulgating National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). This granted amnesty to the politicians and bureaucrats who were accused of corruption and embezzlement (Javaid, 2010). PPP was of the view that most of these cases are politically motivated and are initiated to curb the opposition in the country during both civilian and military rule. NRO provided the guarantee to Benazir to return to Pakistan and resume her politics. This was in clear violation of the Charter of Democracy (CoD) between PPP and PML-N, in which both parties agreed to not seek the military support for their political gains as they did in during 1990s. Nevertheless, Nawaz Sharif chose not to protest because it also paved the way for him to return from his forced exile in Saudi Arabia and later in UK. Upon returning to Pakistan, Benazir started mobilizing her voter and held massive rallies in different cities. She did lend her support to the lawyers' movement and addressed one of their rallies. PPP's election campaign met a massive shock when Benazir was assassinated allegedly by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Munoz, 2013). The entire country specially the Sindh province came to a standstill. All-Parties-Democratic-Movement (APDM), an alliance of opposition parties called for the boycott of elections because of the apprehensions of electoral manipulation in favor of the ruling party. PPP, despite accusing Musharraf and the ruling party of connivance in the murder of Benazir decided to participate in elections under the presidency of Musharraf. Zardari coined a phrase

“Democracy is the best revenge” to justify his party’s participation in elections (Zardari, 2009). PML-N also ditched its APDM allies and decided to contest despite being the direct victim of Musharraf’s coup in 1999. Despite the loss of the ruling party PML-Q and PPP getting majority seats, a hung parliament emerged out of February, 2008 elections. Zardari extended an olive branch to PML-N to form a coalition government for the sake of the continuity of democracy. PML-N accepted the offer and joined the coalition and the new cabinet comprised of both PPP and PML-N members along with other smaller parties took oath from Musharraf. The coalition government gave hope about the future of democracy as the parties which were engaged in a zero-sum politics in 1990s did join hands to prevent another episode of democratic reversal. This fairytale of politics of reconciliation was although short lived but resulted into the resignation of Musharraf by threatening him of impeachment proceedings (Haider, August 18, 2008). PML-N parted ways from the coalition on the issue of restoration of judiciary. The reluctance on the party of Zardari was due to the NRO that gave him and other politicians amnesty from all the corruption charges. In the presence of a compromised judiciary it was less likely that such controversial ordinance would come into question. This proved to be true because after the restoration Chaudhary led court declared the NRO as unconstitutional. PPP tried to legislate to protect the NRO from judicial scrutiny but could not muster the required numbers in the parliament (Oldenburg, 2016, p. 93).

i. Eighteenth Amendment and NFC Award: Strengthening Federalism or Weakening the State?

Tense relations between the center and provinces has been the main source of political crisis throughout the history of Pakistan. Punjab being the largest province in terms of population have been accused by the smaller provinces of being negligent towards their needs. Even during civilian rules such strained relations exist between the center and provinces. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, imposed governor rules in the provinces of Balochistan and NWFP and also initiated treason trial against their leadership. Benazir faced a challenge in the Punjab province in her first tenure where Nawaz Sharif was the chief minister. In 2008, when the initial spirit of reconciliation fizzled out and PML-N left the coalition, center-province tensions resurfaced again. Zardari, through his governor Salman Taseer imposed a governor rule in Punjab where PML-N was the ruling party

(Kanwal, 2017). Governor rule was lifted after the restoration of judiciary. PPP again tried to reach out to the opposition parties for their cooperation in terms of legislation as PPP lacked the majority and was dependent on the former allies of Musharraf, MQM, to sustain their government. The first outcome of this renewed cooperation between the parties was the agreement of National Finance Commission Award (NFC). The 7th NFC Award was a major success of PPP government as previous as there has been a deadlock over the redefining of NFC award for decades.

A new weightage formula was introduced to incorporate the demands of smaller provinces. Poverty, revenue generation and urban-rural density were also given weightage as previously population was the only criterion. Share of provinces in the divisible pool of taxes was increased from 46% to 57%. Through 18th amendment, concurrent list was also removed and several areas of governance, such as health, education and police were devolved to the provinces. There were apprehensions about the capacity of provinces in terms of utilization of increased resources and efficient governance and those proved to be true to a certain extent (Talbot, 2012, p. 217). Provincial capacity in terms of dealing with the deteriorating security situation proved to be inadequate especially in the Sindh province, where the urban centers like Karachi were engulfed in a gang war patronized by different political parties. Rangers, a paramilitary force, took the command of the operation to bring normalcy to the metropolis. Apart from security, provinces did not show significant improvement in the areas of education and health. Neither, the provinces improved their capacity of generating revenue nor a clear road map was given while adopting the NFC award and the 18th amendment. This situation left the center with inadequate resources to invest on the areas of human development as majority of their remaining budget after transferring the provincial share is consumed by defense expenditures and debt servicing (Pasha, August 16, 2010). Another shortcoming of this devolution exercise was that provincial government were not willing to devolve these powers to the district level and continued to govern their provinces through a politicized bureaucracy. For instance, Karachi a city of more than 20 million inhabitants does not have an empowered local government and poor service delivery is a corollary of highly centralized mode of governance at provincial level (Dawn, January 05, 2018).

However, 18th amendment is considered to be a major landmark in the constitutional history of the country by the advocates of federalism in Pakistan. Such exhibition of unanimity was not seen since the adoption of 1973 constitution. Smaller regional parties voted because they have been long demanding for increased provincial autonomy. The name of NWFP province was changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on the demands of ANP, a Pashtun nationalist party and an ally of PPP in the center. PML-N as the ruling party of Punjab agreed despite losing some of its share because they get to enjoy autonomy in Punjab while PPP was ruling in the center. Another reason for such unanimous support was the restoration of complete parliamentary system, as envisaged in the original 1973 constitution. 18th amendment reversed all the changes made by Musharraf in the constitution and took away the powers of the president of dissolving the assemblies. Another reason for PML-N to support the amendment was the removal of limit to become prime minister as Nawaz Sharif was hoping to return to power for the third time (Adeney, 2012) . Judiciary, however was not satisfied with the constitutional developments as it was expecting more independence from the executive and increased role in terms of appointment of judges. In order to avoid the judicial review of the 18th amendment, 19th amendment was tabled in the parliament. According to the new amendment the number of judges were increased from two to four in the Judicial Council of Pakistan (JCP) and made it binding on the president to appoint the judges on the advice of JCP (Waseem, 2012, p. 23).

ii. Memogate and Judicial Activism: Surviving through a Political Crisis

Musharraf's successor, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani had a monumental task of restoring the credibility of the military, tainted by Musharraf's unconstitutional acts and his confrontation with the judiciary. There was a public resentment towards military for its alliance with the US in the war on terror and the deteriorating security situation due to increasing terrorist attacks. Kayani, called back all the military officers appointed by Musharraf in the bureaucracy to reinstate the professionalism in the military. He also mediated between PPP and other parties over the issue of the restoration of judiciary (Fair, 2011). While he was trying to maintain a professional outlook of the military an incident took place on 2nd May, 2011 that put the Pakistani military establishment on the global spotlight. US forces conducted an operation on a compound in Abbottabad city of Pakistan and killed the most sought after terrorist Osama Bin Laden. It was

later revealed that Osama was residing in that compound, a few kilometers away from Pakistan's military training academy in Kakul, for five years. Pakistani military came under heavy criticism both locally and globally. American authorities maintain that the Pakistani military has not found to be complicit but serious questions were raised about the efficiency of the intelligence agencies. After the debacle of East Pakistan in 1971 it was a major humiliation for the military. An enquiry commission was constituted which submitted its report in January, 2013. Government kept it classified but later Al Jazeera revealed the contents of the report in its investigative report (July 15, 2013).

The four member commission wrote a 336 pages long report and interviewed around 200 people including ISI chief, Ahmad Shuja Pasha and Bin Laden's family members. The commission in its report vehemently criticized all the state institutions and called it a colossal failure on the part of all intelligence agencies and other governmental departments (Ibid). It was mentioned in the report that the compound Bin Laden used to hide in was fenced with barbed wires and yet it did not come under notice of any security agency. The report insinuated that Bin Laden might have acquired a support network which helped him evade the surveillance of intelligence agencies. It was also found in the report that ISI and other agencies have stopped pursuing Osama in 2005 as they thought that he is no more alive. A senior journalist shared his views on the issue that since the Islamization done by Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan has become a highly polarized society. This polarization is reflected in every institution including the military. The military leadership might not know the whereabouts of Osama but he must be provided support from some rank and files of the military. Without such support this fact cannot be digested that he was hiding in such high security zone for years just purely on the basis of his own skills (Interveiw, January 31st, 2019)

This crisis, however, provided an opportunity to the civilian government to increase its control over military affairs but instead of taking the parliamentary route Zardari decided to seek American support to materialize it. It was revealed in an editorial of Financial Times of October, 2011 that PPP government through the Pakistani ambassador in US, Hussain Haqqani, allegedly sent a memo to US Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen. In that memo Pakistani government requested to American authorities to put its weight behind the civilian authorities in Pakistan to establish their writ over Pakistani military. It was emphasized that if this

opportunity, arose as a result of Abbottabad fiasco is lost then it will be difficult to materialize this dream of civilian supremacy and this will also endanger the future of democracy in Pakistan. Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistani origin businessman in US, who claimed to be the intermediary of Haqqani, revealed this to the media (Rogin, Foreign Policy, November 17, 2011). The court formed an inquiry commission and it was found that Hussain Haqqani was the author of that memo and treason proceedings were recommended against him. There are still two opinions about the authenticity of the memo as American authorities gave contradicting statements about the existence of such communication. However, it put the PPP government in hot water as it was publicized by the media, critical of the government, as an act of treason. PPP government was already struggling due to acute electricity crisis and Hajj Scandal. Nawaz Sharif tried to capitalize this situation and filed a petition against Haqqani in the Supreme Court (Asad, Dawn, March 08, 2018). His younger brother Shahbaz Sharif was allegedly secretly meeting General Kayani³. It seemed like the repeat of the zero-sum politics of 1990s but somehow the PPP government survived that crisis. The magnitude of the crisis was such that there were speculations about another military coup in the country.⁴

There can be several explanations of this crisis being averted. One reason can be army's engagement with the menace of terrorism and it would have been imprudent on the part of army to facilitate any undemocratic step against the government just after three years of the end of Musharraf's rule. Hyper active judiciary which built up the reputation of challenging the military rulers and vowed to protect the democracy. It would have become difficult for the judges to collude with the military the way they did in before the lawyers' movement. Opposition parties especially PML-N did not turn their protest into a mass mobilization against the government rather they took a judicial route to pressurize the government. Moreover, PPP also made an alliance with PML-Q, which was the product of Musharraf's political maneuvering and was the ruling party during Musharraf's rule. After the assassination of Benazir, PPP termed PML-Q as "Qatil League" (Murderer League) (Business Recorder Editorial, September 18, 2008). This was a major political compromise on the part of PPP to enter into an alliance with PML-Q but that

³ 'Shahbaz and Nisar secretly meet Kayani', Dawn, 03 Oct, 2009. See: <https://www.dawn.com/news/494035/shahbaz-and-nisar-secretly-meet-kayani>

⁴ See Al-Jazeera report here : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZEpOjTLMGA&ab_channel=AlJazeeraEnglish

move paid off during the Memogate crisis because Chaudharay Shujaat, who is considered as a politician closer to the military establishment, put his weight behind Zardari and termed it as a conspiracy. However, the judicial activism continued to be a major source of trouble for the government because of the insistence of the SCP to the Prime Minister to write a letter to the Swiss government to reopen the investigation against Zardari about his Swiss bank accounts. Prime Minister Gilani's refusal while referring to the presidential immunity enjoyed by Zardari, caused him losing his post as the SCP declared him ineligible to hold a parliamentary position for five years due to the contempt of court (Reuters, June 19, 2012). His successor Raja Pervez Ashraf did write the letter but Swiss authorities refused to resume the investigation (The Express Tribune, October 09, 2013) . This was the clear instance of judicial overreach or in other words judicial bullying of the executive but it did not result into premature end of the government and PPP for the first time completed its tenure.

G. 2013 Elections: Return of Nawaz Sharif amidst Changing Party System

Zardari government ended leaving behind worsening economic and security situation. Due to increase in urban/political violence and religious terrorism the country's economy took a massive blow. Massive electricity crisis was followed by capital flight and deindustrialization. National debt increased to almost double during the five years of PPP government without contributing to improved standards of health and education. Media kept reporting about corruption scandals but apart from judiciary no civilian institution showed any interest in ensuring accountability (Jaffrelot, 2015, pp'259- 278). In one of the talk shows, one politician of PPP complained that "If everyone is indulged in corruption then it is our right too to benefit out of it."⁵ Such reputation of being a corrupt party and their dismal showing in terms of governance cost them the 2013 elections in all the provinces except Sindh. They managed to retain Sindh due to the lack of interest of other parties to expand their electoral mobilization till interior Sindh because their major two rivals PML-N and PTI were focused on Punjab. The reason behind this strategy was due to more than 50% share of seats of the national assembly in the Punjab province. Majority of seats in Punjab makes it easier to form the government in the center. This strategy worked for

⁵ "PPP Minister Claiming Corruption as their right" See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GV9_Pil-GFw&ab_channel=Beatthatmate

PML-N because of their better knowledge of the region due to their previous experience of governing the province for four times. It provided them with an edge over other parties specially PTI, which was a relatively new party and had incomparable support of “electables” than PML-N. Nevertheless, PTI demonstrated strong showing in the elections and replaced PPP in Punjab as the challenger to PML-N. Apart from it, PTI also gained majority in KP province by defeating the traditional ethnic and religio-political parties. It left its impact on Urban Sindh, specially in Karachi, where the local party MQM faced a massive challenger in the form of PTI in last two decades. This was a major change in the party system in Pakistan as PTI, a party having only one seat in 2002 elections and boycotted the 2008 elections, emerged as the second largest party in terms of votes, demonstrating its voter base in three provinces (Bangash & Sarmad, 2015).

PML-N, however, managed to get majority seats due to its landslide victory in Punjab. With 166 seats (including reserved seats for women and minorities), PML-N was 5 seats shy of a simple majority. They got allies in the form of JUI-F (religious party) and PKMAO (Pashtun nationalist party). PPP managed to form a government in Sindh province while PTI took charge of KP. Things remain usual in Balochistan as the smaller regional parties made an alliance with the party in power in the center. Nawaz Sharif became the prime minister for the third time and his younger brother Shehbaz Sharif assumed the office of chief minister of Punjab. However, the 2013 elections were followed by allegations of rigging by most of the parties. PPP and PTI accused PML-N of managing the elections in Punjab through the local bureaucracy and the returning officers (ROs) (The Express Tribune, 20 May, 2013). Zardari termed it as the election of ROs while Imran Khan, chairman of PTI demanded for the forensic audit of the elections. PML-N, initially agreed to the demands to pacify the losing parties but did not take any substantive action to initiate any inquiry. Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), an independent election observer pointed out various discrepancies including, faulty voter registration process, a significant increase in rejected votes and lack of transparency in consolidation of results. There were few encouraging trends in those elections in the form of higher voter turn-out as 55% of the registered voters cast their votes. Number of female candidates directly contesting the elections was also significantly higher as compare to previous elections (The Express Tribune, 22 February, 2014).

i. Dharna (Sit-In) Politics of PTI and Renewed Civil-Military Tensions

Imran Khan, the founder of PTI, before establishing his party in 1996 has been a massively celebrated sportsman not only in Pakistan but in the entire cricket playing part of the world. During his cricket days he had an image of a playboy and a maverick sportsman. His rock star sort of popularity saw its peak when he managed to win the world cup in 1992 as the captain of the team. Soon after his retirement he turned to philanthropy and established a cancer hospital for needy people. For establishing the hospital he went on a nation-wide fund raising campaign and millions of rupees were showered upon him. During his philanthropy days he was repeatedly asked about his intentions of joining politics and maintained that he is not fit for the kind of politics prevalent in Pakistan. Eventually in 1996 he established his own party with a single point agenda of anti-corruption (BBC report, 06 August, 2018). His idealism did not yield any results for him in his party's first showing in 1997 election as all of his candidates including himself faced a humiliating defeat. In 2002, however, he managed to win his own constituency and started appearing regularly on political talk shows. In 2008 elections, as part of APDM he decided to boycott the elections but his continued presence on media and his vociferous criticism of both military establishment and the civilian government over the issue of siding with US in the war on terror, continued to put him in the limelight. It was in 2011, when he started playing by the rule of the game and started inviting electables from different parties. Those electables include sugar barons, landed elite and real estate developers. He was allegedly receiving support from certain sections of the military establishment in terms of growing the electoral reach of his party (Warraich, July 27, 2018).

Before 2013 elections he was pinning his hopes on the large number of young voters and did manage to mobilize the urban middle class but that could not translate into his electoral victory. Right after the elections his party started protesting while he was receiving treatment for his injuries he received during an accident in one of his political rallies. Soon after recovery, he started demanding the audit of four constituencies, which he believed will determine the authenticity of the electoral mandate of PML-N (The News International, 06 September, 2014). After failing to convince the treasury benches he decided to mobilize his supporters to Islamabad to stage a sit-in. There were rumors of him being supported by chief of the premier intelligence

service ISI, General Zaheer ul Islam and some leaders of PML-N later claimed the same in their interviews. PML-N leaders accused General Zaheer of planning a coup but his plans were foiled by the then army chief, General Raheel Shareef (The News International, 25 July, 2015). PTI's sit-in, joined by another religious cleric cum politician, Tahir ul Qadri, continued for 126 days and ended due to the horrific massacre of school children in Army Public School, Peshawar in December, 2014. Army convinced Nawaz Sharif to form a judicial commission to probe the allegation of electoral management. The Judicial Commission concluded in its findings that massive discrepancies were observed in terms of conduct of the elections and consolidation of the results but no evidence of an organized electoral management were found (Haider, Dawn, 23 July, 2015).

Alleged role of the ISI in the sit-in and army's continued dominance over foreign policy matters kept the civil-military relations tensed. Nawaz's initial overtures to India and his willingness to accept the Indian offer of mutual granting of MFN status met resistance from the army. His participation in the oath taking ceremony of Narendra Modi in 2014 also caused displeasure among military top brass (India Today, 23 May, 2014). The situation further exacerbated due to the famous "Dawn Leaks". A senior journalist, Cyril Almeida, associated with the Dawn media group, on October 6, 2016 broke a story in Dawn that the civilian leadership has suggested to the military to refrain from patronizing the militant groups allegedly responsible for planning attacks in the Indian side of the disputed region of Kashmir. According to the report, the civilian authorities warned the military of grave consequences in the form of international isolation upon continuity of such patronage. This "leak" came in the wake of Indian claims of surgical strikes in Pakistan against the Jihadi assets of Pakistan's military. The story indirectly affirmed the Indian allegations while referring to the suggestions made by the civilian authority. Hell broke loose in the section of media sympathetic to the military establishment. The government immediately denied the story and ordered an inquiry. Opposition parties also criticized the government of compromising on the issue of national security (The Nation Daily, 15 May, 2017). Some media channels, hinted towards the role of Maryam Nawaz, daughter of Nawaz Sharif, in planting that story. Eventually, the situation died down when Nawaz dismissed, one of his cabinet member, Pervez Rashid for handling the situation "irresponsibly".

ii. Panama Verdict and its Aftermath

In April, 2016, the famous panama papers unearthed the details of offshore companies of properties of wealthy individuals across the world. The leaked documents named personalities from Pakistan including the children of Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. The revealed offshore companies and properties of the Sharif family included the Avenfield Apartments, which they have been accused of possessing since early 1990s. Sharifs have been denying of such ownership for almost two decades but the younger son of Nawaz, Hussain few days before the leaks gave interview to different TV channels and accepted the ownership of those properties. Imran Khan started a campaign for the judicial investigation and the resignation of Nawaz Sharif. PML-N continued to claim that those properties are rightfully owned and no illegal means have been employed to purchase those properties (Specia, The New York times, 28 July, 2017). Nawaz Sharif in his address to the nation and the national assembly confidently presented the financial trail of those properties. Imran Khan insisted of judicial inquiry and filed a petition with the Supreme Court. The court initially was reluctant to take up the case but due to the increased political tensions between PTI and PML-N, the court finally took up the case (Boone, The Guardian, 01 November, 2016). PPP, another major opposition party stayed aloof of all these proceedings and maintained their stance that the institutions of Pakistan are incapable of holding the Punjabi politicians accountable (The Express Tribune, 28 February, 2017). As the judicial inquiry progressed, there was a significant rise in the political heat. There were daily press conferences after every court proceedings by the political parties to sell their narratives. Both electronic and print media contributed to build up a highly polarized narrative around this case. Social media becomes the arena of verbal fights and exchange of harsh commentary between the supporters of PML-N and PTI. The ruling party turned their rhetoric towards the court and some of their parliamentarians warned the judges, without naming them of the anger of their voters. This was not the first time that PML-N was at loggerheads with the Supreme Court. In 1997 supporters of the party stormed in the premises of the court when Nawaz Sharif was supposed to attend to face the charges of contempt of court. The chief justice of that time had to seek the protection of army to clear the premises of the unruly mob. There was a repeat of these pressure tactics during the panama case proceedings too but this time it

remained as verbal statements while addressing different rallies. The court announced its preliminary verdict in which two judges found enough grounds to disqualify Nawaz Sharif but three judges ruled in favor of forming a joint investigation team (JIT). The JIT comprised of 6 members of different civil and military investigation agencies and was given the task of probing the money trail of the apartments and given the mandate to interrogate the Sharif family and their associates (Dawn, April 20, 2017). PML-N's immediate reaction was of celebrations as the prevalent view among the commentators was that this JIT will end up achieve nothing.

The JIT in after its two month long probe suggested to file references against Nawaz and his children as they failed to satisfy the investigative body about the financial transactions related to the purchase of the Avenfield apartments. It also discovered that Nawaz Sharif was the chairman of a Dubai based offshore company and he was drawing salary amounting to 10000 Dirhams which he failed to declare in his nomination papers for the 2013 elections. The investigation also found that the trust deed submitted by Maryam Nawaz was in the Calibri font and claimed to be prepared in 2006, while the said font was not available for commercial purposes before 2007. Therefore, she was accused by the JIT of misleading the court by submitting a forged document. The JIT also declared the Qatari letter as unverifiable as the author of the letter refused to meet the JIT members. The court after hearing the arguments for two weeks ordered the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to conduct the trial of different references against the Sharif family and declared Nawaz Sharif unqualified for life for electoral politics due to concealment of his assets in the form of the salary he was receiving as the chairman of FZE Capital, the Dubai based offshore company (Dawn, July 28, 2017). Sharif was replaced by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, a prominent PML-N minister but Abbasi continued to maintain that his prime minister remains Nawaz Sharif. Entire party of PML-N termed that verdict as another setback for democracy as the non-elected people continue to determine the fate of elected people. Nawaz turned his disqualification into a political campaign and raised the slogan of "Vote Ko Izzat Do"[Respect the representatives who are elected by the vote of the people]. He and his daughter Maryam Nawaz built up the narrative that the reason of their changing fortune is their unwillingness to

compromise on civilian supremacy. Maryam Nawaz said in one of her interviews that she is being punished because she refused to polish the boots.⁶

PTI gained momentum at the expense of PML-N in Punjab. Several “electables” started joining PTI and Imran Khan rose to the office of prime minister after July, 2018 elections (Shah, 2019). Both PPP and PML-N termed the elections rigged in favor of PTI but agreed to be the part of the newly elected parliament. A term “selected” was coined by Bilawal Bhutto, chairman of PPP, for Imran Khan and of course the selector was the military establishment (The News International, 19 November, 2019). . Post 2018 elections set up has been termed as ‘Imran Project’ or “Imran Experiment”. Just before the elections, Nawaz and Maryam were sentenced to ten and seven years imprisonment respectively by the accountability court. The new government had to face enormous economic challenges in the face of historic current account deficit and increased inflation. The opposition parties continued to criticize the “selectors” for installing an incompetent government. Fazl-ur-Rahman the chief of a religio-political party staged a sit-in with the demands of the resignation of the prime minister and new elections in the capital city of Islamabad. PML-N and PPP supported the sit-in but did not actively participate except for couple of days. Opposition leaders in their speeches suggested to the “backers” of the government to take away their support. Amidst such tensed political environment, Nawaz got the permission from the Lahore High Court to go abroad for his treatment. Media started speculating a “deal” between the opposition and the establishment as such relief for a convicted individual was unprecedented (The Express Tribune, 10 November, 2019). Shehbaz Sharif, the younger brother of Nawaz is considered to be the one who is seen as a deal maker with the establishment and Nawaz is portrayed by his supporters in the media and the civil society as the one showing resistance to the diktats of the military.

H. Army Act Fiasco: Judiciary’s Challenge to the Military and Capitulation of Political Parties

A constitutional crisis ensued for a year old PTI lead coalition government in November, 2019 when the Supreme Court suspended the notification regarding the extension of the Chief of the Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. It was not the first time that the military chief has been

⁶ The naysayers of the military in Pakistan label the military apologists as “Boot Polishers”.

given the extension by the government, citing the importance of the continuation of the leadership in the wake of geo-political crisis. Ayub Khan, the first military ruler, appointed General Musa Khan as his successor after relinquishing the post by assuming the role of Field Marshal and later the President. He later gave Musa two extensions to assure his grip over the military through his handpicked general who also shared the ethnic background of Ayub Khan. Zia-ul Haq, another military ruler, after imposing the Martial Law in 1977, held the dual offices of the Presidency and the military chief. Pervez Musharraf followed the suit and did not give up his command of the army until November, 2007 due to the unprecedented resistance shown by the higher judiciary and the lawyer's community. His successor, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was also given additional three years by the PPP's govt. All these years the Judiciary never raised questions on the legitimacy of such extensions rather provided the legal support to the excesses of the military rulers.

In the recent episode of military chief extension, the judiciary set aside the precedence of being a silent observer and entertained the petition of a habitual petitioner, Riaz Hanif Rahi. It is pertinent to mention here that Rahi, had earlier been fined by the high courts for filing frivolous petitions on the name of public interest litigation. In 2005 Mr. Rahi was sentenced to one month long imprisonment for misbehaving with a judge. In 2010, he was temporarily banned from the premises of Supreme Court by challenging the reinstatements of Supreme Court judges. (Gishkori, November 27, 2019). He even tried to withdraw this petition against the extension of the military chief but Supreme Court denied him the right to withdrawal. He filed this petition right after the government issued the notification of the extension in August, 2019. Supreme Court took up the case just days before the retirement of general Bajwa which set the rumors mill abuzz as to the intentions of the higher judiciary and the generals next in line. In the print and electronic media this judicial intervention generated a mixed response. One section of media termed it a step forward on the path of civilian supremacy while some commentators deemed this move as an instance of judicial overreach⁷.

⁷ Two prominent lawyers Aitazaz Ahsan and Irfan Qadir termed this move of Supreme Court as an encroachment in the domain of the executive in their various media appearances. Link:

In its detailed judgment Supreme Court highlighted several shortcomings in the existing army act and gave the government the directions to brought required amendments through parliamentary legislation. The decision gave the government the duration of six months to legislate and the failure in this regard will result into the end of Bajwa's tenure as the military chief (Afzal, December 4, 2019). This unprecedented decision by the Supreme Court raised the questions about the capacity of the government to implement this verdict as it lacked the majority in the Senate and had a razor thin majority in the national assembly. This impression was further reinforced by the dysfunctional legislative business of the parliament during the preceding months because of the highly contentious environment of the parliament. Several of the opposition leaders were under arrest and facing the corruption inquiries including the heads of the political parties. To the surprise of the political commentators and their party members, both the leading opposition parties, PPP and PML (N) readily agreed to unconditionally support the legislation and Bajwa was granted tenure with an almost unanimous act of parliament (The News International, January 04, 2020). This show of cooperation to the extent of obedience on the part of the opposition parties was intriguing because of Bajwa being the target of the criticism of the opposition parties and the naysayers of the PTI led government. Long before the elections in July, 2018, PML-N came up with the narrative of PTI being supported by the "establishment" at the expense of other parties. After the election opposition parties came up with the term "selected" for the government and the selectors were obviously the military establishment who achieved this in collusion with the judiciary. That was the narrative which was being sold by the opposition to their supporters until the army act was presented with the proposed amendments. In the midst of heavy criticism from their supporters in media and the civil society PML-N voted in favor of amendments as per the directions of their ailing leader Nawaz Sharif who sent a letter from London that asked their parliamentarians to cooperate with the government.

Khwaja Asif, a prominent PML-N leader blamed their supporters for such surrender of the party after 3 years long "resistance" against the establishment. He complained that their supporters want their leaders to take a stand for civilian supremacy but they are not willing to come on roads to demonstrate their support (Naya Daur, Jan 09, 2020). PPP on the other hand showed some "resistance" by forcing the government to follow the parliamentary procedures by first

presenting the bill in the parliamentary committees before presenting it for voting. Both the houses approved the amendments with overwhelming majority of three major parties PTI, PML-N and PPP. Smaller parties like JUI-F, ANP and PKMAP registered their dissent by boycotting the vote. Some commentators quip that Bajwa has emerged more popular than the Prime Minister Imran Khan as he has been reappointed by far more number of votes than the prime minister. Extension of Bajwa did solidify the hybridity of the regime in Pakistan where despite two successive civilian transfers of power, the army continues to retain its supremacy over the civilian leadership. The tutelary status of army is considered as detrimental to the entrenchment of democracy in Pakistan but it also becomes instrumental to avert the political and constitutional crisis. This is evident from army chief's role in the 2014 sit-ins by PTI where army chief negotiated on the behalf of the government of PML-N to reach an agreement regarding their demands of transparent inquiry of 2013 elections. The establishment of military courts in 2015 was another instance where army made all the major parties to vote in favor of the establishment of the military courts to tackle the terrorism related trials.

Army's preponderance in Pakistan is equated with the dominance of Punjabis over other ethnicities. Punjab being the largest province in terms of population eventually enjoys major share in terms of recruitment in the armed forces. Almost fifty three percent population of Pakistan resides in the Punjab province. Therefore, if a party secure majority in Punjab only then it can comfortably make the government in the center. That is what happened in 2013 elections where PML-N formed the central government by securing overwhelming majority in the province. Efforts have been made to divide the province of Punjab to dilute its dominance but all those efforts have not come to fruition so far. Military operations in the past in Sindh and Baluchistan provinces have sowed the seeds of resentments against Punjab in those provinces. Punjabi politicians, mainly the landed elite are considered as enabler of this sustained tutelary role of the military. Therefore, when Nawaz Sharif started his movement against the "Khalai Makhloq"⁸ after he was dismissed by the Supreme Court, many who resent the military received his "struggle" with optimism. Their source of optimism lied in the fact that for the first time a

⁸ Khalai Makhloq literally means aliens and it is another euphemism among many about the military and its intelligence agencies. Another euphemism which got popular in the wake of 2018 elections was the "Agriculture Department" as they were accused of electoral engineering.

sitting government, dominated by Punjabis (mainly from central and northern Punjab) is bringing its supporters on roads by raising the slogans of civilian and parliamentary supremacy. But to the disappointment of many it was Nawaz Sharif, who wrote the letter to its parliamentary party to vote in favor of the amendments in the army act. PPP also fell in line as their leaders were also granted bail in the cases of money laundering. As a result, PTI gained legitimacy for their “selected” government as the opposition parties unconditionally came to the rescue of the “selector”.

In the last section of this dissertation a systemic analysis will be done to assess that how the growing intensity of inter-party competition and active role of judiciary has not translated into a transition to democracy. Weak party organization lack of party rootedness continue to reinforce the role of tutelary forces and hence consolidating the hybrid regime in Pakistan.

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MAKING SENSE OF THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY

INTENSIFYING COMPETITION, STRUGGLING PARTIES AND RESILIENT TUTELARY ACTORS

Political parties in Pakistan have come of age since the restoration of complete civilian rule since 2008. Institutions responsible for assuring level playing field have become relatively more transparent and proactive. For instance, the central and provincial heads of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) are appointed as a result of consensus between the opposition leader and the head of the government (Basit, 2013). Elections are not held by under the incumbent government rather a care taker government replace it which is responsible for holding the elections in 90 days. Judiciary also plays a supervisory role if any of the parties complain for a foul play (Bangash et.al., 2015). After Nawaz Sharif declared ineligible on non-declaration of assets then PML-N using its parliamentary majority changed the nomination papers and excluded the part reserved for such declaration of their assets and of their dependents. Lahore High Court (LHC) intervened upon the petition made by a journalist Habib Akram and restored the nomination papers in its original form by declaring that any change in the nomination papers can be brought about by no institutions but the ECP (Riaz, 2018). Such proactive role of judiciary has contributed to raise the standards of accountability of political leadership and fairness of the competition but the quality of the competition remains low due to the lack of institutionalization of parties and resultantly dismal state of party system institutionalization. In the following sections the configurative approach of Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) will be used to produce a theoretically relevant analysis of the historical date discussed in the previous two chapters.

As discussed in the theoretical section of this dissertation that multi-dimensional configurative approach deals with three features of a hybrid regime. Those are; competitiveness, civil Liberties and tutelary interference. Adeney (2017) has employed the configurative approach to analyze the hybrid regime of Pakistan. She rightly acknowledges the complexity of Pakistan's case and emphasizes on using the term hybrid regime. Nevertheless, her analysis appears highly optimistic about the civilian unity in the face of tutelary interference when she claims that PML-N's victory in 2013 and PPP's refusal to support the sit-in of PTI in 2014 is a setback for the military (p.131). Unanimity on the 18th amendment was definitely a landmark constitutional development but both PML-N and PPP continued to collude with the military at the expense of each other. PML-

N's role in both the dubious Memogate scandal and Yusuf Raza Gilani's questionable dismissal by the judiciary did not serve the cause of civilian supremacy (Mahmood et.al., 2019). Similarly, PPP's role in staging the political coup against the PML-N led Balochistan government to prevent PML-N from securing the majority in Senate was another blow to the spirit of Charter of Democracy signed between both parties in 2006 (Ghori, 2018). Adeney discusses increased competitiveness of the successive elections but did not take into account the personalistic nature of political parties which hampers the transition of the regime to a stable democracy and keeps the grip of military intact (Mohmand, 2014). Another important aspect her paper fails to capture is the changing dynamics of horizontal accountability that how the judicial activism is holding the government accountable as compare to the 1990s where institutions of accountability were used to coerce the opposition. Therefore, this dissertation proposes to combine the scholarship regarding party system institutionalization (PSI) with the configurative approach about hybrid regimes to come up with a much comprehensive account of complex hybrid regimes such as Pakistan. In the following sections I will discuss competitiveness, party rootedness, horizontal accountability (combining with media pluralism) and tutelary interference (also its impact on the civil liberties) in the context of Pakistan.

Competitiveness

i. Government Turnover

In the entire literature regarding hybrid regimes, the classification of competitive authoritarianism, proposed by Levitsky and Way (2002) keeps its focus on the notion of competition. They don't limit their analysis of inter-party competition to only elections and also take the competition in legislature, judiciary and media into account. In the electoral arena they suggest that in hybrid regimes incumbents always face a serious challenge from the opposition and possibility of the turnover of the government remains. This makes hybrid regimes different from such regimes where elections are mere façade and the incumbent authoritarian regimes manage to win successive elections quite comfortably. Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) put emphasis on turnover of the government as an important indicator to assess the competitiveness of

elections. They propose that if there are no turnover in four consecutive elections then the regime cannot be considered as competitive. First national level elections in Pakistan were held in 1970, 23 years after its independence. These were followed by the elections of 1977. Both of these elections were though highly competitive in nature but culminated into disintegration of the country and a military rule respectively. The current hybrid regime starts in 1988 and since then every election has resulted into the electoral defeat of the ruling party. Although 2002 elections were fought under the military tutelage, still opposition parties managed to secure substantive number of seats (Talbot, 2003). It forced the military ruler Musharraf to facilitate defections from the opposition parties to form the government. Since 1988 there has been a two-party system comprised of two major parties PPP and PML-N along with smaller regional and religious parties till 2018 with the anomaly of PML-Q in 2002.

PML-Q was mostly comprised of the defected members of PML-N who sought the patronage of Musharraf after his coup in 1999 (Ibid, p. 204). As Musharraf lost his power in 2008, most of the members of PML-Q rejoined PML-N and some of them chose to join PPP and PTI. 2013 elections saw the emergence of a third major party, PTI that posed a serious challenge to both PML-N and PPP in their respective strongholds of Punjab and Sindh respectively. In 2018, PTI managed to secure majority in both center and Punjab. Constant change of governments in successive elections demonstrate highly competitive nature of elections in Pakistan. Following table depicts this high level of electoral volatility in Pakistan since 1988. It includes only those parties which manage to secure majority in successive elections till 2018. Some of these parties either did not exist or boycotted some elections. Entries of the majority party are highlighted for each election.

Table 1.1. Source: www.gallup.com.pk

Parties	No. of Seats and Vote Percentage															
	1988		1990		1993		1997		2002		2008		2013		2018	
PPP/PDA	94	38.5%	44	36.8%	89	37.9%	18	21.8%	81	26.05%	118	30.79%	42	15.23%	54	13.03%
PML-N/ IJI	56	30.2%	106	37.4%	73	39.9%	137	45.9%	19	11.66%	89	19.65%	166	32.77%	82	24.35%
PML-Q	N/A	-	N/A	-	N/A	-	N/A	-	126	25.66%	50	23.12%	2	3.11%	5	0.97%
PTI	N/A	-	N/A	-	N/A	-	0	1.7%	1	0.83%	N/A	-	35	16.92%	149	31.82%

As shown in the above table that during the first three elections after the restoration of multi-party electoral regime in 1988 the competition between the two major parties remain fairly stable in terms of vote percentage. PML-N, a party initially supported by the military establishment managed to increase its vote percentage at the expense of PPP till 1997. There were smaller regional and religious parties but they could not emerge as a serious contender until the elections of 2002 but even that was due to the public sentiment against Musharraf's joining the US led alliance in War on Terror (Waseem & Mufti, 2009). Succeeding elections proved that emergence of MMA in 2002 to be an anomaly. PML-N's decrease in vote percentage in 2002 was due to massive defection from the party and also due to the absence of its central leader Nawaz Sharif. PPP, however did not lose much in terms of vote percentage but post-election maneuvering by Musharraf led to the defection in the party and PPP-Patriot emerged that joined the government coalition (Pattnaik, 2004). PPP's status as one of the top two parties remained till 2008 elections when they managed to form the government. Since 2013 their vote percentage has been drastically decreased due to the emergence of PTI. Emergence of the third party has also affected the vote percentage of PML-N because PTI not only captured PPP's vote bank in Punjab but also claimed constituencies traditionally belonged to PML-N in both Punjab and KP (former NWFP) (Shah, 2019).

ii. *Voter Turnout*

Voter turnout is also an important indicator to gauge the competitiveness of the electoral system. More the turnout more is the level of competitiveness of the elections. Ekman (2009) suggests that in order to understand the sustainability of a hybrid regime level of public discontent vis-à-vis political parties play quite an important role. Public participation in the elections is an important indicator to assess the level of discontent. He analyzes the cases of Tanzania, Russia and Venezuela and concludes that different hybrid regime depicts different trends in terms of public opinion about the impact of elections in their daily lives. In Russia, for instance, the level of cynicism towards elections as substantial source of change among the public is high. Therefore, incumbents have to make no or little efforts to manipulate the elections rather they invest their resources to limit the opportunities for the opposition to prevent them from posing any danger to the incumbents (Ibid, p. 25). In Pakistan, voter turnout has been fluctuating since 1970 elections as shown in the table below.

Election Year	Voter Turnout
1970	63%
1977	63.1%
1985	52.93%
1988	43.5%
1990	45.5%
1993	40.3%
1997	36%
2002	41.8%
2008	44%
2013	55%
2018	51.6%

Table 1.2.

opportunities for the opposition danger to the incumbents (Ibid, has been fluctuating since 1970

Source: www.gallup.com.pk

Electoral politics began in 1970 in Pakistan with a high political fervor as it was preceded by an anti-dictatorship movement against Ayub Khan. Both major parties PPP and Awami League mobilized their supporter on the issues of economic and constitutional reforms. Awami League mobilized its supporter in East Pakistan on the slogans of provincial autonomy while PPP addressed the issue of gross inequalities (Baxter, 1971). Due to the de-politicization of the society by the succeeding military regime of Zia-ul-Haq decline in the voter turnout is observed. 1985's turnout figures are insignificant because those election were held on non-party basis and heavily

manipulated by the military regime to bring up a political leadership suited to their interest (Richter, 1986). That manipulation was further assisted by the fact that MRD (PPP led opposition alliance) boycotted the elections (Rais, 1985). Low voter turnout in subsequent elections in 1988 was due to multiple factors. Many voters did not have the National Identity Card (NIC) which was made compulsory to cast the vote (Rais, 1989). Military establishment was supporting IJI while popular support was with the PPP as the return of Benazir did freshen up the memories of Bhutto among the supporters of PPP and many were pinning hope on her to carry forward the legacy of her father. Therefore, the establishment resorted to different tactics of voter suppression. However PPP managed to emerge as the majority party.

In the following elections the turnout remained on the lower side and more than half of the registered voters chose not to exercise their right. Apart from the inefficiency of Election Commission (ECP), growing disenchantment among masses towards electoral politics due to massive corruption and poor governance of successive civilian governments was the main reason of low voter turnout (Bray, 1997). The trend remained same till 2008 elections but 2013 elections saw an upward trend. Emergence of PTI, led by a charismatic leader Imran Khan, enthused the urban middle class specially the new cohort of voters who did not see their millennial aspirations aligned with traditional parties. Interestingly, this upward trend was observed in highly volatile situation in terms of security (Malik, 2014). Terrorism was on the rise even TTP (a militant organization) declared certain parties as their targets. However, high turnout did not benefit PTI much as it ended up second in terms of vote percentage but third with respect to the number of seats. There was a slight decline in the turnout in 2018 elections but it remained above 50%. Nevertheless, even 55 percent turnout cannot be termed as satisfactory as a large proportion of registered voters, mainly women in rural and tribal areas chose not to participate (Saiyid, 2001).

iii. *Electoral Transparency*

Lack of electoral transparency and instances of electoral fraud also impact the competitiveness of the elections. If the electoral bureaucracy is compromised by means of bribe or coercion then results can be tempered in favor of particular parties or candidates. If the institutions, responsible for ensuring fairness of elections, keep failing to prevent instances of electoral fraud or irregularities then it discourage voters from casting their votes (Birch, 2010). Perception among

masses about prevalent corruption is also an important factor that keeps the voters away from polling stations. Their lack of trust in the institutions makes the electoral process meaningless to them (Stockem et al., 2011). 1970's elections of Pakistan are considered as fair elections but military's refusal to handover the power to the majority party eventually led to the disintegration of the country. Electoral manipulation in 1977 elections led to nationwide protests and rallies by opposition that eventually culminated into another military rule. After the restoration of civilian rule in 1988, there have been allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation but it was not followed by protests to the level of 1977. It was in 2014 when a protracted sit-in held by PTI against the alleged electoral rigging of 2013 elections, which raised serious apprehensions about another democratic reversal. PPP's support to the then government of PML-N managed to avert the crisis.

Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) was established in 1950 but remained a dysfunctional institution till 1970. 1973 constitution tried to empower the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) by providing the office of CEC a constitutional protection. CEC is appointed for five years and can only be removed through impeachment proceedings by the parliament. ECP was further empowered through 20th amendment by making it responsible for appointing caretaker government to oversee elections (Jaffrelot, 2015, p. 428). ECP is usually headed by either professional lawyers or retired judges. It also enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in terms of entertaining complaints about electoral rigging through election tribunals. Central and provincial heads of ECP are appointed as a result of consultative process between the prime minister and the opposition leader. Despite such sophisticated mechanism ECP remains dependent on the civilian bureaucracy which is prone to serve their political masters instead of working in a non-partisan manner (Ibid, p. 432). Such is the level of mistrust on the electoral machinery that ECP had to ask the military to deploy military personnel outside the polling stations in 2013. Due to the reports and video footages of massive irregularities in those elections, ECP was compelled to deploy the military men inside the polling stations as well (Shah, 2019, p. 103). This caused another controversy as the losing parties in 2018 elections raised their concerns about the deployment of military and claimed that their polling agents were denied access to the counting process for which they failed to produce substantive evidences (Bari, July 26, 2019). However, the election

process, although improved significantly but a lot has to be done to ensure further transparency to guarantee the fairness in terms of electoral competition.

Irfan Ghori, A senior reporter associated with Express Tribune shared his view about the electoral management in Pakistan. He said that elections are never conducted without incidents of fraud or electoral management. The polling process showed immense progress during 2018 election but the incidents of pre-poll rigging like harassment of candidates of PML-N by security agencies have been observed (Interview, January 10, 2019). Farhan Hanif Siddiqui, Associate Professor at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad echoed the same views but further added that despite the support of the military, PTI couldn't get the majority it desired. A hung parliament emerged out of 2018 elections but it is a positive sign as far the declining manipulative capacity of the tutelary actors is concerned and also shows the resilience of traditional parties in the face of tutelary pressures (January 15, 2019). Ilhan Niaz, an assistant professor, on the other hand disagreed about the changing nature of competition. He said that all major parties represent elite class. Whenever they seem fit they switch parties except few committed politicians. It is not like there is a competition of different ideologies rather a competition of elite (January 17, 2019). Following tables of will provide a list of irregularities found in both 2013 and 2018 election by the observers of FAFEN. On the basis of comparing data of both elections FAFEN concluded in its report that no necessary linkage can be drawn between electoral irregularities and electoral advantage in both the elections.

Electoral Irregularities	Percentage of observed PSs where irregularity occurred in GE 2013	Percentage of observed PSs where irregularity occurred in GE 2018
Guiding signs were not prominently displayed outside polling stations	3.3%	27.2%
Electoral rolls were missing at polling booths	0.5%	4.3%
Polling staff did not obtain polling agents' statements after showing them empty ballot boxes	4.8%	15.9%
Polling Officer did not call out the name of each voter loudly	18.7%	38.0%
Polling Officer did not strike off voters' name on electoral rolls	1.6%	5.8%
Polling Officer did not check indelible marks on voters' hands	2.2%	6.2%
APOs did not obtain voters' thumbprints on counterfoils	1.8%	5.3%
APOs did not write voters' NIC numbers on counterfoils	1.1%	5.2%
APOs did not stamp and sign on counterfoils	1.8%	5.0%
APOs did not stamp and sign on the backs of ballot papers	0.8%	4.4%
Polling officials marked ballot papers on behalf of voters	0.8%	1.2%
Polling agents/candidates marked ballot papers on behalf of voters	1.0%	1.5%
Government officials tried to influence voters to favour certain candidate/party	0.6%	0.7%
Polling station result (Form-XIV/Form-45) was not displayed outside the polling station	15.3%	18.8%

Electoral Irregularity	Percentage of observed PSs where irregularity occurred in GE 2013	Percentage of observed PSs where irregularity occurred in GE 2018
Campaign materials (posters, banners, flags etc.) were seen inside Polling Stations	3.2%	1.8%
Voters with an identification document other than NIC were permitted to vote	9.3%	1.1%
Voters without any identification were permitted to vote	2.7%	0.5%
Polling staff/polling agents/security personnel or other persons accompanied voters behind secrecy screens	17.0%	6.8%
Polling staff disallowed voters with disabilities from seeking assistance of their choice to cast vote	14.9%	3.5%
Polling Station was captured	1.2%	0.0%
Unauthorized persons pressured polling staff	3.8%	0.5%
Polling staff tried to influence voters' electoral choices	2.0%	0.5%
Voters already queued at polling stations were not allowed to vote at close of voting	23.2%	7.5%
Polling station result (Form-XIV/Form-45) was not provided to candidates/agents present at the polling stations	7.5%	2.5%
Incidence of violence was reported at polling station	7.6%	1.1%

Party Rootedness, Party Organization and Party Identification

In hybrid regimes like Pakistan, parties are weakly rooted in societies as they largely depend on the electability of the candidates than their programmatic linkages with voters. Personalistic nature of politics renders the organization of parties weak (Lancaster, 2014). Over reliance of parties on the charisma of their leaders leave them in a precarious position. Any untoward incident such as assassination or ineligibility of their leadership may lead to either massive

defections from the party or eventual collapse of the party (Harmel & Svasand, 1993). Periodic disruptions of democratic process also contribute to low level of party identification among voters as they don't have enough historical data to develop such bond with a party (Lupu, Riedl, 2013). Successive failures of governments in terms of service delivery also contribute to the declining trust of voters on parties. Elite capture of parties is also an important source of disillusionment for masses which makes them not so passionate about political parties. In such cases parties are reduced as an instrument of advancing and securing the interests of a particular elite instead of being an agent of a substantive change by incorporating the interests of multiple sections of society (Gunther & Diamond, 2003). Party-switching is also a common feature in weak party systems like Pakistan. One important factor that contributes to frequent party-switching is highly centralized decision making process in parties. Lack of decentralized decision making results into lower degree of party loyalties as the second or third tier leadership fail to develop the sentiment of ownership vis-à-vis parties (Kreuzer & Pettai, 2009).

Politics of clientelism also negatively impacts the quality of party system in hybrid regimes. In such political culture it becomes imperative for political parties to remain in power because their political survival becomes directly linked with their control of state resources. In clientelist politics the party-voter linkage becomes transactional that provides undue advantage to the ruling party (Hopkins, 2006). In such scenario opposition parties resort to seek alliance with non-political forces or tutelary actors to use their manipulative capacities in their favor. Clientelism is not only confined to lure the voters but parties also resort to such tactics to attract the candidates who have higher chances of winning elections (Protsyk & Matichescu, 2011). Such candidates can be offered lucrative ministries or development funds or favorable policies for their businesses in return of their support to the parties. This kind of political culture negatively impacts the efficiency of bureaucracy and eventually the quality of democracy. Bureaucracy becomes the part of such politics of patronage which culminates into dismal state of governance due to politically motivated allocation of state resources (Cruz & Keefer, 2015). Powerful interest groups like traders, business or landed elite provide funds to political parties in return of favorable economic policies. This culture of rent seeking makes parties less dependent on mass membership to raise

funds for their electoral campaign and such lack of grass-root level organization cost them heavily during any political crisis.

Party system in Pakistan is dominated by dynastic political parties. With the exception of few such as Jaamat-e-Islami (JI) and MQM all parties are comprised of different political families (Rumi, 2011). PTI emerged with the slogan of changing the culture of dynastic politics by bringing new faces of esteemed professional reputation but since 2011 it also followed the suit of its rivals PPP and PML-N and incorporated many influential political families from both Punjab and KP (Bhatti, June 15, 2018). Apart from the national level parties, regional and religious parties are run as family enterprises. Dynastic politics is so entrenched in Pakistan's political culture that after the assassination of Benazir in 2007, her son Bilawal had to opt for her mother's surname to commence his political career (Mufti, 2009). Nawaz Sharif, who started his career under the patronage of Zia-ul-Haq, later launched his younger brother Shehbaz Sharif as the chief minister of Punjab province while Nawaz himself was the prime minister. Even smaller parties either secular or religious such as JUI-F and ANP are dynastic in their composition. Electoral campaigns of both PPP and PML-N focus on the notion of victimhood. PPP keep reminding their supporters of sacrifices of their leaders Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and her daughter Benazir for the supremacy of civilian rule (Khanzada, May 21, 2012) while PML-N base their rhetoric on the forced exile their leadership had to live in. In the early career of Nawaz Sharif, he presented himself as the defender of the "values" of Pakistani society and proudly associated himself with the legacy of Zia-ul-Haq (Zaidi, November 20, 2019). He modified his rhetoric to the supremacy of Parliament after the tension he developed with the military leadership in his first tenure and subsequently due to the military coup that ends his second tenure prematurely.

PPP presents itself as the party of the center-left as pro-worker and PML-N associate itself to the center-right as pro-businessman. But the reality is that both parties are comprised of business and landed elite and deeply indulged in the politics of cronyism. Loyalty is preferred over efficiency in terms of appointments in bureaucracy (Islam, 2004). Before 20th amendment even in judiciary political appointments were done by both the parties. Military too was not spared as both the parties made an appointment of military chiefs by ignoring the rule of seniority. Bhutto appointed Zia-ul-Haq after by-passing several senior generals to earn his loyalty by granting this

favor. Nawaz repeated the same with the appointment of Musharraf although both generals later usurped power through military coups. Politicians from both parties were given easy access to bank loans and later manage to write-off those loans (Javaid, 2010). Subsidizing the businesses of politicians such as sugar mills, letting business run tax free such as agricultural production and weak regulation of real estate business are few such examples of politics of clientelism (Nelson, March 05, 2018). Political appointments in the lower tier of bureaucracy and police has immensely deteriorated the functioning of state. Many observers rightly blame large military budget as a fiscal burden but the real problem lies in the large size of lower level bureaucracy especially in public enterprises such as Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) which negatively impact the national exchequer. Inefficient administration of these entities due to several political appointments cost the country billions of rupees annually (Wilder, 2009).

Highly centralized decision making and lack of internal democracy is also a defining feature of these parties. Until recently there were no internal elections in these parties and on the orders of ECP they went through a process of internal elections which were highly ceremonial in their nature (Alvi, January 14, 2017). PTI, before 2013 election flirted with the idea of meaningful internal elections but it resulted into massive internal party conflict and eventually cost them heavily in national elections (Tariq et.al., 2016). Leadership of all major parties have a tendency to take decisions without consulting the workers and other party members except their few confidantes. PPP's decision to join hands with PML-Q in 2011 was one such instance where the party leadership went against their previously maintained political stance⁹. Even during early days of PPP, Z.A Bhutto welcomed feudal lords in his party against the wishes of his devoted party workers, who deemed Bhutto as a transformational leader (Khan, 2009). Imran Khan also followed the similar path when he compromised on his rhetoric of change and opened his party to the political opportunists of different parties. PML-N's politics of opportunism outshines its competitors. In order to retain their power in Punjab after 2008 elections Nawaz welcomed many

⁹ After the Assassination of Benazir PPP called PML-Q "Qatil (Murderer) League". Their inclusion in the government left many party workers flabbergasted. See: "Idea of 'Qatil League'- PPP alliance baffles Aitzaz", The News International, March 13, 2009. : <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/165520-idea-of-%E2%80%98qatil-league%E2%80%99-ppp-alliance-baffles-aitzaz>

of the PML-Q members going against his previous stance of denying them entry in PML-N. Moreover, he also gave prominent ministries to previous allies of Musharraf such as Daniyal Aziz, Marvi Memon and Zahid Hamid. Such politics of opportunism make parties in Pakistan as mere electoral parties devoid of any programmatic commitments and policy consistency.

Nevertheless, the politics in Pakistan these days is not completely devoid of any partisanship. Not necessarily programmatic but a regional trend of party identification is emerging in Pakistan (Mohmand, 2014, p-28). PPP has managed to form the provincial government in Sindh in successive elections since 2008. A general perception of corruption about the party has not affected their vote bank in the province rather they have increased their share of the number of seats. PML-N, since 1985 had ruled Punjab province for five times. Despite the massive setback of ineligibility of Nawaz as a result of Panama verdict in 2017, PML-N maintained its electoral hold on northern and central Punjab. KP on the other hand had surprised as it was for the first time voted back the incumbent party, PTI in 2018 election with a thumping majority. Since 1990 KP has voted in favor of five different parties or alliances. This was the first time that a party has succeeded to get the second term in KP (Hussain, August 01, 2018). Apart from that social media has become a medium where party supporters engage in heated exchange of words and at time hurl abuses to their political opponents. They have coined derisive titles for the supporters of their political rivals. PTI supporters are teased with the term “Youthia” which is driven from a popular cuss word “Chutya” which literally means a cretin. Their opponents use it to refer their blind following of their leader Imran Khan. Similarly, PTI supporters call PML-N supporters, “Patwari” which is an Urdu term for a district level land record office and symbolizes corruption (Ejaz, January 13, 2019). Exchange of such abuses is not limited to common supporters as sometime prominent leaders and partisan journalists also indulge in such exchanges (Jilani, December 12, 2019). Despite, the growing partisanship and regional consolidation of voter base, electoral volatility remains high in Pakistan as observed in other hybrid regimes. It is pertinent here to put this issue of electoral volatility in perspective in the light of existing literature regarding the electoral volatility in developing democracies and its impact on PSI.

i. Electoral Volatility

Various studies have shown that electoral volatility remains high in new democracies which continues to hamper the process of democratic consolidation (Bielasiak, 1997; Pridham, 1990; Toka, 1995). Emergence of new parties and shrinking votes of old parties contribute to that volatility. Shifting loyalties of voters leave political parties struggling for stable support base that results into a weak party system (Osion, 1998; Sikk, 2005; Birch, 2003). Tavits (2008) argue that in the early phases of party development the choice made by the political elite rather than voters has a significant impact on electoral volatility. In an unstable party system, party switching and party splitting is more frequent than more institutionalized party systems. Emergence of new parties or alliances in one election and fading away in next elections contribute to the high volatility rate found in various hybrid regimes. The electoral volatility data of 47 countries assembled by Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) clearly indicates that mean electoral volatility is far lower in established democracies like United States (3.3), Germany (8.7), Switzerland (6.5), United Kingdom (6.8) than the regimes with unstable party system such as; Philippines (41.9), Thailand (34.7), Estonia (45.4). The key factor between these countries lie in the continuity of the democratic process and historical experience of democracy. The last elections observed in that data was in 2002. So, the countries experienced multiparty elections just a decade before are more prone to higher electoral volatility. They argue that in established democracies, voters follow a shortcut of making their choices as per the party label rather than observing and assessing the credentials and performance of individual candidates in detail (p. 157).

There are many factors that contribute to the electoral volatility in newly established competitive regimes. Lack of programmatic orientation or commitment prevent the parties from securing stable electoral support. Poor service delivery is another reason which disenchant the voters from their previously chosen political parties. Strong perception of corruption also weakens the chances of party system stability. In such scenario, candidates switch parties to escape the fate experienced by parties with dwindling electoral support. They blame their previous parties and their policies for their failures and join new parties on the promise of performing better through a new political platform. In hybrid regimes, where non-political forces such as military constantly intervene directly or in a tutelary capacity inter-party volatility remains high and consequently it reflects in electoral volatility. Political actors tend to collude with such tutelary actors in order to

brighten their electoral prospects by means of joining the parties, enjoying the favor of tutelary actors or by forming a new party.

Mogens N. Pedersen (1979) in his seminal work proposed an equation of measuring electoral volatility. He suggests that party system change can be observed on three levels i.e. Parliamentary and governmental, intra-party level and at the level of electorate. He focuses on the party system change at the electorate level. He suggests that elections although is not the only determining factor but is the best available vantage point to assess the magnitude of party system change (p. 3). He further explains that both party volatility and shift in voting choices contribute to electoral volatility. He proposes the following equation to measure electoral volatility. Change in the strength of parties is measure through following equation where i is a specific party and t refers to a specific election year. So, the change in the party strength can be obtained through subtracting the vote percentage of a party at the given election from the vote percentage of the previous election.

$$\Delta P_{i,t} = P_{i,t} - P_{i,t-1}$$

In order to get the total net change in a particular election, the change of vote percentage of all the parties would be added by ignoring the sign difference.

$$TNC_t = \sum_{i=1}^n [\Delta P_{i,t}]$$

He suggests that

$$TNC_t \leq 200$$

In order to get the volatility Total net change should be divided by two and

$$V_t \leq 100$$

The equation would appear as follows

$$V_t = \frac{1}{2} \times TNC_t$$

Pakistan, like many other hybrid regimes, experience high electoral volatility. I have measure electoral volatility in Pakistan since the elections of 1988, after the restoration of multiparty elections. Apart from the factors, contributing to electoral volatility, discussed by Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), intervention of tutelary actors found to be another major factor causing high electoral volatility. It is interesting to note that different provinces of Pakistan exhibit different rate of volatilities in the wake of changing political circumstances. In order to grasp the party system change in Pakistan, different provinces need to be analyzed in separately. Following table

depicts the changing nature of party system in the national assembly through the lens of electoral volatility.

Table 1.3

Electoral Volatility in National Assembly of Pakistan

Source: www.gallup.com.pk

Year	TNC_t	V_t
1990	34.7	17.35
1993	31.4	15.7
1997	47.5	23.75
2002	92.34	46.17
2008	59.2	29.6
2013	76.8	38.4
2018	41.97	20.9

During the elections of 1990 and 1993, the electoral volatility remained comparatively low because of the continuation of two party system between PML-N/ alliance of IJI and PPP /alliance of PDA. The same party system continued till 1997 but due to the sharp decline of PPP's votes in Punjab province, the electoral volatility showed upward trajectory. Due to the military coup of Musharraf in 1999, PML-N was deprived of its top leadership due to the exile of Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia. Due to the dynastic nature of political parties in Pakistan absence of the Sharif family caused the massive defection from PML-N and resulted in the formation of PML-Q, which received ample support from the military establishment in order to gather electables under the umbrella of the party. PPP also experienced as its former leader Farooq Ahmed Khan Laghari, who dismissed the 2nd government of Benazir in 1996 by invoking his presidential powers, formed National Alliance. Another major contributor to the high volatility in 2002 was the formation of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMMA), an alliance of different religio-political parties, including JUI-F and JI. During 2008 election volatility was low as PML-Q saw a decline in its votes due to the return of Nawaz Sharif, but managed to retain significant number of seats to play a decisive role in government formation, as it became evident when PPP had to make an alliance with PML-Q in the later stages of its tenure. PPP saw a surge in their votes due to the assassination of Benazir as it gained sympathy of the voters. Electoral volatility saw another spike in 2013 elections due to multiple factors. PML-Q reduced to a small party as many electables from Punjab went back to the fold of PML-N, which resulted into the victory of the party. Another major development was the replacement of PPP by PTI as the second best preference of the voters in Punjab. PPP,

for the first time saw such a decline in Punjab since the elections of 1997 in Punjab. Bad governance and allegations of massive corruption led to the fall of PPP. PTI, on the other hand emerged as the second largest party in terms of votes.

Volatility remained low in 2018 despite the emergence of a new claimant of power in the form of PTI. Low volatility was due to the fact that despite losing the elections both PML-N and PPP retained their electoral strongholds in North/Central Punjab and Sindh respectively. PTI too retained KP as it was for the first time that the voters of KP reelected the incumbents. The table below will provide a clearer picture about the state of electoral volatility in different provinces.

Table 1.4.

Electoral Volatility in Different Provinces of Pakistan
Source: www.gallup.com.pk

Province	Year													
	1990		1993		1997		2002		2008		2013		2018	
	TNC_t	V_t	TNC_t	V_t	TNC_t	V_t	TNC_t	V_t	TNC_t	V_t	TNC_t	V_t	TNC_t	V_t
Punjab	29	14.5	20	10	44	22	95	47.5	31.8	15.9	85	42.5	61.7	30.8
Sindh	56.6	28.3	75	37.5	72	36.2	66	33	45	22.5	34.8	17.4	55	27.5
KPK	23	11.5	34	17	38	19	96	48	63	31.5	80	40	30	15
Balochistan	63	31.5	44	22	53	26.5	51	25.5	72	36	69	34.5	53	26.5


In Sindh province, PPP continues to win elections for last three elections. Despite the comfortable majority gained by PPP in Sindh in 2018, the electoral volatility still increased due to the party system change in Karachi, the largest city of Sindh and the entire country in terms of population. MQM, which has been traditionally winning majority in Karachi and other urban areas of Sindh, was replaced by PTI in 2018. PTI showed its electoral support in 2013 elections but that electoral support resulted into significant number of seats in 2018 only. It was the first time after 1977 elections when Karachi's voters opted for a national level and abandoned the local party, MQM. Internal conflicts and splits of MQM played a vital role in the electoral success of PTI in not only Karachi but also at national level. 14 seats gained from Karachi, helped PTI massively in terms of forming the government in a hung parliament emerged as a result of highly fragmented electoral results in 2018. This is an interesting aspect of the state of party system and its impact on the government formation in Pakistan. Karachi, being the largest city carries 20 national assembly

seats. MQM, historically played quite a vital role in terms of government formation due to its electoral hegemony over Karachi and other urban areas like Hyderabad and Mirpurkhas. Their tally of 20-25 seats have historically been quite crucial for the majority party in search of allies. MQM's decline as an electoral force did not pave the way for another local party, despite a strong contender in the form of PSP, led by former mayor Mustafa Kamal. Rather, voters preferred a national level party, PTI in 2018 elections. This electoral change in Karachi can provide us an example of that how a party system change at local level can make an impact at macro level and consequently determine the process of government formation.

Strong corruption perception about political parties is a major factor in electoral volatility in Pakistan as has been the case with many countries having weak party systems. Rise of PTI as a third national level party is due to its relentless campaigning on the issue of corruption. Imran Khan, the leader of PTI have continuously emphasized that it is due to the corruption at the level of ruling elite, the country has failed to actualize its potential. He views corruption as a trickle down phenomenon as the engagement of the Prime Minister and his cabinet in corrupt practices, create a conducive environment for the bureaucracy to follow the suit. Ironically, he himself is now accused of accepting same corrupt politicians of different parties in his party and succumb to the forces of elite capture of the society. Poor governance has also played a role in preventing the solidification of party identification among voters. The massive electricity crisis during 2008-2013 have led to the decline of PPP in Punjab. Increased political violence and political patronage of practices land grabbing and extortion have led to the shrinking voter base of MQM and PPP in Karachi. PML-N also faced the same fate in South Punjab and KP as its developmental policies was mostly focused on Northern and Central Punjab. PML-N's northern and central Punjab centric politics can further be understood by its handling of infrastructural development under China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC) project.

CPEC is a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Under CPEC, China has pledged to invest billions of dollars on improving road infrastructure, agricultural productivity and establishing industrial zones in Pakistan. Despite the poor state of national railway, PML-N's government prioritized establishing an orange line metro train in Lahore, which is heavily subsidized and criticized by the political opponents as an economic burden on the national

exchequer. In terms of road network, instead of the western route, which passes through the provinces of Balochistan and KP, eastern route was preferred to benefit Punjab the most out of CPEC projects. In the original plan the western route was decided to be given the priority in order to uplift the underdeveloped provinces of KP and Balochistan but due to the electoral interests PML-N prioritized the eastern route which was an electorally motivated decision in the light of geographical proximity of KP with China.¹⁰ The Maps below can help us understand the difference between these two routes.



Source: www.cpec.gov.pk


PPP, on the other hand consolidated its electoral position in Sindh since the elections of 2008 as no other party challenged PPP in the rural part of the province. Both PML-N and PTI concentrated their electoral campaigns in Punjab as the victory in Punjab due to its share in terms of constituencies in the national assembly. More than 50% of constituencies exist in the province due to its large population size. PTI, in its quest for power posed a major challenge to PML-N but did not match the same fervor when it comes to challenging PPP in rural part of Sindh. PPP, due to its continuous rule in the province have managed to establish strong clientelistic network among the landed elite and bureaucracy which proves to be quite vital in terms of winning


¹⁰ See here: <https://www.thefridaytimes.com/the-myth-of-cpecs-western-route/>

elections. Even the support of the military establishment to PTI could not boost the chances of PTI in rural Sindh. A journalist, who covered the elections in Sindh since 2002, shared his opinion on the condition of anonymity that due to the facilitation role played by Asif Ali Zardari in changing the Balochistan government in 2017 to prevent PML-N from gaining majority in Senate, gained them another chance in Sindh as the military establishment avoided the political engineering it did in Punjab before 2018 elections (Interview, January 22, 2019). This role of military establishment cannot be ignored in keeping the party system fragile and percentage of electoral volatility high. From the results of 2002 and 2013 it can be concluded that when the military backed a political party and then abandon it, plays a huge role in keeping the electoral volatility high. This situation can be improved if political parties decide to consolidate their electoral strength on the basis of their programmatic orientation instead of being instrumentalized by the military for political engineering. The maps below can provide the reader a clear picture of changing party system in Pakistan since 2002.

Image 1. 2002 National Assembly Elections

Map 1: 2002 Elections , Map 2: 2008 Elections





Inamullah, Khatak, a senior reporter, associated with Dawn, said that disconnect of parties with their voters was evident when Nawaz was convicted and put in prison and no substantive protests were observed. Only time they were able to register their substantive protests immediately after the verdict when their own party was in government. Once they lost the government the entire resistance movement fizzled out (Interview, December 28, 2018). Mujeeb Afzal, a professor of politics, gave an interesting argument. He said that throughout the history of the country the party system was a reflection of alliances of different class with the military. Earlier it was the alliance of landed elite, later the business class joined in the form of Nawaz Sharif and then this current rise of PTI is the alliance of middle class with the army (Interview January 12, 2019). Farhatullah Babar, a senior PPP politician complained that although 18th amendment restored the federal character of the state by ensuring equity among provinces but it also had established authoritarianism within parties. The compulsion on the parliamentarians to vote along the party lines is according to him against the spirit of democracy (Interview, January 20, 2019).

Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability: NAB, Judiciary and Media

An important feature which certain hybrid regimes share with authoritarian rule is highly weak institutions of horizontal accountability. Ruling parties in such regimes are least deterred by rules and procedures enshrined in the body of law. Other institutions like judiciary and legislative committees fail to ensure check and balances on the policy choices of the government. O'Donnell (1994) call such regimes as "Delegative Democracies". In such democracies, according to him, the element of vertical accountability might be stronger due to highly competitive nature of elections but horizontal accountability appears to be weak. This is due to the tendency among the elected parties or presidents to consider such attempts of accountability as an encroachment in their sphere of authorities. They tend to make policies, issue funds and make laws as per their wishes not through consensus among institutions. O'Donnell considers such tendencies in contrast with the spirit of representative democracies where elected representative are supposed to be held accountable in terms of exercise of their powers delegated to them by people. Schmitter (1999) believes that non-state actors such as media, trade union and civil society organization must be included in the definition of horizontal accountability. O'Donnell (1999) differs and argues that a distinction should be made between state and society and any attempts of accountability made by non-state actors should be strictly consider as horizontal accountability.

However, media is a key institution to ensure accountability of the government by means of reporting pros and cons of governmental policies and enable people to make informed electoral choices. Media pluralism has been emphasized as an important feature to assess the quality of democracy. Different terms are used for the accountability done by media and civil society. One such term is social accountability which includes public protests, investigative journalism or public interest litigation (Bonner, 2009). Diagonal accountability is another term used for media related accountability to assess its effectiveness on both horizontal and vertical accountability. Media reporting can force and enable the institutions to scrutinize the policies of government and also impact the choices of voters. Therefore, diagonal accountability appears to be a more appropriate term (Lührmann et.al., 2017). If both dimensions of accountability appears to be ineffective in any regime then it affects the party system as well. It results into growing mistrust among parties due to the majoritarian tendencies of the ruling party which is devoid of care of parliamentary consensus. If the parliamentary committees are rendered ineffective then

opposition parties are forced to resort to extra-parliamentary route to pressurize the ruling party. If disregard for accountability becomes the culture regardless of any party in power then public trust on democratic institutions decline drastically.


History of accountability in Pakistan dates back to its early days after independence but before 2005 most of those accountability measures were mere façade. Both military and civilian governments promulgated accountability related laws and established legal bodies to purge the political opposition instead of ensuring transparency in terms of governance. The early instances of such ordinances in the form of PRODA by Liaquat Ali Khan's government and EBDO by the military dictatorship of Ayub Khan were to empower the government to regulate the behavior of political opponents and disqualifying them from holding a public office (Malik, 1997). Even Bhutto after coming to power disqualified hundreds of bureaucrats on the charges of corruption to replace them with more loyal civil servants. In 1996, when a care taker government of Meraj Khalid established an "Ehtesaab Cell" to probe the corruption of the dismissed PPP government then it was a clear violation of their mandate as they were responsible for only conducting fair and free elections (Marqusee, 1997). Nawaz after coming to power did not change it rather he used it to put his political opponents, mainly the PPP leadership into jail. Musharraf, after his coup promulgated National Accountability Ordinance (1999) and established National Accountability Bureau (NAB) on the promise of rooting out corruption. However, he used it to both lure and coerce the political elite to form a King's Party, PML-Q. Successive civilian governments since 2008 did nothing to modify this legacy of the military dictator rather used it to exert political pressure on their opponents. It was after the conviction of Nawaz Sharif when PML-N started questioning the legitimacy of NAB (Ali, 2018).

Judiciary has had a checkered history in Pakistan due to the legitimacy it provided to different military rules. It was after 2005, when judiciary started showing its muscles through regular exercise of its *suo-motu* powers which grants them authority to initiate the proceedings on its own if the misconduct of any public official is observed (Iram, 2012). Apart from reprimanding bureaucrats for their misconduct and initiating inquiries against them the Supreme Court nullified agreements related to privatization of public enterprises such as Pakis Steel Mills. Supreme Court also initiated inquiry regarding the missing persons and tried to bring the powerful military under

the ambit of law (Waseem, 2012). The resistance it showed against Musharraf’s excesses earned it the support from political parties, media and civil society organizations. It was the continuation of judicial activism during civilian governments and successive dismissals of two prime ministers which created division of opinion across media and political parties about the merits of such judicial activism. Billions of Dollars of fines imposed on Pakistan by international arbitrators for not honoring the mining agreement as - a result of the intervention by the Supreme Court - with an international consortium further raised concerns about judiciary’s encroachment in the domain of executive (Finnigan, August 14, 2019). Recent intervention by the Supreme to halt the extension of the army chief granted by the PTI government also generated mixed responses. Some celebrated it as the triumph of rule of law while other criticized it as judicial overreach. There is an impression about the judiciary that it is more interested in the rule of justice (Niaz, 2020) than the rule of law while some commentators observed that judiciary is behaving like a political actor and turning into another tutelary force like military (Oldenburg, 2016). One major criticism on the judiciary is that they did not use their activism to improve the judicial system in the country. Following is the chart of pending cases in different tiers of judiciary in the country.

Source: Law & Justice Commission of Pakistan

Name of Court	Pendency	Institution	Disposal	Balance
Supreme Court of Pakistan	20480	19170	16886	22764
Federal Shariat Court	997	346	329	1014
Lahore High Court, Lahore	173037	144422	152776	164683
High Court of Sindh, Karachi	66475	34497	26751	70046
Peshawar High Court, Peshawar	26716	21760	20935	27541
High Court of Balochistan, Quetta	4923	4053	3697	5279
Islamabad High Court, Islamabad	13207	7934	6631	14500
District Courts, Punjab	1107634	2037110	1885534	1161524
District Courts, Sindh	124190	232851	229755	127314
District Courts, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	132762	315014	302992	145203
District Courts, Balochistan	8444	30871	29857	9458
District Courts, Islamabad	28789	36008	36939	27858
Total	1707654	2884036	2713082	1777184



Beside such huge number of pending cases in different courts, the growing hooliganism among lawyers also raises question about the state of rule of law. Intimidation of judges of the lower courts and vandalism in the premises of courts is quite frequent. In one recent incident bunch of lawyers attacked the cardiology ward of a hospital on the pretext that one their fellow lawyers were manhandled by the members of young doctors' association. As a result of that attack couple of patients lost their lives.¹¹ The Supreme Court which, routinely issue suo-motu notices to different branches of the government, chose not to take actions against such lawyers. Few prominent politicians who happen to be leading lawyers, such as, Raza Rabbani (PPP) and Hamid Khan (former PTI), sided with the lawyers and blamed the police for not preventing it. Political parties also resort to pressurize judges for seeking favorable judgments. PML-N, among all the parties has the murkiest history of manipulating and intimidating judges. During 90s, PML-N used to pressurize judges to seek judgments against their political opponents. Shahbaz Sharif's call to Justice Qayyum surfaced, in which he was conveying the message of Nawaz Sharif to give harsh sentences to Asif Ali Zardari and Benazir Bhutto. In one instance, PML-N workers attacked the premises of Supreme Court when the court summoned Nawaz Sharif in a case. In a recent incident, Maryam Nawaz, daughter of Nawaz Sharif, claimed in a press conference that the NAB court judge, Arshad Malik was coerced by security agencies by blackmailing him about his alleged immoral videos to give verdict against Nawaz Sharif and Maryam Nawaz. Arshad Malik in his affidavit claimed otherwise and said that it was PML-N leadership including sons of Nawaz Sharif who were blackmailing him and tried to bribe him to gain favorable judgments.¹²

History of media in Pakistan is a mix of resistance, co-option and self-censorship. During the military rule of both Ayub and Zia journalist were arrested, newspapers were banned and high level of censorship was imposed to ensure favorable reporting. Zia's rule was more draconian as some journalist were put on trial and publicly flogged (Jaffrelot, p. 412). Civilian government though not that stringent but they also had their fair share of attempts to control the media. Bhutto after resuming the power though relaxed certain laws imposed by Ayub Khan but he also

¹¹ See here: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/12/world/asia/pakistan-lahore-lawyers-attack.html>

¹² See here: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/497397-affidavit-of-muhammad-arshad-malik-judge-accountability-court-no-ii-islamabad>

banned three newspapers during his tenure, mostly the right-wing newspapers. Benazir in her second tenure, she stopped publication of some Karachi based newspapers which were reporting extra judicial killings during Karachi operation in 1996 (Ibid, p. 415). Nawaz Sharif after securing two third majority in his second tenure went on a confrontational spree with military, judiciary and media. Intimidating Jang media group through tax authorities, detaining journalist Najam Sethi for his interview to BBC against his government and establishing Press Council to curb media freedoms are few examples of his autocratic attitude towards dissenting media voices (Ibid). Musharraf despite being a military ruler, gave licenses to private media channels. Before that there only on government channel PTV. For this purpose he established Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA).

Private media channels had played a pivotal role during lawyer's movement against Musharraf and Zardari government. They paid a price for it during Musharraf's rule when various channels reporting against the government were taken off-air (Zafrullah & Joseph, 2008). After the restoration of civilian rule both electronic and print media have become a very powerful player and some tv journalist have become the part of clientelistic politics. They gain favor from the ruling parties in the form of lucrative positions in governmental organizations.¹³ Managing Director of PTV is one such position as three leading journalists, Abdul Malik, Shahid Masood and Ata-ul-Haq Qasmi have been made MD PTV. Masood and Qasmi later had to face judicial proceeding against them on the charges of abuse of funds (Dawn, February 03, 2018). Getting plot allotments in governmental housing schemes, securing government jobs for their relatives, free travelling on foreign tour with the entourage of prime minister are among those favors ruling parties grant to journalist to ensure favorable reporting or cover up of any corruption scandal (See the footnote below). Strong partisanship has emerged across Pakistani media. It was very evident during Panama proceedings against Nawaz Sharif when two leading channels Geo News and Ary News reported in a highly contrasting manner. Geo was favorable coverage to Nawaz's legal team while ARY was leaning towards PTI's stance (Rajper, July 05, 2018). Similar partisanship

¹³ Matiullah Jan, a senior journalist who was associated with Dawn during PPP's government started his TV program "Apna Gareeban Chaak", which was meant to promote self-accountability within the media. He revealed various corrupt practices leading TV anchors and reporters were indulged in. After few episodes his program was taken off-air.

was observed during PTI's sit-in in 2014 against electoral rigging. More on media freedom will be discussed in the next section of tutelary interference.

Ziauddin, former editor of Dawn newspaper, said that there has been no real accountability in Pakistan. Singling out politicians does not do justice. He claimed that judiciary, military and bureaucracy is far more corrupt than politicians. It is bureaucracy which educate the politicians about the means of corruption because most of them are not literate enough to identify the loopholes of the system to use them to their benefit (Interview, January 19, 2019). PTI's lawmaker, Firdous Shamim, disagrees with this explanation. He said that it is our responsibility as legislators to improve the system. If we keep persisting with the policy of nepotism and won't let the regulators work freely then the political parties cannot blame other institutions for intruding in their domain (Interview, June 02, 2018). Mazhar Abbas, on the issue of diagonal accountability said that it is true that certain journalist have become the part of this culture of patronage but there are many who are reporting in the most dangerous circumstances for journalists. He referred to the murder of Saleem Shehzad, who was allegedly killed by security agencies for reporting the nexus of some military officers with Al-Qaeda. He said that similar threats are faced by political parties as well and several journalist lost their lives while reporting the conflict situation in Karachi, most prominent among them was Wali Khan Babar who was allegedly killed by MQM workers (Interview December 20, 2018).

Tutelary Interference and its Impact on Party System and Civil Liberties

Role of tutelary actors in formally competitive electoral regimes has been widely discussed in the literature regarding hybrid regimes. Role of tutelary actors such as military or clergy remain pervasive in such hybrid regimes which have had a history of multiple military rules. When a civilian rule followed a military rule then the military tries to retain certain prerogatives in certain policy areas. Przeworski (1988) defines tutelary democracies as such regimes where the military after handing over the power to civilians retains the capacity to intervene to "correct the undesirable state of affairs" (p.61). Such affairs can be of a wide range and may include matters of internal security, military budget or foreign policy directions. Dimension of internal security is highlighted by Alfred Stepan (1988). He explains that in such regimes military retains its prerogative of managing internal violence then democratic credentials of the regime come into

question. Schedler (2002) argues that if tutelary actors limit the functioning of elected officials then it goes against the very norm of democratic choice making where elected representatives should enjoy exclusive rights of determining the course of policy. If such exclusivity is constantly violated with impunity then the regime should be considered as hybrid.

Establishing civilian control over military, or the civil-military problematique has been a persisting problem for hybrid regimes like Pakistan. Military is supposed to submit to the civilian authority in established democracies. In ideal scenario, military should not interfere in the domain of civilians, regardless of their view as to how a government should perform. As Feaver (2003) puts it that “in a democracy, civilians have the right to be wrong”. Huntington (1995) contends that the notion of military professionalism requires that military should not intervene in the civilian affairs and civilians should also correspond in the similar fashion. Janowitz (1960) adopts a sociological perspective to understand the civil-military relations. He says that military’s submission to the civilians comes from societal values. He advises against strict professionalism in the military so it becomes largely dissociated from social undercurrents. Feaver (2003) disagrees with both these arguments and proposes that the control of civilian “principals” is established on military “agents” in a situational and interactive manner. This means that the specific power dynamics of any given political interaction on any particular issue area will be determined by a panoply of factors, such as credibility, expertise and political realities of the regime.

Jackman (1978) while commenting on the predictability of military coups in Africa, disagrees with Finer (1962) that increased social mobilization will diminish the possibility of coups. He argues that if social mobilization is not followed by increased government capacity and improved governance then it will lead towards political instability and keep the possibility of military interventions looming. He further suggests that ethnic heterogeneity is also a major source of political instability in many African societies. Domination of one ethnic group and consequently the unaddressed grievances of other ethnic groups keep the polity politically unstable. If political solutions of such ethnic tensions are not reached then it paves the way for direct or indirect military interventions. Jackman also contends that a party system containing more than two dominant parties is inherently unstable because it helps sharpening the already existing societal

cleavages. If different ethnic groups pursue their political aspirations separately and fail to gather on a unified political platform then the political process will continue to be marred by instability. Johnson et.al. (1984) further develops on the notion of cultural pluralism and claim that if cultural plurality is not reflected in terms of recruiting in military then it hampers the cohesion of military with the society. This lack of cohesion they believe, cause weak organizational restraints, which may inhibit military from intervention.

Zolberg (1968) argues that at times civilian governments themselves encourage military to intervene by deviating from the norms of political pluralism and adopting authoritarian measures vis-à-vis their political opponents. Nordlinger (1977) in the same vein argue that military's corporate interest and the constant urge to maintain its organizational autonomy vis-à-vis other competing entities, such as mass party results into military intervention. He claims that this situation persist if the political parties fail to establish efficient governments. Due to the bad governance, political parties remain vulnerable to such interventions as they lack required public support to stand up to such interventions. In such scenario, military grow as an organization at the expense of other bureaucratic entities as it enjoys major share in the annual budget and its corporate activities largely stay immune to public scrutiny (Austin, 1966). Finer (1962) argues that instead of the actual coup the looming threat of the coup appears to be more effect in terms of securing the interests of military from their civilian counterparts. He further claims that existence and scale of military intervention determines by the existing opportunity structure provided by weak civil society and political parties. Fragmentation of civil society and political parties provide a conducive environment to the military to pursue its corporate interests by exploiting the fault lines exist within civil society and across the party system. Brooker (2000) argues that corporate interest in the military mostly supersede the parochial interest of soldiers due to the hierarchical structure and resulting discipline within the military institution.

Military in Pakistan right after the independence grew autonomous of civilian control due to the border disputes with Afghanistan and India. Urgent security threats to a newly created state with an ethnically diverse population diverted large chunk of state resources to the defence expenditure. Lack of civilian oversight over military spending and inability of politician to overcome their differences led to a strong military institutions which eventually led the military

rule in late 1950s (Aziz, 2007). Since then Pakistan has experienced three more episodes of military takeover and the recent one was in 1999. The last military rule of Musharraf ended as a result of nation-wide protests by political parties and civil society organization, mainly lawyers' associations. By the end of the Musharraf's rule the credibility of the army met a massive blow due to his handling of Baloch insurgency, polarized public opinion about religious militancy and the exercise of brute force against the protestors during the movement for restoration of judiciary (Shah, 2014). Unfortunately, this opportunity was lost by civilians like it was lost by Bhutto after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. More than the resilience of the military as an institution it was the poor showing of the civilian led governments in terms of governance that led to the resurgence of military's dominance over civilians.

Military in Pakistan like other powerful militaries, is a huge corporate entity. It runs several businesses that include private academic institutions, real estate, construction, banking etc. Most of these business are run on the name of welfare of soldiers but also provide post-retirement job opportunities to army officers. Huge allotment of agricultural lands to the retired generals have made them the part of the landed elite as well (Siddiqa, 2017). Some of them use their clout in the rural areas to launch their political career in different parties. Most of these business manage to avoid parliamentary oversight because the civilians themselves are not comfortable with the notion of horizontal accountability. Disinclination of political parties towards horizontal accountability can be summarized in the following scandal revealed by a prominent TV journalist Rauf Klasra. When PML-N came to power in 2013 they met an enormous energy crisis left by PPP government. There was an issue of huge circular debt of Rs. 450 Billion which different government institutions owed to power companies. Ishaq Dar, the finance minister paid the power companies this huge amount with the help of governor of state bank. Auditor General, Akhtar Buland Rana objected on these payments and initiated its auditing. Ishaq Dar halted the process and got Rana sacked through Public Accounts Committee of national assembly on the charges of abuse of his office to increase his perks and privileges¹⁴.

¹⁴ See: Program Muqabil, 92 News, 19 July, 2018
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtRXVBHn9bM&t=215s&ab_channel=92NewsHD

Military has not always been the usurper rather there are instances when the military leadership came to the assistance of civilian rulers. During both Bhutto's and her daughter Benazir's rule attempts of military coups by lower rank army officers were staved off by the military leadership itself (Raza, March 04, 2008). During the sit-in of PTI in 2014, Raheel Sharif, the army chief, sided with the government to forestall the attempts by the then ISI chief General Zaheer-ul-Islam to destabilized the newly elected government (Jaffrelot, p. 283). There have been instances when the civilian ruler managed to impose their will on military chiefs. General Jahangir Karamat had to prematurely resign during second tenure of Nawaz Sharif after his suggestion of formalizing the role of military by establishing National Security Council. General Tikka Khan was also made the army chief by Bhutto, despite his mishandling of East Pakistan crisis against the wishes of top army generals (Nawaz, 2008, p. 325). Benazir appointed Shamsur Rehman Kallu by replacing a powerful general Hamid Gul (Saeed, 1996). Nawaz also did the same by appointing Ziauddin Butt as the head of the premier intelligence agency to the displeasure of Musharraf (Rizvi, 2000). After the bitter experience of Musharraf army has decided to avoid direct intervention and keep flexing its muscles against the civilian leadership from behind the curtains.

Certain sections of media at times is also mobilized by the military establishment to pressurize the civilian government and at times judiciary. During Memogate scandal of PPP's government and Dawn Leaks during PML-N's tenure (discussed in detail in Chapter 3), certain media anchors created a huge ruckus to make the civilian government succumb to the demands of military. It is not to say that the entire media is compromised and they don't report the excesses of military but due to life threats, intimidations of ban, sporadic instances of taking the channels off air make the job difficult for media to report as uninhibitedly as they do about politicians. Political parties also resort to different tactics to pressurize media by limiting their advertisement quota, boycotting media channels and abusing journalists through their social media brigade. When it suits to their interest, political parties also enable tutelary interference at the expense of their political rivals. During memogate proceedings against the PPP government Nawaz and Shehbaz became the petitioner against the government despite their own bitter experience with military. Similarly, PPP also celebrated the Panama verdict against Nawaz and also facilitated the change of government in Balochistan in 2018 to prevent PML-N's majority in Senate. Zardari in one of his

interviews also insinuated about Nawaz of secession of Punjab by working on the agenda of uniting Indian and Pakitani Punjab. Nawaz had done the same in past when he used to refer to Benazir as the agent of West.

Charter of Democracy (COD) of 2006, which is hailed as a major milestone in the political history of Pakistan, could not stop these two parties from strengthening the tutelary forces for the sake of their political advantage. During the recent army act related voting in the parliament it became evident that all major parties are devoid of any programmatic commitments and incapable of challenging the military when required. Military has historically contributed to the evolution of party system in Pakistan. Bhutto, before being the populist leader, was the minister in the cabinet of Ayub Khan. After 1970 elections, military chief Yahya Khan promoted Bhutto and refuse to hand over power to the majority party Awami League. Nawaz Sharif too rose to prominence under the tutelage of army. Before 1990 elections, his alliance IJI received huge sums of money from ISI to destabilize the government of Benazir. The details can be seen in the famous Asghar Khan case. Imran Khan, despite being the strong critic of Musharraf's handling of war against terrorism and accusing him of fighting the American war, later caved in to secure power. Beside his personal charisma, military's assistance also helped his party rise from a single seat party in 2002 to a ruling party in 2018. Before 2018 elections there were massive defection from PML-N's south Punjab chapter and majority of them joined PTI.

Khan's rhetoric against PPP and PML-N of doing friendly opposition and compromising on the notion of accountability gained him popularity among the urban middle class. But for the rural votes he was in need of powerful candidates, usually known as "electables" in Pakistan. When he was asked that how will he pursue his agenda against corruption then he replied "it's difficult to find angels in Pakistan. You have to rely on the available lot. If the top leader is not corrupt then the lower tier leadership would not dare indulging in corrupt practices"(Rehman, July 05, 2018) . Being in the government he is following the footsteps of Bhutto by appointing serving and retired military officers in certain key posts such as PIA chairman and as head of his low income housing scheme. He keeps pushing the idea of the welfare state and have also initiated some and strengthened the already existing poverty alleviation programs. But his over dependency on the military will further strengthen the hybrid regime in Pakistan and we might see the emergence

of a dominant party system in Pakistan (Shackle, July 27, 2018). It is quite premature to say given the past record of military of withdrawing their favors to the political leadership they have promoted but this is a fact that hybridity is there to stay and the country is far from consolidation of democracy.

i. Impact on Civil Liberties

Due to this lack of programmatic clarity and consistency of the policy on the party of political parties, military and intelligence agencies operate with impunity. This culture of impunity results into dismal state of civil liberties. Enforced disappearances is one among many human rights abuses, being committed by the security apparatus of the state. In a recent report, issued by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (2020), strongly criticized the role of Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearance (CIED), which was established by an act of the parliament in 2017. The said commission was mandated to investigate the whereabouts of disappeared people and name the officials responsible for their disappearance. ICJ term the commission as an ineffective body due to their failure in tackling this culture of impunity. The head of the commission Justice (R) Javed Iqbal was later given an additional charge of National Accountability Bureau (NAB) by the government of PML-N and PPP as the major opposition party agreed to the appointment despite his dismal performance as the head of the commission. This appointment shows the seriousness on the part of leading political parties on this issue of enforced disappearance. This issue is not limited to one particular region of the country but KP being the most affected due to the War on Terror, also tops the list of enforced disappearances. Following is the region wise list of enforced disappearances in Pakistan.

Provinces	No. of Enforced Disappearance
Punjab	1406
Sindh	1618
KP	2862
Balochistan	1406
Kashmir & GB	66
Islamabad	291

Apart from political activists, members of dissident/rebel groups, journalist too face such forms of human rights abuse. Reporters without Borders term Pakistan as one the dangerous countries for the journalists. Famous killing of Saleem Shehzad is still fresh in the memories of journalist fraternity, who was allegedly killed by security agencies was publishing stories critical of the military's role regarding their handling of terrorism.¹⁵ Political parties are also accused of intimidating and killing of journalists. Famous killing of Wali Khan Babar, a Geo news reporter in Karachi was blamed on the militant wing of MQM.¹⁶ Recently, a reporter of Sindhi newspaper was found dead and few days before his death he accused local politician belonging to PPP for intimidating him for reporting about rented crowd for one of the rallies of Bilwal Bhutto Zardari, current chairman of PPP.¹⁷ Freedom of association and freedom of expression are also threatened by exaggerated role of the military in Pakistan. Balochistan is one such province where most of the commentators believe that military exercise its unchallenged influence. In 2017, when military developed its differences with PML-N then a political coup was engineered to change the government in Balochistan to create a new pro-establishment party Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) to prevent PML-N from securing majority in Senate. PPP's co-chairman, Asif Ali Zardari at that time tried to take the credit of that change to brag about his skills regarding political engineering. He was of the view that in return of these services establishment will let his party to nominate the chairman of Senate, but PTI put its weight behind BAP nominee and PPP had to go with that option (Interview of a Journalist, 15 January, 2019).

Nevertheless, there are reasons for being optimistic. There is a growing outrage among civil society on the issue of disappearance. Certain civil society organizations run relentless social media trends and stage protests if there is any enforced disappearance. Recently, two journalists Matiullah Jan and Bilal Faruqi were abducted but due to heavy criticism on social media and protests of journalist organizations, they were either set free or released on bail. Another source of optimism is the rise of Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) in erstwhile FATA region, which was mostly affected due to anti-terrorism military operations. PTM rose in the wake of an

¹⁵See here: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-14074814>

¹⁶ See here: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2243235/1-hiatus-10-years-karachi-police-arrest-killer-journalist-wali-khan-babar>

¹⁷ See here: <https://cpj.org/2020/02/pakistani-journalist-murdered-after-warning-of-thr/>

extrajudicial killing of a Pashtun young man Naqeebullah Mehsood and soon after that it turned into a full blown movement and become a vociferous critique of the military establishment. Two of their key leaders, Mohsin Dawar and Ali Wazir won elections and become parliamentarians and continued with their criticism of the security forces in the parliament as well. Both of them were detained for few weeks but as a result of political pressure they were set free. Manzoor Pashteen, their leader has become a cultural icon among certain section of young Pashtuns as they proudly emulate his attire, specially the Pashteen cap he wears. They are accused of using and encouraging ethnic slurs against Punjabis and those Pashtuns who do not share their political point of view (Qaiser & Rafiullah, 2020). The military accused them of being funded by Afghan intelligence agencies for creating ethnic discord within Pakistan. A retired military officer shared his opinion that some of their grievances are genuine as Pashtuns were stereotyped and were mostly blamed for growth of terrorism in the country while the security establishment and political parities remain silent on the issue of Punjabi Taliban (Interview, February 02, 2019)

Concluding Remarks and Significance of the Study

Institutionalization of party system and political parties is essential to understand the sustainability of hybrid regimes. Political parties are the basic institutions of any democracy. Weakly institutionalized political parties result into a democratic deficit and paves the way for non-political forces. In hybrid regimes like Pakistan where tutelary actors hold a firm grip over the system due to their better developed institutional capacity, a powerful institution can only challenge their intrusive behavior. For this purpose, political parties have to reach an agreement and honor it to maintain minimum level of cooperative without compromising on the notion of competitiveness to ensure the transition to democracy. While in power they have to move beyond the pork-barrel sort of spending and divert the state resources to human development. The benefit of such spending will be two-fold. First, it will increase the trust of masses on political parties and secondly, the party-voter linkage will grow beyond client-patron relationship. Political parties should cooperate to make the parliament as a meaningful entity legislating for greater social good rather than instrumentalizing it for myopic political gains. Lack of internal democracy within political parties continue to weaken political parties and overall the party system. In such

scenario, party loyalties will remain fragile and turncoats will remain available to be manipulated by the tutelary actors.

Pakistan has come a long way in its quest for democracy but continued weaknesses of the party system results into the sustainability of the hybrid regime. Lawyers' movement of 2007-2009 provided a sense of optimism in terms of rule of law but lack of respect for democratic norms on the part of political parties prevented them to capitalize on the weaknesses of the military. Lack of initiatives from political parties regarding the issue of Islamist insurgency gave the military an opportunity to gain back its lost credibility at the expense of political parties. Panama verdict against Nawaz Sharif have exposed the weaknesses of political parties that how the entire party instead of submitting before the rule of law have tried its best to keep Nawaz as the leader of the party. Despite multiple stints at power, political parties have to succumb to the pressure of military the way they did in the case of establishing military courts and approving the amendments in the army act to provide extension to general Bajwa. It shows that how weekly rooted these parties are that instead of relying on their voter base they have to rely on the favors they grant to the military time and again. If politics will remain as a means to make personal gains by means of corrupt practices then hybrid regime will continue to survive in Pakistan.

This historic description of party system evolution in Pakistan and its impact on the nature of the regime can be a useful source for the researcher of both hybrid regimes and party system institutionalization. Several comparative studies can be conducted on various aspects of hybrid regime including weak PSI. For instance, the clientelist politics of Phillipines and Thailand (Hicken, 2006) can be compared with the clientelist politics of Pakistan that how it results into weak PSI in these countries. It can also be compared that in some Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Taiwan (existence of dominant parties later paved the way for strong PSI (Croissant *and* Völkel, 2012) which cannot be emulated in Pakistan. Thailand's example can also be pertinent to mention here that how political parties there managed to invoke the cleavages of urban middle and rural/urban working class entrench their support base across these societal cleavages (Ockey, 2005). In Pakistan PPP emerged as the champion of the labor class but soon colluded with landed elite for the sake of electoral gains. PTI, too built its momentum on the basis of its strong support base among urban middle class but later became the victim of elite capture itself.

Existence of ethnic parties and their impact on the nature of PSI in certain African countries can also be compared with the case of Pakistan. As discussed in the theoretical part of this thesis that ethnic parties are devoid of any programmatic orientation and mostly thrive on the ethnic biases of their support base. In this way they consolidate their voter base but deteriorates the overall electoral competition by enjoying electoral hegemony among different ethnic groups (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 179). As previously discussed, there is an emergence of regional party identification in Pakistan, which in the long run is not a good omen for the already fragmented party system in the country. Comparison can be drawn from the case of Turkey that it has transform one hybrid regime i.e. tutelary democracy to another i.e. dominant party system (Musil, 2015, Sayari, 2016). Comparison can be drawn with the case of Pakistan that how different societal fault lines have prevented the emergence of dominant party system in the country. One major areas which remains unexplored in the literature regarding PSI in fragile democracies that how the collusion of political parties with the tutelary actors have kept the party system weak and hybridity of the regime intact. This detail study of Pakistan can contribute to fill this gap in the literature.

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